TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE'S
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BY JOHN W. LIMBERT, PRESIDENT
THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
May 10, 2005
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
On behalf of the 13,000 members of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) -- the professional organization and recognized bargaining agent for the active-duty and retiree members of the Foreign Service -- I thank you for this opportunity to share our views with the Subcommittee on the crucial matter of protecting "soft targets" overseas. I have a longer statement that I request be made a part of the record.
Let me first note that AFSA speaks as the independent voice of the men and women of our Foreign Service. We do not speak for the State Department or for any foreign affairs agency. We do not clear our statements within anyone else in the executive branch. Our first concern is always the safety, well-being and security of our people - including their families - who represent our country overseas. For those of us in the Foreign Service the term "soft targets" is a euphemism. We are talking about the murder, kidnapping, and maiming of ourselves, our spouses, and our children in school buildings and busses, in homes and cars, in recreation centers and places of worship, and in restaurants and shops as we live our daily lives, with all those activities we take for granted here in this blessed land. We take these threats personally; and so, Mr. Chairman, we very much welcome and appreciate your holding these hearings.
Four days ago, we added three names of friends killed in the line of duty to the memorial plaques in the lobby of the State Department - plaques that now contain 218 names. Although I would like to say "never again", I am almost certain that we will be adding more names in future years.
AFSA's concerns about embassy security took on new urgency after 1998 following the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. We note the sobering findings of the Accountability Review Board investigating those attacks that the "emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment." That's diplospeak for, "It's gotten a lot more dangerous out there." Now places that we once considered safe are no longer so. The report said that terrorists could strike us anywhere. And they did; they hit us in Amman, in Islamabad, in Aden, -- and even in New York City and Washington, D.C.
As we consider our Aug. 7, 1998, starting point, AFSA applauds the work of the various administrations and the Congress for their hard work and diligence in improving the security of our missions abroad. But the work of protecting our people is far from done. Mr. Chairman, as we made our workplaces harder to attack, we knew that the terrorists would begin targeting families, in places that did not have the same protection. And they did just that in Islamabad, Istanbul, Bali, Amman, and Riyadh. AFSA has been expressing our concerns about "soft targets," and we thank the Congress, particularly the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, for recognizing that protection goes beyond bricks and wire of our chanceries to include the larger Foreign Service community as well. These committees required the Department of State to develop plans to protect soft targets, and provided initial funding to begin the process.
Mr. Chairman, before proceeding, I need to say that I am not a security specialist.. But I do have 32 years' experience in the Foreign Service, mostly in the Arab and Islamic world, and have served in places such as Tehran, Algiers and Baghdad. With that caveat, I would like to discuss some of our concerns on behalf of all our members posted abroad.
Our Foreign Service world is never without risk. We cannot eliminate the risk, but we can at least recognize its existence. For example, we need to think about the risk at places such as the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, where embassy employee Barbara Green and her 17-year-old daughter Kristen Wormsley were killed by a terrorist attack in March 2002. Sites such as restaurants and hotels are frequently used for meetings by mission staff, or for housing officials on temporary duty or for congressional or staff delegations, and the many schools our children attend, are all in the private sector. In such places there may be limits to what the U.S. government can do, but we cannot ignore them, and should make sure our security strategy to includes them.
A word about schools. AFSA welcomes Congress' attention to school security, but we would also ask for consideration of school buses and the assembly points for our children at school bus stops. We understand when the GAO team recently met with families overseas, these last two areas were of very high concern. The appalling 2004 terrorist attack on Russian school children by Chechen terrorists showed that schools were no longer "off limits".
As the State Department's representatives explained, State has started a phased plan for protecting the overseas schools it sponsors. AFSA supports this plan and urges its continued funding and review as conditions change. We must also constantly review, change, and improve our procedures, because the terrorists will.
Training is a vital part of effective protection of soft targets. It is vital that training for Chiefs of Mission, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, management officers, and diplomatic security professionals include a strong anti-terrorist and soft target protection component. These senior leaders overseas - backed by leaders in the administration and in Congress - will set the example and should be thinking about protection of our people everywhere. If our chiefs of missions are to be held accountable - in accordance with their letters of instruction from the president - then it is not too much to ask that those in the department and OMB who must support their efforts - should also be held accountable.
In terms of training, one should also consider how much and what security training we should provide to all Foreign Service personnel. If our personnel had been better trained to detect surveillance, would such training have saved USAID Officer Larry Foley who was killed in his driveway in Amman, Jordan, three years ago?
Finally instructions, security requirements and methods of enforcement must all be clear and consistent, whether they come from Washington or from a specific post. On-again, off-again attention to the security of our personnel from terrorist attacks sends the message that we do not take terrorism seriously and we do not care about the safety of our people.
AFSA has always maintained that we cannot make overseas duty 100-percent safe. Nor can the Foreign Service represent the American people overseas by staying in fortresses. Under those conditions, AFSA urges the department to take whatever measures are necessary (including constant review in light of changing threats) to provide safety and security of our people - all of them - overseas. We also urge Congress to support the department in providing that safety and security so vital to our people and our operations. This funding and support should be consistent. Our world is not getting safer. If support dries up and people lose interest after a few years - and if we relapse into old ways of doing business - more of our colleagues will die. I guarantee it.
Again, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I wish to express my appreciation for hearing the views of the Foreign Service on this very important issue. We thank you for requesting the GAO study and for conducting this hearing. We also encourage you to continue to review this area as an oversight responsibility to see that the protection of "soft targets" continues.
