FSJ

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

NOVEMBER 1973

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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

NOVEMBER 1973: Volume 50, No. 11

DEPARTMENTS

COVER: "Road to Port Swettenham," by Earl J. Wilson

 The Foreign Service Journal is published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037. Telephone (202) 338-4045

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D. C.

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

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For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); $6.00; two years, $10.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life.*

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

FSJ EDITORIAL

New Tasks

On October 13 Secretary Kissinger announced a number of new appointments to high level positions within the Department. In terms of improving the efficiency of the Department, revamping personnel policies, creating an effective employee management relations system, and enhancing the professionalism of the Foreign Service, two of these appointments are of particular importance.

As the new Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Secretary Kissinger chose L. Dean Brown; for Director General, Nathaniel Davis. AFSA, for its part, is delighted with these choices. In AFSA's view, the officials who bear the primary responsibility for the effective administration of the Foreign Service should be career officers who have shared our common experiences and who, in addition to their managerial competence, have substantial backgrounds in the substance of foreign policy. The Foreign Service Act grants us a substantially greater degree of self-management than is the case for most domestic agencies. This was not an act of largess on the part of Congress, but rather a recognition of the fact that administration does not exist for its own ends, and that the proper goal of the management of the Foreign Service is to advance the foreign policy of the United States.

If the appointments of Ambassadors Brown and Davis are an auspicious sign, we should be, nonetheless, quick to point out that they have a great deal of work ahead of them. The most important task will be a substantial revamping of the entire personnel system, so that the system not only meets today's immediate needs, but also serves to identify, promote and develop the senior talent needed by the Foreign Service in the future. The present personnel system, which focuses solely on today's needs, has done serious harm to the future health of the service, and has substantially undermined the concept of advancement on the basis of merit. In this regard, we would urge the new leadership to make a careful reexamination of the past managers' unwise, shortsighted decision to downgrade substantially the level of a large number of Foreign Service jobs.

In the second place, much still needs to be done to provide the Foreign Service with the kind of due process standards which will guarantee to every member of the Foreign Service fair and equitable treatment on each of the major decisions which affects his career, whether it be promotion, assignment, conversion of status, or separation. Urgently needed in this context is a new grievance system with its fundamental features firmly grounded in legislation. Another major requirement is new policies to preclude the misuse of the FSR appointment authority for political ends, or as a means of circumventing the career service, and clear-cut unambiguous merit procedures for the hiring of FSRs and their conversion to FSRU. This remains an area where the Department's procedures are unbearably sloppy and where the capacity to undermine the career service is very great.

Finally, the third major task will be to make the employee management relations system truly effective. If there is to be a new foreign policy consensus, if the foreign affairs professionals are to be engaged in the policy process, if we are to have a new flourishing of creativity and intellectual excitement in foreign affairs, and if we are to bring about a substantial reinvigoration of the Foreign Affairs Agencies, it will be essential to give real meaning to the intent of the Executive Order under which we and the Department are supposed to codetermine the policies and procedures which affect our careers. To do so will require far-sighted managers who recognize not only the fairness but the utility of genuinely codetermining personnel policies and procedures, and who recognize that while differences between management and AFSA are unavoidable, that we seek the same goals and should work together to create the best possible Foreign Service. AFSA, for its part, stands prepared to work closely with the new Deputy Under Secretary and the new Director General to achieve these goals.

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

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"The Dodo never had a chance. He seems to have been invented for the sole purpose of becoming extinct and that was all he was good for."—Will Cuppy

Mr. Mocking and the Dodo-lings

ROBERT EHRMAN

A DODO BIRD appeared at the Civil Service Commission to apply for a job with the government. The personnel director gave the bird a sympathetic smile.

"What kind of work are you interested in?"

"I'd like to help the Wildlife Service restore the balance of Nature."

"Excellent!" said the director. "What experience have you had?"

"A great deal. I became extinct because of Man."

"It's nice to have you back," beamed the director. "I'll send you over to the Wildlife Service right away. I'm sure they'll want to talk to you."

The next day the personnel director's telephone rang. "Hello," said a voice. "This is Mr. Mocking of the Wildlife Service."

"Mocking? I don't believe I know you."

"You don't," replied the voice. "I just took over as head of the bird section. Say, p.d., about that dodo bird you sent us. Amazing versatility! We're trying to find out how he does it."

"How he does what?"

"How he succeeds in being extinct and extant at one and the same time. It's quite a puzzle."

"Why should it be," said the director. "Some government officials manage it quite nicely."

"You may have a point," conceded Mr. Mocking. "Anyway, while we're waiting for the security check, the dodo's papers are being processed by our new administrative officer. He's a tropical snail, likes to do things at his own pace, so it may take a while. But I'm not complaining—we support upward mobility for minority groups."

Since his retirement from USIA Robert Ehrman has been freelancing for various publications and organizations, including the JOURNAL *and the Voice of America. He is presently concentrating on completing a novel based on the 1936 murder trial of an American physician during extra-territorial days in North China. Mr. Ehrman served with USIA in Africa, India, Germany, the Philippines, Thailand and Washington.*

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"Yes, indeed," said the personnel director. "Well, I look forward to meeting you soon. What's your first name?"

"Mocking is the only name I have. I'm a mocking bird. They hired me because they knew I could mimic a Federal official—and do it at a lower salary."

A week went by before Mr. Mocking called. "We're up against a roadblock," he said. "Our security chief is prying into the dodo's background but can't get anything on him."

'Hmn," mused the personnel director. "Low potential for advancement."

"He has no living relatives," continued Mr. Mocking, "no associates, no fixed address, nothing. All we know is that he became extinct about 1670."

The director raised an eyebrow. "Extinct for 300 years? No one in government has been extinct *that* long. Goes against our policy of encouraging early retirement."

"But wait till you hear this!" fluttered Mr. Mocking. "He said he came back to earth to re-create the species. Man had caused it to become extinct, but the spirit of the dodo bird found a way to reincarnate itself. That's what he said."

"That settles it," said the director. "You've heard of psychopaths who think they're Napoleon or Cleopatra. Your dodo bird thinks he's a dodo bird, so he's mentally ill. Tell him he's fired before he's hired!"

Two days later, Mr. Mocking was on the phone again. "We've laid an egg!" he shouted.

"So what?" the personnel director said cheerfully. "We do it all the time."

"No, no, no!" Mr. Mocking cried. "Not us, the bird. The dodo bird has laid an egg!"

"So tell him to take his egg and clear out."

"But he won't budge!" Mr. Mocking wailed. "I told him he's fired, but he says we're not to disturb him while he's hatching "

"Let's stop calling him a HE," said the director. "If HE laid an egg, it must be a SHE."

"Except," countered Mr. Mocking, "that this could be the male sitting on the egg for his mate. Some he and she birds take turns."

"Mr. Mocking, surely you know whether the bird is male or female. After all, you're a bird yourself."

"But I'm only a little mocking bird, and I know nothing about dodos. I might determine the sex by looking real close, but he won't let me come near. He, or she, is very big and strong."

"But who is the father," persisted the director, "or who is the mother?"

"We haven't a clue, and we wonder if there even *is* a mother and a father."

"Come, come, are you suggesting that the egg has no mother—no, I mean that the egg was laid without the usual, uh, cooperation?"

"At this moment, p.d., anything seems possible. He's a strange creature, this dodo, as if he really did come

(*Continued on page* 26)

"The Good Samaritan was the man who stopped and helped. The others in the parable just passed by. They did not injure the man—they just passed by."—Thomas Melady

THE UNITED STATES AND BURUNDI IN 1972

ROGER MORRIS, MICHAEL BOWEN, GARY FREEMAN, AND KAY MILLER

THROUGH the spring and summer of 1972, there took place in Burundi the systematic killing of as many as a quarter million people. Most eyewitnesses now agree that over a four-month period men, women and children were murdered at the rate of more than 1,000 a day. It was, wrote UN observers, a "staggering" disaster.

Based primarily on interviews with responsible officials, this report traces the reaction of the United States government to genocide in Burundi. It is largely a record of indifference, inertia and irresponsibility.

Michael Bowen graduated in 1973 from Rockhurst College in Kansas City, Missouri. Gary Freeman is a graduate student at the University of Houston, Houston, Texas. Kay Miller graduated in 1972 from Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Roger Morris has worked in the State Department, on the National Security Council Staff, and as Legislative Assistant to Senator Walter F. Mondale.

This is a shortened version of a study sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Comment would be welcomed by both the JOURNAL *and the Endowment.*

Though the Department of State knew the enormity of what was happening in Burundi relatively early, it relied upon a diplomacy which had little chance of relieving the tragedy—and which some in the government fully expected to fail. Though that failure soon became obvious, policy-makers then stood by for nearly four months, rejecting out of hand a proposal to examine American economic support of the regime presiding over the murders. They ignored as well the findings of the Department's own Legal Adviser for African Affairs regarding obligations under international law. They repeatedly misled the Congress, albeit the appropriate Congressional Committees failed equally to oversee policy.

When the State Department finally decided to review policy in the fall, after the carnage in Burundi had seemingly run its course, there was even doubt that Washington's "displeasure" had been conveyed honestly to Burundi. Publicly, the US government never spoke out on the horror in Burundi.

The killings in Burundi in 1972 were rooted in a long history of ethnic rivalry. The 14 per cent Tutsi minority have ruled the 85 per cent Hutu majority since the 16th century with recurrent violence. Adding to the tension were events in neighboring Rwanda, where the Hutu, in the same six-to-one majority, had seized power and, in 1964, had killed thousands of Tutsi.

US relations with Burundi were generally cooler than with most other African states. There was, as US officials saw it, a general suspicion by the Tutsi of the historical friendship between American Protestant missionaries and the Hutu. "Since Catholic missionaries were favored by the Belgians," explained one US analyst, "the Protestants had been sent out to the boondocks. . . . This was just an accident of history; we got the nobodies." And according to one policymaker, there was some reckoning of American interest in the Hutu majority. "We figured that eventually the Hutu were going to run the country, and it just made good sense to stay close to them," the source recalled. "Of course we didn't think then," he added, "that Micombero was going to embark on the final solution."

To overcome this Tutsi anti-Americanism was the main mission, as he saw it, of the Ambassador to Burundi, Thomas Melady. Appointed in late 1969, Melady was a prominent Roman Catholic layman who had authored books and articles on Africa. By all accounts, Melady was successful in improving relations with the Tutsi. "He had quite a lot of contact with Burundian officials," recalled a Foreign Service officer who saw his cables to Washington, "and he told them every chance he got that the United States was absolutely impartial as between Tutsi and Hutu, that their relations were their own affair, and he apparently got through to them."

But US relations with Burundi involved more than diplomacy. For years, American importers have been buying almost the entire output of Burundi's single-crop economy—a mild arabica coffee. From 1967 to 1971, for example, US purchases accounted for more than 65 per cent of Burundi's export earnings.

Moreover for the principal US importer—Folgers Coffee, which is the second largest roaster in the United States and controls some 20 per cent of the world coffee market —the $11-$20 million Burundian crop was of only marginal importance. As a United States Government expert summed it up, "Burundi's coffee wouldn't make or break Folgers."

But the coffee trade did not affect the people of the country as deeply as the figures might suggest. An average of little more than $5 a year reaches the roughly 300,000 family growers, who are mainly Hutu. The remaining millions in coffee earnings go to Tutsi. "They dominate the government and the board and even the cooperative," said one long-time observer, "and then if you think of the taxes that flow back, any way you cut it up the money goes to the people in power, and that's the Tutsi."

But in the spring of 1972, none of this seemed important—and some of it was unknown—to the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs or to the American Embassy in Burundi. Against the background of American relations with Africa in general, the trend seemed to be away from concern with countries such as Burundi. The Nixon Doctrine has postulated a reduction of interest and involvement nearly everywhere. In the aftermath of Vietnam, there was a national aversion to possible foreign entanglements, and a wariness, in and out of government, of what many saw as a moralism in US policy which had drawn the country into the tragedy in Southeast Asia.

In Washington's African policy, all this mingled with a long-standing conviction in the State Department that the United States—seen by Africans as a rich, white outsider—neither could nor should concern itself with internal affairs on the Continent unless invited by the Africans. Moreover, relations with Africa at this point seemed strained in the wake of the passage by Congress of the Byrd Amendment, allowing unilateral importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions. Finally, of course, 1972 was an election year, adding still more to these distractions.

Then, suddenly, following an attempted Hutu coup on the night of April 29-30, 1972, Burundi plunged into a frenzy of killing. The events that ignited the slaughter in Burundi are not clear. What mattered for the United States was that events moved swiftly beyond the suppression of the April uprising, whatever its character. By mid-May, said a high US official, "we started getting disturbing reports that the government was not just mopping up the rebels, but trying to punish the whole Hutu tribe." "It was clear the government [of Burundi] had a hand in it," admitted an American policymaker, "because the repression was systematic." In September, an American Universities Field Staff report on Burundi, which US officials uniformly judged accurate, summarized the killing:

> . . . the four Hutu members of the cabinet, all the Hutu officers and virtually all the Hutu soldiers in the

> armed forces; half of Burundi's primary school teachers; and thousands of civil servants, bank clerks, small businessmen, and domestic servants. At present (August) there is only one Hutu nurse left in the entire country, and only a thousand secondary school students survive.

By the last week in May, the US had what an observer in the White House remembered as "vivid" reports of "massive" killing in Burundi, including executions by hammer and nails when army units ran short of ammunition. State Department Intelligence placed Tutsi casualties in the initial *coup* in the hundreds and Hutu dead from reprisals above 100,000. "By the end of May," said a key Congressional aide, "we knew it was genocide from officially classified information from the State Department."

A June 21 telegram from the US Embassy in Burundi, later published in the New York TIMES, reported "selective genocide," and described burial alive, the "summary" slaughter of returning refugees promised safe conduct, and executions not only of the Hutu elite, but also of the "masses of villagers and refugees throughout the country." At about the same time, an intelligence memorandum circulated with the State Department concluded that, "There is no doubt the Government [in Burundi] is engaged in selective genocide."

Three weeks later, correspondents from the New York TIMES and Washington POST were finally admitted to Burundi and filed first-hand stories. Their dispatches only bore out the picture already formed in official telegrams and other intelligence accumulating in Washington.

These reports prompted the first (and nearly the last) Congressional interest in Burundi. On June 12, Senator John Tunney (D., Calif.) introduced resolutions urging investigations by both the UN and the OAU. Kennedy, telling the Senate that the Hutu were being "slaughtered at the rate of nearly 3,000 per day," asked, "Should not governments condemn the killings?" Neither the Senate nor the House responded to these statements. Only Kennedy would raise the issue again briefly in the Senate. And after a few days of notoriety in June, Burundi largely disappeared also from the media.

From the outbreak, then, the US had ample intelligence on the extraordinary humanitarian crisis in Burundi. There was evidence of Congressional concern. But at the same time there were also equally clear indications of the indifference of other countries, particularly the Africans. And the policy the State Department now followed from May through July mirrored that indifference.

Ambassador Melady directed the initial US response, using his ambassadorial authority to suspend the United States' $500,000-a-year "self-help" aid program with Burundi, and immediately ordering large amounts of emergency aid, such as vaccines and bandages. "Melady'd had experience with this," a State Department officer noted. "He said get the aid, get it in there, don't worry about assurances, just get it in there. So Micombero had the aid and he had the missionaries asking for it, and he pretty much had to give it to them."

Melady also met personally with Micombero early in May. The Ambassador reportedly "impressed on Micombero the necessity of avoiding undue bloodshed" and got in return, as would his Belgian and French colleagues, assurances that the killings were over. Days later, amid still gathering reports of atrocities, Melady was instrumental in drafting a letter to Micombero from the Papal Nuncio on behalf of several diplomatic missions in Burundi. "It was a low key thing, saying we were concerned with their difficulties," said an official who reviewed the demarche in Washington, "but he [Micombero] knew what we were talking about, he knows we aren't stupid." Another official however, remembered the letter as "tactful . . . and it got no real response."

Then on May 25, despite the growing evidence of a major catastrophe, despite Melady's carefully nurtured relationship with the Micombero regime and his experience in the country, the Ambassador routinely left Burundi, as scheduled earlier, for reassignment as envoy to Uganda. Why the State Department should have taken this extraordinary step remains one of the puzzles of the Burundi episode. Melady's departure for his new assignment marked the end, for over three months, of direct initiatives by the United States toward the government of Burundi. Even when questions arose about the misuse of the American aid—including the suspicion, later confirmed, that relief food and medicines were used to lure Hutu to their deaths—there would be no protest or formal inquiry by the Embassy.

A June 21 telegram from the Embassy in Burundi . . . reported "selective genocide" and described burial alive, the "summary" slaughter of returning refugees promised safe conduct, and executions, not only of the Hutu elite, but also of the "masses of villagers and refugees throughout the country."

With Melady's departure at the end of May the embassy passed to the Charge d'Affaires, Michael Hoyt, a career officer with broad African experience who, by all accounts, continued the "vivid" reporting that kept Washington so well informed of the continuing nightmare in Burundi through the summer.

But by the end of May, American diplomacy shifted abruptly away from direct contact with the Micombero regime to efforts to involve the OAU, various African heads of state, and the United Nations. In a sense, this diplomacy was another routine step. "Naturally you try to get the Africans and the UN to cope with this kind of disaster," said one former official, "not only since they're likely to have more influence, but also because we want to encourage an international sense of responsibility in dealing with human rights. The tough choice comes when that doesn't work." That "tough choice" came early in the Burundi crisis.

Nearly all its members haunted by common problems of tribalism and national unity, the OAU had by 1972 acquired a long and frustrating history of unwillingness to become involved in the internal strife of member states. The limits to what the OAU could or would do in

Burundi were clear "very early," one US policy-maker acknowledged. On May 22, OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli had visited Burundi and publicly declared "solidarity" with Micombero. Then, at the OAU Summit in Rabat in late June, the Organization's Council of Ministers sent Micombero what amounted to a message supporting the repression:

> The Council of Ministers of the OAU has listened with interest to the presentation of your delegation concerning the events in Burundi. The Council of Ministers is convinced that, thanks to your saving action, peace will be rapidly reestablished, national unity will be consolidated, and territorial integrity will be preserved.

The State Department's ostensible reliance on the OAU in the Burundi crisis was at least tinged by cynicism. "The OAU never had a chance of acting . . . and we knew beforehand they would be the last organization to take any member nations to task," said one Foreign Service officer.

US efforts to persuade individual African heads-of-state to intercede also proved fruitless. Both President Mobutu of Zaire and President Nyerere of Tanzania spoke to Micombero. After meeting with Nyerere, according to a report received in Washington, "Micombero's face was strained when they came out." The killing continued unabated, however, despite these conversations.

Nor were US officials surprised by this failure. They pointed out that Mobutu was anxious to maintain good relations with Burundi, in order to frustrate Zairian rebels who had in the past successfully sought sanctuary there. These same officials observed that Nyerere's vantage point *vis-à-vis* Micombero was scarcely better than Mobutu's. "Nyerere felt like he had too much of a liberal image," one of them remembered. "He was afraid if he sounded off he wouldn't have too many friends left."

"We also went to Kenyatta," observed a senior US official, "but he did nothing, which is usual for him. If Kenya can stay uninvolved, that's the way he likes it."

In any event, the State Department never fully informed the Embassy in Burundi of the approaches to African leaders on which US policy was supposedly based. "I really don't know which leaders contacted Micombero," admitted an embassy officer.

Nor, according to officials, was the embassy seriously consulted about the United Nations action, on which Washington came to rely heavily by late June. Colleagues say Hoyt did not see until his return to Washington in late August the reports of the UN observer teams sent in June.

To some US officials, the UN role in the crisis was a familiar case of Washington having to prod the lethargic New York bureaucracy into doing its job. Other observers saw a new regime at work in the UN Secretariat in the persons of Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and Bradford Morse, the newly-appointed American Undersecretary-General. It was Morse, these sources say, who was deeply shocked by the first reports from Burundi and persuaded Waldheim to take the extraordinary step of flying to the OAU Summit to press for UN observer missions to Burundi. "The US certainly didn't do any initiating or persuading with us," said a UN aide. "They were falling over themselves to find out what we had decided to do."

At any rate, the small UN missions went to Burundi in late June and again at the end of July. And despite solicitous treatment by Micombero's government and the cross-currents of UN politics which kept their reports from publication, their findings were the basis for one of the few statements made in the international community on the Burundi bloodbath. At a press conference in Geneva on July 4, Secretary-General Waldheim confirmed that the first UN team had found awful suffering and that the dead might number as high as 200,000. To that announcement, there was angry rebuttal in Burundi and silence among the African states and in Washington.

There was no audible reaction elsewhere. After a brief outcry in the French Assembly stirred by press reports, there would be nothing more from the French government. In Europe, only the Belgians, the former colonial power, would speak out to condemn the genocide and withdraw all military and economic aid to Burundi. Whether in deference to the African refusal to intercede, or because the slaughter was largely unreported outside the US and European press, no other governments raised the issue in the UN or in any other forum.

To the press inquiries in June, US officials replied that they refused to play a "numbers game." There was no exact information on the dead, they claimed. Reports of genocide in Africa had been exaggerated before; why not in Burundi too? To Senator Kennedy in mid-June there were assurances that "the civil strife has ended," though the details composing Hoyt's "selective genocide" cable a week later were reportedly already in intelligence circulating in the State Department's African Bureau.

US officials went on assuming that their choices were severely circumscribed. In July, as throughout the crisis, policymakers remained convinced that the United States could only do what other African states approved.

For a bureaucracy which conceived its day-to-day job as the maintenance of untroubled relations with African governments, an independent American response to the Burundi killings threatened that mission. "If we'd involved ourselves in this," said an official, "we'd be creamed by every country in Africa for butting into an African state's internal affairs. We don't have an interest in Burundi that justified taking that kind of flak."

And though they rarely articulate it outside official circles, US diplomats apparently saw themselves disarmed in Burundi by the racial overtones peculiar to US relations with proud newly sovereign black states. One senior official explained, "most of them [Africans] responded to the crisis not on humanitarian lines, but in terms of Africa's image and the political effects of the situation on other African states." A State Department which watched African aid programs dwindling in the Congress, and which saw a growing public indifference in the US to a region earlier thought important, shared that African concern with "image" and the embarrassment to the whole continent in the savagery in Burundi. Also, the same State Department might well have felt most acutely the irony of a US position against violence in Burundi when African states were still witnessing the air war in Southeast Asia.

Whatever the complex mixture of motives the United States Government found reasons in the summer of 1972 to forego any real response to genocide in Burundi. But stifled in the State Department bureaucracy was another option, and quite another view of responsibility.

Most of the 80 per cent of Burundian coffee going to the United States had been sold only under a formal waiver voted by the buyer and seller member nations by the International Coffee Convention. With 40 per cent of buyer votes, the United States would have had the power to veto the annual Burundian request for a waiver when it was made in August 1972. Or the United States might have unilaterally embargoed Burundi's coffee through Presidential authority granted by the Congress. Short of legal action, Washington might simply have sought to persuade the American importer, Folgers Coffee, to forego purchases of Burundian coffee voluntarily.

Whatever the means of embargo, Washington could have threatened it, or imposed it temporarily, either to pressure the Micombero regime to try to stop the killings, or just to dissociate itself from any material support—in this case, major support—of a regime engaged in massive violations of human rights.

As for the potential impact of a coffee embargo, "it would be devastating, it would be a disaster economically," said a former Ambassador to Burundi. "Coffee's their lifeline," stressed a World Bank expert on Burundi, "they'd go bust." There was skepticism within the State Department, however, that any outside effort could have retrained the Micombero regime.

"The first consideration of the government there is always to maintain the Tutsi in power and the Hutu in subjugation. Everything else is secondary," cautioned one policy-maker. Yet the same official confessed that foreign money had influenced Burundi before. "Mobutu wanted to put a stop to Burundi's use as a staging area for Congolese rebels," he said, "and he accomplished this by the simple expedient of buying off Micombero."

The importance of the proposed coffee sanctions was not the specific actions, the tactics, or even whether an embargo assured an end to the slaughter. What was most significant is that the coffee proposal simply never received a serious hearing by those making policy. Presented with an alternative course when every other approach had failed and the human toll in Burundi was continuing to mount, responsible officials seem to have dismissed a change in policy almost instinctively.

Genocide is a specific, legal term with a precise meaning. It boils down to trying to kill a whole people. The Burundi Government didn't try to do that: they couldn't . . . Perhaps they engaged in mass murder; they weren't guilty of genocide.

There seems to have been a crucial misconception about the potential impact of a coffee embargo on Burundi. "You can't wreck 80 per cent of a country's economy when you don't have a real interest involved," concluded an official. Yet the coffee trade affected mainly the fortunes of the Tutsi elite and ultimately the financial base of the Micombero regime, with little impact on the vast majority of Burundians. And at no point in the crisis, according to those involved, did the Department of State consult the Embassy in Burundi for an assessment of the coffee option.

On August 23, 1972, as the carnage in Burundi went into its fourth month, the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs circulated a memorandum written "to meet a need (evident in recent messages to and from the field) for a general awareness of the current obligations of the US government in the area of human rights,"—or, as one source put it, "to jar some people into thinking about this problem." It argued on precedents of international law that the United States had a binding legal responsibility to uphold human rights wherever there were no "overriding political constraints."

Though "political realities" might dictate inaction by the US in some cases, and thus "uneven responses" on human rights questions in general, "such expediency cannot justify US action reinforcing disregard for human rights, since this would violate the US government's international legal obligations."

Though it never mentioned Burundi specifically, that memorandum was clearly written in response to the African Bureau's policy toward the tragedy. In practical terms it suggested only that the US avoid any statement to Burundi that would tend to "reinforce" human rights abuses.

Just as there were no consultations with the embassy or Folgers on coffee sanctions, at no point in the crisis did policy-makers invite the Legal Adviser's Office to prepare an opinion on whether events in Burundi constituted genocide or any lesser violation of human rights. About what was happening in Burundi, officials seemed certain without recourse to international law or treaties. "It is not and never has been the policy of the United States Government that Burundi could be fairly accused of genocide," said one authoritative source. His continuing explanation is worth quoting in full:

> Genocide is a specific, legal term with a precise meaning. It boils down to trying to kill a whole people. The Burundi Government didn't try to do that; they couldn't. You can't kill off 80 per cent of your population. Perhaps they engaged in mass murder; they weren't guilty of genocide.

Other officials admitted seeing the human rights memorandum, but regarded it as simply irrelevant. "If the African countries don't want to get involved, where do we get off putting our nose in?" demanded one diplomat. "The US simply has no real interest involved in Burundi, other than moral indigation, and that's not enough."

There would be no debate in the US government, in the summer of 1972 or later, on the issue of human rights in Burundi.

Overhanging the actions contemplated by the human rights memorandum and the coffee option was the danger of retaliation by Burundi, ranging from public protests to threats to some 150 American citizens in Burundi. There seemed, in fact, some danger to foreign nations in early May. European radio accounts of the repression which cited English clerics as sources had created such hostility that, as one State Department official recalled, "We warned the Brits that this might cost them a few missionaries." But the Burundians took care throughout the repression not to harm foreign nationals. "The American mission," said a policymaker, "*never* reported that the lives of American nationals were endangered." Further, the United States had before it early in the summer the example of Belgium, which in May publicly condemned the Burundi killings and withdrew substantial military and economic aid. "There was never any indication that our nationals were in danger," a Belgian official noted.

The rejection of the coffee sanctions and human rights argument took place, after a brief indication of interest in the Tunney and Kennedy speeches in early June, amid obvious Congressional indifference to events in Burundi. On June 23, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had an exceptional opportunity to inform itself and the American public on the gathering disaster in Central Africa when Robert Yost, a career officer nominated to succeed Melady, appeared for his confirmation hearing. The transcript of that hearing, against a background of enormous human suffering, might be required reading for all those concerned with the failure of Congress to meet its responsibilities in foreign affairs. Committee Chairman William Fulbright began the questioning:

> **Fulbright:** We have been hearing a lot about activities down there. Some of them sound very ominous about the civil strife. Could you tell us a little about that?
>
> **Yost:** Well, sir, this is something that I am obviously going to have to look into very closely when I get there. There have been a number of serious reports in the newspapers . . .

Senator McGee, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, then joined the questioning. Allowing that the trouble had been gathering at least since his visit to Burundi in 1971, McGee offered his assessment of the cause of the violence:

> **McGee:** And this is likely to continue with the brutality between them. We saw people whose legs had been cut off because they were the tall ones. They simply wanted to equalize the size . . .

This elicited from the chairman the following view of the American response:

> **Fulbright:** Well, if he [Yost] gets into trouble he can go down and Mr. Carter [nominee for Ambassador to Tanzania also present for confirmation] will help him out . . .
>
> **McGee:** Carter can speak for the tall ones and you can speak for the short ones and we will have a happy compromise. I have no questions.

Neither did anyone else.

In the House Subcommittee for African Affairs, there would be no interest in Burundi. Though concerned about a "rational foreign policy in Africa," said a source, the Subcommittee Staff was, in the summer of 1972, "too busy to watch Burundi."

In the only mention of Burundi on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman John R. Rarick (D., La.), a frequent critic of both the Subcommittee on African Affairs and the State Department, saw another explanation for the lack of concern. "The usual antagonists of so-called minority rule in Africa," said the Congressman on June 1, "have been conspicuous by their silence as to the mass slaughters of an estimated 50,000 people in the African tribal state of Burundi. Perhaps the reason for the silence is that Burundi is a minority-controlled government favored by the usually vocal opponents of minority controlled governments in Africa."

On June 26, Senator Kennedy made his last Senate remarks on Burundi, charging "an effort in some quarters to cover up another world tragedy. . . ." Five days later, Kennedy wrote Secretary Rogers requesting information and urging a US public statement on the disaster. The Kennedy subcommittee staff released official reports to the Washington POST on August 5 which described "systematic elimination" of the Hutu. And then the issue disappeared from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The final sequel with the Congress was played out late in August when the State Department formally replied to Kennedy and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Tunney resolutions. The identical letters told of $150,000 in US relief contributions, but indicated that more relief depended on "adequate guarantees" that it would actually go to the victims. There was the conclusion only that the OAU "chose not to intervene in what they considered to be the internal affairs of another African state."

The only indication of casualties was the figure 80,000 which had earlier been released by the Burundian Government. When these letters were written to Senators Kennedy and Fulbright, sources say, the State Department had authoritative intelligence that the death toll in Burundi was two or three times that number. The United States had avoided "taking a public position" on the murders, the letters said, "for fear that it might jeopardize the catalytic and supportive efforts we are making." This was sent to the Senators, some sources indicated, at least two months after the last United States approaches to the OAU and African leaders.

During July and August, the situation in Burundi grew steadily worse. The first UN team estimated 500,000 people in need of emergency aid. The exodus of refugees into neighboring countries swelled toward 70,000. The various relief agencies involved — principally the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services—were continually denied access to various parts of the country, and the Red Cross eventually left in protest.

It was at this juncture, late August-early September, that it was finally decided to "review" American policy toward Burundi. One senior official explained that the decision to review policy came because of "a conclusion reached here that the repression was continuing, that there was no evidence of national reconciliation." In any event, after inter-agency meetings including the White House Staff, and the approval of Secretary Rogers and ultimately President Nixon, the United States adopted a policy, as officials described it, of "general restraint" toward Burundi.

On September 28, 1972, over four months and tens of thousands of lives since the first evidence of genocide in Burundi had been cabled to Washington, the Ambassador was recalled. The recall was ordered, as one source put it, "to give point to our displeasure." But Yost, who had dutifully reported to Burundi in August, was not then instructed to inform Micombero of the policy change, nor was there ever a public announcement. Instead, Newsom secretly called in the then Burundian Ambassador, Terence Nsanze, to tell him that "normal relations were impossible," implying a continued suspension of the aid which Melady had earlier halted anyway. Coffee was not mentioned.

Even after this conversation, there was uncertainty that the private "displeasure" had been communicated to Micombero. Less than two months after his recall, Ambassador Yost was ordered back to Burundi. "We finally (*sic*) sent him back to Burundi to make sure that Micombero got the message," said a high-ranking official, "to make sure that Nsanze hadn't lied to him, which was within the realm of possibility."

By the end of the year, the disaster relief office of AID would conclude that: "In human terms, Burundi was the worst disaster to occur in 1972." In the African Bureau, however, there was the expectation that diplomatic business would revert to the familiar pattern. "Our relations are now cold," said an official in February 1973. "After a suitable time has elapsed, we'll seek to normalize them." Another diplomat characterized the ultimate US response to the tragedy in these words: "It depends on what you mean by normal relations. I mean our Embassy's still there, everyone goes to work in the morning, we haven't broken off relations or anything . . . but we expressed our grave concern."

Why did the United States persist so long in a futile diplomacy? Why were the coffee sanctions and human rights memorandum so glibly spurned? Why was US "displeasure" when it finally came, so furtive? Why had this nation never spoken out publicly to deplore the murder of a quarter million people?

In part, the answer lies in the fact that international law and the human rights obligations of the United States Government mattered so little in the crisis. Those responsible for American policy in a major crisis of human rights seemed basically unconcerned about their country's obligations under international law—while those in the Legal Adviser's Office who were conversant with—and concerned about—such obligations enjoyed no real role in policy-making.

The human rights memorandum had posed perplexing issues. To uphold human rights only where there were no "political constraints" suggested a double standard of international justice for strong and weak nations, with a special burden for African countries. For the Hutu who died by the tens of thousands at its hand, however, the Government of Burundi was strong enough. And to deplore their slaughter was to speak for the weak. But these issues were never debated.

There was also the troubling question of why the United States should have spoken out or adopted sanctions against Burundi when 130 other governments were unwilling to confront the crisis. A nation which saw itself, in Vietnam and elsewhere, too long shouldering an international role alone might be unready to take such a lead. However, the issue in Burundi was never intervention. It was dissociation from a regime committing genocide. Other nations did not supply 65 per cent of the foreign exchange income of that regime. Ultimately, moreover, the question comes back to international law. The United States had solemn obligations, regardless of the compliance of others. Again, these questions were ignored by the US in the summer of 1972.

There was little understanding in State of the US responsibility in Burundi stemming from the coffee trade. The same officials who saw the genocide as mainly a Belgian concern because of Belgian aid to Burundi somehow could not see in the same light the millions of dollars supporting the Micombero regime from US coffee purchases. Again, while the State Department shunned coffee sanctions as "involvement," it could also be argued that an embargo would have accomplished quite the opposite—an end to *de facto* American backing of one side in a tribal conflict. But then, there were apparently critical misconceptions, never recognized or corrected, about the embargo authority available to the United States Government and the real impact of a coffee embargo on Burundi. There was also among key State Department officials, a facile and unexamined assumption of American corporate insensitivity to human suffering in Africa.

But looming over all this was the conviction in the African Bureau that avoiding the disapproval of African states was more important than the human lives or the international legal issues in Burundi. Some in the government would afterward characterize the policy in terms of this over-arching concern with one's "clients" — that Melady "wouldn't sacrifice the good relations he'd built up," or that Newsom wouldn't "blot his copy book with the Africans." Perhaps the one hopeful precedent in the Burundi crisis was the courage of the UN Secretariat in rejecting such client pressures.

There seems no easy resolution to this conflict of interests between client governments and human costs. The State Department's concern to avoid any appearance of American paternalism or interference in a foreign struggle, and to spare an impoverished, neglected continent any embarrassment that might further isolate it, may have reflected an authentic sensitivity to the problems of race in world affairs. But the price of this self-imposed inhibition in Burundi was too high. In failing to come to grips with violations of human rights in Burundi, as Congressman Rarick suggested, the United States only further damaged the credibility of its support for human rights among the suppressed black majorities in white-ruled Southern Africa. It was a tragic contradiction to ignore the murder of a quarter million Africans in order to avoid harming Africa.

Perhaps the most serious failure

in all this was that the authority of the President and his senior advisers offered no redress from decisions taken in the African Bureau. The officials ultimately responsible for American foreign policy left the Burundi crisis to a bureaucracy ensnared in a parochial view of the disaster. A Secretary of State who in 1968, as the human rights memorandum reminded its readers, had "strongly urged more involvement by the US Government in international human rights problems" found little to interest him in the Burundi crisis in 1972. The White House chose not to invoke its authority on behalf of considerations of human rights.

With the exception of Senators Tunney and Kennedy, the Congress failed utterly in the crisis. The American press, after the sensation of a few reports, forgot the murders in Burundi. No one was interested in reporting for long, complained THE ECONOMIST, "the dreadful, monotonous statistics of a seemingly endless tribal purge."

To what his own Disaster Relief Office had called the worst human catastrophe of the year, Secretary Rogers devoted one paragraph in the 743 pages of his formal report on foreign policy for 1972. Weeks later, President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress contained a paragraph which observed that "countries have a right to take positions of conscience," and gently chided the Africans for not speaking out. But the United States has still not uttered a single public word to describe the immensity of the crime against humanity in Burundi—or to condemn it.

In the State Department there were rumors of a high-level National Security Council review of humanitarian factors in US policy "in the light of the Burundi and Bangladesh disasters." "In the wake of Burundi," said a legal officer, "there is now a much lower threshold at which the question of effective action . . . is raised."

But there would be no easy answers in terms of "thresholds" or in NSC reviews to the failure of the United States in the Burundi crisis. Until human costs in international affairs come to be as important as any other interest—a difficult and complex change in the people as well as in the institutions of government—it could all happen again. ■

STATE DEPARTMENT REPLY

It is a serious matter to be accused of "indifference, inertia and irresponsibility." We consider the accusation to be disingenuous at best considering the extraordinary amount of staff time allocated to the problem, including many hundreds of hours devoted to the search for ways of assisting innocent victims. We also repudiate the charge that we "repeatedly misled the Congress" in view of the complete briefings provided interested parties like Senator John Tunney, his staff, the staff of Congressman Whitten, and the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees.

At no time in our discussions with Congressional officials did we downplay the seriousness of the Burundi situation. We are also surprised that such accusations were made since we accorded the Carnegie researchers full cooperation in their efforts to ascertain State Department actions in response to the Burundi crisis.

The study also concludes that the State Department waited until the late fall to take action. This conclusion is clearly contradicted by the following list of actions during the first 30 days, most of which are acknowledged in the study, and all of which represented far from routine decisions.

In telegraphic conversation with our Embassy in Bujumbura and in discussions with other parts of the Executive Branch we established certain clear objectives in the days immediately following the outbreak of violence. We recognized that the problem would be regarded by African leaders generally as an internal affair and that it would be necessary to persuade them of the wider implications for Africa if they were to intervene to stop the killing.

We recognized, also, that as the report points out, our relations with Burundi had been troubled in the past and that tactless action on our part could severely affect our influence on the situation. Dramatic actions from outside Africa could also have the effect of rallying African support behind the Burundi Government and obscuring the basically human aspects of the problem. Africans are extremely sensitive to judgments and actions from non-African quarters. Finally we concluded that aid would be necessary but that such aid would need to be part of a voluntary agency and international effort if it were to be effective and were to go to all elements of the Burundi population.

Our first decision was to instruct Ambassador Melady to discuss our concerns with President Micombero (May 5). We then consulted with President Mobutu of Zaïre (May 7). We authorized Ambassador Melady to disburse $100,000 in AID disaster relief funds for medicines, blankets and food (May 9).

We urged the intervention of the UN Secretary General (May 24), the OAU Secretary General (May 25), and Mauritanian President Ould Daddah who was then President of the OAU (May 27). We also helped prepare and fully supported a Western nation demarche to the Burundi Government led by the Papal Nuncio to Bujumbura (May 30). Our aid efforts stimulated similar efforts by private voluntary agencies, the most active of which was Catholic Relief Services.

The foregoing actions were followed in June and July by approaches to the Governments of Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania, as well as the UN High Commission for Refugees and the Red Cross in Geneva. Follow-up discussions were undertaken with Mobutu of Zaïre and the UN Secretary General.

We also took an official stand against any arms deliveries to

(*Continued on page* 29)

A LOOK AT FOUR FOREIGN SERVICES

BRAZIL · WEST GERMANY · ISRAEL · JAPAN PART II

PRATT BYRD

ISRAEL

THE Israeli Foreign Service is a small, highly dedicated, hard-working service which displays a great deal of *elan* and *esprit de corps*. The institution is a reflection in part of the permanent crisis situation under which the nation lives.

The Foreign Service continues to attract a large number of applicants in comparison to the small number of openings each year (ranging between four and eight). Most applicants come from students in the field of law, political science, and languages, a few from economics.

Promotion is directly related to assignment. It tends to be rather rapid at the lower levels, slowing down at the upper levels because of a log-jam which will probably be resolved in the future through retirements. The Service is, of course, still a new one and many of its initial officers are only now preparing for retirement.

The outstanding characteristic of the Israeli Service is a sense of mission (*Shliut*). Israeli diplomats tend to see all problems in international relations in terms of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This focus gives their work a certain sense of non-involvement in extraneous matters; the primary job of the Israeli Foreign Service is to carry out its nation's foreign policy, to present Israeli views on Middle East developments, and to secure support for these views. With concentration on this limited horizon, the Israeli Service appears efficient, effective, and dynamic.

Some Israeli diplomats believe the crisis atmosphere has had some negative results. The Foreign Office has moved, they say, from one crisis to the next without time, energy, or interest enough in long-range planning and policy development. The handling of crises at the Cabinet level often leaves the Foreign Office specialist removed from the scene of action, and officers occasionally feel their knowledge and expertise are being ignored. Some of the concerns in the Israeli Service relate to age, an unusual phenomenon in a Service so young. Higher ranking officers are frequently the parents of children who are ready for or preparing for university; most Israeli diplomats strongly prefer that their children be educated at the university level in Israel. In addition, compulsory military service for both boys and girls is another factor which makes an assignment in Jerusalem attractive to parents with teen-age children. Thus, there is considerable resistance to transfers abroad for Foreign Service officers in this group. The Foreign Office itself is small and there are not enough demanding or attractive positions to go around; the result is perhaps best explained as a combination of underemployment of officers in terms of their experience and expertise, dissatisfaction on the part of officers forced to take jobs they consider undesirable, and difficulties in filling overseas vacancies.

In Jerusalem, there is furthermore some feeling that work in the Foreign Office *per se* is not particularly rewarding. There is little independent responsibility, far less than in overseas assignments. Some officers feel that foreign policy matters are often decided by a small group of leaders at a high level, often without the direct participation of the Foreign Office; the fact that Prime Minister Meir was formerly Foreign Minister leads some officers to conclude she operates in the foreign policy field without utilizing the Foreign Office.

Israeli Foreign Service officers abroad feel a sense of participation in decisions made about their assignments. They feel the Foreign Office will listen to their personal wishes and ideas. They also feel that the ten-member elected Personnel Representative Body is a real help to them in providing possible

(*Continued on page* 21)

Part I of Mr. Byrd's case study prepared at the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy appeared in the October JOURNAL.

BYLAWS

OF THE

American Foreign Service Association

as amended 9/5/73

ARTICLE I

Purposes and Objectives

In addition to the general purposes and objectives of this Association as set forth in the Constitution, the following are declared to be the primary purposes and objectives of this Association:

1. To further the interests and well being of the Members of the Association;

2. To represent all the men and women of the Foreign Service in the Foreign Affairs Agencies in employee management relations;

3. To work closely with the Foreign Affairs Agencies, other interested institutions and individuals to strengthen the ability of the foreign affairs community to contribute to effective foreign policies;

4. To accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds from such other voluntary associations as may be created by Foreign Service personnel or to accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds as otherwise donated to this Association by any person or persons, group or groups, and to utilize or dispose of the same for the purposes of this Association, or, as directed by said other associations or said other donors;

5. To publish the Foreign Service Journal and AFSA News as the official organs of the Association.

6. To maintain and operate a Scholarship Fund or Funds or such other funds as are commensurate with the purposes and objectives of this Association;

7. To carry on such other activities as the Association may deem practicable in order to serve the interests of the Association and its Members.

ARTICLE II

Membership

1. Persons eligible for Membership are those American citizens, wherever serving, appointed in or assigned to a Foreign Affairs Agency under authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as Amended, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Public Law 90-494, or successor legislation to these Acts; persons who have retired or been terminated from the Foreign Service; and persons appointed as Chiefs of Mission, Ambassadors, or Ministers.

2. Any person eligible for Membership may be so admitted upon application and payment of dues, and shall be permitted to maintain membership so long as he or she remains eligible and maintains current dues payment; only Members shall have voting and other rights regarding the conduct of the affairs of the Association.

3. The Board shall establish terms and conditions for affiliation with the Association, other than Membership, for persons not eligible for Membership. American citizens closely associated with or interested in the foreign affairs of the United States may become Associates upon the acceptance of their applications by the Board and the payment of dues.

4. The Board may invite to become Honorary Members for specified periods such representative American citizens as they deem proper. Honorary Members shall be exempt from the payments of dues.

5. The rates of dues shall be set by the Board provided that dues shall not be increased, or an assessment levied, except after approval by a majority of those Members voting in a secret ballot referendum.

6. Members may be expelled or otherwise disciplined by the Association for engaging in conduct which discredits or brings into disrepute the Association or the Foreign Service, or taking court or Administrative Agency action against the Association without exhausting all reasonable internal administrative procedures which the Board shall establish. However, no Member may be disciplined by the Association unless such Member has been served with written specific charges, given a reasonable time to prepare a defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing. The Board shall establish procedures for such disciplinary actions.

ARTICLE III

Rights of Members

Every Member shall have equal rights and privileges within the Association, freedom of speech and assembly, and all other rights guaranteed by law, Executive Order, and regulation.

ARTICLE IV

The Governing Board

1. The property and affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Governing Board composed of Officers and Representatives who shall be elected biennially for terms of two years in the manner prescribed in Article IX from among the Association's Members. Each Board Member shall have one vote.

2. Vacancies occurring during the term of the Board shall be filled by the Board by appointment from the Membership, provided that Representatives shall be chosen from the constituency of the vacancy as defined in Article VI(1), and whenever possible Officers shall be chosen from among the elected Representatives.

ARTICLE V

Officers and Their Duties

1. The Association shall have as Officers: a President, a Vice President, a Second Vice President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer.

2. Officers shall be elected by and from the entire Membership pursuant to Article IX as a slate or as individuals.

3. The President shall function as the Chief Executive Officer of the Association and shall exercise supervision of the affairs of the Association, subject to approval by the Board. The President shall preside at meetings of the Membership and of the Board, shall be the principal representative of the Association, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate.

4. The Vice Presidents, in the order of precedence, shall assist the President in the performance of his or her duties, act as President in his or her temporary absence, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate.

5. The Secretary shall supervise the Association's and the Board's correspondence, and meet its filing obligations, other than financial, under applicable law or regulations, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate.

6. The Treasurer, under the general direction of the Board, shall have charge of the Association's moneys, funds and assets, meet its financial filing obligations under applicable law or regulation, draft a budget for the Board, and render a statement of accounts and balance sheet of the books at each annual meeting of the Association, and at other times when requested by the Board. With the approval of the Board, he or she may make a limited delegation of powers and duties to the Executive Director. All extraordinary expenses and investments shall be made by the Treasurer only upon recommendation to and approval of the Board or by the Membership, if necessary to conform to the Constitution.

ARTICLE VI

Representatives and Their Duties

1. Representatives shall be elected as individuals or as a slate by and from the Membership employed in each of the Foreign Affairs Agencies (State Department, USIA and AID or successor Agencies), and from the retired Membership. One Representative shall be elected by each of the above constituencies for each 1,000 Members or fraction thereof.

2. In addition to their other duties on the Board, Representatives shall have special responsibility for the interests of the Members from whom they were elected with respect to any matters which affect only that particular constituency.

ARTICLE VII

Powers and Duties of the Governing Board

1. The powers of the Board shall be those vested in the Board by the Constitution, by these Bylaws, by powers given them pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, and by the general powers normally vested in a Board by virtue of their office.

2. The Board, in general, shall have the power to perform or authorize the performance of whatever is necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Association and to respond to the views of the Membership.

3. The Board shall determine the Association's policy in all matters affecting the interests of its Members.

4. In addition, the following specific powers are hereby expressly conferred upon the Board:

a. To establish policies and programs to achieve the purposes of the Association;

b. To create and abolish Committees of the Association; to appoint the Chairmen and Committee Members of such; to direct the work of all Committees; and otherwise organize the internal structure of the Association;

c. To ensure the observance of the standards of conduct required of the Association by law and regulation;

d. To manage the assets and investments of the Association; to approve an annual financial plan; to authorize the disbursement of funds; provided, however, that no disbursement exceeding one-third of the Association's general funds shall be made for a specific purpose unless authorized by a majority present at meetings held in accordance with Article XI of these Bylaws; to provide for an annual independent audit of the Association accounts; and to report annually to the Membership on the financial position of the Association;

e. To authorize and approve the employment, compensation, conditions of employment, and duties of an Executive Director and such other salaried employees of the Association, the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and the Foreign Service Club, as may in the consideration of the Board be necessary;

f. To keep the Membership currently informed of important matters affecting the interests of the Membership and the Association, including developments in foreign affairs which are of concern to them as professionals. The Board shall also facilitate communications to the Membership from Members or a group of Members, on matters of Association business; provided, that the costs are borne by those initiating the communication;

g. To seek the advice of the Membership whenever practicable before adopting policies which will have major impact on the Membership or the Association;

h. To make regulations implementing the Constitution and these Bylaws; and to interpret the Constitution, the Bylaws; and any regulations issued. Except as otherwise provided in Article IX, the interpretations of the Constitution, these Bylaws and the regulations of the Association made by the Board shall be determinative;

i. To appoint the Chairman and members of the JOURNAL Editorial Board, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Board, and who, under the general direction of the Board, shall be specifically responsible for the publication of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL. The yearly dues shall include a payment of at least $5.00 for a subscription to the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL.

ARTICLE VIII

Meetings of the Board

1. The Board shall meet at least once each month at a time and place determined by the President, and at such other times and places as the President shall determine. The Board shall meet to consider a particular subject at the written request, submitted at least five working days prior to the proposed date of the meeting to the President, of one-third of the Members of the Board, 25 Members, or one overseas Chapter.

2. A meeting shall be held only with a quorum present. A quorum shall consist of more than one-half of the Members of the Board. Decisions taken at meetings of the Board shall be by a majority of the quorum present at the meeting.

3. Regular meetings shall be announced and shall be open to Members. The Board shall maintain minutes of all meetings, including a record of any votes, which shall be available to Members and Associates. The Board shall publish in a timely manner all important decisions.

4. Special executive sessions of the Board in addition to regular meetings may be held upon the call of the President.

ARTICLE IX

Elections

1. The Board shall appoint an Elections Committee on or about January 10 of each odd-numbered year consisting of not less than five Members, including at least one Member from each constituency. The Elections Committee will administer the elections, interpret those sections of the Bylaws relating to elections, and resolve election issues and disputes. Elections Committee Members may not be candidates, nor may they be members of the Board, nor may they accept appointment to the Board or a Committee Chairmanship in the Association during the year in which the election is held.

2. The Elections Committee shall issue an election call to all Members in the February FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

and/or AFSA NEWS, prescribing the terms and conditions of the election and soliciting candidacies.

3. Candidates may make known their candidacies or Members may nominate candidates in writing to the Elections Committee not later than 30 days following the date of the election call for Officer or Representative positions. Candidacies may be filed for individually or in slates. Candidacies must be accompanied by evidence of eligibility as of June 30 of the year of the election.

4. The Elections Committee shall verify the eligibility of candidates for each position, and announce publicly the names of the candidates on or about April 1.

5. Candidates may submit campaign statements according to regulations to be established by the Elections Committee. The Elections Committee shall have published in the April FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and/or AFSA NEWS, and/or elsewhere at Association expense, the platform statements of the candidates and/or slates during the beginning of a campaign period of not less than 30 days. The Elections Committee during this period shall organize and publicize campaign meetings. Should candidates wish to mail supplementary statements to the membership, the Association will make available to them on request the membership mailing list or address labels. In such cases candidates will reimburse the Association for all related expenses.

6. The official ballot bearing only the names of all qualified candidates, slate identifications when applicable, and voting instructions shall be mailed to each Member on or about May 15.

7. Each Member may cast one vote for each Officer position and, in addition, each Member may cast one vote for each Representative position available in the Member's constituency. Members may vote for candidates as individuals or as a slate, or may write in the name(s) of any Member(s) who fulfills the eligibility requirements as of June 30 of the election year.

8. The secrecy of each Member's vote shall be guaranteed.

9. The Elections Committee shall count on or about July 10 all ballots received at the Association as of the close of business the last working day of June. Candidates or their representatives may be present at the counting and challenge the validity of any vote or the eligibility of any voter.

10. The Elections Committee shall decide all questions of eligibility and declare elected the candidates receiving the greatest number of votes for each position.

11. The new Officers and Representatives shall take office on July 15.

ARTICLE X

RECALL

1. Fifty Members, or a two-thirds majority of the Board, may recommend with stated reasons the recall of a Board Member for behavior in contravention of the Association's Constitution or Bylaws, for committing fraud, embezzlement, or malfeasance in the management of Association funds or, for other such serious misconduct.

2. Special meetings shall be called of the Washington Membership and all Chapters to consider the recall recommendation. If endorsed by a majority vote of the Members attending these meetings, the Board shall appoint a Committee to organize and conduct promptly a recall election by secret ballot. The Committee shall accept, for circulation to the Membership with the ballots, such statements as may be presented by the proponents of the recall and by the Board Member in question.

ARTICLE XI

MEETINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION

1. The Board, on or about June 1 each year, shall present an account of its management of the Association's affairs and its financial program for the succeeding fiscal year in the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and at a meeting of the Washington Membership and at such other locations as practicable.

2. The Board, at its own initiative, may call special meetings of the Washington Membership and/or of any Chapter for any specific purpose, and must call such meetings at the written initiative of one-fourth of the Board, five Chapters, or fifty Members.

3. A majority of Members present and voting at any Association meeting may, after a vote by count of hands, recommend a decision or course of action to the Board, providing that the item in question appeared on the Agenda of the meeting and is within the authority of the Board.

4. Procedure in Association meetings shall be in accordance with *Robert's Rules of Order* except for quorum requirements; provided, that the Constitution or Bylaws shall take precedence over *Robert's Rules of Order* in the event of conflict.

ARTICLE XII

REFERENDUM

The Board, ten Chapters or one hundred Members may, by written request, propose a referendum on any matter within the Board's authority which shall be promptly submitted to a vote of the Membership by publication in the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL *or* AFSA NEWS. A majority of Members casting valid ballots shall determine the Association's final position on the proposal.

ARTICLE XIII

AMENDMENTS

1. One hundred Members or the Board may propose an Amendment to these Bylaws by submission to the Amendments Committee. Each such proposal shall be accompanied by a short statement of explanation.

2. The Amendments Committee shall promptly circulate to the Membership each such proposed Amendment and statement in explanation by publication in the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL or AFSA NEWS. For 45 days following the date of publication of the proposal the Committee shall accept statements of appropriate length submitted in opposition thereto, provided each statement is signed by not less than 10 Members, and no two statements shall be signed by the same Member. Further, the Committee shall commence within 90 days following the date of publication of the proposal, and shall conclude 45 days thereafter, polling of the Membership on the proposal. The Committee shall provide to the Membership, together with the ballots, the statements in opposition accepted by it in accordance with this Article, as well as statements to be furnished by the proponents.

3. Should Members wish to distribute, at their own expense, additional statements regarding a proposed Amendment, the Association shall make available to them on request the Membership list or address labels. In such cases, Members will reimburse the Association for all related expenses.

4. The adoption of a proposed Amendment will require the affirmative votes of not less than two-thirds of the valid votes received.

ARTICLE XIV

Chapter Organization

Members may organize Chapters, subject to regulations to be issued by the Board, to carry out the purposes of the Association. Chapters shall adopt Bylaws, subject to the approval of the Board. The Board shall delegate such authority to such Chapters as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE XV

Transition

1. These Bylaws become effective after they have been acted upon favorably, as provided in Article XI of the Bylaws being superseded.

2. When these Bylaws come into effect, the Bylaws being superseded are automatically repealed; provided, the activities specifically authorized and actually being conducted under such Bylaws shall not thereby lose their validity as Association activities.

3. The terms of the Directors and Officers serving when these Bylaws become effective shall end on January 14, 1974.

4. New Officers and Representatives to take office on January 15, 1974, shall be elected as provided in Article IX for a term to expire on July 15, 1975, except that the following substitutions shall be made in Article IX: "January" for "July"; "December" for "June"; "November" for "May"; "October" for "April"; "September" for "March" and "August" for "February."

5. This Article shall be automatically repealed on July 16, 1975, unless these Bylaws fail to be acted upon favorably in whole or in part by the Membership, in which event the present Bylaws will continue in effect in whole or in relevant part.

Certificate of Incorporation of American Foreign Service Association*

(Showing amendments adopted pursuant to referendum ballot of October 10, 1972)

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that we do hereby associate ourselves to establish a corporation, not organized for profit and in which no capital stock is required or is to be issued, under and by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 10 ("The District of Columbia Non-Profit Corporation Act," Act of August 6, 1962, Title 29, District of Columbia Code (1967), for the purposes and under the corporate name hereinafter mentioned; and to that end we do by this, our Certificate, set forth as follows:

I

The name of the Association is to be AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION.

II

The principal office of the Association is to be located in the City of Washington, District of Columbia.

III

The term of existence of the Association shall be perpetual.

IV

The objectives and purposes for which the Association is organized as a corporation are, as follows:

(a) To promote the intelligent, efficient and skillful discharge of the professional duties of the Foreign Service and of the missions of the Foreign Affairs Agencies in the service of the Government of the United States; to advance and safeguard the careers, economic interests, conditions of employment, and welfare of the members of the Foreign Service, including the welfare of their dependents or designated beneficiaries; to foster among them an esprit de corps; to enhance understanding and rapport between the Foreign Service and the American foreign affairs community;

(b) To acquire such real and personal property as may be necessary for the purposes of the Association, and such other real and personal property, the income of which shall be applied to the purposes of the Association;

(c) To accept, administer, apply and use any property acquired by gift, grant, devise, bequest, or otherwise, in accordance with any of the purposes of the Association that may be specified by the donor thereof subject, however, to the qualification and condition to be understood and accepted in all such cases that, if in the judgment and discretion of the Board of Directors of this Association, the purposes or objectives so specified become unattainable or are obsolete or are not reasonably susceptible of attainment, then the property involved in any such case shall be subject to other objectives and purposes of this Association;

(d) To do all and everything necessary, suitable, convenient, usual or proper for the accomplishment of the purposes herein expressed or incidental thereto and, generally, to exercise and enjoy all rights, powers and privileges now or hereafter granted by Chapter 10 of Title 29 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia, and Acts amendatory thereof, and any other rights, powers and privileges now or hereafter granted by law; provided, however, that no part of the net earnings or of the principal assets of this Association shall inure to the individual benefit of any donor, grantor, or testator, or his or her heirs, representatives, or assigns, or of any member of the Association or of any private shareholder or individual other than through payments of life, sick, accident, or other benefits, which may be provided for the members of the Association; except that the Association may pay compensation, including the employer's share toward any social security or pension scheme, to any Member, Associate, or Director in a reasonable amount for services rendered; and provided, further, that no substantial part of the net earnings or of the principal or assets of the Association shall be diverted to carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.

V

The management and administration of the affairs of the Association for the first year of its existence shall be by a Board of Directors of five persons. For the next ensuing years of its existence, the management and administration of the affairs of the Association shall be in a Board of Directors as prescribed by the Bylaws of the Association.

The Board of Directors as originally constituted shall have the power to make Bylaws; which Bylaws may be altered and changed thereafter as provided in said Bylaws.

VI

This Certificate of Incorporation shall constitute the Constitution of the American Foreign Service Association.

VII

Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed by the Board of Directors or by a petition signed by five percent of the Members as on the date submitted. The Board of Directors will thereupon submit the proposal to all Members for ratification by ballot. If approved within 60 days by a two-thirds majority of the Members voting, the amendment will become effective.

VIII

The Corporate seal of this Association shall have inscribed thereupon the name of the Association, the year of its creation, and the words "District of Columbia." An impression thereof shall be affixed to this Certificate of Incorporation.

GIVEN under our hands and seals this 29th day of November A. D. 1951.

Herve J. L'Heureux
Philip H. Burris

Stephen Winship
Rogers B. Horgan
V. Lansing Collins, Jr.

** The principal provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation were submitted to the Office of the Recorder of Deeds, D.C. Corporation Division Dec. 19, 1972. A Certificate of Election to Accept was issued to the American Foreign Service Association December 20, 1972. This Certificate is available for inspection at the Association.*

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assistance in grievance cases and carrying forward the campaign for better salaries and allowances.

The Personnel Representative Body is in reality a trade union representative, with direct connections with the Trade Union for Government Employees. About 90 to 95 percent of Foreign Office permanent employees at home and abroad belong to the Union and pay monthly dues; the Body considers it represents union members as well as all permanent career employees in its dealings with the Foreign Office on administrative and personnel matters. Union membership is not required, but it is considered of real importance in regard to retirement, health insurance, and other benefits.

An important function of the Body relates to appointments to the Foreign Service from outside. After intensive negotiation, the Body recently secured the right to publicize upcoming vacancies which appeared to be difficult to fill with personnel in the Foreign Service; members of the Foreign Service at home and abroad could apply for these positions and, if qualified, be assigned to them. If no appropriate assignment could be made from within the Service, the Body endorsed the proposal of the Ministry to fill the position from outside. Should the Foreign Office subsequently determine that it wished to grant permanent status to an outside appointee, the Body has the right to review the case and pass upon the applicant's credentials as well as his indispensability. The Body has been successful in limiting the number of such conversions.

The influx of officers into the Foreign Service from outside is, of course, controversial since it impinges upon the career aspects of the Service. Most officers applaud the efforts of the Body to control the Ministry in this respect; they believe the Body's participation in the process insures greater reliance upon the prospect's credentials and talents, less upon his political leanings. By and large, there are relatively few appointments, including those of Ambassador, which can be labeled political appointments in the traditional sense.

There is a growing concern about the role of and limitations on women officers in the Service. Some posts are considered unsuitable for the assignment of women officers especially since the step-up of terroristic activity. Women officers themselves will say they believe women have been treated prejudicially in terms of assignment and promotion. The record of Israel in regard to women officers is not a bad one; there have been women career diplomats who reached the Ambassadorial level and women continue at present to hold extremely responsible positions in the Foreign Office and missions abroad.

Some problems have arisen with regard to wives of diplomats abroad who wish to remain active in their professions. By and large, the Foreign Office is extremely reluctant to waive diplomatic immunity when this is a condition for employment. Wives may be involved in cultural, educational or journalistic careers with less difficulty, but most wives of diplomats abroad are not encouraged to seek employment in the host nation. Security considerations may account in part for this view.

These problems do not confuse the image of the Israeli Foreign Service. It is a disciplined, hardworking group, filled with a sense of mission, determined, tough-minded, and able.

JAPAN

THE Japanese Foreign Service is a quiet, serious, efficient and hardworking service. It is small, particularly in terms of the nation's growing economic and political importance. This leads on occasion to a feeling of being over-worked which is relatively widespread both abroad and in Tokyo.

The Foreign Service attracts promising candidates from Japan's universities, predominantly those in Tokyo and in Kyoto, although this is not the result of policies favoring those two centers of learning. The examinations are considered difficult; competence in at least one foreign language is required. The training program for new Japanese diplomats is extensive. After appointment, the initial course at the Foreign Service Institute lasts approximately three months and is followed by an assignment of one, two, and sometimes three years to a university abroad, where the officer is expected to perfect his foreign language and learn the culture and customs of the foreign country; the Assignment Office decides which university the new officer will attend, but the officer himself arranges his program of studies.

The Service emphasizes the desirability of further training during an officer's career, but shortage of personnel precludes it. Training is sometimes offered occasionally to a senior officer for whom no suitable assignment is immediately available; these number perhaps no more than one or two a year and do not represent a major training program. At present, some short courses are available to officers of the middle level while on assignment in Tokyo.

The Japanese Foreign Service has placed major emphasis on language training for its diplomatic officers, perhaps because of the nation's insular traditions. The Institute spends half of each day during the introductory course in teaching French and English at the Institute; it also offers courses in Spanish, German, Russian and Chinese. Interestingly enough, the overseas campus program includes Russian, sometimes with preliminary studies in the United States followed by Moscow University, sometimes directly in the Soviet Union. Chinese is available so far only in Taipei.

A primary characteristic of the promotion scheme of the Service is its emphasis on seniority and time-in-grade. Promotions generally are made at the same time to officers who entered the Foreign Service together; promotions are in large part automatic, although periodic evaluation reports are required.

Although almost 90 percent of the officers do not utilize the evaluation report to provide information on their own career wishes and plans, these reports are considered fundamental to the assignments branch because of the comments and career suggestions of supervisors. Supervisors are expected to discuss the reports with the officers reported on and to bring shortcomings to their attention; officers do not see completed reports.

Aware of some of the problems of this system, authorities in Tokyo are now considering something like a preference report to be submitted by each officer independently of the evaluation report. The assignments office feels it has not enough information about officers to make good decisions; it also wishes to have information about an officer's family, in order to make good decisions about transfers and their timing. The Assignments Branch would like to be responsive to individual preferences. but on occasion has to make rather arbitrary decisions. Most officers accept this as a special requirement of the Service and feel it is supportable.

Economics is of considerable importance in the Service. Some officers feel the ball has been stolen away from the Foreign Office by Finance, other ministries, and international Japanese private capitalism. Some officers feel that the Ambassadors abroad do have control of economic policy, but that a growing number of economists are required within the Service. On occasion, the Foreign Office borrows officials from other ministries for specific assignments and specific tours of duty; these officers, as a general rule, return to their previous jobs when a tour is completed. New officers are urged to concentrate their studies abroad on economic subjects, and the Institute attempts to improve the knowledge of economics of new officers.

Women's liberation has not yet made a full impact on Japan and there is relatively little concern about it in the Foreign Office. Few women apply for the diplomatic service, perhaps more for the language services branch and the so-called middle branch. These two services are controversial at the moment; originally designed to take care of those officers specializing in languages, visa and consular work, and in administrative work, who were not in the career chain leading to Ambassadorial positions, the distinction has become somewhat blurred as the educational backgrounds of all applicants have become more standardized. Applicants for the non-diplomatic ladders take different entrance examinations, follow different pomotion patterns, and do not advance as rapidly or as far as their colleagues in the "higher" service. Since working conditions and diplomatic and consular ranks abroad are similar, and since educational qualifications are now about equal, there is considerable dissatisfaction. One hears charges of discrimination and prejudice. Unification of the three branches provides a possible solution and is being seriously considered.

With no union representation, the Inspector of the Foreign Service serves as a kind of ombudsman to hear complaints and adjudicate problems. Officers interested in reform and change are referred to as "young Turks"; they seem to be mostly in Tokyo and to be interested in modernization, greater investment in machinery (computers, better typewriters, more equipment), a somewhat expanded Foreign Service to lighten the work load, and overall improvements in salary, allowances and the pace of promotions.

One gets somehow the feeling that discipline is there somewhere in the Japanese Foreign Service without being able to see it. Disciplinary actions against an officer can be taken for serious offenses ranging from dismissal to reduction in salary to a simple oral or written warning. A famous recent case was that of a female officer who was fired for leaking information to the press. Perhaps the disciplinary sense is invisible because it is self-imposed and self-understood. Officers do not question or attempt to challenge the authority or the wisdom of the Ministry on personnel matters.

Change is in the wind for the Japanese Foreign Service in any event. One source feels the Service must be doubled in the next ten years. In view of the extended time required for training and initiation, which may total five years, this would appear an impossible goal without major changes either in examination procedures or in the training process. The major question then becomes: can quality be maintained if such changes are made?

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The study of these Services has produced a number of interesting and, in part, humorous inconsistencies:

If you are color-blind, you may not be able to pass the Foreign Service physical examination in Japan. Once in, however, your chances for a "fortunate" marriage are good; approximately 70 percent of the Service, to quote one source, have married into "good" families, i.e., aristocratic families or wealthy ones.

The Brazilians, though interested in economics, don't require an economics test for admission and strongly prefer that students learn their economics at the Foreign Service Institute rather than in the universities.

For the Germans, the rites of initiation into the Foreign Service produce a fraternity-like feeling without visible scars which lasts throughout a career life-time; honorary memberships in the "crew" may be extended to those who tried but didn't pass the examinations. Also in the sporting tradition is a regulation that the Government will pay shipment charges for a pet if it can be demonstrated he is a reliable and needed watchdog at the post of assignment.

Once someone is accepted into the Israeli Service, he has both to commit a crime and be caught at it in order to be dismissed; criminal proceedings are practically a precondition to firing. The Israeli Foreign Service also operates under an anti-nepotism law, which prohibits the granting of special favors (i.e., jobs) to the children of Foreign Service officers and other government employees.

Unionization per se *does not appear to relate directly to the effectiveness of a Foreign Service. It is a fact of life in two of the Services studied and plays no role in the other two. Union membership is high in the German and Israeli Services (85-96 percent of those in the diplomatic branches entitled to join); the union is seen mostly as a protective organization offering certain benefits toward retirement and insurance, but it is not a prime factor in determining personnel policy. In the Japanese and Brazilian Services, associations have developed in the absence of unions,*

(*Continued on page* 28)

FSJ BOOKSHELF

LISTENING TO JAPAN—*A Japanese Anthology, edited by Jackson H. Bailey. Praeger,* $9.00.

The title puts one off. But the book is not the transcription of another dreary sociologist's tape recorder (imagine the r's and l's). Rather, editor Bailey has put together 14 fine translations of essays on Japanese culture and ideas. As so often with Japanese writers, what seems to be simple—essays on roof beams, soybeans or ghosts—turns out to be sophisticated. What is presumably sophisticated—essays on the world scene, for example—seems at first rather simple-minded (at least alongside the turgid Teutonisms of our think tanks) until the oblique is seen suddenly to be the line of march.

There is a companion volume on Korea, also assisted to print by the Asia Society with a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. No one in Washington has been listening to Japan in recent years; Bailey's collection is a good way to begin.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Arab and Ottoman Conflict

FROM OTTOMANISM TO ARABISM, *by C. Earnest Dawn. University of Illinois Press, $8.95.*

PROFESSOR DAWN'S collection of essays, "From Ottomanism to Arabism," considers the interaction and eventual conflict between Arab and Ottoman ideologies, mainly in the period 1910-1920. In his most interesting essays, Professor Dawn subjects some widely current impressions about the period to detailed, meticulous scrutiny. His conclusions are at times refreshing and original: He argues persuasively, for instance, that one cannot accuse the British of sharp practice with regard to the exchanges that took place among them, the French, the Amir Hussain on the post-war status of the Fertile Crescent.

A word of reproach, however: In his preface, Professor Dawn thanks Professor L. Carl Brown of Princeton for "acute comment and advice." On the dust jacket blurb, however, none other than the same L. Carl Brown proclaims the book "is absolutely first rate. The articles blend to form an integrated whole." There is a whiff of old Ottomanism about such auto-confirmations, and they cause readers to approach a book with skepticism and suspicion.

—HUME HORAN

Problems of Peacekeeping

SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES, *by Larry L. Fabian. The Brookings Institution, $7.50.*

LARRY FABIAN'S "Soldiers Without Enemies" measures up to the Brookings Institutions' high standards. For anyone interested in the United Nations' peacekeeping experiences this is a first-class job. It is not just another history of what the UN has tried to accomplish in peacekeeping, but an analysis of the problems and prospects for doing so on a permanent basis. Mr. Fabian's account of the changing climate in the United Nations is well and accurately done, particularly with regard to the change-over from the initial concept that the Big Five would do the peacekeeping to the present concept that the smaller nations must carry the burden and the Big Five stay out. Related to this is the switch from the concept of enforcement action to the concept of peacekeeping itself. The reviewer recalls a comment by the Brazilian Foreign Minister five or six years ago to the effect that a Chapter 6½ called "Peacekeeping" should be added to the UN Charter in order to clarify our actions.

Explanations of the efforts of the Irish, the Canadians, the British, the United States and others to institutionalize peacekeeping; successful efforts to have some member countries earmark troops, the development of observation groups and the Soviet efforts to hobble the Secretary General give the reader an accurate picture of what the UN "Peacekeeping Committee" ("The Committee of 33") has been up against, its limitations and prospects for success. As Mr. Fabian points out in closing, we should not be carried away by what the UN has accomplished so far—and it has accomplished a good deal—but rather fix our attention on "the enormous distance yet to be covered." A must for anyone interested in peacekeeping problems.

—John M. Cates, Jr.

A "Brothers" War?

The Brothers' War, Biafra and Nigeria, *by John de St. Jorre. Houghton Mifflin Co., $10.00.*

The title of his book, "The Brothers' War, Biafra and Nigeria," by the young English journalist, John de St. Jorre, seems somewhat disconsonant with the epic struggle that took place in Nigeria between 1968 and 1970. De St. Jorre's background includes British Foreign Service experience in the Congo ('60-'61), Kenya, Burundi and Togo. Armed with this African expertise he resigned from the British Foreign Service and became a correspondent with The Observer. In this capacity he was an eyewitness to the tumultuous events that came to be labeled "the Nigerian civil war." An estimated one-half to one million Nigerians lost their lives in the two and a half year holocaust waged over the right of the eastern region (Biafra) to secede from the Nigerian Federation. In a legalistic sense the struggle is faintly reminiscent of the American Civil War, a century earlier. The struggle in black Africa's most populous (50 millions) and well-endowed state held serious implications for all of Africa. Soviet involvement added another, dangerous dimension to the struggle.

The fierce pride and independent spirit of Biafra's Ibos captured the imagination of many Westerners. This is clearly depicted in the early chapters of the book. The author himself admits to his "ideological sympathy" for the Biafrans in their bid for independence. This sympathy was shared by even the normally cold-blooded European mercenaries, who found themselves fighting on opposite sides for the first time since the 19th century. But in the end the author is forced to conclude that the cost in lives and property was too much to justify the continuation of the struggle. The reader is left to ponder the question whether a cause can be "dead but right." This and other unresolved questions arising from the epic struggle are left, unfortunately, unanswered.

However, author de St. Jorre does leave us with several, useful, lasting impressions. Britain's support for the Federal Government was a decisive factor in the Federal victory. Why was Britain committed to a Federal victory? The rationale is a mix of practical considerations and pride. British investment in Nigeria totalled £450 million of which £250 million was in oil. Britain was Nigeria's biggest trading partner. And, the Nigerian Federation was Britain's pride. Britain did not want to see the Federation come "unstuck."

There was also "the man who sold the war," William Bernhardt, English, of Markpress, the Geneva-based, public relations firm which managed Biafra's international image. Bernhardt was successful enough to capture the sympathy and support of many leaders of the black community in the United States. This later proved embarrassing to those who signed petitions of support for "the noble, purely-African, independent experiment of Biafra." These supporters of Biafra later found themselves on permanent "black lists" maintained by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

And, there were the combat mercenaries who, in the author's view, proved a poor investment. An exception was Von Rosen, a Swedish pilot, ideologically committed to the Biafran cause, who brought with him his own, independently-recruited mercenary force and succeeded in knocking out half the Federal Air Force. His effort, too, proved in vain and he retired, at the end of the war, to his medieval castle in Sweden. Some mercenaries were not so fortunate. A small cemetery in Biafra is the last resting place for 25 mercenary pilots and their crews.

While author de St. Jorre frequently seems to skirt the deeper, more troublesome questions, one of his concluding paragraphs comes closer to satisfying the reader's own soul-searching. Contrary to the fears of the Pope in Rome and the Biafrans themselves, the author found no mass genocide and no mass starvation at the end of the conflict. Rather, he found in Nigeria, ". . . a new unity, not absolutist or eternal . . . which has kept Nigeria together. They showed Africa and the world

SPECIAL SERVICES

The **Journal** has inaugurated a new service for its readers, a classified section. In order to be of maximum assistance to AFSA members and **Journal** readers we are accepting these listings until the 15th of each month for publication in the issue dated the following month. The rate is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, **Foreign Service Journal,** 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Education

The Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center welcomes your inquiries. A continuation of the services available for 15 years by AFSA's Consultant in Education and Youth Concerns, sponsored by AAFSW and AFSA with additional expanded activities. Write FSECC, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 or call (202) 338-4045.

Entertainment

Have your next affair, foreign or domestic, at the FOREIGN SERVICE CLUB. Open every weekday for luncheon, special rooms available on reservation for private parties. Inquiries invited for cocktail parties, dinner parties, receptions, etc. Phone Chester Bryant, 338-5730.

Books & Publications

25% DISCOUNT ON NEW BOOKS. Mailing charge: 39¢ (domestic); 75¢ (overseas). BOOKQUICK, B-5, Roseland, N.J. 07068.

A few copies still available—"The Doggerel Dip"—the late Wendell Blancke's inspired "rhymed and scanning history of diplomatic twistery." 25¢ each from AFSA, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Schools

DARROW. A COED COUNTRY BOARDING SCHOOL. Flexible college preparatory curriculum. Student-Faculty work program helps preseve National Historic Landmark Site. All sports, art, music. Concern for each individual within a structure balancing proven responsibility with freedom. Grades 9–12. Darrow School, New Lebanon, N.Y. 12125. (518) 795-1501. John F. Joline III, Headmaster.

that the shaming, anarchic age of the Congo was past; they demonstrated that Africans could finance and fight a modern war and conclude a compassionate peace; although dependent on outsiders they displayed maturity and skill in keeping them at arms' length; and they buried the mercenary myth deep in African soil." Perhaps it *was* a "brothers' war" after all.

—James D. McHale

Down on the Farm

Daily Life in People's China, *by Arthur W. Galston. Crowell, $6.95.*

The author, a Yale professor in botany, his wife and daughter in 1972 lived several weeks in an agricultural commune near Peking. Working beside the peasants—weeding cucumbers, harvesting beans, transplanting rice, winnowing wheat —they felt they learned something of the peasants' daily round. They visited schools, nurseries, hospitals, factories, markets and universities; they sat in on workers' required biweekly meetings. The interest of this sympathetic account of life down on the farm is enhanced by some 125 photographs taken by the author.

China continues to be resistant to outside influences, Galston found, because of sheer size, historical isolation, and preoccupation with its own concerns. Yet it has demonstrated a capacity to carry out radical, internal social change through the group ethic—a social rationale that permeates every aspect of Chinese society. This ethic depends on "every person's discipline and cooperation, and the repression of self-interest in favor of service and loyalty to group goals."

"Discipline and cooperation, and the repression of self-interest in favor of service and loyalty."

His commune experience made him wonder whether "human nature as known in the competitive West is the only course of development possible for mankind." Though noting instabilities in the current political situation in China, including the possibility of abrupt, radical change of direction, he believes that, in coping with poverty, disease, and crime, China offers the West more of hope than of threat.

—Robert W. Rinden

THE DODO-LINGS

from page 6

from another world."

"What does the egg look like?"

"I don't know, I haven't seen it."

"Then how do you know there *is* an egg? Perhaps he made up the egg story as a pretext to stay on."

"Could be," said Mr. Mocking, "but he won't budge, so whatever it is he's sitting on, we can't see it."

"Well, egg or no egg," said the director, "he's got to go. I'll have him declared an undesirable alien obstructing Federal property. Then we'll remove him by force!"

In less than an hour, Mr. Mocking was back on the phone. "A new element has entered the picture, p.d. Women's Lib."

"Women's Lib! What do *they* have to do with the bird?"

"Somehow they learned that we were trying to evict a dodo bird sitting on an egg. They sent a delegation to look us over, and now they threaten to file suit if we eject the dodo."

The director was getting apoplectic. "Who do these women think they are! Tell 'em to go to . . ." He stopped. "On what grounds could they possibly sue the United States Government?"

"Well, they say a woman has the inherent right to have a baby wherever and whenever she chooses."

"But we don't know if the bird *is* the mother," expostulated the personnel director. "Maybe it's the father!"

"I told 'em that, but they say it makes no difference, because eggs are laid by women."

"I've had it," said the director. "If he's not out by tomorrow morning, I'll get the Federal marshals to *carry* him out!"

Early next morning, the director called Mr. Mocking. "Is he gone? I've got three heavily armed marshals standing by."

"You won't believe this, p.d. When I walked into my office, the dodo was gone all right, but he left something behind."

"So there really *was* an egg!"

"Not only that, but the egg has hatched."

"Oh, no," groaned the director, "we get rid of one dodo, only to get another one!"

"Not one, p.d., *two*. There on the floor, surrounded by gooey bits of eggshell, were two cute little dodo-lings!"

"Dodo-lings! Have you gone crazy, too?"

"If a young duck is a duckling," Mr. Mocking chirped, "why not call a young dodo a dodo-ling?"

"I give up," said the personnel director. "But it's all over now. Clean up your floor and get rid of the birds. Give them to Women's Lib. Their maternal instincts will know what to do with your—your dodo-lings."

"I don't think we can do that, p.d."

"What now!"

"The dodo left a note. May I read it to you?"

"Go ahead," the director said resignedly, "but make it quick. I'm due at a meeting on early retirement."

Mr. Mocking started to read.

Dear Mr. Mocking:

With these two dodo-lings, as I knew you would call them, my work is ended and yours begins. One dodo is male, the other female. They will, in good time, reproduce their kind and thus bring back to earth a species that had ceased to be because of Man's ignorance, greed, and thoughtlessness.

But the re-created dodo gives Man a chance to make a fresh start—an opportunity to begin to mend the broken harmony of nature in which all living things depend, directly or indirectly, on one another.

For this endeavor, the Wildlife Service appears to have the resources as well as understanding and motivation. That is why I now entrust the dodo-lings to its custody and care.

Your friend, Dodo

The personnel director burst out laughing. "Terrific! You're a great writer! I never knew how imitative a mocking bird could be!"

"But p.d., I didn't write that memo, the dodo did."

The director was still laughing. "Okay, okay, I'll go along with the gag, but now let's all go back to work and forget about dodos and dodo-lings."

"But p.d.," Mr. Mocking said in despair, "we have to take care of the dodo-lings like the dodo wants us to!"

"Of course," the personnel director said soothingly, "you go ahead and take care of them. Got to run now, I'm late for my meeting. But do let me know when a Sabre-toothed Tiger shows up. I won't be around to interview *him*!"

"Why not?" said Mr. Mocking. "He might be just what you need to speed up your program of early retirement." ■

TOWARDS A NEW DIPLOMACY



FOUR FOREIGN SERVICES

from page 22

mostly devoted to credit, loans, and similar forms of assistance.

These special features apart, all four Services have a lot in common:

• All Services studied are both relatively small in size (600-800 diplomats) and high in quality.

• All Services are firmly based on the view that diplomacy is a career and that diplomats should be professionals.

• The Foreign Service represents an attractive career to university students in all four countries on a par with and sometimes higher than other professions.

• Promotions are made according to plan, often related directly to assignments, and in many cases limited severely by budgetary restraints and vacancies.

• Careers are almost entirely free from security worries in the Services studied.

• Most individual officers are sure their career choice has been the right one. They have a sense of satisfaction about their work and only a normal amount of conviction that they are overworked and underpaid.

• There is a growing concern over the role of economics in international relations and a feeling that Foreign Services must produce economically trained officers in order to remain competitive with other government agencies interested in this field.

• There is almost no feeling that a nation's Foreign Service should mirror the nation. Quality is a more important consideration; "elitism" is not an ugly word when applied to ability and intellect.

• There is some attention being given to the role of women in Foreign Services and an awareness that a woman's career may have to suffer if she marries. There is no intention, however, to offer special consideration to women and their careers at the expense of smooth operation of the Service.

• All Services have extremely close relationships with their nation's Civil Services. The special demands of Foreign Service employees, however, are recognized through special regulations and legislation.

• Most Services emphasize the generalist officer rather than the specialist. Some Services are moving toward modest specialization programs involving training, and many achieve specialization of sorts through relatively long tours and repeated assignments in the same country or area.

• Most Services make a clear distinction between diplomatic officers who are on the career ladder leading to Ambassadorships and other officers, who spend most of their careers in consular or administrative work.

• There is a genuine feeling in all four Services that we should all know much more about each other, that we all have things to learn from each other, and that it is important we should take time for the effort. ■

BURUNDI

from page 15

Burundi (we had never been a supplier ourselves), and began supplying $350,000 worth of assistance for the relief of Hutu refugees in Zaïre, Tanzania and Rwanda. This was followed by a decision in June to suspend all assistance within Burundi when it became apparent that Hutu in some areas were being denied relief supplies in violation of our policy of non-discriminatory distribution. Also during June, in keeping with our efforts, Presidents Nyerere and Mobutu met with President Micombero to urge the end of reprisals, and the first of two UN relief missions arrived in Burundi.

The foregoing demonstrates that we were from the start very active in both political efforts to stop the killings and in humanitarian efforts to aid the victims. The Carnegie study's contention to the contrary is not justified.

The main issue raised in the study worthy of serious debate is the contention that the courses of action taken by the State Department were not the best available and were doomed to failure from the start.

As the study points out, our approach was to inform selected African governments and the UN Secretary General of the truth, and encourage them to apply pressure to the Burundi regime. At the same time, we were seeking every possible way of transferring material assistance to the innocent victims. But the study complains that we should have made public declarations condemning the Burundi atrocities followed by threats to organize a coffee boycott.

Public declarations and coffee boycott threats would in our judgment have paid a high price in a loss of access to African leaders on the subject, and a worsening of Burundi's already desperate economic situation. We studied our limited options against the backdrop of a highly emotional ethnic struggle in which Africans were being slaughtered, American missionaries were potential hostages, and African governments were deeply inhibited by a reluctance to violate Burundi's national sovereignty. In this context, public statements would have served only to coalesce African solidarity behind the Tutsi regime against unsolicited great power interference.

A threatened coffee boycott would not have influenced the Tutsi, and if carried out, would have permanently deprived both Hutu and Tutsi of the foreign exchange to buy bread, medicines, clothing, oil products, and every other basic item to keep the country alive. We do not think it would have been humanitarian to heap further punishment on a country that had already suffered deeply from a decade of ethnic conflict.

Regrettably, the Department's option of working quietly through African leaders did not produce dramatic results. But it was immediately after approaches by Mobutu and Nyerere and the arrival of the first UN relief mission in June that the Burundi regime made the first serious effort to restore order and stop the killings. A combination of UN relief efforts and a silent African opprobrium, both stimulated by the United States, clearly persuaded the Tutsi leaders that their internal problem had serious international implications.

There is no basis for suggestions in the study that the Department cynically decided in advance that our demarches to African leaders would not produce startling results. We knew the Africans would have problems because they believe deeply in the cardinal OAU principle of non-interference in internal affairs. But the dimensions of the Burundi tragedy were so great we had reason to hope that the Africans might have acted more vigorously than they did. We were sorely disappointed therefore that they did not do more.

Finally, we are concerned by the accusation that the Department ignored a memorandum from Assistant Legal Adviser Keith Huffman pointing out that the United States Government has a legal obligation to intervene in another country's internal affairs when human rights principles are being violated. Mr. Huffman's memorandum had absolutely no connection with the Burundi problem. Mr. Huffman also assures us that his examination of our policies and actions with respect to Burundi in 1972 indicated complete adherence to the precepts of his memorandum. What pains us even more about the accusation is that Mr. Huffman explained this background to the researchers before the study was prepared.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that we welcome objective studies of US policies with respect to humanitarian and human rights problems in Africa. In the case of the Carnegie study on US policy toward Burundi, however, we feel that the authors demonstrate a definite lack of understanding of the African environment which led them to favor policy options which would have severely limited our capability to undertake practical and helpful measures, and imposed even greater economic punishment than that already suffered by the beleaguered people of Burundi. ■

(See also "Further on the US and Burundi" by Thomas R. Hughes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on page 31 of this issue.)

LETTERS TO FSJ

Administrative Promotions

■ Your Editorial of July 1973 included statements about administrative promotions which require clarification. During my tenure as Director General the Secretary of State has recommended six officers for promotion who had not been placed on the rank order list by selection boards in a high enough position to ensure promotion in the particular year. Let me review those cases.

1-2. The Grievance Board recommended the promotion of two officers directly to the Secretary of State. These recommendations were under the grievance procedures developed after extensive conferral with AFSA and approved by the Board of the Foreign Service. Following the Secretary's acceptance of the recommendation I submitted the names to the Board of the Foreign Service along with the promotion list and an explanation of the cases.

3. An officer who had earlier been ranked high enough for promotion by a selection board was deferred by administrative action. After receiving a petition from a large number of officers of his class requesting this action and because I thought that equity called for this step, I reinstated his name on a subsequent list with an explanation to the Board of the Foreign Service, which then passed a resolution approving such promotions.

4. After the management of the Department had deleted a name high on the rank order list prepared by a selection board prior to 1971, review of the case both administratively and by a committee composed of individuals from outside the Department recommended that the name should be reinstated on the next list submitted to the Senate, and I consequently added the name. In this case, the then Chairman of AFSA, in testifying on the Hill, gave his personal opinion that the case had been fully investigated, that the officer concerned had been cleared and should be promoted.

5. An officer had been recommended for promotion by a hearing examiner in an equal employment opportunity case, and the then Deputy Under Secretary for Management had accepted the recommendation. The precepts had called for special favorable consideration for officers affected by discrimination by selection boards, but the board dealing with the case questioned the fairness and feasibility of imposing such precepts on conventional selection board procedures. As I am required by regulation to report to the Board of the Foreign Service on the work of the selection boards and the adequacy of the precepts, and on the advice of the Office of the Legal Adviser that I had authority to refer this case for consideration to the Board of the Foreign Service, I did so. The Board adopted a general resolution on this subject and recommended the additional promotion to the Secretary under that resolution.

6. An officer was considered by an *ad hoc* grievance committee (operating under regulations antedating the Interim Grievance Procedures) which did not complete its work until after the selection boards had been dismissed. The committee recommended promotion. Again, on the advice of the Office of the Legal Adviser that I had the authority to refer this case for consideration to the Board of the Foreign Service, I did so, and the Board recommended the additional promotion to the Secretary.

In every one of these six cases I personally notified the Chairman of AFSA of the action being taken, and explained the circumstances.

In summary, it has been concluded that the Secretary of State may make recommendations to the President for promotion, as required by Section 621 of the Foreign Service Act, on the basis not only of recommendations of selection boards, as foreseen in Section 623 of the Foreign Service Act, but also of recommendations of the Board of the Foreign Service on policies and procedures governing rating and promotion, as provided by Executive Order 11264 and the regulations. This latter procedure is in full accord with the requirement of Section 621 of the Foreign Service Act that promotion shall be on the basis of merit. The law does not say that only the selection boards can evaluate merit in the broader sense; if that were so, there would be no need for action by the Director General, the Board of the Foreign Service, the Secretary of State, or even the President.

These are the only cases in the past two years in which names have been added to the promotion lists and they meet the criteria of the Pell amendment. No one was denied a promotion as a result of these cases. I do not believe these cases constitute abuses of the merit system, but rather represent an effort to respond to the working of the established grievance machinery and to follow the principles of due process. Obviously one may question the conclusions of both the selection boards and the grievance boards, and I have done so on occasion, but if we are to have a defensible system, we cannot reject their conclusions without careful review and consideration.

WILLIAM O. HALL

BOARD COMMENT: *Director General Hall established comprehensive procedural safeguards which, coupled with the Pell Amendment, guarantee for the first time the integrity of the State Department promotion process.*

These important procedural guarantees are one of several major due process advances instituted by Ambassador Hall for the Foreign Service.

Our thanks for a job well done.

Further on the US and Burundi

■ The State Department's comments on the Carnegie Endowment study of US policy toward genocide in Burundi confirm the accuracy of that report on the facts. The official response differs largely on the judgment rendered regarding the essential findings of the study—that the US Government, in the face of enormous human suffering, persisted in a predictably futile policy without adequate examination of other alternatives. The Carnegie study, it should be stressed, concludes neither that public denunciation nor that the coffee sanctions should have automatically have been adopted, but that in the frustrating overall circmstances, they merited the kind of serious and deliberate consideration at significant policy levels which were denied them in this case.

On one aspect of the study, the State Department has charged that the authors misrepresented the relevance to the Burundi crisis of the August 23, 1972 memorandum on human rights published as part of the report, and that they did so in spite of testimony to them to the contrary by the author of the memorandum, Mr. B. Keith Huffman.

The cumulative evidence of confidential interviews strongly supports the study in this respect also. With regard to Mr. Huffman's personal intentions and judgments, the Carnegie Endowment will not violate the requested and promised confidential character of the project's interviews with all official sources, including Mr. Huffman. The report stands on its description of the timing, pertinence, and lost opportunity presented by the human rights memorandum, an account substantiated by numerous authorities.

It was, for example, a high official source, speaking specifically about Burundi, who first called the attention of the researchers to the existence of the memorandum. Several additional sources stressed that the memorandum was indeed received and read, precisely and unavoidably, in the context of the Burundi policy. The memorandum was, after all, written by the African Legal Adviser in August, 1972, when Burundi was the leading human rights problem on the continent.

Moreover, the text of the memorandum—referring in August 1972 to "well publicized human rights problems," and to the "sensitivity of African nations with respect to actions by other states regarded as intervention"—is unmistakably relevant to current events in Burundi. Surely the Department of State does not wish to imply, in charging that the memo "had absolutely no connection with the Burundi problem," that human rights were not an issue in this tragedy.

THOMAS R. HUGHES
Washington

On the Existence of Singles

■ I am stunned that anyone who has served overseas with the US Government could make such erroneous statements as appear in the referenced paragraph ("Who's the Kids' Advocate" by Thomas F. Kelly, page 18, first paragraph of center column, September FSJ). I am further dismayed that the Foreign Service JOURNAL would print them.

"Within the foreign post is the unnoticed absence of the college-age youth, who in the stateside situation can serve as a model or can fulfill a crucial informal counseling function."

At every Embassy in the world there are Marine Guards who are usually of college age. Many missions also have secretaries and communicators in their early 20s.

"When the kid complains that "nobody understands me," there is no guy at the "Y" or gal from the Recreation Department who can sympathize or can help explain the foibles of parents."

In the one post that I have been where the single people were accepted as an integral part of the community, some of the single men served as scout masters and were active in the church sponsored youth groups. Some of the single women also acted as "aunts" to the children, participating in family events and organizing special treats for the children. Both men and women "baby sat" for the parents when they took trips out of the country.

We single people do exist, really. No matter how ignored we are by most families and by Washington, we exist in every Mission in the world.

"One of the real satisfactions of home leave is for the kids to discover that there are 20- to 30-year olds in the world."

The kids wouldn't have to wait until home leave if their parents accepted their single co-workers as equals and invited singles, as well as marrieds, to their homes. If they only returned the invitations extended to them by single people, the kids would be aware that lots and lots of single people exist overseas!

ANNE V. WALSH
Lima

Psychic Income?

■ JFSOC's admirable new study of "The Foreign Service Salary Gap" shows a grim picture which should instigate action.

The study reveals, among other things:

• A career FSO, after six years, generally receives about $15,000 less than a comparably qualified Civil Service management intern or career military officer,

• The average Civil Service management intern beginning at GS-7 receives a promotion a year for his first seven years (to GS-13, comparable to FSO-4), while his FSO counterpart rises from FSO-8 to FSO-5, and

• The FSO after 20 years would have to earn more than $42,000 more than the management intern to recoup the initial disparities in income.

As the study argues, a Foreign Service career cannot provide enough "psychic income" to compensate the average Foreign Service officer for the disparity in incomes.

If the Foreign Service is to retain and strengthen its capacity to attract the most competent young officers, it must reduce the sacrifices entailed in a Foreign Service career and improve its material benefits.

The AFSA Board of Directors has talked endlessly in recent years about the nuts and bolts of allowances. But JFSOC has quietly pioneered a compelling over-all analysis of the deteriorating financial incentives which make it increasingly difficult for Foreign Service families to eke out a satisfactory life, especially during their Washington assignments.

JOHN J. HARTER
Washington

Suiting the Ends to the Jeans

■ A couple of weeks ago I was pleased to hear that the Recreation Association plans to offer a SHAPE YOUR FUTURE program during the lunch hour. I would like to congratulate Mr. Bert Knitter on his initiative. It's about time that something was done for us working girls—a program that will help us improve our health, stamina and appearance. As a State Department employee I am proud that our government agency took the first step towards providing lunch time exercises for women.

There is only one drawback. The Women's Fitness Room is probably the smallest in existence. Fifteen women can barely fit in it at one time. What we need is a larger facility that would be available to us on regular basis every Monday and Friday. (Someone suggested we could use a different room each time.) It is a shame to have a program such as SHAPE YOUR FUTURE and not be able to make it available to more women because of space limitations.

A fitness enthusiast

AFSA NEWS

THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON

By Rick Williamson

Some of you may have noted the following article in the Washington **Post** on September 7:

A Multilateral Affair

Foreign policy isn't all they think about at the State Department these days.

For evidence, we have the report of the General Services Administration:

On Aug. 27, somewhere in the vicinity of Room No. 3662, in that part of the department occupied by the Agency for International Development, a woman was heard crying out as if seeking help.

An employee then observed the door of a supposedly unused storeroom opening. Out came two males, followed by one female.

Guards were summoned. Inside the storeroom was found a makeshift bed constructed of old boxes; also a batch of pornographic pictures.

The GSA said yesterday that none of the trio has been identified. Metropolitan police and federal officers are continuing an investigation, according to a spokesman. The room has been cleaned up, he said.

The State Department public affairs office did not want to talk about the affair, if that's what it was.

In this era of serious national scandals touching the very heart of the democratic process, it's nice to know that there is still some room left for more lighthearted scandals. It was subsequently reported that this particular event was part of a larger ring involving GSA guards and employees from several domestic agencies.

From time to time management likes to imply that we're to blame for most or all of their difficulties, and it is true that we often give the management of the three Foreign Affairs Agencies a rather hard time. But, though the room in question is right down the hall from the AFSA office in the State Department building, we are completely and totally innocent in this particular case. As a matter of fact, we didn't know anything about it. Apparently our spy network broke down in this particular instance.

The reason for raising all this is that we do rely very heavily on our members to keep us informed of developments. Individual members writing to AFSA about problems, abuses, and grievances, and comments from members on personnel policies and programs including new ideas and suggestions for change, constitute one of the greatest strengths of this Association. We make ample use of this information and these ideas in our negotiations with management, and often letters or calls from individual AFSA members provide the decisive difference, especially if a matter cannot be resolved through negotiations and goes to appeal or ends up as a grievance. Hopefully, you as AFSA members will continue to drop us a line or give us a call and let us know what's bothering you or what you think the Association should be doing on your behalf.

This month, activity in the negotiations has focused on State and USIA, where we are negotiating the precepts for the upcoming selection boards. We will give you a full report when the negotiations are complete. So far, however, the negotiations have gone very well in both Agencies. We have been able to obtain literally dozens of changes in the precepts, including several major changes. In USIA we were successful in getting the ranking of the lowest quartile completely eliminated, thereby precluding a situation which had developed in the past in which many officers who were doing an outstanding job but were only recently in grade received warning letters, with an attendant serious impact on morale not justified by any legitimate personnel purpose.

In State we were successful in obtaining a very substantial broadening of the number of officers who will be referred from the functional panels for consideration on an interfunctional basis. AFSA believes that interfunctional experience is highly beneficial to the officer concerned and to the Service, particularly in terms of an officer's future utility as a foreign affairs executive. Last year's precepts were unduly restrictive in the procedures for referring officers for interfunctional consideration. We were also successful in solving a long-standing problem in State which did not affect very many officers, but which was most unfair to those officers affected, namely, those officers who are repeatedly ranked significantly higher than the vast majority of their peers by successive selection boards, but who just missed being promoted. As a result of agreement reached during negotiations, it will be most unlikely that this can occur in the future.

We also were successful in reaching "side agreements" on two important matters relating to the selection process. The major difficulty we faced in the precepts was how to handle selection out. We were already negotiating with management on a new selection out system which would take into account all of the relevant factors including promotion rates, lateral entry, time-in-class, etc. Moreover, the entire question of selection out is currently before a Federal District Court and it is unclear when the legal issues will be resolved. Accordingly, there was no prospect of reaching agreement on selection out in the context of this year's precepts without seriously delaying convening of the selection boards. Early in the negotiations, State's management agreed to drop all arbitrary percentages and to base identification for possible consideration for subsequent selection out by a Special Review Panel on relative competitiveness with one's peers. AFSA was unable to concur in this aspect of the precepts. However, since management's position was a substantial improvement over past practices, we agreed not to interpose objections and to permit the selection boards to convene. The Department, in turn, agreed not to convene a Special Review Panel to consider those identified for possible selection out until the larger issues concerning selection out had been resolved in the courts, and between AFSA and the Department in negotiations. We anticipate reaching a similar side agreement with USIA.

The other side agreement we reached with management concerned the integrity of the promotion process. There have been repeated rumors within the Service that names have been added to the list, taken off the list, or that the promotion line was adjusted to include or exclude certain individuals. Ambassador Hall, while Director General, and his staff, had instituted a number of procedures which served to preclude any such tampering with the promotion process. Similar safeguard provisions were also in effect in USIA. AFSA strongly felt, however, and in the negotiations the Department and USIA concurred, that it would be useful to strengthen and supplement these safeguards and to codify them in an agreement between AFSA and the two Agencies. This agreement should serve to strengthen Servicewide the confidence in what is surely one of the fairest promotion systems in the world in terms of procedural safeguards.

The only major difficulty in the precepts which remains unresolved is the treatment of labor officers. AFSA strongly supports the concept of specialization within the Foreign Service—both functional specialization and country and area specialization. We firmly believe that the labor function is an important one, and that labor officers like all other officers irrespective of their specialization deserve fair and equitable treatment in the promotion process. AFSA could not agree, however, with the Department's proposals which would give labor officers an extra chance of promotion not available to any other kind of specialist. Nor could we agree with the Department of Labor's position to create an entirely separate cone for less than one and one-half percent of the entire officer corps in State. To do so, we believe, would seriously fragment the Foreign Service.

Since we could not reach agreement on this matter in the negotiations, AFSA promptly took the issue on appeal before the Disputes Panel. The Department of Labor, unfortunately, initially chose to block referral of this matter to the Disputes Panel, thus causing an inexcusable delay in the Disputes Panel consideration of this issue. The Disputes Panel has now met and, as this is being written, the entire question has been forwarded to the Board of the Foreign Service for final resolution. This will be the first time in which the Board of the Foreign Service will exercise its role under the Executive Order as the final arbiter of disputes between management and AFSA.

In the meantime, we have urged the Department, and the Department has agreed to recommend to the Board of the Foreign Service, that the intermediate selection boards in State be convened immediately, even though this one aspect of the precepts has not yet been resolved. If the Board of the Foreign Service agrees, the intermediate selection boards will be able to meet on schedule and there will be no delay in the promotion process.

In AID our big "victory" has been finally to convince management, after repeated heavy pressure from AFSA, that urgent steps were needed to put the new performance evaluation system into effect. AID management has at last taken action to assure that all employees and all rating officers receive copies of the new forms and work sheets, and management has agreed to begin training supervisors in the proper use of the new form. In one respect, of course, we are elated that AID management is belatedly coming around to doing its job. We are disturbed, however, that some officials in AID management have taken such a callous attitude toward the successful implementation of an advanced new performance evaluation system. Effective management requires not only intelligent policies but also careful steps to assure that those policies are implemented in the best possible fashion. We have also begun conferring with management on what appear to be serious abuses of the Complement. If our suspicions that the Complement is being used improperly prove to be correct, we intend to raise this matter for negotiations on a priority basis.

AFSA often finds itself in an adversary role with the management of the three Agencies. While this varies from Agency to Agency, a certain degree of conflict is inevitable, even under the best of circumstances—if for no other reason than that we and agency management on many questions have a decidedly different viewpoint. However, we hope you won't get the impression that our dealings with Agency management always involve differences. On a number of questions we have the same goals, the same concerns, the same approaches, and work closely together to resolve common problems.

IS THERE ROOM FOR CREATIVITY IN USIA?

The USIA Advisory Committee

On September 30 USIA lost the services of an FSLR officer who, within weeks of his departure, had, together with the Agency, been praised in the Washington **Post** by Wolf Von Eckardt, commended by Senator Fulbright in an unsolicited personal letter occasioned by the article, and lauded in a letter to the Director of USIA by one of the world's three leading architects, Louis Kahn. Did Neil Thompson resign from USIA seeking to capitalize on his recent acclaim by going into private practice? He did not. He was simply dismissed by USIA in a letter telling him that his services were no longer needed by that Agency.

While AFSA recognizes the legal right of USIA to terminate an FSLR's contract, it takes particular issue with the fact that Mr. Thompson was released at a time when his duties and the function of the entire unit in which he worked were under examination by USIA management with a view to reassessing proper location of his unit within the Agency.

The release of this particular officer has broader ramifications. A highly talented professional, he joined USIA to make a contribution to the foreign affairs community through the medium he knows best — architecture. The broad sweep of his thinking about US government public buildings and the United States' public image abroad, and his vision about the role of architecture in an information and cultural program which won him widespread respect and recognition, were apparently too imaginative and too unstructured for USIA.

Instead of giving scope to his work, in line with the thinking expressed by the most recent US Advisory Commission on Information Report, this talented officer was told to concern himself with such matters as heating ducts and cooling vents. Many Foreign Service personnel, while recognizing the importance of heating and cooling systems, nonetheless feel that there should also be a place in USIA for a man of broader talent. His release has been a demoralizing factor for those USIA officers who would like to be part of a dynamic, creative Agency which can absorb and utilize the dedication and talents of men of vision who have definite professional contributions to make.

Neil Thompson's release has been a step backward for USIA, not only in the eyes of the public but, more importantly, in the view of a number of its most committed officers.

Kindergarten Allowances

By the time this reaches you, the State Department authorization bill is expected to have been enacted and signed into law by the President with the authority to pay allowances for kindergarten still intact. This will cause management of the three foreign affairs agencies problėms for two main reasons. First, they did not seek the legislation under OMB orders, so they did not specifically budget for the added cost. Second, education allowances are granted on an annual academic year basis. This legislation comes with the 1973-74 year already well underway. Despite these handicaps, AFSA feels that management has the will and the ability to pay this allowance this year. AFSA therefore advises employees overseas who have children aged four and over in kindergarten this year to submit formal applications for an education allowance even before new regulations are issued. We feel a flow of such applications will help management determine the scope of their problem and will also demonstrate "employee interest."

Other Scholarships Available to Foreign Service Children

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to children of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information to the schools, colleges and universities indicated:

Amherst College Scholarships: To be granted to the son of a Foreign Service officer entering as a freshman. Renewable upon maintenance of a satisfactory record and demonstration of financial need. Write to Dean of Admission, Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002.

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California. Scholarships are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12, inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dartmouth College: S. Pinkney Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are sons or grandsons of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiry to the Director of the Office of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Middlesex School Scholarship: Offered on a competitive basis for Grades 9 through 11 to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service family. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Middlesex School, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

Miss Hall's School: An anonymous donor has made possible for daughters of Foreign Service officers four scholarships each year, the value of each being 25% of tuition charged. The school enrolls approximately 160 students in Grades 9-12. Address inquiries to: The Headmaster, Miss Hall's School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

Northfield Mount Hermon School: A $1,000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of US Government personnel stationed overseas in grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of the higher travel cost experienced by such personnel. For further information contact President Howard L. Jones, Northfield Mount Hermon School, East Northfield, Massachusetts 01360.

St. Albans School: Priority is given to the son of a Foreign Service officer in granting partial scholarship assistance through the Phillip Funkhouser Scholarship Fund, providing the applicant qualifies academically. Apply to Headmaster, St. Albans School, Washington, D. C. 20016.

St. Andrew's School: Middletown, Delaware. The Norris S. S. Haselton Scholarship. Awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service officer of career where need is indicated. Write to Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 19709. Other scholarships are also available at St. Andrew's School.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to daughters of Foreign Service personnel.

Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the daughter of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the daughter of an employee of the Federal Government or of a State Government.

Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Westover School: Middlebury, Connecticut: Financial aid and scholarship awards for grades 9 through 12 are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas. Write Director of Admissions, Westover School, Middlebury, Connecticut 06762.

Yale University Scholarships: A scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son of a member of the United States Military Services, or of an employee of the Federal Government or of a State Government.

Complete information is obtainable from the Director of Freshman Scholarships, 1502A Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

Foreign Service People

MARRIAGES

Brand-Belding. Susan Brand, daughter of Minister and Mrs. Robert A. Brand, was married to David Belding on August 18, at Mead Chapel, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont.

BIRTHS

Wick. A son, Ryan Edward, born to FSSO and Mrs. David Wick on September 15, in Berlin.

DEATHS

Cochran. H. Merle Cochran, former Ambassador to Indonesia, died on September 20, in Houston. Ambassador Cochran entered the Foreign Service in 1914 and served at Mannheim, Nogales, Bern, Lugano, Kingston, Port-au-Prince, Montreal, Paris, Basel and as a Foreign Service inspector before his appointment to Jakarta in 1949. He resigned his post in 1953 to become managing director of the International Monetary Fund where he served until his retirement in 1962. He is survived by his wife, Barbara, of Houston.

Gufler. Bernard A. Gufler, former Ambassador to Ceylon and Finland, died on September 6, in Bad Godesberg. Ambassador Gufler entered the Foreign Service in 1929 and served at Warsaw, Kaunas, Berlin and Colombo, before his appointment to Ceylon in 1959 and to Finland in 1961. He retired in 1966 with the rank of Career Minister. Ambassador Gufler is survived by his wife, Dorothy, 1621 Boswell Ave., Topeka, Kansas 66604.

Jones. Howard P. Jones, former Ambassador to Indonesia, died on September 18, in Atherton, California. Ambassador Jones joined the Foreign Service in 1948 and served at Berlin, Taipei, Jakarta and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs before his appointment to Indonesia. He retired in 1965 to become chancellor of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii. At the time of his death he was a senior research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Ambassador Jones is survived by his wife, Mary, 27 Laburnum Road, Atherton, California and two granddaughters.

King. William B. King, FSIO-retired, died on October 1 in Charleston, S. C. He joined USIA in 1951, after serving with AP and UNICEF and served at Belgrade, New Delhi, Baghdad, Karachi and London before his retirement in 1972. He was co-author with Frank O'Brien of "The Balkans: Frontier of Two Worlds" (1947).

Marcy. Oliver M. Marcy, FSO-retired, died on October 4 in Franklin, N.H. Mr. Marcy entered the Foreign Service in 1942 and served at Mexico City, La Paz, Arica, Athens, Warsaw, The Hague, Belgrade and Rabat before his retirement in 1965. He is survived by his wife, Phyllis, of 59 Central St., Franklin, N.H. and a sister, Constance McGregory, 3649 Upton St., N.W.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

(Act of August 12, 1970: Section 3685. Title 39. United States Code)

1. Title of publication: FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL.
2. Date of filing: October 10, 1973.
3. Frequency of issue: 12 times a year.
4. Location of known office of publication: 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037
5. Location of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers: 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037
6. Names and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor:
Publisher: American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037
Editor: Shirley R. Newhall, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
7. Owner: American Foreign Service Assn., 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037
8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: American Foreign Service Protective Association, Suite 1305, 1750 Penna. Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006.
9. For optional completion by publishers mailing at the regular rates (Section 132.121, Postal Service Manual)
10. For completion by nonprofit organization authorized to mail at special rates (Section 132.122, Postal Manual).
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months.
11. Extent and nature of circulation.

	Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 mos.	Single issue nearest to filing date
A. Total no. copies printed (net press run)	8,400	8,400
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales	18	25
2. Mail subscriptions	7,466	7,677
C. Total Paid Circulation	7,484	7,702
D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means		
1. Samples, complimentary and other free copies	560	585
2. Copies distributed to news agents, but not sold		
E. Total Distribution (Sum of C and D)	8,044	8,287
F. Office use, left-over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing	356	113
G. Total (Sum of E & F—should equal net press run shown in A)	8,400	8,400

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

Shirley R. Newhall, Editor

AFSA Elections Developments

Voting in the first direct elections of AFSA officers, conducted under the Association's recently revised bylaws, begins on November 15 when ballots are mailed to the membership. The balloting extends through January 9, 1974, and the new Governing Board takes office on January 15.

Under the former bylaws, AFSA members elected the Board of Directors, which in turn chose the Association's officers. Another new feature is that each of the membership's four "constituencies" votes for Representatives on the Governing Board — two for AID, four for State, one for USIA, and two for Retired members—according to the formula of one Representative for each 1000 members or fraction thereof.

As AFSA members will have learned from the Elections Committee's announcement, the Association's current Board Chairman, FSO Thomas D. Boyatt, heads the Achievement Slate. He is opposed for the position of President by former FSO John D. Hemenway, Independent. For Vice President, John J. Harter opposes FSO F. Allen Harris, the Board's present Vice Chairman.

Other members of the Achievement Slate are FSR Edwin L. Martin (AID) for Second Vice President, FSO Richard H. Melton for Secretary, and FSIO Lois Roth for Treasurer. FSO Robert T. Willner, Independent, and Slate candidates FSS Francine Bowman, FSO Charles T. Cross, FSSO Charles O. Hoffman and FSO Raymond F. Smith are contending for the four State Representatives in the new Board. FSS Mary Ann Epley and FSR John Patterson, running for the two AID Representatives, and FSIO Carl Gebuhr running for the lone USIA Representative, complete the Achievement Slate. All Achievement Slate members are incumbents on AFSA's current Board, except Bowman, Martin and Melton.

The DACOR Slate for the two Representatives in the Retired constituency consists of CA-ret. James W. Riddleberger and FSO-ret. William O. Boswell, President and Board Member, respectively, of Diplomatic and Consular officers, Retired. The slate is unopposed.

The Elections Committee's October 9th announcement transmitted the candidates' platform statements to the membership. Additional copies are available on request from the Elections Committee, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Handicapped Dependents Study

As agreed between AFSA and management, a study of the problems of handicapped dependents in the Foreign Service is underway. AFSA wishes to encourage employees with personal experience in this area to communicate with Mr. Robert B. Hull, Jr., coordinator of the study. Mr. Hull is located in the State Department with the following address: PER/PCE/PP, room 1818. Telephone extension 21273. Some of the information that would help determine the extent of the problem would include, but would not be limited to the following:—

(a) the nature of the dependent's handicap.
(b) what special arrangement you have made to care for your handicapped dependent.
(c) The costs involved.
(d) How the fact of having a dependent with a handicap has affected your ability to accept assignments.
(e) How has employment in the Foreign Service affected your eligibility for assistance in the state of your legal or actual residence; what information is available to you about your home state facilities and their availability to residents who are overseas on assignment in the Foreign Service.
(f) What has been your experience in obtaining help under existing regulations and policies of the foreign affairs agencies, including medical assistance, educational allowances, separate maintenance allowance, and liaison with home state authorities.
(g) Do you have knowledge of other employees who have had to abandon their careers in the Foreign Service to secure care for the handicapped dependent concerned.
(h) What suggestions do you have about how the Foreign Affairs agencies might assist to ease the burden and to facilitate the employee pursuing an unrestricted foreign service career.

Our limited experience to date indicates the existence of a major information gap on this subject. We need as much information as possible about actual experiences, and we need as many innovative ideas and suggestions which can only come from employees with the appropriate direct knowledge of the problems.

Sears Roebuck and Pouch Mail

After extensive correspondence with Sears, we have determined it will not be possible to persuade that mail order house to rescind the surcharge on parcels mailed through the State Department pouch facility. We have even had Department officials writing to Sears to demonstrate that special packaging is not required by regulation, but this has had no effect. AFSA members will therefore have to draw their own conclusions about this aspect of Sears customer relations. To our knowledge no other mail order house imposes a similar surcharge on merchandise mailed through the pouch. AFSA members who wish in spite of the surcharge to continue ordering from Sears for delivery through the pouch are reminded that Sears has agreed to stop collecting the D.C. sales tax on such orders. Since their computers are apparently not sophisticated enough to eliminate the sales tax automatically on zip code 20521, your order blank should have "sales tax exempt" written across the face.

The Secretary Said . . .

In his initial address to employees of the Department of State, Secretary Kissinger said, in part, "I have talked to some of the officers in the Foreign Service Association, and I take their concerns extremely seriously.

"What we will try to do in addition to the normal administrative concerns which you must have, however, is to make sure that the ablest people get put into key positions as rapidly as possible."