Vulnerable Embassies? Don't Blame Congress

Conventional wisdom at State blames lagging construction on low appropriations. That's not true.
By Senator Rod Grams

When embassy security is being given the attention it deserves in Washington, it is likely that a tragedy has occurred. The State Department initiated the Security Enhancement Program in 1980 in response to the increasing frequency of terrorist attacks on embassies, including the hostage taking in Tehran. Five years later, in the wake of three Beirut bombings, the Inman Advisory Panel on Overseas Security made recommendations to overhaul our security framework. We were forced to recognize that our efforts had fallen short when the U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi were destroyed by vehicle bombs in August 1998.

In the aftermath of the East Africa bombings, the State Department convened accountability review boards chaired by Adm. William Crowe to examine these two tragic incidents. The Crowe report highlighted that the U.S. government has placed too low a priority and devoted inadequate resources to security concerns. The panel made it clear that unless the vulnerabilities identified in the report are addressed in a sustained and financially realistic manner, the lives and safety of American employees in diplomatic facilities will continue to be at risk from further terrorist attacks.

The conclusions reached by Adm. Crowe were strikingly similar to those made by another admiral, Bobby Ray Inman, 14 years before. In 1985, the Inman panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security, including 50 consulates. At the time of the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, only 49 of the recommended facilities had been built or enhanced to meet the new security standards. Many of the embassies constructed and purchased after the Inman-inspired standards were adopted did not meet those requirements, either. The unfortunate truth is that our overseas government buildings were not vulnerable because we lacked security requirements; they were vulnerable because over three-quarters of those buildings had those requirements waived. The Money Trail

The Crowe report found that responsibility for obtaining adequate resources for security programs is widely shared throughout the government, including Congress. However, contrary to popular opinion at the State Department, much of the blame for the Inman program's failure does not rest with congressional appropriators, but closer to home. According to State Department officials, Congress appropriated only $1.2 billion for Inman security enhancements compared with $3.5 billion suggested by the Inman study. These figures are misleading, however. The State Department at the same time admits it is impossible to specify the amount of past funding linked specifically to Inman recommendations.

It is far more instructive to examine total State Department spending for security during the period in question. From FY1987 to FY1998, administration requests amounted to $5.8 billion for security purposes in various State Department accounts. According to a 1999 Congressional Research Service report, Congress' appropriation of $5.0 billion belies the contention that Congress abandoned its commitment to Inman recommendations.

Reductions made by Congress often were linked to specific circumstances, such as construction delays. A 1991 General Accounting Office report noted that nearly half the funds appropriated for the program remained unobligated at the end of fiscal year 1990, reflecting delays in entering into the construction phase of projects. The Foreign Building Office's difficulties in effectively using appropriated funds continued. Congress rescinded a combined amount of $100 million of unobligated funds in the Security and Maintenance of Overseas Missions account in FY1995 and FY1996. While the State Department claims it needed greater resources to achieve the Inman standards, State neither used all of the resources it had been given nor pushed for more to be appropriated. In fact, the State Department was required to report to Congress about any shortfalls in security funding. Section (401) of the 1986 Diplomatic Security Act (FY86-FY90) states, "In the event that sufficient funds are not available in any fiscal year for all the diplomatic (security) programs, as justified to the Congress for such fiscal year, the Secretary of State shall report to Congress the effect of the insufficiency of funds will have with respect to the Department of State and each of the other foreign affairs agencies" (emphasis added). Congress never received such a report. The Administration's Weak Response

Given that the cornerstone of the Crowe report was the finding that underfunding was in large part responsible for the weaknesses in our security structure at the embassies in East Africa, the administration's initial proposal was shockingly inadequate. The administration asked the Congress to provide for an advance appropriation of $3 billion over five years. The funding started in 2001, not the next fiscal year (2000), and the bulk of the money was proposed for the out years. Under the administration's plan, Congress feared we would have been doomed to repeat some of the same mistakes that were made following the Inman recommendations. The funding structure would have made it impossible to achieve efficiencies in embassy construction. There was just not enough funding in the next three years to permit a single contract to design and build an embassy or a single contract to build multiple embassies in a region. Furthermore, the back-loading of the funding meant it could have been a decade before secure embassies were up and running.

Congress decided a more targeted approach was necessary, full of the strings which the executive branch, during negotiations on the final text of legislation, routinely attempts to break. With the FBO's poor record in effectively using resources, Congress was loath to give more funds than could be effectively absorbed. By all accounts, the State Department construction program following the Inman report was plagued by management weaknesses. According to GAO, these shortcomings included "delays in filling authorized staff positions, poor planning for project and budget requirements, and inadequate coordination of site acquisition and other critical parts of the development cycle." As GAO noted, of the 57 projects planned in 1986, only seven had been completed by September 1991. This time, Congress was determined to assert its authority to ensure all the funds designated to meet security concerns actually did so. Making Security the Law

The result of this effort was my legislation, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act, which was included in H.R. 3427, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and signed into law in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000. Many who deal directly with these matters, including those outside Congress, were concerned that the embassy security funds would be tapped for other purposes if legal restrictions were not in place. For instance, as the Senate Report (106-43) to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act stated, "By the early 1990s, as the budget deficit grew and the dissolution of the Soviet Union required the department to open several new posts, the Inman construction program was all but forgotten." As time passes following a tragedy, the impetus for devoting funds of the necessary magnitude to secure facilities tends to wane. This legislation makes sure funds appropriated to the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance Account are used only for high-priority new construction or major security enhancements needed to bring U.S. diplomatic facilities or posts into compliance with security standards. Funds in the account may only be used for the 80 most vulnerable facilities, as designated by the secretary of State, except under special circumstances. Congress may authorize or appropriate funds for a facility not on the list, most likely in response to the administration's budget request. Also, the secretary may notify the appropriate congressional committees that the department intends to use funds for such a facility (which Congress may put on hold). Flexibility was built into the process because we recognize and support the need to build new facilities in places like Berlin and Beijing, which may not be as vulnerable to terrorist attack as other posts.

While the $1.4 billion a year recommended by the Crowe Panel encompassed support for all security concerns, the $900 million a year which was authorized for five years would deal with just construction and major security enhancements. When Adm. Crowe suggested that $1 billion of the $1.4 billion should go for that purpose, he noted in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Now, when we submitted that figure we were aware, first of all, that that figure is an estimate made by some people who are not in this business, and ... we would never come to that figure exactly. But we feel that to really correct the problem we need to be in the neighborhood." So even though the Crowe figure was a broad estimate, Congress was unwilling to stray far from that amount. Indeed, the State Department testified it could only absorb $650 million in the first year.

The security requirements in my legislation reflect some of the lessons that we learned from Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. While these requirements might not have prevented lives from being lost in the bombings, they could prevent the loss of life in the future. The Crowe panel found there was an institutional failure on the part of the Department of State and embassies under its direction to recognize threats posed by transnational terrorism and vehicular bombs. From now on, the Emergency Action Plan for each mission will address these threats. In retrospect, it is disturbing that the risks from vehicle bombs were not taken into account in the EAPs for the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, considering those were the kind of bombs used on our facilities in Beirut which sparked the Inman review.

We also were compelled to impose some of the very same security procedures which were supposedly adopted following the Inman report. For example, in 1985, a co-location policy was established which required all U.S. government personnel to be located in the same chancery office building or on a chancery/consulate compound. This policy was put in place to avoid exposing "soft" official targets once the embassies were hardened and to concentrate limited resources on a single office site. However, these guidelines are often ignored. Indeed, after the August 1998 terrorist bombings, in violation of State Department guidelines, USAID headquarters decided not to move its missions in Kenya and Tanzania into the more secure embassy compounds that are going to be built. AID reversed itself only after hearing from the Congress and U.S. officials in Kenya and Tanzania.

Similarly, a requirement for all new buildings to have a 100-foot setback from the property perimeter was put in place in the 1980s following an analysis of the bomb blasts from the Beirut terrorist attacks. While it is acknowledged that a setback is the best way to protect against large vehicular bomb blasts, that requirement was recognized more in its breach. Today, over 80 percent of our embassies do not have a 100-foot setback. Under my legislation this requirement can be waived only by the secretary of State.

Working abroad will never be risk-free. But we can take a number of measures like these to make sure that safety is increased for U.S. government workers overseas. We can also put forward requirements to ensure we have an effective emergency response network in place to respond to a crisis should one arise. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act requires crisis management training for State Department personnel, support for the Foreign Emergency Support Team and rapid response procedures for assistance from the Department of Defense New Threats, New Countermeasures

However, to focus solely on the threats of the past, without preparing ourselves to confront emerging threats, would be an error. Attention also should be given to providing integrated, real-time chemical and biological agent detection and identification to allow personnel to respond appropriately to an attack, minimizing casualties. However, funding for new programs, or for information technology security or Diplomatic Security personnel, cannot be taken from the construction account.

Congress, once again imposing its will through reporting requirements, is compelling the State Department to decide if there are some diplomatic facilities which are so vulnerable they should be closed. The potential for reduction or transfer of personnel or closure of missions if technology is adequately exploited for maximum efficiencies, and the possibility of creating regional missions in certain parts of the world will be explored. It will investigate new ways of doing business, like examining the feasibility of opening new regional outreach centers, modeled on the system used by the U.S. embassy in Paris.

With these steps, I believe we can better ensure a safe environment for U.S. government workers abroad. We can also be confident that should another terrorist attack occur, we will be ready for the aftermath. But there are steps that we should be taking to provide a higher level of security in this age of transnational terrorist threats. Secretary Albright has said that no overseas embassy can be considered a low-threat post. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the world is changing -- doing business as usual is not going to work. We need to think outside the box and explore new ways to confront new challenges. I understand that there is a trade-off between security and accessibility. But as Adm. Crowe noted, one of the myths being promoted is that we have open embassies abroad right now. He testified, "We have some embassies that are very open to light, but they are not open to people. We have locked up our embassies the world around." Those who talk about open embassies are harkening back to an era that is long passed. We don't want our facilities to be fortresses, but sacrificing aesthetics may be the price we have to pay to save lives. Sen. Rod Grams, R-Minn., is the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is the author of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, which was signed into law.