The Foreign Service Journal, April 2010

Mindful that the next big threat would come from sanitation-related causes, the team is using skilled san- itation and shelter experts to pre- pare the community for the coming rainy season. USAID’s Office of Transition Ini- tiatives, established during the Clin- ton administration to find ways to reconcile disrupted, traumatized so- cieties, also went to work in Haiti early on to help the government re-establish itself. For in- stance, OTI set up a facility where President Rene Preval could hold press conferences and address his traumatized population. And it continues to play that role in Haiti. Embassy Port-au-Prince was augmented by consular of- ficers from around the world who worked tirelessly to process the evacuation of American citizens back to the States. Consular officer Paul Mayer, on loan fromMontreal, described the lines of thousands who stood outside the U.S. embassy, and the sad duty to say “no” to the unqualified cases. Writing in the State Department blog, he said, “The Foreign Affairs Manual explains things in precise detail. The FAM, however, doesn’t prepare you for the feeling you get from saying ‘No,’ and ‘I’m sorry,’ over and over.” Mayer and his colleagues also tried to ease the discom- fiture of people standing for hours in the tropical heat. They distributed bottles of water and candy bars, and aided those who fell ill. They did all they could, but will no doubt long be haunted by what they witnessed. The embassy also had to tend to American groups who came to “do good” by taking children back to the United States. One group of 10 from Idaho made international news when they were arrested trying to cross into the Do- minican Republic with Haitian children. This, and other acts by seemingly well-intentioned people, cost time and effort that should have been devoted to providing relief. The outpouring of emotion and resources from the American population was a reflection of our nation’s hu- manitarian impulse. Ideally, this translates into useful sup- port for mainstream aid organizations through the fungible commodity the professionals can make the best use of: money. There may still be warehouses full of clothing and dated medicines from past disasters that never did find their way to people in distress. Heading off this misplaced assistance becomes part of the government’s public rela- tions challenge. Lessons to Be Learned The Haiti story retreated from the front pages, succeeded by news of the even more severe Feb. 28 earthquake in Chile. The story is far from over, however. There are still lives to save and a nation to re- build. When the full story is told, there will be individual heroes and hero- ines in addition to effective, highly professional teams — as well as groups of well-inten- tioned, but unprepared people. So there are lessons to be learned from this “all-government response.” Perhaps the most positive lesson is that the “3Ds” — diplomacy, development and defense, shorthand for State, USAID and DOD — worked well and in concert. This was a good test for a more integrated effort in post-con- flict environments where each of the departments has a vital role to play. USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance had the lead in Haiti, as was appropriate, and performed well. The embassy and USAID mission supported the team with local knowledge and dedication. When the DART leaves the scene, our State Department and USAID Foreign Service officers will carry forward the ef- fort to help Haiti rebuild its government, its civil society and its infrastructure. In the early days of the crisis, critical voices asked why USAID was put in charge of the response. Why not the military? Or the Federal Emergency Management Agency? The answer should be clear to anyone who stud- ies this crisis carefully. An objective analysis will lead to the conclusion that future “all-government responses” should be limited to those organizations trained and cer- tified to do this work internationally. State and USAID demonstrated in Haiti why they should take the lead in disaster response. Military units are essential, but they operate best under broad direction from trained humanitarian professionals. In this case, they received that guidance from an exceptional USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team. Above all, despite daunting challenges, our govern- ment will emerge from the Haiti crisis having made a vital humanitarian contribution. The compassion of our peo- ple and the competence of our government were on dis- play for the entire world to see. ■ The “3Ds” — diplomacy, development and defense, shorthand for State, USAID and DOD — worked well and in concert. 20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 1 0 F O C U S