SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, military theorists have focused much attention on the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). The swift dispatch of the vaunted Iraqi military during the Gulf War, and in particular the visual impression of the U.S. military as a technological juggernaut, served to accelerate the debate. Talk of a fundamental reordering of the U.S. defense posture and indeed in the basic American approach to war now echoes through the halls of the Pentagon and within the Congress. So what is this debate about? If there is an RMA, what does that mean to the U.S., our allies, and our adversaries?
The RMA debate, though it may at first seem abstract and abstruse, is important to the Foreign Service and to all those who seek to understand America's place in the world. After all, both the foreign policy community and the military seek to shape the world in which the U.S. functions, to defend American interests - though of course in different ways. If there are, on the near horizon, military developments looming that could radically change the power relations among nations, diplomats need to know that.
What is a military revolution? Andrew Krepinevich has defined it as "what occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict." The net result of such a revolution is a profound increase in the military operational effectiveness of the nation that has successfully harnessed the new approach to war. While the frequency and extent of previous RMAs is a matter of some contention, it is nonetheless clear that such changes have occurred several times in the 20th century.
The intellectual formulation of a new method of warfare is the single most important component of an RMA. As straightforward as this may seem, the notion is often forgotten. In the parlance of the military, war-fighting doctrine must first be devised. Next, organizational changes must occur within the military seeking to implement a RMA. Grafting new technology to organizations which remain fundamentally unchanged is a prescription for disaster. Finally, new technologies must be correctly identified and then harnessed to implement the new war-fighting concept.
Again, this simple proposition is full of hazards. During the 1920s, strategists in many nations recognized that air power would be critical in future warfare, but few anticipated the capacity, range, or power of World War II air forces. As one might expect, there is no easily formula for fusing ideas, organizations and technology so as to prepare an RMA. Experience shows these activities often proceed along parallel, rather than sequential, tracks.
RMAs have occurred frequently in history. While historians debate the specifics, they identify a number of periods where a combatant mastered a new form of warfare and achieved a significant increase in war-making potential, which then radically altered the nature of future wars.
For instance, the introduction of the long bow in the 14th century gave those who mastered its employment a radical advantage on the battlefield. Battlefields previously dominated by the mounted, armored knight were transformed to an arena where the infantry, equipped with the long bow which could strike at great distances, now reigned supreme.
The gunpowder revolution of the 15th century, the mass armies raised by Napoleonic France, and the conversion of wooden sailing ships to steel hulls and steam power are all examples of past RMAs.
To be sure, RMAs are complex phenomena, with multiple factors influencing their outcomes. It was not the military virtuosity of Napoleon, but rather the French Revolution, which was the decisive factor that radically increased the size of the French army, thereby changing the methods of warfare. It was not an emerging new concept of naval warfare which identified a need for a "revolutionary" means of propulsion for ships which then produced steam power. Rather, the Industrial Revolution brought about the application of steam power to machinery, and its subsequent exploitation in war followed commercial development. The process linking new technology to the battlefield is rarely obvious to the innovators until they have made their successful breakthrough.
Perhaps the most widely recognized RMA of the 20th century was the German introduction of "blitzkrieg" at the start of the Second World War. The Germans began with an intellectual formulation of warfare that grew directly from their doctrinal solution to the World War I stalemate of trench warfare. This doctrine, known as infiltration tactics, called for brief, violent preparation fires designed to disrupt enemy command and control. These fires were closely followed by specially trained attack groups, known as storm troopers, who led a general offensive designed to avoid enemy strong points and instead seek gaps in enemy positions. Infiltration tactics provided the intellectual foundation for a new form of warfare, and it was this solid doctrinal foundation that formed the basis for a radically new formation, the Panzer division. As new technologies emerged, the tank, the airplane, and the radio being foremost, they were applied to this new organization to create a highly mobile force of enormous striking power. Mechanization allowed infiltration attacks to be conducted at tremendous tempo and depth. These mechanized attacks, known as blitzkrieg, allowed Nazi Germany to conduct a lightning war which swiftly conquered much of Europe.
Without question, the twentieth century's most radical new technology of war was the atomic bomb. Nuclear weapons comprise another RMA, but in a narrow, unique sense. Developed in near total secrecy, the atomic bomb came as a complete surprise to military planners, with only a handful of the most senior commanders even aware of its existence. More than 50 years after Hiroshima, there remains a valid question of whether nuclear weapons can be employed for any purpose other than total annihilation of an opponent. No wars between two nuclear armed powers have yet been fought and the battlefield utility of such weapons may prove to be extremely limited.
At the heart of the RMA debate is the role of technology in achieving a radical increase in war fighting. The image of overwhelming technical superiority during the 1991 war with Iraq gave rise to the idea that we were observing yet another historical discontinuity in the conduct of warfare caused by the advent of new, high-technology weapons systems. Yet, there is strong dissent to this point of view, particularly from many of the uniformed military, who view technology as less important than the training of the forces involved or the battlefield doctrines which were employed with such precision.
These military thinkers point out that mere possession of new technology is not sufficient to realize war fighting gains; it must be supported by appropriate organizational concepts and units prepared to exploit its potential. Great Britain and Germany both developed radars optimized for defensive employment before WW II. The British, under Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Dowding's relentless leadership, created an integrated network of radars, defensive fighter aircraft, and command and control mechanisms which ultimately produced the victory now referred to as the Battle of Britain. For their part, the Germans also produced a workable radar, but chose to view it as merely a means to replace their ground-based air observer corps. Without the ability to rapidly act on the information provided, the technology of the radar was insufficient by itself to achieve a decisive improvement in capability. Likewise, the superior tank, both in numbers and capability, belonged to the French in 1940. The Germans, however, massed their armor in their Panzer divisions, employed it within the framework of blitzkrieg, and shattered the French army in six weeks.
Is a revolutionary new form of warfare about to emerge, and render current doctrines, technologies, and organizations as obsolete as the sailing ship in the age of steam?
Just as WWII brought several RMAs - blitzkrieg on land, aircraft carrier and amphibious warfare in the naval realm, and strategic bombing (including the separate RMA of atomic weapons) and radar-controlled fighter defense in the air - it now appears we are once more seeing the genesis of multiple RMAs. As is normal during the early stages of revolutionary change, there is contention over the character and ultimate direction of these budding RMAs, but a few broad observations are possible.
First, the emergence of genuine precision weapons indicates that one new direction of war likely will involve a capability to conduct thousands of highly precise and lethal strikes within hours, at accuracies and ranges several orders of magnitude greater than those observed seven years ago during Desert Storm. When one considers that the weapons of Desert Storm were perhaps 1,000 times more precise than their World War II forebears, the full effect of such precision begins to emerge. (This precision, however, depends on extraordinarily accurate intelligence to identify targets, which may prove a new Achilles heel.) Nevertheless, the possibility of a new paradigm of war involving thousands of precise conventional strikes, delivered against an opponent in a near-instantaneous manner, could fundamentally change warfare.
Information warfare, an area of particularly polarized debate, is another plausible RMA, and one that provides a unique set of challenges to a post-industrial society such as ours. In the future, the potential for a very different form of warfare exists, one that focuses on destruction of an opponent's financial markets, disruption or manipulation of communications infrastructure, or jamming of any electronic equipment reliant on the microprocessor. Proponents of information warfare emphasize the potential for greatly expanded intelligence architectures capable of providing near clairvoyance of the battle space. Skeptics note the essential and unchanging nature of war, still best described by Carl von Clausewitz as a nonlinear phenomenon, full of chance and friction, and inherently unpredictable by analytical means. Further, they question whether the U.S., with our society's profound computer dependence, is not the very nation most vulnerable to such a new means of war. Perhaps the most important issue to recognize is that a new information-based society is taking shape worldwide. Just as the industrial revolution provided the new means of combat, so also will this information revolution. Welcome to the cyberspace battlefield.
There are several other potential RMAs, all with ardent supporters. Experimentation and evaluation will show which of these emerging doctrine and technologies prove successful.
What, if anything, do RMAs hold in store for our friends and foes? History seems to indicate that, at the onset of RMAs, multiple paths forward emerge. Faced with ever-constricting budgets and a pressing need to modernize, the U.S. may be forced into early selection of the most promising approach and make a substantial investment. Others may choose to wait, determine which path offers them the best potential, then invest heavily in a new form of warfare.
Naval experience between the two world wars indicates that taking leadership first is not always the winning strategy. Consider the British, Japanese, and American experiences in transforming their navies to take advantage of the airplane. By conceptualizing aircraft as the means to radically increase the range and striking power of the fleet, naval theorists forever changed war at sea, but the realization of these ideas proved elusive. At the end of World War I, the British were the unquestioned leader in naval aviation. By the start of WWII, however, they had fallen to a distant third, and their carriers played a secondary role in their operations throughout the war. Japan had no naval aviation at the close of WWI, but within 20 years had forged a naval air capability which proved nearly unassailable by late 1941. The American experience was one of steady progress and experimentation, but it was not until 1943 when American carrier strength reached the capability envisioned by the early innovators of naval aviation.
Maybe our friends and allies would be wiser to wait for the U.S. to work out the bugs, and then harvest the RMA windfall, counting on American largesse to give them the qualitative edge when needed. This is an especially important consideration for the future of NATO.
Still another possible RMA outcome is that it could allow specialist or niche competitors to emerge. A niche competitor could make an asymmetrical response to superior overall U.S. military capabilities, for example, by employing biological weapons or conducting cyber-terrorist attacks against targets within U.S. territory. Such a competitor could possess sufficient war-fighting ability to greatly increase the cost of U.S. involvement within its sphere of influence. While the U.S. would ultimately prevail, the cost of achieving our national objectives could be excessive. Moreover, a potential adversary need not compete across all military areas, but may choose to be selective in objectives and time the competition to maximize his advantage.
Military power is a constantly changing equation. Without innovation, time will slowly erode America's current military pre-eminence. The real challenge for America is to innovate while maintaining the structure necessary to maintain our own security. To be sure, the changes promised by the RMA will take years to implement. The structure of the military of 2010 will generally resemble that of today. However, the military of 2020 will be radically different, or it will likely be irrelevant.
Cost is not the determining factor. Economic strength and size of defense budget historically have proven to be irrelevant factors in the success or failure of nations which have undergone previous RMAs. Germany's development of blitzkrieg and Japan's development of the aircraft carrier are just two examples of how intellectual advance preceded material capability for a new form of warfare. Thus, the U.S. cannot afford to feel secure merely because it outspends everyone else on defense by several orders of magnitude.
Finally, the RMA poses an additional, unique burden on the U.S. History shows that early leaders in RMAs are sometimes unable to sustain their relative advantage. A U.S. defense establishment tightly stretched to maintain a worldwide presence and military advantage via continued dependence on existing systems is poorly positioned to innovate and to achieve the exponential jump in war-fighting capabilities that new concepts promise.
Regardless of its shape or context, no RMA will change the fundamental nature of war. War will remain a complex endeavor, extremely violent and non-linear. Any revolutionary approach to warfare must recognize this first principle or be doomed to failure. Moreover, there are no "silver bullets" out there which promise to make war on the cheap. Although cost is not the determinant of an RMA, neither is technology.
While the RMA offers the potential for a strategic leap ahead and has captured the interest of militaries worldwide, it is proving exceeding difficult to achieve the intellectual breakthrough so vital to ultimate success. The RMA necessitates, first and foremost, innovative thinking about military problems, and innovation is a particularly difficult characteristic to foster within the typical hierarchical structure of the world's militaries.
Despite these challenges, for the United States to maintain its security in the 21st century, the nation's leading strategists must study, conceptualize and harness the next generation of RMAs.
Christopher Gunther is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. He wrote this paper while a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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