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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

OCTOBER 1974 60 CENTS

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

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

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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

October 1974: Volume 51, No. 10

FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR

Cover: Woman with Flowers, by Barbara Ebersole

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The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

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

FSJ EDITORIAL

A Tragic Loss

THIS ISSUE of the JOURNAL honors the Association's 50th anniversary. Celebration of our Golden Jubilee, however, is overshadowed by and tragically linked to the senseless murder of our colleague and very, very good friend, Rodger Davies.

Rodger was an outstanding Foreign Service officer. His personal and professional characteristics and the experience he had gained embodied those qualities which represent the finest qualities of the corps. He met his end also in the finest tradition of the Service —bravely, calmly, doing his duty. But in addition to being a splendid diplomat, Rodger was also a fine human being, warm, quiet, personable—the kind of individual it is a pleasure and benefit to know. Like many in the Foreign Service, I worked closely with Rodger over the years, particularly after 1971 as we both dealt with the Cyprus problem which eventually generated the assassin's bullet.

I have been to too many funerals and memorial services recently as AFSA President to honor colleagues who have suffered tragic and heroic deaths at the hands of thugs or political fanatics who in some twisted fashion think they can advance their cause through senseless killing. Representing the Association on such occasions is the most emotionally painful and yet most emotionally rewarding aspect of being AFSA President. The pain is in the death of friends, the reward is in public recognition that the Foreign Service meets the severest tests of professionalism and sacrifice in the nation's service.

On our 50th anniversary as the professional association of a unified Foreign Service, Rodger's death reminds us all that for fifty years a commitment to the Foreign Service and to representing this country abroad has always meant and will always mean a real dedication to service and a willingness to sacrifice, sometimes in a most tragic way. On August 28 I wrote to President Ford thanking him for speaking to the Association on July 1st. The letter included the following paragraph:

> "As delighted as we were to have you speak to us on a happy occasion, I speak for all in the Foreign Service in stating that your remarks at the plane-side memorial service for Ambassador Davies meant even more to us. Rodger Davies was a close personal friend and colleague for several years. He will be greatly missed by all of the Service. We therefore particularly appreciate your joining us in expressing our sorrow—a task which has occurred all too frequently in recent years.
>
> "It goes without saying, Mr. President, that as Foreign Service career persons we pledge our full support and commitment to the achievement of your Administration's foreign policy goals. You have our every wish for continued success as you assume the responsibilities of the Presidency."

As we enter our second half century, I would like to hope that I and my successors will not have to write quite so many letters of this sort in the future. But when the occasion demands I hope we can all meet crises as Rodger Davies did. Homer, writing about an earlier war in the Eastern Mediterranean, described a fallen comrade in terms eminently applicable to Rodger:

"The kindest of manners,
The gentlest of hearts,
In death a hero, as in life a friend."

With best regards to all of you on our 50th anniversary.

TOM BOYATT

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President Ford on 50 Years of the Foreign Service

I am very pleased to pay tribute to a half-century of achievement and professionalization of the Foreign Service.

The United States and its diplomacy grew together. Today, your service is too little known, too much ignored, and too much scapegoated.

As you celebrate 50 years as a career service, we look back proudly on your record of achievement, of courage, and of sacrifice. The great professionals—men like Murphy, Bohlen, Thompson, and Kennan—left their mark on our times. The headlines go to a few. But countless others have served, and continue to serve, the United States with great distinction . . .

Those who doubt our future as a Nation are willing to assume less world responsibility. I can understand the fears and anxieties involved. But I cannot accept a scenario of helplessness and hopelessness. I cannot imagine that we will withdraw from the world.

It is my deepest faith that those ideals and abilities that made us the hope of the world will lead to an even more illustrious future. And I trust that the officers of the Foreign Service share my vision.

Just as the foreign diplomats who tour the United States find inspiration and give inspiration, our Foreign Service could offer—and perhaps receive—a great boost in morale by renewing personal contact with our domestic scene as part-time ambassadors to our own people.

Just as you have told the American story abroad, tell it at home. Tell us about our new partnerships with many lands. Tell us about our new relationships with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The Foreign Service officer must be reassured that we value the individuality and integrity of his reports. Foreign relations are too important to be left to a corps of "yes men." You must report without fear or favor what you actually see abroad, not what we in Washington might want to hear.

Let all Government personnel be honest, whether in domestic or foreign service. Discuss our problems frankly. But just as frankly, point out our merits as a Nation.

And be assured that the US Government recognizes your merit.

I am confident that the Foreign Service, in the next 50 years, will rise to even higher levels of excellence. You will represent abroad the best of America—our optimism, our energy, and our ideals, our goodwill, and our integrity. You will personify all the virtues that inspire the American spirit of "can do." You *can do* and you *will do*. We count on you. And we will back you.

Your work helps determine the success of your policies. You have achieved great distinction in these troubled times. During a period of transition and turbulence at home, you have acquitted yourselves with distinction abroad.

President Eisenhower said that "the history of free men is written in choice—their choice." You have chosen—and you have chosen well—by identifying yourselves and your careers with the United States of America. ■

(Excerpted from the then Vice President's speech at the Golden Anniversary luncheon sponsored by AFSA, July 1, 1974.)

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COMMUNICATION
re:

The Future of Foreign Assistance and Aid . . . cont'd

PHILIPPE RENARD

THE DISCUSSION and analysis on the role of USIA, AID and the political appointment of non-career ambassadors which the Foreign Service JOURNAL has conducted in recent issues is, in my opinion, one of the most noteworthy contributions for the betterment of the Foreign Service in recent memory. The editorial on "The Future of Foreign Assistance and Aid," (FSJ, July '74) with its open invitation for discussion and divergent opinion is notable in this regard. It is hoped that it will open the windows to more than one view and that these views will be accepted as honest opinions, professionally voiced, regardless of whether or not they are currently in vogue. Nothing could be better or more healthy for AFSA or the Foreign Service, as long as these opinions are cogently written and stated dispassionately. The stifling of the dissenting opinions of the "Old China Hands" or the brilliantly written views of George F. Kennan are of too recent memory to make the same mistake again.

The recent editorial correctly points out that "As a result of our government's *ad hoc* approach to foreign assistance since the Marshall Plan, there has never been established a long term commitment to the function of foreign assistance as an adjunct to foreign policy or to professionalism in its implementation."

Such was not the intention of the Marshall Plan or US foreign assistance in its early stages. The purpose of the Marshall Plan was to re-establish the economic infrastructure of war-devastated countries and later, in the early '50s, to assist in this same kind of development in the various newly independent nations emerging from colonial status, as well as in some of the older, but obviously under-developed, nations of the world. American foreign aid was just one of the weapons employed during the Cold War and was relevant in its time and in its application. As can be seen throughout much of history, nations tend to fight their current wars with the successful weapons of the last. This was not true of the weapon of foreign aid when it was first introduced; but, as has been stated far too often recently to need repeating again, the Cold War is over. AID was not, at

Philippe Renard is an American freelance writer who, for the past eight years has been working in Southeast Asia, India and Africa. He is currently in Latin America.

Great news for mothers of cavity-prone children!

Most children don't brush properly or often enough. That's why the dental scientists at Lever Brothers invented a new fluoride dentifrice called Aim®. If you have children, read on:

Most cavities happen between the ages of five and fifteen.

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Why?

Could be your children have poor brushing habits. Could be they're also eating too many sweets. And they probably don't brush properly or often enough. Surveys show the average child brushes less than 30 seconds at a time. Shocking!

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The speed at which a toothpaste dissolves is called the "Dispersal Rate." Because Aim is a gel, not a paste, it has an exceptionally fast dispersal rate.



Aim's new clear blue gel formula spreads faster than paste.

This means when a child brushes with Aim, it spreads its good taste faster than paste in the normal brushing time.

Unique gel formula is low in abrasion.

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

Aim has the precise amount of stonnous fluoride established as effective against decay.

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Ask your dentist about Aim.

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If you have a cavity-prone child, ask your dentist about Aim.

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Take Aim against cavities!

From the JOURNAL of Fifty Years Ago, October, 1924



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"These foundations have proved their ability to accomplish herculean tasks on smaller budgets without the multi-layered bureaucratic insulation endemic to government organizations in general."

that time, seen as a permanent policy nor intended as a career agency. It was an immediate answer to an immediate problem. Its transient nature was the primary justification for bringing in personnel at salaries inflated above those which their colleagues of equal responsibility were earning in "the old line agencies" in the belief that Government could not expect to recruit expertise on a temporary basis at regular, career government salaries. As on other occasions in government, time begets permanence and we soon had career-temporary employees.

The editorial, again correctly, points out that "the time has come to recognize that some form of US foreign assistance will be a major aspect of our foreign policy for the foreseeable future," and suggests that Congress develop a foreign assistance establishment having 1) "a commitment to the development assistance function" and 2) "a meaningful and dependable career system for those personnel involved in the administration of a world wide assistance program." I would suggest that the time has come for the US to start working with those infrastructures, which we have spent so much time and money in developing, in an equitable business relationship so that those structures develop normally into sound economic bases. To this end Congress should appropriate less money for direct aid and make more funds available to the existing sources of international financing such as the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the International Development Association and various regional banking establishments.

Another suggestion would be that Congress make more funds available to the privately endowed foundations of known excellence such as The Ford Foundation, The Asia Foundation, and The Rockefeller Foundation, to name but a few. These foundations have proved their ability to accomplish herculean tasks on smaller budgets without the multi-layered bureaucratic insulation endemic to government organizations in general. Foundations are already participating in AID projects and in this era of the shrinking dollar and epidemic inflation there is little justification for having the funds come from Congress to AID to the Foundation to the project before application. The efficiency of the foundations has been achieved primarily because of two factors: 1) their insistence on proven excellence as the criteria for hiring their personnel and on assignments made on this basis; and 2) the foundations have a great deal more freedom to get on with the project with-

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out the often stultifying side-effects of the relationship of the program to current US/Recipient Country relations.

As a matter of practical business acumen and intelligent use of natural, secondary and human resources, would it not be better for Country A, if they needed to build a major power source or capital project, to be able to go to a banking consortium, for example, of Chase Manhattan, FNCB and United California Bank to borrow money made available to them by Congress under adequate control, with the bank providing guidance as to its application and arranging American technical expertise of proven ability for consultation and advisory opinion in the construction? The loan would be with American funds, have an American personnel input and would be less expensive for Country A than having AID set up a new office with the usual battalion of technical advisors and then the contingent of administrative support personnel bringing up the van. Putting such loans on a strictly business basis would have the added advantage of developing technical expertise in Country A, loosening the political strings as to whether the project will be tied to future American goals and current military "needs" in that area as well as inculcating a positive and healthy national pride in self accomplishment. It also puts the granting of loans on the basis of past performance and fiscal responsibility rather than current political relations.

Because the United States has developed its own frontiers and built its own economic infrastructure, not only more successfully than any other nation in the world, but without foreign advice and guidance, does not necessarily mean that we are the nation most capable of advising all others on similar problems, or that we have a divine mission to do so. The purpose of our foreign assistance policy should be the use of American funds and technical expertise to substitute for the lack of these resources in Country A; it should not be a lever

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to force Country A into line with current US foreign policy or to provide the necessary motivations for Country A to purchase all American equipment to be used in the construction of the project. America's record at trying to win friends and influence allies with AID has been notably unsuccessful. Countries worth having as either are not for sale.

The editorial points out that the treatment AID has received in recent years and AID's "awkward" personnel system have drained the taxpayer unnecessarily and have resulted in a loss of professionalism because of the lack of a dependable career system for its personnel. There can be little argument with that. But this is not to say that we should continue to keep putting new patches on an old garment. What might be more beneficial for the taxpayer, more complementary to future foreign policy and at the same time of more real value to the recipient countries is to come up with a new garment by devising a new system for foreign assistance that is responsive to their needs and as relevant to the times as was the Marshall Plan at its inception. The point is that once a program has lost its relevance or the world has passed it by, it should be allowed to die gracefully, thankful that it served its purpose in its day, but knowing and accepting that its day has come and gone. This, in effect, is what the editorial is asking: that a new concept of aid be envisioned, although for obvious parochial reasons it cannot suggest a concept that does not include AID. To provide the forum for the presentation and discussion of such ideas will be of inestimable value to the Foreign Service and is the epitome of professionalism on the part of AFSA and the JOURNAL.

A Half Century of Foreign Affairs As Viewed by the Press

The most important development in foreign affairs of the past half century has been (a) the creation of nuclear weapons, (b) the gradual realization that nuclear weapons have no ideological coloration, and (c) thus the understanding that whether we shall live together or die together depends on the willingness, first of all, of those who control the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union to restrain their mutual suspicions of the motivations of each other in the search for that fundamental relationship that alone can assure the continuity of the globe and make possible the improvement of the lot of those who inhabit it.—*Chalmers M. Roberts, author of "The Nuclear Years" and "First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times." Columnist for the Washington* POST.

One of the most important developments is the enlarged role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy at home and the enlarged role of public diplomacy in the conduct of foreign policy abroad.

This stems from three factors:

1) The position of the US as a Great Power in an ideologically divided and shrinking planet.

2) The communications explosion which brings world events constantly and vividly into the home of every citizen.

3) The democratization of foreign policy as manifested in citizens' demands for participation in shaping foreign policy because their own peace and lives are so visibly at stake.

As a result of these developments over the past half century, US Ambassadors and their staffs have the delicate but essential duty of expounding American foreign policy to the peoples as well as to the Governments to which they are accredited. —*Roscoe Drummond, Washington Columnist, the Los Angeles* TIMES *Syndicate.*

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

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

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. . . we are advancing . . . toward a mutually accepted relationship where respect and orderly safeguards combine to uphold the rightful expectations of Foreign Service employees.—Nathaniel Davis

ACCELERATING PROMOTION

NATHANIEL DAVIS

THERE ARE old bureaucrats and there are bold bureaucrats, but there are no old, bold bureaucrats." The Secretary has asked us, in effect, to defy that old adage and find a way to enable the bright, the bold and the relatively young to have a chance at senior responsibility before they sedimentate above the eyebrows and wash empty the recesses of daring.

I shall not try here to address the question of selecting the best from among the many, or reliably documenting superior performance. You have probably heard enough from me on these subjects in a rival publication.

I shall also resist the temptation to use the pages the JOURNAL offered me so generously in this Golden Jubilee issue to pontificate, or write high-sounding generalities on the half-century behind or ahead of us. The Service is people—and their morale, aspirations and hopes matter for the next 50 years, as for the last. Therefore, I make no apology for my use of this space to talk about promotion.

Most officers in our Service sense that promotions have slowed since the first two postwar decades, when we had an expanding Service. We may someday have one again, but the realistic prospect is that it will not be soon. It may be that good officers are already feeling the internal need to reduce their hopes—to anticipate, say, retirement from Class Three instead of Class One. Neither the Secretary nor we want a Service of reduced expectations and lowered sights, so how do we make room at the top?

Under the present system in the Foreign Service, the number of promotions is tied to vacancies in the next higher grade—the excess of jobs over people in the career. When the system is in balance, one new vacancy at Class One mathematically creates at least five more, as each promotion creates a vacancy in the promoted man's old class, cascading promotions down at least through FSO-6. In the middle grades particularly, promotions are tied to vacancies by specialty, following the idea that the numbers of career people up and down the Service should roughly correspond with the jobs to be done. Our gross failure to observe this rule in the 1960s produced senior under-employment—the walking-the-corridors and make-work phenomenon—and inflation in rank—or degradation of job responsibility.

There is some ineludible mathematics in all of this. I see only three variables if we wish to accelerate real promotions in the Foreign Service: 1) Thin out the present senior ranks; 2) reduce inward-flowing from the outside into the upper ranks of our Foreign Service system, or 3) expand the number of real jobs, or vacancies, at the top. Let's look at each of these possibilities.

Thinning Out. Through a combination of undesirable developments, retirement has now become extraordinarily attractive. The $36,000 executive ceiling is advancing down through FSO/FSR-2 and GS-15, with no immediate relief in sight. Inflation has been accelerating, and pensions increasing at one percent more than the rise in the cost-of-living. The average senior FSO retiree gets tax-free income for the better part of two years. Even if an officer has not reached 35 years' service, cost-of-living increases in his or her pension are outstripping the benefits derived from adding two percent annually to the pension base. If officers get good jobs after retiring, they may double the income they received in the Service.

The results have been notable. During FY 1974 58 FSOs at Class One and above retired. In addition 11 FSRUs retired. By the time you read these words, the August "open-season" on retirement will have come and gone—with at least thirty more such retirements if the past can be a guide. In FY 1974 65 FSO-1s and above left the Service for all causes. No FSO-1s or CMs were appointed through lateral entry, and 45 FSO-2s were promoted. So Class One-CM contracted by 20 persons. On July 1, 1973 there were 344 FSO-1s and CMs; and on July 1, 1974 there were 324. For Class Two, the contraction is even more substantial: 393 to 353, a decrease of 40.

This is a way to thin out the senior ranks, but is it a good one? Not altogether. My colleagues in PER and I have looked at each name among the 55 senior retirees in March to examine whether retirement was skimming the cream or resulting in the less-good departing the active ranks. The answer is

that it seems to have done a little of both. There were half a dozen officers among the 55 who, I felt, were among our finest—and some others who were very good indeed. I regard this development as a failure and a frustration. I also believe the young are not always the bold and bright, and the seasoned officer may sometimes be the wisest and the best. Retirements of our finest officers are wasteful of millions of dollars of training and preparation over a lifetime, and a cost in human and psychic terms that leaves me deeply uneasy.

As many of you know, selection-out resumed on January 31, 1974. In Class Two and above, 15 officers were identified for relatively substandard performance or reached Time in Class. Almost all of these 15 elected retirement in March. Additionally, one or two Chiefs of Mission retired who might have anticipated the possible applicability of Section 519 of the Foreign Service Act. There were good officers in all of the above-mentioned categories, and some extraordinary ones, but no system can altogether avoid this, and the Service seems to have been made better by the creation of these vacancies for promoting our rising talent.

I notice a deep ambivalence in the Service, reflected in AFSA, over selection-out. As between retirement and selection-out, it seems little short of silly to count mainly on retirement, which makes no discrimination as to the quality of the officer. How much more sensible to identify those we can more easily spare? The Service is even more ambivalent on the mathematics of the question. There is the deepest reluctance to face up to the relationship between accelerated promotion and the opening of vacancies. Some clutch at Section 519 to escape the dilemma, asserting that enforced Chief of Mission retirements (which by no stretch of the imagination could exceed half-a-dozen a year) could open the broad road to accelerated promotion throughout the system. Section 519 will be used. But this can only affect numbers at the margin. The present extraordinary retirement incentives will pass—at least I hope they will—and when that happens, selection-out of some kind will be essential, I think, if we wish to create and maintain the kind of upward mobility we all seek.

Lateral Entry. AFSA is understandably concerned about seepage through the permeable walls of our Foreign Service system at the upper-middle and top grades. Any career service must be a closed system to some degree if incentives and opportunities are to be maintained—to induce the best of our young Americans to submit themselves to rigorous entrance examinations, to spend long years in tropical ports and on lonely sands, to learn Chinese, Hungarian and Finnish, and to act always as a deployable, expendable resource, world-wide available, substantively competent, professionally flexible and ready for what comes. The multiplier theory works both ways, and every outside appointment at the Class One level —whether political or otherwise —cascades down as at least five fewer Foreign Service promotions.

We professionals delude ourselves, however, if we think our political leadership will eschew outside hires, whether political or purely merit-motivated. It is unreasonable to expect this. If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that there are important jobs which Foreign Service officers are ill-equipped to do and significant responsibilities which Foreign Service officers have shown themselves reluctant to undertake. We should also admit that some leavening is good for us. The Foreign Service is not a members' protective and benevolent society, and the day we start to become so will be the day we begin to atrophy.

We must also recognize that the question is more complicated than some career FSOs would like to recognize. The Foreign Service is an organism with a number of membranes, and osmosis should not be sealed off between them. We have tenured employees in at least four pay plans (FSO, FSRU, FSS and GS) and all have legitimate aspirations for upward mobility, good assignments, career development, educational and training opportunities and a fair shake. Giving a better shake to non-FSO tenured employees is among the top items on our agenda in PER.

During the past fiscal year there have been 228 FSR appointments from outside the Department under the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary. Of these 13 were schedule C-type—or essentially political. The rest were doctors, auditors, security and communications specialists, INR analysts, commercial officers in the exchange program, etc. The Secretary has recently approved a practice whereby Schedule C-type appointments will expire within a month of the expiration of the tenure of the principal (as in the case of a Special Assistant) or one month after the end of the Administration.

Adding to the Available Jobs. The third variable is to increase the number of jobs at the top. A year ago, there were 70 career Ambassadors, and there are now 75. A year ago there were 52 career officers in Departmental positions at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary and above; and there are now 56. New posts have been opened, most dramatically in the Trucial states, and the changes do not reflect any shift in the balance between career and non-career appointments, but for promotion purposes they do mean nine more top-level jobs.

I have already written as much as I expect you want to hear about out-of-agency details. Every added detail at the Class One level that we will be able to count on in our planning would cascade down as at least five promotions. While senior officers represent 19 percent of the officer corps, they compose 28 percent of the officers on detail. More than half of the officers assigned to other agencies are in Grades 1 through 3.

On January 18 of this year, a new Act of Congress made non-reimbursable details of Foreign Service officers of over 90 days illegal, and we have been obliged in

Continued on page 57

"By such slow stages, through such various channels, has the great river of diplomacy changed its bed. The water is the same as formerly, the river is fed by the same tributaries and performs much the same functions. It is merely that it has shifted itself a mile or so in the sand."—Sir Harold Nicolson

THE PRESENT CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE

JACK PERRY

DIPLOMATS are usually leery of talking about new eras because they are professionally aware of the persistent things in international relations. Even traditionalists, however, are now aware of huge changes converging from several directions. The United States has withdrawn from direct involvement in the fighting in Indochina. We have moved onto new planes in our relations with Russia and China, even if many old problems remain. We are facing up to finding new ways of dealing with old allies in Western Europe and in Latin America. We are looking again at some old strategic shibboleths. Galvanized by the oil situation, we are taking economics as seriously as politics. And at home, we have gone through a series of severe political shocks which have resulted in foreign policy being subjected to more public and Congressional scrutiny than at any time since the Truman Administration.

At this time, with so much of our national policy passing through a landscape of interrogation marks, the Foreign Service is given the opportunity of serving under a new Secretary of State, who seems sure to leave important marks in history. From their low estate of the past few years, the Service and the Department are presented the challenge of rising into relevance. Our traditions, our people and our outlook qualify us to contribute importantly to the new period in American diplomacy.

The temptation will seize us, no doubt, to avoid the heat of the kitchen and stay in some kind of safe managerial retreat. We will be tempted to eschew opinions and cultivate skills, regarding foreign policy not as a democratic process but as a series of directives. But some of us believe that making and carrying out foreign policy in a democracy ought to be an open process, in which professional diplomats have an important contributive role. It is in this sense that some of the present challenges to the Foreign Service may be listed.

First, To Start From Where We Are

Although ambassadors may be sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth, diplomats are failures if they lie to themselves. At this time we need to confront ourselves with the most honest estimates of where our actions have brought us. To recognize the vast damage at home and abroad caused by our Vietnam policy, for example. To look at where our consumption of energy curve is taking us. To see that the arrogance of power is not merely a red herring of Senator Fulbright's but a charge that many countries still level against us. To look honestly at how far détente can go, and how far it cannot go.

First of all, we need to recognize that the past decade, beginning with President Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and going on through our internal controversies over civil rights and Vietnam and down through the Watergate matter, has brought big changes in the foundations of our foreign policy at home and in its setting abroad. The way foreigners think about our country

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Jack Perry, former member of the JOURNAL *Editorial Board, has remained an interested and valued contributor to its columns. He has served in Moscow and Paris, as well as on assignment to the Council on Environmental Quality, and has just left for his post in Bucharest.*

has changed a great deal in the course of this decade. In the eyes of many, we are not the superpower supreme, or even the leader of the free world, but one nation among the others—and a nation, at that, with a lot of problems at home.

At the same time, Americans have started to look at their place in the world with a fresh eye, it would seem. Vietnam brought deep disillusionment about the duty, as we had seen it since Truman, to guarantee the security of much of the world. Inflation and energy problems helped re-focus attention on domestic priorities. Meanwhile the Constitutional debates occasioned by Watergate brought into question what had been the increasingly accepted supremacy of the Presidency in foreign affairs.

It is within this re-shaping of outlook and of power relationships within the United States and between it and the rest of the world that the honest diplomat has to find his own place, and that of the Department and the Foreign Service.

Second, To Defend Diplomacy

Professional diplomats know by year-in year-out rubbing of shoulders with foreigners that the reconciling of diverse national interests is something that does not end, something that requires understanding and patience by those at home. This knowledge does not come instinctively. In order to promote the true national interest, a diplomat must sometimes stand up to those at home who undermine long-term interests for the sake of expediency and short-run gain. Consulting with allies is tedious, even perilous, but the diplomat must urge it. Keeping on decent terms with governments ideologically unsympathetic to our own, or publicly critical of us, is often unpleasant, but wise. The American diplomat will be accused of seeing everything from the other fellow's point of view—or worse, of sacrificing American interests in pursuit of some vague international state of goodwill—but he must endure this, and insist that planetary neighbors must eventually look through each other's eyes. As we give our best advice to the Secretary, our constant challenge will be to give diplomatic advice. Professionals know what that is, and how hard it is.

"To grasp the extent of this malady, one need merely ask how long it has been since a major foreign policy was the subject of public debate before it was adopted."

Third, To Let the People in On Foreign Policy

We diplomats have been victims of a malady that has struck the Executive Branch repeatedly since World War II. In this sickness, policy-makers believe that the people do not understand foreign policy, which must therefore be conducted in secrecy by the experts—by the men with security clearances who understand international affairs. The role of the Congress, according to this way of thinking, is to approve what the Executive Branch does, and the role of the people is to applaud choices made. The diplomat, for his part, is to justify and explain policies already adopted. To grasp the extent of this malady, one need merely ask how long it has been since a major foreign policy was the subject of public debate before it was adopted.

At present there is a great demand in the country at large for openness in the making of policy—and this will mean foreign policy as well as domestic policy, in all likelihood. It will mean that the President, the Secretary of State, the Congress, and the entire foreign affairs establishment will be increasingly called upon to outline foreign policy choices to the people. This is not to say that the principle of confidentiality, which every diplomat knows is vital to diplomacy, need be transgressed; it does mean that a larger degree of public participation in foreign policy-making is possible and desirable. The best Foreign Service officers have always known the art of speaking candidly to press and public without breaching confidentiality. The line between openness and leaks is hard to draw, but the professional diplomat knows how to draw it.

Diplomats cannot initiate a policy of greater openness, but they can advocate it within the councils of government, and are essential to carrying out such a policy once adopted. The foreign policy professional in a democracy has the challenge to be the defender of the people's right to participate fully in the foreign policy process.

Fourth, To Be Partners With the Congress

The corollary to the above point is that the diplomat should readily acknowledge the Constitutional role of the Congress in foreign affairs and should be prepared to work intimately with the Congress in the making and implementing of foreign policy. This does not imply any slackening of loyalty to the Secretary and the President, but it does imply the diplomat's willingness to work closely with a Congress bent upon reasserting its prerogatives in foreign affairs. The Secretary has already set the example for us; but we have to review our habits, and work out the practical arrangements of partnership.

Too often in the past the entire burden of working with Congress was put upon the Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and a few people in the Bureau of Congressional Relations. Broad, informal contacts in a variety of settings between working-level diplomats and people up on the Hill, both elected representatives and staffers, were not encouraged. Little attention was given to expansion of channels, for example by having each Bureau establish its own relationship with the Hill, as is the case with many Departments in domestic affairs. No doubt a higher degree of centralization of contacts is necessary in foreign affairs; but even so, there would seem to be much room for a broadening of the Hill-Foreign Service relationship. If Congressional resurgence in foreign affairs is one of the facts of

American public life, then professional diplomats ought to meet the Congress halfway, or better, and get the partnership working properly as soon as possible. And neither side should pretend that it will be easy.

Fifth, To Go Beyond Traditional Diplomacy

At all the symposiums and roundtables nowadays they are talking about moving beyond traditional diplomatic concerns to the real problems of the planet towards the end of the 20th century— overpopulation, shortages of food and energy, threats to the environment, helping the underdeveloped, improving the functioning of the world economy, and so on. Diplomats, while remaining aware that power is power and international politics is still politics, ought to be in the vanguard of those who are not merely talking at symposiums but are trying to engage the nations in solving the problems. The diplomats, who know by experience what a small neighborhood our planet is—and how impossible it is to secede from it —should know better than anyone else that transpolitical diplomacy is what the future of international relations is mostly about. There is a great challenge here for the Department and the Service to bring the nation's attention—not once, but repeatedly, day in and day out—to the grinding, gritty problems that have to be worked out painstakingly in cumbersome multilateral organs, with little credit to those that work them out—and with a new problem looming behind every solution.

Sixth, To Put Our Own House In Order

The familiar cliché is that Foreign Service people are impressive singly but unimpressive collectively; put together, we become the Fudge Factory. Those of us who have served in other agencies, other countries, and in other spheres besides government will defend the proposition that the Foreign Service has large numbers of people to be proud of; but looking at our collective selves from the outside, we have to confess to many of the shortcomings that others are all too ready to remark on. Many of us would subscribe to the Earl of Courtown's statement: "The stranglehold of paper implies what so many people feel, that bureaucracy today is our master instead of being our servant. This arises from administration being considered as an end in itself rather than a means to an end."

Many diplomats feel that if we are given hard and important jobs to do, we are capable of organizing ourselves around the work to be done, without frills and fuss. In recent times we have been scrutinizing papers for typographical errors, writing sequels to policy studies, debating NSSMs, splitting ourselves up into cone systems, and so on, because we did not have sufficient responsible work to do. If we put the horse before the cart, give diplomats proper jobs and administer the people around the jobs rather than vice-versa, we may render some real service. This may be the hardest challenge of all.

Pride in the Foreign Service tradition needs rekindling, and this may already have begun. The Open Forum idea is an important contribution, for its continuation and enlargement should signify a readiness at all levels to listen to ideas and frank opinions coming up from within the ranks. At times in the past, conformity and loyalty seemed to be the cardinal virtues, and all of us know men who ruined their careers by staunch advocacy of unaccepted positions. If the diplomatic service is to be a career to be proud of, as it has been in most of our history, then we must continue to attract able young men and women with the promise that they can deal with significant matters in a meaningful way and retain a reasonable hope of attaining positions of prestige and influence. If there is no responsibility at the bottom of the ladder, no contribution to make in the middle, and no room at the top, of course the Service will decline in the quality of its people.

Our best tradition is characterized by professionalism, by a thorough understanding of our country and its relationship to the world, by a courage of conviction, and by an ideal of service. Too active a concern for the perquisites of the profession is not typical of the tradition; but strong defense of our responsibilities is. Perhaps the time has now come, for example, when the Service will speak out as vigorously as some Senators have done about the shameful practice of selling Ambassadorships. John Kenneth Galbraith's suggestion of several years ago, to have a Foreign Service Association panel to comment on the professional acceptability of high-level diplomatic appointments, in the manner of the Bar Association, may be worth reconsidering. Standing up to the rest of the bureaucracy is also timely: we badly need to reestablish the central position of State and the Foreign Service in foreign policy. This involves a whole range of battles, of course, from upper-level negotiations with Defense or Treasury down to an Embassy political section's refusal to let CIA usurp the function of political reporting. The challenge to State and the Service is to serve the national interest, conceived as broadly and as variously as possible.

We will be lured by the argument that the President makes foreign policy, with the Secretary of State as his chief advisor, so that the diplomatic service is essentially a group of clerks to carry out the policy as made. That argument oversimplifies a complex democratic process. Acceptance of it signifies a non-thinking Foreign Service, a group of robot diplomats, which is not fitting for our country. The argument leads towards quadrennialism in foreign policy, that is the bending of all policy towards the election or re-election of a President every four years. That is not our system. The President makes foreign policy, with the important participation of the Congress and the underlying agreement of the people, on the basis of enduring national interests: that is our system. It requires not automatons but thinking civil servants who give honest advice based on their conception of enduring national interests. The American diplomat constitutes part of a permanent government dealing with foreign affairs, and as Administrations come and go he keeps his eye on lasting national interests, telling his new superiors every four years the situation as he honestly sees it.

Put it all together, and the diplomat is driven to the undiplomatic assertion that right now we really do face one hell of a challenge. ■

How many a man has dated a new era in his life from the reading of a book.—Henry David Thoreau

OUR DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT

Lights and Shadows of 50 Years

SMITH SIMPSON

ONLY SINCE WORLD WAR II has material about and from the diplomatic establishment reached impressive proportions and analytical character. It is extraordinary that as late as 1939 about all that existed in book form on the State Department was a genial, indulgent "Inside the Department of State" by the New York TIMES correspondent assigned to the Department, Bertram Hulen; sympathetic volumes in the American Secretaries of State series edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis; and a few other, independent biographies of occupants of that position such as Tyler Dennett's of John Hay and Philip C. Jessup's of Elihu Root. On the Foreign Service, materials were harder to come by. Some familiarity was required with Congressional reports and the landmark study of the old National Civil Service Reform League, published in 1919 and prophetically entitled "Report on the Foreign Service." Of individual diplomatic officers, along with Dennett's Hay, Allan Nevin's biography of Henry White and Sir Harold Nicolson's of Dwight Morrow—the one a career officer, the other a political—stood as rarities; and memoirs by the officers themselves were few and scattered, defying any systematic triangulation of American diplomacy. Illustrative of these were Henry Lane Wilson's "Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile" (1927), A. L. P. Dennis's "Adventures in Diplomacy" (1928), Hugh R. Wilson's "Education of a Diplomat" (1938) and the choice "Diplomatically Speaking" of Lloyd C. Griscom, which, appearing in 1940, deflected at least one university student to the Foreign Service. Astride biography and memoirs lay Burton J. Hendrick's charming "Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page" (1923). But the American conduct of diplomacy was by no means unexceptionably charming. Unjustly treated by the ruling clique of our diplomatic establishment, Dennis committed suicide—a Charles Thomas of his day.

Most of this literature, whether written by historians, biographers or practitioners, was concerned with the unilinear progression of events and careers rather than any exploration of the strategies, tactics, techniques and skills explanatory of the process of international politics, presenting views of diplomacy akin to what military histories, studies and memoirs would offer of the military process if they omitted the guts of battles and wars—the strategies, which determined which battles and wars should be engaged in and the tactics, logistics, organization and personal qualities determinative of outcome. It was all insightful and fascinating but it came, in sum, to meager fare.

Beginning with Robert Bendiner's sharply critical and not exactly unbiased exposé, "Riddle of the State Department" (1942), and continuing through Harold Stein's gutsy study of the internal battles within the State Department over the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (in his "Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book," 1948), Bryton Barron's emotional "Inside the State Department" (1946), James L. McCamy's "The Administration of American Foreign Affairs" (1950), Robert E. Elder's balanced but limited "The Policy Machine" (1960) and my own "Anatomy of the State Department" (1967), all of that changed as far as the State Department was concerned. It now became the focus of analysis seeking to portray how it works and why it slips. Little of this new literature, however, set out to explain the Department in its en-

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"This was the program which produced the George Kennans and Charles E. Bohlens who thereby . . . got the kind of education which fitted them to recognize the significant and profound in Soviet-American relations."

tirety, in its overall functioning, much of the effort being expended on it as a policy-making body. This reflected the mesmerization of academicians with decision-making, to the neglect, almost total, of what happens to decisions once made. Indeed, there continues much inclination in the academic community to consider the policy contributions of the diplomatic and consular posts as either non-existent or inconsequential, these posts being, in their remote and inadequate view, simply dispatch centers. So that community seems to have lagged behind the public in general in its understanding of diplomacy and diplomatic agencies, the Department —and even more the Foreign Service—continuing to be to it something like Africa before the expeditions of David Livingstone, known rather by its external coastline and the configurations of its more conspicuous policy-making rivers than by its enormous interior tributary systems and human complexities. McCamy and I tried to break through these limitations, to explore the interior, including the culture and mentality of the hinterland inhabitants. The loquacious "Fires in the In-Basket" of John P. Leacacos followed in 1968 and John Franklin Campbell's "The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory" three years later. An interesting light in this new development is that practitioners themselves have joined in.

Government agencies have also joined in the expeditions, with the Hoover Commission leading off in 1949, the Bureau of the Budget and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee participating later through the Brookings Institution and the State Department itself through various committees. All of this, however, came to fairly stilted, organizationally slanted studies. No one would have gained from them any familiarity with diplomacy or of the State Department as a diplomatic organism.

It was not until Huntington Wilson's "Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat" (1945), Willard Beaulac's "Career Ambassador" (1951) and Joseph C. Grew's "Turbulent Era" (1952) that this familiarity began to evolve through full-length memoirs from Foreign Service ranks. They were supplemented by J. Rives Childs's "American Foreign Service" (1948), the first effort of a Foreign Service officer to explain what he does, but he made the mistake of writing it while on active service. The Department so censored it that Childs tried vainly to prevent its publication. Having subsidized the venture by giving the author a leave of absence, the establishment had its way. W. Wendell Blancké fared better in 1969 by awaiting retirement to publish "The Foreign Service of the United States." Little known but apt was a case study of the psychological and ethical problems of a vice consul in Indonesia immediately after World War II which was included in Harold Stein's casebook mentioned above.

The Service of post-war years has not been a wholly new Service or of wholly new perspectives. It has harbored many carry-overs from the earlier side-line diplomacy which had demanded little more of practitioners than a pair of ears, a pair of legs to trot to Foreign Ministries, a pen, then a typewriter, and an ability to write in decipherable English. For the most part, these survivors were dilettantes, having sought appointment to satisfy a longing for travel, hunting opportunities, socializing with notables or simply the prestige of "diplomatic status." Alexander Kirk's remark that the reason he joined the Service was because his mother wanted diplomatic facilities of travel was one of his ironic remarks which contained a germ of truth. Even the better officers are acknowledging in their memoirs published in recent years that they entered the Service not from any professional interest in foreign policy or diplomacy but because they did not know what else to do.

Along with the dilettantes were some serious practitioners and with these came a subtle change in our diplomatic establishment, our diplomatic literature and thence the public relations of the establishment. This was brought about by the altered posture of international affairs in the American mind effected by World War I, which, in turn, brought international relations courses to American universities. To this development John M. Allison referred in his notable "Ambassador from the Prairie" (1973), reporting that he took one such course pioneered at the University of Nebraska by the well-known Norman L. Hill. University students were thus graduated with a serious interest in international problems and politics and as various of these wound their way into the Service serious diplomatic practitioners began to multiply. The founding of a School of Foreign Service at Georgetown in 1919 gave further impetus to this, as did the later establishment of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

In addition, there were two far-sighted realists within the diplomatic establishment who contributed notably to this evolution. One was Robert F. Kelley, who joined the consular service in 1922 and, having been a Russian specialist at Harvard, by a series of happy accidents shortly became chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the Department. Anticipating the time when the United States would have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he initiated a four-year program of Russian studies abroad—in the cultural and political environment of Europe, to provide greater realism—with subsequent tours of duty as close to the Soviet Union as officers could be posted. This was the program which produced the George Kennans and Charles E. Bohlens who thereby acquired something significant—and even profound—to write about. Through the efforts of a colleague interested in professionalism in US diplomacy, they got the kind of education which fitted them to recognize the significant and profound in Soviet-American relations.

The other was Prentiss Gilbert, the first and only US Observer to the League of Nations. Gilbert was independent-minded, original, hostile to cliché thinking. He had had broad experience, understood international politics and, highly distrustful of the residual Wilsonian idealism in the American view of diplomacy, used his assignment in Geneva to educate and train

younger colleagues on his staff in the international maneuvers which enmeshed and manipulated the League. From that realistic, far-sighted effort came outstanding officers like James W. Riddleberger, Llewellyn Thompson and Jacob D. Beam.

Such are the factors which account for the emergence of a light drizzle of literature by career diplomatic officers in the 1940s and 1950s, including George Kennan's "American Diplomacy, 1900-1950" (1951). This falling weather, which gradually became a brisk shower and is now approaching a downpour, has ranged from the first full-length memoir of a long-term Foreign Service officer —Beaulac's—to Donald Dunham's collection of delightful vignettes ("Envoy Unextraordinary," 1944), Cecil Lyon's "The Lyon's Share" (1973) and Bartley Yost's "Memoirs of a Consul" (1955). Within this range have fallen other full-length memoirs of long-termers—from Post Wheeler and his wife, Hallie Erminie Rives (a cousin of J. Rives Childs), Grew, Robert Murphy, Kennan, Bohlen, Allison—and more limited reminiscences from Ellis O. Briggs ("Farewell to Foggy Bottom," 1964), Waldemar Gallman ("Iraq under General Nuri," 1964), Henry S. Villard ("Affairs at State," 1965) and Philip Bonsal's ("Cuba, Castro and the United States," 1971) recounting special aspects or periods of diplomatic experience. The Wheeler-Rives memoir, "Dome of Many Coloured Glass" (1955), is unique for its husband-wife collaboration, each contributing alternating chapters, and for its blazing candor. Both of them writers of distinction—he a one-time journalist and she a novelist with best-sellers to her credit—their book is a kind of diplomatic "Gone With the Wind" of 860 spellbinding pages, too candid, it seems, regarding the rivalries and jealousies which wracked the Service to have been reviewable in the Foreign Service JOURNAL, but it added to public enlightenment as well as literary diversion.

In addition to the expanding literature of our career practitioners, who possess more than fleeting experiences and fugitive judgments, has been a spilling downpour from political appointees and this, too, has been of great range, from such shockingly superficial and distorted memoirs as Joseph E. Davies's "Mission to Moscow" (1941), which he saw to it was made into a movie, to the solid and illuminating Carlton J. H. Hayes's "Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945" (1945), Stanton Griffis's "Lying in State" (1952), Claude G. Bowers's "My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II" (1954) and "Chile Through Embassy Windows, 1939-1953" (1958), along with Chester Bowles's "Ambassador's Report" (1954), John H. Morrow's "First American Ambassador to Guinea" (1967), and J. Kenneth Galbraith's "Ambassador's Journal" (1969)—all presenting the overseas aspect of diplomacy. Such memoirs as Roger Hilsman's "To Move a Nation" (1967) and Charles Frankel's "High on Foggy Bottom," two years later, dealt with the Department.

Dean Acheson, of course, occupies a unique place in all this and so do his memoirs. Although not a careerist, mode of appointment, he was one in fact and he had the advantage of a two-year tutelage in strategic thinking and organizational management under his predecessor, General Marshall. A warmer, wittier, more humane chief we have never had and his "Present at the Creation" (1969) stands alone in its analysis of policy decisions and executory moves in terms of strategies, tactics, techniques and personal qualities—a model of memoir writing and a rebuke to those who think of diplomacy as simply an art and not one of the social sciences.

Our diplomacy of aid—and economic diplomacy in general —has received little attention. No memoir of our informational and cultural diplomacy exists, so far as I am aware, except John Mecklin's "Mission in Torment" (1965) describing our Saigon mission. Of the memoirs and studies of our Southeast Asian fiasco, relatively few have focused on our diplomatic performance. Of these, three of the more sharply illuminating are Chester L. Cooper's "The Lost Crusade: America In Vietnam" (1970), Edward G. Lansdale's "In the Midst of Wars" (1972) and David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" (1972).

Some additional features of this period have been the appearance of the novel on diplomacy (including that analysis of our Southeast Asian diplomacy in the guise of a novel, "The Ugly American," which appeared in 1958, two years after Graham Greene's "The Quiet American," both focused on Ed Lansdale, whose memoir was earlier mentioned); the first full-length portrayal of a State Department civil servant (Katharine Crane's "Mr. Carr of State: Forty-seven Years in the Department of State," 1960); the appearance in 1967 of Max Savelle's pioneering and exhaustive study of "The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Anglo-America, 1492-1763"; studies of the diplomatic roles of the President and Secretary of State; books on negotiating with communist regimes; and serious efforts to grapple with diplomacy as a political science.

Among the latter, several pioneering and landmark studies have attested to our growing interest in our planetary relations. These have included the one solid historical study of our diplomatic service, Warren F. Ilchman's "Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History" (1961) which is more than its subtitle suggests; Graham H. Stuart's unique "American Diplomatic and Consular Practice" (rev. 1952), which is a political science approach to diplomacy and consular work; and Charles W. Thayer's "Diplomat" (1959), the first effort of a Foreign Service officer to essay a political science analysis of his calling. Coming eleven years after Rives Childs's more limited study, it is truly a notable attempt to concep-

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"What do Americans believe now nearly three decades after the end of World War II?"

The Clouded Image: American Opinion and the Developing Countries

JOHN W. SEWELL

THE MAJOR CHANGES which have taken place in our relations with the rest of the world during the past two years dramatize a period of transition in US foreign policy. The long-standing confrontation between the two major superpowers has waned, and the massive American involvement in Southeast Asia, which many saw as the culmination of this ideological confrontation, has ended.

However, the "new era" of US foreign relations that these changes symbolize is also marked by new problems that will pose great difficulties for Americans. Most Americans have been dismayed by the apparent vulnerability of the US economy in recent months. The sacrosanct dollar has been devalued twice, food prices have skyrocketed, inflation is rampant, and oil has become expensive and sometimes scarce. Moreover, we are only beginning to understand the growing dimensions of global interdependence in trying to find solutions for emerging problems such as preserving our own environment, controlling the narcotics trade, sharing the resources of the seas, shaping the potential of burgeoning technology, and assessing the implications of the multinational corporations. In all of these areas, Americans will find that they have to deal on the basis of increasing equality with a much greater number of states, many of which fall into the category of developing countries.

Yet as the cold war has waned and American policymakers no longer emphasize the entire less developed world as an arena of competition with the Soviet Union or China, US relations with the developing countries have fallen into neglect. Despite Secretary of State Kissinger's acknowledgment that "a world community cannot remain divided between the permanently rich and the permanently poor," there has been a general decline in US governmental support for the development of the poor countries in policy decisions and negotiations on trade and monetary matters, the equitable distribution of food and energy resources, development assistance, and the sharing of revenue from the exploitation of the oceans. The most recent example has been the grudging American response to UN Secretary General Waldheim's call for special relief for the countries hardest hit by this year's price increases in food, fuel, and fertilizer, and the ill grace with which the American delegation agreed to reconsider our opposition to linking a new issuance of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) to developmental purposes only after the developing-country members of the Committee of Twenty threatened other monetary system reforms that were in the interest of the rich countries.

What does the public think of this trend in US policy? During the "cold war" period, public opinion supported the main lines of US foreign policy. But what do Americans believe now nearly three decades after the end of World War II? Are they still concerned and sympathetic about the problems of development and the plight of people in the developing countries?

The current wisdom maintains that the bitter experience of the Vietnamese conflict and the pressing nature of our domestic problems come to predominate the American outlook on the developing world. Indeed, there is a great deal of disillusionment and doubt both in and outside Washington concerning our relationships with the developing countries and the role of aid in their development. Congressman John Brademas was reflecting a very widespread impression when he said that "both Congress and the Executive Branch perceive the American public, if not hostile to, certainly not enthusiastic for, foreign aid."

But is that perception correct? Survey data* on how Americans view global poverty and development indicate that the perceptions of Washington policymakers and the opinion of the public at large may be far apart.

What the Public Thinks

The survey, which assesses American attitudes on governmental as well as private commitments to global development, US foreign aid and trade policies, budget priorities, and a range of other issues concerning world poverty and development, revealed the following:

1. *The American public has not become isolationist and Americans do not want to withdraw from active participation in the world.* Although Americans lack even a minimal understanding of the dimensions of the grave problems facing three quarters of the world's population, they express a strong sympathy for the problems of the

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**For the questions, detailed results, and analysis of this survey, see Paul A. Laudicina, "World Poverty and Development: A Survey of American Opinion," Monograph No. 8 (Washington, D.C.; Overseas Development Council, 1973). This survey, conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., consisted of one-hour interviews with a representative sample of Americans. To minimize "leading" respondents, the survey relied primarily on open-ended questions and avoided the pro-con, either-or and multiple choice formats.*

poor abroad. Moreover, when they are provided with information about these problems, their concern tends to increase, and they show a greater willingness to support actions to help solve them.

2. *Americans regard world hunger and poverty as very serious problems deserving "top priority" attention, but give precedence to domestic poverty needs when asked to assign first place to one or the other.*

They show more optimism about the short-run feasibility of alleviating US poverty than poverty abroad. They also feel a more direct responsibility for dealing with domestic poverty.

3. *Americans do not, however, see the solution of domestic and international problems as conflicting.* Rather, the public's views on all aspects of US development policies appear to be governed by two major misperceptions: a) Most Americans are unaware of the true dimensions of world poverty as compared with domestic poverty; b) Most Americans also have an inflated idea of how much the United States today spends on foreign development assistance, erroneously believing that the United States is actually spending far more in terms of relative wealth than other rich nations. But when provided with more facts about the true situation, many Americans show willingness to change to favor allocating a greater proportion of the budget for overseas poverty programs.

4. *Cold war considerations, which were the major rationale for providing assistance to the poor countries in the 1950s and 1960s, have lost much of their credibility.* The reasons for US foreign development assistance enumerated by those interviewed were overwhelmingly humanitarian and moral. The survey results also clearly show that, as of the fall of 1972 (when the survey was conducted), the increasing evidence of US economic interdependence with other countries had not yet made any significant impression on the public as a reason for assisting the poor countries.

5. *Despite these misperceptions and this lack of knowledge, and despite the decline of the cold war rationale for US assistance, more than two thirds (68 percent) of the public supports the principle of the United States providing foreign assistance to the poor countries, with only 28 percent opposed.* The fact that this support for the idea of furnishing foreign assistance is not at present automatically translatable into support for US official aid programs is not a contradiction, but an expression of public dissatisfaction with these programs as they are now perceived to operate. Although the American public knows little about aid programs, it believes that too much of US official aid is wasted in our own bureaucracy, and that US aid does not get to those who need it most in the poor countries. Americans also question the integrity of some recipient governments in handling aid funds.

6. *Even when given the opportunity to reallocate funds within the federal budget, a majority of those expressing views (49 percent) chose to either maintain or increase—not cut—the amount budgeted for foreign economic assistance.* In contrast to this position on foreign economic assistance to the poor countries, the survey results show that a majority (52 percent) of Americans favor cutting the foreign military assistance budget. The survey further shows that one of every two people regards the US provision of military training and equipment as an ineffective and unacceptable form of foreign aid.

7. *Americans do not believe aid should be used as a political tool; they feel that those countries most in need of US economic assistance should be favored in its allocation.* Public support is strongest for direct, visible programs aimed at alleviating such basic problems as hunger and malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy. This conclusion indicates that the bilateral aid legislation passed last year emphasizes the type of aid most Americans favor.

Many foreign policy specialists will be suspicious of these results, if only because the findings do not seem to agree with the commonly accepted wisdom about the state of American public opinion on international issues. But some collateral data bears out the survey's accuracy. For instance, at the very time that US government assistance has been declining (the US now ranks twelfth among the fourteen industrial countries in the percentage of GNP devoted to development assistance), *voluntary* development assistance from the American people has risen to an all-time high. In 1971, voluntary contributions from the American public amounted to $889.6 million (with aid to Israel excluded). United States voluntary contributions (.06 percent of GNP) were second only to those of Sweden (.07 percent), and significantly above the average of 0.4 percent.

Further confirmation of the survey's findings is provided in a new study by public opinion analyst Louis Harris ("The Anguish of Change," W. W. Norton, 1974). Harris concludes that there is a large gap between the policies Americans will support and those measures policymakers *think* their constituents will support. Dealing with a range of contentious issues such as Vietnam, women's rights, domestic poverty and crime, Harris concludes that: ". . . the public. . .is far more sophisticated, far more concerned, and far more advanced than the leadership believed. It can be said with certainty that the people by and large have been well ahead of the leaders."

The Washington Perspective

If these findings are correct, why does public policy not reflect the basic sympathy Americans seem to have for the problems of the poor countries?* The answer can be found in two separate factors: the disappearance of the development coalition of the post-World War II period and the peculiar relationship between public opinion and public policy, particularly as it involves the legislative branch. For more than twenty years, public support for the developing countries was focused on aid and was mobilized

** The actual polling for the survey was conducted in late October 1972, before the Arab oil embargo, and before the current inflationary spiral had reached its current peak. Undoubtedly, these events will have affected public opinion to some degree. Certainly, Americans are now much more aware of their dependence on the outside world, particularly for energy. But these events probably have not changed the overall pattern of American attitudes towards global poverty and development, simply because these attitudes are too deep-rooted. It is indicative, for instance, that most Americans have tended to blame the oil companies, and not the oil countries for the shortages of gasoline and fuel oil. In the absence of other data, therefore, one can safely assume that the results remain valid.*

at the national level by a triangular partnership consisting of the Executive Branch (which saw aid largely as an important tool in the cold war), key members of Congress, and a variety of private groups (which basically agreed with the aims of American foreign policy and also supported development aid for various other reasons). And indeed it is worth remembering that as a result foreign economic aid has been supported—albeit grudgingly—at multibillion-dollar levels by every administration and every Congress since the end of World War II.

But today this support is waning, in part because this coalition no longer exists. The Executive Branch still favors assistance programs, largely on short-range political grounds, but its support is considerably less vigorous. Moreover, congressional support is now fragmented; while many continue to support development cooperation, others, reacting against Vietnam and other overseas commitments, no longer wish to see it continued in any form. Many members of Congress and many of the private organizations that used to be part of the foreign aid coalition—and still potentially are the natural constituency for aid to the developing countries—now hold two major reservations that have sharply decreased their former enthusiasm.

First, many question the fundamental aims of US foreign policy, particularly with respect to the developing countries, because these aims appear to them to be tied to the past and largely irrelevant to the problems of the next decade. This criticism, which arose mainly, but not exclusively, out of our disastrous experience in Southeast Asia, has spawned widespread disapproval of the use of aid for short-range political or security purposes rather than for the problems of global poverty. In addition, many believe that in most countries development has made the rich richer and has not helped the poor. With this disapproval has come a reluctance to give financial support to any foreign policy that assists such conspicuously repressive regimes (as, for example, the military government of Greece), while cutting off assistance (and, indeed, pressuring international organizations to follow suit) to democratically elected regimes such as the one recently overthrown in Chile. This feeling is heightened in the case of foreign aid by the fact that military and economic assistance are still closely linked legislatively.

The second reservation held by the former development constituency is increasing awareness of our social and economic problems here at home. Many former supporters of overseas development have come to wonder whether Americans should not adhere more closely to the old adage that "charity begins at home." A notable example of this change in opinion has occurred within the American churches and labor unions. One would expect the churches and church-related groups to be providing moral leadership for global development. But until recently they had virtually ceased to be important supporters of development aid, partly because of Vietnam, but also because they now give primary importance to problems of domestic poverty. American trade unions also have changed their position on an issue of great importance for the development of poor countries; once strong supporters of free trade, many are now pressing for protectionist trade legislation and for measures designed to restrict the overseas investments of multinational corporations. Much of the fear of free trade and investment prevalent among union leaders arises from their perception of the threat to American jobs from imports from the "cheap labor" areas of the world, primarily the poor countries.

As a result of these factors, the views of the private organizations that used to form the backbone of non-governmental support for overseas development in the form of aid have changed drastically. It is now quite clear that the old coalition of private groups cannot be resurrected without an entirely new effort based on a recognition of their fundamental reservations.

Congress and Foreign Policy

The disaffection with US policy rampant among those who formerly constituted a development coalition has reinforced the view of many policymakers in Washington that the public is hostile, or at least apathetic, toward government programs to help the poor countries —and especially toward all forms of foreign assistance. This belief is certainly one major reason why government interest in maintaining or expanding such programs is so low. But despite the fact that US foreign aid programs continue to receive congressional support, there still appears to be a substantial discrepancy between the public's basically positive and sympathetic response to the problems of world poverty and development and the reluctant and generally declining response of policymakers to those same problems.

Why is there such a discrepancy?* One reason is that the way the issues are presented to the public in a survey is not normally the way they are presented to policymakers for decision. Issues frequently reach policymakers in forms which obscure their impact on the development of the poor countries. Members of Congress generally vote not on abstract questions, but on complex and imperfect proposals which seldom lend themselves to clear-cut choices.

A decision in the trade field, for instance, is liable to be quite complex. In the ODC-sponsored survey, many more respondents said they would favor freer trade with the poor countries if they could take it for granted that American workers would be totally protected from the adverse consequences of more cheap imports. But members of Congress have no opportunity to vote for or against freer trade in a bill that provides total worker pro-

**I am indebted to former ODC Visiting Fellow, Charles Paolillo, for much of the material in this section. His analysis of congressional decision-making on foreign economic issues will be published by ODC later this year.*

tection; more likely, they must decide whether to vote for or against freer trade with developing countries under a system of *partial* protection for affected workers and industries. They then must decide if the amount of protection is sufficient—a quite different question from the question posed in the survey.

Another reason for the apparent discrepancy is that while a survey is taken in a neutral context, government action, of course, is taken in a political context. Regardless of what a member of Congress believes his constituents feel about a particular issue, he may also try to assess the possibility that his position on the issue will be distorted, thereby costing him constituent support. Whatever his own opinion, he may feel unable to support the US development assistance program for fear of being accused of voting for "foreign handouts" while his own district cannot get funds for medical care or education.

Still another reason is that policymakers do not view the public as an undifferentiated mass. On any given issue they generally do not ask "What does the public think?" but rather, "What are the views of business, labor, minorities, the young, the old, the farmers, the miners, the liberals, the conservatives, the rich, the poor?" A policymaker generally assesses any group's views according to that group's importance to him, as well as according to his assessment of the particular issue's actual importance to the group. Those whose political support is essential but uncertain carry greater weight than those whose support can be taken for granted, and those whose support is unattainable are often disregarded.

Finally public opinion often is not the main influence on decisions taken by Congress and the Executive Branch. Clearly, the substance of the issue itself is important, as are the other issues that so often are included in foreign aid bills —for example, end-the-war amendments or anti-impoundment amendments. In the case of overseas development, as on other issues, the strength of a policymaker's own knowledge and opinion tends to guide his decison. However, many members of Congress (as well as policymakers in the Executive Branch) have no strong personal views on development issues. Since clear signals on these issues are likewise still lacking from the public, other decision-making factors tend to play an unusually important role. A Congressman's position on development assistance to other countries may be partly designed to pressure the Executive Branch on some other issue, such as the reduction of defense expenditures or the increase of funds for domestic programs. Or he may be heavily influenced by the state of relations between the Executive and the Congress. Or in the absence of presidential leadership, he may cast his vote with the committee chairman who is managing the bill—simply because he is a committee chairman himself and has a stake in the committee system. Or he may vote with the leadership of his party because he does not know what else to do. The variations are endless, and often the total weight of these other factors is at least as great as the weight of substance and public opinion combined.

What Can Be Done?

Currently two strong subthemes are being voiced in the foreign policy community concerning public opinion. The first is a fear of a new "isolationism," somehow akin to that which manifested itself after World War I. According to this view Americans are turning inward and focusing either on domestic problems or on their own self-gratification. This gloomy conclusion is buttressed by those who cite survey data showing a lessened desire on the part of Americans to come to the aid of close allies, and a series of congressional actions, particularly the diminished enthusiasm for foreign aid and the desire to cut US troop strength in Europe.

The second subtheme involves the search for a new agreement on the directions and goals of American foreign policy. The Secretary of State's plea at the *Pacem in Terris* conference to " . . . search for a new consensus" was echoed by former Undersecretary of State Katzenbach in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, who gave first priority to " . . . discussions sufficient to establish the domestic consensus necessary to gain acceptance for, and support of, our foreign initiatives."

Unfortunately the pleas for agreement on foreign policy issues ring hollow for two reasons. First the foreign affairs community has no systematic way of assessing public opinion on foreign policy issues. As Bernard Cohen points out in his excellent book "The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy," the Department of State long ago gave up any attempt to assay public opinion, relying instead on intuition reinforced by reading the New York TIMES and the Washington POST. Moreover, little systematic work is being done privately, except for that sponsored by Potomac Associates. As a consequence, there is little understanding within the foreign affairs community of how public opinion does, or could, affect foreign policy.

Until recently, it had even become fashionable to downplay the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. But what the American public thinks *is* important in determining the general direction of national policies, although scholars have argued for a number of years about just what its precise impact is and how public opinion is transmitted to our policy makers. Public opinion is important if only because policy makers pay attention to it; for the policymaker, public opinion may be a matter of *concern* even though it may not be a direct influence or constraint. It has political force as long as the policymaker either receives encouragement for positions he wants to take, or in contrast, sees some limitations on effective action. The key to the importance of the public in the policy process, therefore, is whether or not it will accept or oppose strongly the policies proposed by the Congress and the Executive Branch.

Finally there is little understanding among policymakers about how Americans are informed and mobilized on issues of international importance. We are at a time when the need for *public* understanding and support of forthcoming American policies may be even more crucial than in the past. But little effort is being made to understand how the public can be educated on foreign policy issues and how some form of agreement on the broad

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THE NEW CHINA TOURISM OF THE '70s

JOHN K. FAIRBANK

TODAY WE HAVE contact with the Chinese state, not with the Chinese people, as we used to do up to 1949. China has stood up and asserted her sovereignty. In preliberation China the American had his unequal treaty privileges. His rights of travel and residence, made universal by the most-favored-nation clause, had long set the precedent that China was wide open to foreign visiting. The withholding of a visa by the Chinese government would have been an extraordinary act. In postliberation China, the foreigner comes only as an invited guest specifically given a visa. Today China's strict limitation of access is a refreshing contrast in Chinese eyes to the subservience of treaty times. The revolutionary generation deem it only appropriate that foreign contact like all other developments should be under rational and purposeful control.

The opening toward America has become, for the moment, a foreign policy campaign. Selected travelers are given opportunity to report their impressions of revolutionary progress. This new style began in 1971 with the ping-pong players and journalists like Seymour Topping and James Reston of THE NEW YORK TIMES. It was highlighted by the Nixon visit in early 1972, and has been recorded in books or articles by the young, self-styled radicals of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, a galaxy of popular writers like Barbara Tuchman, John Kenneth Galbraith, Harrison Salisbury, and even Joseph Alsop, to say nothing of academic visitors and Overseas Chinese. The guided tour is based on the premise that the institutions of the new China are worth seeing and that the observation of proper behavior is edifying, just as Confucius said. Travelers are not only visitors, but guests who deserve special treatment.

In 1971-72 Americans admitted to Peking began to join the select company of those from all over the world who have met Prime Minister Chou En-lai. The China visitors who have dined with him can vie with one another as to who had more hours of contact, who stayed later into the small hours. Mr. Chou has used these occasions to provide news and enunciate policies, but also and primarily, no doubt, to appraise foreign attitudes and opinions. Usually his banquets were held in the Great Hall of the People that flanks the big square in front of the old Peking Palace—a regal building of imposing proportions with banquet rooms for each of China's provinces, quite aside from the Hall itself, which can seat 10,000 delegates, or the banqueting area for 5,000 diners. The routine on these occasions was so beautifully personalized and friendly as to outshine Madison Avenue's best efforts in public relations. For example, delegations could stand on three tiers inconspicuously available in front of a backdrop for group photographs of distinction, while individuals in ones, two, and threes could be photographed with the Prime Minister in a friendly pose, all in a matter of seconds, with excellent photographs available the next day.

This newly cultivated friendship has complex roots, and its forms of expression are influenced by long traditions on both sides. If it is to be more than a superficial stunt and the product of a friendship campaign that could run its course like any other campaign, then the American participants need to get it into perspective as an activity of the Chinese revolutionary state. But this hopeful augury of constructive future relations is not inconsistent with certain continuities from an earlier day. The treaty system of the period 1842-1943 was preceded by the many centuries of the tributary era. The tribute system had a long history stemming from the Han, and by the beginning of the Ming Dynasty in 1368 it had become fairly well institutionalized. The essence of it was that foreign ingress into China was not a natural right but a concession or boon given the foreigner by the ruler of China. In general, outside influences were excluded, and those permitted were mediated through this regulatory system. Commerce was not the law of international life, but something sought by the foreigner and granted by a self-sufficient Chinese realm only in certain circumstances. For the nomad and seminomad barbarians of Inner Asia, there were horse fairs on the frontier, where Chinese teas and silks could be exchanged for cavalry mounts. Just as Confucian social theory exalted the official over the merchant within Chinese society, so the major aim in foreign relations was to establish personal contact with outside rulers as a basis for harmonious relations. Foreign trade was a subordinate consideration.

In the present dispensation China does not propose to live by foreign trade, but is interested in certain outside goods and techniques. The new state has no thought of renewing what foreign historians have called the tribute system, yet there are certain elements today that echo the past. The old Canton trade for a century and a half before 1842 was the principal channel of contact for European merchants. During the annual trading season, they came and lived in the Thirteen Factories, a ghetto area on the banks of the Pearl River outside the city walls of Canton. There they dealt with designated counterparts, the Hong merchants and smaller shopmen, bargaining over the qualities and quantities of goods. By custom they were allowed to make certain visits to see sights and observe Chinese life without participating in it. They were forbidden to study Chinese writing or export Chinese books that might contain secrets of the realm. Today the Canton Trade Fair similarly permits foreign merchants to come to almost the same area on the Pearl River for limited periods of commercial negotiation. Entertainments and edifying contacts with Chinese life are arranged. Students of the 18th century might well find that today there are similar problems of translation, interpretation, verification of quality, bargaining over terms of payment and, in addition, the entertainment of the foreigner at Chinese banquets and through the

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Performance evaluation is, then, something of an executive art and science in itself.—Herbert E. Meyer

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: The Annual Inventory

PAUL V. WARD

IN JUNE AND JULY of each year practically everyone in the Foreign Service of the State Department is faced with what is commonly viewed as a "necessary evil" where the ends justify some means, and we don't seem to have any better means than the ones at hand; that is, the Performance Evaluation Report. Each year some changes are made in the form and instructions, but "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."

I would submit that the "vicious cycle" can be broken and a new start made toward a much more satisfactory system—from the viewpoints of "rator," "ratee," and the organization as a whole. I do not presume to have the "ultimate solution." There isn't one, but there seem to me to be several steps that could be taken to deal more effectively with a rather complex problem, with the stakes being the kind of Foreign Service we will have in the next decade.

Performance Evaluation: For What Purpose

Why does the Department of State and Foreign Service, or any large organization, have a formal performance evaluation system?

Once the number of people in an organization has reached a point where each member does not know all others personally, where decisions must be made on assignment of personnel to tasks which require specialized experience and qualifications, and where access to higher paying positions is limited, the usual administrative response is to institute a formal, written appraisal procedure which provides "objective" justification for management's decisions in these areas.

Thus, there is an *administrative* purpose for a formal review of employees' performance. That is, to serve as a basis for decisions on salary increases, promotions, assignments, and terminations.

Another objective is usually more implicit than explicit. That is to *control* or mold the behavior of employees *and* that of their supervisors—to ensure that job related activities, and in many cases personal ones, are within the limits established by the organization's leadership.

Since many people like feedback about how well they are doing on the job, another role of a formal evaluation system is to give them some indication of how they are perceived by higher levels. This function is particularly important in an organization where many interpersonal relationships are not conducive to open and concrete two-way communications. This *informative* role perhaps should be more central than it usually is.

Related to the control function, but somewhat different, is management's desire to use the performance rating system to *motivate* employees to improve the quality and increase the quantity of their performance.

An evaluation process may also be needed to *identify executive talent*.

An additional role, which is in conflict with some of the above, would be to serve as a crucial variable in the *creating of an organizational climate* that is conducive to (1) the fulfillment of both organizational purposes and member needs, and (2) the development of energetic and creative people who effectively perform the organization's tasks and improve its capacity in the process.

How many of these roles do people expect the Foreign Service Performance Evaluation System to fulfill? The answer would depend on the perspective of the respondent. Let's assume that all of them are consistent with the expectations of at least some people in the Department.

How well does the present system fulfill the desirable objectives? One could write a book on each topic, but a few generalizations will serve to illustrate the complexity of the issue of reform in an ongoing system.

Promotions—Is the current system a valid basis for just decisions? I believe the majority view in the Department is that it is not.

Selection-Out—Because of the nature of the system (generally unrealistically high ratings and susceptibility to personal bias) it is probably even less valid as an instrument for identifying the marginal performer.

Assignments—Most people would probably agree that corridor reputation is more used than the written record in making assignments, particularly for people who have been in the Service for some time.

In order to fulfill these three functions effectively, what are the basic criteria a system would have to meet?

- Valid data in universal categories that allow comparisons to be made.
- Information that is relevant to the objective. That is, data which discriminate between better performers and weaker performers must be the basis of the written record.
- The system must be perceived as valid and just by employees.
- It must be sensitive to changes in (a) knowledge, (b) at-

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titudes, (c) ability, and (d) performance.

How do these specific criteria relate to the functions outlined above?

Identify Potential Executives—The degree to which the system meets the requirements of this item will determine its usefulness in picking out potential leaders. The Foreign Service system appears to be nowhere near that selective.

Mold Behavior—There is a good bit of subjective commentary that would indicate the current system is pretty good as a unilateral control device for supervisors, but the questions is, is unilateral control desirable?

Inform—Some research has indicated that periodic performance evaluation systems tied to salaries or promotions are not effective in providing useful feedback to employees. In addition to the general phenomenon of portraying everyone as practically walking on water the system has other shortcomings. Any criticism seems to have a negative impact on performance rather than motivating improvement. Praise has little effect one way or the other.

Motivate—Here again there is evidence (studies in General Electric) that an effective informative and motivating system which leads to improved performance requires: (a) establishment of specific goals, (b) day-to-day feedback and coaching, and (c) mutual goal setting. (Current efforts to adopt a management-by-objectives (m-b-o) philosophy seem to be in the right direction, but successful implementation of such a philosophy requires a much more systemic change than simply requiring, through regulations, that the paper exercise be done in anticipation of filling out a performance evaluation report that is already seen by many as an unpleasant chore.)

Creating a Self-Renewing Climate—A performance evaluation system can be an initial impetus in the direction of a dynamic and progressive organization, but it will only flourish and grow in a supportive and responsive environment.

Alternative Systems

I believe it is evident to most participants that the existing policy and its implementation do not meet the criteria for any of the desirable objectives discussed earlier. An even more fundamental question is whether or not it is possible for any one general system to serve all those functions. Many experts on the subject have come out in favor of multi-method systems.

What are some alternatives?

One would be to have a promotion system that is semi-automatic during the middle grades (Diplomacy for the 70's Task Forces recommendation) and have the junior and senior promotions based on composite data collected over a period of time from a variety of sources. This should permit supervisor-subordinate relations to follow increasingly the management-by-objectives pattern, which in turn would fulfill the continuing objectives of feedback and motivation. Assignments would be based on general personnel office data and reputation as they now are.

A variation on the above theme would be to take the supervisor out of the business of performance evaluations altogether and let a team of personnel specialists working with the Inspector General's staff accomplish that task, using a variety of instruments and getting input from an individual's subordinates and peers, as well as supervisors. These reports could be used for administrative purposes and to provide feedback to the individual on how well he was doing. Such a system would not necessarily preclude a management-by-objective operation, nor a competitive, merit promotion system. A self-rating procedure might fit in well in this approach.

Another option would be to set up a system of points (as proposed by some AFSA activists) whereby a person earns promotions by accomplishing self-improvement of formal training programs, taking difficult assignments, etc. This would allow an individual to set his own pace and he would always know exactly where he stood in terms of achieving his personal goals. This system would reward both effort and merit and could be structured to direct behavior toward the future needs of the organization as well as the individual.

There are also proponents of using only a battery of standardized objective tests to measure personality traits, performance skills, knowledge and attitudes. Administrative decisions would then be made on the basis of "objective" scores rather than subjective personal judgments. Here again the results could be made known to the individual, just as college entrance exam scores are, for purposes of guiding him in personal career decision making. The underlying assumption of this system is that only valid tests would be used for a specific purpose. (Such a system seems antithetical to our professional self-image, but would probably be more accurate in its selectivity and predictability than the present system.) The individual could choose for himself the timing of attempts to qualify for new levels of responsibility and/or pay. Specialized tests could be used to sort out people for special assignments.

I don't think it is worthwhile to devote space to discussing systems that might be based solely on seniority or solely on the informal subjective judgments of management, although they are theoretical options.

Although I am not advocating any particular system at this point, it is evident that there are several different alternatives to our present one and that other single systems, or preferably a multi-method approach, might be more effective for the Department. The important thing is that studies of reform possibilities should not be limited to tinkering with the present scheme, to the exclusion of other options.

Fine Tuning Present System

Assuming that for the moment the Department decides to keep the basic one-on-one periodic rating system it now has, there are improvements that could be made in the current Foreign Service procedure to make the resultant data and ratings more valid. The Department could, for example:

Eliminate the use of terms ("qualities" and "attributes") which are subject to such varying interpretations. As indicated above the terms and definitions used should be based on some evidence that the resulting "scores" will differentiate between better performers and poorer performers, at least. Research has shown that the use of the present group of factors is needless duplication as they all are highly correlated.

Eliminate the overlap between the proposed lists of performance "qualities" and personal "attributes." Recent research has indicated that both types of categories should be included for a more complete picture of the individual. The specific lists should be revised, however, so that one of them clearly describes how well the employee accomplished his specific assignments while the other refers to more generalized, enduring personality traits.

Determine what the four "most" and four "least" checks attributed to the terms described above will tell the promotion boards, other than that various rating officers see different aspects manifested by their subordinates. Does one combination tell the panel member that the individual has higher potential for senior jobs than another individual with a different profile of check marks? This obviously requires some pre-use research before a list is finalized. Unless such discriminations are possible, however, the check lists are not very useful.

Print the instructions for each section on the form itself. That will take up valuable space, but here again research indicates that the degree of consistency between rating officers is improved by the close proximity of instructions to the data to be recorded.

Prepare the forms and their instructions so that no identification will be available to the promotion panel members. This can be arranged by having the right pages of the form permanently bound together with a consular type seal before a cover page with all the names is signed. Thus the identification page can be covered with an envelope with a code number for use by the panel which will then consider only the reports per se. Instructions should prohibit specific proper names which would indicate post of assignment or other facts which might unduly influence the panel member's assignment of a rank or score as a result of the "halo effect."

Delete the requirement that each rating officer assign overall value judgments ranging from "inadequate" to "extraordinary." Have him only present detailed observations as to what he sees and leave it up to a panel in Washington to assign ratings or scores. This will accomplish two things. One, it will no longer require the rating officer to "play God," and consequently should enhance the openness and reality orientation of the supervisor-subordinate relationship. Secondly it will enlarge the sample of persons on whom comparisons are made.

Select only the most outstanding FSOs to serve on the promotion panels and give them special training in the whole evaluation process, in much the same manner that BEX members now receive orientation from external consultants. Have two groups review all the records. One to assign ratings on the continuum and make recommendations for promotions as is now normally done by the rating officer, and the second to play the traditional role of weighting and ranking officers within a class for the promotion list. The advantage of this system is to have someone make overall ratings and recommendations who does not have to work with the individual on a day to day basis and also who does not have to determine where he falls on the promotion list. If the second panel questions the rating given in a particular case a meeting of the two sub-panels should work out the difference.

"I believe it would be best to leave the system alone for at least one year and spend the time developing commitment at all levels for a fundamental change and doing the research that would produce a viable solution for the problem that everyone knows exists, but doesn't quite know how to solve."

The reports of the first subpanel, that is the continuum rating and promotion recommendation, should be furnished to the employee as feedback on how his performance was viewed at the Department level, but not his final position on the ranking list. Such detailed information has been shown in private companies to be a disincentive.

I insist on the critical incident reporting technique. In other words, the rating officer, the reviewing officer and the rated employee should all be instructed *not* to make general statements but to describe specific events in the reporting period. These events should be chosen by the rated officer as valid examples of his central tasks. They should focus on (1) describing a significant problem or task faced by the rated officer, (2) his proposed course of action, (3) the barriers to accomplishment of the objective, (4) what the employee actually did, (5) the immediate results, and (6) the long term consequences for both the rated employee and his unit. There are at least two advantages to this system. Both the rating and rated officers can focus on more concrete "facts" rather than the more abstract concepts, and disagreements can be pinpointed more precisely in their respective statements. Secondly, the review and promotion panels in Washington can base their evaluations on more directly objective data rather than second-hand abstractions.

Instead of having the reviewing officer critique the rating officer's report, have him give his own performance evaluation from another perspective. The local review panel can take care of ensuring fairness and non-discrimination and the Washington panels will have the benefit of two, hopefully independent, reports from close to the individual's work.

Status Quo with Pilot Research

Considering the results of past change efforts in the Department and other large organizations, one should keep in mind that small changes in the performance evaluation system, especially those initiated from the top, usually result in an initial flurry and then a return to *status quo ante*.

As a result, I believe it would be best to leave the system alone for at least one year and spend the time developing commitment at all levels for a fundamental change and doing the research that would produce a viable solution for the problem that everyone knows exists, but doesn't know quite how to solve. A more precise consensus definition of the "problem" should be formulated; several different small pilot projects could be carried out to test new techniques of goal setting, performance evalua-

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Do the shapers of diplomatic practices display more flexibility than, say, architects? Than business executives?

State Department Rigidity: TESTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS

DAVID GARNHAM

THERE IS A broad consensus that the State Department is one of the more inept institutions of the US government. Because State's performance is considered mediocre, and because the Foreign Service officer corps is the Department's most important personnel group (although only twelve percent of State's employees are FSOs), it is not surprising that the Foreign Service is often blamed for State's difficulties. A chronic criticism is that State's officials are timid, rigid, and noncreative. Nearly everyone who is exposed to the Department receives an impression of pervasive conservatism. Consider the following quotations:

You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was (Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in "Beckoning Frontiers," by M. S. Eccles, 1951).

The bureaucratic routine through which foreign service officers must go produces capable men, knowledgeable about specific parts of the world, and excellent diplomatic operators. But it makes men cautious rather than imaginative (Dean Acheson, in "The Secretary of State," edited by D. K. Price, 1965).

Ideas must always be studied, cleared here, coordinated there. The product of that process is not likely to diverge sharply from what has been inherited. In most of the bureaus of the Department there is a feeling created by the procedure of rotating people in and out of posts . . . A man comes to an assignment, and he is told what policy is. He must find a way to navigate through the storms, to resist the pressures of peoples and events, and to turn over the policy to his successor in the same condition in which it was when he received it from his predecessor (Charles Frankel, in "High on Foggy Bottom," 1969).

From the moment a young Foreign Service officer enters the confines of the bureaucracy he feels the disciplines of caution and conformity; his mind may be as devoid of the "little grooves" which the late Texas Senator Tom Connally ascribed to it as that of a babe in arms, but by the time he reaches his first post, he has become part of the system (Henry Serrano Villard, "Affairs at State," 1965).

An officer who gains a reputation for persistence in making his views known, particularly on measures the lines of which have already been formulated, comes in the end inevitably to make a nuisance of himself . . . Independence of mind—and I write without any intended irony—is a quality which detracts seriously from the value of a diplomat (J. Rives Childs, "Foreign Service Farewell," 1969).

This study tests a psychological explanation of State Department rigidity. The psychological hypothesis asserts that State is rigid because the Department's employees, and especially Foreign Service officers, are inflexible. We know that some individuals are more rigid and cautious than others, and we would expect an organization to resist change if the average rigidity of its personnel was high. This psychological hypothesis underlies many appraisals of State's deficiencies. For example, A. M. Schlesinger Jr. in "A Thousand Days" (1965) has written, "one almost concluded that the definition of a Foreign Service officer was a man for whom the risks always outweighed the opportunities."

In addition to the consensus that FSOs behave cautiously, two considerations make the psychological hypothesis more plausible. First, members of the Foreign Service officer corps are, to some degree, self-selected. And, as J. P. Lovell ("Foreign Policy in Perspective" 1970) has written, "it is clear that variations in career choices occur to some extent according to variations in personality. Thus, those who enter the Foreign Service . . . by no means represent a random cross section of the population in terms of their personalities and attitudes." A second consideration is that the Service's selection process tends to perpetuate characteristics of the Foreign Service officer corps. As John E. Harr has stated:

Both the Walther and Fielder-Harris studies hold that the oral examining panels tend to select from among those who have passed the written examination "young people they consider most like the successful officers already in the system." This, of course, is not surprising. As Theodore Caplow points out, any functioning hierarchy will "evaluate the candidate as a potential in-group member, and will therefore give special attention to his congeniality in the broadest sense," including "his ability to conform to the habits and standards of his elders" ("The Professional Diplomat," 1969; see also R. Walther, "Orientations and Behavioral Styles of Foreign Service Officers," 1965; F. Fielder and G. Harris "The Quest for Foreign Affairs Officers—Their Recruitment and Selection," 1966).

If one considers the frequent allusions to FSO timidity, the role of self-selection in Foreign Service recruitment, and the Service's penchant for selecting new officers who are similar to present officers, it appears quite possible that the Foreign Service may constitute a self-perpetuating group of psychologically rigid individuals.

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The Psychological Hypothesis

To test the psychological hypothesis, FSO flexibility was measured using the Fx subscale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). The CPI is one of the most highly respected and widely used multidimensional psychological testing instruments.* Fx measures "the degree of flexibility and adaptability of a person's thinking and social behavior." (H. G. Gough, "Manual for the California Psychological Inventory," 1969.) Fx also measures the absence of rigidity which D. A. Hills ("The California Personality Inventory Flexibility Scale," 1960) defines:

> as the generalized habitual tendency to respond persistently to new situations with previously appropriate responses when such persistence is not adaptive. In other words, although the situation or problem has changed, the person continues to respond as if there had been no change, with inadequate resultant performance.

Basically, rigid individuals resist change; highly flexible individuals are very adaptable. Indeed H. G. Gough ("An Interpreter's Syllabus for the California Psychological Inventory," 1968) asserts "A very high score on Fx (18-19 and above) . . . [seems] to presage a mercurial, too volatile temperament."

The Fx items were included in a questionnaire mailed worldwide to 500 Foreign Service officers in May 1970. The sample included only officers from the eight lowest grades, i.e., FSO-8 through FSO-1; the sample was randomly selected from the January 1970 Foreign Service List. The questionnaire was completed by 274 officers, and the Department of State Mail Room returned 22 questionnaires as nondeliverable. The adjusted response rate (when nondelivered questionnaires are subtracted from the denominator) is 57 percent.

If the psychological explanation of State Department rigidity is valid, we would expect FSO psychological flexibility to be low. We might also predict, as the Foreign Service literature suggests, that senior officers occupying more influential positions are less flexible than junior officers. The data do not support these predictions. The Fx mean for the Foreign Service sample (n = 266) is 14.25; the standard deviation is 3.4, and the range is 5-22. Gough has published Fx means and standard deviations for a number of occupational groups (see Table 1). The Foreign Service mean is very high, and the standard deviation is quite typical. Gough reports an Fx mean for only one group (psychology graduate students) which is higher than the Foreign Service mean. The null hypothesis of equal Fx means is rejected at the .001 level (using a two-tailed t-test) when Foreign Service officers are compared with architects, business executives, military officers and physicians.

Further evidence of Foreign Service flexibility appears in the research of Mennis ("American Foreign Policy Officials," 1971). Mennis compared a sample of FSOs (n = 37) with a sample of military officers (n = 58). The Foreign Service officers were selected from political officers assigned to geographical bureaus in Washington; the military sample was drawn from officers in "Geographic Area-Political" positions in the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), the Army's International Policy Division, the Navy's Operations 61, and the Air Force's International Affairs Division. Mennis examined the cognitive styles of these groups using Fx and a short-form of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. Mennis scored the scales using a Likert-type format, and he used Guttman scaling to produce a final five-item dogmatism scale and a ten-item rigidity scale, i.e., ten items from the Fx scale scored to measure rigidity. The two scales were merged to assess a "doctrinaire" cognitive style which is both dogmatic and rigid (see Rokeach's "The Open and Closed Mind" for a discussion of the difference between dogmatism and rigidity). Because the number of items was reduced and a different scoring procedure was adopted, it is not possible to compare directly Mennis's Foreign Service sample with my sample. However, Mennis rejected the null hypotheses of equal FSO and military rigidity, dogmatism, and doctrinaireness. FSOs were significantly less doctrinaire, less dogmatic, and more flexible than their military counterparts.

As I have indicated, the Foreign Service literature suggests that

TABLE 1
PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY (Fx) AND OCCUPATION

Occupational Group	*n*	*Mean Fx*	*S.D.*
Foreign service sample	266	14.2	3.4
Psychiatric residents	262	13.9	3.4
Research scientists	45	13.3	3.9
Physicians	312	10.7	4.0
Architects	124	10.6	4.2
City school superintendents	144	9.7	3.4
Business executives	107	9.3	3.6
Military officers	343	8.5	3.5
Dentists	59	8.1	3.7
Machine operators	105	7.8	3.4
Salesmen	85	6.9	3.1

**Fx consists of 22 true-false items; it may be scored to measure either flexibility or rigidity. As a measure of flexibility the sum of the false responses is used. See M. Rokeach ("The Open and Closed Mind" 1960) for a listing of the Fx items. For discussions of the CPI, and the Fx subscale, see H. G. Gough ("Manual for the California Psychological Inventory," 1969) and O. K. Buros ("The Sixth Mental Measurements Yearbook," 1965).*

One previous application of Fx is particularly germane to the present study because it established a relationship between psychological flexibility and creativity. The psychologist D. W. MacKinnon ("Personality and Realization of Creative Potential," 1965 and "The Personality Correlates of Creativity," 1962) drew three samples of American architects which he labeled Architects I (n = 40), Architects II (n = 43), and Architects III (n = 41). The first sample was selected by a panel of architecture professors. Architects I were considered to be among the most creative contemporary architects. Architects II lacked individual reputations for creativity, but they had all worked with architects from the first group. Architects III were a cross-section of American architects. An architectural panel assessed the creativity of work by the three groups. The null hypotheses of equal creativity were rejected at the .001 level; Architects I were judged more creative than Architects II, who were judged more creative than Architects III. The CPI was administered to the three samples, and Fx was one of the scales which differentiated the groups. Architects I were more flexible than Architects II, and Architects II were more flexible than Architects III.

older (senior) officers are more rigid than younger FSOs. For example, in their case study of the attempt to establish PPBS in the State Department, F. C. Mosher and J. E. Harr ("Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership," 1970) contrast "the older and more traditional ambassadors in the Foreign Service [who] were inclined to be skeptical of radically different approaches" with "the young officers [who] seemed especially receptive to new ideas and were innocent enough not to worry about possible risks to their later careers in associating themselves with a radical new undertaking that might turn out to be controversial." This is not an isolated observation, and a negative relationship between age and Fx was predicted. Such a finding could support the psychological hypothesis. State's rigidity might have a psychological basis (despite high overall FSO flexibility) if the more influential, older, and higher ranking officers are less flexible.

There is a significant negative relationship between age and Fx ($p < .05$), but r equals only $-.14$. The null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected, but the relationship is extremely weak. Furthermore, an analysis of variance did not support the hypothesis that higher-ranking officers (e.g., Grade One and Grade Two officers) are less flexible than lower-ranking officers (e.g., Grade Six and Grade Seven officers; see Table 2). The null hypothesis of no relationship between Foreign Service rank and psychological flexibility is not rejected. Fx is weakly related to age, and age is strongly related to Foreign Service grade; therefore, it is useful to employ analysis of covariance to examine the relationship between Fx and grade controlling for age—i.e., age is the covariate. For the analysis of covariance $F_{6\ 256} = .94$; there is even less evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship when age is controlled.

My findings are that FSO flexibility is high; there is no relationship between Foreign Service rank and Fx, and there is only a weak relationship between age and Fx. I have conducted other analyses which indicate that psychological flexibility is not related to career satisfaction, occupational success, religious background, regional background, or an officer's functional cone, e.g., administrative, consular, economic, or political. Obviously, psychological flexibility within the Foreign Service officer corps is very high and homogeneous. If only the psychological evidence were considered, we would predict that State would be dynamic and innovative rather than sluggish and rigid.

TABLE 2
FOREIGN SERVICE GRADE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY

Grade	*n*	*Mean Fx*
One	31	13.7
Two	45	13.3
Three	45	14.5
Four	64	14.5
Five	43	14.9
Six	28	14.9
Seven	8	13.0
$F_{6\ 257} = 1.38$		

Conclusions

Clearly, the empirical evidence does not support the psychological hypothesis: Foreign Service psychological flexibility is homogeneous and high. Indeed, 18 percent of the sample have Fx scores above 17, which Gough describes as possibly *too* flexible. Is it possible to reconcile State's alleged rigidity with the finding that members of the Department's principal career service are extremely flexible? One plausible alternative to the psychological explanation of State Department conformity is a "systemic" hypothesis which is based on the fact that human behavior is strongly influenced by social context. This hypothesis emphasizes characteristics of the State Department social system. The systemic hypothesis assumes that FSOs are not more rigid than other individuals of similar age, education, and intelligence; it suggests, rather, that professional diplomats work within a social milieu which induces conformist behavior. The promotion process is a part of the Department's social system which can serve as an example. One report in "Diplomacy for the 70's" (US Department of State, 1970) makes the following assertion:

> The Task Force found a widespread belief among Foreign Service officers that the promotion system tends to stifle creativity, discourage risk-taking, and reward conformity. The effect appears to be due in large part to the interaction of two factors. The first is the fiercely competitive nature of the Service resulting from the selection-out principle. The second is the exceptional importance of the efficiency report in determining the rate of an officer's advancements. The knowledge that the good opinion of his supervisor is crucial in determining whether he advances at a normal rate or falls behind and is eventually selected out can act as a powerful deterrent to a forthright expression by an officer of views on policy matters which may be at variance with the views of his supervisor.**

The central assumption of the systemic hypothesis is that even highly flexible individuals will behave cautiously if they perceive that caution is rewarded and innovation is penalized.

Having failed to confirm the psychological explanation of State Department rigidity, the systemic hypothesis appears to be quite a plausible alternative. Several authors have advanced systemic explanations, but these studies, with the partial exception of C. Argyris, "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness within the Department of State," (1967) are impressionistic (in addition to Argyris, see I. M. Destler, "Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy," 1972; John E. Harr, "The Issue of Competence in the State Department," INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, March, 1970; A. M. Scott, "The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture," INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring, 1969; and Department of State "Diplomacy for the 70's," 1970). Therefore, a data-based test of the systemic hypothesis now seems appropriate. ■

** *A specific instance of this phenomenon is discussed by C. Wolf, Jr. in "Indonesian Assignment," 1952.*

"We cannot know what the future holds.
We do know, however, that change is the only
constant in world affairs. And we know our Agency
is charged with helping to fashion that change."—Edward R. Murrow

USIA AT THE CROSSROADS

GEORGE G. WYNNE

The nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain information activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs.

President Harry S Truman
Executive Order 9608
August 31, 1945

THE FOUNDERS of the United States pleaded the merits of their cause before the world with a team of talented communicators headed by Benjamin Franklin, and the Declaration of Independence itself was a public position paper that sought to explain and justify out of "a decent respect to the Opinions of Mankind" the American colonists' revolt against the established order. But while the forerunners of today's "public diplomacy," designed to win support for our cause, persuade and influence foreign opinion, were present at the creation of the Republic, the United States early on withdrew behind its moat of two oceans and left diplomacy to the diplomats. Except, that is, in times of major war and domestic strife when the government found it helpful to talk directly to foreign audiences other than the officials of foreign ministries. During the Revolutionary War, crudely-printed leaflets called on the Hessian soldiers to defect to the American side and promised land and freedom to those that did. About 5,000 of the enemy heeded the offer. During the Civil War the Union campaigned for the support of European public opinion on the slavery issue to the point of publishing an open letter by President Lincoln to the people of England. In World War I, the Committee on Public Information headed by George Creel, a journalist friend of President Wilson, responded to German propaganda initiatives with a mass media effort to diminish the enemy's will to fight while rallying support for the Allied cause. Leaflets were dropped by artillery shell, aircraft and balloon over the German lines to encourage surrender and publicize American war aims. In World War II, millions of "safe conduct" passes were dropped on enemy lines promising good treatment and an honorable way out of the war, a technique that was later copied with spotty success in Korea and Vietnam. These direct propaganda appeals to enemy soldiers and civilians in enemy and enemy-occupied countries which became known as "psychological warfare" or "psychological operations" in the absence of a shooting war, were practiced from the start by the major ideological protagonists of this century. At their first diplomatic negotiations at Brest Litovsk in 1917, Communist negotiators, headed by Leon Trotsky, threw leaflets from the windows of their special train urging German troops to overthrow their government and join the world revolution.

George G. Wynne is a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. His "2,000 Years to a More Powerful Vocabulary" in the January issue elicited many letters and comments which will be reported by Mr. Wynne in an early issue. He is also the author of the recently published "Why Geneva?" which gives an insight into international conference diplomacy.

Blatant and often deceitful campaigns of coercion and subversion organized by the Nazi and Stalin regimes beating the drums of the mass media served to give the word "propaganda" a bad name, particularly in the United States. As employed by the Goebbels Propaganda Ministry, the concept became synonymous with the technique of the "Big Lie." Advocacy information directed officially at foreign audiences over, under, and around their own governments, though conceded to be necessary, consequently took on some of that distasteful hue and continued to be viewed with suspicion by the traditional diplomatic establishment and most legislators who were, and are, apprehensive over a mass media propaganda tool in the hands of the incumbent Administration. (As an aside, the word "propaganda" lived up for centuries to its perfectly legitimate origin derived from "propagation of the faith"—propaganda fide—practiced by the Roman Catholic Church.)

By the same token, World War II and the events leading up to it made information activities conducted abroad acceptable though they continued to be conceived in narrow, direct and short-range propaganda terms. Nazi, and later communist, propaganda distortions had to be countered and the belief in America's high purposes sustained abroad. From this thought process sprang a succession of organizations and provisional arrangements to conduct information campaigns aimed at foreign audiences in support of American policies beginning with the hemisphere-oriented Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Nelson Rockefeller) in 1940, the Voice of America in 1942 and later that year the consolidated foreign and domestic effort to boost morale with facts and figures that was known as the Office of War Information (OWI), directed by news commentator Elmer Davis, which became the forerunner of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Offices of the OWI abroad were named the United States Information Service (USIS), a name that stuck when USIA was constituted as a separate agency in 1953. The residual OWI functions had been lodged for a while in the State Department Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs that evolved through a series of reorganizations within the State Department, budget cuts and recommendations by congressional committees into a semi-autonomous unit within the Department organized in January 1952 as the International Information Administration (IIA). The IIA absorbed all the information and educational exchange as well as cultural relations functions with foreign countries, the latter carried out since 1937 in a minor way by the State Department and placed under OWI direction during the war years.

The creation of a separate United States Information Agency by President Eisenhower in August 1953 reflected on the one hand the recognition that a major power must concern itself directly with public opinion abroad, on the other a desire by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to rid his Department of responsibility for operations that went beyond traditional diplomatic activities, had a propaganda flavor, dealt directly with foreign audiences, and were distasteful to the practitioners of government-to-government diplomacy. The propaganda orientation of the new agency, which is the source of its continuing identity crisis, was further accentuated by the cold war context that gave it birth. In his first State of the Union message, President Eisenhower called the reorganization of the international information effort by the United States essential to the nation's security. "There is but one way to avoid global war," the President said, "and that is to win the cold war." USIA was to mount the big guns in the battle for mens' minds. The Congressional view of the necessary but unappetizing propaganda role devised for the new agency was expressed in the resolution of the Hickenlooper Committee—a Senate subcommittee set up to study the proposed reorganization — which recommended that responsibility for educational and cultural relations not be taken over by the new Information Agency but remain with the Department of State. The absorption of the cultural function by USIA would be "inadvisable," the committee resolution stated, "and would tend to give educational exchange programs a propaganda flavor." Accordingly, when the Agency was created, the cultural exchange program remained with the Department of State, a situation that has persisted into the present and was further set in concrete by the Kennedy Administration with the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. While the creation of a separate agency of government gave belated organizational recognition to the fact that the conduct of public diplomacy—the search by major governments for the sympathy of foreign peoples—had become an indispensable component of the conduct of foreign relations, the structural anomaly that resulted from the separation of information and cultural exchange programs placed all activities in direct support of foreign policy initiatives outside the direct control of the foreign policy makers while retaining the climate-building educational and cultural programs that exercise only an indirect, long-range effect on foreign relations, inside the Department of State.

It is a tribute to American pragmatism, to the tact and the skills of USIS officers around the world and in the backup services at headquarters, that this jerry-built structure with its messy lines of responsibility, overlapping and dual hierarchies in policy and cultural programing formulation was able to work as well as it did over the past 20 years. Like his predecessors, James Keogh, the present Director of USIA, considers as the Agency's main task the balancing of the spectrum of information about the United States that reaches foreign audiences, the placing into perspective of our actions and policies that affect other countries and the correction of misinterpretations of the workings of this country. This task goes on around the world no matter how poorly the organizational lines are drawn: "Whether our officers are broadcasting on the Voice of America," Mr. Keogh recently told the Public Relations Society of the United States, "editing a magazine in Arabic, or scheduling a performance by Duke Ellington in Moscow, or setting up an exhibit in Bulgaria, or arranging a lecture

by a Fulbright professor in New Delhi, or assisting a French TV producer to plan a series on American environmental programs, or giving the facts about US trade policies to a Japanese editor, it is all part of the same effort—the extremely important work of explaining our country and our people, of correcting or minimizing misunderstandings that clog or contaminate relations between the US and other countries."

The need for our officers to be engaged around the world in a wide gamut of activities with a great variety of audiences is given by the fact that nowadays more vocal segments of the population than ever before influence the way representative governments run major countries and there are an unprecedented number of opinion molders busily molding and articulating the views of these new interest groups. Public opinion now is a many-splendored thing and even closed societies are showing increasing signs of sensitivity to public opinion in their own and other countries. A bad world press is distinctly unhelpful to the image countries try to project. It used to be that diplomats needed to gain the ear of only a handful of their colleagues in the foreign ministries and possibly other government offices. The rest out there didn't matter, at least not as far as the formulation of government policy was concerned. Now, USIS posts even in small and medium-size countries maintain audience lists containing the names and addresses of literally thousands and tens of thousands of individuals whom our posts find it essential to address and include on mailing and invitation lists. And there are more tools to do the job. Besides the conventional article placement, radio/TV and exhibits projects, library and exchange-of-persons activities, we now have such things as custom-made video tape recordings (VTR), produced in response to local needs and opportunities, and the fledgling electronic dialogue (ED) which links a VTR presentation on a subject of interest with a genuine trans-oceanic press conference by an overseas conference call with the spokesman on the tape.

The widening recognition that foreign opinion matters for America, not only in times of war, and that larger audiences than merely foreign ministries need to be addressed by our official representatives has been paralleled in our own country by the democratization—with a small 'd'— and subsequent opening of the Foreign Service to all the groups that together make up this nation. In other contexts this process has been identified as the "decline of the WASP," and nowhere has this been more apparent than in the public diplomacy sector which itself was organized in response to the greater popular participation in the decision-making processes of other nations. By background, character and inclination, our response mechanism has been the least tradition-tied and establishment-oriented of the lot and it has probably had a leavening effect on the Foreign Service beyond its own ranks. While more an anecdotal than statistical evidence of this trend, the four working ambassadorships assigned at the moment to USIS officers are occupied by four outstanding officers of whom three are black and one is a woman. The professional background of the USIS career officer, our average FSIO, if there is such an animal, also tends to be somewhat more diverse, reflecting in many cases a later entry into the service from the private sector.

While the exercise of public diplomacy by the United States through the United States Information Agency—what the late George V. Allen, one of the ablest USIA directors, called government talking directly to people—has finally come into its own, our official perception of information and cultural programs as solely in the service of short-range foreign policy goals has haunted the Agency from its inception. It has led to exaggerated expectations with cultural and information efforts applied directly to immediate objectives and considered practically as weapons in our cold war arsenal. Exaggerated tactical expectations have been followed by bitter recriminations with the Agency's leadership in Congress on such occasions as appropriations hearings, and elsewhere in the public prints when the Agency proved unable to quantify the unquantifiable—success in molding public attitudes abroad and their direct impact on the actions of foreign governments on issues important to the United States. Tom Sorensen, who helped run the Agency during the Kennedy Administration, quotes an unnamed top USIA official in his book "The Word War" as saying that: "In times of calm the State Department expects less from us than we are capable of doing. In times of crisis, they put an intolerable burden of expectations on our

USIA IN CAPSULE

Readers not entirely familiar with the Agency's operations might find the facts and figures cited below helpful in evaluating this article. Views expressed in the article are the author's and do not represent an official position of either Agency or Department.

USIA currently:

- **operates the Voice of America which broadcasts in 36 languages around the world to an audience of many millions,**
- produces or acquires more than 150 film and television documentaries annually for showing to overseas audiences and assists producers from other countries in preparing documentaries about the U.S.,
- **teletypes texts of U.S. policy statements, speeches and background material to 127 USIS posts five days a week. These texts and the speed of their receipt are often of crucial importance to our representatives in placing U.S. developments into perspective with host country officials and media,**
- publishes magazines in 27 languages, distributes them in over a hundred countries,
- **builds and circulates abroad some 50 exhibits annually dealing with life in the United States,**
- maintains and supports nearly 300 libraries abroad in U.S. information centers, reading rooms and bi-national centers in 98 countries,
- **organizes discussions, lectures, seminars, press conferences, and cultural events to acquaint host country audiences with aspects of American life relevant to their interests,**
- administers educational and cultural exchange programs abroad for the State Department,
- **maintains personal contact and cultivates a dialogue with opinion leaders in the 109 countries in which USIS posts are operating.**

It does all this with 9,572 people, over half of them local national employees, on a 1974 budget of $224 million.

backs. Then after the crunch they revert to normal and tend to forget that they are still dealing with a psychological problem." What is true about the Department's occasionally exaggerated expectations of USIA applies in even greater measure to the Congress where the Agency, which is spending today about the same in real dollar terms as the year it was founded* has been buffeted with an almost annual regularity in appropriation and authorization controversies. It has been feast or famine, more often the latter, usually without reference to the intrinsic merit of the Agency's information and cultural services as part and parcel of the required diplomatic apparatus of a world power operating in the communications age. Just after the start of the Korean War, Congress nearly tripled the Agency's appropriations for 1951, the next year it was cut back again radically, presumably because the justness of the American cause was not universally acknowledged in consequence of the stepped-up USIS activities. When USIA Director Arthur Larson, an Eisenhower appointee, made a maladroit public remark critical of the Democrats at a speech in Honolulu during 1957, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, chaired by then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, promptly cut the Agency budget almost 40%, lopping off $50 million from the Administration's request of $140 million. On the other side of the spectrum, there was talk in the Senate in 1949 that a massive propaganda campaign might be a bargain substitute for the Atlantic Pact. It is a consequence of the skewed parameters of purpose assigned USIA by many legislators that the specter of Joe Stalin—i.e. Soviet intransigence in negotiations and the jamming of the Voice of America—became the best friend the Agency ever had in Congress during its formative years. The peaks and valleys of the appropriations landscape have levelled somewhat in recent years but the Agency, unwittingly or not, continues to be viewed as a propaganda instrument and tied to short-range purposes even by some of its operators. The increasing perception that this short-range focus is only part of a larger purpose in the altered international climate of the late 20th century has led to the renewed current crisis of the Agency's identity and purpose. In failing to articulate sufficiently frequently and convincingly the larger climate-building role of public diplomacy, government spokesmen have allowed the future of the Agency to be tied to the deep-seated American suspicion of government communications. W. Phillips Davison comments perceptively in his "International Political Communication" that US official "communications activities have been criticized as inconsequential exercises and treated with disdain while at the same time so much is demanded of them that their failure to achieve results beyond their powers is used to justify the original low opinion." It is a paradox that Americans as a rule accept without a squawk advocacy, i.e. propaganda, in all aspects of daily life, in advertising, religion, politics, the editorial page and lately unfortunately even its spillover into the other columns, but retain their pronounced distaste of its use in international communication.

The suspicion with which the Agency's work is regarded domestically is in large part due to the ignorance of its foreign operations, but it is unable to make friends at home and build up a constituency precisely because of ingrained suspicions that the Administration in power could use its skills and facilities to build a propaganda machine. It is a kind of vicious circle that other nations have broken, or better said, never constructed, by taking a long-range view, keeping foreign policy explanations apart from cumulative cultural impacts and refraining from an annual cost/benefits analysis of government-sponsored information programs abroad. The United Kingdom with one-sixth the GNP of the US spends about as much as we do merely to project the image of a highly-civilized country, rich in tradition yet modern in outlook. A respectable distance from any direct government manipulation of the long-range image projection is maintained by having the effort managed by publicly-chartered corporations such as the British Council and the BBC. France, which maintains the most extensive and expensive foreign information and cultural program of the western nations, has as its main objective the promotion of the French language abroad, a task that employs more than 30,000 teachers with about half a million students now attending French-sponsored schools abroad. The effort costs in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars a year, more than double the USIS budget, and no one seriously asks what it has done for the "force de frappe" lately. The Federal Republic of Germany too, spends half again as much as the US to project in the most general way the image of economic, institutional and social progress in the new Germany through a string of subsidized private and quasi-official organizations such as the Goethe Institutes which offer language instruction, conduct exchange programs, arrange book publications and engage local elites in a continuing dialogue. Even East Germany which only recently began interacting with the western world, carries its image-building forward under a low profile cultural umbrella. A long way from Marx, its cultural centers abroad are called the Herder Institutes, now that Goethe is already spoken for. Herder, a 19th century poet, translated Shakespeare into German. The Soviet Union leads the world by a wide margin in the use of resources to project the picture of a society that favors peace and friendship with all nations, embodies the anti-colonial aspirations of developing countries, and is committed to peaceful coexistence with ideological adversaries. While no hard figures are available, it is estimated that the USSR now spends almost a billion dollars annually—roughly four times the USIA budget—to publish and distribute abroad nearly a hundred million books in dozens of languages, to support some 13,000 foreign students mainly from developing countries in the Soviet Union and teach Russian to an estimated 20 million people abroad, according to Soviet figures, besides conducting a range of other foreign policy support activities both of a short and long-range character. Even Japan, a relative newcomer

Though there were then less than half the number of independent countries in which USIS offices are maintained (UN membership in 1953 was 60, in 1974 135).

to international information and cultural programs, now has public relations officers in 146 foreign posts and established a government-subsidized foundation that will have an endowment of $330 million to sponsor cultural exchanges with foreign countries.

These figures indicate the general acceptance of public diplomacy and the expenditure connected with it as a legitimate concern and responsibility of government. This recognition is also present in the United States but is still tempered here by the confusion between diplomatic apples and oranges—the lumping under one roof of direct and indirect policy support operations in the information and cultural field with the need to justify both in terms of short-range expectations. But the current self-questioning by the Agency and ongoing studies within the larger review of the government's foreign policy mechanisms by the Murphy Commission,* whose Report is due next June, show that perceptions are changing and that there is awareness of the need to bring our public diplomacy in line with America's new and more modest role in the world. As one of five, rather than two global power centers, this task, in Secretary Kissinger's words "requires a different kind of creativity and another form of patience than we have displayed in the past . . . in the '70s our role will have to be to contribute to a structure that will foster the initiative of others." Conformance to these precepts will adjust our public diplomacy to the steady effort required for long-range goals and make our people better listeners instead of merely breathless advocates of what is expedient for today. The great debate over the Agency's ultimate purposes has now been joined among the experts and the communicators. At issue: How to reconcile the confusion of purposes among foreign policy advocacy and bridge-building for our society, how to end the historical anomaly that splits responsibility for information and cultural exchange programs between the Agency and the Department and has the same USIS officer in the field reporting to two different masters in Washington?

THREE QUARTERS of the respondents to an AFSA survey among its USIA membership favor cultural and information programs under one organizational roof but there is no clear consensus on where that roof ought to be built —inside or outside the Department. Rarely has an Agency or an activity been scrutinized, debated, plucked apart and reassembled the way USIA and its predecessors have been since the end of World War II. More than a dozen internal reviews, study commissions, task forces, advisory groups and panels appointed by the President, the

Congress—notably the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and even the two political parties, have focused on the flaws and the goals of the Agency. These groups and the reorganizations that flowed directly or indirectly from their recommendations generally recognized and diagnosed correctly the major problems but never sliced through the tangle of mechanisms and purposes to create a clean-cut and balanced model that would accommodate both the short and the long-range, the direct and the indirect policy support functions of our foreign information and cultural programs. While perceiving that the public diplomacy spectrum covers both these segments and that a mix of short and long range programs may be pursued in either of them, the model has always been weighted towards the direct or short range policy support side, probably because it is always the one easier to define and measure progress against in terms of country programs. Progress towards a world of peace in which there is good will towards the United States, mutual respect and tolerance of diversity among nations is surely more difficult to assess than the promotion of American exports or an effort to win understanding for some restrictive US trade practices. Our public diplomacy establishment, comprising information and cultural officers and headed by the PAO at each Embassy, is in charge of both the short and the long range efforts and at times these might be at cross purposes. Charles Frankel who was Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the 1960s argues persuasively[1] that advocacy of day-to-day US foreign policy positions is not always compatible with the promotion of sympathetic understanding of American life and institutions. He notes that "the capital an officer builds up in performing the tasks of cultural liaison, he loses in performing the tasks of an advocate," and he quotes Dean Rusk as having said that those cultural exchange programs make the best propaganda that have no propaganda purpose.

The organizational structure for public diplomacy that will emerge from the deliberations of the Murphy Commission and the inputs of other study groups such as the Stanton Panel[2] will need to recognize and balance both the direct and indirect support of American purposes by our operators abroad. In so doing the question has to be faced whether it might not make better organizational sense to reverse the current pattern and place the direct support of foreign policy within the State Department and the indirect support outside it in a public body that would not only receive funding and policy direction from the official foreign affairs community but also inputs from the private sector. The Voice of America which supports policy directly and indirectly could be placed under the control of either the Department or the public corporation but as more of its broadcasts are devoted to cultural topics than the day's news and commentary, the public corporation with its representation from the arts and humanities would on balance prob-

*Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, established by the Congress in 1972, chaired by Amb. (Ret.) Robert D. Murphy.

[1] "The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs," The Brookings Institution, 1966 p. 34.

[2] Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, Georgetown University, chaired by Frank Stanton.

Continued on page 50

"Through the passage of the Rogers Bill the serious limitations and inadequacies inherent in our present Foreign Service adjustment have been removed, and a substantial basis of reorganization achieved . . . the country receives its best assurance of security and substantial achievement in the future conduct of its foreign affairs."—Charles E. Hughes

The Making of Diplomacy

ROSE H. FALES

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The Rogers Act of May 24, 1924, introduced by John Jacob Rogers, Representative from Massachusetts, 1913-1925, provided for the following: amalgamation of the Diplomatic and Consular Services into a unified Foreign Service; new appointments to be made after examination; all appointments to be made by commission to a class; readmission to the Foreign Service of career officers after service as a chief of mission; provision of a retirement and disability system; representation allowances; and home leave.*

THE ROGERS ACT was not only an idea whose time had come, but it was a classic example of what forces, pressures and hard work are required to transform a movement for reform into an Act of Congress. In January of 1923, the AMERICAN CONSULAR BULLETIN, predecessor of the JOURNAL, editorialized:

Hearings have actually begun on the Rogers Bill. On Monday, December 11, the Secretary of State appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives to present his views with respect to H.R. 12543 for the reorganization and improvement of the Foreign Service. His statement was a full endorsement of the provisions of the bill, which he stated had been referred by him to the President and had received the entire approval of the Chief Executive . . .

In the meantime, the Committee concluded that it would be desirable to run through the entire bill with Mr. Carr on the stand in order that its various features might be thoroughly explained with respect to their technical bearing on the service organization . . . Following which the Committee will likely proceed to the consideration of the bill. It may be stated that there is an encouraging prospect of a favorable report.

And, in February, the BULLETIN reported as follows:

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, in a letter to Representative John Jacob Rogers, which is printed in the hearings, strongly advocated the enactment of the bill . . .

The present session of Congress will terminate on March 4, leaving very few legislative days ahead. However, the Rogers Bill has created much interest and there appears to be no well defined opposition to the measure.

Former Ambassador John W. Davis said in his testimony printed in the same issue of the BULLETIN:

"I have read this bill, and it seems to me it presents four features which, if I may use the phrase, are cardinal points of reform in this question. Manifestly, if we are to get good men in the Service and hold them, after they get there, we must set them to work under conditions which are agreeable, that will stimulate their personal ambition, and that will induce them to remain in the Service after they have had the experience which makes them valuable."

But the following issue of the BULLETIN mourned:

The Rogers Bill has failed of passage! After a phenomenal series of achievements in which its merits were definitely established, it became entangled in the Senatorial logjam at the end of the Sixty-seventh Congress, as did many other important measures, and died on the calendar for want of sufficient time for its proper consideration . . .

Rarely has a bill of this character aroused so little opposition or elicited such fulsome (sic) praise and commendation throughout the entire course of its journey upward toward final enactment. The Committee on Foreign Affairs had labored earnestly and with great effect in shaping its provisions towards the ends which it was sought to achieve. At every turn the legislative intent was clear; America must have a Foreign Service equal to that of any other country, and to do this the Service should be made to appeal to the best material the country affords.

Wilbur J. Carr, then Director of the Consular Service, was quoted in Consul Tracy Hollingsworth Lay's book, "The Foreign Service of the United States" (1925), "In my judgment, if you enact it, you have a bill which will furnish the basic structure of the organization for your Foreign Service for 50 years—a bill on which you can build any kind of a foreign service you please, a bill in which you can provide for ministers, ambassadors, secretaries and consuls in the light of what you believe to be

Mrs. Fales spent weeks in the Library of Congress researching the periodicals of 50 years ago to find out what they were saying then about diplomacy, the foreign service and the Rogers Act. LIFE, CONTEMPORARY, COLLIER'S, *the* SATURDAY EVENING POST, FORUM, *the* WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION, AMERICAN MERCURY *and others all had some comments to offer on foreign affairs and its practitioners.*

Hon. John Jacob Rogers

responsive to the opinion of the country."

The tourists, the journalists and the businessmen streaming abroad in a reverse Atlantic migration, discovered that the only people who had any experience with this mystifying, but intriguing Old World were the consuls and the diplomats. Who they were, where they lived, what they did, and what they were like, became important to both the serious observers of foreign affairs and the inquisitive public.

Within fifty years America may be leading the world . . . We are witnessing . . . the opening phase of another great Westward movement of the center of civilization, comparable to the drift from Asia and Egypt and Greece toward Italy and Gaul. (H. G. Wells, "A Forecast of World Affairs," CURRENT OPINION, October 1924)

With what dismay must the shades of Bismarck, Castlereagh, or Cavour view this evolution,—this transfer of diplomacy from the privacy of the King's Closet to the hustings. (Bronson Batchelor, President of the Institute of American Business, "Democracies and Foreign Policy," FORUM, August 1924).

The great issue in this year of grace is, how shall we justify our existence as a powerful nation?—how shall we do the service to the world that is due from us?—how shall we find and take our place in the procession that is headed toward the New Era? (E. S. Martin, Editorial in LIFE, January 17, 1924)

What an injustice would be done to the Anglo Saxon race, to which humanity owes so much of its progress, if it were to be judged by its diplomats. (Sigmund Munz, CONTEMPORARY, March 1922)

The tortuous passage of the Rogers Act was not always front page news but almost, because Americans had a new and riveting fascination with foreign affairs which absorbed them even more than the domestic issues of the day. Teapot Dome, the Scopes trial, radio, airplanes, prohibition, taxation, the Ku Klux Klan and women's suffrage were all seen against the background of war debts, reparations, immigration, the World Court, the occupation of the Ruhr, disarmament—almost as if the great national debate which resulted in the non-participation in the League of Nations had confirmed America's involvement with the power politics of the older societies.

Public opinion, to which the Congress was just as susceptible as now, was firmly isolationist, and was convinced that the desirable isolation of the United States from foreign entanglements could be effectively served by well-informed, intelligent diplomats who would detect in time the machinations of the wily Europeans to involve Americans in their quarrels. But neither the public, nor the journalists who helped to mold their opinions, nor the Congress, were sure that all men in the American diplomatic or consular establishments were red-blooded, democratic, intelligent or well-informed enough to make the world safe for democracy.

In spite of the theory that there is a new era of open diplomacy, neither the Congress nor the public know much about what the State Department is supposed to do or whether it does it or not. . . .

Ignorance is a terrible handicap. For instance, if the President could have taken advantage of the information from an efficiently organized State Department he could have been instructing the American public about the war in 1915 . . . We need to retain the very considerable brains and ability which have been dimmed by disorganization in the past, give them a chance and add to them as rapidly as possible. Unless the public desires this and makes its desires known, and Congress will provide the added money even in the face of the necessity for general retrenchment, we shall lose much of our present opportunity for influencing the world towards our ideals, lose much of the friendship of their nations . . . and increase the risk of future wars. (March of Events, WORLD'S WORK, August, 1919).

But even more important to the legislators was the pressure by expanding business and banking interests for first class professional expertise in all those far-flung places on the unfamiliar globe, where the dollar, not yet recognized as Almighty, was competing on the world's market.

But now we are the greatest nation of creditors, of contractors and of tourists that history has ever known . . . Every construction contract requires diplomatic support and pressure. Every foreign loan requires investigation. The diplomatic cases arising from our enormous trade are myriad and multifarious. (Sterling Usher, AMERICAN MERCURY, May 1924).

Secretary Charles Evans Hughes spelled it out to Congress:

There has too long been too great a distinction between the political interests of the Diplomatic Service and the commercial interests of the Consular Service. Both are engaged in political work, both are engaged in commercial work. You cannot at this time take economics out of diplomacy. If you would protect our interests on the one side, you must support them on the other, and I believe that the two branches of the service . . . should be drawn together and treated as an interchangeable unit. (WORLD'S WORK, July 1922).

During five years of legislative gestation between 1919 and 1924, Representative John Jacob Rogers and Wilbur J. Carr marshaled their forces well. They sought and obtained strong, if laconic, Executive backing from the President:

The Foreign Service of the Government needs to be reorganized and improved. (Calvin Coolidge: Inaugural Address 1923)

. . . and from Secretary of State Hughes:

In view of the multiplication of international questions and of the interrelation of political and economic problems, it should be apparent that the national interests demand thoroughly trained foreign service officers. (Foreword to "The Foreign Service of the United States" by T. H. Lay)

Fortunately, Wilbur J. Carr and Joseph C. Grew, then Under Secretary of State, had become as sensitive to the nuances of public opinion as the Congress itself. When the Bill came up for the last time in January 1924, they were well rehearsed and ready to out-appeal all the public appeals. Carr masterminded the operation, and Grew, finally convinced to cast the lot of his beloved diplomatic corps with

that of the consuls, trained Hugh Gibson, then Ambassador to Poland, as spokesman for the diplomats, wisely assessing himself to be a red flag in the legislative arena. The Rogers Bill was explained as an instrument for God, Country, for Peace and for Trade. All were willing to sound like an overseas Chamber of Commerce in order to convince the Congress that a truly career professional foreign service was necessary for Yankee competition. They spoke patiently, eloquently and copiously, and they disarmed the critics by admitting that sometimes the services had not been democratic or sharp enough salesmen for the Flag.

COLLIERS had an article in November 1923 about the Consular Corps entitled, "He Has Jobs for Rising Young Men."

It is the business of the Consuls to know what the other people are thinking, report it to the State Department. They are the first line of contact: Diplomacy could not function without them. . . . Today it is the extraordinary diplomat who comes in contact with more than the ruling clique and the toddle and talcum set.

Grew, helping to prepare Gibson's testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote:

We must get it out of the minds of the public that the consular service is the only one that looks after the business side. Rather the diplomatic service, in its commercial activities paves the way for the consular service to function at all. ("Turbulent Era," by Joseph C. Grew, 1952)

Gibson testified:

Diplomacy has not become a matter of business, but business has become so international in character that it has more and more need for the assistance and support of diplomacy.

In rebuttal to the common misapprehension that all the diplomats were "tea drinkers with the white spats and cookie pushers," Gibson went on to say in later testimony:

As a matter of fact, we have a service to be proud of, and the so-called white spatter is of no importance beyond the fact that he is obnoxious. It has been said that the diplomatic service is more spat upon than spatted.

The problem of *where* the American Ambassador lived reflected the entire debate, involving the problems of career vs. non-career, representation allowances, salaries, retirement, and especially the questions of national pride and foreign criticism. It was obvious to all that none but an extremely rich man could afford the major embassies unless Congress appropriated more money.

At the Committee hearings in January 1924, the question was asked:

Do you really agree with the testimony of Ambassador Davis that the weight and standing of an ambassador is affected by the character of the building he lives in?

Former Undersecretary of State Franklin Polk—"Undoubtedly.

"The present niggardly policy produces the most extravagant display in the American diplomatic service. Most of the American ambassadors in Europe for the last half century have been rich men, sometimes mere millionaires, who have shocked both Europeans and Americans by the lavish scale on which they lived. The selfish shortsightedness of the American congressman who wishes to spend the people's money where it will impress his constituents with his own importance instead of impressing the world with his country's, has resulted in Berlin, as it has in other capitols of Europe, in the summary dispossessing of the nation's representatives. (Commonsense in American Embassies, from March of Events, WORLD'S WORK, August 1923)

A story circulated in most of the periodicals of the '20s concerned Ambassador Joseph Choate in London. Ambassador Choate had spent many weeks in a hotel while trying to find a suitable residence.

Our Homeless Diplomat



Bobby—"Come, move on home."
Choate—"Home! home! I have no home; I am the Ameri an Ambassador."

Late one bitterly cold and rainy night a Bobby found a man wandering about and told him to go home. "Home," cried the man, "I have no home. I am the American Ambassador."

The New York TIMES, February 10, 1924, in an article "Uncle Sam's Homeless Diplomats," reported Ambassador Gibson in Poland had to return his house to his landlord who had become Premier, and by agreement had to remove the bathrooms which he had had installed in order to return the property as it was received! The article went on to point out that in our 52 missions, we owned only twelve houses. Every business had its "Exhibition Rooms" where the public was received to be impressed, so why not the business of diplomacy? The TIMES went on to suggest that the war debts, recognized as uncollectible, should be used to buy houses for Uncle Sam. This would be preferable to the idea of Senator Lafollette, just back from Europe, who suggested that mini-White Houses be built around the world.

Ambassador Myron T. Herrick's purchase of the property on the Avenue D'Iena was front page news in the New York TIMES in March 1924.

Herrick profited $75,000.00 in francs . . . small panic on Paris bourse . . . State Department has no criticism . . . it didn't know about the purchase but has explicit confidence . . . characteristic of Herrick's patriotism . . ."

An article in WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION says that he cabled the House Appropriations chairman, "If you take it, the government will make $400,000; if you leave it, I will make $400,000."

In discussing the need for proper embassies and the proper sort of men to staff them, the press referred constantly to Benjamin Franklin. Some cited him as a man of affairs, not a professional diplomat; but he was just as firmly cited by the diplomats as a professional in foreign affairs. Controversy swirled about his manner of dress . . . if he was successful in homespun, why did others need ostentation? It was Ambassador Herrick who seemed to have the final word; when asked in Paris about the argument, he smiled and said, "No American Ambassador in Paris today could afford homespun." (SATURDAY EVENING POST,

May 8, 1926). Comparisons were continually being made with Great Britain whose Diplomatic Service was considered a model, but whose historical background, salaries, housing and allowances we could never dream of matching. The New York TIMES pointed out that Wellington simply sent his troops, who were camping on the Elysée after Waterloo, to occupy the Charasti Palace, and gave the French Government $20,000 for the property, now worth five million. The British Ambassador to Washington got $12,500 for salary, a staffed residence at no cost to himself, plus $97,350.00 for expenses in representing his government. . . . Former Ambassador John W. Davis testified in embarrassing detail about how he had had to spend $50 to $60 thousand a year to keep up even the modest style appropriate in a sober and grieving post-war London, and he stressed that he would not be able to afford to maintain the Knightsbridge house recently given to the United States by J. P. Morgan, Jr. for our new Embassy.

No one, but no one, wanted to increase Ambassadorial salaries; $17,500.00 (unchanged until after World War II) was adequate. "All we want is equipment to do our work," said Gibson in response to a committee member's question, "May I ask why this extra allowance is called representation?" This apparently controversial new idea was explained in the journals of the day as being the equivalent of an expense account in business.

> This allowance should in no sense be part of the salary: it should be used only as an expense account, and any unused portion should revert to the public treasury. There is a danger in giving our diplomatic representatives huge salaries: the places would be likely to become political plums with all the demoralization that this would imply. . . . The fact is that no Ambassador at one of our great capitols can live in simple decency on less than $50,000 a year. The American Ambassador in London, for example, is obliged to give a reception on the Fourth of July to all the American residents in that town. Even if he fed them only sandwiches and coffee, the function costs him not far from $2,000. . . . A total budget of $50,000—including salary and allowances—would enable him to fulfill his duty with all the dignity and modesty that his position makes necessary. Then poor men as well as rich could accept such appointments and the ability and character of the diplomatic service would consequently improve. (March of Events, WORLD'S WORK, August, 1922).

Not everyone felt that way. Rep. Tom Connally of Texas was opposed. "Appropriations of public money for entertainment purposes affords temptation for abuses and magnifies the importance of the social duties of consuls and secretaries." A former Democratic leader was quoted as saying . . . this sort of allowance would permit "the secretaries to meet and mingle socially with Kings, Queens and monarchs, the princes and the princesses, and the lords and ladies of Europe, to have them tango and kowtow around with royalty." In desperation Carr was forced to plead, "It is hardly necessary to say that the State Department does not seek authority to supply uniforms and motor cars to ambassadors and ministers." However, proponents of this new concept brought in Mark Twain:

> A $17,500 Ambassador is a billionaire in a paper collar, a King in a breech-clout, and an archangel in a tin halo.

No matter what phase of the Rogers Act was under consideration, money and business seemed to be the criteria used to measure success. Frederick L. Collins wrote a series of interviews in the WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION, with our men in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, London, Rome and Madrid . . . it was not clear from his series that the career men all won out over the non-career.

Alanson B. Houghton, Ambassador to Germany, serious, able and experienced though he was, did not like the career status.

> The average young man in the diplomatic service is not the kind of young man with whom you would wish to do anything very important in your own business. . . . To become Counselor or First Secretary earning $10,000 is not the bait that attracts young men who want to work.

William P. Fletcher, the brilliant career man in Rome, who rented the Raspiogli palace himself received this mention.

> Fletcher wasn't complaining. He's been at it too long to be soured by this appalling lack of Congressional foresight. He remembers the time when he was "promoted" from Cuba to China—and had to pay for his passage to the Orient out of his salary of fifteen hundred a year. . . It was becoming increasingly clear to me that this man operated just as a business man did: that he was the same shrewd Pennsylvania Yankee he would have been had he stayed in his uncle's law office in Greencastle, only he was dealing with governments and dignitaries instead of street railways and widows . . . This man who had adopted diplomacy as a career, just as you or I might adopt plumbing or sawing wood, had an almost commercial pride in getting on with his business.

(Fletcher had also told Collins that he was trying not to speak much Italian any more as it was ruining his Spanish, and that there were 17 Spanish speaking posts to one Italian.)

In Madrid Mr. Collins interviewed Alexander P. Moore who rather favored political appointees like himself:

> Being an Ambassador is just like selling a bill of goods. I'm selling America to the Spanish people, that's all. In Pittsburgh, when I wanted anything done, I went to some ward-leader; in Madrid I go to some Duke or other with a long name.

Ambassador Moore called King Alfonso, "Chief" . . . "The King seemed to like it. They get tired of all this falderal." Moore liked his work . . . he defined his mission as "doing things a little better than the other fellow," and he seemed to enjoy some measure of success at this. His giant red and silver limousine rushed by the British Ambassador "as if he were hitched."

The law-makers had to be convinced that the Bill was a modest expenditure of public funds. The original estimate of the increased annual cost of the entire package was $328,000 (with $50,000 the first year to set up the pensions), but Connally felt that it would eventually cost $500,000 a year for retirement alone.

Continued on page 53

FSJ BOOK ESSAY

Four Ambassadors, Three Decades, Two Questions

JEAN L. LALOY

AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN A CHANGING WORLD, *by W. Averell Harriman. Doubleday, 1971.*
MEMOIRS, 1950-1963, *by George F. Kennan. Little, Brown, 1972.*
WITNESS TO HISTORY, 1929-1969, *by Charles E. Bohlen. W.W. Norton, 1973.*
UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS, *by Foy D. Kohler. Harper & Row, 1970.*

THESE FOUR BOOKS, all written by former American ambassadors to the Soviet Union, are a gold mine of reflections. In them, one finds records of conversations, excerpts from correspondence, portraits of personalities, narrative accounts, and personal judgments. They also reveal four men, each of whom played an important role in international diplomacy.

Different as they are, all four represent that type of American who has always been liked in Europe. Besides the culture and tradition common to our two continents, they embody a certain freshness and élan that seemed to typify America—or, more especially, the often naive image of America entertained on this side of the Atlantic—from the days of Washington and Franklin to those of Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The foremost symbol of this idealistic and idealized America was General George C. Marshall, whom each of our four authors mentions with respect and admiration tinged with sadness. The times, certainly, have greatly changed.

W. Averell Harriman's book, for the most part, reproduces lectures he delivered in 1969, since supplemented by personal commentaries, enabling the reader to savor both the vivacity of the spoken word and the added depth of retrospection. The volume, which contains a wealth of assorted memories and observations, concludes with an interview given by the author in 1946, in which he asserted that the Soviet Union presented a challenge but not a threat to the Western world. He adds the comment, "I could say much the same today." In discussing American foreign policy, Mr. Harriman warns of the danger of becoming arrogant:

In the present world situation, we have to keep a sufficiently strong military position, but we have to guard against a growing arrogance of power. I don't like to admit it, but the danger exists. (p. 169)

Here we find a reassertion of the American liberal tradition founded on a realistic appraisal of the forces at work but seeking to orient them toward an ideal, if I still dare use such a word.

Foy D. Kohler's book is more didactic but no less astute. It combines recollections of his activities in the USSR with views formed since he has been teaching at the University of Miami. The result is a work both of reference (he often cites little-known Soviet sources) and of actual experience, as well as one which presents a series of highly perceptive judgments concerning US-Soviet relations. Kohler is without doubt more reserved than Harriman in his estimate of the chances for true friendship between the two countries; yet he remains open and confident in the future. His book will enlighten all who read it.

Then there are the two memoirists, George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, two friends who never totally agreed with each other, yet were never really in disagreement. As I write these lines, I recall again the places where I met them for the first time—Bohlen at the Oriental Languages School in Paris in 1932, Kennan at the NATO Defense College in 1951. How many days and how many trials have since gone by!

Their books fit their personalities. Bohlen's reflects a man who was (since, alas, one must speak of him in the past) sure, elegant, aristocratic, with a hint of irony in his clear eye, a man with a pragmatic outlook that sometimes bordered on skepticism, but at the same time a person of straightforward character and innate honesty. Kennan's reveals a man "too proud not to be shy," as he himself says—a personality of astonishing subtlety, with a generous and troubled mind and a scrupulous sincerity.

Kennan addresses himself not so much to a critique of the Soviet Union as to a questioning of US actions and policies. In this, he comes the closest of the four authors to the European mentality (and perhaps to the new mentality currently emerging in America). We are used to criticizing ourselves. We have all known not only alternating triumphs and defeats but also the false vanity of total victories that leave the victors worse off than the vanquished. We doubt ourselves. Kennan seems to share something of this European point of view. He reveals his disappointments and his doubts with extreme frankness.

But in certain other respects Kennan deviates from the European outlook. In him, thought and action are not always reconciled, and the solutions he recommends sometimes appear difficult to apply. That was true of the proposal he made in the Reith Lectures in 1957 for a reciprocal withdrawal of forces from the center of Germany. To a certain extent, it was also true of the policy of "containment," which Kennan tells us was distorted from its intended meaning by the military and the realists. One can imagine that this former diplomat feels more at home in Princeton than he did in Moscow, but one can also be thankful for his contributions to diplomacy as well as to political thought in general.

Bohlen, for his part, looks, reflects, and relates. One finds in his book many evidences of his talents as a raconteur, so much appreciated by his friends. But he also understands. And he understands because he is always at peace with himself. He tells us that he sometimes behaved "like a fool," and he even cites documents proving that he was wrong—for example, about the Cuban crisis and about the acuteness of the Sino-Soviet conflict. (Almost everyone of us has made many mistakes. I certainly have, and especially about the Sino-Soviet conflict.) At the same time, Bohlen's cool and balanced view does not confirm the position of the "realists" who see the USSR as a power like any other. He describes quite accurately the complications caused by Communist ideology as much for the Soviet regime itself as for its adversaries. On the other

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hand, he does not ascribe everything to ideology. He apportions fairly.

The book also presents a subtle but very revealing portrait of Stalin—a man who, Bohlen notes, stands "high on the list of the world's monsters." Perhaps Bohlen is overinclined to defend the position he always held regarding the truly collegial nature of the Soviet leadership. But, on the whole, he provides much information of great interest. This is true as well of the chapter devoted to his tour of duty as US Ambassador in Paris from 1963 to 1968. Although his observations are circumspect, those who know how to read between the lines will find there much food for thought.

Of the many questions raised by these remarkable works, I shall restrict my comments to just two: the origins of the "cold war," and the problem of communication among governments, then and today.

THE BIG QUESTION that arose in the wake of World War II—a question somewhat forgotten today—was none other than how to stop Stalin (then on the way to dominating Germany) without bringing on an open conflict. This was, in fact, the only real problem. Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, China, even Korea—all these represented challenges of varying but more or less acceptable degree. Yet the crux of what came to be known as the cold war, but what was in fact the struggle for Germany and hence for Europe, was whether or not it was possible to devise and adhere to a proper policy without risking war—neither appeasement, for which so many Europeans were ready, nor open conflict. What then?

Three excerpts are worth citing in this connection. The first is from a memorandum drafted by Bohlen at the end of the Tehran Conference and outlines his estimate of Soviet aims in postwar Europe:

. . . Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federation or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately in their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence. (Bohlen, p. 153)

The second is an excerpt from an earlier volume of Kennan's memoirs and recalls his judgment of the Soviet attitude with regard to Europe in the spring of 1945:

. . . The Russians had, as they saw it, little to gain from a real collaboration with us in the reconstruction of Europe; but they had much to gain by dangling before our eyes the prospect of such collaboration and inducing us to defer constructive measures of our own until it could be realized. . . .[1]

The third is Harriman's recollection of a brief but illuminating conversation he had with Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. He writes:

The first time I saw him [Stalin] at the Conference, I went up to him and said that it must be gratifying for him to be in Berlin after all the struggle and the tragedy. He hesitated a moment and then replied, "Czar Alexander got to Paris." It didn't need much of a clairvoyant to guess what was in his mind. (Harriman, p. 44)

There are several other reasons for believing that in May 1945 Stalin and his colleagues estimated that the fruit of victory for them would be not "world revolution" but supreme authority—the right to a deciding voice—on the European continent. Did not Molotov, Stalin's faithful lieutenant, again define the "socialist camp" in 1955 as extending "from the Pacific almost to the Atlantic"? *Almost*! Some adverbs are quite revealing.

Against this interpretation, some recent historians invoke Stalin's caution, his occasional retreats, the moderation he showed toward Finland, the temporizing tactics he sought to impose on the French and Italian Communists. These are, indeed, known facts. But do they signify that an understanding was possible? Stalin was not a gambler. "A monster of cunning, a monster of spite"—that was how Jean Payart, the counselor and guiding spirit of the French Embassy in Moscow between 1930 and 1940, characterized the Soviet dictator. And up to a certain point, cunning has its virtues. Someone who prefers cold and calculating vengeance is, after all, less likely to set the house on fire than an emotional pyromaniac. Stalin was cunning and therefore deliberate. He accommodated the Finnish Social Democrats, abandoned the Greek Communists, and spared the Yugoslav Communists. Was he, then, liberal? Or moderate? No, he was simply prudent. He weighed the risks; he calculated.

If this was the case, how does one explain the intensity of the crisis? Shouldn't the parties have reached an accommodation?

Many arguments have already been advanced in opposition to those who hold that the misunderstanding was primarily due to Truman's rigidity, to Byrnes's narrowness, or to Hull's "open door" policy.[2] But one answer to the question was given as early as 1946 by no less an authoritative source than Maxim Litvinov. Talking with American news correspondent Richard C. Hottelet on June 18, 1946, Litvinov amazed his interviewer with the frankness of his remarks. According to a cabled report received by the US State Department,

Hottelet asked him [Litvinov] if suspicion, which seems to be large motivating force in Soviet policy, would be mitigated if West were suddenly to give in and grant all Russian demands like Trieste, Italian colonies, etc . . . whether that would lead to easing of situation.

He [Litvinov] said it would lead to West being faced after period of time with next series of demands.[3]

Responsibility for the misunderstanding is shared, as always, but it is unequally shared. A large part of it must be laid at Stalin's door. Let us see why.

Bohlen, supported to a large extent by Harriman, maintains that Stalin's attitude changed after

[1] *G. F. Kennan, "Memoirs 1925-1950," Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1967, p. 257.*

[2] *G. Kolko, in his "The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-45" (New York, Random House, 1968), describes then Secretary of State Cordell Hull's policies as "the classic pursuit of national self-interest in an ill-fitting wrapper of internationalist rhetoric" based on the old doctrine of the "open door."*

[3] *US Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946," Vol. 6, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 763. (Litvinov at this time was Deputy Foreign Minister, but two months later Moscow announced that he had been relieved of his official duties.)*

Yalta. He ascribes this change, in part, to Stalin's realization of the risks that a policy of relative tolerance would lead to in Eastern Europe, and in part to the Soviet leader's discovery of tempting prospects not only in Germany but also in France, Italy, and Belgium. In Kennan's opinion, the proper course for the Western allies to take would have been to abandon the idea of maintaining the wartime entente and instead enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union allocating spheres of influence, leaving each party free in its own zone. Foy Kohler sees the USSR's domestic problems as a determining factor behind Soviet policy in this period—i.e., the need to reestablish the revolutionary legitimacy of the Communist Party and the need to control—in order to restrain more effectively—the exhausted Russian masses longing for a respite and for an entente with the Allies.

Personally, I do not believe that Stalin "changed" after Yalta. Nor do I believe that an agreement setting up spheres of influence would have settled the problem. The very notion of spheres of influence implies a preponderance, but not a monopoly, of influence for each party within its own sphere; and it also implies a certain degree of permeability of each sphere by the influence of the other side. When the latter does not exist, it is not a fair contest. For then one sphere is more fragile than the other and cannot resist. That is what happened after 1945 in China, precisely the area where there was an attempt at setting up spheres of influence, probably with the prior approval of Stalin.

My own conviction is that Stalin was a prisoner of the policy he followed after August 23, 1939. Having divided up Poland with Hitler, how could he believe that a reborn Poland would willingly accept alliance and "friendship" with the Soviet Union? the Soviet leader found himself forced either to acknowledge his 1939 mistake or to dominate Poland completely. In order to prevent him from choosing the latter course, the Western leaders would have had to issue an absolute and unreserved *non possumus* from the moment of the Soviet break with the Polish government in London over the Katyn affair in April 1943. But was that possible given the military situation that existed at that time? In any event, seeing that nothing happened, Stalin proceeded to maneuver under cover of the interallied agreements to impose his unilateral will in Poland. Thus, he succeeded not only in erecting a military and political bulwark to protect the stronghold of his power in the USSR, but also in establishing the corridor toward Germany which every Bolshevik had considered essential since 1920. Finally, by all this, Stalin justified—both to himself and to all those who had previously criticized him—his claim to be the faithful executor of Lenin's policy. What Lenin had failed to achieve—the extension of Bolshevism beyond the borders of the Soviet Union—Stalin accomplished from 1943 on. He moved forward step by step, assessing at each step the reaction of his allies and playing up to their sensitivities in some areas, but never deviating from the line he had chosen for attaining his essential objective.

In the circumstances that existed at that time, it was extremely difficult to make Stalin change his policy. It was nevertheless important at least to discern what was happening. This the four diplomats did, each in his own way. But who listened to them? The general public goodwill that existed in the West toward the USSR in wartime quickly changed into an undoubtedly overemotional hostility. Even today, Western public opinion wavers between trust in the policy of détente and distrust of Communist "totalitarianism."

The problem that this raises is one of communication between governments and responsible officials, as well as between the publics of different countries. Means of communication exist, but misunderstandings continue.

IT HAS OFTEN been said that present-day ambassadors are reduced to the role of mere postmen. In my view, however, they can better be regarded as intelligent "terminals"—as indispensable channels of communication between governments.

On this point, the four books under review provide much food for thought. They make it quite clear that internal communication within the US governmental system sometimes functions quite badly. In some instances we find the State Department raising hasty and ill-considered questions: one such move prompted Kennan to dispatch his much-publicized "long telegram" to Washington in February 1964.[4] On other occasions, the ambassador does not succeed in getting through to his superiors. And sometimes an internal situation develops that virtually paralyzes all intragovernmental communication: the chapters that Bohlen and Kennan devote to the McCarthy era are terrifying to read. On occasion, it is the Secretary of State who makes things difficult—e.g., Dean Acheson by only half listening to Kennan, and John Foster Dulles by packing Bohlen off to the Philippines. Such difficulties are multiplied by the proliferation of bureaus, agencies, task forces, and panels. Nor is the US situation in this respect unique: it is just one example of a general phenomenon.

In a sense, communication with one's adversaries is more sure than communication with one's partners. . . It is comparable to putting together an intricate piece of machinery which, by virtue of delicate adjustments . . . can sometimes be made to run.

The problem becomes still more serious when it involves communication between governments. As long as there is the bond of a common political idea, such as existed among the Western allies in the early stages of the postwar reconstruction of Europe, misunderstandings work themselves out. But whenever "national interests" become the decisive impulse, discord is the rule. Statesmen believe that they can surmount the difficulty by speaking directly to one another, but most of the time one

[4] *Kennan's famous "long telegram," divided into five sections totalling 8,000 words, was prompted by an inquiry from the State Department as to the reasons for the USSR's sudden refusal to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Annoyed at Washington's lack of response to his earlier warnings about the nature of Soviet postwar policy, Kennan seized the occasion to deliver what he called in his "Memoirs" a "telegraphic dissertation" presenting a comprehensive analysis of Soviet policy and its implications for the United States. Excerpts are reprinted in Annex C of the volume cited in footnote 1.*

finds that they accomplish nothing because of a lack of preparation.

In a sense, communication with one's adversaries is more sure than communication with one's partners. Occurring less frequently, it is generally based on prepared texts. It is comparable to putting together an intricate piece of machinery which, by virtue of delicate adjustments (in this case, commas, synonyms, or shifted paragraphs), can sometimes be made to run. Within alliances this is rarely the case, and the results are not always favorable.

There remains one final point. If one relies on the conclusions reached by the authors of these books, one surmises that progress toward an understanding between the Soviet Union and the countries of the West will be slow and difficult, and that in the long period of groping known as détente the United States must continue to play a leading role. On both these points, it is not certain that there is today an implicit and stable understanding among the Western leaders. Since 1969 we have been operating in a new phase. An effort is being made to build a "structure of peace," but does this idea have the same meaning for the responsible leaders on both sides of the Atlantic? There is also talk of moving from confrontation to negotiation, of reestablishing a stable world. But this assumes a whole set of prior conditions. Communication within alliances must be as good if not better than communication between "great partners." An attempt must be made to define the role to be played in today's world by the medium powers which are strong enough to have some pretensions but not strong enough to make them prevail. Lastly, there must be a greater effort to understand the intentions of the adversary or whoever proclaims himself, ideologically, as such.

What formerly went unchallenged today requires reflection, research, exhanges of views, and clarification. Would it be presumptuous to hope that the example of the four American diplomats whose books we have discussed may inspire us to raise, among allies, the questions that must be answered if we are to cope with the challenges, not of the next three decades, but of the present one? ■

FSJ BOOKSHELF

The Man at the Center

KISSINGER, *by Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb. Little, Brown and Company.*

AMERICAN FOREIGN policy in the years 1969-1974 has revolved around four major developments and crises: the Vietnam war and subsequent Paris Agreement ending direct US participation; the China breakthrough; detente with the Soviet Union (with its satellite SALT I agreements), and the still unfinished story of the Middle East coupled with the separation of forces agreements there that appear to be holding.

The scope, diversity and complexity of the issues imbedded in each of the four would normally rule out any one man shaping the final outcome. Yet at the center of each stands the rotund figure of one Henry Alfred Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President of the United States and Secretary of State.

Obviously it would take a book to chronicle the details of this man's odyssey through such a volatile, five-year sweep of history, and that is what the brothers Kalb, Marvin and Bernard, both Washington-based CBS correspondents, have done in 549 well-paced pages.

For the person who wants insights and at least some degree of understanding of these events this book is a must. It is written in lucid style. It benefits from inside details provided by Kissinger in conferences with the authors. And perhaps it also suffers, because of this, from having too much of the Kissinger-provided point of view.

Yet the Secretary emerges as a fully fallible, but multi-dimensioned man of enormous talents, energy, intelligence and background.

The story begins with Kissinger's early forays into government activities, including a secret Vietnam peace probe for the late President Lyndon Johnson, his introduction to and hiring by the new Nixon administration, and his movement onto stage center at a moment of potential change in world affairs.

All this is set against the background of Kissinger's early years in Germany, his education, expansion through such forums as the Harvard International Seminar and his books on nuclear warfare in preparation for his later search for weapons balance in the strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union.

"Kissinger" plows through the early disillusion of endless, fruitless, secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese, the Secretary's strange early belief that somehow staged withdrawals of US forces from Vietnam would force Hanoi to negotiate seriously, his addiction to trying to read meaning into vague "signals" from the Communist side (a technique he constantly warned newsmen to avoid), the upheavals that followed the April, 1970 invasion of Cambodia, and the breakthrough that came when Hanoi submitted a nine point plan in 1971 that eventually became the basis of settlement—such as it is.

Somewhat strangely, and probably without the authors' intent, it is the now-deposed President Nixon who emerges as the strong man who made the Paris accords happen. When the Communists balked over translating their nine points into a detailed agreement that could not be read ambiguously, it was Nixon who stepped in with the controversial 12-days of intensive B52 bombings of the north. Rapid agreement followed. The reader, however, is left to wonder whether Nixon received a signal that meaningful talks would follow when he halted the raids, or simply gambled and lucked out.

Meanwhile the authors are simultaneously providing impressive detail on the China breakthrough, Kissinger's secret July 9-11, 1971 trip to Peking, with the help of Pakistan's Yahya Kahn, and the subsequent 1972 summits in both Peking and Moscow.

Of particular interest is the questionable haste with which the final parts of the SALT I agreements were thrown together in order to have them ready for signature at Moscow.

The Middle East emerges as a separate drama of its own, that slowly drew Kissinger into its vortex. There is a dramatic, moving account of the 1970 crisis when Syrian armored columns, with

Moscow's blessing, invaded Jordan, pitching the United States and Soviet Union toward potential intervention and confrontation.

Of equal import is the near confrontation that came when both Moscow and Washington alerted forces during the final stages of the October, 1973, "Yom Kippur" War. Kissinger's subsequent marathon negotiating efforts produced separation of forces agreements between first Israeli and Egyptian forces, then Israeli and Syrian.

The book suffers in places from "conventional-wisdom" type judgments. Some seep through in pre-judging the future of South Vietnam, and in dubbing the alert of US forces in the Yom Kippur War as "clearly not Kissinger's finest hour." Yet one finds it hard to argue with the result: the Soviets backed down and the fighting was stopped.

But in one sense this is unfair sniping at an otherwise good book. It is well worth reading by anyone interested in current history, and in the historic figure of an immigrant Jew who has startled the world with his successes at the negotiating table.

—JAMES CARY
Chief of Bureau, Washington, Copley News Service

Woodstein's Work

ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN, *by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. Simon & Schuster, $8.95.*

IT WAS EARLY in the morning on June 17, 1972, when Metropolitan police detectives surprised and arrested five men as they were installing sophisticated bugging and wiretapping devices inside the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Apartment complex. Since then the American public have daily seen on their news screens and read in their newspapers the slow, bewildering and often shocking unraveling of the Watergate break-in.

What facts we do now know about Watergate can be credited to the initial persistence of just a handful of men in discovering the full truth—in the judiciary, Judge John J. Sirica, and in the press, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. They were two young Washington POST reporters originally assigned to cover a third-rate burglary. But Woodward and Bernstein soon found many disturbing links. It was they who first dialed the phone numbers in Howard Hunt's address book. And it was they who first interviewed and gained the confidence of Hugh Sloan, the former CRP treasurer and the first man to provide them and the American people with any tangible, direct information on the committee's relationship to the White House. Bernstein and Woodward found themselves in an enviable position for journalists of not only reporting, but also making the news.

The 300 pages of "All the President's Men" do more than just catalogue the hard, investigative reporting of two men. There is nothing detached about the writing in this book. The authors reveal to us all the ploys and tricks employed in their trade to get at the truth, and this book is a testament to their success. We are introduced to the major personalities and see the inner workings of a major Washington newspaper.

This book offers no pretense to being the definitive book on Watergate. What it does offer the reader, though, are insights into the machinations of Nixon politics and a better understanding of the affair which all but paralyzed the American government.

—TOM THOMPSON

Inner History

THE RINGS OF DESTINY: *Inside Soviet Russia from Lenin to Brezhnev, by Aino Kuusinen. William Morrow, $7.95.*

A REFLECTIVE PERSONAL account of a life well-lived, in far-away places and in highly unusual circumstances, is likely to be much more rewarding reading than academic reconstructions of things past; and this is surely the case with Aino Kuusinen's memoirs of her life as wife of a member of the ruling elite in the Soviet Union, as intelligence agent for the Comintern in the United States and in Japan, as prisoner in a Soviet concentration camp, and finally as free citizen back in her native Finland. Her book offers a remarkable view of people and places, some of the greatest importance and others never well-known and now little remembered. As a record of the past and as literature, Mrs. Kuusinen's book deserves a place alongside the not entirely dissimilar memoirs of Evgenia Ginzburg and Nadezhda Mandelstam.

The author, who died in Finland in 1970, promised herself she would write this book while she was in the slave labor camps at Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic. Publishing her memoirs, she wrote, "seemed the only means of avenging myself on those who had robbed me of my freedom." In this, her resolution was not unlike that of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Like the author of "The Gulag Archipelago," she appeared to fear that without such accounts of life as it actually had been lived in the Soviet Union, future generations would never fully understand the realities of our time.

In this, however, both she and Solzhenitsyn are surely mistaken. For what emerges from her descriptions of the functioning of the Soviet state apparatus is not a despairing conviction that Soviet state secretiveness will forever prevent the world from knowing the inner history of the Soviet regime. Rather it is, at least for this reviewer, a conclusion that the nature of the Soviet bureaucratic system effectively guarantees that even the most well-placed actors in Soviet society are really helpless to falsify in any effective way the evidence of their doings buried here, there, and everywhere in the Soviet state archives. The very comprehensiveness of these archives, when combined with the ultimate insecurity which even the most powerful officials cannot but feel, makes it certain that when the archives come someday to be opened (in ten years or in a hundred), future scholars will have much less difficulty recording the actual deeds and misdeeds of the Russian leaders of these generations than Solzhenitsyn and others so pessimistically assume.

But since none of us can count on still being around a hundred years hence, we must make the most of works such as the present one. And since official documents, even in the best of circumstances, are but pale and blurred reflections of the real world, there is and there will always be an extra satisfaction in reading such an absorbing personal testament as this one.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

Life and Love in the Foreign Service



"Anyone else care to take issue with the Ambassador's views on use of the 'dissent channel'?"

"If you're getting that picture for a visa, forget it. The law's been changed."

"Which one of you wrote that piece for OPEN FORUM?"

"Détente, shmétente–In this restaurant we will never serve cottage cheese and ketchup!"

"When she comes to, sir, would you please explain that it's no reflection on her character? We have to fingerprint everyone before we can clear them for the Foreign Service."

"Next time keep a civil tongue in your head. Remember, this is a U.S. Consulate . . ."

"But the message from Washington said the Inspectors would be arriving this Friday–"

USIA AT THE CROSSROADS

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ably be better equipped to give general program direction as long as a direct policy channel is maintained to the Department.

A watchdog commission of prominent Americans, while not involved in actual operations, might have an oversight responsibility to insure that short and long range efforts go in tandem, that good will deposits are not used up indiscriminately for momentary tactical or budgetary reasons as when major installations are closed or opened, or tested local programs reorganized radically by officers that may have an axe to grind or a reputation to build in Washington.

Central to the philosophical underpinning of the revised Agency model in an environment that has presented the United States with new opportunities for constructive dialogue is the empathy component, what Barbara White in her 1973 study on the future of USIA calls the "mutuality of interests." Charles Frankel observes that "cultural relations involve a capacity to hear what others are saying, not only a capacity to speak one's own piece" and a wise professor once called "the big ear" the most important tool for explaining the United States to foreign visitors. This is an oft-neglected corollary to Edward R. Murrow's famous remark that conveying information "that last three feet" is the most difficult of all. In the same vein, Wilson Dizard quotes Adlai Stevenson[1] in his UN days as having said "America needs to turn up its hearing aid," a concept that could imply an entire new mandate for the Agency in facilitating a two way flow of information in place of the current one way pattern, and in the process opening a number of doors that have been shut by the sound of our own voice.[2]

[1] *Wilson Dizard, "The Future of the Overseas Information Program," manuscript, Washington 1974.*

[2] *"The Message Becomes the Medium," article by author in USIA* COMMUNICATOR, *February 1974.*

What could all this mean to the role of the PAO and his information and cultural affairs colleagues in our posts abroad? When both direct and indirect policy support initiatives are integrated into Mission operations more closely than ever before, the question that might be raised in the smaller Embassies could be: why a separate orchestra conductor in the person of the PAO for a two or three piece combo? The senior man, be he on the information or cultural side, could give the cues and be called PAO, but the Ambassador himself ought to be conducting the Mission to the tune of "Public Diplomacy is Everybody's Business!" In fact, with the policy-making and negotiating functions now largely removed from the Ambassador's duties, public relations may well be his most important diplomatic responsibility.

When—and if—this day arrives, USIA, like the proverbial committee-built horse that turned out to be a camel, may finally assume its intended form. ■

DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT

from page 23

tualize diplomacy in modern terms. It has not supplanted but it is far more realistic and up-to-date than Harold Nicolson's "Diplomacy."

John E. Harr's "The Professional Diplomat" (1969) has an excellent opening chapter on the declared subject before getting into organizational problems and the Crockett reforms. It provides material post-Ilchman, as do studies emanating from the Herter Committee in the early 1960s and the book on which Frederick C. Mosher and Harr collaborated concerning the effort to introduce systems analysis into the diplomatic establishment ("Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership," 1970). The extraordinary surge of American interest has thus assaulted much of the periphery of diplomacy excepting the one segment on which Acheson alone has ventured. More works could be cited but the limitations of space compel an invitation to be extended to the avid reader to repair to the bibliographies of Robert B. Harmon ("The Art and Practice of Diplomacy: A Selected and Annotated Guide," 1971), Richard Fyfe Boyce and Katherine Randall Boyce ("American Foreign Service Authors. A Bibliography," 1973), and Elmer Plischke (in my "Instruction in Diplomacy: The Liberal Arts Approach," 1972). The fact that bibliographies have at last become available is a sign of the change which has overtaken us.

Mention of that volume on "Instruction in Diplomacy" merits a few words of amplification, for it, too, is a landmark, which I do not hesitate to say, for I was only the editor and one contributor, it being the product of many minds. It evolved from a two-day meeting in Philadelphia sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science to bring together scholars and practitioners for a concerted effort to analyze diplomacy, define it in accurate terms and examine whether it should be taught as an integral part of the liberal arts program of our institutions of higher learning. No such effort had ever been undertaken before and it raised the question sharply whether diplomacy is indeed susceptible to a scientific approach. The consensus was that it certainly is.

The Foreign Service JOURNAL itself has reflected these changes in attitude. If its pages are not so copious as one would have expected and hoped, they at least have reflected growing skepticism, un-ease and willingness to question. I have no doubt that if Wheeler and Rives were to publish "Dome of Many-Coloured Glass" today, the JOURNAL would review it. It has even learned to laugh a little and one should mention, in any "lights and shadows" review, those delectable "Fables of the Foreign Service" which John Stutesman (now it can be told) inaugurated and those equally choice motion picture stills, "Life and Love in the Foreign Service," which began when Robert W. Rinden came across a cache in China. The latter were collected in a slim volume which Shirley Newhall published in 1969.

Anyone must ask how much of this downpour has sunk into general consciousness or indeed into his own and how much has run off the surface, outstripping the time and capacity of both public and practitioner to absorb it? I have no doubt that it has run off a good part of the diplomatic community. Our failure to professionalize our calling and therefore to require some familiarity with its literature for admission and the shocking failure to utilize to this end the introductory "orientation" of newly commissioned officers at the Foreign Service Institute has produced a hardly literate Foreign Service. Apart from this is the fact that officers, once on duty, are too driven in their daily tasks to do much reading and the funding of sabbaticals has hardly been high on the list of departmental budget priorities so that a "year off" to catch up a bit has reached only a pitiful fraction of the total corps.

As far as the academic community is concerned, I am constantly astonished at professional meetings of political scientists to find how little of this literature has been absorbed. The product of a prestigious graduate school in foreign affairs who is now teaching university courses in international relations asked me the other day: "What do diplomats *do*?" An answer to this has been available for some time if one will read such books as those mentioned above, but academic minds are too channeled to other fields than diplomacy. Diplomacy being rarely taught in our institutions of higher learning except in unilinear form by history departments means that there is little learning, higher or any other, about diplomacy.

". . . it raised the question sharply whether diplomacy is indeed susceptible to a scientific approach. The consensus was that it certainly is."

Perhaps, in the next 50 years, this will change and the Foreign Service JOURNAL on that occasion will have more to celebrate than an amplitude of materials explicatory of our calling. Perhaps by then we may even have professionalized our diplomacy and our political officers will see it as primarily political action with political reporting and analysis assuming their proper place as supplementary to action rather than as now their principal functions. ■

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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tion and feedback to employees. The outcome of such controlled studies could provide the basis for system-wide changes that would have a greater chance of success than armchair-derived solutions.

THE KINDS of studies that could serve to define the problem might include:

- Determining what factors contribute to a person's promotion under the present system and calculating their respective weights through statistical analysis.
- Developing a picture of what types of performance and personal qualities are considered meritorious by supervisors and whether or not these perceptions are shared by subordinates.
- Attempting to learn why the present requirement for two intervening counseling interviews is not effectively met.
- Analyzing the correlation between management-AFSA promotion precepts and the records of promotees under the present procedures.
- Studying the impact of the present report and interview on the subsequent performance of employees and their relationships with supervisors.

SOME TASKS for the pilot project stage of the research would be to:

- Delineate the criteria that discriminate between high performers and low performers. Operationalize the meaning of meritorious performance so that evaluation instruments can be designed to measure the important and not the peripheral behavior. (HEW a few years ago engaged in such a study to develop a new instrument for PHS officers. Perhaps the Department could learn from their experience.)
- Compare different measures to find ones with the most reliability among raters and the most validity when correlated with the above mentioned performance criteria (a USIA sponsored study of the characteristics of superior FSIOs in developing a possible new battery of selection tests is relevant here).
- Analyze the impact of different procedures on the organizational climate, including the productivity of various units. (A few offices in the Department and smaller missions overseas would probably be agreeable to participating in such pilot research.)
- Collect and synthesize data from employees at all levels on their perceptions of the impact of various performance evaluation procedures on their behavior and motivation.
- Start the procedure of management-by-objectives called for by the instructions to rating officers and evaluate its success before requiring and expecting it to be incorporated effectively in the service-wide formal evaluation system.
- Experiment with a split-role system. That is, see if it is possible to have one procedure for getting information to support promotion decisions and another to encourage employees to improve performance and provide them with feed-back on their progress. ■

THE MAKING OF DIPLOMACY

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These officers already have the advantage of culture and travel. They have opportunities of gratifying their social ambitions in foreign courts and of residing in an atmosphere pleasing to their tastes. . . . On the whole, the terms of the bill are too generous.

Another member was against retirement systems on principle.

After you have passed the stage of what is necessary to keep a man from suffering actual bodily want, you pass beyond the pale of what I conceive you are privileged to do in taking money out of the Treasury of the United States and giving it to any man, regardless of how long he may have served and regardless of how valuable his service may have been.

But the opponents went down to defeat. The Bill passed. Patriotism and Peace were served: "It is a poor patriot who would scrap both his ships and his diplomats at the same time" (Secretary Hughes, 1922). "The pacifist ought to bless the diplomat because by his skill he may often avert wars. By the same token, the believers in preparedness must regard him as our first line of defense" (Maude Child, SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 16, 1925).

No longer could our European colleagues assume that an American diplomat—

. . . will be a political appointee who will take himself rather seriously, and who will spend his time abroad in getting what amusement and prestige he can out of the place; or the amiable dilettante, interested perhaps in art, who wants to enjoy a ranking position in Europe which will enable him to use all the privileges of an aristocracy which he is supposed, by the very nature of his Americanism to despise (Maurice Francis Egan, COLLIERS, March, 1926).

And the "March of Events" in WORLD'S WORK for February, 1924 proudly proclaimed:

Young men can now enter our foreign service almost with the assurance that they may reach any position for which their abilities and character qualify them.

Mr. Carr's dream for the Foreign Service—"that eventually the man without an income can afford to enter it, and the man with private means will seek its honor" had become reality. (COLLIERS, November, 1923)

The Rogers bill came as near being wise for the country and giving satisfaction to everybody familiar with its field, as any measure that gets through the shoals of Congressional debate. (Mark Sullivan, WORLD'S WORK, November, 1925)

. . . .

Ambassadors . . . will probably continue to exist in some form or other for a long time yet, since governments become progressively more involved with each other as they interfere more and more in the lives of their citizens and therefore need their agents abroad. But under the impact of the further development of communications, with the emphasis of each country's interests continually changing, with the formation of ever more political and economic associations on a world or regional basis, ambassadors will probably be unrecognisable in fifty years' time as anything related to the scene of today, just as the ambassadors of today have little in common with those grand, rare birds of exotic plumage who preened themselves in the palaces of Europe before the cruel wars of the twentieth century which they had so signally failed to prevent. (Lord Trevelyan. "Diplomatic Channels," 1973)

Whoever thinks the future is going to be easier than the past is certainly mad. (George Kennan, "American Diplomacy 1900-1950," 1951)

THE CLOUDED IMAGE

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outlines of new foreign policy can be achieved. It, therefore, behooves all of those who advocate more public discussion of foreign policy issues and the creation of a new "consensus" to begin thinking about how Americans get their information on foreign affairs in this country. Certainly some degree of "consensus" on US development policy may be more possible than is commonly thought. It is interesting that on issues where groups seek to create a constituency, new initiatives are possible. The experience of organizations supporting family planning is a good example. Despite the general negative feeling toward development assistance, the Congress never has failed to provide substantial amounts for family planning programs.

Public opinion can even act in a negative way, as it did last year in the successful congressional initiative to reform the bilateral aid program. The members of Congress who took the lead in this reform sensed the widespread public disillusionment with the effectiveness and objectives of official American aid programs, and they designed their bill to focus these programs on the problems of the poor majority within the developing countries. In this particular case, the Congress was responsive to the public's negative opinion of the existing program.

In the future there will be a need for much greater positive public support for the policies needed to meet the pressing needs of the poor countries. To generate this support, however, will take an effective package of development policies, greatly increased national leadership, and a renewed effort to inform Americans on these issues.

The first step is to create a development assistance program acceptable to a majority of Americans. Most Americans do not understand the purposes and operation of US development aid programs, and many believe that a lot of aid is wasted in our own bureaucracy or absorbed by elites in the developing countries. Therefore, the first step toward attracting increased public support is to ensure that the aims of our aid programs do not conflict with the public's priorities and that they are clearly understood by the public to be effective in dealing with the problems of the poor abroad. The new development aid legislation passed last year—which focuses explicitly on agriculture, education, health, and population control, and which supports a new approach to development aimed at reaching the poor directly—should enhance the acceptability and effectiveness of US development aid. But if the new approach is to win support, the public must be made more aware of the new program and the progress of its implementation.

The mobilization of public opinion is further complicated by the lack of a single, clear-cut policy measure around which public support might be rallied. The traditional vehicle for the mobilization of support has been the foreign aid authorization bill. However, the current foreign aid bill is a particularly ill-suited measure for this

purpose—largely because it combines development aid with military aid and a number of other controversial programs, such as police assistance and aid to Indochina. Therefore, one of the early steps should be to split the development aid and military aid authorizations. Finally it is important that the federal government begin to treat all development-related measures in a coordinated way. Development aid, trade and monetary policy, private investment, energy, food, ocean resources, environment, and other fields, all profoundly affect the poor countries. The new development assistance legislation recognizes these interrelationships in calling for the head of the Agency for International Development to chair an inter-agency committee to coordinate all US policies and programs related to the development of the poor countries. It also requires the Executive Branch to submit an annual report to Congress on actions affecting overseas development. This report could be turned into a powerful device to focus attention on American policy toward the poor countries—just as the widely publicized reports of the Civil Rights Commission were so effectively used to call public attention to the plight of minorities in this country.

The importance of national leadership on development issues cannot be understated. Whether in the Legislative or Executive Branch, policymakers have a great deal of latitude to advocate and carry out policies that are genuinely responsive to the needs of poor countries—and to do so without suffering on election day. Such policies would engender no strong opposition and, with the proper leadership, could even gain a substantial degree of positive public support. However, it is also clear that this support will not come about unless positive steps are taken both within and outside the government to mobilize public opinion.

The critical element of a renewed US response to the development needs of the poor countries is national leadership. This leadership, which has been largely missing for at least a decade, is necessary both to educate the public about the critical importance of the complex new issues of global interdependence and to mobilize support through a partnership including the Executive Branch, concerned members of Congress, and private organizations.

It is likewise important to begin an educational campaign which involves not only national leadership but also the private sector, particularly the media, churches, educators, and voluntary organizations. Without such an effort, the public support needed to support wise government policy is not likely to be forthcoming. Clearly no attempt to create an informed public opinion or to renew support for a greater US contribution to the development of the poor countries will be easy. But if successful, it could become a significant and constructive influence on government policy, outweighing many of the extraneous factors that now too often shape decisions. The effort should be made. For government policy based on the support of the people is more likely to be not only the best but also the most enduring kind of policy. ■

THE NEW CHINA TOURISM

from page 28

curio trade.

Another motif running from the old Canton Trade era underground to the present is the Chinese preference to have someone in charge of the foreign visitor. A bearer of alien culture and heterodox social thought is a misfit in Chinese society. It is preferable for such people to be treated as guests for whom some recognized Chinese authority is responsible. In the old Canton days, there were guarantors and "security merchants" who stood surety for the foreigner's doings while he was in China. Today a visitor is usually an invitee of a Chinese government office. This puts the Chinese state representatives in the position of hosts, responsible for the happiness and welfare of the visitor as well as for any deviations. The host is generally in the driver's seat, expected to proffer civilities and amenities to ensure harmonious relations. A guest in the Chinese code of manners is bound, by rules of reciprocity, to repay this kindness by proper conduct. Far from being an artificial anachronism, this principle may be one of the hopes for the future, a possible solution for problems usually created by American tourists abroad. A guest is expected to offer constructive criticism, but not destructive. Since he is not simply a commercial buyer of his visit, his money cannot command the situation. American tourists can no longer try to bring Emporia into Hangchow, or Kansas City to Shanghai. On this new, managed basis, with Americans as guests and Chinese as hosts, Sino-American relations have been a limited contact but certainly fruitful thus far.

The new relationship is being structured more by the Chinese than by the Americans. One hopes this may continue. We now know that American expansion is resistible, while the Chinese social order seems less malleable than we once thought. Between two such massive and diverse societies, contact must be mediated through institutions. Yet the institution of American tourism, like that of the new Japanese tourism—an expression of commercial-industrial-material affluence—has shown its cultural limitations. The innate Chinese feeling for a code of civility and etiquette, which once contributed to building up the tribute system to mediate Sino-foreign relations, is again proving its value to set limits and give shape to the new American contact with China. It is this, as much as the stereotypical thinking of American visitors, that imparts so much similarity and even tedious repetitiousness to the flood of travel reports offered the American public. "China: Behind the Mask" proves to be little different from "A China Passage," "China Returns," or "The 800 Million" simply because the same sights, the same briefings, and the same cultural reactions were involved. The probing questions of the individual Westerners have been almost as predictable as the data-laden answers of the orthodox collectivist briefing officers. Closer contact between two distinct cultures inspires a mutual reassertion of their distinctive values. In this cultural stalemate, which may last for a long time, guided tourism is a plain necessity. ■

ACCELERATING PROMOTION

from page 17

the ensuing months to convert all such details to reimbursable status or reclaim the officer. Moreover, since January, by one of those cyclical conjunctions that sometimes occur, details of more than 40 percent of our officers who were serving with other agencies were due to terminate. Under these circumstances, I report with some satisfaction that the number of FSOs on detail is now greater than it was at the beginning of the year. I am proud that FSOs are serving as Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the case of two officers, Deputy Director and Assistant Director of ACDA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and as senior staff members of the NSC. Good officers in good jobs spread the word.

Since we recently, for the first time, asked officers to tell us of their interest in specific detail assignments, we have been receiving a steady flow of responses. There are now some 200 officers on detail with 38 agencies and international organizations. While some are balanced by exchanges, most are straight out-of-agency details. I believe that the Foreign Service of the United States is exactly that, and that Foreign Service officers can and will serve their country with loyalty and effectiveness in other departments and give their superiors full satisfaction as they bring the broad and special skills of the Foreign Service to varied tasks.

Promotions have been going up at the middle and senior grades. The Class I to Career Minister list this year was the largest since 1969. The following table shows promotions from the next four classes as a percentage of eligible officers whose files were reviewed):

	1972	1973	1974
Class 11 to I	6%	11%	14% (45 officers)
Class 111 to 11	8%	9%	12% (63 officers)
Class IV to 111	9%	12%	12% (81 officers)
Class V to 1V	17%	23%	31% (162 officers)

Barring RIFs, BALPAs, OPREDs and such developments —and some may threaten—I believe our present job-manpower balance will sustain a further advance in 1975 promotions. "The job crisis" for senior FSOs may be passing. There are still senior FSOs we have trouble placing, as there will continue to be so long as selection-out is at its present level, and officers' reputations—rightly or unfairly—preceded them. But even after reclassification, 105 FSO/R I jobs are being filled by FSO 2s and below, while only 47 FSO Is are in jobs classified below their grade. It is already a seller's market in the junior ranks of the Foreign Service, and the buyer's market at the senior ranks is fast disappearing. We are also increasing mobility and opportunities for non-FSO personnel. The seven lean years in promotions for the Foreign Service just might be drawing to their close. ■

LETTERS TO FSJ

Evaluating Performance

■ When space is scarce, why does the JOURNAL print an anachronism such as Charles S. Kennedy's comments on the new State Department performance evaluation forms (FSJ, August 1974)? There surely are not many members of the Foreign Service left in 1974 who feel with Mr. Kennedy that they cannot produce a candid evaluation without commenting upon "race, creed, color, age, national origin, or sex."

We're talking about how an officer has delivered during the year on the responsibilities assigned to him or her. Whether he is yellow or white or his wife is a Presbyterian just isn't the point, except that he has civil rights like other Americans.

And Mr. Kennedy objects to cutting down on the length of reports. We are trying to evaluate one another through an extravagantly structured system including weeks of hard-to-spare hours on selection boards. The discipline of prescribed, uniform length is a major advance in the new form. Any woman (or man) who can't give a clear picture in six pages of how well a subordinate has fulfilled agreed work requirements shouldn't be an FSO anyway.

And, frankly, the complaint that the new form allots a half inch more to "effectiveness and candor as a rating officer" than to "managerial ability" bores. No one is challenging the importance of managerial ability, but it's about time we evasive FSOs were rated on our performance *as raters*. Ask anybody who has labored on a selection board trying to sort out all the vague, laudatory treacle.

Finally, the truism about the difficulty of working in an isolated post with a subordinate who has read a candid evaluation. First, our Constitution, thank goodness, is increasingly interpreted as insisting upon open ratings. Second, the challenge of management, particularly in our dispersed Foreign Service system, is to be open with one another, be candid—and still to function effectively together and to achieve that magic sense of participation. It's fascinating and it's very difficult, but not impossible.

Evaluation procedures are hard to devise for conditions imposed by foreign service. The new form is not perfect, but it's much better, and I expect after some experience we'll be able to make it better again. AFSA committees and the Department deserve our congratulations and gratitude for hours of hard work improving the evaluation procedure. How about some constructive ideas, Mr. Kennedy, instead of the weary criticisms? And, FSJ, how about printing some positive thoughts instead of the old petrified carping?

WILLIAM C. HARROP

Canberra

AID Organization

■ I cannot resist the opportunity to reply to the editorial in the July 1974 issue of the JOURNAL. I feel that the editorial is by and large a good one, yet there is one statement which I believe to be misleading, to wit, AFSA has "already succeeded in widening training opportunities for officers and staff employees." I realize that one of AFSA's most persistent problems lies in communicating with its membership. Having said this, I should like to know precisely what AFSA has done on widening training opportunities. I myself have certainly not seen many training announcements coming across my desk, nor have my supervisors been notably less rigid in approving Applications for Training than in the past. Thus, I ask, what have you done?

In the same editorial you solicit ideas to help AFSA structure its priorities. My own will be confined to essentially two areas: (a) The objectives of AID; and (b) The organization needed to carry out those objectives.

The Objectives of AID–I believe that the fundamental objective of *all* AID assistance —whether it is titled development grant, development loans, supporting assistance, or what have you—should be to help countries help themselves to become independent of the need for our aid as soon as practicable. I believe that only on this basis can there be any assurance of continued Congressional support. Presumably, this objective already underlies our development programs, but I believe that immediate measures should be undertaken to assure that there is a focus on this objective. Our supporting assistance programs, on the other hand, seem deliberately aimed at the creation of permanent client states such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Jordan, and Egypt. For the apparent sake of political expediency, we keep pouring in dollars. The Treasury Department may have to borrow the money from, say Germany, in order to support local oligarchies who use the funds to buy goods from Japan! This situation is dangerous because:

(a) There is little or no incentive for the recipients of our aid to develop their own productive capacity or improve their export potential. Thus the need for cash drops continues unabated, worsening our already weak balance of payments position and probably hurting our export trade as well.

(b) Congress may soon tire of this whole sordid mess and impose even more drastic cuts in aid, leaving our clients able neither to fend for themselves nor to help us meet the political objectives which ostensibly dictated our giving them aid in the first place.

In my humble opinion, it would seem both economically and politically wise to condition our supporting assistance on self-help measures such as realistic exchange rates, pricing systems, etc. that will maximize the incentives for broad participation by the people of the aid-receiving countries in their own economic development.

I also believe that such an approach would be helpful to the job-security of AID employees. In those cases where such conditions are rejected or unlikely to be fulfilled, I would suggest that the Department of State administer and appropriate the funds. If that alternative is not acceptable, then I would suggest that the aid be withheld. AID must in fact become only what its name implies: the Agency for International *Development*.

(b) *The Organization*—What is sorely needed is a meaningful and dependable career system for those personnel who are involved in the administration of a world-wide assistance program. I would urge that organizational changes be kept at a minimum and that these changes be designed to insure that the objectives outlined above can be carried out in an efficient and orderly way.

AFSA can help accomplish AID objectives and goals by assuring that personnel are trained to administer AID programs. AFSA should push for periodic training which should be given to every officer and secretary. In addition, AFSA must push for a rational placement system, meaning that every qualified AID employee can have the chance to compete for every vacancy, and that the "who you know routine" becomes a thing of the past. AFSA will have to push vigorously for this placement system, as GS Personnel types have for too long held these reins and will not easily relinquish them. Finally, I would urge that the rating and promotion systems be refined. The current performance rating system is a start in the right direction, but needs much clarification and refinement.

I am delighted to see that AFSA wants to improve the effectiveness of our foreign aid. I feel that one way to accomplish this would be to urge AID to encourage a free flow of ideas. In AID, one of the greatest impediments to a continuing exchange of ideas is the prevalence of persons holding key positions in the Agency who are personally so insecure that they use their bureaucratic clout to squelch or intimidate personnel, or twist to their own exalted image any ideas that have their origin with persons of lower rank or lesser power. To remove this impediment to permanent, vigorous and constructive policy debate within AID, I would suggest that AFSA urge Administrator Parker's office to examine the personnel records and operating procedures of key officials. Those who are found to consistently interfere with the free flow of ideas should be advised to change their obnoxious practices or be transferred to other less responsible positions. In addition, AFSA itself should encourage the free flow of ideas and not merely content itself with receiving ideas from the "In-Group." AFSA must learn to be responsive to *all* members' ideas and not reject these ideas simply because some personnel may be unable, for one reason or another, to contribute time to work on committees, come to AFSA's boring and tiring meetings which are laden with long-winded reports, or simply do not wish to negotiate with Management officials in an often fruitless and not very rewarding exercise.

Name withheld by request

A Reflection

■ I havc, as requested, read and reflected upon the last paragraph of Mr. Smith Simpson's review of "The Lyon's Share," in the August FSJ Bookshelf:

> Finally, I liked the references to the interests and activities of Mrs. Lyon who, as a Foreign Service daughter, knew what was expected of her in a diplomatic service. There was never a question in her mind whether she would do what was expected, or required, of her. That is worth reading —and reflecting upon—these days.

I find that, somehow, the more I do so, the less I care for Mr. Simpson's attitude.

MARY M. STOLZENBACH
Tokyo

Embassy Security

■ The public should be made aware of the highly questionable policy of our government with relation to the security of our Embassies and other diplomatic missions. This policy has two aspects:

1) We permit no action to defend our personnel except the retreat to the upper floors of the building even in cases of aggressive attacks where it is clear that the host government is not capable of preventing the attack (Cyprus) or does not intend to do so (as apparently true in Panama in 1964);
2) Physical security requirements are given minor attention except after the fact.

In Cyprus the menace of surrounding buildings should have been evident—yet there were only wooden shutters to protect the interior. At another Embassy (a new building inaugurated recently) every office is within the range of the surrounding apartments and office buildings—and there are no shutters at all. I should make clear that the government in that country is completely capable and would, without doubt, stop any attack on the Embassy but could hardly keep under constant surveillance the numerous apartments and offices from which a sniper could operate.

I realize that allowing our people to repulse an attack is something a superpower shies away from. We do not wish to be accused of "murder" or make "martyrs" or suffer a break in relations, but I think we have enough experience over these last years to realize that our restraint has not helped in this regard. It is obvious that diplomatic protocol and safeguards can and usually are ignored. The criminals even when self-declared and known are politically absolved! Moreover, we can do something about making Embassy buildings secure. Our architects have succeeded in making them look like fortresses and garnered ill will thereby, but they are far from that.

Foreign Service officers and staff will continue to do their duty. Someone should speak out on their behalf.

LEONARD J. SACCIO
Ambassador, ret.
Woodbury, Conn.

Letter to AFGE Local 1812

■ The special April issue of AFGE's NEWS & VIEWS has come to my attention. Several misstatements in this issue should be corrected for the record.

First, the Thomas Fund advertisement was in fact printed in the May 1974 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL on page 7.

Second, AFSA considers that the suit instituted by the Thomas Fund to compel due process in procedures for selection out based on substandard performance served a useful purpose, even though we did not agree with all elements of the Fund's initial brief. AFSA strongly supported this goal by consulting with and assisting the attorney for the plaintiffs, and by submitting a brief which concurred with their position in most respects. AFSA would hope that AFGE's other objectives in respect to the foreign affairs community of the United States government will all be equally constructive.

I would appreciate it if this letter could be printed in the next issue of AFGE's NEWS & VIEWS in order to correct the record.

THOMAS D. BOYATT
President

And AFGE's Reply

■ I have reviewed your letter of May 23, 1974. I have also reviewed the files.

Surely you jest!

FRANK A. CHIANCONE
General Vice President

AFSA NEWS

Rick Williamson

THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON

This has been one of THOSE months. You know the kind—it starts out a perfectly good month and by the end of it you are about ready for a padded cell. So, if this month's column lacks a bit of sparkle and zip, you will know why. It's not that it has been a bad month for the Association, all things considered. On the contrary, we got a number of useful things accomplished this month. It has just been a bad month for me.

The cause of the difficulty has been the extreme urgency with which we and State management have had to approach this year's precept negotiations. Tom Boyatt and the Director General had agreed earlier this year that major steps should be taken to move forward the convening of selection boards so that the promotion list could be released earlier next year than it was this year. In order for this to work, the Threshold Review Panels needed to begin in August, and the Intermediate Boards needed to begin their work in September. Once the decision was made that the Intermediate Selection Boards would convene on September 10, we and State management were under extreme pressure to conclude those portions of this year's precepts which needed to be in effect so that the Intermediate Boards could convene. This meant reaching agreement on the general precepts, including those portions of the precepts concerning selection out which required action on the part of the selection boards, as well as agreement on the Intermediate Board Precepts and the special directives for the Specialist Boards. Since, as we indicated in our reports on selection out and the cone system in last month's JOURNAL, the views of the Service were in substantial disagreement with the precepts proposed to us by management, we were forced to seek some very basic changes in a very short period of time. As a result, very little else has gotten done in AFSA this month except for the precepts and those things which urgently required immediate attention such as signing the payroll checks. A lot of things (such as answering correspondence, planning for Foreign Service Day, and getting this column written on time so that I am not ashamed to show my face when I talk to Shirley Newhall) have suffered in the process. The Intermediate Boards did convene on time on September 10, but the precepts weren't finished until the night before. We will report more fully on those negotiations next month.

In any event, in addition to the precept negotiations, a number of other things have happened this month. We joined a number of other unions and professional associations in objecting strenuously to efforts by OMB and the Civil Service Commission to juggle the Bureau of Labor's statistics so as to minimize federal pay comparability increases. The Association objected strenuously to this manipulation of the data so as to result in a 5.5 percent increase for federal workers, although the data clearly supports at least a 7.3 percent increase. Our letter to the Civil Service Commission and OMB objected to this kind of manipulation, and also objected to the procedures they had used which had the practical effect of denying hundreds of thousands of federal employees any real input into the federal pay comparability process. Subsequently, Steve and I testified before the President's Advisory Committee on federal pay, objecting not only to the 5.5 percent increase, but also strenuously objecting to the decision by President Ford to put off the timing of the federal increase for three months, stressing, among other things, that the real wages of Foreign Service personnel have been eroded even faster than those of federal employees generally, because of the higher inflation rates abroad. We have also written to the Chairman of the Senate and House Post Office and Civil Service Committees, urging them to hold hearings on this matter, and requesting the opportunity to testify on behalf of an immediate increase for federal employees. As this is being written, the chances for overturning the President's recommendation look fairly good.

Our effort to get the larger increase for federal employees to which they are statistically entitled, and to have this increase implemented on the 1st of October rather than have it delayed, brings up a point which we have not previously stressed. We have consistently supported the efforts of other federal employee organizations, whether trade unions or professional associations, on matters of pay, leave, retirement, etc. Indeed AFSA is the largest organization representing professionals as their exclusive representative outside of the classified service, and as such occupies something of a unique position. Whenever the interests of all federal employees are at stake, AFSA has been very active with the Hill, the press, and elsewhere. We have been told repeatedly by other organizations that our role in this process has been a very helpful one. In short, where the interests of the Foreign Service are the same as the interests of other federal employees, we are quick to work together with other organizations to defend our common interests. What makes AFSA different is that when the interests of the Foreign Service differ from those of other federal employees, we never have a conflict of loyalties. We are the only organization concerned solely with the well-being of Foreign Service personnel.

This month we finally had the

first "conferral" on Executive Order 11636. The executive order under which we operate calls for an annual meeting of parties to discuss how the executive order should be modified. We have been pressing for such a meeting for over a year because we felt some changes were needed in the rules under which we represent Foreign Service interests with the Agencies. We have repeatedly stressed the need for the Order to be an organic and consistently improving instrument, the need for a separate set of rules for employee relationships in the Foreign Affairs Agencies, and the especially strong need for the employees to have an input into the rules which affect their careers and livelihood. Unless these needs can be met through an improved Executive Order, the pressure for legislation embracing the Foreign Service in a government-wide employee relations system will become irresistible and will almost inevitably lead to the imposition of Civil Service rules and practices on to the Foreign Service, a long-standing goal of many in other government unions and of many in the Civil Service Commission.

Steve Wallace

TRANSITION AND REFLECTION

From its humble beginning, the Association has grown to nearly 7,300 members and continues to expand its roles and professional activities. Last year, when AFSA was elected to be the exclusive representative of the Foreign Service personnel of the three Foreign Affairs Agencies, fears were voiced by some that professional activities would suffer. These fears, fortunately, have proven groundless. Our status as exclusive representative has added strength to our efforts of improving professionalism in the Foreign Service. As Tom Boyatt mentioned in his President's Report in the August issue, this has been particularly true in Congress on such matters as our opposition to the sale of ambassadorships, our achievement of a reform of the Foreign Service Act eliminating the abuses of political and personal considerations in the selection process, and our success in obtaining Foreign Service retirement for career AID personnel. In addition, we have continued to strengthen our standing programs.

Complementing the continued pursuit of professional objectives has been our new effort to improve employee benefits and personnel practices in a large number of areas. And while our efforts on the professional front have been strengthened as a result of our new role, some have expressed doubts about the ability of the Association to face management staunchly when representing the interests of employees in the bargaining unit. This charge of "company unionism" has been heard from a few of our own members as well as from outside critics.

This allegation is groundless, as the record of our negotiations clearly shows. If there were any lingering doubts, they were finally set to rest this month. For the first time, AFSA took management to court, with AID management winning the dubious honor of being first among the three Agencies to be the defendant. The issue centered on AID's arbitrary and politically motivated RIF of 66 personnel in the Office of Public Safety. The Association did not succeed in obtaining its immediate objective of a temporary restraining order and an injunction from the Federal District Court against AID, which would have kept the affected personnel employed pending the outcome of the case. This was a most unfortunate outcome for the RIF'd personnel, but in another sense we did win an important point. If the substance of the case is won in the end, the employees will have to be rehired with back pay. In either event, the fact that AFSA did take court action demonstrates that we will take any steps necessary to defend and protect the rights of Foreign Service employees.

Provided that AFSA continues to have the funds to take court action when needed, the recent suit also should have a longer range salubrious effect on the attitudes of management in all three Agencies. This would apply particularly to AID and USIA where certain management officials prefer to view AFSA more as General Motors would view the United Auto Workers. But then, noting that AID and USIA are postwar latecomers to the Foreign Service, the lag factor in management's attitude is not as surprising as it is disappointing. Furthermore, the relative youth of the two Agencies combined with their less homogenous character and dual FS/GS personnel systems compound the Association's problems in dealing with the Agencies. Certainly the situation is better in State, where the management of the agency is in the hands of career Foreign Service personnel who share a common interest in the good of the Foreign Service, even though their perspective is inevitably different.

The structural and attitudinal deficiencies of AID and USIA will be long and hard to overcome, for even now the managements of these Agencies are attempting to subvert the whole spirit of E.O. 11636 by proposing a drastic increase in the number of "management officials" excluded from AFSA's "bargaining unit." Such changes would serve to exacerbate AFSA/management relations, encourage adversary confrontation *a la* GM and UAW, and polarize the Foreign Service community. In many cases the Foreign Service experience and consciousness is much greater among AFSA officers and negotiators than that of AID and USIA management, so it will be incumbent upon us to take the lead in educating these management officials as to the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Foreign Service. This may be AFSA's biggest single task.

AID AFFAIRS

1. The promotion freeze continues to be of particularly rankling concern. We have filed an unfair labor practice; and if discussions produce no compromise in the immediate future, we will probably file a formal complaint and attempt to take the issue before the Employee-Management Elections Commission.

2. After reaching agreement with AID management on a program for training Foreign Service staff for Foreign Service positions, management at the 11th hour decided that there were elements of the agreement that were unpalatable. Nevertheless, we are optimistic for a change that agreement will be reached soon.

3. We have recently received from management a proposal formalizing an executive development

program which exists in the federal government. This is an important subject, one that has long-term implications for many career AID personnel, and will therefore receive considerable analysis by the Association.

4. The unfair practice charge of AID's RIF procedures and the assignment of Agency Occupational Specialty Codes (AOSCs) may soon be reaching its way to the Employee-Management Relations Commission for resolution. In the meantime, many of the RIF'd officers from Public Safety have filed grievances with the Grievance Board and Appeals with the Civil Service Commission.

Joint Agency Members' Interests

We are near agreement with management on a procedure which we hope will eliminate many of the difficulties employees have faced in obtaining compensation for irregular and occasional overtime. The chief innovation is that in emergency situations supervisors will be able to order up to eight hours of overtime without obtaining prior approval from the authorizing officer. This change should help to end the practice of employees being whipsawed between supervisors who order overtime and authorizing officers who refuse to approve it, a problem which had the practical effect of denying overtime payment to hundreds of employees, particularly in the Staff Corps.

A large difference remains between the AFSA and management positions with regard to duty overtime. Management's latest proposal would not define duty overtime as regularly scheduled, but would authorize monetary compensation for about one percent of employees who earn more than a GS-10, Step 10 (who can't demand it under current regulations). We have proposed that duty overtime be defined as regularly scheduled, except when individuals perform it less often than once every 26 weeks.

As a result of a meeting with the Disputes Panel, the management of the three agencies agreed to implement by September 15 an agreement reached with AFSA three months ago to lower emergency visitation deductibles. Management also agreed at the same meeting to begin to consult seriously on increasing per diem payments at FSI.

After many months of negotiations, we have reached agreement with management on increased household effects shipments, a major improvement which will be of particular benefit to single employees. There remain several unresolved issues with regard to the negotiating process on this question, particularly the effective date of this important new benefit. We think it should go into effect immediately, but management wants to wait until next summer, or even later, without providing us the financial cost data to explain why it should take so long to implement.

AFSA's New Treasurer

Juliet C. Antunes

A native of Troy, New York, Ms. Antunes is a graduate of the College of Saint Rose (BA) and the State University of New York at Albany (MA). She entered the Foreign Service in 1966 and was assigned to USIS Brussels as a Junior Officer Trainee. This was followed by a stint in Paris as Program Assistant at the Cultural Center. In 1969 Ms. Antunes was assigned to London as Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer. While there she served as USIS representative on the AFSA Board.

In late 1972 Ms. Antunes returned to Washington and was assigned to the Board of Examiners as a Deputy Examiner on the Political Panel. She then spent a year on out-of-Agency assignment to the National Endowment for the Arts. Currently she is assigned to IWE as desk officer for the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy and Switzerland. Last year Ms. Antunes served as a member of the AFSA Elections Committee.

1974-75 Scholarships Awarded To Foreign Service Juniors

The Scholarship Committee (formerly the Committee on Education) submitted its annual report to the Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association on June 3, 1974, and requested approval of the list of grants for the academic year 1974-75.

The awards this year were made on the basis of the financial need of the family, in accordance with the Resolution of the Board of Directors of September 18, 1972.

The Headquarters Staff, using the College Scholarship Service's reports, recommended the order of the allocations. The Committee reviewed the work of the Headquarters Staff to determine the applicant's eligibility requirements and to audit the allocation of the applicant's category of need. The Committee followed the policies and procedures of the Scholarship Manual, approved by the AFSA Board of Directors on September 10, 1973.

Any member of the Association having a recommendation would assist the Committee by presenting it in written form addressed to the Committee's attention.

The Committee continues to review suggestions and proposals that in addition to need, would give weight to the scholarship attainments and the general worthiness of applicants in the allocation of awards. When a feasible proposal is formulated, the Committee will present its findings to the Governing Board for consideration.

This year, in response to queries, 334 packets of scholarship materials were distributed, 142 applications were completed, and a minimum of 50 awards were recommended.

Fifty-one scholarships have been awarded this year, to Foreign Service children who will be attending colleges and universities ranging from Dartmouth to the University of Hawaii. The recipients and their respective awards follow:

Edick A. Anderson, III, **Edward T. Wailes Memorial**; Heather Lynn Anderson, **Edward T. Wailes Memorial**; Mark Kennan Anderson, **Edward T. Wailes Memorial**; Maria Carolina Bar-

gas, **George H. DeMange Memorial;** Matthew St. John Bargas, **Selden Chapin Memorial;** Barbara Lee Bryniarski, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial;** Patricia Ann Bryniarski, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial;** Christopher Mark Chadbourne, **AAFSW;** Deborah Tate Dodderidge, **J. F. Begg Scholarship;** Linda Diane Dodderidge, **Berlin American Women's Club;** Andrew James Gibb, **AAFSW/Ladies' Group in Rabat;** Maha Anwar Hadid, **Charles E. Merrill Trust;** Mahmoud Anwar Hadid, **William B. Benton Memorial;** C. Nicholas Hodge, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial;** P. Christopher Hodge, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial;** Michel Alexander Ivy, **AAFSW;** Ann Pamela Jurecky, **James L. Carson Memorial;** Jane Elizabeth Jurecky, **Julius C. Holmes Memorial;** Mary F. Jurecky, **Selden Chapin Memorial;** Gabriela M. Kozlowski, **Natalia Semler Memorial;** Richard LaRocca, **Dr. Wayne Wilcox Family Memorial;** Martha Frances Lyman, **AAFSW;** Mary Frances Mattran, **AAFSW;** Kevin Michael McNeill, **Wilbur J. Carr Memorial;** Peri Alain Neilson, **AAFSW/US Government Wives of Tegucigalpa;** Thu Huong Nguyen, **Arthur B. Emmons Scholarship;** Stephen James Nolan, **Edward T. Wailes Memorial;** Margaret Mary Purcell, **Frederick S. Quin Memorial;** Mary Grace Purcell, **AAFSW;** Catherine Jane Reinhardt, **Paris Fund;** Charles Henry Reinhardt, **Paris Fund;** Renata Xochitl Rick, **Herbert Peck Fales Memorial;** Robin Stephanie Rick, **Ernest L. Ives Memorial;** Russell M. Rick, Given by an anonymous donor in memory of **Thomas Tait;** Mark Augustine Ryan, **Marjorie Gallman Memorial;** Michael Barry Sedgley, **Charles E. Bohlen Memorial;** John Gould Shaw, **AAFSW;** Timothy W. Shaw, **AAFSW;** Allene Teruko Shimomura, **Charles E. Merrill Trust;** James Lee Smith, **Honorable David K. E. Bruce;** Sydney Benita Sowell, **Honorable David K. E. Bruce;** Sarah Patricia Springer, **Honorable Clare H. Timberlake;** Norman Sean Terry, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial;** Edward Andrew Tsoy, **Honorable Jefferson Patterson;** Elizabeth Moon Tsoy, **Vietnam Memorial;** Martha Jean Wagner, **AAFSW;** Rebecca Louise Wagner, **AAFSW/American Community of Yaounde;** Ursula Anna Wagner, **Charles E. Bohlen Memorial;** Wylla Worth Waters, **AAFSW/Belgrade Women's Club;** Kristen Marie Wellde, **AAFSW;** Sara Sloan Wile, **American Women's Group of Bonn.**

AFSA appreciates the support of its members and friends for this program over the years and finds especially welcome the splendid support of the AAFSW.

JOIN AFSA

New to the Ed Board

Sandy Vogelgesang (FSO-5) is joining the JOURNAL's Editorial Board.

She admits to being a mid-Victorian Midwesterner who has digressed from the Taft turf of Ohio to concern about feminist rights and the role of the American Intellectual Left.

In her better-behaved moments in the State Department, she drafts cables and memoranda for EUR/RPE and continues her active role with the Secretary's Open Forum Panel.

Ms. Vogelgesang just concluded her elected term as Panel Chairperson. Previously, she served as editor-economist in EB, political analyst in INR, and assistant cultural affairs officer in Finland.

She was a history major at Cornell University and received an MA, MALD, and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. With one book just published by Harper and Row, she continues to look for new excuses to plague friends with Germanic syntax.

A Loss to our Ranks

Eloise Jordan, AFSA's popular and charming receptionist, resigned from the Association on August 23. We are describing her as the receptionist simply because many visitors and telephone callers will recognize her in that capacity. Others who spent longer periods of time in the AFSA headquarters or who served on committees will know that this is far from a full description of her duties, both volunteer and assigned, and of her capabilities. Her able coordination of the Scholarship Program and her work with that committee was especially valuable to AFSA. Mrs. Jordan worked for the Association for over three years. We will all miss her sorely and the AFSA staff and AFSA members wish her the best.

AAFSW News

Book Fair Coming

Inflation-free books at the Association of the American Foreign Service Women's Book Fair '74 will go on public sale on October 7-11, from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Exhibition Hall of the State Department, 2201 C Street. Proceeds from this 14th annual fair will go to the Education/Scholarship Fund, according to Dawn Vine, Book Fair Chairman.

Family Day, "G" rated for State Department, USIA and AID personnel, is Sunday, October 6 from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. A building pass will be required at the C Street entrance, Margaret Dickman, Family Day chairman, reminds employees.

Dorothy Wolfson is chairman of the 27 volunteers who have worked all year on the Fair.

Among the thousands of books, from floor to ceiling, one will find school books and how-to books, enduring fiction and non-fiction, valuable reference books, books on Ecology, Anthropology, Psychology, and Sexology, books in foreign tongues, on the sound of music, on ESP and the extension of the mind.

In the Foreign Language Corner, chairman Mrs. E. Spaulding will reign; in the Rare Book Corner, veteran volunteer Mildred Bell may be consulted; in the Stamp Corner, amateur philatelist Marjorie Forbes will offer her expertise; and in the Art Corner, artist Virginia Knepper will assist in decision making. Betty Haselton, chief of Cashiers, promises quick and pleasant service from her many helpers.

Come, bring your friends to meet other friends at the Fair. Come during your coffee break or on your way to lunch, between medical appointments or FSI classes. Come every day to examine the books that are replaced hourly if necessary. Come prepared to buy. Come as you are. You are expected.

Shopping bags will be made available.

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

Listings in this Special Services column are 40c per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail to Special Services, FSJ, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

BOOKS

THE OWL AND THE PUSSYCAT, a bookshop for children, happily mails books worldwide. Yes, we do accept orders for adult books. Marvelous catalog, $1.00. Order now for Christmas delivery. 321 South Ashland Ave., Lexington, Ky. 40502, USA.

REAL ESTATE

HOME LEAVE THIS FALL OR WINTER? Apartment in Tiburon, California; floor-to-ceiling views of SF from every room; two bedrooms and two baths; completely furnished down to cat by fireplace and **Cougar** in garage; swimming, tennis, sailing; five minutes walk to town center, stores and ferry to San Francisco. Write: Les Squires, 20 Harbor Oak Orive, No. 11, Tiburon, CA, 94920.

BEGG INTERNATIONAL, INC. is the sister company and international real estate counterpart of Begg, Inc., Realtors, who have for so many years assisted FSO's to buy and sell their houses in the Washington area. Begg International specializes in best quality real estate overseas. For your retirement or holiday home in Portugal, Spain, the Caribbean, etc., consult: Begg International, Inc., Realtors, 1714 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. Tel: (202) 387-4805.

EDUCATION

THE FOREIGN SERVICE Educational and Counseling Center welcomes your inquiries. A continuation of the services available for 15 years by AFSA's Consultant in Education and Youth Concerns, sponsored by AAFSW and AFSA with additional expanded activities. Write FSECC, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 or call (202) 338-4045.

ENTERTAINMENT

HAVE YOUR NEXT affair, foreign or domestic, at the FOREIGN SERVICE CLUB. Open every weekday for luncheon, special rooms available on reservation for private parties. Inquiries invited for cocktail parties, dinner parties, receptions, etc. Phone 338-5730.

Foreign Service People

Marriage

Conlin-Long. Carrie Patricia Conlin, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Michael M. Conlin, was married on September 6 to Larry Long in Washington, D.C.

Deaths

Altaffer. Maurice W. Altaffer, FSO-retired, died on July 11 in Zurich. He entered the Foreign Service in 1921 and served at Berlin, Stuttgart, Frankfort, Aleppo, Nogales, Dresden, Zurich and Bern, and as consul general at Bremen and Palermo, before his retirement in the early '50s. He is survived by his wife, Jeanne R. Altaffer, Rigistrasse 18, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland and by five children.

Davies. Rodger P. Davies, Ambassador to Cyprus, was killed by gunfire on August 18 in the Embassy in Nicosia. Ambassador Davies entered the Foreign Service in 1946 and served at Jidda, Damascus, Benghazi and Tripoli, Baghdad and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs before his assignment to Cyprus. He received the merit honor award in 1967 and was appointed Career Minister in 1969. He is survived by a daughter, Ann Dana Davies, a son, John Davies, both of 35 Hillcrest Road, Berkeley, California 94705; and his mother.

Field. Pattie H. Field, FSO-retired, died on July 16 in Denver. Miss Field was the first woman admitted to the Foreign Service under the Rogers Act and the first woman to represent the US abroad as an FSO and Vice Consul. She retired in 1957.

Ivy. Michel M. Ivy, FSO-retired, died on July 29 in Wheaton. Mr. Ivy transferred from the OSS to the Department of State in 1945 and served at Madras and Bombay and as executive secretary with the Policy Planning Council before his retirement in 1968. He is survived by his wife, Muriel, 12705 Connecticut Ave., Wheaton, Md., three daughters, a son and two grandchildren. The family requests that expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

Michalka. Charles Kirkland Michalka, son of FSO-retired and Mrs. Earl R. Michalka, was fatally stabbed during a robbery in his Washington apartment on July 14. He is survived by his parents, 1208 Hardee Road, Coral Gables, Fla. 33146, and a brother, John.

Schnare. Margaret Kloss Schnare, widow of FSO Lester L. Schnare, died on July 10 in New York City. She accompanied her husband to posts at Genoa, Milan, Rangoon, Calcutta and Tehran, before his retirement in 1955. Mrs. Schnare is survived by a daughter, Margaret E. Schnare, Apt. 12J, 250 West 85th St., New York, New York 10024.

Sobolewski. George H. Sobolewski, former FSL at Warsaw, died on June 22 in Hempstead, L.I., N.Y. He is described by Ambassador Richard T. Davies as "the mainstay of the General Services Section at the Embassy in Warsaw from 1947 to 1960." In 1960 he emigrated to the US and became an American citizen. He is survived by his wife, Halina, and a daughter, of 100 Washington St., Hempstead, L.I., New York 11550.

New Careers

Piltti Heiskanen, now retired from USIA, writes from Moedling, Austria, "I am working as a correspondent for *Suomen Kuvalehti*, the most important weekly newsmagazine in Finland. My first assignment was an interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria. This week's issue carries my latest work, an interview with Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo, the Commander of the UNEF. . . The large Sewdish-language daily *Hufvudstadsbladet* published a short story of mine. . . So I can highly recommend retirement into journalism and writing in general."

William R. (Red) Duggan writes from retirement: "Fortunately I have found my retirement here in Oregon fascinating—busy and comfortable in a marvelous environment. (Perhaps it is one of the last and best—this Oregon.) In addition to lecturing on political science at Willamette University in Salem, I am also engaged in writing, outside lecturing and consultancy, with Ford Foundation, on African affairs."

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