The Foreign Service Journal, April 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2017 61 people and the draining of wet- lands that were the historic homeland of the Marsh Arabs for centu- ries. Whatever the U.S. inva- sion unleashed, it did not unleash it in a country with domestic tranquility. For Freeman, mistakes made in Washington had a great deal to do with why and how relative stability in the Middle East disappeared. In several places he lays out a linear narrative of increasing U.S. involvement starting with the larger military presence required for the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, growing animosity in the region as a result, the backlash of terror- ism, more intervention, more terrorism and, ultimately, the collapse of whole states and the rise of ISIS. Freeman also expresses a consistent animosity for Israel, which he blames for much of what has transpired. In the midst of all this, he says, the United States lost its soul—with torture, rendition and the “promiscuous use of drone warfare.” He stresses the “limi- tations of purely military solutions to political problems” throughout. In the realm of solutions, Freeman begins by stating U.S. objectives in the region: securing a place for Israel, keeping oil and gas at reasonable prices, main- taining freedom of navigation, engaging in commercial relations and promoting stability and expansion of liberty. No Simple Answers America’s Continuing Misadventures in the Middle East Chas W. Freeman Jr., Just World Books, 2016, $33.99/hardcover, $19.99/paper- back, $9.99/Kindle, 251 pages. Reviewed By Keith W. Mines I never miss a Chas Freeman article—he is colorful, provocative and engaging. While others might make similar argu- ments, who else would accuse our lead- ers of saying, “Don’t just sit there, bomb something”—or warn that “Strategic incoherence invites punishment by the uncontrolled course of events”? This collection of speeches given to widely varying but serious audiences is vintage Freeman, and reminds me why I love his work. At the same time, I found many of his critiques in this collection unfair, and his suggestions largely undeveloped. The challenges of the Middle East are simply more complex, more varied and less prone to simple solution than Freeman would often like to concede. On the issue of what went wrong in the Middle East, Freeman has an almost Noam Chomskyesque sense for how the region was before U.S. involvement, and for how it could be if the United States were to leave it alone. When reflecting on taking up his posting as ambassador to Saudi Arabia 26 years ago, he describes it as having been a “zone of tranquility”—a jarring characterization for a country where one could lose a limb for petty theft, and that was facing a menacing Saddam Hussein intent on regional hegemony. Elsewhere, Freeman states how the U.S. invasion of Iraq ended that coun- try’s “domestic tranquility”—a tranquil- ity enforced by the gassing of its own BOOKS But the recommendations culled from various chapters add up to more of a list of what not to do than what to do. He argues for stopping the militari- zation of our strategy (“when in a hole, stop digging”), ceasing the facilitation of “Israel’s indulgence in denial and avoidance of the choices it must make,” and ending the free ride we are giving our Arab partners on their defense. These are all good points, and a nar- rative that is largely defensible when taken piecemeal. But my own experi- ence leads me in a different direction. The idyllic version of the Middle East, if it ever truly existed, has been collaps- ing under the weight of the multiple transitional challenges the region has confronted over the past four decades. Tribal societies are giving way to the demands of civil society; dysfunctional command and oil-based economics must move to open capitalist economies to provide for a growing population; religiously organized and rural societies are becoming urban and being chal- lenged by pluralism; and citizens are demanding a say in government, leaving traditional totalitarian systems reeling. All of this has unfolded against a demographic picture that would make Malthus cringe: Of the 20 countries in the world with the highest population growth rates, six are in the Middle East and North Africa. Whether or not one accepts this as a counter-narrative, Freeman could, at a minimum, concede more historical inevitability within these societies and ascribe less blame to Washington. While Freeman could, at a minimum, concede more historical inevitability within these societies and ascribe less blame to Washington.