The Foreign Service Journal, March 2008

46 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 8 he creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, commonly known as the F Bureau, within the Department of State in January 2006 was a giant step toward a brighter future for international affairs planning and programs. Yet a mere two years later, the knives are out for this promising experiment in foreign assistance budget planning. Some at the U.S. Agency for International Development see the new process as one more step down the road toward the disintegration of development assistance in the maw of the diplomats. The NGO community fears that the new setup will lead to the elimination of development and USAID as goals and instruments of U.S. foreign policy, or at least wipe out the agency most closely committed to their agenda. And Congress, for its part, didn’t feel consulted about the change and doesn’t like it. For all these reasons, the first systematic effort to connect U.S. foreign assistance spending to our strategic goals and tai- lor all assistance programs to the needs of the recipient coun- tries may die in the next year. If it does, we can expect the Defense Department to replace State as the lead agency for U.S. overseas engagement, providing nationbuilding services and development assistance, training foreign security forces of all kinds and providing fiscal support to foreign govern- ments that are willing to support American purposes around the world. That outcome would not only be a shame; it could fatally damage U.S. national security. It is crucial to strengthen the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, not to kill it, whether outright or through a thousand cuts. F Is for Fix The F Bureau represents the first institutionalized, com- prehensive, leadership-supported, strategically-driven effort to coordinate State and USAID’s foreign assistance resources, which constitute about 60 percent of all U.S. aid. During its first cycle, the “F” process led to reallocation of assistance from 80 country programs (out of 155 total) and 20 central programs to higher-priority bilateral programs. Over $2 billion was shifted from less needy regions (such as the Western Hemisphere and Europe) to needier areas such as Africa and South Asia. Funding to support food aid to India was reduced, because India is now a food-exporting nation. Assistance to the Dominican Republic was increased, because of its strong governance and the promise of economic growth. Funding for Millennium Challenge Corporation-eligible countries was shifted to sectors that would support MCC efforts, such as municipal government support in Ghana. And spending on biodiversity and family planning was re- duced in some countries, where field missions, embassies and host governments did not rate them as high-priority objectives. D ON ’ T R EINVENT THE F OREIGN A SSISTANCE W HEEL T HE F PROCESS IS HALF A LOAF , AND ONLY HALF - BAKED AT THAT , BUT STILL AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARD MESHING U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SPENDING WITH OUR STRATEGIC GOALS . T B Y G ORDON A DAMS Gordon Adams is a professor of international relations at the School of International Service, American University. From 1993 to 1997, he was associate director for national security and international affairs at the Office of Management and Budget. He is currently writing a book on national security budgeting.