What to do until the waiter comes back.

We refer to that pleasant time when you would just as soon sit a bit before you order. There are a number of things you can do besides eating the bread and wondering what it is that the lady in the green dress is having that looks so good:

1) Drink the bottle of wine you ordered when the waiter came by. Why wait to enjoy life? Have a glass now. 2) “Yes,” you might say, “but I haven’t decided what I’m going to eat yet!” 3) Who says you can’t do it the other way around? 4) The more we think about it (ordering the food to suit the wine) the better idea it seems. Perhaps we should copyright it.

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The Foreign Service JOURNAL welcomes contributions and will pay for accepted material on publication. Photos should be black and white glossies and should be protected by cardboard. Color transparencies (4 x 5) may be submitted for possible cover use. Please include full name and address on all material submitted and a stamped, self-addressed envelope if return is desired.

The JOURNAL also welcomes letters to the editor. Pseudonyms may be used only if the original letter includes the writer’s correct name. All letters are subject to condensation.

Address material to: Foreign Service Journal, 815 - 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, D. C., 20006.


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Ambassadorial Nominations

CLARENCE A. BOONSTRA, to Costa Rica
JOHN F. HENNING, to New Zealand
DAVID S. KING, to Malagasy Republic
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II, to Austria
ROBERT L. PAYTON, to Federal Republic of Cameroon

Marriages

BEWLEY-PETerson. Josephine Ellen Bewley was married to John Avery Peterson, son of FSO-retired and Mrs. Avery F. Peterson, on December 17, in Carmel, California.

EDMONDS-GILSTRAP. Nancy Anne Edmonds was married to Patrick Gilstrap, son of Ambassador-retired and Mrs. Sam P. Gilstrap, on November 22, in Bethesda, Maryland.

WAikamnuAN-Owen. Mrs. Somboon Waikamnuan, AID FSL Contract Specialist, was married to AID FSRO Douglas E. Owen on December 19, in Bangkok, Thailand. Mr. Owen is assigned as AID Regional Executive Officer in Danang.

Births

GRANER. A son, Philip Richard, born to Mr. and Mrs. Ralph H. Graner, on January 26, at Hong Kong.

Deaths

BULLITT. William C. Bullitt, first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, died on February 15, in Paris. Ambassador Bullitt entered the Department of State in 1917 and was sent to Paris later that year. He served on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace there until 1919 when he was sent to Russia. In 1933, he was appointed special assistant to the Secretary of State and appointed Ambassador to Russia later that year. He also served as Ambassador to France from 1936 to 1940.

FALZONE. Michael A. Falzone, FSO, died on January 25, in Rome. Mr. Falzone entered the Department of State in 1949 and served at Palermo, the Department, Bremen, Ankara and Rome, where he was labor attaché.

PETERSON. Van G. Peterson, S.J., eldest son of FSO-retired and Mrs. Avery F. Peterson died on February 4, at St. Bonifacius, Minnesota, where he had recently joined Jesuit College. Van was winner of the William Benton Scholarship while an undergraduate at Georgetown.

VALLANCE. William Roy Vallance, retired assistant legal adviser, State Department, died on February 15 in Washington. Mr. Vallance entered the Department of State in 1918. Mr. Vallance represented the United States at many international conferences before his retirement in 1957. He served as secretary-general of the Inter-American Bar Association from its founding in 1940 until his death.

WILEY. John Cooper Wiley, retired Ambassador, died on February 3, in Washington. Ambassador Wiley joined the diplomatic service in 1915 and served at Paris, The Hague, Buenos Aires, Caracas, the Department, Copenhagen, Madrid, Lima, Berlin, Managua, Warsaw, Moscow, Antwerp and Vienna. He was appointed Minister to Latvia and Estonia in 1939, Ambassador to Colombia in 1944, to Portugal in 1947 and to Iran in 1948. He retired in 1953.

WILSON. David G. Wilson, Jr., FSO, died on February 6, at Auckland. Mr. Wilson entered the Department in 1945 and served at Pretoria, Helsinki, Baghdad and the Department before being assigned as consul general to Auckland in 1964.
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President's Correspondence

Two new draft bills designed to provide coordination between the Federal Retirement Systems and the Social Security System have just been sent to the Congress by the Department of State. The importance of these bills is indicated in the following communication between Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and president of the Foreign Service Association and Mr. Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Finally we have the drafts addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Vice President, United States Senate. Publishing these letters is in keeping with the JOURNAL's policy of keeping its readers informed on all initiatives—of the Department, the Foreign Service Association, or indeed any one else—designed to improve the lot of the Foreign Service officer.

MEMORANDUM
TO: H—Ambassador MacArthur
FROM: O/DG—John M. Steeves
SUBJECT: Amendments to Title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, to provide for certain coordination with the Social Security System

The attached amendments to title VIII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, would implement the transfer of credit plan and the Social Security minimum plan recommended last year by the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems. The plans would provide certain coordination between Federal retirement systems and the Social Security system. Similar legislation was informally sent to Congress last year but was not introduced.

The attached amendments together with related amendments to the Civil Service retirement law and the Social Security Act are being coordinated by the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Martin in the Office of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, has requested that we send these amendments forward at this time.

The Honorable
Charles L. Schultze, Director
Bureau of the Budget

Dear Mr. Schultze:

In accordance with established procedure there is transmitted herewith a draft bill to authorize a transfer of credit between the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System and the Social Security System and to provide Social Security minimum benefits for Foreign Service annuitants and for other purposes.

This bill is being submitted at this time in accordance with a request from your Office of Legislative Reference. It is designed as a companion bill to the proposed Social Security Act Amendments of 1967. It parallels similar legislation drafted by the Civil Service Commission staff amending the Civil Service retirement law.

Enclosed are draft letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in support of the proposed legislation together with the draft bill, a section-by-section analysis and a cost estimate.

Please inform the Department if there is any objection to the submission of this draft legislation to the Congress.

Sincerely yours,
Douglas MacArthur, II

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And then two identical letters—one to the Vice President, United States Senate and the other to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Enclosed is a draft bill "To Authorize (1) a transfer of credit between the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System and the Social Security System and (2) Social Security minimum benefits for Foreign Service annuitants, and for other purposes."

This is a companion bill to the proposed Social Security Act Amendments of 1967. If enacted, this bill would further amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, to implement the transfer of credit plan and the Social Security minimum plan which are designed to achieve a measure of coordination between the Social Security System and the Foreign Service and Civil Service retirement systems.

These amendments will generally improve survivor and disability protection for participants in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Systems with short service. They are not intended to create new categories of persons eligible to receive Foreign Service retirement benefits.

These amendments are designed to implement recommendations A.4, (a) and (b) of the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems which were endorsed by the President in his message to the Congress on March 7, 1966 and again mentioned briefly in his January 23, 1967 Message on Older Americans.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there would be no objection, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, to the presentation of this draft legislation to the Congress for its consideration.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

DOUGLAS MACARThUR II
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

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Special Division naturally grew in complexity and scope. The
In the Department
FEBRUARY
1942
IN THE JOURNAL
repatriation, protection and other problems. The first Chief
was George Brandt. He had James H. Keeley as Special
Assistant. They worked under the supervision of Brecken-
ridge Long and later were assigned directly to Long's office.
At this point Joseph C. Green was made Chief (October
1941). As of March 28, 1942, five new Assistant Chiefs were
named: Edwin A. Plitt, Frederick van den Arend, Bernard
Gufler, Eldred D. Kupfinger, and Albert E. Clattenburg.
Sidney K. Lefoon, on return from Chungking, and William
M. Franklin were assigned to the Division. With others, these
men helped write an interesting chapter in the wartime history
of negotiations and arrangements for exchanges of belligerent
diplomatic and consular personnel and repatriation of persons
unable to get home. Axis and Japanese officials in those Latin
American Republics that declared war and the officials of
those Latin American Republics that declared war and the officials of
restricted news of travel. But she supplied some details
of the torpedoing by a German submarine of a ship on which
Nathaniel Lancaster was a passenger. Nathaniel, now living
in Mechanicsville, Virginia, has filled in some blanks, in-
the enactment. The

Ordeal at Sea

Jane Wilson's "News from the Department" that appeared
monthly in the JOURNAL was somewhat hobbled by wartime
restrictions on news of travel. But she supplied some details
of the torpedoing by a German submarine of a ship on which
Nathaniel Lancaster was a passenger. Nathaniel, now living
in Mechanicsville, Virginia, filled in some blanks, in-

contribution of the Swiss Foreign Office and its representa-
tives in places where they took charge of American interests
and the key role of the Legation in Bern must also come to
mind.

By March 1942, the State Department had offices in eight
buildings. The Visa Division, which six months before had
settled in fine new quarters at 515 22nd Street, had to move
over to the Temporary U Building at 12th and Constitution,
along with International Communications, the Geographer's
Office, Research and Publications, and the Office of Philippine
Affairs. The American Hemisphere Export Office pushed the
Division of Cultural Relations out of the Winder Building and
over to the Old Grant Building at 532 17th Street.

At this time, Millard Kenestrick took charge of air raid
precautions in the Department. Gilbert White and Harold
Kissick supervised the floor wardens. The main building was
divided into eight zones on each floor. The first blackout was
on December 9 and the first air raid practice December 24.
Theodore Achilles, Edwin Plitt, Jerome Stenger, and Jack
Williams gave advice based on experience with air raids and
black-outs in London and Paris. By April all offices that had
to stay open 24 hours a day were ready for complete
black-out.

The American Foreign Service Association held informal
luncheons every Thursday at the Army and Navy Club at
tables for six to eight people. There were no speeches.

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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March, 1967
In Nagoya—the right bank in the right place

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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March, 1967 9
eluding the name of the ship and where she sank.
The M.V. City of New York of the American South African Line had left Lourenço Marques February 15, 1942 with about 90 passengers and a crew of 120, bound for New York. On Sunday, March 29, just after the luncheon gong had sounded, a torpedo struck forward. The radio room was shattered but the operator managed to rig up an emergency transmitter and send out his S.O.S. Lifeboats had just been lowered when a second torpedo struck. It was only ten minutes after the first explosion that the ship sank, about 75 miles off Cape Hatteras.

Nathaniel’s lifeboat drifted for 36 hours in an off-shore north-west gale and heavy seas that prevented rowing and required constant bailing. Late the second afternoon a second lifeboat came close. There came a shout, “We have a stowaway aboard,” and the ship’s doctor held up an infant born in the boat during the night. The mother was the wife of an attaché of the Yugoslav Consulate in New York.

In the pitch-dark of earliest dawn on Tuesday, the American destroyer Jesse Roper approached and at one a.m. picked up the survivors in Nathaniel’s boat. Survivors in others nearby were also picked up. They were landed at Norfolk at 10:45 that night. Seven passengers and sixteen crew members were lost. The last lifeboat to be picked up drifted to a point off Cape May. Three of the seven passengers who died were in that boat.

Nathaniel reached the State Department on April 2. When the baby born in the lifeboat was christened, the ship’s doctor was godfather and the name given the child was Jesse Roper Mahorovitch.

In Greenland

Jane Wilson also reported details of the accident that obliged George West to carry on the work of the Consulate in Godthaab, Greenland, from his hospital bed for six weeks. It happened January 8, 1942, the day after Jim Penfield had turned over the Consulate and left for Washington. There was a howling gale and the ground was covered with ice. The brake of the windcharger of the generator had come loose after nightfall and George went out to stop the charger. The wind bowled him over and in no time he found himself wrapped around the flagpole 75 feet away with a broken leg. He managed to drag himself to the house and make a splint with a pillow and belt. Then he had to wait on a davenport until someone came who could call a doctor: the telephone system did not provide service after dark.

At Shanghai, Harbin, and Mukden

From the French authorities, the Embassy in Vichy learned that in Shanghai the Japanese had transferred 20 American diplomatic and consular representatives and their wives and children from a hotel in the International Settlement to a hotel in the French Concession. Forty-four other Americans in official positions had permission to stay at home, whether in the Settlement or the Concession, and move about much as they pleased. Frank P. Lockhart, the Consul General, had recovered from typhus. Mrs. Lockhart had been caught with the Americans interned in Manila but she was allowed to travel to Shanghai to rejoin him.

From the Swiss Government it was learned that the Japanese placed the American consular officers in Harbin and Mukden under surveillance as of December 8. They had to stay in the consular premises and were deprived of use of short-wave radios. They could get permission to telephone but this had to be done through guards and interpreters. According to the Foreign Service list, the officers in Harbin were Louis Gourley and Jay Dixon Edwards and in Mukden William R. Langdon, Kenneth Krentz, and U. Alexis Johnson.

At Bad Nauheim

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Nauheim were keeping busy. They had started a University and arranged lectures and recitals. They conducted courses in German, Spanish and French and other subjects. They were allowed an hour's walk in the afternoon along the town's fashionable street. Their living quarters were in the Hotel Jeschke.

New Offices

The Consulate General in Wellington was raised to the status of a Legation and the Consul General Raymond E. Cox, became Counselor. General Patrick J. Hurley was named the first Minister. At this time he was on a confidential military mission in Australia. He arrived in Wellington in uniform and it was some time before he got hold of the suits he needed for civilian life. The suits came from Washington by sea pouch around the far South Pacific to Melbourne and then to Sydney, where they had to wait until the Post Office could advise confidentially that they could be accepted for transport to New Zealand.

Charles Thayer went from Moscow to Kabul to open a new Legation. In May 1942, Cornelius Van H. Engert was confirmed as Minister to Afghanistan.

James B. Stewart

It is a pleasure to recall that the originator and maintainer of this column, the Honorable James B. Stewart, was named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Nicaragua twenty-five years ago. He was serving as Consul General in Washington when the Department announced the appointment on March 5, 1942.

A daughter, Valerie, was born to Mr. and Mrs. C. Burke Elbrick on March 21, 1942, in Washington, D. C. Our present Ambassador to Yugoslavia was then serving in Lisbon as Second Secretary. The name was agreed upon after a long dialogue by transatlantic cable. After Holton Arms in Washington, Valerie attended schools in Habana and Paris while living with her parents. Then she went to college at Sweet Briar. In her junior year she studied in Paris at the Sorbonne and the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. She recently spent a year with her parents in Belgrade and had a job there with an American motion picture director who was making American-Yugoslav co-productions. Now she is back in Washington.

New Recruits

On March 14, 1942, the Department announced the appointment of a group of successful candidates designated as Foreign Service officers, Vice Consuls, and Diplomatic Secretaries and their assignment as Vice Consuls to the following posts:

Joseph N. Greene, Jr., Montreal
Henry Hanson, Jr., Stockholm
Douglas Henderson, Nogales
Armistead Lee, Toronto
LaRue R. Lukins, Habana
Albert E. Papappo, Mexico City
Henry L. Pitts, Jr., Mexico City
Leslie A. Squires, Monterrey
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Caracas
Richard E. Usher, Winnipeg

FORTY YEARS AGO

The first scholarship, the Oliver Bishop Harriman Foreign Service Scholarship, was announced in the March 1927 issue of the JOURNAL. Mrs. Elizabeth T. Harriman established it in memory of her son, Oliver Bishop Harriman, who died on May 1, 1926, in Copenhagen where he was serving as Chargé d'Affaires. The principal of the fund, $25,000, was deeded in trust to the Chatham Phoenix National Bank and Trust Company of New York. In 1933 the Manufacturers Trust Company became trustee.
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The United States And Europe

As a result of World War II and its disasters, the United States has for over 20 years been a participant on the European scene on a scale not before known in its history. During this time the Americans have established a strong military presence in the Western half of the Continent and have actively influenced the defense, foreign, and to a certain extent even the internal policies of most of the states in this area.

In retrospect the development of an active American role in European affairs appears to have been both inevitable and necessary; inevitable because the Europeans managed their own affairs so badly that US intervention was required to save the situation, and necessary, at least from the Americans’ point of view, in order that the security of their country should not again be threatened from that part of the world.

In the early post-war period, the US presence on the European Continent was generally taken for granted as a natural consequence of the most disastrous conflict in history. Even more, Americans were, with few exceptions, welcome there both as a stabilizing influence and for the economic resources they possessed. The strong Soviet challenge to the existing political and social order made the development of an effective counterforce appear more essential than ever, and the American presence was in time institutionalized through a military alliance and a series of other collaborative arrangements.

Until recently the relationships so created were accepted by most West Europeans as being in the natural order of things. Since the Soviet Union was generally less accommodating towards its Western neighbors, the latter were only too glad to have the active support and assistance of a major power in their efforts to rebuild the political, economic, and social structures shattered by the war.

This state of affairs is now undergoing a substantial transformation with changes occurring almost daily. The reasons for the changes are complex and range from a certain resentment over US predominance on the Continent to uneasiness concerning the American stance on various world problems. The underlying cause, however, appears to be a desire on the part of all Europeans, both in West and East, to lead again a normal life free from the tensions and threats of cold and occasional hot wars.

In this picture of an order which the Europeans are now gropingly fashioning for themselves, the United States occupies a much less prominent place than it has been accustomed to assume in the past. In a sense this is only natural in that if the Europeans show competence in handling their own affairs there is a reduced need for intervention by an outside power. But even more, it reflects a growing feeling of urgency on the part of the Europeans about putting their own house in order.

The desire of the Western Europeans for greater stability arises both from the abnormality of the circumstances created by the war and its aftermath and from a growing realization that the United States no longer has the answers to the problems facing their Continent. For many years the US position on vital issues affecting their countries was accepted without serious questioning by European leaders. In part this was based on a genuine mutuality of interests and in part it was grounded in the hope that with perseverance backed by American power the division of the Continent could one day be ended.

Such a hope has now become illusory. There is a growing feeling in Europe that the United States, by its lack of willingness to face facts in time, has been contributing not to the end but to the perpetuation of the hostile confrontation that divides the Continent. Most Europeans now seem to consider, for example, that the recently abandoned US attempts to foster greater military integration were out of step with changing historical conditions and served only to obstruct the evolution of a much-needed and desired détente.

It is in the field of politico-military affairs that the United States is facing its greatest difficulties in Europe. Having insisted for over a decade and a half on the indispensability of an American troop presence to guarantee European security and help bring about an eventual Cold War settlement, the United States now finds for a very mundane reason, to wit, lack of money, that this is not quite so essential as it seemed. And instead of working together with its allies in search of a solution to the East-West tangle, the US has begun to talk about arrangements with the Russians while pressing the Europeans to make greater financial contributions to the maintenance of its defense establishment on their territory.

The results of this kind of maneuvering are predictable. As far as the Europeans are concerned, it will mean a lessening of confidence in the reliability of the US as an ally and a more questioning attitude towards American ability to achieve the goals it has proclaimed for Europe. The Russians, for their part, may view these develop-
ments with equanimity if not satisfaction since they appear to be on the verge of achieving a long-standing objective, namely a US troop withdrawal, without the necessity of giving up anything in return.

Although the United States can take small comfort from this situation, it may find that as a result of such tribulations its relationship with the Europeans will eventually be established on a sounder basis. The United States has become too closely involved on the European scene and is too much identified with certain groups of interests. Such involvement is neither desirable nor necessary. First of all, it calls forth latent resentments and leads to charges of meddling and interference. Secondly, while European and American interests frequently converge, this is not always the case, and each side should be free to pursue its affairs in whatever way is appropriate.

Given the present constitution of the world, it would in fact be more satisfactory for the US and Europe to have a less interdependent relationship. The US economy is in some respects so volatile and American political preoccupations in some parts of the world so intense that a too close integration could have serious consequences on both sides of the Atlantic. Ideally, one side should be able to come to the aid of the other in case of need, as the US has done since 1945 and as Europe may be required to do in the not too distant future if present trends continue.

The European scene is currently characterized by so much diversity and inner vitality that it is difficult to see how as a practical matter the US can continue to play the role of guardian it has assumed for the past twenty years. Not only is this becoming technically impossible, but it also is to a certain extent a self-defeating proposition from the point of view of achieving US objectives in Europe. The United States must learn to be more detached, to be available for assistance and help if called upon rather than attempting, as it now so frequently does, to influence the course of events by interference and manipulation.

At the present time the US is much too emotionally involved in too many international conflicts and quarrels, both in Europe and elsewhere. American officials, wherever they are located, appear to have a compulsion to assume a stand on every troublesome issue, whether it concerns them directly or not. While such an approach is theoretically admirable, especially in the light of the self-imposed US mission for keeping the peace, the results often turn out to be meager in terms of time, effort and money spent.

As applied to the European political scene, the American attitude of compulsive neighborliness is coming to be less and less appreciated. From a purely practical or realpolitischer point of view, the US has already passed the stage where its counsels are accepted on the basis of shared ideological convictions. Something more in the way of justification than the usual clichés about a solidarity of “free world interests” is now required in order to present a credible position. Europeans are currently searching for pragmatic solutions to the problems that beset them and American fundamentalism is considerably less attractive than it was at a time when Continental affairs were hopelessly and uncompromisingly entangled in a maze of mutual recriminations.

A natural result of the lessened receptivity towards the American point of view on many policy issues is a growing lack of meaningful dialogue between the US and its European allies. When American spokesmen try to make a case for concerted action on Cuba or Vietnam, such appeals find no response in countries to whom they are at best matters of secondary concern. Even more, there is in Europe a rising uneasiness over the lack of US flexibility in dealing with so many vital questions. In this sense, General de Gaulle might be considered as the spokesman of a growing body of as yet largely inarticulate opinion in most European states which is disturbed over the course of events and favors the development of less binding associations with American power.

The future Europe may or may not conform to General de Gaulle’s vision of a collection of nation-states living in harmony from the Atlantic to the Urals. One thing can, however, now be said with certainty, that the power of both the United States and the Soviet Union to influence the actions of individual countries on the Continent and to make them conform to their respective models is rapidly decreasing.

It is up to the United States to recognize this change and to accept it gracefully. There is a lack of reality evident in waiting for certain uncomfortable phenomena to disappear from the scene so that one may return to the status quo ante. Once a country puts itself in this position it becomes retrograde and falls behind the course of events. In the long run this constitutes a situation which no amount of power can hope to rectify. If the United States is to avoid such an entrapment, it must keep pace with history, or, better still, stay a little ahead of it.
Dark Is the Day

It is raining.

It is cold. Cold and damp and muddy.

The Arno River is brown and ugly and swirling under the Ponte Vecchio, and the water is full of naptha, floating debris, and rubbish.

It is now one p.m. and today is the 5th of December, one month after the flood.

I am sitting in a bar on the via Guicciardini, having tea and toast, hoping that I won’t have to talk to anyone and that no one will talk to me. I’ve heard too much already.

This morning I’ve seen men cry and women have wept on my shoulder and I have wept with them—as anyone would and everyone does, looking at the devastated beauty of this glorious city. Since the Alluvione I’ve been impressed and humbled by the magnificent spirit of the Florentines, proud of their energy and enthusiasm, the courage with which they confronted their catastrophe, and their readiness to rebuild, recreate and re-establish.

But today, somehow, things are different. The initial effort has given way to exhaustion and depression. Suddenly, everyone seems to be coming out of shock. Now that the sweeping and the pumping and the carting-away are over, the people of Florence are looking around and what’s left? Dirty, bare walls, empty stores, vacant rooms, nothingness. A lifetime’s work has disappeared. A business, a shop, an ambition carried on from generation to generation—gone. The struggle, the success, the post-war drive, the savings—gone.

And it is still raining. And cold. Cold and damp and muddy.

Mr. C. is a photographer. He has a tiny shop on the via Maggio, a sweet wife and a beautiful 22-year-old daughter, named Fiorella. For five years he developed pictures for us, enlarged pictures, counselled us on light exposures and camera equipment and the speed and variety of films. This morning his store was empty—not only of people, but of supplies. Gone were the cameras, the home-movie equipment, the gay blown-up Ferrania posters, the stacks of orders. Gone were the bright lights, the shiny display cases, the busy counter, the lenses and the tripods. A few rolls of film lay pathetically forlorn on a temporary shelf and anachronistically four shiny new barometers were hanging on the still-damp wall. “Yes, we’re starting again,” Mr. C. said, as I looked at them. “Everything was lost, the plate-glass window smashed, the entire shop washed out. These barometers are the first shipment of an order from Milano so that business can begin again.” His eyes filled with tears. “We lost our life’s work. Everything. Maybe I’m crazy to start again but this is the only work I know. Cosa vuole? We’re not that old... but still it will take time. We had twenty years wrapped up in this shop—all gone in two hours.” In the darkroom in back the naptha and water stains were high and greasy on the walls and the one iron table that had survived the flood was ruined and rusting.

“And Fiorella?” I asked.

“The strain was too much for her. She was expecting a baby in February. She lost it two days after the flood...”

Just one block from the Ponte Vecchio on the via Guicciardini is the ceramics store of the M. family. The finest of Italian pottery was always displayed, and inside the store a warm welcome was always extended by all the members of the family. The store had been theirs for years and they were justifiably proud of it. Every...
thing was available from dinner services to ashtrays, from flower vases and small statues to coffee cups. The little store was impressive in the variety of its displays, but the true treasure chest was downstairs in the cantina—there, in room after room was one of the biggest ceramic collections of Florence. It was almost a museum.

Mrs. M. wasn’t there this morning. Her niece told me she hadn’t come back to the store she loved since the flood; she could not bear to return. The daughter was washing plates in an improvised bucket-sink, carefully, one at a time, removing the caked mud, and then putting each object lovingly on the shelves. “Would you like to go downstairs?” she asked me. “Do you mind walking in mud?” I could only stand numb when I reached the cantina—there wasn’t much to say. “We put all the broken pieces over there,” the uncle said, pointing to one of the rooms which was high in rubble. “We haven’t even been able to cart it away yet.” The water had come in, swirled over the shelves and receded, leaving a tangled mass of broken, unrecognizable tea pots, plates, fruit bowls. There was mud thick over everything and every bit of bowl and cup and jar was filled with it. The brother came downstairs. “Everything will be all right,” he said. “It will just take time and perhaps by the time it’s finished I’ll be too old to see it.” His niece smiled. “Yes, we’re coming along.” she said bravely. “And what a break for me! I’ve been excused from washing dishes at home!” And then she burst into tears.

The morning of the flood, Mr. T., who owns a leather store, was on the Ponte Vecchio helping a relative rearrange some of his stock of gold bracelets. “The Arno had often risen high before,” said Mr. T., “and I didn’t pay much attention to it, except that my cousin was worried about his new stock of Christmas jewelry. I worked there with him for two hours, putting everything on the top shelves of his shop. Then I came back to my own store, went down into my cellar where all my supplies and machines

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all his tools, his leathers, and a number of priceless volumes. The son was out now looking for work—any work—anything at all that he might find to do. He was a leather engraver by profession, and his father’s assistant.

“When are you getting married?” Mr. T. asked him. Tears came to the young man’s eyes. “My fidanzata’s father died, you’ve probably heard—they lived in Gavinano, you know. Lost everything. The old man had a stroke. The shock was too much for him. Furniture, money, clothes, all that they owned. No time to save anything. And the trousséau and the wedding presents and what we had bought to set up housekeeping—gone. Well, coraggio. We’re young. We can work. But we won’t start life as we’d planned.”

There’s a little narrow street off the Piazza Santo Spirito and here, for years has worked A., master-craftsman at repairing, restoring and polishing antique furniture. This morning his workshop was a shambles, still, of ruined chairs, mud-encrusted tables and broken chests. When I arrived A. was working hard—and there was the lovely odor of alcohol and lacquer and wood, mixed with the dreadful smell of the oily mud that had permeated everywhere all over the city. A. told me he had been asleep the dawn of the flood, had awakened with a jolt and broken chests. When I arrived A. told me he had been asleep the dawn of the flood, and when I got there I wished I had been right there in that shop now.

“Funny thing he was working on a green velvet sofa with matching chairs the day before the flood, and when I saw him he said, “You know, I have a feeling I’ll never finish these.” He certainly was right. The sofa and the chairs floated by under my window the very next day.”

The man who had for four years made shoes for everyone in our family was pathetically trying to pull his little business back to shape. It wasn’t the shoes that he’d lost, it wasn’t the equipment—but it was the records and the names and the sizes and the orders of all the tourists and foreigners who had ordered shoes from him and had paid in advance, and who were who knows where, now? How could he get in touch with them? All his Fall and Winter work, and nothing to start with now. “What to do? he kept repeating. “What to do. . . ?”

The beautiful Lungarno Acciaioli is crumbling into the Arno and is closed to traffic. Part of it, today, because of the rain and the rising river, was closed even to pedestrians. I stepped cautiously along the narrow sidewalk, hating the rain, hating the mud, hating the devastation and the desolation. I wanted to go and see my friend Mr. L., who owned an art store, but when I got there I wished I hadn’t gone.

There were boards substituting for the entrance and it didn’t matter if the boards were weak: there was nothing inside. Even the tile floor had been washed away. There were only damp and grimy walls where once had been paintings and parchment lamps and the gay and lovely Florentine gilded wood objects.

In the middle of this dreary emptiness stood Mr. L., while two workmen took measurements and surveyed the walls. Mr. L. and his brother and father had not been able to get to the shop in time to save even one small carved box, and here, too, everything that the family had saved and worked for had been washed away. “It’s almost Christmas,” he said, “and how can I make the children understand? We can’t open here again until April—May, probably. All my father’s lifetime, and now mine. I’m just too discouraged to have any strength left.”

It was my turn to have tears in my eyes as I said goodbye to him.

Near the Santa Maria Novella Church is a sportsman’s delight—a sports store with a very sporting owner. P. not only knows all about sports but he participates and wins medals in all of them. Skiing is his favorite, and 15 years ago he started a small ski shop in answer to many requests. A few years later having made instant success, he moved into larger quarters, and then took over the premises next door. He had an enormous well-stocked basement and then added another one. It was a joy to see him in the Fall when the winter shipments arrived and this past October he had made a stunning display in his underground showrooms. When the roaring waters lashed into his store, not a ski was left, the bobsleds, the parkas, the poles, all were swept away. This morning a few pairs of woolen gloves were upstairs, and one photograph of P. at the end of a winning race was still tacked on the wall. “Well,” he said, “Here we are. Wiped out. Store, basement, stock. I guess I won’t do any skiing this year but maybe I can get ready for next summer’s camping season!” Thirty million lire loss is a small estimate. "We lost our car, too," said his wife. "Never mind. We're still alive and thanks for coming by. We only need a little encouragement to get started!"

It’s still raining.

It’s still cold. Cold and damp and muddy.

These lines were written three months ago, in the days now remembered as perhaps the darkest of the Florentine flood.

With gratitude and joy it can now be reported that due to the superhuman courage, effort, help from within and without, and from the fortitude of the Florentine spirit, the situation is incredibly normalized.

"Ci siamo fatti coraggio" is the keynote—and now the stores are open again, ready and waiting for business.
George Allen was 42 years old when he became American Ambassador to Iran in 1946. He was considered young for such an appointment—indeed, it remains something of a record, shared by very few. But his knowledge of the Middle East was profound; and he was the choice of Secretary of State Byrnes.

Allen was to work with a Chief of State who was even younger. The Shah was only 27, a tender age to face his terrible responsibilities. Iran had been occupied by the British, Soviets and Americans during the war. British and American troops had left by March, 1945, but Soviet troops remained, notably in Azerbaijan Province, and it was becoming clear that Russia had no intention of giving up its dominance, at least in the northern provinces. The young Shah had been on the throne for a relatively brief period and could rely on few forces—political or military, national or international—for any showdown with Stalin.

The United States was friendly and concerned, but our policies of a global kind were still far from the determinations of a later period to resist the spread of Russian influence.

Allen began to play tennis with the Shah from time to time. This gave the two men informal opportunities to have long, quiet talks away from Court formalisms. The Ambassador well remembers how concerned the Shah was. His long dissertations on the situation were a mark of confidence which Allen fully respected. His constant urging at that time was that the Shah should maintain his courage—fortunately, one of Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's most distinctive characteristics—and that he should fulfill his important role as the symbol of unity and stability in Iran.

During the summer of 1946, the influence of the Communist (Tudeh) Party in Iran reached its highest point. On August 2, three Tudeh members joined the Cabinet with three other politicians whose views were markedly similar. The pro-Soviet element was dominant. The Prime Minister, Qavarn, seemed to be succumbing to the tremendous pressures placed upon his Government by Russian power. Especially did he seem to be acceding in all points in negotiations with the Russian-sponsored regime of Pishevari, leader of the semi-autonomous province of Azerbaijan, in northwestern Iran.

The Shah had so far refrained from entering actively into these negotiations. But finally an issue came on which he felt he had to take a stand. Included in the Azerbaijan "army" were 24 officers who had deserted from the Iranian Army at the time of the provincial revolt in 1945 and had gone over to Azerbaijan. Most of them had been advanced two or three grades in rank. Pishevari insisted that these officers not only be forgiven and reinstated in the National Army as part of the settlement for the return of Azerbaijan to the central government. He also insisted that they should retain their new grades.

The Shah, under great pressure from Qavarn and realizing that he would assume full responsibility before the Soviets if he caused the negotiations to break down, agreed to grant a general amnesty and to reinstate the officers; but he said that he would cut off his right arm before he would sign a commission making an officer a colonel, for example, who had been a captain before his desertion and who would reenter the army in advance of officers who had equal seniority and who had remained loyal to their oath of allegiance to him.

In another of the incredible blunders of Soviet diplomacy, Pishevari refused to accept anything less than 100 percent of his demands and went home in a huff. The negotiations were never resumed from that point on.

Word soon got around that the Shah had taken a stand, and a steady rise in his popularity began. Particularly in the Army was it recognized that the young man had risked, on behalf of the officers, having the Soviets angry at him personally. (The reader should realize that this was no small risk in 1946 in a country with a thousand miles of border on the USSR, with Soviet troops poised only minutes away and the United States busily dismantling its own military power.)

Iran conferred the Order of Homayoun on Ambassador Allen in 1962. At the ceremony in the Iranian Embassy, left to right, George Allen, Jr., Mrs. George Allen, Jr., Richard Allen, Ambassador Allen, John Allen, Mrs. Allen, Ambassador Zahedi Ardeshir.
The Shah of Iran and Ambassador Allen (taken at Gulestan in Iran in 1946).

The next development, and a deciding one, came about in a curious way. The Soviets had for some time suggested the foundation of a joint aviation company to have a monopoly of all air traffic in northern Iran. The Soviets were to furnish all the planes, equipment, personnel, weather stations, etc., with the Iranians furnishing merely the air through which the planes would fly.

The Americans knew about this proposal but could find no good way to oppose it, deadly as it evidently was to Iran independence. Then, one day in mid-October, Randall Williams,* our Embassy’s Economic Officer, learned from a well-informed Iranian friend that the Soviet proposal had been considered in the Cabinet on October 1. A member of the Iranian Cabinet had opposed the Soviet proposition—in a small degree, on a procedural point. Within 12 hours the Cabinet official had been called on the carpet in the Soviet Embassy. Enraged, he had later complained bitterly to Qavam about the “traitor” who was reporting on Cabinet meetings to the Soviets. Both he and Qavam suspected that the “traitor” was another Cabinet officer, but nothing had happened since.

As soon as Randall Williams passed the story on to him, Ambassador Allen seized on it as just what he had been looking for. “What a gold mine we’d struck,” he recalls.

Immediately, he asked for an appointment with Qavam. He told the Prime Minister that there was a traitor in his Cabinet who was running to the Soviet Embassy with the most secret discussions in his official family, thereby enabling the Soviets to hold a pistol at the head of any Minister who might be brave enough to express a patriotic sentiment. The Ambassador said that unless something were done promptly about the situation, he would have to recommend to Washington that the Qavam Government had become, in effect, subservient to the USSR and therefore no longer independent and not worthy of continued treatment as such.

Then he waited three days. Nothing happened. It seemed that the pro-Soviet group had too strong a hold on Qavam to permit him to punish the offender. So, on October 14, the Ambassador, without instructions, went to see the Shah. He reviewed the information he had received and his discussion with Qavam. He recommended firmly the necessity of drastic action “within one week” if the Shah was to keep things from sliding irrevocably into the Soviet camp.

The Monarch sat listening and considering. When the Ambassador finished, the Shah went into his office. The next day, word reached Qavam (the Persians were ever subtle) that the Shah was about to arrest him. The Prime Minister sought an audience with His Imperial Majesty. When they met, the Shah specified that Qavam must dismiss six members of his Cabinet immediately and agree to fight the Tudeh to the last ditch in the forthcoming elections, with no more talk of collaboration. The Prime Minister obeyed.

The settlement of “The Iranian Crisis” is interpreted as variously by American statesmen as the Alexandrine scene was viewed by Lawrence Durrell. President Truman alleges that he sent an ultimatum of some sort to Stalin, John Foster Dulles ascribes the successful outcome of the crisis entirely to the United Nations. Others see Qavam as the hero, tricking the Russians into believing that if they got out of Iran, the Qavam Government would turn over oil, air and perhaps political monopolies to the Soviets. Some also say, who tend to give the British credit for all things good or bad, that they stage-managed a tribal rebellion which forced Qavam to act against the Communists.

Future historians will have to sort it all out. But whatever their point of view, if they are serious, they will find at the center of the event a courageous, young Shah. And they will discern at his side a professional American diplomat who acted swiftly and independently at a crucial moment, with a sure sense of timing.

*Randall Williams, FSO-1, is still on active duty, as is Career Ambassador George Allen.
Chance Plays Too Great a Role

As part of its March issue dedicated to Junior Foreign Service officers, the JOURNAL presents two opposing viewpoints on promotions in the lower reaches of the Foreign Service. In "Chance Plays Too Great a Role," Jonathan Dean argues that through the first three grades promotions should be largely automatic—based largely on time spent in grade. The contrary view is advanced by Frederic L. Chapin's "Margin for the Maturing Process." Mr. Chapin would maintain a rigorous competition from the beginning of an officer's career.

The procedures for the advancement of junior officers are those used throughout the Foreign Service. Panels examine the efficiency ratings of the officers in each class, grade them, and recommend them for promotion, "selection out," or to remain in grade according to the standard procedure. When this procedure is applied to the promotion of junior officers of Class 6 and below, the factor of pure chance plays too great a role. There are also other undesirable side effects.

Although much thought is devoted to the first assignments of newly-commissioned junior officers, it is clear that chance must play an important role in whether a junior officer is designated in his first two or three assignments in the Service to relatively anonymous positions in a routine operation or to a challenging position where he can show his capabilities. Trainee rotation lessens this factor of chance, but examination of the records indicates that its effect remains considerable.

Because their service is limited to a few assignments, chance also plays a large role as regards the rating officers whom junior officers draw for their first three or four efficiency ratings. There is a wide variation in personality among rating officers and a wide variation in their knowledge of the Foreign Service promotion system and how to write an efficiency report. Both negative and positive efficiency reports written by officers experienced in the system carry far more weight than those written by officers with less experience or interest. Thus, some officers are unduly penalized or assisted by a single rating written by an experienced officer or by a difficult or careless supervisor.

In a large number of cases, because the selection process has recruited highly motivated young officers who have a similar high level of performance, and because these officers have not as yet had the opportunity to perform in a variety of assignments, the performance files do not give and cannot give a sharp profile of the individual's capacities and personality, which in any case may still be in development. On the basis of this limited evidence, the most scrupulous promotion panels may find it difficult clearly to distinguish the capabilities of one officer from another. Recommendations for promotion may be based as much on the chance factor of a colorful characteristic or incident as on actual merit.

With more experienced officers, the effect of factors of chance is balanced out after a variety of assignments and a number of different rating officers. Their cumulative files give a more accurate picture of their capabilities. But the promotion procedures presently applied to junior officers can be unjust and inaccurate. Some officers receive disproportionate recognition and a head start which has enduring effect throughout their career, while other receive a low degree of recognition which may also have permanent effect. Owing to the heavy role of chance, the system can be both inequitable to the individual and an inefficient way of flagging superior performance capability.

A second drawback of the system as presently applied to junior officers is overemphasis of the element of competition (Continued on page 45)

Life and Love in the Foreign Service: Junior Officer Department

"Well, something must have given the junior officers the silly idea that we FSO-1s live differently."
Margin For the Maturing Process

During the past year, the role of junior officers within the personnel system was the subject of discussion and analysis in two rather different quarters. On the one hand, a serious study of the question was done by Mr. Norris Haselton and Ambassador Robert Newbegin, two distinguished retired Foreign Service officers with long experience in personnel matters. On the other, many of the same issues were explored in the exchange of views between the Junior Foreign Service Officers' Club and Deputy Under Secretary Crockett.

The Haselton-Newbegin study concluded, in part: “Recruitment, lateral entry, the appointment of FSRs to FSO positions, promotion rates at various levels, natural and forced attrition are all interrelated; a major change in one inevitably affects the others.” This means that the concerns of the junior officer can be addressed only in the context of the Service as a whole; the junior officers have made it clear that they see it the same way. What follows is an effort to put the question of junior officer advancement in that larger context.

The May 4, 1966 memorandum of the Junior Foreign Service Officers’ Club expresses the desire of junior FSOs for more rapid promotions matching those in other government agencies and private enterprise. This desire is particularly understandable to those who as junior officers experienced the Great RIF of ‘53, the absence of promotions from ’52 to ’55, Wristonization, the demotion of over half the FSO corps in July ’56, and the long road back. Junior officers today, as they were ten years ago, are perhaps even more concerned with achieving increased responsibility and more challenging work, than they are with mere promotion to a higher class and larger salaries. These concerns echo a point made in the Journal ten years ago: “Junior officers want to know that promotions when they do come will be real promotions in terms of responsibility.” Ten years ago, also, there was much talk of increasing the velocity of junior officer promotions. To a considerable degree, rapid promotions have been maintained. The bulge in the Foreign Service has been pushed from Classes 5 and 6 a decade ago to Classes 3 and 4, and one year of substantive duty would, if anything, shift the bulge to classes 1 and 2, but would be divided into three groups: promote, defer, or retain an annual review of Class 7 officers by selection boards. The precepts for these two boards in 1966 called upon them to rank order 60 percent and 50 percent of the officers in class, respectively, and these percentages, in effect, reflect the adoption of the “fully qualified” concept.

Without going into all the variants which have been suggested, the following scheme for the promotion of junior officers appears the most equitable, while assuring proper review of officers’ records and guaranteeing the continuity of a service characterized by excellence. Upon the completion of one year of substantive duty (or one and one half years, including the basic officers course, the consular course, and 16 weeks of FSI language training), the record of a probationary officer would be sent to the Senate or interim appointments would be made by the President. To support the quarterly review and provide an adequate basis for a reasoned judgment, all officers would receive the present short form efficiency report every six months, with all supervisors who might have supervised the officer to be incorporated in and filed with the six month report. Probationary officers would not be ranked numerically but would be divided into three groups: promote, defer, or select out, as at present. While no quotas for selection out would be established, the Probationary Board would be instructed not to promote officers automatically but to evaluate carefully whether an officer was likely to have a successful Foreign Service career. The Probationary Board would be reminded that under the Foreign Service Act the selection out of officers while still on probationary status is...
much the easiest and least painful process both for the officer and the service, and this opportunity should not be passed up lightly.

Non-probationary FSO-7s would continue to be reviewed by an annual selection board constituted as at present, but the above system for probationary officers would be retained in many respects.\(^1\) Non-probationary 7s would continue to be rated on short form efficiency reports, except for those in hard language training, who would receive the present type of language training evaluation reports. The first performance evaluation report on an non-probationary officer would be accompanied by a development appraisal report, and an FSO-7 would receive a DAR at the end of each tour at a post, but not after every six month period. Every effort would be made to give an FSO-7 a new assignment, if only in terms of function, after his promotion from probationary status. A non-probationary FSO-7 would only be eligible for consideration for promotion by the annual selection board after receipt of a six months evaluation of his performance in class. In other words, for an FSO-7 who was promoted from FSO-8 by the March Probationary Board to be considered, it would be necessary for the probationary list to be processed and announced promptly and for the first six months efficiency report and the DAR on an FSO-7 to be promptly written and transmitted to the Department. Without such data, as a minimum, a selection board meeting in late September through early November can not make a meaningful judgment. Earlier reports will be evaluating an officer in relation to other FSO-8s, and supervisors' recommendations concerning promotion will not be helpful. Moreover, there would be no development appraisal reports, which are of great significance in promotion from Class 7 to 6 because of the emphasis on potential, as well as performance. While officers could continue to be promoted out of probationary status without removing their language probation, no officer should be promoted again without completing this requirement. The latest review of the records of non-probationary FSO-7s indicates that very few indeed have not complied with the minimum language standards and that many have made or are making exceptional progress in two or more languages. Personnel should review the cases of all officers promoted from probationary status who have not met the language requirements and maintain a roster of such officers. The roster should be used to make assignments as soon as possible to posts in world language areas where officers can fulfill their requirements. The annual selection board should be provided with a list of language probationers with a special indication for those who have been assigned to world language areas, but have not met the requirement. This simple device would not only maintain language skills at a high level but save the board much time in determining a factual matter.

An important innovation would be that the annual selection board for non-probationary FSO-7s would not be required to rank order the upper 75 percent or more of the eligible officers, provided the Department maintains, as is expected, its policy of promoting large numbers of FSO-7 officers each year. The 19th Selection Board in 1965 promoted 51.6 percent of the officers in class and the 20th Selection Board was instructed to rank order 60 percent. It would suffice to give the selection board a rough percentage of the number to be promoted and instruct the board to divide the class into three groups: promote; defer (including ineligibles not considered so extraordinary as to merit accelerated promotion); and select out or counsel to consider alternative employment whether in the Staff Corps, special Departmental assignments, or elsewhere. If the present selection out criteria of three years in the low 10 percent and one year each in the low 10 percent and the low 5 percent are retained for Class 7, it would probably be desirable to rank order the bottom 25 percent or 20 percent to focus precisely on the weakest officers. Because officers with thin files will be deferred, the attempt to identify the weakest officers should be the major preoccupation of the board. The board should not feel constrained by rigid percentages, although the 10 percent and 5 percent categories should be retained for purposes of formal action. Career counseling should be brought into much closer relationship with the selection boards.

Another important innovation would be to separate the processing of the results of the annual Class-7 selection board, as well as the Class 6 board, from the results of the boards for Classes 2-5. The promotions should be issued perhaps jointly with the results of the December Probationary Board as recess appointments or sent to the Senate when it convenes in early January.

The Herter Committee and other experts have pointed out that the promotion from Class 6 to Class 5 is one of the important watersheds in the Foreign Service. It marks the entry into mid-career. An FSO-5 should be able to operate with considerable independence in a variety of situations. Selection out prior to promotion to Class 5, while not as easy as during the probationary period, still can lead marginal performers to find many other useful careers and not burden the Foreign Service. The annual selection board which considers FSO-6s should therefore be constituted as at present and based on the traditional principle of promotion of only the most qualified officers. To permit the identification of such officers, the evaluation of at least one full year in Class 6 is essential. Eligibility standards should be instituted to assure this. A selection board can not make a meaningful decision on the basis of any shorter period. An annual efficiency report using the long form and the development appraisal should be required, as well as a six month report on the short form. No language probationer should be promoted to Class 5, no matter how or when he entered.

Most important of all, the basic method for selection out of officers in Classes 7 and 6 would be through operation of time-in-class without promotion. Time in Class 8 should be limited to four years, and the present ten year limit on time-in-class for Classes 6 and 7 should be reduced to 5 and 4 years respectively. This limitation is essential to justify the “up or out” theory of excellence which alone can justify the maintenance of an accelerated promotion system so desired by junior officers and so essential to keep the Foreign Service competitive with other Government agencies and private enterprise.

The total promotion system advocated above may not substantially reduce the present average time of 7.5 years between entry into the Foreign Service and promotion to class 5, but the theoretic minimum is about five years. Every effort is made to eliminate administrative slippage and enable the better officers with good potential for successful Foreign Service careers to move ahead rapidly. Any period less than five years to advance through three classes is really meaningless in terms of testing an officer's capacity to grow with increased responsibilities. In any shorter period, an officer would only have a few brief rotational assignments and one or two jobs at or near the lowest level of responsibility. In such a short period, an officer might demonstrate some versatility, but not necessarily growth. At the watershed from Class 6 to 5, the Foreign Service must maintain its traditional “careful, almost judicial, ways,” as one of the Department's personnel experts recently put it. Perhaps the House Foreign Affairs Committee Report of 1946 put it best: “Promotions should not come so rapidly as to leave no margin for the maturing process...”

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\(^1\) A proposal for a Junior Officer Selection board in permanent session which would consider all FSO/FSRs in Classes 8, 7, and 6 each quarter is an alternative of much merit to which I am indebted to Mr. Thomas J. Dunnigan, Director of the Junior Officer Program.
What are entering Junior FSOs like? "Are we getting the best?" "Are they adequately trained?" "Are they motivated for a Foreign Service career?" "Are they as good as earlier groups?" (I.e., "as good as we were?") The questions are endless.

Rather than answer, I more frequently ask, "What do you mean by the best, adequately trained, qualified, etc.?" These terms are highly subjective and definitions are infinite. Occasionally, entire conversations are spent on defining terms.

Quantification by BEX provides partial answers. I say this guardedly, for implying that quality can be quantified raises hackles. For the most part, entering Junior FSOs have good undergraduate scholastic records. They participated in extracurricular activities, varying from rigorous sports through esoteric poetry readings. While over half have graduate degrees, two recent entrants did not have a bachelor's degree.

They are preponderantly political science, international affairs, history and government majors. The intake of economics majors is rising slowly. Diversity of educational background is satisfied by the occasional science, mathematics, physics, engineering and many other majors. Lawyers outnumber ordained ministers. Over one-third of the entrants have served in the military. About two-thirds have had overseas experience in the Peace Corps, the military, in business, and as students or teachers. Almost all states are represented, with the most populous, California and New York, being the largest suppliers. If a measure of the success of the College Relations Staff is the diversity of colleges represented, it has been eminently successful.

But, to most of us, "best" does not mean just an outstanding scholastic record, wide geographic and collegiate distribution, etc. "Best" is a vague, undefinable, unmeasurable quality, the definition of which is not universal. Hence, each of us evaluates the incoming Junior Foreign Service officer against his definition. For my part, I believe the Foreign Service, in a highly competitive market, is doing very well indeed.

No cliché annoys more than, "But, are they adequately trained to assume Foreign Service responsibilities?" This is doubly annoying when sanctimoniously intoned to mean they aren't. To meet the standards some set for "adequately trained" an individual would have to pursue intensified studies until long after he had passed the mandatory retirement age. If "adequately trained" means a major in political science, then, obviously, many FSOs entering are not adequately trained. If "adequately trained" means they should be experts in international law, most enter inadequately trained. To me the only fair measure is that entrants have successfully completed their academic work and passed the written and oral examinations. Presumably, these examinations focus on those qualities, abilities and basic body of knowledge the Service requires. If they don't, they should be recast. Of course, if the Service requires perfection in all things, the examinations could be made so difficult that no one would pass. I understand that the FSO examinations are among the most difficult given. For my part, and particularly in light of my association with them, I have no difficulty assuming entering FSOs are adequately educated. Of course, all FSOs—not just juniors—require continuing training just to keep up and meet the ever changing and expanding needs of the Service.

Even if the Junior Foreign Service officers are not "adequately trained," they believe they are. They resent older colleagues thinking they are not. They come to the Service eager to get to work—they are gung ho. While appreciating the need of some minimal training before going to their first posts, most welcome only that which is orientation or directly related to their first assignment or career advancement (area and language training). Experience leads me to conclude that six months training before reporting on the job represents the saturation point. After that, the curve is down. I believe that, were training extended to a year or more, we would have dropouts during initial training. Many of the young FSOs frankly state they have opted for the Foreign Service, as opposed to an academic career, because they want "to go where the action is." We should get them out of the living room and into the kitchen quickly.

Perhaps the much touted difference in generations is no more strongly emphasized than when conversation turns to motivation. Some older officers express distress that entering officers do not have the priestly dedication they themselves brought to the Foreign Service. The majority of entering FSOs candidly admit they hope and expect the Foreign Service will be their career or that they are entering because, of all the options open to them, the Foreign Service appeals most. Theirs is not an unconditional commitment but rather a hope that the shoe will fit. This probably results from their having many more options than did their seniors. Recruiting pressures at universities—many jobs seeking the man rather than the man seeking the job—temper outlooks. The Foreign Service is not the only government entity offering careers in international activities. To this add offers from business, foundations, and universities. Even so, one meets entering officers—more frequently than I suspected—who are taking substantial reductions in salary to join the Foreign Service.

A small number of entering officers, after having had a six weeks orientation "look see," become less certain about the Foreign Service as a career. This results from their learning that Foreign Service responsibilities do not conform to their
Entering Junior FSOs Like:

earlier concepts. When some discover that policy formulation
may not be their immediate primary responsibility—that their
office won't be facing south on the seventh floor—and that
operations and service functions loom large, they doubt that
they are getting what they bargained for. A large number,
after having completed the initial six weeks, are more certain
about making the Foreign Service a career. Most state they
want job experience before recasting attitudes.

Naturally, entering officers have anxieties and concerns.
The most prevalent relates to conformity and dissent within
the Foreign Service. They wonder how they can remain
intellectually honest. Old wives' tales have taken their toll.
Also, many enter without knowledge or understanding of
service discipline and how it relates to dissent. Some of these
attitudes have, in part, been conditioned by the rare university
professor oozing hostility toward working for the government
in general and the Department of State and the Foreign
Service in particular. Two recent entrants told me that
respected professors actively attempted to dissuade them from
joining. One professor spoke of the young officer's "selling
out." That the student entered despite such counsel, speaks for
itself. Although concern about conformity and dissent dissi-
pates during the six weeks orientation period, several reserve
judgment—they prefer "to wait and see."

The fashionable criticism of Junior Officers is, "They don't
know how to write." True, an academic "publish or perish"
atmosphere may favor an ability to write in three fogged
pages what can be written crisply in a sentence. Some
entering FSOs, like their elders, do not use good adequate
Anglo-Saxon words but "utilize" longer synonyms. By and
large, most of them—this runs counter to the popular view—can write clearly and concisely when they enter. Since
writing is a major concern, we alert entering officers of its
importance and make them aware of "the problem." We
acquaint them with reporting and correspondence forms and
styles. They submit writing samples which are reviewed with
several reserve judgment—they prefer "to wait and see."

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them. Each receives a copy of Strunk & White's "The
Elements of Style." We make available other accepted
authorities such as Fowler's "Modern English Usage."
Perlmutter's "A Practical Guide to Effective Writing," and
Gowers' "The Complete Plain Words." The mathematically
inclined apply Robert Gunning's Fog Index to their efforts.
Some are probably applying it right now to this article.

"The problem?" is a circular one, with everyone pointing the
finger at someone else. A Junior Foreign Service officer writes
from his first post, "I won't beat the drum on effective writing
again, but my feeling is you won't solve anything by
encouraging Junior officers to practice it. The problem is
upstairs, and it's devastatingly simple to fall into the easy
comfort of bureaucratic prose." Another, feeling slightly
schizophrenic, observes that his supervisor finds some of what
he writes too short and sends it back for "nuances." On other
occasions, the same supervisor returns material for removal of
"irrelevancies." A story has drifted back that one frustrated
officer rewrote a report about five times; each time for the
next level of approval. The draft finally accepted was more
like his original draft than any of the intermediate one.

Since a bureaucrat is one who generally signs something
written by someone else and writes for someone else's
signature, good drafting is what a supervisor says it is. Hence,
training in drafting appears clearly to be a supervisor's
responsibility. After all, we at FSI may encourage the
omission of irrelevancies when the supervisor wants the
nuances.

Entering Junior Foreign Service officers quickly become
aware that public speaking is a requirement. Many make
troublesome efforts to improve through evening courses. Perhaps
the best way to encourage them is for supervisors to be
excellent models and to give them public speaking responsi-
bilities early in their careers. They will welcome opportunities.

That the entering officers are perceptive and alert about
their new environment and the system is revealed by their
attitudes toward conformity and dissent. Simultaneous
to taking the oath, they plug in. They identify the
"main stream" clearly. The rumor mill signals jobs which
allegedly make for rapid promotion and the jobs which,
"though necessary, are routine and to be avoided." Despite
official efforts to develop early an understanding that a career
service requires a paying of tithes in the undertaking of
necessary non-substantive jobs, the grapevine message comes
through louder and clearer. The grapevine tells entering
students what work provides excellent management training
opportunities in the lower grades, but the caution is "don't get
stuck." Attitudes toward their careers, their work, the system
are primarily influenced by the seniors whom entering officers
meet socially and at work rather than by formalized training.
Not that they want to be homogenized—that they will resist—
but they do want to survive while contributing.

My personal observation, after almost two years of associa-
tion with entering FSOs, is that the Foreign Service is
successful at recruiting articulate, well educated, motivated,
questioning, ambitious, intellectually curious and honest
officers. They want to get ahead in the system. They want to
do a good job. They want satisfying and rewarding experi-
ences. They want responsibility, not "make-work" camou-
flaged as training. The Foreign Service is getting young
officers of worth and with great potential. The Service will
get the most out of them if supervisors are rigorously
demanding and give them meaningful work to do. Sound
sensitive supervision is the heart of training and the key to
developing the potential. I know Junior Officers can meet the
challenge and produce well.
On Getting Into the Kitchen

The lot of the Junior FSO in Washington has been improving visibly. In the months since the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club (JFSOC) sent its letter to Mr. Crockett expressing concern at the level of morale among younger FSOs (see August Journal), an unusually high percentage of junior officers have been promoted, "rapid promotion to 5" has been promised, and senior personnel in the State Department have devoted generous amounts of time and attention to discussion sessions with junior officers. Yet all is not quiet. Ferment and concern remain, not the ferment of the underpaid and overworked, not that of officers who find the kitchen too hot, but rather the ferment of those their feet in the cold and wondering whether the kitchen will really be the center of foreign affairs action when they ultimately get inside.

Not the least of the junior officer concerns lies in the fact that in the months since the JFSOC statement was published, only one letter has appeared offering comment (see December Journal), and that one was unsigned. I won't dwell on that letter here, but if the "gimme-gimme" attitudes imputed to JFSOC by our anonymous critic were in fact the source of this junior officer ferment, then surely most of the ferment would by now either have been quelled by the embourgeoisement of rapid promotions or sapped by the departure of dissidents in search of greener pastures. On the contrary, the discussions which junior officers have held among themselves and with senior officers and the experience of watching the demise of the Hays Bill have combined to convince us that change will come, that change has to come. We see little reason to doubt that the change will come from without, as in previous reorganizations, unless it is soon generated from within. Yet it can hardly come from within if the only response of the Service to its difficulties is the covert gripe, the unsigned letter, and the stiff upper lip.

The traditions, the syndromes, the myths of the Foreign Service must change. But, fortunately or unfortunately, the reception given to those who seek to confront old myths with "new realities" is rarely cordial. Myths tend to be obstinate and self-reinforcing, for their most frequent challengers are outsiders whose grasp of the situation is perceptibly weaker than the insiders', and whose lack of sympathy for the myth-holders can be taken for granted. Foreign Service myths, as products of an often-embattled and firmly-knit in-group, are surely among the hardest of the breed. The historical resistance of the Foreign Service to outside efforts at reorganization is a matter of record. But it is also no secret that in the more recent instance of the Hays Bill, the Foreign Service did not exactly look upon the proposed reform as its own progeny. The "beleaguered" insiders and the "hostile" outsiders were again engaged in reinforcing each other's myths. It is for these reasons, among other more substantive ones, that I and many of my colleagues who entered the Service in the early 1960's found the article "Are We Obsolete" exciting in its implications. For one of the first times since we entered the corps, someone free from the taint of the "hostile outsiders" was making a constructive proposal for improving the basic structure of the Foreign Service.

The Non-Dynamics of Polarization

The "outsiders," of course, are not just the congressional or presidential committees which have heretofore taken the lead in Foreign Service reform—there is also an "in-group" and an "out-group" within the Service. The two groups are related to what one high-level observer has termed the "two cultures of foreign affairs": the community oriented towards the "hardware" of systems, statistics and quantifiable facts, and the community oriented towards the "software" of humanistic values, psychological variables, and other intangible factors of human existence. Within the Foreign Service the counterpart of the "software" and humanist-oriented culture has been the traditional elite of the political ladder; the culture of "hardware" and systems has been represented by a cluster of non-prestigious but bureaucratically influential public servants identified in one way or another with administration. Obviously not all officers fit within these categories, but the polar tendencies exist and exist strongly enough for one to speak of a real breakdown of communications between the two "cultures." Both have become identified with their own defensive and self-perpetuating myths, which together have made a restructuring of the Service from within almost impossible.

The myth of the political elite, familiar to all, has asserted that the only really important specialty was political ("substantive") work, that no one with a proper quota of self-esteem would volunteer for assignment to another agency, that no one without overwhelming family or health problems would ask to be sent to Washington, and that the only good ambassadors were the products of many years of progress up the political ladder. The mechanics of the Service has reinforced this myth and made it true, to a great extent. Elites attract elites, and the reputation of the political specialty has attracted the most capable of new generations. These, in turn, whether well- or ill-served by their choice of career ladders, still have risen to the top to perpetuate the myth in lore and efficiency report. And the longer the Service has sorted itself out by this pecking order, the easier it has become for the elite nucleus to pass off the organizational thinking of others as a simple product of sour grapes and the "bureaucratic mentality."

The other culture, in contrast, has been identified with an "official" myth so obviously didactic as to invite disbelief. Spokesmen for this viewpoint have tried to foster the belief that all specialties are equal in the eyes of the service, that the smart officer jumps at the chance to spend a few years in administrative or consular work, that "good" assignments and "bad" assignments always average out, that any slot is good background for future responsibilities, and that everything important in foreign affairs boils down to "good management." The automatic skepticism of the FSO towards this doctrine has been reinforced both by countless specific cases which point in the opposite direction, and by the fact that the doctrine's spokesmen have traditionally been either lateral entrants or officers who have gravitated towards the lowest prestige specialty in the service: administration.

D. BRUCE JACKSON

Into the Kitchen

On Getting

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March, 1967

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The Ferment Focused

The ferment of the current junior officer generation has in part been an offshoot of the first, the traditional, myth. With the impatience and candor expected of youth, we have tended to bring into the open the brooding frustrations of older officers whose aspirations are fixed on the political ladder. These concerns, such as those expressed in the JFSOC letter to Mr. Crockett, were for the most part fully valid. Specifically, any substantial influx of FSRs or lateral entrants into positions of responsibility in the Service is a matter for general concern, NOT because this involves unfair competition, but because the necessity for such importation is telling evidence that the Foreign Service personnel system has proved too inflexible to produce officers with the needed background. Similarly, junior officer concern that talented individuals have been able to advance over twice as fast in the management intern programs of other agencies* as in the Foreign Service is not purely frustrated ambition—how can the Service hope to attract the best talent of the nation's colleges if its image is colored by such facts? And colored it is; one need only ask an FSO who has recently gone recruiting and been confronted with the cynicism about the advantages of a Foreign Service career which is widespread in our top universities.

But these battles are not ours. As one senior Department official has recently observed in connection with the myths of the Cold War, each generation tends to fight the wars of the preceding generation without knowing it. In regard to the Foreign Service, our battle cannot be either a holding operation against lateral entry or a campaign for faster promotion, higher pay and the surface trappings of an elite. The battle must be for the fact of foreign affairs leadership, not the right to it; it must aim to achieve the authority of recognized Foreign Service excellence, rather than to seek recognition of Foreign Service authority when the excellence may lie outside. If one reads the JFSOC letter to Mr. Crockett of this spring, and even more if one reads the minutes of the many subsequent meetings between junior FSOs and Mr. Crockett, Mr. Dunnigan, and Mr. Steeves, it becomes clear that the ferment of junior officers in Washington goes beyond the frustrations of an underfed elite. It is not a matter of gripes over the vagaries of the Service but of impatience with both the political and administrative myths, of concern over the whole question of preparation for foreign affairs leadership. The central issue that has emerged is the impatience and candor expected of youth, we have tended to bring out into the open the brooding frustrations of older officers whose aspirations are fixed on the political ladder. The proposed "third track" of foreign affairs executives would free the Service from its continuous oscillation between specialization and "broadening" and would provide an avenue for rational development of real foreign affairs leadership. On this part of the mid-career proposal, and on the initial statement of the crisis confronting the Foreign Service, I think there is enthusiastic agreement among junior officers. On the details of the proposed restructuring, and on the philosophical and sociological rationale for the proposal, there is room for further refinement.

There is first a problem of definition. "Elaboration of policy" is stated to be the first of three principal tasks of the Foreign Service, yet the proposal allots this subject only a few lines, inevitably prompting raised eyebrows among those of the traditional Foreign Service "culture." To be sure, if only "elaboration" of pre-determined policy is at issue, then a managerial third track wise in the byways of bureaucracy might succeed brilliantly. However, much more is involved. Certainly this "elaboration" is an important element of the Foreign Service obligation; but, while the Service is not the final arbiter of policy, its mandate extends deep into the area of policy formulation. To begin with, a large proportion of US policy is formed as a mosaic of day-to-day decisions. And ultimately, successful policy derives from two indispensable ingredients: an accurate evaluation of the needs in a situation, and an accurate estimate of the bureaucratically-possible capabilities for meeting those needs. A formula for grooming future foreign affairs executives cannot afford to stress either factor to the neglect of the other.

Second, from a pragmatic standpoint, if no other, the implicit value judgments visible in the proposal smack too much of the "official myth" for general acceptability. It may well be that executive ability is the highest order of human genius and that its possessors deserve to be recognized as a

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LIFE AND LOVE IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE: Junior Officer Department

by S. I. Nadler

"Are We Obsolete"

The alternative suggested by the six mid-career officers would go far towards establishing the sort of redivision of the Foreign Service which must take place. The proposed "third track" of foreign affairs executives would free the Service from its continuous oscillation between specialization and "broadening" and would provide an avenue for rational development of real foreign affairs leadership. On this part of the mid-career proposal, and on the initial statement of the crisis confronting the Foreign Service, I think there is enthusiastic agreement among junior officers. On the details of the proposed restructuring, and on the philosophical and sociological rationale for the proposal, there is room for further refinement.

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(Continued on page 43)

"I am thinking of you, dear, but you've got to think of me and my career, too. It was the foreign minister, after all . . . it was just a little pinch. . . ."

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March, 1967
Comments on the Argyris Report

Prescriptions for Effective Administration

I am reminded, after reading the admirably conceived Argyris report, of the rejoinder of an old Middle Eastern hand, when he heard me complain about Persian bureaucracy: "But the Persians like it that way." And indeed, he was probably right. For how otherwise could the system have developed as it did? The outsider finds it surprising that the signatures of two or three Ministers and a dozen or two underlings may be required before a government school may import and take possession of a refrigerator donated by a foreign foundation. But what the outsider does not know is that every man who signs the import form sleeps more soundly at night, knowing that he is in such a respectable and numerous company of fellow signatories.

What I would imply here is that the administration of the Department of State is by no means as ineffective as Professor Argyris' high-ranking Foreign and Civil Service seminars lightly conceded in their Airlie House bull sessions. People with quite high rank complain a lot about ineffective administration, of course, but these complaints usually refer to other peoples' ineffectiveness, not their own. If a poll were taken on such matters, I dare say most respondents would contend that, while the Department is indeed in administrative difficulties, their own areas of immediate responsibility are being run in surprisingly orderly and rational fashion. And this is not to be wondered at. After all, the people who do the Department's work are neither abnormally foolish as individuals, nor under unbearable outside restraints. What they do, then, and the way they do it must be done for good reasons. Like my Persians, they must—most of them, anyway—like it the way it is.

It is interesting, to be sure, to learn that Professor Argyris thinks we would be more effective if more of our business got transacted in staff meetings and conferences, rather than in the corridors and elsewhere. But is this true? Who really thinks that things always move more smoothly when issues can only be discussed and settled in open conferences? The answer, I think, is that nobody who has read much diplomatic history, or who has seen these things closer up, would agree that this is a safe prescription for administrative or any other kind of effectiveness. This is not the way the world's work gets done, whether in business with foreigners or in the dispatch of internal office affairs. The ways of work of people in the Department, surely, are much more a reflection of the real nature of the outside world, than the consequence of an unhealthy "interpersonal milieu."

This is not to say that we everywhere have the right mix in our milieu. Many matters might well be dealt with more effectively by candid, combative, aggressive type B personalities, than by discreet, evasive, diplomatic type A's. But the reverse is also true. All of us have noted that there are times when the bold, direct approach to other persons will work best, and others when a certain amount of sly circumspection is more fruitful. This is as true for the Fish and Wildlife Service as for the foreign affairs establishment, for the Department of the Navy as for NASA. It is not enough, in other words, to tell us that our work and the world's demand different interpersonal relations.

What Professor Argyris is suggesting, of course, is that a healthier, happier kind of interpersonal milieu would improve the administrative effectiveness of the Department of State. It might indeed. But what, in the meantime, would have to be done with our existing calculus of survival quotients? Professor Argyris says that "people soon learn the survival quotients of 'checking with everyone'; of developing policies that upset no one; of establishing policies in such a way that the superior takes the responsibility for them." Is this not another way of saying that people have learned the survival quotient of conformity to the mores of the existing interpersonal milieu?

It is much to the credit of the high-ranking guests at Airlie House that so many of them found fault with this milieu. Surely, though, it is too much to expect such people to go beyond this, and start unlearning their survival quotients. For these people, more than most, can at least be assumed to have taken the measure of the real world around them. How otherwise would they have lasted long enough to get into Airlie House? And, in taking the real world for what it is (and this includes the administrative world), they will have learned that there are limits, too on the amount of "leveling" they can permit themselves in their dealings with their fellow men. They may not, like Emerson's philosopher friend, sum up their experience of human nature in saying, "Mankind is a damned rascal; the world lives by humbug, and so will I." But they will know that people who are more open and more trusting—who level unto others without waiting for others to be level unto themselves have a lower survival quotient than their more cautious contemporaries. They will have learned, in short, a particular calculus of survival quotients, and this quite as well as their Middle Eastern bureaucratic counterparts.

It seems to me, therefore, that it is beside the point to attack a particular interpersonal milieu, without first addressing oneself to the need for a radical reform of our inherent survival quotients. And here, I think, one sees how really difficult the problem is. For these survival quotients are undoubtedly much more than peculiarities of the administration of the Department of State. They, in large measure, an inherent feature of the bureaucratic process per se.

I may be wrong in this. It might be that these matters will begin to be looked at differently, when enough people have learned at Airlie House and elsewhere to see themselves as they really are. It is encouraging, certainly, that the Department's administrative leadership encourages and finances such examinations of the administrative process as the report of Professor Argyris.

Is there any indication, though, that the short-term psychiatry practiced at Airlie House actually works a useful reform of people's behavior when the seminars are over? I doubt it. What the seminars aim at amounts ultimately to a kind of moral reformation of men's characters, and I don't think that results of that kind are to be had so easily, so quickly, or so painlessly. For, note that even the outside consultants who run the seminars are themselves not entirely "level" with their guests. Why otherwise would we choose the ambiguous verb "to level?" It would be "leveler," surely, to have said "to give up lying to one another" or "to start being honest." What assurance is there, in other words, that the Airlie House alumni, any more than the rest of us, can afford to throw out our old survival quotient calculations, and start level-
The social sciences no doubt have many important lessons to teach us, and I would not want to look down at them for trying to teach us that we will be more effective administrators when we cherish truth and shun falsehood. But our problems are more complicated than this. They involve the essentially insoluble problem of how to proceed in the administration of public affairs while lacking any standards which can, in an unquestionable way, ascertain success or non-success in the performance of an official's duties. Since there can never be really objective standards in most such matters, we are left dependent on the administrative gifts of the particular individuals who come at one time and another to occupy the positions of highest authority in the Department.

These high officials, and perhaps the rest of us as well, are in turn obliged to operate in a very demanding domestic political and social environment. For it is certainly an oversimplification to assume, as I think Professor Argyris has done, that the ways in which foreign policies are formulated and carried out are largely an internal affair of the personnel within the Department and the executive branch of the government. These are aspects of the subject, it seems to me, which are of much more relevance, in any discussion of the Department's "interpersonal milieu," than Professor Argyris could perhaps be aware.

In any case, as I suggested above, we are left in the end with administrative superiors who do the best they can. Some exercise their skills with talent and art. Others, inevitably, do less well. If this seems unhelpful, we should remember that we could all be much worse off. We are a long way, at least, from the situation suggested by this exchange between an interviewer and an old-time foreman:

Interviewer: "How do you handle a new employee?"

Foreman: "I just stand there . . . and stare him down to kind of show how dumb he is."

Interviewer: "And then?"

Foreman: "Then I spit. . . ."

THOMAS A. DONOVAN
Washington

Non-Argyris Solutions

The JOURNAL's lead editorial in the January issue expresses the hope that readers will submit views con-

The purpose of the exercise was to get people to understand each other better and to break down barriers which might have been built up by social or career or hierarchical systems. In this way, the operation of the Department and the Foreign Service would be improved.

So far so good. Certainly no one would quarrel with this goal. But does it accomplish its purpose?

My reply, after a good deal of observation and discussion, can only be no. I would like to be able to be less categorical—to say, as some of my respected associates do, that it perhaps does some good and very little harm. Many sincere people have put a great deal of time and money into it. I do not question their honesty or their motives, and when I characterize sensitivity training as ill-suited for our needs, I do so with Oliver Cromwell's admonition to the Church of Scotland in mind, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken."

My conclusion, in brief, is that sensitivity training is a fad. Some business firms which adopted the new training methods are said to be easing off or trying different approaches. Other important firms examined it and never took it on. I certainly hope the State Department will not go overboard for this latest example of group therapy, and as for myself, I would give it up. I am eager to experiment with new training methods and I'm glad this one was given a try, but I believe we should look for something better.

Some 228 officers have now attended sensitivity training. One should not expect miracles, of course, but at some point a return for our time and effort should begin to become apparent. I am unable to detect any difference between the activity or point of view of officers who have taken the course and those who have not. Most of the participants in the sensitivity sessions had a pleasant week at Airlie or Dedham House or Tidewater Inn, and some of them may have found the sessions useful, at least for a few days or even weeks, but I simply do not think we are getting our money's worth. During the past two years, something over $275,000 in contracts and off-site expenses have been committed to this program and for follow-up activities.

A few people who have gone through the course think it does positive harm. The sessions often concentrate on an unusual characteristic or psychological weakness of one of the participants and drive the point home. If a man is struggling against an inferiority complex, for example, his
foible may be dragged out into the open and exposed to examination and, he may feel, ridicule. I am told that one person had to be institutionalized following a session, and Dr. Argyris warns that persons with nervous or psychiatric history should not take the course.

My own objection to the method, as I personally observed it, was Dr. Argyris' efforts to find, or if necessary, to generate a dispute between participants. He will accuse someone of not "leveling" and will declare assertively, "I read you as saying something quite opposite." In my group, someone acted as Argyris' spur to get a quarrel started. After the storm there was supposed to be a certain amount of "feed-back," which often involved self-criticism. If a participant preferred not to express an opinion about someone or something, he was badgered—not angrily but persistently.

Tung Chi-ping, a young Red Chinese who defected from a diplomatic post in Africa recently, has this to say about the brain-washing sessions he went through as a student in Peking: "These purge campaigns all end in an orgy of self-criticism—in which your fellow group members may turn against you. You look for their faults because your own survival may depend upon your being able to denounce someone else." Perhaps Argyris and his supporters feel that something along this line is necessary to break through the crust of a "caste" mentality. Argyris clearly regards the Foreign Service, in general, as an old-school-tie clique, unwilling to admit outside competitors except through the rigid entrance by examination at the bottom. As his article indicates, he thinks of the typical FSO as a close-mouthed, reserved fellow who refrains from expressing open feelings, whether positive or negative, who does not like others to tell him about his impact on them, who emphasizes substantive, not administrative, activities, who accepts dependence on others, especially under conditions of risk-taking, and who, most damning of all, should not hurt his fellow officers even in the interests of the organization.

The "good guy," in Argyris' view, is just the opposite. He welcomes competition, is not afraid to say so, welcomes being told by others of his impact on them, thinks administrative matters are as important as substantive ones, resists strongly being dependent on others, and is ready to hurt others, if necessary, in the interests of the organization (which I take to mean the Department or the US Government).

If the first is a true picture of the Foreign Service officer, maybe a bit of a purgative, less freely administered than in Peking but a mild dose, is called for. If so, let us admit it freely and openly. I had the impression, during the session I attended, that an effort was being made to manipulate something behind the scenes, chiefly in the direction of generating a quarrel. Normal reticence was discounted as artificial or "not leveling." Such methods may work for awhile among a run-of-the-mill group, but I could not avoid wondering how Argyris' training course would go down with his own fellow members of the Yale faculty. My guess is they would raise amused eyebrows, just as they would dismiss any other idea for making over human beings through five days—or five weeks—of close communion.

The aim of sensitivity training, it is alleged, is to break through the crust of hypocrisies which characterize much of human relationships. It may be true that if colleagues smother grudges or resentments, or if an individual has an eccentricity or mannerism which irritates those with whom he works, or if a person's initiative is being suppressed by layers of supervisors, the best way to correct them is perhaps to bring them out in the open. Only through awareness and frank discussion can barriers to cooperation be broken down.

The theory has a good deal of appeal. However, as I saw it in operation, it resulted all too often in picking quarrels where none existed, imagining ulcer motives, and greatly exaggerating differences of view. There were constant references to the disdain with which the so-called substantive (i.e. policy) officers looked down on those in administrative positions. High indignation was expressed against an FSO who, after two years in administration, is said to have declared that he had given his tithe to administration and hoped he would not have to do it again. In defense of the FSO, someone pointed out that many teachers have objected to the time they have had to spend in administration, whether as school principals, deans, or college presidents, and that a devoted teacher wants to teach, just as most men who go into the Foreign Service want to be as directly related to the conduct of foreign relations as possible. The defense was not accepted, and the debate went on and on.

The better answer to this problem, it seems to me, is much more rotation between so-called substantive and administrative positions, and in mixing the two. Everyone should do his tithe in administration, or more if necessary, and many jobs can be part one and part the other. Certainly the top jobs in administration, such as the Deputy Under Secretary of Administration and the Director General, should involve much more substantive responsibility than they have generally had in the past. There should be a Permanent Under Secretary as in the British Foreign Office, with wide responsibilities in both the administrative and substantive field. If high policy officers take the attitude that they do not want to be bothered with administration, and if administrative officers are kept out of foreign policy matters, the differences will continue. The answer is not, in my view, to exaggerate or broaden the differences in sensitivity sessions, but to reduce them in practice.

George V. Allen
Washington, D. C.

A Questionable Business

Much of what Professor Argyris says about the work habits of the Department of State can be verified in daily experience, but the malady is not as widespread as he implies, nor so damaging to the substance of the work. Nor is it so serious at Foreign Service posts, where the organizations are leaner and lines of responsibility and authority clear.

Without stopping to make detailed inquiry into the precise nature and causes of the alleged "sluggishness" in the Department, Argyris ascribes it all to defective personal relationships. He describes symptoms, not causes, and gives a grossly distorted view of the Foreign Service, inadequately balanced by a few lines of praise at the end of the article. It is extraordinary, by the way, that a professional consultant to the Department should permit his material to be used to discredit the institution as a whole, as has already happened.

The picture which Professor Argyris draws of the FSO is of a servile and timid creature motivated only by the prospect of reward and fear of penalty. The FSO seems to be short on integrity and any larger concern for the substance of his work. Life is all tactics, with an eye only to survival and promotion. This is an absurd caricature and he should try to get to know us better. If the behavior of FSOs whom he observed in his "laboratory" is different from that of business groups, there may be good reason, some of them to our credit. And it is puzzling to consider how the self-serving officers he postulates get so much done so well at Foreign Service posts around the world and in Washington.

(Continued on page 46)
AIRING THE PROBLEM

A s a glance at the table of contents suggests, the theme of this month's JOURNAL is the junior officer and the Foreign Service. It is tied more specifically to the concerns of the junior officer himself—his thoughts on the Service, his role in it and, not inappropriately, his chances for advancing within it to positions which offer challenge and responsibility. The junior FSO is presented from different perspectives: that of his A-100 course instructor, those of members of his recent Selection Boards, and his own.

One thing is quite clear: there is concern, there is dissent, there are in some cases some very deep misgivings about the way the system is presently working. These were expressed last May in the memorandum of the Junior Foreign Service Officer Club to Deputy Under Secretary Crockett; they have been aired and expanded upon since and, we assume, will be again. Although the question has been posed, probably few if any officers consider that we're obsolete, collectively; but quite a number are asking if we're not moving in the direction of institutional obsolescence.

What, if anything, is to be done? Certainly no consensus emerges in this month's JOURNAL as to solutions to the Service's personnel problems. It would seem rather that the problems themselves are still being defined. But we would make one point on which the junior officers themselves have been insisting for some time now: there is no “junior officer problem” distinct from the problems of the Service generally. We will no doubt be hearing more from our junior colleagues in the near future—we hope so. In the meantime, they have posed rather sharply some serious questions which affect us all.

ROOM AT THE TOP

O ur competitive career Service is designed to recognize and to promote the most promising officers. Since the total number of Foreign Service officers does not increase—indeed, it is less now than several years ago—our selection process must assume a rate of retirement at senior levels which will allow for promotions. It would be foolish to recognize talent through the annual Selection Board technique, but to be unable to advance it for lack of room at the top.

Selection out has not been as effective as envisaged in the Foreign Service Act. While the process must be continued to weed out the mediocre, it is painful, psychologically demanding and actually drops from the rolls a very small percentage of officers. Furthermore it inhibits others from seeking early retirement. They are deterred by the realization that their colleagues might jump them with the group that has been found wanting in quality of ability and performance. Mandatory retirement for age affects relatively few. Maximum time-in-class has been set at almost meaningless limits such as the ten years permissible at Class Seven, hardly a requirement of much significance in a competitive system.

The consequence is obvious. There is a congestion in the upper levels of the Service which must be dealt with promptly and systematically if the vigor of our competitive system is to be maintained.

We are, therefore, in complete support of the decision to reduce maximum time-in-class limitations on Foreign Service officers. There will be individual problems and the loss of some good officers as a result, but we believe that the health and vigor of the Service will be enhanced. We also believe that retirement upon reaching maximum time-in-class will be viewed as a dignified and honorable way to retire. We are all familiar with the military system whereby officers “passed over” begin to prepare for departure from military service without the psychological burdens which our “selection-out” process has sometimes imposed.

But this measure is not sufficient by itself. Attention must be given also to the establishment of more realistic “minimum time-in-class” provisions. A professional career must place some emphasis upon the value of experience and training. It seems to us that it would be a reasonable requirement to assume that an officer would not be seriously considered for further promotion unless he had spent at least a year in a class, perhaps two.

Also we urge that legislation be sought which will offer better inducements for early retirement. The Foreign Service Association is studying this problem and may have proposals in the near future.

Undoubtedly there are many other facets of personnel administration to consider. The Director General of the Foreign Service and his staff are working hard at these matters. Any constructive suggestions will be welcomed by him and will be published in the JOURNAL if directed to us.

THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION

Today in America 40,000 computers
—help manufacturers keep annual inventory fluctuations to half ($2 billion) of the level ten years ago;
—enables the Federal government to review 100,000,000 income tax forms (and find mistakes both ways);
—force competing savings institutions to calculate and credit daily interest due depositors;
—give subscribing law firms in minutes case research and precedent citations that clerks formerly needed days to find;
—serve as an anonymous marketplace for job-hunters and for employers;
—absorb, shuffle and reveal in an instant the gushing outpouring of data our society produces daily;
—project the shape of the US economy for a well-known business school;
—free librarians, bookkeepers, clerks from hours of drudgery and release those people for more creative work;
—help children learn more and quicker.

Some voices warn against dehumanization as a computer concomitant. Others claim the computer is the greatest boon ever to mankind. No matter what, the computer is here to stay.

What are we doing about and with the computer? Well, the Department's computers
—perform numerous financial and accounting functions;
—print staffing patterns, special management and manpower studies;
—publish visa lookout books, UNGA voting profiles, INR bibliographies;
—allow experimentation with information retrieval on a country basis;
—evaluate the cost/benefit effectiveness of CU programs;
—permit simulation games for the Senior Seminar;
—provide most effective use of our Office of Communications equipment;
—are available for any Departmental user.

But, is this enough? The Department has been in the computer age for about five years. Other foreign affairs agencies have been in the field much longer with a lot more resources. If the State Department is going to exercise total leadership in the community of foreign affairs agencies, then—among other things—we must lead in the computer revolution.
WASHINGTON LETTER

by LOREN CARROLL

The last time retired Foreign Service officers felt a little increased weight in the annuity check was in April, 1966. That rise was 4.3 per cent. Many (dwelling ruefully on the constant rise in the cost of living) permitted themselves to hope that another hike would be voted by Congress at the end of the year. Congress did indeed vote hikes for all Civil Service and military "retirees," because the annuities of both these groups are tied to the Consumer Price Index which means that they are adjusted whenever living costs mount by as much as three per cent and remain at that level for more than 30 days. But Congress recessed before taking action on Foreign Service annuities.

It cannot be said that the Department drags its feet in these matters. On January 5, a new bill went to Congress and on January 24 it was introduced by Senator William J. Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The new bill (S.624) is brisk and to the point. It asks for an increase of 5.7 per cent on all Foreign Service annuities. It also contains two admirable provisions. One would make payments retroactive to January 1, 1967 and the other would guarantee retired Foreign Service officers and survivors future cost-of-living increases whenever Civil Service retirees get them.

And now what are the prospects? Many temperate thinkers, quite devoid of careless optimism, opine that the chances this time are excellent. It will be a moment for jubilation if Congress establishes the principle of absolute equity between Foreign Service and Civil Service annuities.

However bright the prospects, prudence is called for. Put off the patio, the power mower, the trip to Las Vegas, etc., until you feel the money in your pocket.

End of the Blackout

Perhaps we did neglect our education. Perhaps we were gazing out the window while the professor was talking and that's why we cannot even today tell the difference between Duns Scotus and Vasco da Gama. Perhaps we were gliding off to the basketball game when another professor was talking and so today we cannot understand the wisecrack about Schopenhauer. Then in later days we were too busy becoming experts on Liberian politics and European cartels to retrace our steps to our denuded past.

But now let us all cheer up. Ignorance is no longer necessary. The Government Printing Office has set up a bookstore in the Department—ground floor. It opened with a bang at 2:30 p.m. January 11, and has been doing a thriving business ever since. There are books, pamphlets and leaflets on a stupendous range of topics and prices are so cheap that there is excuse for remaining ignorant. For an initial whirl you might try "History of Naval Fighting Ships." This might spur you on to something solid such as the "Amharic Basic Course" (only $2.25). If this is too challenging there's a wide range of foreign language phrasebooks. The one in French is only 25 cents but that's rather "vieux jeu." For showing off purposes at cocktail parties, for instance, you had better spend 40 cents and get the one on Cantonese. For placid reading there is a very decorative book on the White House (many sumptuous photographs). But if you succumb to this, you ought to harden up the head muscles with "Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents."

Are you thinking of retirement? For 40 cents you can get "Theory and Use of Electronics Test Equipment." But perhaps you are daunted by this. Then what about "Starting and Managing a Service Station" (only 35 cents). There's also "Home Laundering" for 15 cents. Rugged types might like "Trapping Bobcats" and lazy patio sprawlers would prefer "Attracting Birds" (15 cents).

"Use and Care of Revolvers" (25 cents) is a choice item but hot-headed types should not buy this one at all. Even cool-headed types should spend $3.00 more and get "Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia."

How about "Gobbledygook Has Gotta Go"? We have been agreed on that for a long time and if enough of us buy the book (40 cents) perhaps it will come to pass. And while we are at it there is available: "How To Improve Your Handwriting." We haven't been thinking of this since the Palmer Method but if we bought the book (15 cents) think how we could amplify our popularity in all circles. "I intended to fetch you in the car, Amelia, but I couldn't understand that note you left in the entrance hall, 'gson cat food stripe zipper to twost origmalten.'"

Anyway the age of ignorance is over. No matter what lures you, you will find it in the new book shop. Fish, Gestalt psychology, Genghis Khan, gestaltism, petunias, doodlesacks, droskies or Nell Gwyn—it's all there!

Award

Confucius has been taking a terrific shelling lately. Red Guards all over China have been denouncing him. In Shantung Province, his birthplace was pillaged and a temple erected in his honor was reduced to rubble. Why this resentment against a sage who lived so long ago—between 550 and 478 B.C.? The answer is that the Red Guards consider him "reactionary" and "feudalistic." Specifically his teachings failed to "conform" to the thinking of Mao-Tse-tung. Confucius' obtuseness lay in his failure to anticipate what big thoughts Mao-Tse-tung might hatch in the twentieth century. Nevertheless if we were in Mao-Tse-tung's boots we would ponder on something Confucius said way back in 475 B.C.:

"The great mountain must crumble, The great beam must crack." Confucius did his best and Confucius has been shabbily treated. To show that Washington Letter still holds him in high esteem we are bestowing on him the March award. This is the first time the award has gone to the leader of a sect.

Madame or Madama Butterfly

After sixty-seven years, Madame Butterfly is still holding the center of the stage. It began life in the USA—a story by John Luther Long. David Belasco turned it into a play in 1900 and Blanche Bates, a famous actress in her day, starred in it throughout the country. People who scarcely knew the difference between "Hamlet" and "Way Down East" heard of "Madame Butterfly" one winter's day when Eleonora Sears, a prominent Bostonian with an invincible talent for getting herself on the front page, walked across the stage attired in a fur coat, during a performance in Boston. This was the sort of stuff editors liked in that era. Every newspaper in the
country ran Miss Sears' caper on its front page. Miss Sears said she had done it because a friend bet $50 that she wouldn't have the nerve. He was a rash man because when it came to nerve, her past had already shown that she was a virtuosa.

After its years of success in the theatre, Giacomo Puccini turned the play into an opera in 1904. Produced at La Scala it was, at first, a flop. Puccini made a few changes and it became a resounding success. The Japanese background, a Japanese heroine, an American hero (a most unheroic blighter!) were ingredients that contributed to a smash hit. Great singers such as Emmy Destinn, Geraldine Farrar and Antonietta Stella have given imposing performances of Madame Butterfly or, to give her her own name—Cho-Cho-San in English and Cio-Cio-San in Italian. The ideal exponent of the part would be, of course, a Japanese. But Japanese vocal chords simply cannot cope with the music Puccini wrote for Cio-Cio-San. An Italian movie company a few years ago produced a version wherein all the Japanese characters were played by Japanese. A beautiful Japanese actress gave an affect ing performance of Cio-Cio-San and she moved her lips adroitly while Renata Tebaldi filled the sound track with gorgeous sounds. Still, a few Japanese sopranos have sung the role on the stage in America and Europe. One was Tamaki Miura, another was Tope Isang. Both had small voices of rather reedy timbre but their acting was highly effective.

All this leads to a curious musical contest to be held in Tokyo next March. Under the auspices of the Tamaki Miura Memorial Society, supported by the ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, the Contest will bring together about fifty sopranos from different countries. Anyone who can sing designated sections of the score will be eligible. The winner will get the Tamaki Miura Trophy and $2,780 in prize money. The contest will be repeated every three years. The second will take place in Osaka at the Japan World Exposition in 1970 and the third in Italy.

Washington Isn't the Worst

Washington has got 10,000 taxis—the highest per capita rate in the world. And yet Washingtonians and visitors alike complain about the poor service. Many explanations are offered and two will bear thought:

1. Only 30 per cent of the drivers are full-timers. This lot starts work at 7 a.m. and leaves off at 4 p.m. The other 70 per cent work at other jobs until 4:30 or 5 p.m. and then go home to eat before starting their second careers at 7 p.m. No wonder then that the hours between 5 and 7 p.m. don't show many cabs in the street.

2. Drivers would prefer meters instead of the present zone system.

Whatever the diagnosis, the Washington cab service is not the worst in the world, nor are the drivers the most churlish. Those honors go to Paris. Next comes either New York or Rome. Let us now examine the other side of the picture: what city has the second best service and the second most agreeable drivers in the world? Answer: London. Top honors? You won't guess it: Quebec City.

The Finest Ten

Here are the ten greatest wines in the world. This unhesitant statement is justified because the list was compiled specially for Washington Letter by one of the world's great connoisseurs: David Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain.

Red Wines
Château Cheval Blanc, 1926
Château Léoville Lascases, 1945
Château Mouton Rothschild, 1949
Clos de Vougeot, 1945
Château Cheval Blanc, 1955

White Wines
Corton Charlemagne (Louis Latour) 1957
Scharzhofberger Spätlese (Egon Muller) 1959
Schloss Johannisberger 1959
Le Grand Montrachet 1962
Berncasteler Doktor Auslese (Thanisch) 1959

What Do You Mean—Tight Credit?

Sign in a Washington bank: "Come in and ask us for a loan!"

Peaks on Parnassus

What is the most beautiful line in all world literature? Well, for this month don't let us exaggerate. Let us merely present the moving words written by Marie Antoinette at 4:30 the morning of her execution, October 16, 1793.

The original manuscript is stained with tears.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

S. I. Nadler

"No, I'm not considering retirement: I am looking forward to several more years of devoted service."

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Washington. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski speaks to the American Foreign Service Association on November 30. Dr. Brzezinski’s remarks were reported in the January Journal.

Rangoon. Mrs. Henry Byroade, wife of the United States Ambassador, is shown with Senator Gale W. McGee of Wyoming and Senator Frank E. Moss of Utah during the Senators’ visit to Burma.

Palermo. Mrs. John Ordway, wife of the Consul General, presents gifts to the two-year-old guests, Renata Alongi and Marcella Volpi, at the Christmas party given by the seven American wives from the American Consulate General for the 59 girls at the Santa Rita de Cascia Orphanage.

A Tide of Words: China

Journal rules of brevity are stern, and I can give here only a hint of content and quality of these fifteen books recently sent the Journal for review—all on China. Four of our authors practice journalism, and their books show it. Three are translators, subordinating comment. Two are academic, offering scholarly treatises, one on Mao and one on the overseas Chinese. Two are editors who have assembled the work of scholars. Three write about pre-communist China—an intellectual historian, a biographer, and a novelist. There are, in addition, Robert Blum’s posthumous book, and Chiang Kai-shek’s recollections of his relations with the Soviet Union.

“Soviet Russia in China” is a revised and abridged version of Chiang’s 1956 “Summing Up at Seventy.” Read Chiang’s views on errors in policy and strategy of Nationalist China, and you will see that those mentioned lie in the field of military and foreign policy decisions. He is silent on force of ideology and effectiveness of government apparatus, his own and Mao’s.

Robert Blum’s “The United States and China in World Affairs,” edited by A. Doak Barnett, is a reflective and extended exposition of the doctrine of containment but not isolation. Blum offers penetrating comment on the American problem of dealing with China. He tells us less about the phenomenon of China itself. However the title of Blum’s book is also the descriptive title of a Series of books and monographs which he supervised for the Council on Foreign Relations, and in aggregate the Series elaborates upon themes he states in his book. The Series is becoming a major contribution to our understanding of outlook in the Pacific.

The scene of Langdon Gilkey’s “Shantung Compound” is China, but the subject is man and his nature. Gilkey is master of character development and narrative pull. The internment camp at Weihsien, in 1943-1945, that this American Protestant theologian reveals, bears comparison in intent to Mann’s “Magic Mountain.”

James E. Sheridan’s “Chinese Warlord” will delight readers whose acquaintance with China began in the 1930s. He tells of Feng Yu-hsiang—China’s celebrated Christian General—but in doing so he illuminates an era of republican China seldom dealt with, except cursorily, by scholars of Chinese affairs. Chiang’s stature and achievement in the 1925-1949 period can be appreciated better against this backdrop of the world in which Feng played his transient role.

Y. C. Wang’s “Chinese Intellectuals and the West—1874-1949” is a work which I found to be of absorbing interest. Wang has made use of his Chinese source material far more exhaustively than all but one or two Western scholars. In addition, he writes a surprisingly fresh, supple brand of English. The Chinese intellectual is examined in the totality of a changing Chinese environment. It would be a pity were the American reading public to regard this splendid review of Communist China’s intellectual inheritance as something of interest only to specialists.

The articles reprinted from The China Quarterly in “China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command” were selected and edited by Roderick MacFarquhar. Authors of contributions are firmly established authorities in the United States/United Kingdom field of Chinese scholarship, and these articles are samples of their best work. It is hardly too much to say that contributions by Benjamin Schwartz on “Modernization and Maoist Vision,” Donald W. Klein on “The Next Generation of Chinese Communist Leaders,” Howard L. Boorman on “The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung,” inter alia, offer more that is real and relevant to understanding Mao’s China than is found in many entire books by woridly authors.

Roger Swearingen edited “Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today,” and brought to his book contributions from Max Frankel, Philip E. Mosely, Marshall Shulman, and George E. Taylor. Frankel’s contribution gives us a subtle and imaginative burial of McCarthyist clichés about the “Communist World.” Other contributors seem to fall short of the force and freshness of insight shown in their books, and their writing for Foreign Affairs and the New York Times, perhaps because the purpose set for this thin book was a bit pretentious.

John E. Rue’s “Mao Tse-Tung in Opposition, 1927-1935” is a careful treatise on the man during his advance, intellectually and physically, towards Yenan. Rue’s fascination with his subject is reflected in his acknowledgements: “Perhaps my greatest debt is to Mao Tse-tung—one of the master politicians of our era, a subtle thinker who adapted Marxism of old Europe to the demands of the Chinese revolution, a shrewd strategist and charismatic leader who succeeded in reuniting China after almost half a century of turmoil. His life story has occupied my scholarly endeavors for a decade.”

Lee Kuan-yew has been known to ask American visitors to sum up Washington’s policy towards the overseas Chinese—not just be it observed, towards Singapore. Do not consider this idle curiosity. What would be Singapore’s fate in Southeast Asia were the Chinese minorities suddenly to become object of coordinated and persistent harassment, or worse? But an equally disturbing question arises if we ask what becomes of Southeast Asia’s development capabilities if the immeasurably talented Chinese minorities are driven from the economic scene in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Lea E. Williams’ “The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia” is a brief but valuable contribution to the Council’s Series. In it he reviews the facts, and prescribes United States advocacy of assimilation as remedy.

He warns against assuming that the overseas Chinese are bound to become a Peking fifth column, and doubts that we should support Taiwan’s proselytising. He recognizes how limited United States influence is likely to be on the internal affairs of Southeast Asia’s countries. He has written a sensible little book.

For “Peking and People’s Wars,” the US Marine Corps gift to Chinese studies, Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, has written an analytical introduction to the September 2 Lin P’ei and the May 10, 1965, Lo Jui-ching statements—“Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!” and “Commemorate the Struggle Against US Imperialism Through to the End!”—Lin’s being early evidence that Mao had begun to groom an...
his concluding chapters to take account of what, since August 1966, the Red Guards have done to earlier forecasts, including his own, about China after Mao. But he would not be alone in wanting that opportunity.

—Robert W. Barnett

Soviet Russia in China, by Chiang Kaishek, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, $4.50.
Shantung Compound, by Langdon Gilkey. Harper and Row, $4.95.


"Parasites, Myths and Deaf Mutes"

Alliance Without Allies, written by an angry man, is a diatribe against existing conditions in Latin America and against the Alliance for Progress which the author considers dead, not because it lacked noble objectives, but because it was never fully understood and accepted, and could not be carried out by "hygienic" technicians who failed to make the Alliance a popular cause. Originally published in Spanish, under the title of "Parasites, Myths and Deaf Mutes," the book is now available in English for readers interested in passionate denunciations.

The "parasites" are decidedly the Latin American oligarchs for whom Alba reserves his strongest opprobrium and whom he accuses of maintaining a sub rosa, unholy alliance with the communists in order to provide the peoples of Latin America with a catalog of scapegoats, variously the US, USSR, Castro and communism or colonial Spain—with the United States clearly in the lead. The "parasites" are the great potential riches in Latin America, the need for external assistance to resolve any problem, the empty call for liberty, racial equality, and the desire for progress. Alba claims that the political parties of the democratic left as well as the oligarchs have had neither the courage nor the desire to do what is necessary in Latin America. What they want, he argues, is the semblance of change without giving up those things they cherish, or revolution on easy terms. Alba questions the validity of the concept of peaceful revolution in the Latin American context.

The Chapter entitled "Dialogue of the Dead and the Dumb" reviews realistically some of the fundamental shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress and demonstrates the lack of mutual understanding between the Latin Americans and the Americans, as well as the specific failings of each of the partners. But Alba later argues that the Alliance for Progress is dead, "sterilized, emasculated, and mutilated" by technicians and bureaucrats. He says the bureaucrats are "obessed with efficiency, and efficiency is not exactly the distinctive characteristic of reform. Reform presupposes a certain degree of waste, error, disorganization, inefficiency, and amateurism."

Therefore, "these renowned experts wind up accepting imitation reform programs as the real thing."

There is some truth in almost all the accusations Alba makes and some of his observations are penetrating, but the very real problems, as well as the achievements, of the Alliance have been detailed more objectively in other works, where improvement is sought and recommended.

What does Alba offer as an alternative? Nothing tangible. He wants a new politically-oriented Alliance which must think only of the people, operate in the midst of the people and with the people. "It must be the people," he says and he would therefore do away with all reports, evaluations, inquiries, seminars, roundtables, the training of trainees to train trainees, the achievements, of the Alliance for Progress is dead, "sterilized, emasculated, and mutilated" by technicians and bureaucrats. He says the bureaucrats are "obessed with efficiency, and efficiency is not exactly the distinctive characteristic of reform. Reform presupposes a certain degree of waste, error, disorganization, inefficiency, and amateurism."

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Duty, Honor, Country

Much of the man—his greatness no less than his weakness—is revealed in this collection of selected speeches and papers of the late General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. A good deal is to be said on the credit side. There is the ever present consciousness of the drama of history as the broad panorama of human activity and a source of practical military object lessons. There is the imaginative, progressive military thinker who recognized and articulated the value of mobility, concentration of force, technology and the coordinated employment of land, air and sea power well before almost all of his military contemporaries. Indeed, the excerpt from General MacArthur's annual report in June 1935, as he prepared to step down as the Army's Chief of Staff is one of the most impressive documents in the collection. The principles it states, moreover, with refreshing clarity, have dominated the conduct of American military operations ever since, including those now being carried out in Vietnam. They have significantly influenced professional military thinking the world over. Finally, there is the superb command of English from the pen of a skillful and articulate craftsman.

Unhappily, there is another side. It emerges perhaps most shockingly in the sudden effort to shift all responsibility when things went badly after the Chinese Communists crossed the Yalu in November 1950. The discrepancies, the contradictions, the growing sense of having lost touch which mark many of the General's pronouncements after this event will be obvious to every discerning reader. But, be this as it may, the fact remains that dedication and the very highest in professional skill have served the country well. And—Duty, Honor, Country are not the monopoly of any one institution but are the property of all who serve.

—Wolf Lehman


Small Town Communism in Italy

As the title "The Searchers" is slightly pretentious, so the subtitle Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town is slightly misleading. Belden Paulson is a political scientist, obviously of the behavioral science bent; "The Searchers" is a carefully annotated and edited version of his field research notebooks and tape recordings. It includes many pages of translated transcripts of interviews with the citizens of "Castelfuoco" (Fire Castle), a pseudonym for a town just south of Rome, well known as the home of the Colonna family. The author shows profound insight into the thinking of his subjects.

However, this is communism and conflict in a particular town, and the author wisely makes no attempt to defend his conclusions as applicable to Italian towns in general (quite in contrast to Luigi Barzini in "The Italians," whose cardinal error is overgeneralization). The American reader unfamiliar with Italian individualism must be on guard against assuming Paulson's analysis applies to Italy in general (although it might well).

Read the last chapter of this book first, as it contains the best exposition of the author's approach to his problem, and without this, one loses the thread of the narrative. The interviews might have been edited a bit more, and the evaluation of them elaborated upon in more detail. Also I found the author's habit of using many perfectly translatable Italian words in this English text annoying (and it would be confusing to the reader who does not read Italian). But then this is a book for the specialist, in Italian politics and sociology, or in the sociological techniques of political science research, and for either one, a source of carefully documented insight into the political man.

—Douglas J. Harwood

The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town, by Belden Paulson, with Athos Ricci. Quadrangle Books, $6.95.

Antarktiko Defined

This attractive book is billed as the first definitive history of Antarctica. It is that, and more. It is also an authoritative report on the scientific work now being done there and of the beauty, mystery and danger of the place, all of which adds up to say that Antarctica is indeed now a "continent for science"—and little else!

Richard Lewis, the author, is the science writer for the Chicago Sunday Times and a recognized authority on Antarctica. He writes well for the layman on the history and science of the continent, covering such subjects as the mysteries of radio whistles and the reasons for cosmic particle study. He tells about fish found there without hemoglobin, the oxygen carrying compound of the blood, and about discoveries of coal and petrified wood, evidence of a once sub tropical Antarctica.

The history part is also deftly handled, beginning with the speculation by Greeks 2500 years ago that below the constellation "Arktos" lay a cold continent they called "Antarktiko." And there is the story of the first sighting of the Continent in 1820 by a 20-year-old captain from Connecticut, to the chagrin of his Russian rival. Then there is the drama of Scott who struggled to be the first to reach the pole only to find when he made it that Amundsen had been there a month earlier.

This highly readable book is illustrated with clear maps and many brilliant photographs. It is a must for the Antarctic traveler, with its practical information about living conditions there but it will also appeal to both the armchair adventurer and political scientist. The unique Antarctic Treaty for instance is examined because it has internationalized the area, prohibits nuclear explosions and provides adequate inspection. Thus this treaty may be the model for space agreements of the future.

Except for the lack of a reference map showing the earliest penetrations into Antarctic waters, and an answer to the question of what will happen to the "Continent for Science" should something of value be found there that can be exploited, this book is probably the most satisfactory book now available on Antarctica for the general reader.

—Giles M. Kelly

A Continent for Science—The Antarctic Adventure, by Richard S. Lewis. Viking, $7.95.

Science for Sale

This searching, and often angry, examination of federal science policy has led the author back through two decades in the attempt to document what he characterizes as "the Contract State." As in any good detective story the "crimes"—and the book is very critical of many individuals and government agencies—are recounted with relish.

Nieburg levels his heaviest guns at the Air Force, which "set in motion a rush to contract out practically everything that was not nailed to the floor"; at NASA for, among other things, "extravagant claims for a direct pay-
off from space exploration"; and at "RAND-like," non-profit "think factories" as "a bureaucracy vested with anonymity, its empire-building inaccessible to traditional correctives."

The major thesis recurs throughout the book but is best said toward the end: "Popular faith in the mystique of innovation, almost an end in itself, has provided a cover for the emergence of an industrial R&D and systems-engineering management cult with unparalleled private economic and public decision-making power. ... The public consensus for defense, space and science is distorted to serve the public decision-making power."

The author demonstrates a real capacity for political analysis — of Government, of corporations and within the academic world — and a thorough understanding of power structures. He has addressed himself to major issues of the domestic scene, but issues which are also increasingly important in international relations.

Science and technology exist today as islands in our foreign policy, as in many other areas of our lives. Looking forward to an integration of these areas with those of politics and economics, this frank and critical study of American science policy from the direction of political science has much to offer the serious student of foreign affairs.

—Dale Barnes


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"The Text is Also Good"

EGYPT, by Leonard Cottrell, was originally published in French in 1965 in the "Beaux Pays" series. It is a highly illustrated (164 pages of photographs), fussy, quarto volume of the sort people often thumb through on coffee tables, but rarely read. The photographs are predictably excellent but the text is also good for a change. It starts with a brief summary of Egyptian history and then takes the reader south from Alexandria to Nubia, describing the principal Pharaonic monuments enroute, with brief details on how to get to the less commonly-visited ones, and advice on which ones deserve a special effort.

Cottrell is very knowledgeable about Pharaonic Egypt and has many useful and interesting insights to impart. His book provides a good survey of Egyptian monuments and art and is a painless guide to the procession of the dynasties and the ebb and flow of Egyptian civilization. It is too pretty and too big, however, to use as a tourists' guide book, nor is it detailed enough. Rather, it is the sort of book to read before you come, or to buy after you have left Egypt and find your own pictures did not turn out too well.

This is the umpteenth such book to appear on Egypt in recent years; many of the others being much grander and more expensively illustrated. This particular book would be more deserving of its all-embracing title if it had devoted more text and pictures to the medieval Islamic monuments of Cairo. The period from the Arab conquest to the arrival of Napoleon is dispatched in one paragraph and three photographs.

—RICHARD B. PARKER

Taken for Granted?—The Counter Thrust

I T was one of the hallmarks of Livingston T. Merchant's successful two turns of duty as Ambassador to Canada that he recognized from the outset that Canadians and Americans, whatever they have in common, are two separate breeds. Not only did he recognize it, he enunciated it in public on sundry occasions. Canadians found it a welcome relief from the banal observations of American tourists, "you are exactly like us."

Dwelling on dissimilarities in temperament and tradition Ambassador Merchant shrewdly took action to bring back USIA into action in Canada. (It had been eliminated in some economy
wave on the ground that there was no good reason to spend money to inform good friends about American affairs.) Ambassador Merchant opined that friendship should be kept in good working order and that good friends surely deserved as much as enemies.

On the basis of his knowledge and perceptions Ambassador Merchant has assembled a book on Canada that covers many facets of Canadian life and Canadian-American relations. He obtained the individual contributions and supplied an Introduction and a last chapter "In Conclusion." In 165 pages we get:

"The Long Border," by Bruce Hutchison
"The Canadian Sense of Destiny," by I. Norman Smith
"United States Investment in Canada," by Michael Barkway
"American Business in Canada," by Ivan B. White
"The Complications of Continental Defence," by General Charles Foulkes
"Canada: Stern Daughter of the Voice of God," by Dean Acheson
"Can Improved Communication Help?" by James B. Reston

Ambassador Merchant sums up in these words: "We, as two peoples, I am sure, will remain close and loyal friends. We will never agree on everything or be free from problems. On the big issues in the world we will surely find agreement in the future as we have in the past; and even more intimate consultation than exists today can go far to assure a smoother, mutually respectful relationship. Finally, each of us must learn never to pay the curiously mixed insult and compliment of taking the other for granted."

Many reviews end on this note: "For all those who wish to inform themselves on Albania, this book will be indispensable." But this throws on the reader the responsibility of deciding if he wishes to know anything about Albania. This review will take no such easy way out. It will end on a more importunate note: All Americans should inform themselves on Canadian affairs and Ambassador Merchant has provided them with the perfect starter.

—HIRAM CALDWELL

NEIGHBORS TAKEN FOR GRANTED, edited by Livingston T. Merchant. Praeger. $4.95.

Useful

It depends on what you are looking for. If you expect to find in "The European Powers—1900-45" fresh facts, new insights or illuminating appraisals, you are condemned to disapp-pointment. If, however, you are looking for a swift, efficient compendium of the first forty-five years of our century, Martin Gilbert is your historian. Although the text covers only 291 pages, there is no sense of cramming or undue compression. There is a good bibliography and—to increase the book's usefulness—a good index.

—CHESTER B. IBBOT


The Next Day

THOSE who enjoyed reading "Friday, the Rabbi Slept Late" (presumably, all who did read it) will find many of the same characters, much of the same blend of murder mystery suspense and social commentary, and equal enjoyment in Harry Kemelman's "Saturday, the Rabbi Went Hungry."

The burning question is not so much can Kemelman score a success a third time, but what title he will use. Would you believe "Sunday, the Rabbi Went to Church"? Then would you believe? . . .

—S. I. NADLER


A great American career diplomat . . . the growth of American career diplomacy . . . and the significant years just before World War II in Japan

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by WALDO H. HEINRICHJS, JR.
Department of History, University of Tennessee

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—John Barkham, Saturday Review Syndicate. Illustrated with photos. $10.50 at all bookstores

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What's with the JFSOC?

The Junior Foreign Service Officers' Club—JFSOC—has been around for some seven years. It was formed about that long ago by a group of energetic junior officers in the Department who sensed an obvious community of interest without any kind of organization to go along with it. They created one. It has thrived since, picking up personnel and purpose along the way.

More than one senior officer at this point would break in with a couple of perfectly legitimate questions: why a separate and special organization for FSOs and FSRS of classes six through eight? Doesn't the Foreign Service Association serve and represent the Service as a whole? There are two main answers to this one. First, JFSOC is something more, not something else; it is an organization which in no sense competes with, but rather complements, the activities of the AFSA. This has always been the case, but has become even more so since JFSOC representatives became participants in the Association's deliberations. The representative Club member—who typically is an AFSA member in good standing—wouldn't have it any other way.

The main argument for a distinct junior officers' organization derives naturally enough from the place of the junior officer in the scheme of things in Washington. It is, for

JFSOC's President

Anthony Wallace, President of the Junior Foreign Service Officers' Club, is a newcomer to the Department. He entered the Foreign Service in 1965 after graduating from Georgetown University and serving a tour in the Army. Unlike the rest of his Basic Course classmates, he was assigned to Washington. Under the rotational assignment program, he went first to the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc and then to AID for a year in the Office of Development Planning, Bureau for Latin America. He and his wife, the former Louise Dailey, are off to Quito this Spring. Mr. Wallace has devoted most of his energies as President of the Junior Officers' Club to enhancing the group's role as professional spokesman for Junior Officers. He serves as an ex officio member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Service Association and is helping to increase social and professional contacts between the Association and the Junior Officers' Club.
example, altogether appropriate for the younger FSO or FSR here to have professional contacts with his contemporaries in the Embassies and elsewhere in government—but these don’t often come about unless he takes the initiative. It is rewarding and useful for him to develop social contacts in the same circles—but guest lists at Embassy receptions tend to have a built-in cutoff point at or about the 0-5 level. It is to everyone’s benefit that serious interchanges take place between junior officers and their high-level Department colleagues—but such exchanges tend not to take place individually or on a chance basis. Given these circumstances and others like them—the list could be extended—the JFSOC provides its members with a degree of access and leverage which they might individually find difficult to acquire. That it has done so successfully is born out statistically: membership now stands at around 165, and the trend is up.

Part of the Club’s success has had to do with a well-established social program. The annual highlight, of course, is the Independence Day Reception, which on July 4 brings together junior officers and their diplomatic counterparts, along with senior Department officials, Members of Congress, and, not infrequently the Secretary himself. The International Junior Diplomats’ Ball, an annual winter affair, is the other large-scale social event sponsored by the JFSOC and, like the July 4th Reception, takes place on the Department’s 8th floor.

Not well-publicized, but no less useful, are the monthly luncheons held jointly with IJDIW members; these afford an opportunity for discussion with middle- and lower-echelon diplomats stationed in Washington.

During the past year, however, JFSOC has developed into something more than a socially-oriented association. Given the recent anxiety of junior officers about aspects of the personnel system, and their future within it, perhaps it was natural that the JFSOC should become a vehicle for these concerns. In any case, it quite unequivocally has.

This new orientation toward professional questions can best be said to date from May 8, 1966, when Club officers met with Mr. Crockett and members of his staff to explore the question in some detail. Nothing was resolved in any final sense, but the twelve officers who put their names to the May 4 memorandum which led to the meeting didn’t skirt the issue: “the Foreign Service must appeal to the excellent. To do this it must offer competitive salaries, responsible jobs, prestige, and the opportunity to develop one’s talent. Many junior officers—by all indications a majority—believe that the Foreign Service is presently deficient in all these respects.”

The JFSOC hasn’t been quite the same since. The May 4 memorandum triggered discussion which was not confined to classes 6-8. While some officers characterized the whole approach as a self-serving one on the part of the Service’s junior members, most saw it in a broader context, noting that the ability of the Service to attract and then hold able young officers is only momentarily a problem for the junior officers themselves. In the months that followed, JFSOC members were given the opportunity to pursue career questions further, with Ambassador Joseph Palmer, then Director General, and his successor, Ambassador John M. Steeves.

It was not long before the AFSA itself responded generously to the new initiatives in the junior officer ranks. Anthony Wallace, JFSOC President, was invited to join the Association’s Board of Directors on an ex officio basis, following the Chairman’s observation that “the future success of the Association depends in no small measure upon the extent to which younger officers become involved in its affairs and shape its policies.” Two junior officers were also selected to serve on the Journal’s Editorial Board. The JFSOC was asked to place a representative on the Association’s Career Principles Committee—and, not content with that, an ad hoc Career Principles Working Group has been formed and is active within the Club itself.

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Among Our Contributors

Our cover artist, HILDA VAN STOCKUM, came to Washington with her husband, E. R. Marlin, in 1935. Miss van Stockum studied at the Hibernian Academy of Art in Dublin and the National Academy of Fine Arts in Amsterdam. She also spent a year at the Corcoran and her entry in the 1937 Biennial Exhibition at the Gallery was one of a group chosen to tour the principal cities of the United States. In 1964 Miss van Stockum visited her daughter in Kenya and our cover is one of her impressions from that visit. Miss van Stockum is also the author of eighteen children's books, the latest, "Mogo's Flute," was published by Viking Press last fall.

D. BRUCE JACKSON, author of "On Getting into the Kitchen," has served in Manila and the Department. He is a member of the Board of JFSOC and has served as vice chairman of the JFSOC Career Principles Committee, which he helped organize in the summer of 1965. So far he has successfully avoided serving in the administrative area, but he admits that this article may jeopardize his claims to being a Soviet affairs specialist.

JAMES A. RAMSEY, a former Foreign Service officer who is frequent contributor to the JOURNAL, has just returned from a three-month tour of fifteen European countries, both East and West. He offers in this month's issue his impressions of the changing US relationships with that Continent.

JONATHAN DEAN, at present Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department, Robert Bowie, has served in the Department, Prague, Elisabethville (at the time of the Katanga secession), the National War College and as Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs. Mr. Dean's views on the promotion of junior officers appear on page 21 of this issue.

FREDERIC L. CHAPIN, now assigned to BEX, was a member of the JOURNAL'S Editorial Board for many years and has been a contributor to the JOURNAL'S pages for an even longer time. Mr. Chapin's article appears on page 22.

JEAN STODDARD, brought up in Poland as the daughter of the American Military Attaché and educated in France, spent many years in Latin America before returning to Europe in 1956 with her husband, John C. Stoddard, and four children. They lived in Florence for five years where Mr. Stoddard was head of the USIS. After Florence came Thailand, Laos and Yugoslavia, then a Rome assignment a year ago. Mrs. Stoddard's first-hand account of the Florentine flood damage starts on page 16.

ALEXANDER J. DAVIT writes, "I am a Pennsylvania of the World War II crop of FSOS who trained at Lathrop House. I have served at Damascus, Port Elizabeth, Tangier, Kuala Lumpur, Paris and Washington in my fair share of 'main stream' and 'grunt' (to use Junior FSO parlance) jobs. I am assigned to the other side of the river as Coordinator of Junior Officer Training, enjoying every minute of it, and probably learning more than I am teaching."
true elite, but this controversial thesis is not essential to the third track concept. The establishment of a third track with a clearly defined rationale and with a visible advantage in developing executive excellence would in itself attract the most versatile officers, without the need for alienating existing elites by demoting them to a status of "technicians." The simple device of designating officers as either FSO-Specialist or FSO-Generalist would establish all the necessary distinctions without disrupting existing status symbols. The specialist would remain identified as the elite professional that he is and would have the opportunity to develop further his professionalism; the generalist would relinquish the chance of becoming truly expert in one field in exchange for the chance to become broadly knowledgeable in several and to move as fast as possible towards the challenges and frustrations of executive responsibility. For the specialist, the danger of being thrown assignments totally removed from career interests could be greatly reduced; for the generalist the tedium of doing similar things for years could be similarly avoided. The rationalization of both the specialist and the generalist track could give both a more authoritative voice in the formulation and elaboration of policy. The creation of a separate elite-generalist category need not imply a ceiling on the advancement of specialists, for near the top there must be a reconvergence of specialist and generalist. The generalists who become policymakers at the highest levels invariably wish to refer not to other generalists but to high-level specialists, and for the Service to abdicate its role in producing such specialists would be as senseless as to neglect the development of executive talent.

A corollary of these points is of course a rationalizing of the role of the staff corps. No proposal for enhancing the professionalism of the FSO corps can prosper if the Service keeps expanding to take in non-professional jobs. A large proportion of jobs in the administrative, consular, and commercial fields do not attract the professional-calibre officers entering the Service via examination, and attempts to fill such jobs with FSOs merely invite discontent. They are jobs which need to be done expertly and by persons with a commitment to overseas service, yet they cannot sensibly be fitted into the pattern of professional specializations of the officer corps. Filling them with an expanded and strengthened staff corps would not only improve FSO morale and strengthen FSO professionalism, but it would also tend to raise the prestige of those administrative and consular positions which are more than "housekeeping" or "visa-stamping."

Finally, one must answer the doubts over the "content" of the third track which arise among Foreign Service traditionists faced with what appear to be manifestations of a managerial syndrome in the original proposal. Since when, they will ask, is "individual brilliance" out of place for the good executive, and why is "organizational caution" any more a characteristic of the good diplomat than the good manager? How can the "technicians" of the diplomatic arts and of the stamping of passports be fitted under the same umbrella except in the controlled climate of an organizational charting room? Finally, given that foreign affairs executives must have a strong background in economics and must appreciate the value and applicability of "management tools" such as PPBS and FAPS, isn't the degree of immersion in these specialities suggested in the proposal likely to make the third track just a new specialty?

The Challenge: A New Synthesis

The answers to these criticisms must be found above the polemic, not within it. The foreign affairs executive must be the synthesizer of both cultures, of both myths, rather than the exponent of either. He must understand the calculus of the managerial "theory x and theory y" and the anti-calculus of personalism in diplomacy, without becoming a captive of

KITCHEN (Continued from page 27)
either. Specifically, any third track cannot be a “track” in the sense of a totally separate path of clearly defined steps; it must remain broadly fluid and deeply involved in the stuff of foreign affairs: the traditional negotiating, reporting, and representational functions plus those of economic assistance, information, intelligence, and military affairs. It must be identified more by its dynamics than by its content. Unlike the track of the FSO-Specialist, in which long assignments would be emphasized to make maximum use of specialized qualifications, the executive career framework would emphasize shorter assignments tailored to the wider-ranging needs of future program direction. Lateral movement into responsible positions in other foreign affairs agencies would provide the diversity of experience essential to executives who must plan and implement programs cutting across agency boundaries. Training in the theories of management, supervision, and systems analysis could be an important fact of the generalist career pattern, but not the central one. Details or sabbaticals for work on Capitol Hill or in American universities would be highly desirable additions to the pattern, both for their educational value for the officers concerned and for the increased understanding of the Foreign Service which would be fostered in these critically important outside groups. Finally, the executive pattern would have to be even more highly competitive than the existing “elite” system, for the line between the brilliant generalist who can command the respect of diverse specialists and the jack-of-all-trades who can command the respect of none is drawn very high on the scale of human ability.

The problem of executive leadership has recently been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. A recurrent finding of such studies has been that outstanding federal executives are not those who have worked steadily towards the top of a career ladder, but rather those who have followed highly unorthodox upward paths leading through challenging experiences in several fields. If this is so, one is led to ask, why not abandon the idea of a “career” for would-be-executives altogether, rather than attempting the difficult mixture of diversity and continuity required in an executive track. Yet not to make such an attempt would amount to an abdication of foreign affairs leadership, an acceptance of “technician” status in the foreign affairs process, and an invitation to the most imaginative and talented of the younger generation to get out of the Service and pursue challenge and excellence in related fields or sister agencies. The Foreign Service actually has a unique chance to achieve the needed synthesis. It has a unique breadth of mandate—to run American foreign affairs, not merely to staff an agency; it has a unique tradition of eliteness—a chance to retain people who in any other agency would already have left to choose their own unorthodox outside paths upward; and it has a unique tradition of smallness—a chance to avoid the sluggish mediocrity which tends to be the result of the endlessly subdivided decision-making of big bureaucracies.

Within the corps itself, there are ample resources. There are officers in the ranks who would rather be assistant secretaries than ambassadors, who would rather combine policy-making with a little insecurity than policy-elaboration with great security, who would rather have a 20-year career of higher challenge and reward and faster selection out than a 30-year career of evenly paced advancement. There are many who would rather see the kitchen hotter and the confection more meaningful than see a kitchen secure from outsiders but representing only a fraction of foreign affairs decision-making. The factors are all there, and they would grow dramatically once a real momentum was visible in the direction of grooming true foreign affairs leadership. It is my hope that the tolerance which has been shown to the “junior officer ferment” is in part a recognition of the fact that this ferment is one important guarantee that the Foreign Service of the future will not fail to claim its presidential mandate.
at a point in life when professional attitudes are in a formative stage. The Foreign Service promotion system is based on the principle of competition. Exposing young officers to the full impact of a heavily competitive system from the very outset of their service may stimulate productivity and performance. It may, however, have some unintended side effects whose cumulative result may be a net loss for the Service. Among these side effects are an excessive sense of hierarchy and rank among some young officers at an early phase of professional development. With the junior officer almost wholly dependent in the early years of his service on two or three efficiency reports from his immediate superiors, he is constrained by the factual situation to think in this formative stage of his professional outlook in terms of this dependence on their good will and approval. In a Service and in a society which is increasingly structured and organized, this situation intensifies already high pressures for conformity. Young officers often have not yet developed the character or the experience to withstand the pressures it generates.

The net long-term result, given emphasis by this early exposure, may be a trait of cautious conservatism which dampens intellectual initiative. This is a normal and probably unavoidable aspect of any hierarchic organization, but its effect should, where possible, be deliberately minimized. If dependence of the junior officer on his immediate supervisors in this formative stage of his professional outlook could be reduced, the pressures for conformity might be lessened.

Again, overemphasis on competition at this early stage of personal and professional development can encourage personal rivalry, ruthlessness and egoism at the expense of mutual support and cooperation in a joint enterprise. It diminishes the possibility of the growth of a healthy esprit de corps.

Furthermore, the competitive approach and dependence for promotion on written efficiency reports tends to inhibit the adventurous spirit of young officers and make them reluctant to serve in other agencies and activities where their efficiency reports would be prepared by persons unused to the Foreign Service system and whose competence as a rater may not be given full weight by promotion panels. This situation could be improved by use of a different promotion procedure.

It is possible under the Foreign Service Act to have a promotion system for junior officers where promotion through the first three classes of the Service is to a larger extent than at present a question of time served in grade. Promotion into Classes 7, 6, and 5 could, as a standard procedure, follow two years of service in the prior class.

The present efficiency rating system could be retained; but the system of formal annual promotion panels for entry into Classes, 7, 6, and 5 would be dropped. Instead, efficiency ratings would be reviewed throughout the year by boards composed of qualified persons (including public members and retired Foreign Service officers) which could recommend separation in cases of extremely poor performance and more rapid advancement in a few cases of truly remarkable performance. These boards would consider only these two categories of personnel for action and the large remaining majorities would be advanced regularly. The present rigorous system of competitive selection would begin with promotion from Class 5 to Class 4.

The proposed system of junior officer promotion would provide a six to eight-year apprenticeship period before entry into Class 5. In this period, chance inequities of first assignments could be balanced out, character and performance developed, and some of the injurious side effects of the competitive system removed. With a larger officer corps than foreseen by the drafters of the 1946 Foreign Service Act, this approach, which would provide prior knowledge of grade for placement and assignment, would also make for simpler, more efficient management of the junior officer group.

CHANCE (Continued from page 21)
ARGYRIS (Continued from page 30)

This is not to say that the Department and the Foreign Service do not have problems. They do. For example, on the vital question of conformity, I have found (in a study I am making) that this was a serious concern of junior officers as they viewed making this a serious conformity, of which more I hope, do not need the shock treatment one of us every day. Men of integrity, our organization probably has less of conformity, as does our entire society. Every organization has pressures for conformity, as does our entire society. The findings of the studies and research in this field in the past 20 years are important and relevant, and we should all be familiar with them, not least because of the need to evaluate the analyses and recommendations of specialists in the field.

Having found certain characteristics in our organization (which other organizations have) and having assumed that they are the whole cause of the alleged difficulties, Dr. Argyris then prescribes his special medicine. It consists mainly of "sensitivity training" in "T-Group" sessions, referred to as management conferences in the introduction to his article.

The T-Group consists of ten to fifteen participants, living together for perhaps a week. There is a leader, usually a trained social psychologist. He does not exert control, but guides the group to productive learning situations. The T-Group has no agenda; it makes its own rules in a highly permissive atmosphere, seeking to deal with the topic, organizational effectiveness. Some of the participants may be impatient to get started; some take their time; some tend to dominate. As sessions progress, the men analyze their own experiences in the struggle to create a working group. Eventually, through mutual trust (say the sponsors), they tell each other how they feel and what they see—frankly, freely and fully, and often brutally. The goal is to foster in the participant a greater insight into himself, an awareness of his impact on other people, an increased sensitivity to the feelings of others, and a better understanding of others and himself. In addition to the formal sessions, there may be panel exercises, lectures and demonstrations, all on the general theme of organization effectiveness, motivation and leadership. (This explanation is adapted from the literature of the movement.)

The T-Group method is still experimental. Although the sponsors say this is not the case, it partakes of psychoanalysis, group therapy and even of psychiatry. The "trainer" is a psychologist and the psychiatric aspect comes in the actions of the rest of the group, under the manipulation of the trainer, building up emotional tension, breaking down defenses and exposing weaknesses, and then trying to restore self-respect. This is close to the practice of psychiatry by amateurs—a questionable business.

The process of laying bare for general discussion some of one's defects of temperament, character and "interpersonal style" may sometimes be salutary, but it is an invasion of...
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privacy (compounded in the present case by publication of the results) and it can be a degrading, painful and even traumatic process. I have heard that there has been one suicide in another agency. A recent press account said that over 20,000 persons had taken these courses and that "only" eight (none of them FSOs) had suffered nervous breakdowns. The sponsors explained this by saying that these eight persons had taken that over 20,000

findings and research of behavioral science was "useful" or "interesting" and too early to judge the long-range effect. Therefore, if I start the day under the first set of good circumstances, I really should choose good Type B, and under the second set of bad circumstances, bad Type A. But the rules of the game demand just the opposite. This contradiction, however, adds a therapeutic element of conflict to the game.

Let me sound two notes of caution. First, regardless of circumstances, never let a predictable pattern of choice between Types become detectable. If, for instance, you are in EUR and a Type B from AF discovers which days he can count on your being Type A, you are thus in danger of surprisecgression and subject to injury in the name of organizational loyalty, while you yourself are restrained from telling him to go to hell. Secondly, it is inadvisable to play the game to excess—you might split your id, you know.

In conclusion, when you tire of my game, don't be a behavioral type yourself. And knowing my colleagues better, I think, than does Chris Argyris, you'll be great!

David H. McKillop
Washington, D. C.

"Fresh and Useful Insights"

I trust that this letter will be one of many agreeing with Dr. Argyris' article in the January issue and testifying to the benefits of "sensitivity training," with whose experimental application to Foreign Service groups Dr. Argyris has been associated.

People sometimes argue about the desirability of improving "the system" as opposed to the need to recruit more "good people"—as though either of the two courses were the answer, as though we could afford to choose one to the exclusion of the other.

The Foreign Service needs "good people." If we could recruit a lot more outstanding people, and hold them, the Service would be able to handle yesterday's problems in very superior fashion without materially changing the traditional system (or systems, since living, thinking, organizational and other systems all have a bearing on our performance as a Service).

To cope with tomorrow's problems, we are going to have to improve both systems and people. In my opinion, the urgency and the feasibility of improving systems are much greater than the realistic likelihood of recruiting the requisite number of officers and employees of the higher levels of competence that would be necessary to fit the traditional system for all the challenges that lie ahead. The ability of the Foreign Service to attract good recruits is great but not unlimited, and it does not seem to be growing. Further, to place too much emphasis on recruiting better people is shortsighted as well as unfair to many now in the Service. Our greatest resource for the future may well be our officers and employees whose abilities are underutilized at present. Some of our personnel wastage may be because of sub-standard quality, but in many cases the employee's alleged mediocrity is in fact the product of all our systems—thinking, working and "living" systems.

Dr. Argyris' analysis and recommendations are directed not only at improving some of the systems in which we live and work, but also at raising the competence of our people, through the reduction or elimination of barriers to effective communication among them as well as by making the Service a more attractive environment for "good people." He deserves our gratitude and his work merits our most dispassionate study. It would be surprising if any anthropologist could explore all the room for improvement in the norms and operations of a tribe like ours without errors of detail. I believe most of Dr. Argyris' recommendations are sound and realistic. Others may disagree; but I don't see how anyone who reads Dr. Argyris' article without bias can fail to obtain some fresh and useful insights as to how we might try to improve the Service. And we need all the fresh insights we can get.

David L. Osborn
Minister
Tokyo

More letters (pro and con) on the Argyris Report will appear in the April JOURNAL.
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