The Foreign Service Journal, March 2008

will not generate the nationalistic reaction that fuels a key part of it. Only as a last resort should a big power take part directly in internal conflicts over an extended period of time, and only in cases where there is a vital national interest involved that can only be attained by being on the ground. This is especially true when a regional conflict is but one piece of a global struggle in which opposing sides feed on a narrative of religious nationalism. Because of how the Saddam Hussein regime was deposed, the Iraq war unavoidably began as the worst of the three models, and we have had a difficult time mov- ing it into the other two. Proxies have not developed as a coherent force, and the political process has been mud- dled and uneven. We seem perpetually stuck in first gear. The recent success of the “surge,” however, leaves us ready to change gears, and the overall development of Iraqi security forces could get us to second. But to go beyond that, a long-term strategy must focus on the underpinnings of the conflict and seek political solu- tions, bolstered only secondarily by force and economic reconstruction. In its current configuration, Iraqi citizens’ core polit- ical identification is ethnically based, and politics is a scramble for power at the national level. But this con- fessional system a la Lebanon, where political power is based on religious, sectarian groupings, can never pro- duce stability in Iraq. The only way the country can be functional over the long term is if it is organized around a federation model for its 18 governorates, which breaks down confessional groups (e.g., Shia, Sunni) at the local level, leading to provincial political identification that facilitates national unity. If this model is rejected by Iraqis, then partition becomes much more like- ly, if not inevitable. Four Flawed Proposals Four major proposals for a way forward have been advanced over the past months, all of which ignore Iraq’s political center of gravity. The first is the proposal, advocated by Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and analysts Peter Galbraith and Leslie Gelb, to partition Iraq into three ethnic states divided among Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. This is unquestionably where the country is headed, and unless concerted force and effort are applied over an extended period of time, it is where Iraq will end up. Partition would not be a complete catastrophe for the United States. It is not a given that these three states would fall under the sway of outside powers, or that any would provide a haven for al- Qaida. The post-conflict relationship between southern Iraq and Iran is not clearly established, and the invitation to outside terrorist groups in western Iraq was very short-lived. As long as the three new states controlled their territory, could be coerced to follow international norms of behavior and regional spillover was minimized, it would be a manageable outcome. The U.S. would be able to disengage over time, hopefully with the approval of the three new states and without fighting a rear-guard withdrawal. There are other, two-state variations of partition. One envisions a Shiite-Sunni state in the south and a Kurdish state in the north. This has some advantages over the three-state model because it allows the most historically alienated of the three groups, the Kurds, to go its own way, while keeping the oil-rich south tied to the less well- endowed west, and averts the question of what to do with Baghdad. Another, a proposal of utter desperation, calls for a Sunni-Kurdish state in the north and west and a Shiite state in the south. Still, given the downsides of partition in any configuration, it would seem to be a last resort, not something to be proactively sought. And, significantly, there appear to be few Iraqis outside of the Kurdish region who support partition. A second proposal, from the Iraq Study Group chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, ignores the fundamental internal political issues that are at the heart F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23 Keith Mines was the Coalition Provisional Authority gov- ernance coordinator for the Al Anbar province of Iraq in 2003-2004, with responsibility for overseeing all CPA eco- nomic, political and security programs. His previous experience as a Special Forces officer and FSO includes service in Tel Aviv, San Salvador, Port-au-Prince, Budapest, Mogadishu, Kabul and Darfur, with a focus on countries in political and economic transition. He cur- rently serves as deputy political counselor in Ottawa. The views presented here are his own, and do not reflect those of the State Department or Embassy Ottawa. A long-term strategy must focus on the underpinnings of the conflict and seek political solutions.