Mediterranean Relations: A Southern Perspective

Why are Europe's relations with the southern side of the mediterranean not as warm as Europeans sometimes like to think?
By Bechir Chourou

In biology the interdependence of two organisms is called symbiosis, of which there are three varieties: mutualism, in which the interdependence is beneficial to both organisms; parasitism, in which one organism can satisfy its needs only by causing harm to the other; and commensalism, in which the organisms come together for a specific purpose but remain free to separate, and their relationship is either beneficial or harmless to both organisms.

Similar forms of interdependence exist between humans: Marriage, friendship, soup kitchens, kitchen cabinets, feudalism and non-governmental organizations are all forms of symbiosis. However, any attempt to classify them as examples of mutualism, parasitism or commensalism is bound to be controversial. For instance, slave owners, pimps and arms dealers might all consider themselves to be illustrations of mutualism, not parasites. In other words, a symbiosis will be evaluated differently by smaller and larger symbionts as well as by outside observers.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a case in point. When the 15 members of the European Union and 12 states from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean -- Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority -- met in Barcelona in 1995 to set up this partnership, they intended to create a zone where all would live in peace, security and shared prosperity. Could there be a loftier endeavor or a better example of mutualism? But I would argue -- at the risk of being called a revisionist or, worse yet, dismissed as politically incorrect -- that the EMP was not built on the model of mutualism. Instead, it actually symbolizes the antagonistic type of symbiosis called parasitism between North and South. In other words, the general belief in the southern Mediterranean region is that the main concern of EMP proponents is not the promotion of democracy or the welfare of people, but the protection of self-serving interests at most people's expense.

Double Talk

The EMP project suffers from a number of weaknesses that threaten its very foundations. To begin with, the signatories proclaimed their adherence to a number of principles and their belief in certain values such as democratic rule, respect for human rights and international law. Yet at the time of signing, most of the non-E.U. countries had rather poor records in the area of human rights, which have not improved significantly in the six years since. In addition, at least one signatory was forcibly occupying the territories of other partners in defiance of international law.

It may be objected that the EMP intends to bring about the implementation of those principles and respect of those values. But that argument fails to convince many citizens in the Mahgreb and elsewhere, who believe that their rulers remain in power mostly as a result of support they receive from Europe (and the United States), and that their sponsors will continue to back those regimes even if their human rights records deteriorate further.

If there were any doubts about that, they were quickly dispelled by the widespread sigh of relief breathed in the region, as well as in the E.U. in the U.S. when the Algerian army announced its decision to cancel the second round of the legislative elections held in January 1992 when it became clear that parties associated with Islamic fundamentalists would gain control over the legislature. Tunisia and Morocco, two EMP members, welcomed the cancellation on the grounds that if Algeria fell to the fundamentalists, they and the rest of the Arab world would follow (in application of the well-known domino theory). And since everyone "knows" that the fundamentalists are terrorists who are opposed to democracy, tolerance and progress, it is morally right and politically imperative to stop them by whatever means necessary.

People in the southern Mediterranean are fully aware that their rulers remain in power because they have been given material and political support from powerful patrons. During the Cold War, all a leader had to do was to declare his support for one camp or the other to receive lavish support. Many countries joined the Western camp and obtained everything they needed to eliminate communists. Every time they encountered opposition, of whatever kind, they declared it to be communist and dealt with it ruthlessly. In some cases, the repressive machine the West helped build over the years for this purpose grew so powerful that when some of the leaders (e.g., Saddam Hussein) became undesirable, their erstwhile patrons could not get rid of them.

Ends and Means

After the Cold War, the victorious camp could no longer be blackmailed by threats to switch to the enemy; so leaders had to find another justification for continued support. (However, unbelievable as this may sound, even today there are a few regimes that claim there is a communist conspiracy against them.) Rather conveniently, some radical groups claiming to be defenders of Islam had by then become quite notorious as a result of terrorist acts carried out in various parts of the world. So Islamic fundamentalism was proclaimed the new enemy of the West and declared to be even more dangerous than communism. The world was asked to brace itself for a "clash of civilizations." Regimes in the Mediterranean region gallantly joined the battle, since it was a way to stay in power and keep the goodies coming.

The enemy is new but the alliance and its modus operandi are familiar: You hunt the bearded devils and we won't ask questions. To further sweeten the deal, additional concessions were exchanged: You keep placing orders to keep our armament industry afloat, you purchase our refrigerators and washing machines, you keep the oil flowing, you anchor your economies and finances to ours, and in return we will say you are nice guys. This generalization may sound superficial, even crude, but it is how the fundamentalists are depicting relations between Arab dictators and Western governments. And a growing number of Arab citizens accept this as an accurate reflection of reality and are convinced that the West has never really abandoned its old colonialist reflexes.

Indeed, after sifting through all the rhetoric, one can identify Europe's three real concerns in the Mediterranean: oil, markets and immigration. This characterization is particularly true of France, Italy and Spain's relations with North Africa. At present large quantities of North African oil and gas are shipped to Southern Europe, and important investments have been made on fixed infrastructure to transport Algerian gas across the Mediterranean. With respect to trade, Europe is the recipient of some 80 percent of the Maghreb's exports and the supplier of a similar proportion of its imports. However, E.U. trade with the entire southern Mediterranean represents an insignificant part of its trade with non-members.

As for immigration, an increasing number of young North Africans who were victims of the economic stagnation and growing unemployment that hit the region since the early 1980s thought they could get relief in Europe. The backlash in Europe was quick and its intensity increased as unemployment became a problem there as well. The thesis, widely propagated by right-wing parties, was that migrants were taken jobs away from the natives. In reality, the situation was not much different from that of Mexicans in California. Local businesses needed workers to do difficult or menial jobs in agriculture, construction or sanitation, and immigrants were the only people willing to accept such jobs. If they are illegal, they present the added advantage of not being too picky about working conditions and pay. But politicians could not present those realities to voters. So, severe measures were taken to make access to Europe -- legal or not -- as difficult as possible. A visa regime was instituted and made so complicated that obtaining a visa became an event worth celebrating. But the policy failed to transform Europe into a secure fortress. Its main effect was to discourage potential bona fide visitors from going to Europe. I for one have not set a foot in France since visas were instituted in the late 1970s simply because their requirements and consulate personnel are particularly -- unhelpful, to put it politely. As for illegal migrants, they rarely consider applying for a visa among the methods they contemplate to enter Europe. Consequently, it is widely believed that their number has not decreased despite the toughening of visa procedures. By definition, they cannot be counted, but scores cross every day from Morocco into Spain and from Tunisia into Sicily.

After the Barcelona summit the decision was taken to try and deal with the root of the problem. It was thought that if people had jobs they would not try to leave home. But the problem was how and how fast can jobs be created. All the classical tools were envisioned: increasing investments, expanding existing businesses, opening European markets to goods from the South, etc. But implementation did not follow. Foreign investors do not consider the region sufficiently attractive or secure. Free trade led to higher unemployment because many local businesses could not stand up to competition from European producers. In sum, the Barcelona process had results exactly opposite to the ones it set out to achieve: more unemployment, less welfare, and greater desire for migration.

Nevertheless, every nation remains free to define its own interests and foreign policy objectives. So if any or all E.U. members want to close their borders to certain categories of foreign nationals, or to obtain oil at a low price or at no cost at all, or to seek markets for their products, they have the right to do so. Similarly, non-European members have the right to seek unlimited access for their people and goods, to regulate the quantity of natural resources that they want to sell, to obtain the cancellation of their debt, to solicit substantial grants and gifts and free access to scientific knowledge and technical know-how.

However, no nation is -- or should be -- free to use any means to achieve its objectives or protect its interests. When two entities want to exchange things, they bargain. Naturally, each one tries to cut the best deal, and to that effect it uses its strong points and exploits the partner's weak ones. However, the entire process is supposed to respect certain ground rules such as fair play, equity, transparency, level playing field, etc.

Unfortunately, negotiations within the EMP, while appearing to stick to the letter of these rules, have not always respected their spirit. Assuredly, when the southern leaders signed the Barcelona Declaration, there were no visible guns pointed at them; they were acting on their own free will. But that is precisely the problem. The southern leaders represented only their personal unchecked will, whereas the northern leaders signed on the basis of mandates given to them by their electorates and for which they would be accountable. Consequently, it is legitimate to ask: What is the legal value of a contract signed by a party that does not have proper accreditation and authority, or that may in fact be in collusion with the other co-signer? Admittedly, hardly anyone bothers to quibble about such minor details. But, it is perhaps time that someone did.

Correcting Past Mistakes

The influence of fundamentalism may have waned but it has certainly not disappeared, as the current situation in Algeria, the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and elsewhere dramatically shows. In Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, the movement is said to be eradicated or under control, but that may be wishful thinking. To kill this proliferating tree, it will not be sufficient to cut its branches. One has to find its roots and eliminate the nutrients that keep the tree alive and thriving: poverty, dictatorial rule, nepotism, abuse of power, injustice and despair.

There is no doubt that the region's Muslims have succeeded in bringing political and economic issues into the religious sphere, and in tarnishing Western civilization thereby. However, the trend may still be reversed, provided that new voices with alternative proposals are allowed to compete for popular attention. So far the political scene in Arab and Muslim countries around the Mediterranean and elsewhere has been monopolized by the ruling regimes and the fundamentalists. The record of those regimes has been dismal by any standards, but their most serious mistake has been their unrelenting cling to power. By repressing criticism and by rejecting demands for accountability, they let problems -- and resentments -- accumulate. Some of these leaders tried to deflect attention from political and social issues to religious and cultural ones, and allowed religious leaders to denounce the "rampant Westernization of Muslim societies." For example, in the late 1970s, Tunisia's late President Habib Bourguiba actively encouraged university students to create a movement called "Ennahdha" as a counterweight to socialist, communist and liberal parties that were challenging his rule. However, that tactical move quickly backfired on its initiators, because the imams did not unleash their wrath solely against miniskirts and bikinis but also against social ills and those responsible for them. That was sufficient to reveal them as "subversives." The fundamentalists also delved into foreign affairs and declared their support to the Palestinian cause and their opposition to Zionism and imperialism. And that was sufficient to declare them as an international terrorist organization bent on destabilizing the existing international order.

Algeria demonstrates vividly how damaging the denial of democracy can be. In 1988 it was not the Muslims who pushed people in the street; in fact, the army called on them to help quiet things down. That revolt may have been averted had there been forces to impose checks on the military junta that ruled the country since independence. In any event, political reforms became inevitable, and when they were adopted they went mostly to the Muslims, who had a number of advantages over the multitude of parties that proliferated at that time. They had been active for a long time before being legalized. They supplied social services and concrete help to citizens when public services came to a complete halt. They were the first to denounce corruption and incompetence in government -- and the first to pay the price for their courage. With that kind of legitimacy and credibility, their victory should not be surprising.

The current situation in many current and prospective EMP members is similar to that of Algeria in 1988 in substance, if not in severity. The partnership agreements that have gone into effect have created more problems for the southern partners than they have solved. In particular, they led to a decrease in government revenues, an increase in unemployment, a larger trade deficit with the E.U., and greater social inequality. As a result, the EMP is aggravating the very problems that it seeks to solve, such as immigration, poverty and instability. At the same time, the political and cultural aspects of the agreements (democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, cultural exchanges*) have been more or less ignored. Ultimately, by failing to bring about shared prosperity and greater understanding between societies, the EMP is supplying ammunition to radicals and paving the way for their future success.

Until recently, the European reaction has been to argue that these are unavoidable problems that will go away after a transitional period. But for a young Algerian who holds a university degree, can't find a job of any kind, has to share a run-down apartment with a dozen family members, has no prospect for founding a family and leading a decent life, and knows that the country is awash with petrodollars, he would have difficulties accepting calls for patience and understanding. He would be particularly suspicious when such calls come from countries that claim to support popular sovereignty and democratic principles but which do not practice what they preach. And there are millions all over the southern Mediterranean who hold similar views.

In the last few months a number of E.U. institutions and members have started to change their attitudes towards the Southern Mediterranean countries and the implementation of the EMP. There are more frequent and open calls for going beyond the commercial aspects of the partnership. Criticism of dictatorial rule and high-level corruption has been more forthcoming. Pressure is said to be exerted behind the scene to coax reticent regimes to allow genuine democratic practices. Attempts are being made to distinguish between radical and moderate Muslims. Even the United States appeared to be going in that direction during the Clinton administration, although it is doubtful that the current administration is much interested in the promotion of democracy or, for that matter, of anything that would bring tangible benefits to the Third World. JFK, Humphrey, Fulbright and Carter, where are you?

Credibility and Boldness

The future of European-Mediterranean relations is uncertain at best. There is no doubt that Europe and the West in general do not project a positive image in the Arab world, Mediterranean or otherwise. Shared confidence and mutually beneficial relations between North and South can be instituted and sustained only if all actors gain greater credibility and show a disposition to adopt bold innovative policies. At present, Southern public opinion is struck by glaring inconsistencies in Europe's declarations and policies towards the Mediterranean. For example, the E.U. supports free trade in the case of industrial goods but not of agricultural products. It wants the free movement of goods and services but not of labor. It proclaims that the South does not present a military threat but creates rapid intervention forces (EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR). As members of NATO, why do European countries not re-examine the need to maintain the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean? Do they really believe that training seminars on civilian control of military forces can be of any use to officers who already exercise political authority? Why should Iraq and Libya be punished for transgressing international law but not Israel?

These are but a few of the contradictions and inconsistencies that would have to be resolved. If and when the West opts for a fresh start in its approach to the region, it should adopt a number of new principles to be buttressed by specific actions. To be brief and to the point, I shall limit myself to the following:

1. The United States may find it useful to consider that the Mediterranean is not limited to its eastern basin, and that in addition to the Israelis it is also home to millions of other people who may have legitimate aspirations for justice and equity. In light of this, the U.S. may want to abandon the current approach of dealing with the Maghreb countries as single units separate from the rest of the Arab world and only on the basis of crises or single events. In this respect the second Clinton administration took what appeared as a hopeful initiative. Under the leadership of Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Stuart E. Eisenstat, the United States sought to institute a U.S.-North Africa Economic Partnership as a first step towards strengthening relations between the parties. The initiative seemed to signal a change of policy towards North Africa, but it would have been only a half-step in the right direction. Stronger U.S. ties with the Union of the Arab Maghreb would be a most welcome prospect, but the initiative offered no hope that the U.S. would incorporate the North African sub-region into its Middle East policy. In any event, the initiative vanished with the Clinton administration. Perhaps Washing- ton would be willing to take a fresh look at the region on the basis that policy there cannot be made solely in light of what Israel wants.

2. The structure of the EMP has to be drastically revised. At present, the partnership involves the E.U., which acts as a unit, and 12 southern countries that rarely play as a team. This is like pitting the Lakers against the Chicken Hawks, the basketball team of aging academics to which I belong.

3. Eight of the 12 Southern partners are members of the Arab League and would, therefore, have difficulties undertaking anything that would be inconsistent with that status or with their status as Arab and Muslim states. This is why making participation in the EMP based on a geographical criterion is unrealistic, and why the principle was not strictly applied from the very beginning. To be more efficient and better balanced, the partnership should be between the E.U. and the Arab League or some other suitable structure that would represent countries directly involved in the region's affairs.

4. Arab states have not been willing to act in unison despite the fact that they have signed numerous agreements linking them in various fields. This is not because Arab populations are against unity or integration, but because Arab rulers have always preferred being big fishes in individual small ponds to being small fishes in one big pond. Arabs have never been given an opportunity to choose between balkanization and integration, but the question can be put to them only if there is an appropriate democratic setting. However, the fact of the matter is that the Arab world is the only region in the world that has not been affected by any of the successive waves of democratization. Many of us are unhappy about being so singled out and are wondering who is so afraid of democracy.

All Arabs are confronted with the challenge of guiding their caravan out of the storm in which it has been caught for over half a century. Throughout that period, whenever the hot desert wind threatened to quite down, powerful wind machines would be activated from the North. To counter that phenomenon, some are calling for the construction of a high concrete barrier on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Others want some sand to be put in the strategic gears of the great northern machine. But there are still a few who continue to think that cooperation is better than confrontation or isolationism. For the mutual benefit of all, that endangered species should be protected and nurtured before it disappears.

Bechir Chourou is a professor of international relations at the University of Tunis in Tunisia. He has written several academic articles and book chapters on various aspects of Euro-Mediterranean relations. He has recently testified before the European Parliament and submitted written testimony to the British House of Lords on approaches to reinvigorating the Barcelona Process.