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Communication Re:

THE ROOTS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Editor's Note: This overview of the origin and establishment of the Foreign Service and the Department of State was compiled by Harriet P. Culley. It leads the way into an issue which combines the history of the Foreign Service with present-day concerns.

The roots of the Department of Foreign Affairs go back to 1775 and the appointment of a "Committee of Secret Correspondence," with Benjamin Franklin at its head. The Continental Congress had responsibility for the foreign affairs of the colonies and was charged with "sending and receiving ambassadors under any character, entering into treaties and alliances, etc." But after 14 months, the members decided to lighten the burden on themselves and passed the following resolution in November 1775:

Resolved, that a committee of five be appointed for the purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world, and that they lay their correspondence before Congress when directed.

The new committee started corresponding with "our friends" in Europe to explore the possibility of a reconciliation with Great Britain. In March 1776, it sent its first representative, Silas Deane, to the Court of France, and soon after, Dr. Franklin and Arthur Lee joined him to make up a commission to negotiate a treaty with France. In 1777, other commissioners were sent by the committee to Spain, Germany and Prussia, and Tuscany.

In April 1777, the name of the committee was changed to "committee for foreign affairs"; and Thomas Paine was named the first secretary at $70 a month. It would appear that Congress considered him more than just a clerk, and Paine thought of himself as sort of a "secretary for foreign affairs." His tenure was short, however; he was dismissed after only 20 months in office, for making an official matter public.

The chief function of the second committee was to keep our ministers in Europe, as the commissioners had become, informed about events in the United States. But even then diplomats in the field were not satisfied with the correspondence they received. John Jay wrote the committee from Spain in 1780, "Till now I have received but one letter from (the committee), and that not worth a farthing... One good private correspondent would be worth twenty standing committees, made of the wisest heads in America, for the purpose of intelligence."

The great accomplishment of the two committees of the Continental Congress was the work of the commission in France composed of Dr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Lee. They signed with France treaties of amity and commerce and of alliance on February 6, 1778, which represented the first public recognition of the independence of the United States by a foreign power.

By the end of 1780 it was obvious that the increasing burden of international relations could not be handled by the committee for foreign affairs and, in January, it sent to Congress a "plan for the department of foreign affairs." The plan pointed out "that the extent and rising power of these United States entitle them to place among the great potentates of Europe" and necessitate "friendly correspondence and connection" and "that to render such an intercourse advantageous, the necessity of those potentates, is obvious and can only be acquired by a constant attention to the state of Europe, and an unremitted application to the means of acquiring well-grounded information."

The plan stated "that Congress was, moreover, called upon to maintain with our ministers at foreign courts a regular correspondence, and to keep them fully informed of every circumstance and event which regards the public honour, interest and safety" and:

That to answer these essential purposes, the committee are of opinion, that a fixed and permanent office for the department of foreign affairs ought forthwith to be established, as a remedy against the fluctuation, the delay and indecision to which the present mode of managing our foreign affairs must be exposed.

After the free debate, the Continental Congress passed the following resolution, on January 10, 1781:

Resolved: That an office be forthwith established for the department of foreign affairs, to be kept always in the place where Congress shall reside.

That there shall be a secretary for the despatch of business of the said office, to be styled "secretary for foreign affairs."

Thus the department was set up outside of Congress, but the resolution made perfectly clear that it was directly responsible to Congress and would have very little life on its own. The secretary for a salary of $4,000 a year, was to:

- keep and preserve all the books and papers belonging to the department of foreign affairs;
- receive and report the applications of all foreigners;
- correspond with the minister of the United States at foreign courts, and with the ministers of foreign powers and other persons, for the purpose of obtaining the most extensive and useful information relative to foreign affairs, to be laid before Congress when required:
- transmit such communications as Congress shall direct, to the ministers to these United States and others at foreign courts, and in foreign countries;
- attend Congress, that he may be better informed of the affairs of the United States, and have an opportunity of explaining his reports respecting his department;
- employ one or, if necessary, more clerks to assist him in his office;

*Among other actions, they sent "addresses" to the king of England and dispatched agents to London to seek aid from Englishmen they believed were "friends to American Liberty."
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take an oath of fidelity to the United States before the president of Congress, along with his clerks, and an oath for the faithful execution of their respective trusts.

It was planned that the secretary would have a secretary at $1,000 a year and a clerk at $500, but that was revised, according to the 1781 Civil List, to two undersecretaries at $800 and $700 apiece, and a clerk and interpreter-translator at $500 each.

The first secretary for foreign affairs was Robert R. Livingston, chancellor of New York, who took office nine months later on October 20, 1781. The department's first home (as pictured on our cover) was a small, plain, brick house at 13 South Sixth Street in Philadelphia, 12 feet across the front and 30 feet deep. It had six rooms and an attic and a dark, winding stairway led to the secretary's office on the second floor.

Secretary Livingston has been credited with organizing the department, injecting vigor into its administration and making the position of secretary respectable. But his was a familiar cry, as he wrote to Congress: "(Two clerks) are barely sufficient to do the running business of the office, which is much greater than I imagined it would be; five copies, besides the draft, being necessary of every foreign letter or paper transmitted." Sometimes, the department sent seven copies to guarantee that at least one would arrive, and each packet was marked "To be sunk in case of danger from the enemy." Sometimes agents were used to hand carry instructions, which were often in cipher. Mr. Deane and Mr. Jay often corresponded in invisible ink, which the recipient treated with acid. Many of the letters were captured without being sunk, and went to the British Foreign Office.

In another letter to Congress, Secretary Livingston described the living arrangements of our ministers abroad.* Dr. Franklin had a part of M. Chaumont's house at Passy, kept a chariot and pair and three or four servants, and gave a dinner occasionally "to the Americans and others." In spite of this Secretary Livingston wrote, "His whole expense, as far as I can learn, is very much within his income." John Adams lived in lodgings, kept a chariot and pair and two men servants, and also had a private secretary. Secretary Livingston added that Adams was about to rent a house. It appeared that Francis Dana's salary, even in Russia, where the relative value of money was so high that a house could not be hired for less than 15 guineas a year, was ample. The cost of living, taking Philadelphia as a standard, was 20 percent cheaper in Paris (if wine, clothing and the wages of servants were included); in Amsterdam, it was 10 percent cheaper than in Philadelphia, and in Madrid, somewhat higher, since one had to follow the court from place to place.

All matters of great importance went to Congress for clearance, but the secretary carried on the correspondence with "our friends in Europe" and, in one instance, scolded Dr. Franklin: "I am sorry that you found it necessary to act with reserve and to conceal your measures from the court of France. I am fearful that you will not be able to produce such facts as will justify this conduct to the world or free us from the charge of ingratitude to a friend who has treated us not only justly, but generously."

Secretary Livingston did not give up his post as chancel-

*As of January 1, 1783, the salary of a minister plenipotentiary was not to exceed $5,000, but an allowance was given for household expenses.
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lor of New York while he was serving at the head of the new department, and after 13 months, he indicated his desire to return to it. He left, finally, in June 1783 and suggested Thomas Jefferson or John Jay as his replacement. Mr. Jefferson refused, saying that he would not serve even if elected. John Jay was nominated and elected without his knowledge while he was in Europe, serving as one of the commissioners negotiating and signing the peace treaties with Great Britain. When Congress moved from Trenton to New York City in December 1784, Jay agreed to serve and took up his office on December 21.

Secretary Jay took over a department which had been without a head for a year and a half and was badly in need of reorganization, the first of many to come. He abolished one of the positions of undersecretary, and added a doorkeeper and messenger, a junior clerk, and two more interpreters, for a total of three with specialties in French, Dutch, and German. He petitioned Congress for a library of the “best books on diplomatic Subjects,” and asked that Dr. Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson be directed to procure them. He suggested the appointment of a consul and vice consul to Canton, and a commercial agent to Lisbon. He worked for naval strength, maritime importance, and enforcement of treaty obligations. He spoke out on the relationship between the department and the field: “It is proper and common to instruct Ministers on the great Points to be agitated, and to inform them how far they are to insist on some, and how far they may yield on others. But I am inclined to think it is very seldom thought necessary to leave nothing at all to their Discretion,” for where that ought to be done, “the man ought not to be employed.”

The social obligations of the secretary were heavy: “At least one ceremonial dinner and one drawing-room” were given by the Jays each week, and Mrs. Jay seems to have assisted ably in these affairs.

The changeover from government under the Articles of Confederation to government under the Constitution took place in the spring of 1789, and President Washington took office on April 30. The Department of Foreign Affairs under the Constitution came into being on July 27, but two months later its name was changed to the one it now bears, the Department of State. Jefferson was named the first secretary of state and this time he agreed to serve. He was commissioned while he was still in France, and Secretary Jay continued to occupy the office until March 22, 1790, when Secretary Jefferson was sworn in.

In the nine-year period from 1781 to 1789, the Department of Foreign Affairs and its two secretaries for foreign affairs established the foundation for the Department of State which followed it. Both men had given dignity and respectability to their position and had developed and administered competent staffs. Secretary Livingston has been credited with organizing the Department and injecting vigor into its operation and Secretary Jay started the careful collection and filing of the department’s papers including official correspondence, and a library of books on foreign affairs. In spite of the time lapse between their service, and the moving of the department six times* in order to be “in the place where Congress shall reside,” they achieved

*From Philadelphia to Nassau Hall in Princeton, then to the State House in Annapolis, the French Arms Tavern in Trenton, the Fraunces Tavern and two locations on lower Broadway in New York City.
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notable diplomatic success, working through their distinguished ministers, Dr. Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. Their greatest accomplishment was the treaty with Great Britain ending the war for independence. Although it was uphill work with Congress retaining all significant powers, the Department of Foreign Affairs came to have a strong voice in foreign affairs and it left a not unimpressive heritage to pass on to the Department of State.

**Communication Re:**

**Foreign Service Species and Why They Have Become Endangered**

**TOBY ZETTLER**

Of the seemingly endless series of analyses of “What’s wrong with the Service,” it seems odd that no attempt has been made to apply the principles of “biobureaucratology” to the problem. This relatively new discipline treats a service organization, such as the Foreign Service, as a community of species within a bureaucratic ecosystem. It accepts the widely held (at least outside the State Department) notion that the success of any service organization is directly proportional to the sum total of the skills and motivation of its members. However, in analyzing the human interactions that affect skills and motivation, the biobureaucratologist doesn’t deal with individuals, classes, professions, ranks, or formal organizational units. He deals instead with “species,” groups of individuals within the organization (i.e., bureaucratic ecosystem) that share common traits of personality, character, and professional habits.

A biobureaucratic analysis is especially valid for the Foreign Service. With its relatively long cultural history, restricted entry, and low turnover, the components of the community vary little with time; one is dealing with the same three species over an extended period. The FS is practically unique among bureaucracies and other service organizations in this respect. However, these very qualities, which the sociologist may judge desirable and the FSO find comfortable, encourage—even reward—inadaptability.

In a harsh and changing environment like the jungle of official Washington, inadaptability can lead rapidly to extinction irrespective of the other merits of an endangered species. In the absence of powerful political protection, this principle of nature holds as rigorously for the biobureaucratic species as for the biological species. On the road to extinction, the species become progressively weaker and less able and willing to compete. And, as suggested above, the social or service organization of Toby Zetller joined the Foreign Service in 1967, after private experience in the chemical field. He has served at Tegucigalpa, Milan and Guayaquil.

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which it is a part is proportionately less successful in reaching its goals. Conversely, other species within the same organization may adapt better and survive the extinction of their colleague species and, by migrating to other ecosystems, even the demise of the organization itself.

Returning from the general to the specific, how do these biobureaucratic principles apply to the bureaucratic ecosystem known as the Foreign Service? The Service is made up of three species of FSO which will be described below. The FSS species is excluded because its technical skills enable it to adapt to a wide variety of environments. The three FSO species, for the reasons cited in the second paragraph above, have many traits in common; only the differences will be described here. The species are listed in order of inadaptability and hence probability of extinction. It should also be noted that the disappearance of any one of them implies the end of the Foreign Service as most have known it.

1) The Passive Observer: This species' most notable characteristic is an absence of career ambition, often accompanied by a lack of initiative and a disinterest in the state of the Service. It tends to be studious, even professorial. Its curiosity is so universal that supervisors may have a hard time channeling it to meet organizational goals. On the other hand, it seldom challenges "management" or "Washington." Its level of intelligence is above average. It abhors deadlines and quick studies but excels in detailed analytical and speculative studies. Social obligations of the profession are viewed with amusement but tolerance; it enjoys the opportunity to observe human nature but often will choose the interesting over the important contact. Because it is slow if not loath to recognize predators, PO seldom arrives at the highest levels of the Service. However, in the case where it does, it is almost invariably a poor manager. It is easily victimized by incursions; other agencies and species may not attack it directly because of its rank and reputation, but will appropriate large sections of its territory and possessions by taking advantage of its inertia, naiveté and abhorrence of power plays. Thus, PO is a valuable source of analysis and intellectual innovation at lower and mid-levels of maturity, but a threat to the survival of its own species and of the Foreign Service community of species when thrust into positions of leadership.

2) The Ruffled Activist: Aggressive and competent, this species wandered into the Foreign Service ecosystem in relatively recent times and has found it difficult to thrive
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in the presence of the overwhelming numbers of the other two species. Instinct for survival makes it alert to the conventions of the community but it tends to evade them and move quickly and decisively when the unconventional path is more effective. It therefore flourishes at overseas posts, away from the glare of the Washington sun. It is very task- and result-oriented and thus is easily frustrated in the Foreign Service environment; its call can be described as a loud, vulgar and irritated bray. Nonetheless, this orientation goes hand in hand with ambition and accomplishment, so its rate of promotion is above average. Operational and planning skills overshadow the analytical in this species. When challenged or frustrated by other Foreign Service species, particularly those in the Washington habitat, its first instinct is to fight. In these encounters, the numerically superior species will frequently bloody the RA but seldom deliver the mortal blow because of the latter's disproportionately high contribution to the well-being of the community. The RA is effective but not brilliant in social situations, which it invariably considers merely a means to carry out its primary responsibilities. Despite its maverick reputation, certain members of this species rise quickly in the community hierarchy because of their sheer competence; once at the top they have been known to alleviate the community's dysfunctions. However, many others choose to depart for more rewarding bureaucratic ecosystems or to assume the characteristics of the more dominant Foreign Service species in order to survive. As a result, reliable biobureaucratic observers believe that the number of members of the RA species is in decline. Remaining members of the species are found primarily in the administrative and consular cone habitats; until the recent drastic destruction of E/C cone territory they also frequented that habitat.

3) The Naked Opportunist: This most hardy of the Foreign Service species is notable for its adaptability to rapidly changing environmental circumstances. It forages constantly in search of a more direct path to the higher vantage points within the jungle. Once upon such a path it can become a superachiever, at least until such time that it finds a better path. Unfortunately, it tends to forage independently, and during these forage periods is only a superficial contributor to the community as a whole. Its ambition is almost without limit, so the NO will always gravitate to a place near the powerful in the sun even if the substance is elsewhere. It also actively seeks pseudo-kinship ties in other ecosystems. This species prefers the Washington or large embassy habitat and is particularly numerous in special assistant and other staff positions. Consequently, this species is more recognizable than the other two. This community exposure can lead to promotion or cycling with equal rapidity, depending on the apparent ability of the individual, which in turn is judged semi-independently by a "mentor." A mentor is a high-ranking member of the community with which the NO often assumes a synergistic or even parasitic relationship. It will often follow its mentor everywhere and even try to mimic it. This species is socially gregarious but calculating; its dropings are distinctive for the number of names found there. The NO adapts readily to and can even thrive in an incompetent or illogical environment (unlike the PO which ignores it or the RA which fights it). Its survival is therefore almost certain even if the Foreign Service ecosystem as such is wiped out completely by the
attrition observed in recent times. Meanwhile, its numbers are reported to be increasing.

Adaptation may yet save all three Foreign Service species from extinction, but, as documented in these species sketches, the process will have to be much more rapid than it has been in the past. The world and the Washington milieu have changed in a way uncongenial to a small corps of foreign affairs professionals. The ecosystem frequented by the Foreign Service community has been invaded by specialists in domestic agencies who are conversant with the ever more complex technical subjects which influence foreign relations. Political centralization at the White House, especially the ascendancy of OMB, has progressively limited the influence, resources and scope of action of Foreign Service species. In biobureaucratic terms, the jungle is more hostile than ever. Only a heroic effort to acknowledge weaknesses and adapt can save the more endangered Foreign Service species (Passive Observer and Ruffled Activist), but individual effort will be wasted without support from the community leaders (common name: management).

The grisly alternative might be termed "natural selection out."

Communication Re: WASHINGTON REVISITED Or the War of the Words

A n important objective of the Journal is to keep all Association members in Washington and in the field informed. As the field knows only too well, communicating with the department is at best difficult and at worst impossible. (A distinguished former member of the historical office has brought to our attention a despatch from the consul general in Barcelona dated 1828, in which our nineteenth century colleague complained fretfully to the Honorable the Secretary of State for several pages that he had had no communication of any sort whatsoever from the department since 1816.)

We are indebted to a senior colleague, FSO R. Van Winkle, who has lately returned to a posting in Washington after some years in the field for the following insights into the continuing sweepstakes for buzzword of the year for FY ’81.

Van Winkle reports that when he wandered into various offices around the department in the course of his arduous professional duties in the bureau of resources, intelligence and personnel (RIP) using such buzzwords current during his earlier Washington incarnation as “posture,” “parameters” and “bottom line,” he sensed at once from the furrowed brows and puzzled glances he attracted that something had changed in Foggy Bottom.

We have told Van Winkle and we are glad to report to you that there are three hot contenders for the position of buzzword of FY ’81. Anyone who is really “in” must know how and when to allow one or more of them to roll casually off the tongue. A word of explanation about each may be helpful to prevent misuse by the field and conse-
quent ridicule or ignoring of messages by the department, an occurrence otherwise unthinkable.

1) Sustainable—in the sense of tolerable, or (a) what we can get away with, (b) can fund, or (c) will fly. Reminiscent of "let’s run it up the flagpole..." of FY '64, but with vigorous, cold-blooded managerial overtones, so popular in the computer age.

2) Universe—in the sense of the defined area under discussion. It may be as small a universe as the number of left-handed, red-headed persons in the smallest bureau. Universe replaces parameters, which gave up the ghost from exhaustion brought on by overwork several years ago; it is clearly more apt in the space era. Cosmos might have served had it not been forceps delivered in NATO 25 years ago (in the form of cosmic clearance) with considerable damage to its future development.

3) Triage, occasionally semi-triage—for the Darwinian selection process which determines the success of ideas, people, programs and practically everything else in the building known as New State Extension* back in 1959. Triage, a very macho high-brow usage, was first identified in late May being taken out for an airing by S/P, always a fertile breeding group for buzzwords.

The Journal will continue to monitor this silent struggle for chief buzzword of '81 (FY not CY) and will report to the field the final outcome at an early date.

*Now it’s just State. Even Old State is now clumsily termed EOB in this year of our Lord 1980 and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifth. The English do these things so much better. The New Forest, established by Henry II in the late twelfth century, is still known as the New Forest.

A Diplomat’s Viewpoint

Steadfastness

JACK PERRY

For a professional diplomat, the cardinal need in American foreign policy is steadfastness.

Now I write that bearing in mind that diplomats are paid to carry out policy, not make it. And that diplomats, serving so often abroad, are peculiarly sensitive to the views and requirements of other nations, ally, adversary, or uncommitted. The diplomat—"witness to history," in Chip Bohlen’s phrase—looks beyond domestic origins of foreign policy trends and surveys what works in foreign policy. In old-fashioned terms, how is the national interest being served.

In the United States, as has often been observed, we were fortunate enough, in inheriting a rich continent, to be protected from European Great Power politics, leaving us with a false conviction that we could either retire from power politics or rise above them. In both world wars, we were able to enter late and still win—a feasibility that seems incredibly remote from the hair-trigger, split-second nuclear balance of today. Our post-World War II alliance structure, and our constant involvement in global politics in all regions, also seem far away from those irresponsible days before Pearl Harbor.
Yet there is an American approach to foreign policy, as seen by a career diplomat, which derives from our above-the-battle past, and which may also be an anachronism in the world of today. This is the practice of having a divided and constantly changing foreign policy, with allies and opponents not knowing from one American election to the next what the new direction will be. This is the absence of steadfastness.

Wait, you will say: What you are describing is merely democracy at work in foreign policy. Democracy is messy, and the popular will changes as conditions change in the world; but that is our system, and no American is willing to sacrifice democracy to continuity in policy, even if you dress it up with a fancy name like "steadfastness." What you are suggesting is authoritarianism in foreign policy, and we won't have it.

In reply, three points. First, there was a degree of unity in post-war American policy—a feeling of purpose, a continuing direction—which seems lacking today. Many things have of course changed: bipartisanship has lost its hold, the presidency has lost some authority, Congress is both more powerful and less cohesive, Vietnam has deprived us of some instruments of policy we had before, and so on. But the fact remains: in the eyes of the world, we do not have the unified, steadfast policy we once had.

Second: The Soviet Union is now a most challenging adversary. Our superb response to Stalin after World War II was impressive, but a hugely more powerful USSR demands a hugely more impressive—and steadfast—response today. We cannot opt out, or go isolationist, or leave it to others (although we must have their help), or—as some definers of détente hopefully wished—rise above power politics. We are in an adversary situation with the Russians around the world, and nothing can take the responsibility from us of meeting this challenge. The challenge to diplomacy is especially weighty, because the resort to war would be the loss of the entire matter. We must reduce tensions, but we must meet the Soviet challenge. And we cannot do it alone—successful alliance diplomacy, with increasingly independent allies, is a condition of success overall.

Third: From the Vietnam experience we have developed an adversary attitude to foreign policy which is hurting us, which we cannot afford. If you look at the other major nations of the world, past or present, you will conclude, I believe, that successful foreign policies were not conducted under adversary conditions, with half a nation tearing down what the other was building up. Differences, debates, occasional national changes of course, yes; democracy, yes; but national disunity, no. The highly successful British foreign policy of the nineteenth century included...
THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE—200 YEARS OLD AND LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

Over 20,000 men and women registered to take the entrance examination December 6 to become Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service Information officers. Two hundred fifty of them will survive the written, oral, physical and security examination process. The Foreign Service of the United States thereby begins its third century with renewed promise that it will continue to attract the very best from a broad range of American society.

Who are the People of the Foreign Service?

The latest top 1% selected from among America's most highly educated population will join 11,000 of their colleagues in a common profession whose basis is willingness to serve our nation anywhere in the world whenever they are called. The members of the Service who share this commitment include secretaries and communications specialists, economic development officers and couriers, commercial and agricultural experts, security officers, and consular and administrative specialists. They include increasing numbers of women and minorities who are being selected through renewed emphasis on the regular examination procedures. They represent not just the Department of State but also the Agency for International Development, Foreign Commercial Service, United States International Communication Agency and the Foreign Agricultural Service. They are the heroic hostages in Iran and the core staff at US missions facing danger in Central America, Africa and the Middle East, as well as hardships, family disruption and health hazards throughout the world.

They are the officers receiving the annual awards from the American Foreign Service Association in recognition of extraordinary accomplishments—Trusten Frank Cridge for his outstanding performance as deputy chief of mission while Ambassador Diego Ascencio was held hostage in Colombia; Ray Caldwell for his development of extensive political contacts for the American embassy in Spain; Geraldine Chester for her role in the negotiation and implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty.

Their numbers are small—not having grown at all during the last thirty years when the rest of the federal bureaucracy and our international commitments were burgeoning. Their rigorous selection, extensive training and worldwide experience constitute a national resource which is essential if the US is to retain its world leadership role for the remainder of this century and into the next.

Need for an Effective Foreign Service

Implementing the national consensus to strengthen our national security begins with the Foreign Service—our first line of defense. The Service advises the president and the secretary about where and how our national power can be applied to advance national interests and provides the bulk of the information which, along with covert intelligence, provides our national leader with advance or current knowledge about threats to national security. It also enhances our national security indirectly by, for example, providing foreign governments and people with information to encourage their support of US policy or by assuring that scarce US bilateral economic assistance is used in ways which will best satisfy basic human needs, thereby diffusing potential conflicts with the world’s have-nots.

Never has the need for an effective Foreign Service been greater. Explosive situations in Poland, Iraq-Iran, and El Salvador are current examples of the need for skilled and professional diplomacy. In the longer run, Global 2000, describes population and resource pressures which are going to require even more skillful pilots to steer us through troubled international waters.

Obstacles to Meeting the Challenge

Effective utilization of the people of the Foreign Service will require increases in the resources our nation devotes to this vital component of its national security. The number of career professionals dealing with the core requirements of modern diplomacy is grossly inadequate to the task. There has been a dangerous decline in the quantity of officers doing economic and political reporting and analysis abroad. Staffing has not begun to keep pace with the expanding requirements for protecting American citizens abroad and administering US immigration law. Training in the sophisticated skills required in today’s complex world has been static despite congressional admonitions to get on with the task. Utilization of modern computer and communications technology has fallen as much as 20 years behind the state of the art as modernization projects are deferred year after year. Our ambassadors’ vital links to their homelands are severed by the lack of travel funds while other professionals are frozen in Washington, not able to be deployed where their skills are most needed. Meanwhile, allowances authorized by Congress to compensate in part for the difficulties of world-wide availability and to make the most difficult posts more attractive remain unfunded. The lowest paid foreign service employees and the most senior continue to receive totally inadequate incentives to dedicated international service. No wonder that, when surveyed by the American Foreign Service Association in mid-1980, 48% of the Service indicated that they were seriously considering leaving it. For the US government to attract its brightest citizens to service and then fail to retain them through lack of professional and material incentives is to squander a national resource.

A New Foreign Service Act and a New Administration

Fortunately steps are underway to reverse this trend. Recognition of the problem began under Secretary Kissinger. Secretary Vance and Under Secretary Read moved boldly to rectify many of the defects of the Foreign Service personnel structure in proposing a new Foreign Service Act. Secretary Muskie, with strong support from Senators Pell and Percy, and Representatives Fasceill, Schroeder, Leach and Buchanan, and from the Foreign Service Association, saw it through to successful conclusion. Responsibility for implementing the new legislation, effective February 15, 1981, will fall to the new administration and to the ongoing efforts of the Service itself.

Hopefully, the Carter administration will exit providing a strong institutional base for the conduct of our international relations by including in the budget which it is about to present to Congress adequate funds for the tasks ahead. The Office of Management and Budget’s recent record with regard to foreign affairs, however, is a dismal one. The first task of the new administration could well be that of rescuing its foreign affairs apparatus from being crippled at the hands of the overeager budgeteers of the outgoing administration.
"As in other walks of life, and as in other professions, a man is ultimately judged, not by his brilliance, but by his rectitude."—Harold Nicolson

THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATS

CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

Diplomacy stands at a crossroads in the turbulent '80s and with it the future of the career service. No one questions the need for a corps of trained foreign service professionals to represent the nation overseas, or the role of the State Department as the formal vehicle for conducting foreign relations, but in practice the department's leadership role in foreign affairs within the government is increasingly subject to challenge. Not only has there been a shift in bureaucratic power from the State Department to the National Security Council, but in many eyes the department is viewed as merely a bureaucratic mechanism to formalize policies and implement decisions arrived at through other channels.

Fifty years ago, in the aftermath of the world war that shattered the old order in Europe, Sir Harold Nicolson sought to identify the reasons for the inability of diplomacy to solve the pressing problems of the post-war era. He set down his answer in a small book entitled Diplomacy, subsequently updated in his Chichele Lectures at Oxford in 1953, which called for a return to the traditional methods of the old diplomacy, which he defined as the "conduit of relations between civilized states." With impeccable literary grace—and remarkable selectivity of historical example—he traced the evolution of the diplomatic method from its origins in the Greek city states, through Byzantium, Venice and 18th century France, to its apotheosis in Edwardian Europe. He concluded his analysis by scathingly enumerating the anarchical and barbaric forces that were threatening to destroy it.

In Nicolson's idealized picture the old diplomacy, grounded in the European system of nation-states, was the outgrowth of a natural hierarchy of power, in which larger states assumed responsibility for the conduct of smaller states, and diplomatic intercourse was entrusted to a corps of professionals who insured that relations were conducted according to principles of "courtesy, confidence and discretion." Nicolson seems to equate the diplomatic method almost exclusively with negotiation, though not in the operational sense we think of today; he saw it as a continuous, confidential and discreet process of adjusting relationships and differences between sovereigns. He says nothing about other aspects of diplomatic representation—military, commercial, public information. The reporting function is taken for granted.

Nicolson saw the primary threat to traditional diplomacy as originating not so much from the break-up of colonial empires or dramatic advances in transportation and communication, disruptive as these were to the civilized tenor and measured pace of diplomatic intercourse, as from the rise of popular democracy and the application to the conduct of external affairs of the "ideas and practices which in the conduct of internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the essentials of liberal democracy." In brief, like his later American counterpart, George Kennan, Nicolson bewailed the intrusion of domestic factors into the conduct of foreign relations.

Today, Nicolson's historical perspective seems almost ludicrously culture-bound and his standards of international behavior unbelievably artificial. (Can the term "responsibility" be seriously applied to the three partitions of Poland? to the rape of the Danish duchies by Prussia? to the repeated invasions of Italy by France? to the suppression of the Hungarian rising by Russia?) Profoundly disturbed by the impact of messianic Wilsonian idealism on the peace negotiations of 1919, and the rejection of the Versailles treaty by the Senate, Nicolson viewed the diplomatic method as one of the last enclaves of civilization—an extension of the upper-class norms of Edwardian Europe, whose stratified class distinctions and traditions of civility he unconsciously extrapolated to the international arena. In order to nail down the indispensability of his class and educational tradition to diplomacy, he rather artfully narrowed the definition of the diplomatic function to exclude such difficult and inconvenient areas as the economics and technology that had already transformed European society and were rapidly revolutionizing warfare.

Dismayed by the League of Nations—and even more by the United Nations—Nicolson regarded their proceedings not as part of the "negotiating" (i.e., diplomatic) process but as "exercises in forensic propaganda." Appalled by the "diplomacy by insult or diplomacy by loudspeaker"
which first made an appearance in the era of the fascist dictators, he equally rejected the intrusions of popularly-elected politicians, especially American ones.

Nicolson’s analysis (if it can be flattered by such an appellation) is useful today for his advocacy of certain timeless virtues in the conduct of relations between states—reliability, truthfulness, discretion, firmness, and consistency. Where his analysis failed fifty years ago—and where similar attempts fail today—is in its incomplete comprehension of the underlying idiom of history and human development, of which relations between governments and modalities of international intercourse can only be a reflection. Today the forces destructive of the old diplomacy that were operative in the 20s and 30s have been intensified and multiplied many times over. A return to the past is impossible.

The crisis confronting diplomacy in the 1980s can only be understood as part of the much larger crisis confronting the nation-state. Despite all the frenzied manifestations of nationalism and the proliferation of new nations, the basic reality to the latter part of the 20th century is that “One World” is rapidly becoming a fact. The steady and inexorable shrinkage of the planet to the dimensions of a global village, combined with quantum leaps in the advance of technology and the social and economic development of hitherto backward regions is daily making the nation-state more obsolete at every level of international intercourse. As this process accelerates, the traditional modalities and instrumentalities have become too narrow and stereotyped to accommodate the traffic.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, here are some of the factors that are rapidly changing the shape of diplomacy:

1) The Revolution in Communications and Transportation
This is not merely a question of the extension overseas of the long arm of the executive branch, thereby reducing the importance of ambassadors and diplomatic missions. Of far greater impact are the multi-level channels of communications and transportation that now bind societies together, and saturate them with information on every facet of political, economic and social life. The proliferation of news and information media—ranging from scholarly and technical journals at one end of the spectrum to radio and television at the other—has created so many information outlets that no significant development can be kept in isolation and analyzed for long.

In addition, the breadth of media coverage now dwarfs official coverage to the point of making the latter hopelessly narrow, no matter how much deeper its penetration. Mass communication also unleashes governmental propaganda, directed at a nation’s own citizens, neighboring countries, and the rest of the world, on an unparalleled scale. Air transportation has compressed the time frame of international intercourse and made isolation of criminal activities inside national boundaries impossible.

2) Extension of the Role of Government
In every nation today, whether socialist or nominally free, the role of government in regulating the social and economic welfare of its citizens has projected the state into every level of commercial and financial life. In the United States, a governmental interest is present in a whole range of transactions untouched by government thirty years ago. This has generated corresponding pressures on government from the business, labor and societal sectors affected. Government has everywhere extended its control over society and the person to the point where even in free societies the citizen has little redress except at election time. The effect on foreign relations is to expand government’s constitutional mandate to intervene in transactions and activities extending overseas.

3) Advanced Technology
The transformation of warfare—by science and technology has not only created a “balance of terror” in nuclear armaments, but made the technology factor a crucial element in military readiness and comparative military strength. It is also transforming industry all over the world, on the one hand increasing productivity, on the other increasing energy consumption and vulnerability to economic and military disruption. The march of technology introduces an element of perpetual change into society, strongly accentuating the interdependence factor, discussed below.

4) Global Interdependence
The voracity of advanced industrial societies for fuel and raw materials has made national self-sufficiency a thing of the past. The economies of advanced industrial societies like the United States, Japan and Western Europe have become vulnerable. But dependence on foreign energy sources is only one aspect of the interdependence of advanced industrial societies on each other and the Third World. For nearly all countries, exports provide the foreign exchange to pay for food, fuel and other imports on which the standard of living, and in a few cases like Britain and Japan, the physical survival of the population, depends. Economic self-sufficiency is almost everywhere an idle dream, except at the price of return to a subsistence economy and a medieval way of life. Environmental effects are also global in character, inextricably linked in such matters as toxic discharges and oil spills to the economic life of industrial societies. Moreover, multi-level relationships between nations now continue through periods of extreme political hostility and even war.

5) Egalitarianism—Mass Education
A rising level of general education and social equality has become both a precondition and inevitable consequence of technological progress and economic development. As mass education takes hold there is no way of containing popular participation in the governing process, however crude or indirect. There is no longer any way of containing ideas—and ideologies. Even the most repressive governments pay involuntary tribute to popular sentiment by feeling the need to justify their policies. Egalitarianism is replacing stratification by class whether or not accompanied by political freedoms.

6) Acceleration of Change
Every nation, whether advanced or less developed, now stands on a moving walkway from which it falls off at its peril. Economic development is the name of the game in the Third World, and technological progress in the advanced industrial countries. Together with mass education they stimulate societal change and fuel rising expectations. Constant political and economic adjustment becomes necessary to make society work, introducing a component of instability into foreign relations, as well.

The convergence of these factors produces effects that make obsolete the conduct of foreign relations as a
distinct and separate field of political activity. Internal and external affairs are now inextricably mixed up. Overseas developments frequently dictate popular responses at variance with foreign policy goals or commitments; these translate into internal political imperatives that cannot help but interfere with the steady pursuit of foreign policy goals.

The points of impact where overseas developments strike the domestic economy and social structure have now multiplied to the point where it has become virtually impossible for an administration to consistently pursue foreign policy goals without being subject to pressure from special interest groups, usually applied through Congress.

"The Departments of Justice and Treasury regularly conduct business with counterpart ministries overseas without going through diplomatic channels."

There is, of course, nothing new in the role that special interest pressures play in the formation of foreign policy—witness the effects of tariff policy and racial discrimination on US relations with Japan during the '20s; of the China lobby on US relations in East Asia during the '50s. What is different today is the degree to which the breakdown of a native American ethos has lowered resistance to ethnic, racial and special interest particularity. This trend has been so encouraged by governmental demagoguery that decision-making, even in fields that are regarded by foreign governments as reserved on sovereignty, has been the breakdown of European hegemony and the challenge to the consensual methods of the old diplomacy posed in international forums by the socialist bloc and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World. As a result, the American style of international agreement, based on a contractual model that aims at covering every conceivable contingency, is gradually replacing the traditional European-style treaty and the more radical regimes of the Third World.
instrument of regulation.
Within the United States the complexity of the subject matter of diplomacy has opened the way to formation of a new foreign policy elite of full-time specialists in defense and foreign affairs matters, centered in foundations, universities and think tanks. Special interest pressures exerted through Congress and other public channels by business, labor or farm groups at least reflect legitimate economic and societal interests that in any event would have to find expression through the political process. Their objectives are tangible and their methods plainly visible. Much more elusive are the goals and methods of the new elite, which has replaced the traditional establishment of bankers, politicians and lawyers. Its members employ words and ideas as weapons, gauge success and failure by the influence they exert over the political leadership, and camouflage a remorseless quest for power and riches under a protective mantle of selfless scholarship.

The creation of an outside community of academic specialists capable of infiltrating the bureaucracy and imposing its ideas on experienced military and civilian leaders is unique to the United States. Orginally confined to areas of science, technology and advanced engineering, where expert advice could only be obtained from outside the government, the thirst for ostensibly objective scientific opinion has now spread to areas of foreign relations formerly reserved to the diplomatic practitioners. No other country would permit the career ranks of its government to be infiltrated by theoreticians with free license to impose their ideas on foreign policy and no accountability for the success or failure of their advice except to the politician who for a brief period gives them employment.

Unlike the old establishment, with deep roots in society and no personal advantage to be gained from public service other than enhanced standing in the community, the new elite is dominated by ambitious intellectuals whose entire life is wrapped up in their professional achievements, and whose ambitions—social and financial, as well as academic—depend on the influence they can exert on the decision-making process. Secure in tenured positions, with no obligation to actually educate, its more influential members are given facilities, research assistance, and travel opportunities on a scale impossible for business and professional men in other fields to match. Battening on government or industry grants, they have the mobility to shuttle from outside consultancies to inside policy jobs in a way denied to professionals locked into corporations and law firms by business commitments, retirement plans and shareholdings. Their continued access to colleagues in power is assured by the community’s operation as both personnel recruiting ground and source of future employment.

“In the US, these choices have been sharpened by the emergence of the new intellectual elite, ready and eager to fill any vacuums created by the incapacity of the career services.”

The ascent to power of this new elite has a conspiratorial side inimical to good government. The financing of some of its leaders has been concealed from public view and is on a scale that leaves them in some degree captive to the policy biases of their patrons. The links between Kissinger, the Rockefeller interests and the late shah certainly distorted US policy toward Iran. The Trilateral Commission, while certainly not a conspiracy in the crude sense portrayed by the right-wing fringe, was nevertheless converted into an instrumentality advancing the political fortunes of Governor Jimmy Carter at an early stage of his presidential candidacy—with the predictable result that after Carter was elected to office key national security jobs were given to the commission’s directorate, headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in effect dictated his options in accordance with their own predilections and those of their sponsors. The creative talents of the more gifted members of the new elite should not blind the public to the fact that they have imported values into government that are alien to the American tradition in both the figurative and literal sense. Their addiction to grand designs and resounding formulations, coupled with Old World affinities and hatreds brought over in their baggage, has severely damaged the American reputation for pragmatism, candor and moral principle. Their public pronouncements sometimes betray a shocking ignorance of the Constitution and separation of powers. Their personal traits, ranging from paranoia and deviousness to loose-lipped braggadocio, have repeatedly poisoned the climate of confidence so essential to a healthy relationship between colleagues and allies. As a result, honest reporting and the frank interchange of conflicting viewpoints have been made extremely hazardous for senior officials with careers at stake.

These strands come together in the phenomenal growth of the NSC, headed by the president’s national security adviser, at the expense of the secretary and Department of State. The interrelationship between foreign and domestic affairs, often invoked by apologists to justify this trend, is not the determinative factor—that connection is divisible by the very nature of government and, until recently, was never permitted to diminish the supremacy of the secretary in his own sphere. The intractable new development is the encroachment of powerful departments and agencies with legitimate interests and independent statutory missions in the foreign affairs field that give them a degree of operational autonomy impossible for the department to control. The need for a coordinating mechanism to weigh the diverse interests and present balanced policy options to the president is obvious. Repeated efforts to endow the secretary of state with enough authority to exercise a coordinating role have run into a wall of departmental and congressional resistance. The rise of the NSC has been the inevitable result.

What do these lessons portend for the future? Can diplomacy survive the welter of conflicting forces that threaten to swamp it? Will the career services disintegrate into an aggregation of specialists bound together at the top by the small minority of managerial generalists who have managed to rise above the specialties that gave them a head start in the first place?

Before getting down to specifics, an analogy to the British legal system may be in order. Just as the career diplomatic service of every nation seeks to maintain a monopoly on the conduct of foreign relations...
with other governments, so has the elite corps of barristers sought to remain the exclusive channel for litigating disputes between private parties in the British courts. That system is now in a continual state of crisis. As the subject matter of commercial and financial disputes has grown in size and complexity, the necessity of prosecuting a claim in the courts through an intermediary totally unversed in the technical intricacies of the subject matter has confronted the system with a dilemma. Either the issues must be broadened to allow a wide range of economic and sociological data to be introduced as evidence, or the issues must be narrowed and refined until they turn on a few critical questions of law and fact capable of being addressed by a classically-trained barrister and adjudicated by a classically-trained judge (there are no judges in British civil cases). The United States has taken the former route—the only feasible way of rendering justice in anti-trust cases and regulatory proceedings.

The British have taken the other route, squeezing out substance until they reach an authentic legal question at the core. The price, however, has been judicial restraint that amounts to retreat from the burning social and economic issues of British life.

Diplomacy faces a similar predicament. Unless its institutions and practitioners can master the complex transactions making up the network of transnational relationships, they cannot hope to deal with the disputes that these transactions generate. Once again, the options are contraction to preserve institutional integrity versus diversification to achieve broader horizons. In the United States these choices have been sharpened by the emergence of the new foreign policy elite, ready and eager to fill any vacuums created by the incapacity of the career services.

The nation's political leadership desperately needs credible answers to the complex problems that crowd in upon it from overseas. It cannot be expected to limit itself to the thin gruel served up by the bureaucracy when richer fare is constantly being offered up by the academic community. What follows are a few of the ingredients, not necessarily in order of priority, that might be incorporated into a crash diet to bring US diplomacy—and its practitioners—up to speed for the '80s.

**Specialization, Graduate Education:**

Broader and more intensive language training, especially in "hard" languages, should be made a pre-requisite not only for advancement but for senior posts in the field. If training cannot be completed before arrival at a post, it should be continued thereafter until an acceptable level of proficiency is attained. It is disgraceful and ridiculous that at the time of the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran there were only a few qualified Farsi-speakers in a mission with over twenty substantive officers. Language proficiency should also be made a precondition for promotion to become effective—i.e., without changing actual promotion standards or procedures, no officer should be confirmed in his higher grade until he passes tests in his language specialties at the same level of proficiency as before.

Second, the department should broaden its personnel base by selectively recruiting at slightly higher grades people with advanced degrees in law, business administration, engineering and the sciences—rather like the navy system of recruiting doctors, civil engineers and lawyers. These specialists would be primarily assigned to bureaus like ACDA, OES and economic affairs, or to overseas posts like the international energy agency and NATO, until they gradually become integrated into mainstream economic and political work. To the objection that such specialties are really applicable only to a few advisory positions at middle level, the answer is that the insights that specialists bring to complex matters will be useful to the department at every stage of their careers.

Third, the department should in time develop graduate training programs right through the Ph.D. degree. Assignments to universities should be made as a matter of routine in exactly the same proportion for the civilian career services as the ratio of advanced degree candidates bears to serving officers in the military—and justified to Congress (if the question arises) on the same basis. Apart from the obvious benefits to both the department and the officers concerned, this program would help build up links with the foreign policy community.

Beyond this, the Foreign Service Institute should be drastically upgraded, both in the demands made on students and the quality of curriculum and faculty. If there is no other way to infuse it with academic rigor it should be moved under the wing of one of the local universities. The director should be a respected academic, not a tired, hard-shell bureaucrat waiting for retirement. Officers should not be assigned to the institute as a way-station or rest-cure but should apply on the basis of their intellectual capabilities and capacity to do advanced research and writing of a standard up to publication in scholarly journals. The State Department should exert unremitting pressure on the Defense Department to reform the National War College in the same way.

To the objection that ambassadors and senior level career officers should be judged by other than academic standards, the answer is that advanced professional education is by definition academic. It should be of as high a quality as can reasonably be obtained in a government setting, and officers unable to meet these standards should be advised not to apply; there will always be other routes to the top.

**A Broader Definition of the Diplomatic Calling:**

If the State Department wants to assume primacy over the full range of official relationships binding the United States to other nations, its personnel will need to concentrate on non-governmental levels of host country societies to a greater extent than has hitherto been regarded as part of the diplomatic function. It would be a mistake to interpret this as a call for greater contact with the political opposition or dissident groups, important though this may be in special situations. Of much greater long range benefit—especially for a civil servant looking down from his secure perch of diplomatic privilege and economic security—is to develop sympathetic understanding of the societal forces at work in the host country and the motivations of its citizens. This can only be done by broadening the personal contacts of mission personnel to include youth, labor, intellectual and clerical circles at one end of the spectrum, and private financial, business and celebrity circles at the other. Investment patterns and currency transactions are especially

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important—when local industrialists start to liquidate their domestic holdings in favor of Texas pipeline stocks, and generals’ mistresses start to gossip contemptuously about the dictator’s wife, it may be a hint that the mandate of heaven is about to be withdrawn.

There is scarcely a society in the world where indicators of impending change are not visible in every corner—provided an embassy officer speaks the local language, keeps himself open to unofficial contacts, and spends some of his time with intelligent citizens instead of his bureaucratic counterparts. Indeed, the danger for an American diplomat lies more in being embarrassed by a profusion of sycophantic or self-seeking “friends,” pathetically pouring out every shred of rumor or hearsay that will enhance their importance, than in finding no one to talk to.

Another weakness that needs to be corrected is the narrow and formalistic view of their functions taken by some of the less flexible types in the Foreign Service, especially those over-impressed by the symbolic image of the diplomat. The author of this article was a principal negotiator in a multinational exercise to set up a quasi-public international organization in a central European country. The organization in question had been endorsed by three presidents and was viewed by the Soviet Union as so important that the deputy chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology—who was also Premier Kosygin’s son-in-law—had been assigned to the organization as chairman of the board on a virtually full-time basis. Throughout the final phase of negotiations with the host country, which was desperately eager to see the organization located there rather than in a neighboring competitor, the senior members of the US country team barely took the trouble to acquaint themselves with either the project or its international implications, let alone to be of substantive assistance. Strictly speaking, it lay outside the province of their country-to-country mandate, and the negotiations involved an intimidating amount of technical detail. But the real reason for their indifference was that the project did not raise political problems with the host country—and therefore merited only low level administrative support.

Operational Links with other Departments:

At the Washington end, two innovations are needed:

There should be a concerted effort to generate legislation and presidential directives giving the department primacy in policy-making and leadership in policy-implementation.

In addition, the department needs to inject itself operationally into other official channels of US foreign relations in order to obtain a grasp of the total picture. The assignment of Foreign Service officers on detail to other departments and agencies has been of some help in this regard, but only when the assignment has been to a position affording a full view of the agency’s foreign activities. This falls short of keeping a finger on the decision-making pulse, so that the department can exert timely influence on policy formulation.

As a first step the department ought to make a thorough survey of the statutory mandates of other departments and agencies of the executive branch, as well as those of the principal regulatory commissions, to determine the scope of their international responsibilities, especially in such critical fields as defense, energy, finance, and uses of the oceans. Thereafter it should negotiate formal liaison arrangements with these governmental bodies so that without interfering with their operational responsibilities the department can keep itself informed, and exercise guidance, with respect to activities that impinge on US foreign relations. This should not be allowed to turn into a sterile exercise in bureaucratic coordination—the inevitable sequel of an attempt to cover the full spectrum of agency international activities. The approach should be highly selective and discriminating—aimed at insuring that departmental responsibilities in the rest of the government are exercised with due regard for the more sensitive aspects of US foreign policy.

Operating in a Goldfish Bowl:

Sooner or later the department is going to have to tighten its rules on public disclosure or risk having its hand forced at every turn of the diplomatic wheel. Foreign governments have now become quite expert at manipulating the media; and the media are now locked into a competitive cycle that makes them willing collaborators. Absent official authorization, the standard reply of the working level to all requests for information from the press should be “no comment,” and referral of the questioner to the department’s spokesman. The “anonymous official source” label should be especially avoided: it has been thoroughly abused by the press in the form of unfounded inventions.

Even the most inflexible traditionalist now understands that policies and negotiating positions must be formulated with unexpected exposure in mind. Sooner or later, the proliferation of leakage points and the compulsion of even the most authoritarian government to show achievement, or at least purposeful activity, makes disclosure inevitable. Less understood is that the currency of private undertakings and corridor assurances on which diplomats set such store is now of such transient and uncertain value as to be almost worthless. Statements on the public record, no matter howopaque or misleading, provide the only firm basis from which to derive the intentions of other governments and frame the policies of one’s own.”

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If any conclusion is possible, a prediction can be made that the diplomat of the future is doomed to perform his functions in precisely the atmosphere that Harold Nicolson so justly abhorred. The profession has become both impossibly demanding and physically dangerous; the amenities and privileges to diplomatic life greatly attenuated. The consolation is that no other profession provides such a ringside seat to history in the making—and a chance to make history oneself.
The worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers; the best kind are the reasonable and humane skeptics."—Nicolson

Who Should Be an American Ambassador?

MARTIN F. HERZ

The question is not, and has never been, whether professionals or nonprofessionals ("political appointees") should be ambassadors. It is, rather, how one chooses or finds or trains the best people to become ambassadors.

"The best people?" Is there some undertone of elitism in that question? Yes and no. If it is elitism to want the best possible surgeon to operate, to want the fastest-running and highest-jumping athlete to compete, to have the best-trained and temperamentally best-suited man or woman as an astronaut, then it is elitism also to want the best man or woman available to represent the United States abroad. But of course it is not elitism in the snobbish sense that is sometimes imputed to that word. It is, rather, a rational recognition that difficult and responsible tasks should be performed by the most highly qualified people.

Certainly the United States—indeed, any country with important interests abroad—requires high quality in its foreign representation. It is only good common sense to want the most vigorously selected, best trained and most highly skilled people to man that first line of defense. But high quality is not a monopoly of Foreign Service professionals.

Also, it is understood nowadays that there are no "unimportant" posts to which one can assign unqualified or poorly qualified ambassadors. As I shall demonstrate, there is plenty of damage that an unqualified man or woman can do in such a post—and in today's world there is no guarantee that an American embassy in a quiet, out-of-the-way country may not suddenly become the focal point of American interests, perhaps in a wider regional context, which requires expert work of the highest professional quality.

What, then, do we mean by professionalism? Selection, training, experience, plus character and technical skills. If I distinguish between "skills," which are highly important, and the factor of "experience" (which of course helps to develop and sharpen skills), it is because the job of an ambassador requires skills of several kinds, only some of which are transferable from other professions or can be learned rather quickly; and all of them are not always found in one individual. In recent years the managerial aspect of running a large embassy has become so important that executive experience, for instance, the running of a large university, has come to be regarded as a qualification for running an embassy. Managerial skills are certainly more readily transferable than diplomatic skills.

This aspect of the question comes down to the one that has agitated also the medical profession (which I choose for parallels that could be cited with many other professions): Should a doctor or a managerial expert be in charge of a hospital? There are good arguments on both sides, but there is no argument whether a hospital administrator or a surgeon is better qualified to perform major surgery. In diplomacy, the manager of a diplomatic mission is also the surgeon who must "operate" in his conversations with the foreign minister and other elements of the power structure of the country to which he or she is accredited. He must make difficult diagnoses, and sometimes must prescribe (or recommend) risky therapy.

We have said that the managerial functions can be more easily delegated than the diplomatic ones. To come down to specifics: To appoint the governor of a Middle Western state to become United States ambassador to Mexico—a man who did not speak Spanish and had no background in foreign policy in general or Latin America in particular—would be about the same as to expect the governor of a South African province to perform, in the Groote Schuur hospital in Capetown, the heart transplant surgery that was previously performed there by Dr. Christian Barnard. With the difference that the nonprofessional diplomat has at his side a team that covers up for his mistakes and prevents as many as possible; whereas the unfortunate effects of bungled open-heart surgery are more quickly apparent. But it would be appropriate to make a governor who is a good executive the director of a hospital—on the understanding, of course, that he would leave the medical work to doctors.

What is it that makes a good diplomat, and thus a good ambassador, in addition to the factors that were enumerated above? The kind of empathy which comes from years spent in cross-cultural communication.

Martin F. Herz, Director of Studies of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, is a retired Foreign Service officer and former ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Among other posts he has held were political officer in Austria, France, Cambodia and Japan; political counselor in Iran; minister-counselor for political affairs in South Vietnam; and deputy assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs.
Diagnosticians who use all the apparatus of tests and examinations but make their most important decisions by intuition.

A gynecologist, for instance, has a patient who is brought to the hospital because of a suspicion of ectopic pregnancy, a potentially deadly complication. All the customary tests are made, and they are negative. The old professor and chief of the department, i.e., the old professional, says, “I think, nevertheless, that here is an ectopic pregnancy. Take her to the operating room, we’ll open her up.” Which is done, and the patient turns out to have an ectopic pregnancy, notwithstanding the negative indications given by the tests.

The old professor is asked how he knew. He doesn’t know himself. But he has over the years seen tens of thousands of pregnancy women, including large numbers whose pregnancies were ectopic. He could “smell” the symptomatology, including elements that were not tested but which probably had been present in previous cases that he had seen. Experience paid, and a life was saved.

The same very often holds in the field of diplomacy. The thing that is not present in the equation is noticed by someone who has learned to notice also what is not there; the inflection of the foreign minister in saying something signals an opening to the experienced professional which is missed by the amateur.

The right tone, the right inflection of the foreign minister in making an announcement (as did the fact that the US was an ally of the USSR at that time), or the offhand remark of a sub-cabinet officer. He thus was no neophyte in foreign affairs. He went on to become the only American to have headed our three most important missions in the West (London, Bonn and Paris) plus Peking, NATO, and a highly responsible negotiating assignment. He had ready access to the top, knew how to operate the system, and possessed a personality that radiated the best of American culture. He was a man of the world in the best sense of that term. We don’t have enough of this kind, and we can never have enough of them in ambassadorial positions.

Douglas Dillon seemed a mistake when he was appointed ambassador to France. He didn’t even speak the language. (His father had originally been taught for the post.) His main qualification seemed to be that his family owned a famous vineyard in the Bordeaux area. But he surprised us by being an extraordinarily quick study, displaying empathy that was equal to that of many professionals, and making decisions and recommendations that could not have been surer and wiser. He went on to become undersecretary of state and secretary of the treasury. He learned on the job, deferred to experts as long as he felt insecure, and when the first crisis came displayed excellent judgment. I would consider him to be an exception because he lacked relevant background and experience even in a related field. (A more recent exception of the same kind may be Geri Joseph, our current ambassador to the Netherlands, who seems to have a natural aptitude for diplomacy in spite of, not because of, her background in journalism.)

Exceptions of that kind should make us humble about generalizing.

Ellsworth Bunker is a different case. He was chosen to be ambassador to Argentina at the age of 57, and went on to become one of our most experienced ambassadors, serving also in Rome, New Delhi, in Washington as ambassador to the OAS, then in Saigon for six grueling years, until at 79 he undertook one of the most difficult and demanding negotiating assignments in helping
to bring the Panama Canal treaty to completion. I am devoted to him and believe he will not take it amiss when I remark that in his first diplomatic post, where he is credited with "masterful inactivity," he was probably less qualified than would have been a professional and also less qualified than he was in later posts. We can learn something from his case: When someone is superbly gifted in the field of diplomacy, his best accomplishments are apt to come after the customary age of retirement. I would put Bunker at 80 up against any professional aged 50. At 80, in fact, he had higher high-level diplomatic experience than any American professional has ever had at age 50 or even age 60. In his case, too, we can thus say that "experience pays."

Among more recent appointments, who could cavil at the nomination of Senator Michael J. Mansfield to the post of ambassador to Japan where by all accounts he has turned in a superior performance? It may be that a professional like Marshall Green could have done as well; certainly he knows more about Japan—but Mansfield knows more about Washington and he has had 24 years of experience in following Far Eastern affairs from Capitol Hill. (The only irony of his appointment is that Green was retired at 63 whereas Mansfield, his cumulative experience standing him in good stead, became ambassador at the age of 74.) Similarly, though not on the same level, the appointments of Kingman Brewster to London and Robert F. Goheen to New Delhi, each from positions of university president, were distinguished ones: Brewster seems to have worked out well, whereas Goheen was something of a disappointment; but no one can say that either of these men lacked stature or was appointed in return for money or as some other kind of payoff.

Now the Bad News

Ambassadorships have also, alas, gone to people who not only lacked any visible qualifications for the job but were clearly awarded the post in return for favors financial, political or both. Let us look first at appointments of the '30s and '40s: The millionaire Joseph P. Kennedy, pro-German and isolationist, was American ambassador to Great Britain at a time when that country had to steel itself against Nazi aggression; the amateur William C. Bullitt, enthusiastic for intimate relations with the Soviet Union, first went overboard in favor of the Soviet Union—only to become so disenchanted that later, as ambassador to France and afterwards, he could see Russia only as an eternal enemy. "General" Patrick J. Hurley, an oil lawyer and millionaire, who had been Hoover's secretary of war, was appointed ambassador to China during World War II under circumstances that have been most aptly summarized by Barbara Tuchman as follows:

Hurley was just what [Generalissimo] Chiang had always wanted in an envoy—a man with direct access to the president and no experience of China, who was easy to manipulate through his vanity. When Ambassador Gauss [a career professional] resigned at the time of Stilwell's departure, Chiang was only too pleased to ask for Hurley as successor.

The aftermath involved one of the greatest disasters of American diplomacy (all of which, however, must not be attributed to Hurley). As Tuchman summarized the situation, "Hurley accepted no guidance from his staff. Because he was over his head in the ancient and entangled circumstances which he proposed to settle, he fiercely resented and refused the counsel of anyone more knowledgeable about China than himself. When the coalition blew up in his face and he found Chinese affairs resisting his finesse, depriving him of the diplomatic success he had counted on, he could find an explanation only in a paranoid belief that he was the victim of a plot by disloyal subordinates . . . ."

"If the president of the United States wants to appoint a horse's asterisk (or words to that effect) as ambassador, he is entitled to do so."

Not only did he help to bring about the ruin of a generation of China Hands but he contributed massively to American public misconceptions about China and Chiang Kai-shek which placed a heavy mortgage on American policy in the Far East for decades.

Perhaps the most notorious appointment of an unqualified ambassador in the years immediately after World War II was President Eisenhower's nomination of Maxwell Gluck, proprietor of a chain of ladies' dress shops, as ambassador to Ceylon, now Sri Lanka; but Gluck was not the worst appointment and became notorious only because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a rare departure from its custom, actually inquired—very briefly—into his qualifications. Having written extensively on that appointment [Journal, May 1978] I wish to record here that Gluck was not even the worst ambassador the US has sent to Ceylon; and many another political appointee, questioned as Gluck was questioned by Senator Fulbright, would have been shown up to be equally ignorant and perhaps even more so. Gluck was asked whether there was any connection between his nomination and the fact that he had contributed $30,000 to the political campaign; he squirmed. He was then asked about Ceylon and turned out to know virtually nothing about it. When asked the name of the prime minister of Ceylon he did not know it; and when asked who was the Prime Minister of India (Nehru) he said he knew but couldn't pronounce the name.

In the colloquy in the Foreign Relations Committee that ensued, Senator Fulbright said he had not wanted to embarrass Gluck by asking him to spell Nehru after the nominee had said he was unable to pronounce it, adding: "Anyway, I am not going to make a big fight about it. I am simply saying that—following up on the chairman's [Senator Theodore Francis Green's] letter, I think the department ought to be a little more concerned about sending—especially to India and that area, Ceylon—a man with no qualifications. That ought to be a position there for a professional man. I will grant that sending a man like that to Belgium can't do much harm, because the Belgians know us and can overlook such things. I don't think the Ceylonese or Indians will over-
look a man who is totally unaware of things that are important to our relations with them."

I submit that what Fulbright said to his colleagues after the hearing was much more significant than what transpired between him and the hapless nominee, for it foreshadowed the attitude he took when he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee—that there were some countries where qualified ambassadors were desirable and others where their qualifications didn't matter; and later he extended that tolerant view to one which, according to someone who was closely associated with him, boiled down to saying: If the president of the United States wants to appoint a horse's asterisk (or words to that effect) as ambassador, he is entitled to do so. The dereliction of the SFRC in that respect deserves to be highlighted, for it would not have taken many hearings like that of Gluck to persuade the Eisenhower administration—that it is politically risky to nominate unqualified candidates for ambassadorial positions. "Senatorial courtesy" is another problem, especially when members of the committee are themselves beholden to the nominee.

And the Worse News

While there were shocking appointments by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, undoubtedly the worst record in terms of simony was established by the Nixon administration which literally auctioned off ambassadorships (or "chances" for ambassadorships) according to precise information derived in connection with the Watergate investigation. There would be no purpose in mentioning more than a few cases—they were too numerous. Arthur K. Watson, ambassador to France, contributed $300,000 to the Nixon campaign in 1971 and early 1972 but had also made earlier contributions. He was not one of our most successful ambassadors to France. Vincent De Roulet, son-in-law of the owner of the New York Mets, contributed (together with his father-in-law) some $183,000 before and after becoming ambassador to Jamaica where he did major damage to our relations due, inter alia, to an ill-considered public remark that he had the prime minister in his pocket, which of course led to an overturn in the political situation and other unfavorable consequences. Ruth B. Farkas, the wife of a department store executive, gave $300,000 and became ambassador to Luxembourg, following in the footsteps of such previous unqualified political appointees as Perle Mesta, the Washington hostess sent there by Harry Truman; Wiley Buchanan, the Texas millionaire and art collector sent by Eisenhower; and Kingdon Gould, the Washington parking lot magnate appointed by Nixon. (Luxembourg, by the way, had an excellent idea: It finally let it be known—discretely, of course—that it was fed up with being a dumping ground for unqualified moneybag ambassadors—and as a result got a professional, James G. Lowenstein, who was well familiar with the concerns of that NATO ally.)

The situation had become so smelly that Jimmy Carter, during his 1976 election campaign, vowed that he would put an end to it. In an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times in August, 1976 he said he was interested in "improving the quality of our major diplomatic appointments. I want these to depend firmly on merit. I am not under obligation to anyone, and I don't believe people should be paid off for helping elect a president by getting embassies." On November 9, 1976, after he had been elected, he said: "I plan to appoint diplomatic officials who have superb credentials, strictly on the basis of merit, not reward people for political favors. And that's a commitment that I've made on my word of honor. I'm not going to break it."

Still, it is certainly true that a diplomat, even he nominated, among his first ambassadorial appointments, Mr. Philip H. Alston, Jr., a lawyer from Atlanta, Georgia, to be ambassador to Australia; Governor Patrick J. Lucey of Wisconsin to be ambassador to Mexico; Ms. Anne Cox Chambers, chairman of the board of Atlanta Newspapers and of the Cox Broadcasting System, to be ambassador to Belgium; and Governor John C. West of South Carolina to be ambassador to France, together with his father-in-law) some $300,000 and became ambassador to Luxembourg, following in the footsteps of such previous unqualified political appointees as Perle Mesta, the Washington hostess sent there by Harry Truman; Wiley Buchanan, the Texas millionaire and art collector sent by Eisenhower; and Kingdon Gould, the Washington parking lot magnate appointed by Nixon. (Luxembourg, by the way, had an excellent idea: It finally let it be known—discretely, of course—that it was fed up with being a dumping ground for unqualified moneybag ambassadors—and as a result got a professional, James G. Lowenstein, who was well familiar with the concerns of that NATO ally.)

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And then he nominated, among his first ambassadorial appointments, Mr. Philip H. Alston, Jr., a lawyer from Atlanta, Georgia, to be ambassador to Australia; Governor Patrick J. Lucey of Wisconsin to be ambassador to Mexico; Ms. Anne Cox Chambers, chairman of the board of Atlanta Newspapers and of the Cox Broadcasting System, to be ambassador to Belgium; and Governor John C. West of South Carolina to be ambassador to France, among the then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
potential—it enabled, for one, the president to tell an insistent candidate that he personally would have loved to nominate him but that the board, to his intense regret, had chosen someone else. Also, the board itself, theoretically, could delve into the background and qualifications of nominees and advise the president to desist from sending their names to Capitol Hill (and in some cases this was apparently done). But the composition of the board, which was heavily weighted in favor of politicians, representatives of minorities, and others who knew little or nothing about diplomacy, was disappointing from the beginning, notwithstanding some excellent and well-qualified members in its ranks. The board approved, even recommended, some of the obviously unqualified appointees of the Carter administration such as the Mr. Warner mentioned above, Milton A. Wolf (a construction company president) to Vienna, and the unfortunate Richard Kneip who became ambassador to Singapore and there astounded his staff by such questions as “You mean, there has been a war between India and Pakistan?” and “Did you say there are two separate Koreas? How come?”

What is to be done?

If we don’t want the best, then nothing need be done. But if we do,—the readers of this article and others who are concerned and wish to raise a voice in favor of upgrading the quality of ambassadorial appointments—can take into account some of the following considerations:

1. Give Weight to Experience. Career officers do not have a monopoly on qualifications for ambassadorial positions. However, experience in several Foreign Service posts and positions is more likely to point to such qualifications than experience in other work: Among ten candidates from the career service, the odds are that two or three may turn out to be weak or perhaps even misfits. Among ten non-career candidates, the odds are that the number will be considerably greater, especially if they do not come from fields closely related to foreign affairs. Experience counts—therefore, to the extent that potentially outstanding chiefs of mission can be identified early in their careers, to the extent that they can count on having more than one ambassadorship, the odds on developing out-

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standing ambassadors improve. Bringing along the most brilliant and competent officers to responsible positions in younger years—which is increasingly happening at present—gives the best promise of good results. The same is true, of course, of non-career ambassadors. Only the most outstanding candidates should be considered. Even then, if Thomas J. Watson, Jr., for instance, could have had prior apprenticeships as ambassador to Upper Volta and Bulgaria, he no doubt would have functioned considerably better in his position in Moscow.

2. Consider Character. Nicolson’s dictum about character being the most important ingredient of a successful ambassador is still true. Yes, he also has to be an operator, but there is a distinction between skill in the organization game and cutting corners or buying favors or otherwise engaging in sharp practice. Moral courage is the first requirement of a good ambassador. It is found among both career and non-career candidates—but not as often as one might think. The idea that career people are too often “bucking for promotion” (or incentive pay) whereas non-career ambassadors are past such considerations is poppycock. Non-career ambassadors are sometimes more concerned about their “image” than they should be, and too often want so desperately to “succeed” that they violate Talleyrand’s warning against excessive zeal. Case studies of ambassadorial failures on the job (career as well as non-career) would bring this out with telling conclusiveness.

3. Beware of Vanity. It is the greatest enemy of a good diplomat—and of a bad one, too. Even superb professionals have fallen victim to it, letting a personal slight, for instance, color their judgment of the person who administered it; or failing to report (or reporting inaccurately) developments which cast an unfavorable light on themselves. But vanity is found less often in a disciplined career service than among non-career people some of whom become light-headed when addressed as “excellency” and begin to suspect that they are omniscient. A career officer has learned the benefits of staff work and is more likely to listen to professional advice than a non-career appointee. Some of the most horrible gaffes committed by neophyte ambassadors occurred because of their unwillingness to use their staffs. I would be less than candid, however, if I failed to note that there have also been career officers in ambassadorial positions who lost their moorings, displayed symptoms of hypomania, and began to think of themselves as a combination of Jesus Christ, Talleyrand, and Napoleon. Such men—regardless whether career or non-career—must be swiftly brought down to earth, and home.

4. Beware of Ethnic Appointments. It is a fallacy to believe that appointing an American of Polish extraction (such as former Postmaster General John A. Gronouski) to Poland will flatter the Poles; or that appointing someone of Italian descent (say, John A. Volpe) to Italy will flatter the Italians; or that appointing a black will flatter a black African country; or that appointing an American Hispanic (say, Julian Nava) as ambassador to Mexico will flatter the Mexicans. Whether they are flattered will depend on the qualifications of the appointee (quite aside from the question whether flattery is a good reason for any diplomatic appointment). If a Gronouski turns out not to speak Polish and a Nava turns out to know little about Latin American politics, the host country will be adversely
impressed. The same goes for appointing a general to represent the United States in a country run either by a military dictator or by a political leader with a military background. When President Kennedy sent General James M. Gavin as ambassador to France, for instance, he no doubt thought that de Gaulle, being a general, would appreciate having an American general to talk with—but de Gaulle did not consider himself a general. He had nothing but contempt for "mere" generals, regarding himself to be far more, namely the embodiment of La France. Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, a man who knew European history backwards and forwards, spoke French fluently, and had met most of the European movers and shakers of the last thirty years, was a much more effective representative in France. He was also a more effective ambassador to the Soviet Union than any non-professional could have been at that time. It is true, on the other hand, that a person of stature will run no risk of being overly impressed by persons of high rank; so there is merit in appointing to a major post someone who has rubbed shoulders with important people. Both career and non-career candidates can fill that requirement.

5. Money is no qualification. Should the possession of money (as distinguished from the payment of it) be a qualification for appointment to the large embassies where representational requirements are important? The answer is that the United States is wealthy enough to meet the legitimate expenses of ambassadors—and that it is doing so right now in most cases. The Economist a few years ago, noting that Ambassador Walter Annenberg had said that he spent $250,000 a year of his own money to live in London in the ambassadorial style he considered appropriate, and that he had contributed $1.5 million to refurbish the residence, concluded that "there is no doubt that the job in London is expensive." Writing at that time under a pseudonym, since he was still on active service, the author of the present article suggested in a letter to the editor (printed in The Economist in January, 1973) that

None of the expensive things that Mr. Annenberg did and which you list in your article seemed essential for the functions of an ambassador, unless you regard his giving of expensive gifts and his lavish entertaining as necessary for the conduct of diplomacy with your leadership. I cannot imagine why an American ambassador needs to prove to his guests by the opulence of his table or the number of footmen that the United States is a wealthy country.

Suppose an American ambassador invited only 12 people to a dinner instead of 64—perhaps that would give him more of a chance to talk with his guests; and for the maintenance of Winfield House I suppose that if the government had its choice between an ambassador who is an amateur but who keeps the grounds impeccably, or an experienced professional who allows them to run down a little, perhaps it would not follow your implied advice and would opt for the man of intellectual and professional substance, rather than pecuniary substance.

Meanwhile all this has been proven by the successful tenure of Arthur A. Hartman, a career officer with no private fortune, as ambassador to France. Elliot Richardson, not a career officer but also without a personal fortune, was not daunted by the financial requirements in London. Mike Mansfield, and before him Douglas MacArthur II and Edwin Reischauer, managed in Tokyo without personal reserves expended by Robert Ingersoll. Chip Bohlen in Paris was able to make out, perhaps with some discreet support from the department at a time when the House appropriations subcommittee was still especially niggardly with representation funds. In any case, the burden of proof is now on those who believe that one has to be wealthy to be ambassador in one of the world capitals. If I were given such a position and found it impossible to make ends meet, I would cheerfully cancel the Fourth of July in favor of more small luncheons and dinners—without any impairment of relations.

6. Scrap the Board. The Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Nominations, so promising at first, must be judged a failure. It lacked the qualifications to determine the qualifications of ambassadors, consisting as it did of a large majority of people who never had anything to do with diplomacy (although it did, fortunately, include a few members like Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk, Carol Laise and one or two others who know from first-hand experience what the requirements are). While I have it on good authority that the board managed to serve the president as an alibi for turning aside some "terrible" would-be nominations, enough terrible ones have been certified to discredit the entire enterprise. If or when we have an honest and courageous president it should not be necessary to have a board to protect him against weakness, cowardice, or ignorance. Staffs are supposed to do that. If a president wishes to live up to the Carter statement that he would only appoint people with "superb credentials," "strictly on the basis of merit," he will need a body of a different composition to tell him who they are.

7. Wake Up the Senate. The Senate, and especially its Foreign Relations Committee, has been derelict in not looking into the qualifications of ambassadorial nominees and into undesirable reasons, such as political favors or campaign contributions, that might be behind their nominations. The information is available, in copious detail, that would permit at least a modicum of scrutiny to take place. It is not even necessary for this purpose that the examination of candidates be in great detail. Superficial examination, as the Gluck case and the gaffes of more recent appointees amply demonstrate, would bring out the most glaring lack of qualifications in a number of candidates. This, in turn, might lead to greater circumspection on the part of the White House and the political leadership of the State Department and would make them put the brakes on the kind of scandalous nominations that have been getting by without so much as a question. As indicated, the custom of "senatorial courtesy" is a problem. One way to solve it would be for the SFRC to adopt a rule whereby any of its members who have been recipients of money from a candidate should automatically disqualify themselves from consideration of his nomination.

Support the Chief. Finally, there is a question of the loyalty owed by the deputy chief of mission and the section chiefs and all the rest of an embassy's personnel to the ambassador who is, after all, the personal representative of the president and is entrusted with large responsibilities. This question has been raised in connection, for instance, with the publication by the Foreign Service Journal of a "whistle-blowing" article about the (Continued on page 68)
BREAKOUT

A Plan for Reforming Our Foreign Policy Institutions: Part 1

WILLIAM CLEVEN VEALE

For over three decades the turbulent winds of a changing world have tested the mettle of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The record of those years suggests to many that both institutions are severely wanting. The many studies and recommendations from that period give testament to the wide range of views about what the problem is and what needs to be done to make the department and the Foreign Service more effective instruments for developing and conducting our foreign policy. Well-intended measures for organizational reform and for improved personnel policies have invariably peaked and faded away after a few years, feeding expectations that future measures are doomed to a similar lack of lasting impact. Some even refuse to see serious problems, and remain confident that both institutions will be able to continue “muddling through.”

Not only have the department and the Foreign Service been unable to make proposed solutions to the problems stick, but they also have been unable to define the problem in ways that point to real solutions. Meanwhile, in other quarters of government, alternative solutions are advanced aimed at further whittling down the role of the State Department and absorbing the Foreign Service into the Civil Service. Unless the department and the Foreign Service embark at once on a vigorous and forceful effort to assert a leadership role in solving the problem, those kinds of alternative solutions will ultimately prevail. Indeed, while the Department of State’s influence has been on a long decline since the end of World War II, we have seen in the past four years an accelerating erosion of State’s organizational assets.

Henry Kissinger, as secretary of state, made much of his intention to “institutionalize” his foreign policy, but the task was never completed. The structural and human limitations of the organization he commanded precluded carrying out or sustaining such an ambitious goal. Yet Kissinger was not the first secretary, nor will he be the last, who would want to do so. And clearly, presidents, too, will come to office seeking, as did John Kennedy, a dynamic, responsive foreign policy apparatus at their disposal. How much longer State and the Foreign Service can continue to entertain pretensions that they can play the role expected of them, and then fail repeatedly, depends in large measure on the successes frustrated presidents and secretaries have in finding alternative ways to make and conduct foreign policy. The record of failure has grown so long that presidents and secretaries could understandably resign themselves to accepting a more modest role for the State Department and the Foreign Service. But it would be a serious mistake for the department to allow this to happen. The consequences for the way our foreign policy is developed, coordinated, and implemented would be far-reaching, and unlikely to be in the interests of the American people.

The first order of business, then, is to define the problem of organizational ineffectiveness in ways that meaningfully point to solutions; the second and more difficult one, is to convince the president that, as Chip Bohlen pointedly indicated to Kennedy, he is a central part of the problem and bears the chief responsibility for developing a sustained interest in solving it.

The Real Dimensions of the Problem

The central problem facing the Department of State is that it repeatedly fails to gain the confidence of the presidents it should serve. To a lesser degree this is also true for the Foreign Service, collectively, although post-war presidents have relied heavily on individual Foreign Service officers. The Foreign Service, however, unlike the department, has been able to compensate for this general lack of confidence by seeing itself as the Foreign Service of the United States, only one of the duties of which is to serve the institution of the presidency. Predictably the reaction of presidents was to promote other instruments for developing and conducting foreign policy, finding in the process institutions in which they can place confidence. For much of the post-World War II period, these have been chiefly the CIA, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the NSC system in various forms. Presidential reliance on these agents to a degree greater than on the State Department, may go a long way to explain the nature of our emphasis on covert action and military measures in devising responses to foreign crises. And, over-reliance on the NSC for
coordination and follow-up may also help explain why we have had such large gaps between our ability to conceptualize approaches to foreign problems, and our capacity for implementing designs produced by such a system. Ultimately, the lack of presidential confidence in the department and the Foreign Service has created a vicious circle with the very causes of that lack of confidence. What specifically are those causes, and how do they interrelate with each other?

First, the department has been unable to effectively implement foreign policy through its embassies and missions because ambassadors have not had full authority over all the agencies operating in the host country, particularly the CIA and the military. Although the country team approach has been applied in some areas, the concept was essentially stillborn from the beginning because of the failure to apply the same concept in Washington to forcefully backstop chiefs of mission.

Second, the Department of State’s ability to coordinate foreign policy overseas has been seriously impaired for the same reasons. In Washington, the limited organizational assets which State actually commands, the passive acceptance of a modest policy support mission in the shadow of the NSC, and the failure to make extensive use of senior career FSOs in aggressive interagency coordination roles, work to keep the department from performing the coordination functions it otherwise might.

Third, presidents have frequently complained that State has not been responsive to their needs, delivering a product unwanted or too late to be useful. The extensive system of often indiscriminate clearances associated with excessive compartmentalization and bureaucratic layering are, of course, partly to blame for this. In addition, however, the organizational nature of the department and the other foreign affairs agencies are such that they discourage the resolution of problems at the working level, unnecessarily forcing upward parochial views for mediation by the top echelons. Under these circumstances, too often what has been done before becomes the lowest common denominator, and creativity suffers.

Fourth, preoccupied with defending its shrinking turf in the face of the onslaught of other agencies, and hamstrung by its own internal process, the State Department has forgotten the importance of seizing and keeping the initiative. Indeed, some are content with a role for the department that relies upon other agencies to propose initiatives and that, in theory, lets the department steer these initiatives in desired directions, or to present counterviews, on the assumption that State’s voice will nearly always be deferred to. In practice however, this has meant that the State Department has increasingly played a reactive role.

Fifth, the cumulative effect of State’s inability to implement and coordinate foreign policy effectively, its reputation for unresponsiveness, and its frequent disinclination to seize the initiative, has been to reduce its influence in the foreign affairs community, particularly in foreign economic policy. Lacking the will to protect its influence, to carve out a determining role on such issues, the department at the same time is unable to lay claim to the resources that would enable it to do so. Unable to engage other agencies in depth across a broad front, State seems to lapse into doing what it can to obtain at least symbolic gestures of deference by other agencies, gestures which these other agencies can readily afford to dispense when doing so essentially buys them a free hand to proceed as they wish.

Sixth, the decline in State’s influence has been an important factor in the sagging morale of the Foreign Service. It may also affect the department’s ability to attract highly qualified people, and the chances are thereby reduced for a positive, internally-generated effort being mounted to reverse the factors contributing to State’s waning influence.

Seventh, improper and inadequate staffing of the department and its overseas posts over a prolonged pe-

riod has wreaked havoc with the department’s ability to focus its efforts in ways which might begin to permit it to play a more central and assertive role. Over-extended in some areas, underutilized in other areas, State muddles through, somehow convinced that it does so by rightly focusing on “only the essentials.”

Over the years, this method of operation has served to build a bureaucratic culture in which it is honorable to have dissipated one’s energies in futile efforts to deal with all the essentials. More important, it has engendered a degree of superficiality in Foreign Service work that often approaches dilettantism, and this trend does not go unnoticed by other agencies eager to move in on State’s turf.

The simple but memorable words of Walt Kelly’s Pogo seem starkly appropriate: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”

Last, the department has shied away from demonstrating its potential to play a central role in integrating domestic factors into its foreign policy recommendations. An aggressive assumption of such a role by the department might go a long way to establish presidential confidence in the department as the rightful lead agency for developing and conducting a domestically supportable foreign policy.

Thus, there are many interrelated and mutually reinforcing dimensions to the problem of institutional ineffectiveness at State. The result is a vicious circle which can only be broken by an act of will by those who come to know the system at its worst. The simple but memorable words of Walt Kelly’s Pogo seem starkly appropriate: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”

Before launching any comprehensive effort at reform, however, we must consider four factors:

(1) The nature of the relationship between the secretary and the president: The secretary of state must have the full confidence of the president, and he must be the exclu-
The President of Foreign Affairs: Congress, the Legislative Branch, and the Executive Branch

The relations between the executive and legislative branches: Congressional attitudes, level of interest and tolerance for reform must be carefully gauged. A period of keen congressional interest in foreign affairs, and its immediate aftermath, would seem like the best time to point out how reforms could help improve future performance.

(3) Tolerance in the Foreign Service for Reform: Widespread awareness of the transient nature of past reform efforts makes any new call for reform highly suspect. Yet, development of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 revealed extensive interest in solutions to the full range of problems.

(4) The Movement for Governmental Reorganization: The public's interest in more efficient and productive government was behind the Carter administration's reorganization efforts. To the extent that the public continues to see a need to strengthen our foreign policy, the support for institutional reform exists. But, the department and the Foreign Service must demonstrate to the public and any incumbent administration that it is worthwhile to strengthen their role.

If we conclude that the time is right for a holistic approach to comprehensive reforms, then our efforts should be directed along five main axes:

1. The redefinition of the mission of the Department of State to broaden its responsibilities and affirm its mandate to speak and act for the president in all aspects of foreign affairs.

2. The design of a new relationship with the White House that clearly establishes the secretary of state as the chief coordinator of all foreign operations of the US government.

3. The structuring of organizational assets in the foreign affairs community under the Department of State so as to maximize the effectiveness of the secretary in foreign affairs.

4. The strengthening of the personnel resources available to the secretary and the president for developing and conducting foreign policy, building on the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

5. The improvement of operational effectiveness through more extensive use of modern management and productivity-enhancing techniques aimed at closing the gap between policy and resources.

What follows are some specific thoughts on how things might be set right. Some are new; others have been proposed repeatedly over the years. Some are provocative, far-reaching and unsettling; they are bound to be controversial and, frankly, require a new mind-set about State's role. Others are familiar, more limited in scope, and easily accommodated by the present system. All are advanced here to be seen in a total context, and perhaps to help turn thoughts into action.

The Mission of the State Department

Clearly, the president is responsible for the conduct of our foreign relations, but to help him meet those responsibilities from the inception, Congress established a secretary and a department. Indeed, in recognition of the central importance of this function, the Department of State was made the senior cabinet department, and the secretary of state the senior cabinet official. Presidents have nearly always set the tone for our foreign relations, however, and in the early years of our national development, the mission of the Department of State was easily formulated and accomplished. Then, as America became more intimately involved with the world around us, presidents came to find, particularly in the course of giant wars and ensuing competition, that there were other instruments at their disposal, outside the Department of State, which could be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.

With the full emergence of the United States after World War II as a superpower with global interests, the Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, to ensure in formulating foreign and defense policy, the president had to avail himself of alternative sources of advice. This organizational modification of the traditional relationship between the secretary of state and the president, combined with the post-war onslaught of wave after wave of new and complex international problems, has shaken the confidence of the department in its mandate and in its ability to carry out its mission.

Indeed, the limited wartime role of the department and the new realities of the NSC system have led many in the Foreign Service to question the rationalize the new situation by narrowly defining the department's role and simply one of offering advice in our relations with foreign countries. This meant an aloof, detached role in Washington bureaucratic struggles and a repertory and representational role abroad. It meant that a few good generalists could tackle this job, and that other agencies could be permitted to provide the specialists necessary to serve what were regarded as more parochial interests.

The sad story of the years since World War II is the department's failure to play the leadership role others expected of it, and its failure to develop career patterns suited to staffing such a role. Lacking confidence in itself and unwilling to play an assertive role, these failures cost the department the confidence of presidents. As a result, the NSC system, grafted at first on the policy advising organ of the department, but growing ultimately into the White House centralized Nixon-Kissinger process, assumed more and more responsibility for what was once once the comprehensive mission of the Department of State. Yet, the evidence suggests that the NSC-centered system is overburdened and incapable of performing all the tasks inherent in the assumption of a comprehensive mission:

Only the secretary of state and his department have a realistic potential for performing a comprehensive foreign affairs mission. The changing nature of America's role in the world and of our ability to influence events will increasingly demand a new set of finely-tuned policies arrived at from hard necessity; we no longer can expect to formulate policies with the luxury of a wide range of easy choices. And this means that there will be an increasing premium on the need to insure, not just fully coordinated policy planning, but also fully coordinated implementation of policy. In short, the Kissinger years taught us that one man just can't do it all; the task of institutionalizing foreign policy still lies ahead.

In this light, the first step is to reassert State's mission in a broadly conceived way that helps answer what organizational assets State should command, and helps define the relationships with the White House and other executive branch
agencies. A comprehensive mission for State would assign it the dominant, and where appropriate, the exclusive responsibility in four areas:

**Foreign Policy Planning and Formulation:** State should have exclusive responsibility for foreign policy planning, and the predominant responsibility for formulating policy options in cases where presidential decisions are required. This is critical where bilateral relationships are concerned but of growing importance in multilateral diplomacy as well.

**Foreign Information Gathering:** With its worldwide access to foreign decision-making circles and opinion-molders, State is already well-equipped to support foreign policy planning and formulation. However, because of the impact which our foreign intelligence collection efforts can have on foreign policy, State should have the controlling responsibility for gathering information from foreign non-technical sources. State could then perform its policy planning and formulation function with a picture of the world based on something more than the perceptions of foreign elites and, at the same time, insure that collection efforts are consistent with our foreign policy objectives.

**Foreign Operations:** State must be given full and complete authority for the conduct of all foreign operations of the US government in non-wartime situations, excepting only the internal administration of overseas specified and unified military commands. State’s responsibilities would include all foreign operations relating to representational and reporting functions, negotiations, consular services, development assistance, communications and educational-cultural functions, security assistance, environment, energy, trade promotion, financial cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and assistance, and covert actions. However, this is a tall order; to effectively orchestrate all these diverse and sometimes divergent operations State must be endowed with far greater organizational assets than it presently commands, and its central mechanisms for planning, coordination, monitoring and decision-making must be drastically overhauled. More than ever before the department staff will have to insure that principals see and understand real alternatives, and the tradeoffs involved in choosing between them. To do this effectively, the department will also have to be given much more direct control over all personnel engaged in foreign operations.

**Domestic Interests:** For too long the department has accepted President Truman’s admonition to the effect that State should stick to advising on foreign policy, and leave the assessment of domestic implications to the White House. Much of the presidential discontent with State stems from the fact that State’s advice on foreign affairs seems to come out of an ivory tower far removed from what presidents see as the reality of domestic politics. Few presidents come to power with an understanding of the limits of American influence in foreign affairs; their own

prior experience in the field most often involved using foreign policy issues to serve their immediate domestic political needs. That this approach should persist in the White House is only natural, and is perhaps a valuable feature of a democracy’s foreign policy process. Nonetheless, State should be in a position to provide not only advice on how foreign conditions shape our courses of action, but also advice on the degree of domestic support that exists, or that can be created, for recommended policies.

**The White House Connection**

The secretary of state in both name and fact must be the president’s principal agent and senior adviser in the conduct of US foreign relations. This means that the Department of State is the chief agent of the president for formulating, coordinating, and carrying out foreign policy. It means that in all matters bearing on foreign relations the Department of State’s voice is the determining factor, unless the president rules otherwise. And, most importantly, it must mean that foreign relations sub-

pursue national security policy, arms control policy, international economic policy, international scientific and technical cooperation, international communication activities, and foreign intelligence operations.

Deference, but all too often only deference, is paid now to a pro forma State role in all these areas. In reality the National Security Council, Defense, CIA, Treasury, Commerce and other agencies have become powerful baronies in a feudal patchwork of countervailing power. Those other agencies, often well-endowed with money and programs that are easily understood and responsive to manipulation, can bend policy to suit their parochial interests; through their greater resources they can subvert State’s efforts to carry out

prior experience in the field most often involved using foreign policy issues to serve their immediate domestic political needs. That this approach should persist in the White House is only natural, and is perhaps a valuable feature of a democracy’s foreign policy process. Nonetheless, State should be in a position to provide not only advice on how foreign conditions shape our courses of action, but also advice on the degree of domestic support that exists, or that can be created, for recommended policies.

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policy. Lacking adequate resources itself, but most importantly lacking influence, State is often unable to counter these moves effectively. Instead, the department deludes itself into believing that the fealty paid to its figurehead role affords it a true policy coordinating role. This situation has created a void at the pinnacle of government, recognized years ago by those enjoying the National Security Council’s perspective, and rationalized away by State. Yet, the presidency had to be served.

The NSC staff and its functions have expanded enormously over the years to fill the most critical parts of the void—other agencies are in competition with each other and with State to fill the rest. But, the system does not work well, does not insure effective coordination, and drops entirely too many balls down the cracks between contending agencies. No NSC staff functioning as part of the White House can possibly do the whole job, and therefore neither can the man supported immediately by that staff, the assistant to the president for national security affairs. The

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“The doctrine and practice of nonpartisanship in foreign policy is a very practical political expendient, designed to moderate asperities inherent in our constitutional system.”—Dean Acheson

LESSONS OF THE MIDCENTURY

ELEANOR LANSING DULLES

When the secretary of state left the impressive building next to the White House which State shared with War and Navy in the 1940s for the characterless building on 21st street, he took with him large responsibilities.* The increasing range of tasks had not been imagined by Jefferson and Adams, or even by their later successor William Seward. For approximately 160 years there had been a dignified, orderly handling of foreign affairs following the lead of England and concerned as first priority with Europe, then with the Far East. There had been little attention to Africa, the Middle East or other parts of the world.

The portfolio which he carried to 21st street included matters related to the United Nations, Bretton Woods financial organizations, plans for NATO, the reconstruction of distressed areas and with some score of treaties designed to bring peace to a distressed world. There had been over the years a series of reorganizations of the institution but none of them had kept pace with the growing demands on the capacities of the secretary and the major expansion of personnel yet to come.

One can take arbitrarily, but with some substantive justification, the years of Acheson and Dulles as the beginning of the modern period. In these years a number of facts and relationships are notable and serve as guides to future conduct of foreign affairs.

Though there were vast differences in style, the fundamental aims and the consistent direction of the two secretaries of state were identical. Both the differences in style and the similarities in policy are seen in four elements of their partnership, notably 1) in their close relations to the president, 2) in their selective use of the department’s resources, 3) in the capacity to dominate institutional complexities, commanding in times of crisis, and 4) in connection with their use of the media. Through all of the years of decision their strong characters are evident.

Their shared aims were closer than the positions of their parties. The bipartisanship of 1950 and 1951 was feasible because of the recognition of extraordinary need for workable relations with Congress and the pressure for action in relation to Japan and Europe. Working relationships under Arthur Vandenberg’s cooperation had helped in the early stages of postwar leadership but had not sufficed to quiet the bitter arguments over the China policy of the administration in 1948 and 1949. Moreover, Vandenberg’s mortal illness reduced the moderating influence. Thus the Democrats, finding in Dulles a competent and experienced expert, who had supported NATO and the Marshall Plan in his short time as senator from New York, accepted him as assistant in developing the policies of the ’50s. The fact that Dulles was appointed consultant in April 1950 and then in May given the assignment of drafting and negotiating the treaty of peace for Japan was of major importance in bringing the Pacific area into the new era of postwar cooperation. The treaty was signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. During these months Dulles helped in supporting reconstruction and security in Europe and elsewhere. The partnership with Acheson, while not on a close personal basis, was of great effectiveness.

The termination of bipartisanship in 1952 as the presidential campaign gained momentum was inevitable and had been anticipated by President Truman. The collaboration had not neutralized the criticisms of .Far Eastern policies in the Senate and made more evident the need for better communication between the Executive and Congress as the voters gave the new president a special

*The address of the State Department from 1800 to 1801 was 2109 Pennsylvania Avenue. The building has recently been razed. See article by Andor Klay in the Washington Star of October 22, 1980.

Eleanor Lansing Dulles who currently lives in Washington has been an economist, political scientist, professor and writer. Her professional association with the State Department dates from 1942 but she has known of its problems from earlier years through her grandfather, John W. Foster, her uncle, Robert Lansing, and her brother, Allen, who was a Foreign Service officer for ten years. She was much involved with the reconstruction of Austria and Berlin. She is the author of thirteen books. The most recent is Eleanor Lansing Dulles: Chances of a Lifetime, A Memoir. This article is based on the manuscript of Acheson and Dulles, The Improbable Partnership, to be published.
mandate. This experience in mid-century made clear the conditions under which partisan foreign policy could be moderated and the extraordinary possibility of meeting pressing needs in an effective manner. Such occasions are political interludes not easily duplicated.

What emerged clearly from the leadership of both Dean Acheson, secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, and Foster Dulles, secretary from 1953 to 1959, was the importance of working closely and on completely responsive terms with the president.

The most striking characteristics of the Acheson-Dulles tenures in office and one not duplicated on other occasions was the closeness of the men to the president. The frequent telephone calls, the visits to the Oval Office and the unbroken channels of communication were notable. There had been no period before, and probably none since, when the ease of exchange, the smoothness of reporting and the promptness of affirmative action have been so marked. Acheson had a warm personal feeling for Truman. At the time of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, creation of NATO in 1949, the Korean attack in 1950 their relations had been harmonious and effective. Dulles telephoned Eisenhower early, often met with him at midday—stopping at the White House frequently on his way home. When out of the country he sent a long cable from foreign stations summarizing his talks and actions. He did not show the same close affection that characterized Acheson’s letters to “the boss,” but he always spoke of Eisenhower with respect and admiration. Both of them indicated in conversations with me that the high regard was mutual. Roosevelt did not have comparable good fortune—perhaps he did not want it. No president of recent times has had the same solid friendship.

The apparatus of the department and other Washington agencies was sprawling and to many confusing, but both Acheson and Dulles had a perceptive understanding of where in the apparatus expertise and wisdom could be found and how to dominate institutions, including the National Security Council. The choice of people who could give quick and practical advice at whatever rank and wherever posted was important. The insight both men had is now recognized. Those who worked closely with Acheson knew of his trust and confidence. Those who were in the intimate circle of Dulles’s advisers had a similar feeling of easy communication with their chief. This situation is one that is often misunderstood. The top man cannot deal with hundreds—he must pick and choose and have special consultants. The choices inevitably aroused criticism—but the critics are unrealistic and somewhat blind to the realities of the demanding task—the impossible burdens on the secretary of state. Dulles brought in some who had not before served in Washington. His selection was natural but was not congenial to some of the old Washington hands. Both had to find easy associates. Changes in command after assuming office with the help of close aides made it possible to avoid the “layering” of which Dean Rusk has complained. In a time of crisis, even more than in day-to-day operations, rank does not establish series or stages of action. The lowest echelon meets with the highest and the title and grade is ignored. Here again the quality of the secretary, his instincts and his understanding are paramount.

The instruction to condense recommendations into short statements is sometimes ridiculed. The inference drawn is that the president and the secretary cannot read. The truth of the matter is that consideration of the summary statement branches out very quickly into a wide variety of more detailed studies. The art of the expert in giving the proper emphasis to the salient points is the result of long experience in dealing with issues and the knowledge of past action and commitments. The wealth of material stored in the minds and files of many officers is brought to a sharp focus to help narrow the options. This process of applying policy is little understood by the outsider inclined to think the daily work of many in the department is wasteful and unnecessary.

The shift from what seems to be routine to what is crucially important—for readiness for action in the case of Korea, in the Lebanon crisis, in Berlin challenges—is impressive. It is not clear if this took place on the occasion of the occupation of the American embassy in Iran.

The crises of the period from 1947 to 1959 are revealing in respect to the ability of the secretary and the preparedness of the institution. The tone of the response to sudden need has varied from instance to instance.

In a review of the Acheson-Dulles years the reaction to critical events was at a high level with the nation quickly maintaining and reaffirming its support of security, reconstruction and the strengthening of weak nations. It seems, on balance, that the system was backed by the leaders, and the leaders benefited by the system. The general result was the clarity of policy which some condemned as they tried to deny the realities of the Cold War, while others recognized as benefits in the onward progress of the nation newly charged with large responsibilities. It is clear as Khrushchev suggests, where quoted in Khrushchev Remembers*, that the message, as to the US position and the will to act quickly, consistently and in cooperation with the Allies was widely read and genuinely understood. They were able to achieve public support even when Congress was difficult.

The use of the public media and particularly the news conference was of growing importance under Acheson and Dulles. Much can be learned from studying the techniques in their use of the varied means of communication. There were advantages in having special confidants among reporters and also dangers. The confidential backgrounder was not a fully safe instrument though it was useful to the press in enlarging their understanding.


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HOSTAGE ANNIVERSARY

As the nation observed the anniversary of the taking of the Iran hostages, hopes for their early release were rekindled. Since that date negotiations have appeared to accelerate amid still stronger feelings of hope.

Missions had a variety of suggestions and concerns about how best to mark the anniversary. Buenos Aires asked if AFSA/W could offer guidance for observing the anniversary. The embassy had already held commemorative meetings and bedecked embassy trees with yellow ribbons. The status of a proposed hostage postage stamp was questioned. Jerusalem AFSA members had discussed the possibility of holding a prayer service. Lahore called for a symbolic gesture to emphasize the bond felt by millions of Americans including the members of the entire foreign service with our colleagues. Lima asked AFSA/W what measures if any were being considered to commemorate the 4th of November.

AFSA/W responded on November 2 with a circular telegram expressing hope for an early release of the hostages and suggesting appropriate low key events such as religious services, display of yellow ribbons, prayer vigils, etc. On the postage stamp for the hostages, AFSA had learned that an eighteen-month lead time was required to process new stamps, so that it would not be practical to achieve issuance of the stamp during the probable time of their captivity.

After November 4, word was received from several posts of special events that had taken place. In Belgrade the ambassador met with over one hundred embassy employees on November 4. In Naha a service of remembrance consisted of a flag raising, prayers by naval chaplains, addresses by military leaders, and the singing of the navy hymn. In Nouakechott the AFSA representative placed a yellow ribbon at the entrance of the embassy compound. In Quebec, the consulate general hosted a November dinner. In Seoul a vigil ceremony was held at which the AFSA representative provided a brief recapitulation of events of the past year. A book available for signatures and eventual transmittal to the hostages contained the simple message, “We remember.”

Also looking beyond the immediate occasion, Quebec urged that recognition be given to Canadians in the ceremony marking the appointment of Ken Taylor as Canadian consul general in New York. Martinique thoughtfully suggested that AFSA or the department might extend on its behalf a very warm invitation to any of our colleagues who are released from captivity in Iran to spend a couple of weeks or more in Martinique as honored guests. Martinique thought the tranquil Caribbean environment might help in the recuperation process. Not a bad idea!

In summary, our hostages are remembered. Our hopes are with them. Having transcended the sad anniversary, we now look forward to a happy date of safe return.

NOTICE TO AFSA MEMBERS FROM AFSA ELECTIONS COMMITTEE

The 1981 AFSA Governing Board elections will soon be upon us. The election process will get underway with the publication of the Election Call in the February Foreign Service Journal, as provided in the AFSA Bylaws. The Election Call formally notifies all AFSA members of the opportunity to participate in the nomination and election of members of the Governing Board to take office on July 15, 1981 and prescribes the terms and conditions of the elections.

The Election Call, in accordance with AFSA Bylaws, will require that nominations be received by the Elections Committee not later than March 2, 1981. The Elections Committee hopes that this advance notice will be helpful to all AFSA members in their election planning, and that they will make their nominations promptly, once the Election Call has been issued.

QUERY ON IDCA

This interesting question from John Sperling, AID representative on AFSA’s Board, and response from Jim Kraus, chief, labor relations staff, had to be omitted from December’s “Dialogue on AID” for space reasons.

Q. I don’t know if you can speak to this or not but just a little over a year ago IDCA was formed with high expectations. In recent months we have had a tremendous amount of feedback from our members asking us why in the world IDCA was ever created. They point out that IDCA was a good idea and would have added greatly to the delivery and coordination of foreign assistance if the originally envisioned wider authorities had been obtained. Given that IDCA was cut back in its authority many of our members feel that there is precious little chance of them gaining the additional authorities needed to do their job well. Put simply, they question whether IDCA should continue to exist. Frankly, our members have been appalled by the fact that out of around 50 employees in IDCA there are two or perhaps three very lonely Foreign Service employees helping to make policy on our foreign assistance. This is astounding. The conventional wisdom is that IDCA has delayed the process, has produced very little, and in fact, we would do better by retaining the IDCA authorities and eliminating it as an institution. Do you have any comment?

A. I can only comment on your remarks from a labor relations perspective. The scope of authorities and relationship between IDCA and AID are set forth in Reorganization Plan #2. It sets forth the goals and expectations of the various relationships. I believe that condemnation of IDCA at this early stage is premature and quite harsh, considering that the organization has been in existence for only one year.
AWARDS CEREMONY SCHEDULED

AFSA has announced the winners of the Christian A. Herter, the William R. Rivkin, and the Averell Harriman Awards which are given annually to senior, middle-grade, and junior Foreign Service officers, respectively. Each award carries an honorarium of $1,000.

These awards are in recognition of extraordinary accomplishment, reflecting outstanding initiative, integrity, intellectual courage, and creative dissent. The presentations of all three awards are being made at a ceremony on January 9, 1981, as part of a program commemorating the Department of State’s 200th anniversary.

The award winners are:

The Christian Herter Award: To Trusten Frank Crigler for his outstanding performance as deputy chief of mission in Bogota, during the period Ambassador Diego Ascencio was held hostage by a terrorist group in the winter of 1980. Mr. Crigler has been a member of the Foreign Service since 1961.

The William R. Rivkin Award: To Ray L. Caldwell for his exemplary achievements as head of the internal division of the political section of the American Embassy, Madrid. Mr. Caldwell joined the Foreign Service in 1971.

The Averell Harriman Award: To Mrs. Geraldeen G. Chester for her extraordinary contribution as a key member of the team negotiating the Panama Canal treaty and its subsequent implementation. Mrs. Chester was in private law practice before joining the Foreign Service in 1972.

ATTENTION STAFF CORPS

All Staff Corps employees who have had to pay customs duties within the past three years into countries to which the US accords free entry privileges may have cause for a grievance. According to 2 FAM 240, the United States extends customs courtesies and free entry privileges to foreign diplomatic and consular officers and employees on a reciprocal basis.

2 FAM 243 states:

243 Securing Reciprocal Courtesies and Privileges. Where foreign governments are not disposed to grant to US diplomatic and consular officers and employees customs courtesies and free entry privileges similar to those enjoyed by that country’s representatives in the United States, this discrepancy is brought to the attention of the foreign government by the American diplomatic representatives in that country. If the foreign government will not grant the same exemptions and courtesies to our representatives abroad as are granted the representatives of the government concerned in the United States, the US government, will, of necessity, have to withdraw such exemptions and courtesies extended to that foreign government’s representatives in the United States. Representations or protests of this sort are reported immediately to the Department.

In many cases the United States has not withdrawn such exemptions and courtesies. If you have been affected by this, AFSA wants to know about it. Contact Emmett O’Brien, OC/TR, in care of the AFSA office.

AFSA'S PAT GUILD

If you’ve been to the AFSA office in the Department lately, the first person you’ve probably met is Pat Guild, our indispensable staff secretary. As first impressions go, it’d be hard to think of a nicer one, possessing, as she does, an abundance of cheerfulness, helpfulness and boundless patience. Pat graduated from Sweet Briar college in 1979 with a major in psychology (which has unquestionably stood her in good stead), and we found her through the Washington Business School. She says she admires Foreign Service people and finds them “strong-willed”—(the present Governing Board may have played a part in forming that impression!).

For the future, Pat says she may go back to school someday, but we hope that someday is a long way off.

AFSA SCHOLARSHIP

WHO — For dependent children of FS families who are serving or have served abroad

HOW — Apply to the AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator, by letter or phone (202-338-4046) giving FS affiliations and type of scholarship — Merit, Financial Aid, or both.

WHERE — AFSA, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037

WHEN — IMMEDIATELY! All applications must be received at the AFSA office by February 15, 1981.

Merit Awards are for graduating 1981 High School seniors or juniors, based on academic excellence.

Financial Aid Awards are for undergraduate students based on need. FS personnel in the lower grades are encouraged to apply.

HELP!

The MIC needs additional volunteers to tackle bread & butter issues facing all FS employees. Won’t you spare an hour or two a week to:

• negotiate with management on regulations
• assure fair administration of existing policy
• follow up on concerns from the field.

This is not an altruistic mission: YOU and all employees benefit from our work and MIC members have the personal satisfaction of being instrumental in making the “system” function better. Call AFSA on 632-8160 or stop by at N.S. 3644

F.S. TASK FORCES

The new charter for the Foreign Service becomes effective February 15, 1981. An enormous amount of work is ahead as AFSA prepares its positions on the issues entailed in a massive overhaul of the regulations, and negotiates with management to implement them. Task forces have been organized to address provisions of the Act, and are open to interested members. The task forces are: I. Employee/Management Relations and Grievance Procedures, II. Conversion Procedures, III. Flow Through (intake, promotion and retention), IV. Senior Foreign Service, V. Training/Career Development, and VI. Allowances.
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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
WASHINGTON BOUND?

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Before adjournment the 96th Congress finally passed the budget reconciliation bill which had been stalled over the election recess. In its original form this measure would have eliminated one of the semi-annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) applied to federal retirement annuities. It also would have done away with the “look back” provision under which the amount of a prospective retiree’s annuity could be calculated to include the last COLA, as well as the provision permitting retirees to receive the full amount of the first COLA following their actual date of retirement. In the original version of the bill all of these changes would have become effective on the date the bill became law.

The president signed this legislation on Friday, December 5, 1980. In its final form it provided the following:

1. The present semi-annual COLA was not changed. Moreover, since President-elect Reagan is on record as favoring its continuation in a letter to the National Association of Retired Federal Employees sent prior to the election, there appears to be a good chance that the semi-annual COLA will be retained.

2. Those who retire on or subsequent to December 5 will receive a pro-rata share of the first COLA following their retirement equal to one-sixth of the amount of that COLA for each month they have been in retirement status. With the next COLA scheduled for March 1, 1981, anyone retiring in January, 1981 for example would be eligible to receive two-sixths, or one third, of the March 1 increase.

3. The “look back” provision was extended for 45 days following the date that the bill was signed. Consequently, anyone contemplating retirement in the near future must be in retirement status not later than the 44th day—or January 18, 1981—to take advantage of this arrangement.

Don’t miss the February issue of the Journal

As in the past, the February Journal will feature an update on tax information for FS employees.
to be in a category that is declared domestic. The current position designation of the job you are in as FS or GS has no direct bearing on conversion.

Q. What about secretaries and communicators who are worldwide but want to go GS? What do we have to do, resign?

A. Currently, yes, you would have to resign from the Foreign Service in order to compete for a GS position. The act’s purpose is to separate out the “domestic” employees and keep the worldwide employees in the Foreign Service. The protections on conversion extend only to those who are converted involuntarily. If you choose to convert from worldwide, you are on your own.

Q. Then a worldwide communicator or secretary couldn’t voluntarily convert and still receive protection under the act.

A. That’s right.

Q. If you are domestic and convert, do you have to do it right away?

A. No, you have three years from February 15, 1981, before you have to convert. Even if you want to stay Foreign Service and your appeal is denied, you still have the three years. That is specified in the act, and don’t let anyone tell you otherwise.

Q. Do you have to do it voluntarily? Suppose you have a medical problem Will you have to go to GS?

A. No, because you are worldwide available and there are jobs for you abroad.

Q. If someone is converted, can the position (and therefore your grade) be downgraded after conversion?

A. No, that grade is yours as long as you do not voluntarily leave this position. Even if the position is downgraded, it wouldn’t matter—for your purposes it will remain at your grade as long as you do not voluntarily leave it. If you wanted a promotion, however, you would have to find another GS job at a higher level, compete for it and get it. At that point, since you would have left your original “conversion” position voluntarily, you would lose the protection against downgrading.

Q. But if you convert, and the job is downgraded, wouldn’t your salary be lowered in two years?

A. No, this is an entirely different thing. The two-year downgrading protection you are thinking of applies only to the “pure” Civil Service situation. The special provisions of the Foreign Service Act take precedence and have no time limits. You have, in effect, rank in person, and you will keep that rank in person when you convert as long as you remain in the same position. If you are the FSR equivalent of GS-12 whatever position you go into will be graded GS-12 and will remain GS-12 so long as you are in it. If the position is audited and downgraded, the downgrading will apply only to the person who comes after you in that job. For you, so long as you do not leave voluntarily, it will remain a GS-12.

Q. We have engineers who are Foreign Service but are sitting in positions which are to be Civil Service positions. Since there are no FS engineering positions overseas, these employees will have to convert. But, we are told that because the jobs are designated Civil Service, they will be put on the register. We are told that the people who are in these positions and must convert have to go on the register and compete and be picked up if they are converted. In other words, they are converting from FS to GS at their own request and will lose the conversion protection.

A. No way. If you must convert and are in a Civil Service job, you do not have to compete for the job with other GS, and it is not a voluntary conversion. You are protected. Section 2104 (a)(2) of the Foreign Service Act provides that such an individual “shall be appointed to such position without competitive examination.” However, if the people sitting in these positions are worldwide available and wish to remain Foreign Service, I would be very surprised if that couldn’t be worked out.

Q. Did you say that those converted will lose their tenured status?

A. No. I said that everyone who comes in initially after February 15 will come in untenured and will go through a probationary/career candidate period and be tenured after satisfactory completion of that period. But if you are career FS now, and you convert, you will be converted to career status. The act requires that you be converted to the type of appointment which corresponds in tenure to the one you held prior to conversion.

Q. Is incentive pay in addition to post differential or instead of?

A. In addition to. It is intended to help out hard-to-fill posts.

Q. What is going to happen to in-grades under this new act? Right now, we have two systems, where FSRS and FSOs get their in-grades on a given date and FSS a year from their last.

A. It will now be the same for everyone—you have to be 52 weeks in step or grade in steps 1 through 9, 104 weeks for steps 10 through 13. Anyone who has been in grade for steps 1-9 more than 52 weeks, or at step 10 more than 104 weeks will get an in-grade increase on February 15, the effective date of the act, assuming satisfactory performance.

Q. And it will then be on the same date from then on?

A. Yes, except if you are promoted next year, your next one would then be 52 or 104 weeks from the promotion date, depending on your step.

Q. If by law we are eligible for certain benefits and management says “sorry, we don’t have any money,” what recourse do we have?

A. To try and get the money. Certain things, like salary and retirement benefits, are entitlements and must be paid. Others, such as many allowances, are not, and if Congress does not appropriate the funds, the authorization to pay doesn’t really mean very much. However, we have friends up on the Hill now, people who are well aware of the problems of Foreign Service people and sympathetic to them. Working through them, we will attempt to get the money. It will take work and time, but we think it can be done.

Q. On selection out, is the grandfathering period ten years from now?

A. Ten years from February 15, or until eligible for an annuity, whichever comes first. This applies only to FSS who were not previously subject to selection out, and only to sub-standard performance. TIC is a different matter.

Editor’s Note: At another meeting similar to the interview Thea de Rouville had with representatives of September 17 (see October issue), August J. Bleske (OCIP), William O. Weatherford (OCIT) and Emmett O’Brien (OCITR) raised more questions regarding concerns of communicators. This interview will appear in next month’s Journal.
Foreign Service Wife:  
A Study in Motion

NANCY MATTHEWS

This is a story about Foreign Service wives—who they are, who they were and who they will be. It is a story with a beginning but no end, a story that each individual continues to live out in her own way. It is a story that is the sum total of all those lives.

Windsailors

Missions have played significant roles in the histories of their countries ever since the beginnings of contact between peoples. But it was not until modern times, with the establishment by most nations of a corps of career diplomats charged with the responsibility for conduct of foreign affairs, that wives and families needed to be reckoned with. Today the United States Foreign Service has become a vast network of professionals who cannot be considered in any context without concern for their families. To this group of wanderers, Foreign Service has become a way of life.

Today's Foreign Service wife has many faces and many personalities. She is the wife of the American ambassador in Paris and the mother of a small baby in Chiang Mai. She works for a salary in an office in Cairo, as a volunteer in a hospital in Madrid, plays tennis in Kenya, dances in Moscow, sings in a choir group in Mexico. She belongs to the PTA in Washington, is a den mother and drives car pools to ballet class. She dresses up in elegant clothes and attends receptions and dinners in the world's capitals; she dresses in faded jeans and brushes away mosquitoes in the steaming jungles of South America. She tries to put away boredom in the desert heat of the Middle East, wilts in the winter dark of Scandinavia, blooms in a Japanese garden. She is strong, she is weak, she is beautiful, she is plain. She is from Kansas, New England, Vietnam and Colombia. She speaks French sometimes, or German or Arabic or Chinese. Or she speaks only English, except for kitchen necessities. Whoever she is, she has one thing in common with all of her sisters—she chose to tie her life to that of one whose career is the Foreign Service of the United States.

Putting to Sea

The story of the American Foreign Service wife really began in 1784, when Abigail Adams sailed for Europe aboard the sailing ship Active. After a long separation, she was to join her husband in Paris, where he was American joint commissioner at the Court of France, one of our young country's first representatives abroad. This remarkable woman was the formidable predecessor of a long line of courageous women. Her figure stands now in the dimly lit hall that houses the collection of first ladies' inaugural gowns at the Smithsonian's Museum of History and Technology. She stands demurely, in her time-faded blue gown, between two friends, the seated figure of Martha Washington and the taller, more youthful Martha Jefferson Randolph, daughter of Thomas Jefferson. Her smallness of stature, the slightly wistful expression she wears and her look of fragility seem to deny the inner strength that sustained her.

Born and brought up in strict New England, granddaughter and daughter of Congregational ministers, but without formal education, she sustained home and family in the most difficult times during the birth pangs of our country, when she was separated from her beloved husband more than she was with him. Her determination to hold together all that was dear to her, and her total dedication to the cause for which her husband labored, never left her for more than a fleeting moment, nor did her devotion to him. Fortunately Abigail was a prolific letter writer, and her correspondence with her husband, family and friends gives an intimate glimpse into her character and leaves for history a fascinating chronicle of the times.

Her eight months in Paris and two years in London as the wife of an American minister were experiences for which she was at first ill-prepared. Although her life had rarely been easy, she had not expected to be called upon to deal with the many frustrations she encountered in trying to run her household and doing what she considered her duty in a foreign country. She rose to the occasion, however, with characteristic resolve.

Arriving in France after an irksome and disagreeable four-week voyage, and a short sojourn in England, her first impressions were dismal. "It is the very dirtiest place I

Nancy Matthews' Foreign Service experience has included posts at Palermo, Zurich, Madrid, Saigon (two years of separation, during which she spent a month at post), Mexico City and Egypt. During her Washington years she twice served on the board of AAFSW and was a member of the original planning group in 1961. She was president of the Embassy Women's Group in Mexico City. In Cairo, after editing the Embassy Newsletter for three years, she founded an English language bi-monthly journal, Cairo Today, which is now an established publication in that city. She is married to FSO H. Freeman Matthews, Jr., deputy director of the office of management operations.

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she did successfully for the next twenty-eight years, until her death. She did so with charm, dignity, and good humor, in spite of hard times and separations which in today's world would not have been easily tolerated.

Going from the old-world charm and the relatively easy life of Budapest in 1927 to the then-remote city of Bogotá, Colombia was an experience unlike any she had ever prepared for. The journey took nearly as long as Abigail's voyage on the Active. In the days before the air travel we now take so much for granted, ships were a necessity rather than a luxury. Accompanied by their Doberman pinscher, the couple made the trip by banana boat from New York to Puerto Colombia, calling at various ports along the way. From there it was a short but expensive train ride to Barranquilla, where they boarded a little paddle-wheel steamer for the two-week journey up the Magdalena River to Girardot. Cabins on the boat were minute, ventilation non-existent, mosquitoes thick and the jungle heat intense. Food consisted mostly of rice and bananas. What meat they had was provided by the periodic slaughter of one of the cows being towed behind on a barge for the purpose. After two weeks of winding through the steaming jungle, the little boat finally arrived at Girardot where, next day, another train took the exhausted travelers to their final destination, the 8,000-foot-high city of Bogotá, their home for the next three years. Their furniture arrived months later, almost in ruin. In those days it was shipped at one's own expense and the insurance company paid up only after more months of waiting. But they nonetheless settled in to a pleasant, interesting—and challenging—life. Their first son was born at home the next winter, while his father lay in another room critically ill with typhoid. Fortunately, a Ford Foundation doctor saw them through both crises, as local medical facilities were far from adequate. Later the mother took her young baby with her on a trip home for a necessary operation, all at their own expense, of course. During this painful separation of several months, communications were slow; letters consigned to ships of the United Fruit Company took a circuitous route to their destinations.

That introduction to Foreign Ser-
Nedlyweds, pre-Budapest

character already solid, overcame a fragility which she refused to allow to interfere with her determination. She was well prepared when her husband was appointed American ambassador to Sweden in 1947.

This woman became my mother-in-law in June, 1950, when I married the son born on that chill New Year's Eve in Bogotá when his father nearly died of typhoid. Her influence upon my innocence was enormous. It was from her that I learned about devotion to the Foreign Service, which in those days was an expected and accepted attitude. I also learned about compassion. In both posts where her husband served as ambassador during her lifetime, as well as during his tenure in one of the most senior State Department positions, she was an inspiration to young wives who came into the Service, often bright-eyed, but insecure and uncertain as to what was expected of them. Although she herself usually gave a gentle briefing to new embassy wives, during which she explained what she hoped for from them in the way of help and support, she was always understanding. She never made unreasonable demands as did some senior wives of that era, when personal lives came second to the embassy's need. Good hostess, good sport, good-natured, good wife and good mother, she was gentle and ladylike at all times. She also had a very strict sense of duty and was convinced of the necessity of being a partner in her husband's work. She did so with pleasure. She was a role model for her young, green and very inexperienced daughter-in-law.

But I still had much to learn, and the background was motion.

Whitecaps and Rough Waters

When I graduated from Connecticut College in 1949, I had absolutely no plans. My only awareness of the Foreign Service had come the previous April, when one of the girls on my floor in the dormitory had left school to marry a young Foreign Service officer in Kashmir. She was to honeymoon on a houseboat, floating among the flowers. I vividly recall how the romance of it captured the imagination of us all. We gave little thought to what her life might be like after the honeymoon. But the very weekend after my graduation, the direction of my life was established in an instant. I met the man I was to marry, and the Foreign Service soon became a reality to me.

A visit to my future in-laws in Sweden the following Christmas thrust me pleasantly into embassy life—at the top. The confection of a Swedish Christmas enchanted me and I was excited at the prospect of a life spent abroad.

Just a few short months after our marriage in 1950 I found myself alone, with my new husband back in the army and headed for Korea. I moved to Washington to stay with my in-laws and got a job at the State Department. Now my education really began. I learned what the State Department did and what the Foreign Service really meant, and was deeply impressed by the dedication and devotion of both of my husband's parents to it.

Later, the war over and a year in Washington behind us, we left with our small son for our first assignment in Palermo, Sicily, and I found that nothing had prepared me for my first real-life experience.

From the first day, I simply could not adjust to the conditions I found—a drab and drafty second-floor apartment with rats screeching in the arbor over the door, a crude icebox filled daily with filthy, melting chunks of ice, flies everywhere, a language I could not understand, a two-burner hotplate to cook on, daily power failures and, before many days had gone by, a baby who was severely ill. After three weeks I had lost pounds, not cooked a single meal for my poor husband nor written a word to our anxious parents. One day at noon my husband came home and found me crying uncontrollably. I told him I wanted to go home. It was the lowest point I have ever reached and I have thought about it many times when things seemed difficult.

Fortunately, I did not go home,
remember the experience as being very frightening.

During three years in Switzerland I operated with more confidence, but large amounts of entertaining cost us more money than we should have spent from our own pockets. However, we enjoyed it and thought it worthwhile, As we subsequently rose slowly in the Service, responsibilities became more awesome, perhaps, but they continued to be dealt within the framework of unquestioning duty for some years.

**A Fresh Breeze**

Back in Washington again in 1960-1962, a movement had begun to incorporate the Foreign Service wives who met periodically for lunch into an association with a character and a purpose. June Byrne was the catalyst and I was a member of a small group that met to lay the groundwork. The effort was a success, and the Association of American Foreign Service Women was born and given official status as a non-profit organization. Among its early goals were to provide a structure for discussion and exchange of information, and to contribute the results of its fund-raising efforts to scholarships for Foreign Service children.

Mrs. Charles E. Bohlen attended some of the planning sessions to give the group the benefit of her wisdom and support. A contemporary of my mother-in-law and a very fine woman, Avis Bohlen was the wife of one of the department’s most distinguished ambassadors. She had recently given a speech to some young wives whose husbands were brand-new FSOs. She talked about the duties of the ambassador and his wife. “It is part of her responsibility to make the wives be busy and happy and contributing, because if the wives are unhappy or homesick or not fitting in, they can very quickly affect the morale of their husbands which then means an effect on the work of the embassy as a whole.” The “duties and responsibilities” of the ambassador’s wife, she said, are basically the same ones of other wives, but on a much grander scale. She also emphasized the positive aspects of Foreign Service life as she saw them and added, “If at the beginning you learn the rules and know what is expected of you, from then on everything that happens is a plus.”

That same year, two-week sessions of the Foreign Service Institute’s “wives course” brought participants, most of whom were going out to the field, up-to-date on the thinking in many areas of American life. In one lecture on the country team concept, we were told, “It is a new kind of diplomacy. It is complete diplomacy as it has never been before. It involves everyone, including wives... International relations are people and women are becoming very effective in international relations.”

Another speaker, Mrs. Mary Hilton, pointed to a “new pattern” quietly evolving in the lives of American women. “A woman now completes her education, works until married or until her first child is born, when she will either stay home with the youngest child until he is of school age, then seeks full or part-time employment or volunteer work.” She continued that a number of women were beginning to combine roles. “The goal,” she said, “is free partnership with men in the sense that there is free choice of where one thinks her best contributions can be made.”

In the same year, 1962, I made a speech to a women’s organization in my home-town. In it, I tried to explain to women who had never been a part of it just what the life of a Foreign Service wife was like.

Although the talk was given almost 20 years ago, the description of some of the qualities of such a wife are still valid: Willingness to adapt, to put up with the young ones as they adapt to new cultures, to face possible problems with uprooted children. As far as the obligations I stressed, I would now change must to may in areas such as helping the ambassador’s wife, participating in “representation” and entering into local activities. The rewards, I believe, are still the same; a sense of being present when history is made, travel and learning experiences for the family and, for many a satisfying feeling of participation in the chosen career of one’s husband.

**Winds of Change**

By the time we went to Mexico in 1970, profound changes had begun. The Association of American Foreign Service Women, against a background of women’s liberation and drastic changes in attitude, had seen the necessity for redefinition of the role of the wife. A Task Force was organized to deal with the fact, as stated in a Management Reform Bulletin dated June 3, 1971, that “Hardly any wife has chosen this as her own way of life; most have accepted it gracefully as a by-product of their choice of mate.” The recommendations of this Task Force exerted enough weight to bring about the famous and world-shaking “72 Directive.” In Mexico it came to my desk on the yellow-banded paper of an administrative announcement. Someone had written on top in red ink, “Alleluia!”

No more were wives asked to assist at embassy functions and fake part in representation. The ambassador and his wife now invited embassy couples to official functions as guests (although they were usually not invited back again if they acted like guests. The same kind of help was still needed and there were still many who enjoyed the opportunity to meet new people).

In January, 1973, just one year after the directive was issued, a meeting was held which was to be an open discussion of concerns relating to the new role of women. It evolved into two camps, one of which was content, but felt the group should be more active. The second, mostly made up of younger wives, voiced strongly their desire to be allowed to work, something that at that time was almost impossible for a foreigner in Mexico. I left Mexico before any answers were found, and I doubt that I realized at the time the far-reaching importance of the concerns voiced in the residence living room that morning.

**A New Course**

Today, eight years later, in a busy office on the seventh floor of the State Department sits a very attractive blonde woman named Barbro Owens: Barbro was born in Finland and was the youngest member ever of the city council of Helsinki when she met her husband John, a Foreign Service officer assigned to the embassy there. Today, Barbro is an FSO, one of the two Washington aides to Donald McHenry, ambassador to the United Nations. Her husband has recently gone to Bermuda as consul general. This couple represents a new phenomenon in the Foreign Service, the tandem couple, each pursuing their own careers and hoping to find assignments at the same post. They are becoming more and more numerous. Although, the department has been very sensitive to the needs of
helped to define women’s legal rights in certain situations, the group has worked for changes in the Foreign Service Act which would give spouses more benefits under its provisions. Importantly, the new amendment now firmly cements the AAFSW position. The AAFSW as a result of its work over the past decade has gained respect and credibility with both the Department of State and members of Congress. It functions as a strong voice for Foreign Service women.

Uncharted Depths

And now, after many years of following patterns and traditions, the Foreign Service wife has been awakened and liberated. Legislation and updated regulations have made Foreign Service life easier to cope with. Strides have been made in the areas of education allowances, dependent travel, medical care and separations, with more under study. And she is no longer made to feel duty bound in a job in which her contributions were traditionally taken for granted.

In another sense, she has been set adrift. The framework has been provided for her to do as she wishes, and yet there are still many limitations. Those who have careers cannot always follow them abroad. Those who do not wish to or are not in a position to follow a career are faced with the aftermath of the ‘72 Directive, which in effect gives the Foreign Service wife “non-status.” Although those who work may get efficiency reports or ratings, those who do not or, who do only volunteer work abroad, may not be recognized or mentioned as part of the “team” the department once felt was so important. Add to that the new facts of life which include evacuations and terrorism, even assassinations, as a threat to Americans overseas. Many unresolved dilemmas have resulted from this tugging in so many different directions.

One of the most obvious of these is brought about by the fact that, even though the Foreign Service wife has been given her freedom from such duties as once occupied her, there are still certain responsibilities to be met, particularly as one’s spouse rises to senior levels. Someone has to do these things. In many countries a failure to do so would be badly misunderstood. And a Foreign Service wife is still her husband’s partner; necessarily, she is more visible in the Foreign Service. Those basics have not really changed; they were the same for Abigail Adams and for Mrs. Bohlen in-law as they are for Barbro Owens and for me and for all the young women who are coming into the Service today.

I have had no easier time than others in dealing with these themes. My own solution has been to take what I have learned from years as a traditional Foreign Service wife and use it to adapt to a new style. Recently, after my children had all begun lives of their own, I, too, decided to work and pursue a career overseas with some success. It has been enormously rewarding and has enriched my life in many ways. But I remain also a traditional wife in the sense that I still believe in certain obligations to the long partnership I have had with my husband in his career.

Today each individual woman, each Foreign Service wife, must define her own role as wife—a woman, as a private person—and do it in her own style. How to meld together old values and loyalties with new thought and new direction is a question for the ’80s. We should not fear changes and uncertainties, but address ourselves to the dilemmas and try to work them out with the tools at hand, and with a measure of gratitude to our predecessors who have inspired us and prepared the way.

Abigail Adams wrote these words as she tossed about the Atlantic Ocean on her way to the adventure that awaited her in Europe, “I begin to think that calm is not desirable in any situation in life. Every object is more beautiful in motion.”

So it is with the Foreign Service wife, this woman of infinite variety, whose story has been and continues to be so important a one in the annals of American history.
Many people, aware that the Foreign Service is my second career, have asked how I would compare my experience in the Foreign Service with previous experience in industry. I have always begged off by saying I haven't been in the Foreign Service long enough to give a useful opinion on the subject. But, since I now have seven years of Foreign Service experience, both overseas and in the department, perhaps I can make a few observations which may be of interest, may cause anger, or may sound like sour grapes. I record them here for whatever they may be worth.

A common question concerns what I think of the general level of capability of people I have met in the Foreign Service, and how they stack up against executives in industry. I can respond without hesitation that in the Foreign Service, and in the State Department, I have come across people who are as good as, if not better than, any in industry in terms of judgment, maturity, ability to analyze problems, creativity, decisiveness and general intelligence. I've also come across people who are as bad as any I met in industry. But, on balance, I am convinced that in many ways Foreign Service officers are clearly superior to their opposite numbers in industry.

There is one characteristic, however, which I think is much more common among industry executives, a trait which I've been surprised to note seems often lacking among FSOs. It's a form of aggressiveness which is sometimes labeled "empire building." It is seen in the subject to grab a new area of responsibility for oneself. It's a characteristic of an industry executive at any level who wants, and intends, to move up. Although it often leads to infighting and politicking, it receives at least tacit approval from management because it signals a personality which is considered essential to a dynamic, growing business. An example is seen in the marketing representative who exceeds his or her authority and quotes a lower price to a customer, or a higher quality, in order to beat the competition. He won't be fired. On the contrary, management appreciates his aggressiveness in getting the business. He may offer the production plant a severe challenge in making good on the quotation, but this stretches its capability and makes it grow and management knows this. But he has to be willing to stick his neck out to do it.

I'm talking about the same personality that recognizes that rules are made to be broken; that any individual who would consider himself to be a professional must know when and how to break them. The "system," the framework of "rules," is constructed to handle the ordinary, routine situation. The real pro will never hesitate to break a rule in the interest of efficiency, justice, and, yes, humanity, and that's really why he's there. Anyone can blindly apply the rules. Too often, FSOs in any cone insist on "going by the book" and thereby compromise their own potential to find a creative solution to a problem.

If this characteristic is in relatively short supply among FSOs, why so? Are the FSO selection, retention, and promotion processes loaded in favor of the "well behaved" who passively accept the system, or is the "empire builder" trait extinguished in the managerial milieu in which FSOs live and work?

After going through the selection process in 1973, I realized that it identified people who were widely read, with catholic interests and very retentive memories, who were good students and, in general, heavily oriented toward academic interests. I think this may still be true, although I know there is a continual effort to revise and improve the selection process. But perhaps we should first decide what are the "well behaved" who need logical people of good judgment? (A psychologist might tell us that the two categories are mutually exclusive)—or some mix of the two? Maybe the selection process should merely require a basic level of intelligence and emphasize motivation, with the expectation that highly motivated individuals will bloom on the job (as Harry Truman did); or that they can be shaped to the right form. But in any case the selection process, until now, may have been giving us a preponderance of "academic students" among our FSOs, and thus a built-in bias against the brash, aggressive, empire builder. I know that academic faculty can be afflicted with "empire builders," but students are accustomed to playing a relati-
ly passive, non-aggressive role in the classroom, and maybe we’ve overstuffed the Service with people who have been conditioned to accept the status quo.

I think a case can also be made that the department’s hierarchal environment may kill aggressiveness in the FSO.

Modern management theory makes a broad distinction between the hierarchal and the participative approaches to management. In the hierarchal system authority and direction flow from the top down, there is little or no information flow upwards, lines of authority are very clear, decision making occurs at high levels. This system is typified in military structures, and it tends to be efficient, but it stifles individual initiative. The participative system emphasizes participation in decision making at the lowest practical level, unobstructed information flow upwards (as well as downwards), everyone’s viewpoint is valued and needed, and lines of authority are blurred. This system, on the other hand, tends to produce imaginative and creative approaches to problems. And although decision-making may be slower in the participative process, once decisions are made they are carried out much more effectively because those who must eventually do the work are the same people who took part in the decision-making process (explaining the increased efficiency of US workers in Japanese-managed assembly plants).

Now the whole Foreign Service system of retention and promotion by review panels on the basis of OERs, of selection-out, of time-in-grade I understand to be modeled on military personnel system, with its built-in strong hierarchal, rather than participative, philosophy. (I have no idea what logical linkage there is between the Foreign Service and the navy, although many of the younger FSOs do wear bell-bottom trousers.) But the Foreign Service should be looking for chances to be more participative, with a view to encouraging initiative and imagination (and empire building) among its officers. For example, the OER should be written by the rated officer (who is more interested in doing it?), not his/her supervisor. For those who may scoff: We are all our own severest critics and personal puffy can be easily devastated by a few well-chosen remarks in the supervisor’s sector of the OER. This process would give FSOs more feeling of participating in their own review process (and relieve supervisors of the onerous burden of preparing the OER). Going beyond the OER itself: Why should a panel in Washington decide on retention on promotion of a junior officer in Manila whom they have never even seen, and know only through the written word? Could not the consul general at post (who probably has had 25 years of experience and is in the best position to evaluate the officer) make the promotion decision? Surely the consul general has been selected with great care for his or her heavy responsibility, and surely the department has great trust in his ability. Couldn’t he even be allowed to promote a junior officer from 0-7 to 0-6? If we could be less hierarchal,* maybe our FSOs would become more “aggressive” as they became more participative.

Maybe it is because we operate in a milieu which is dominated by financial considerations that initiative, aggressiveness and empire building tend to be stifled. Peter Drucker, in his commentaries on modern American business management, identifies a shift in the concerns of American managers from the creation of wealth-producing resources toward immediate payoffs. He describes this as a shift in cost effectiveness from emphasis on effectiveness to emphasis on cost, and he has suggested that this trend is perhaps a good deal more pronounced in government today than it is in business. He thinks that a reason for this shift may be the increasing pressure, especially in an inflationary period, to produce results fast. An inflationary period by definition is one that erodes and destroys both industrial and political capital. In an inflationary period the existing value of future results is subject to the exceedingly high discount rate of inflation which, in effect, means that no results more than a year or two ahead have any present value whatever, whether value is defined in economic or in political terms. It is therefore not a period in which either industry or the policy maker can take risks. Drucker says that therefore both industry and the governmental policy makers in an inflationary period concentrate on small but sure and immediate payoffs; that is, on what can be calculated with high probability.

I think we can see many examples of Drucker’s concern right here in the State Department. We see it in examples where the “budgetary tail” ends up wagging the “program dog.” For instance: Every year an arbitrary decision is made as to the total amount to be requested of the Congress for voluntary contributions to international organizations and programs. The State Department then takes this total amount and distributes it as voluntary contributions to the various international programs. But this is backwards. The needs for the program should be determined first. The individual programs should receive contributions depending on need and US self-interest in the program, and a total budget should be determined from that.

In the chemical industry, if program managers have an excellent idea for a new program or a new product line, the decision to go ahead will be made on a number of bases, most important of which will be the potential return from going into the new product line. One shudders at the thought of what would happen to a financial vice president sitting in a meeting of the top executives of the Dupont Fibers Division, when it was decided that a new Orlon plant should be built to take advantage of the high market potential for the product. If the financial vice president stood up and said, “I’m sorry, you had better scratch the whole idea of a new product. We don’t have the money to undertake a new initiative,” I think he would be fired. His job is not to tell management what can’t be done; his job is to tell management how it can be done.

In such an event I’m sure the company president or the board chairman would say, “Look, Charlie, your job...
is to get the money. Now go out and get it! I don't know whether you have to get a loan, or use retained earnings, or sell more stock, or what. That's your job and that's why we're paying you. But don't tell us we can't go into the profitable new product which holds potentially great returns for us. Rather tell us how you're going to get the money to enable us to do this." It seems to me this should be the job of our financial people. A financial manager who merely sets a target figure, and tells everybody they have to live within that target, regardless of what is to be accomplished, is abdicating his responsibility. A child can do that; we don't need a highly paid executive to set a figure and be unable to change it or even make an input of creative ideas to the dialogue.

In fairness to the budget and financial people, however, I should point out that in practice we are really talking about relative priorities. The Congress sets spending levels based on a mix of political, financial and program priorities. Program officers have to be aggressive in making sure that the value and impact of their programs receive full appreciation vis-a-vis political and financial considerations when the decisions are made. If the financial viewpoint seems to dominate in decision-making we should criticize ourselves for failing to sell our programs as well as they deserve. The budget people are only doing their job in emphasizing the need for financial prudence.

We see the budget tail wagging the program dog elsewhere in the Foreign Service. For example, maybe (just maybe!) most Foreign Service officers, being "specially selected and highly dedicated," should be FSO-1s. I don't know why we have to live by the pyramid concept of personnel structure. A pyramid is a unique geometric figure: extremely stable; the most difficult construction to overturn or move (is this significant?). But it doesn't necessarily describe the distribution of talent among FSOs. If it's going to be "expensive" for 3,000 Foreign Service officers to be distributed among the FSO-2 and -1 levels, that's a worry that our budget people have to face. They've got to get more money so we can do it. But the answer (to their) problems (is not to) adjust our system for rewarding the best people by keeping deserving individuals at lower pay levels and lower responsibility levels than they deserve (it is a "rank-in-person" system after all). Again this is a symptom of the disease that Peter Drucker has put his finger on for both industrial and government managers. But I think it's worse in the Foreign Service. Can you visualize an industrial manager saying, "Joe, we all agree you should be promoted to a level commensurate with the great job you do for us, and that you should be rewarded accordingly. But the accountants say we can't promote you because they can't find the money. So please stay where you are indefinitely until they decide I can promote you?"

This budgetary mind-set is spread throughout the entire department, and I think it sometimes results from the lack of creativity and aggressiveness in FSOs. The Congress had to tell the State Department of the need for more consular officers in certain areas and that they should ask for more support for consular activities! This is something unheard of in industry: The idea that industrial managers would be so unaggressive that they must be urged to ask for more resources, and urged to extend their activities into new areas of responsibility! Executives who are passive would never survive in industry. But the fact remains that we FSOs passively accept the idea that we can't do things unless the budget people think they're worth-while.

We can see the tail wagging the dog again in the idea that ambassadors should be good "resource managers" because they have responsibility for many millions (or billions) of dollars, and for many people. (It is even suggested that they should be carefully selected for their ability to manage these resources!) Again financial considerations are dominating and distorting the department's concept of the ambassador's job.

"Management of Resources" is not some mysterious function understood only by certain people who have been initiated into the nether regions of knowledge. We have, or can get, many people who can very efficiently and very nicely manage resources, and we need not saddle the ambassador (and the DCM) with worries about resources. Certainly the administrative counselor should be able to do enough worrying for all. The administrative counselor has a prepossessing title, is highly experienced, and is very able. He can manage resources efficiently and effectively under the general policy guidance of the ambassador. (Do we remember Metternich for his ability to "manage resources"?) Was Chip Bohlen so effective because he was able to "manage resources" efficiently and thus earn the plaudits of M? The ambassador must represent the United States to the country to which he is accredited and represent that country to the United States. We should select him on the basis of imagination, dedication, analytic ability and whatever else is necessary to carry out and interpret US policy in terms of the government that he is accredited to, and to interpret that government's policy in terms which are meaningful to the United States government. That says it all and it's a mouthful. But he should not worry about the embassy budget, junior officer training, morale, "resource management," or any of the myriad of administrative concerns inherent in an operating entity like an embassy.

Perhaps I've completely missed the reason why FSOs are less aggressive than industrial executives. Or maybe I'm completely wrong in my assessment of the FSO personality because the statistical universe I've sampled is too small. But also maybe there could be some changes in the management style of the department which would lead to improved performances, efficiency, and effectiveness. Perhaps the real question is whether the department itself can manage change.
Women in the Foreign Service: A Quiet Revolution

Barbara J. Good

Any role for women in United States foreign policy and diplomacy is recent. Until just a decade ago, the Foreign Service to a large degree, and the domestic service to a lesser, reflected and applied all of the traditional prejudices against employed women known in American society as a whole.

Discrimination began when the Department of State itself began, under its first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, in 1789. His staff of seven clerks did not include any women. Jefferson as president (1800-1808) declared in a letter to Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, that women in public office were an innovation for which neither the citizenry nor he was prepared.

The first female employee of the Department of State was one Mrs. March, according to the historian Homer L. Calkin in Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs. On September 28, 1804 she received six cents a copy for “folding, stitching and covering with cartridge and blue paper” each of 3,467 copies of the laws passed by the first session of the eighth Congress. This modest beginning was auspicious only in one respect: there was no discrimination in pay; Mrs. March received the same amount given one William Duane for similar work. Still, for many years, no woman could be employed by the department except on a part-time basis, and usually the work was done at home because women were not allowed on government premises. The common task was that of copyist, the forerunner of today’s typist.

Slowly, however, major barriers fell until one remained—the permission to join the diplomatic service. During the 19th century a number of women unsuccessfully sought appointments to US diplomatic and consular missions abroad. In 1909 Frederick Van Dyke explained the problem as diplomats then saw it. He wrote: “Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the employment of women as diplomatic officers is their well known inability to keep a secret.”

The women’s suffrage movement and World War I in all likelihood gave women inspiration and opportunity to enter more fields of employment. A woman took the examination for the diplomatic service in 1921, but alas, failed both the written and the oral examinations, which were then given together. In 1921-23 there were ten instances when women took the Foreign Service examinations—six for the diplomatic exams and four the consular exams. But it was Lucile Atcherson of Ohio who became the first woman to pass the examinations and become an officer in the US diplomatic service in 1922. Ms. Atcherson ranked third in the examination with a score of 86.60, only .57 percent behind the highest scoring candidate. A second woman entered the service in 1925. One senior officer (male) subsequently proposed a ban on admitting more women. He thought it a good idea to wait and observe the usefulness of those already in before opening the “floodgates,” even though Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, in 1924, had supported fair treatment of all persons.

The “flood” of women recruits was at best only a trickle. Between 1921 and the onset of World War II, only six women were appointed as officers via the examination process. The all-male establishment had many simplistic and paternalistic notions about women. It was convinced, for example, that women serving abroad would be “compromised” by male officials in the country of assignment, that in Moslem countries they would be faced with purdah, and that women could not function in the traditional “macho” societies of Latin America. Women in the Foreign Service would, it was thought, also come in contact with the “wrong elements”; consular work overseas could mean dealing with rough and tough sailors, police officials, and prisoners. Furthermore, the depart-
ment believed that foreign affairs ministries abroad might not take a woman seriously as a political officer. Finally, when women were admitted as Foreign Service officers, it was understood that they would remain single; a marriage certificate required a letter of resignation—policy which, though unwritten, remained for almost 50 years; that is, until mid-1971.

The policy of "femina non grata" was not equally true for secretaries. Few men were willing to do secretarial work, except in the earliest days of diplomacy when private male secretaries entered the service. Those men accepted secretarial duties as a means for entrance into an elite, if ill-paid, diplomatic service. Warren Frederick Illchman in Professional Diplomacy wrote: "The preeminently masculine calling of diplomacy was exposed after the war to the 'onslaught' of the liberated and newly enfranchised American women."

A shortage of manpower during World War II and rapidly expanding global diplomatic relations after the war gradually increased the number of women serving in foreign affairs. A few women even managed to rise to senior positions, among them, Ruth Bryan Owen, who was named minister plenipotentiary to Denmark by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. Frances E. Willis served as ambassador to Switzerland, Norway and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka); Margaret Joy Tibbets, ambassador to Norway; Carol C. Laise, ambassador to Nepal and later the first woman director general of the Foreign Service. Many of these women have since retired. With peace and return to "normalcy" the male-dominated establishment reasserted its traditional attitudes. Recruitment of women into the Foreign Service remained at the suspiciously constant low level of about seven percent for more than a decade prior to 1971. Among the few recruited, the rate of promotion was only a third that of men as late as 1969, and only a scant few managed to move to the top. The number in the Foreign Service reached its lowest point at 4.8 percent. These facts, plus the dynamic resurgence of the nationwide women's movement in the late '60s and early '70s spurred women in the State Department to organize in order to redress the long-standing discrimination and to demand equitable treatment. The reform group, the Women's Action Organization (WAO) represented not only the Department of State, but the Agency for International Development (AID), and the then-United States Information Agency (USIA)*, both agencies sending employees abroad and modeling their personnel policies almost entirely on those of the State Department.

When the reemergence of the women's movement provided a favorable climate for activism, I was fortunate to be in a position to help

*Now the International Communications Agency (ICA)

found the WAO. In 1951, as a struggling artist just out of Berkeley with no funds to continue my studies abroad as planned, I had jumped at the chance to join the State Department for a foreign assignment. My first job was as a cryptographer which sounded intriguing and important, though I was quickly to discover its limitations. All Foreign Service employees must agree to serve worldwide; I requested Rome, so I could continue my studies. Luckily, I was assigned there. In those days the dolce far niente philosophy still permeated Italy, but it stopped short at the gate of the US embassy. There the Protestant work ethic prevailed. I soon found that constantly-changing work shifts precluded any courses at the School of Fine Arts. This displeased me, but by then I realized that life as a serious woman artist would mean far greater sacrifice than the possibility of the prospect of spinsterhood in a career that would take me around the world. Even though the work itself was routine and boring, by that time the glamour, excitement, and wanderlust of the foreign service life had captured me. Assignments took me to South America and the Orient. Despite my growing sense that management and my colleagues in the Foreign Service did not particularly favor women, I decided to make the most of it.

In 1965, the Department of State assigned me back to the office of personnel in Washington as a Foreign Service recruiter, traveling around the country promoting the Foreign Service and interviewing young men and women candidates. This job was a turning point for me. It was then I really learned for the first time how disproportionately difficult it was for women to overcome the hurdles as candidates for the Foreign Service and subsequently as officers. Fortunately, being on home territory gave me the opportunity to become an activist. I realized how difficult achieving change from within was going to be. Working alone I found that my repeated efforts and suggestions were eventually ground down in the bureaucratic mill. My experience was not unique. Some of the finest women officers had expressed great frustration. One woman assigned to the department's equal employment office, and who consequently knew the rather grim statistics on the status of women in the State Department and the obstacles to promotion and change, expressed her hopelessness by resigning from the Foreign Service.

In 1968 the department's professional association, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), began a thorough revaluation of the conduct of our nation's foreign affairs in response to the challenges posed by the dramatic technological innovations of the electronic age. None of the AFSA recommendations dealt even peripherally with women's role and concerns. Some women expressed indignation at this lack of attention to their aspirations and potentials. One of them was Jean Joyce, then senior reports advisor in the bureau of educational and cultural affairs (CU), who told the president of AFSA that even in CU (where women were usually numerous) there were no women attending top policy-making meetings. No woman in CU was ever promoted to the position of
quiet revolution. On the 50th anniversary of Women's Suffrage Day in May 1970, Mrs. Marcy arranged for the ad hoc committee to meet with the State Department's deputy undersecretary for management, William B. Macomber, to state our case. We were fortunate to have such a man in such a crucial post at that time. Secretary Macomber was willing and able to listen sympathetically and to lend effective support to our proposals for policy changes.

We asked for an opportunity for a broad meeting of women employed by all three foreign agencies. At Secretary Macomber's request, the ad

hoc committee worked very hard to gather the necessary information on women's status and needs for inclusion in each of the 13 departmental task force reports. When the results of our combined efforts were presented at the meeting, many management officers appeared taken aback by the repeated inequities which we cited and which they were forced to face for the first time. Of course no ready answers were available, but at last the unspoken issues had been definitively raised.

Our early successes and the now-obvious willingness of management to work with us led us to consider what kind of a more permanent organization would best serve our needs. Should we be a committee with AFSA, a group linked to the American Federation of Government Employees, or one that would be totally autonomous and represent women in all categories? The AFSA president, William Harrop, wisely agreed with many of our members that we should become totally autonomous. It was felt that our voice would be strongest as an independent organization. First, it was formally agreed that we should serve all categories of women in the three foreign affairs agencies. Other extremely important decisions were that we would be a voluntary organization within State/AID/USIA which could act independently and quickly; but also that we would work, not by sharp confrontations or militancy, but by dealing directly with management, putting on a waiting position to bring about reform. Our target continued to be chiefly persons in the top management of the State Department—such as, for example, Undersecretary Macomber since, as noted earlier, State personnel policies set the pattern for the other two foreign affairs agencies.

By November 1970 the Ad Hoc Committee formally became the Women's Action Organization (WAO) of State, AID, and USIA. During this early period of WAO one of the reforms we called for—and got— was an end to the ban on marriage for women in the foreign affairs agencies. This new policy subsequently permitted the foreign affairs agencies to employ working couples. Other reforms included a reduction of the inequity between allowances granted men and women in living arrangements and other perquisites, and a reduction of discrimination in hiring and assignment practices. For these initiatives, our ad hoc committee was given a management award in 1972 by the president of the United States. Mary Olmsted, our first president, received the coveted Christian Herter Award in the same year for "intellectual courage."

More and more of our proposals were adopted and old inequities righted, and our worldwide membership rose to over 1,000. We realized that we were being helped not only by a cooperative undersecretary for management, but also by the growing strength of the women's movement nationwide. Women's reform movements were being pushed everywhere, especially in the organized professions and unions, and were making front-page news almost daily. The State Department's politically astute Undersecretary Macomber realized he was facing a national, not a purely internal, social revolution.

Our work as an organization independent of AFSA was also facilitated by the establishment in 1968 of the Federal Women's Program by
the federal government. Agencies were directed to appoint a women's program coordinator to monitor and implement the program.

Finally, in August, 1970, and specifically in response to demands made on it by WAO members, the State Department appointed a part-time women's program coordinator, Elizabeth Harper, as well as an officials committee. Jean Joyce, Alison Palmer and I were among those asked to serve on this first committee. By 1972, the coordinator position was made full-time with the title of special assistant to the deputy undersecretary of management. The first woman to hold that high-level position was an outstanding manager and feminist, Gladys P. Rogers. She recognized the tremendous value of a pressure group like WAO and, although a management representative, she worked closely with us in toppling the many blatant and archaic policies which discriminated against women. The timing of the mandated program greatly facilitated WAO's effort to press for change.

WAO's years since 1973 have been less dramatic since the most glaring inequities and practices, such as the ban on marriage, were eliminated early. Nevertheless, under a succession of committed presidents and with a growing worldwide membership, WAO has had plenty to do. Discrimination against women continued and persists today. Correcting such problems requires changes both in basic attitudes and in the power structure itself.

One particular field of concentration among the younger officers and their spouses, grouped in a department-sponsored organization called the Open Forum, was the demand for greater recognition of the professional (as contrasted with the "tea-pourer") status of spouses. WAO moved quickly to support their position. We also focused on the need to use the professional skills of Foreign Service spouses and initiated the first spouses' "skills bank" which Cynthia Chard, a Foreign Service spouse and WAO board member, both pioneered and carried out. This "skills bank" became the forerunner for the department's creation of a long-needed office, the Family Liaison Office (FLO), to deal with the many special problems and stresses of Foreign Service families.

WAO has also worked persistently to secure less sexist treatment of women employees. Here, equality in women's working conditions at posts around the world was an important goal. For example, WAO has urged an end to exclusion of women officers from overseas all-male clubs where important information is often exchanged, and valuable local contacts made. Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé served as a pioneer in this area by influencing the all-male American Club of Stockholm to accept women members. Other such clubs have now opened their doors to women, including the American Club in Madrid, Spain where Ambassador Terence Todman declined the traditional honorary membership afforded to chiefs of mission until the club charter was revised to drop discrimination.

WAO has recently been stressing the importance of implicit and explicit bias in the Foreign Service's performance evaluation and promotion system. These performance ratings often institutionalized discrimination against women, and remain crucial obstacles to the achievement of equal opportunity and promotion. Lois Roth (ICA) wrote a paper for WAO entitled "Nice Girl or Pushy Bitch: Two Roads to Nonpromotion," which said in part: For instance, "kind and supportive" remarks about women officers often perpetuate myths and values that get read in the promotion process as weakness, and that, in calling women "pushy or abrasive when they are properly ambitious, men are using a double standard that does women in the Service great disservice and ultimately men in the Service dishonor.

In reflecting upon WAO's first decade and its achievements, we are aware that our very existence is unique. To my knowledge, and from my conversations with UN colleagues, in no other career foreign service in the world have women organized with men voluntarily to accomplish similarly and equally needed—reforms. WAO in this sense might be said to serve as a model for the rest of the world. WAO is also unique in that, unlike some feminists in other fields, we have encouraged men to join us and to serve on our board of directors.

Reflection as we go into our second decade (and the State Department's third century) must include the fact that WAO has had some failures, as well as successes, and has sometimes been criticized for its moderate position. For example, when the ad hoc committee was first moving in 1970, our early meetings included Alison Palmer, mentioned earlier. She chose, however, to pursue a militant course independently of WAO, and brought the first formal discrimination complaint against the Department of State. She charged discrimination against women in assignment to posts abroad which, as in her own situation, hampered career advancement. Her victory in 1971 was a landmark event for all Foreign Service women, resulting in a management directive categorically outlawing all discrimination in assignments. While this directive benefited all women employees, not all viewed Alison sympathetically when she subsequently became the moving force behind a class action suit on behalf of women Foreign Service officers. WAO, after long discussion, joined her in that 1975 effort, which caused a temporary split in our ranks. Some WAO members believed that we had taken a "confrontation-with-management" posture in violation of our "work-with-management" philosophy. Although the WAO wounds have healed, we remain a somewhat silent partner in the suit, which has now dragged on without a decision into its fourth year. Meanwhile, in all activities and contact with management, we continue to work "within the system" in a policy of moderation, using sustained pressure to achieve our aims.

As to WAO's shortcomings, we clearly do not have enough low-ranking women and minority women among our members nor enough high-level women. In some instances, facing women who have "made it" in the system can present special problems. Some who have been successful in invading the virtually all-male "room at the top" often help perpetuate male-dictated attitudes.

There are many people, men and women, in power points at the top echelons who similarly are not ready for equal rights. While it may not be within WAO's power to change attitudes and behavior at all levels, we are certainly greatly indebted to those few outstanding men and women.

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DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Foreign Service Career of Cornelius Van H. Engert

Cornelius Van H. Engert entered the Foreign Service in 1912 and retired in 1946. After tours in the late 1940s with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, he helped establish the American Friends of the Middle East. At 94, he travels extensively and lectures frequently. The following edited excerpts from interviews conducted in his Washington apartment between September and November reflect insights into key 20th century events and personalities:

Q: You once said that having experienced the San Francisco earthquake and fire was excellent preparation for your long career in the Foreign Service. What did you mean?
A: Well, I witnessed one of history’s greatest natural catastrophes before entering a Foreign Service career that went from one calamity to another—and was always exciting.

When I arrived at my first post, Constantinople, in 1912, Turkey was at war with Italy over Libya. During the two Balkan wars that followed, Constantinople was in imminent danger of being captured by the Bulgarians, and I could occasionally hear the guns quite plainly. This culminated in World War I, the Allied attack on the Dardanelles, and the disastrous British Gallipoli campaign of 1915. I crossed the Atlantic twice in 1917, after the United States entered the war, and narrowly escaped being torpedoed. I spent eight years in disturbed Latin American countries in the 1920s, I was in Peking during the Sino-Japanese War and the invasion of Manchuria, and I was in Addis Ababa when Mussolini’s troops conquered Ethiopia—and I had to defend my legation there against rioters. It seemed my career always put me in the eye of a storm, until I retired from the Foreign Service just after World War II.

Q: The Foreign Service changed a lot during those years. . .
A: It certainly did. We were pitifully understaffed in 1912, when the whole State Department had only as many people as one of our larger embassies had in 1946. My initial salary was $1,200 a year—and even as a frugal bachelor in Constantinople, I had to spend several times that much to live. The Rogers Act, twelve years later, improved matters, but not nearly enough.

Q: Were written and oral examinations required for entrants into the Foreign Service in 1912?
A: Yes, we have had fairly stiff entrance examinations since early this century, for those entering at the bottom. But for many years, for political reasons, the president, on the recommendation of a senator, had to designate an applicant before he was allowed to take the exams.

Q: You knew your senator from California?
A: Slightly. Anyway, I called on Senator Phelan to say goodbye, just before leaving Washington for my first post. He asked if I had met Secretary of State [Philander C.] Knox. I laughed, and said there was no reason I should. He said, oh, yes, you should—and he telephoned for an appointment, right then. We immediately went together, and the senator introduced me to the secretary, who cordially shook my hand. Then they embarked on a political discussion that had nothing whatever to do with me or foreign affairs.

Q: Did you meet any other interesting individuals before leaving Washington?
A: Yes, Henry Adams—one of the most interesting scholars America ever produced. My favorite history professor at the University of California, Henry Morse Stephens, had given me a letter of introduction. Adams said he envied me for going to Constantinople because, he said, that was a major center of European diplomacy and the gateway to Asia. He said Asia, from one end to the other, is like a mass of jelly—you touch one end, and the other end quivers. He realized, even then, that the world in general and Asia in particular were shaping up toward a new era.

Q: Based on your observations in
Constantinople, why do you think the first world war came about?

A: I recently found a letter I wrote the first world war came about? Constantinople, why do you think cabled the kaiser that Belgian neutrality was of great interest to the United States, the kaiser might have hesitated to take military action against Belgium.

Q: You were at the Dardanelles for awhile, were you not?

A: Yes, some, although not so much as later. One lovely Sunday morning, as there was no traffic on the straits, I rowed myself out a way, and heard a terrific explosion, just a mile away, turn turtle. A British submarine had penetrated the mine fields and torpedoed it. I rowed toward it, where Turkish sailors were drowning. A few were floating around, and as they grabbed and hung onto my boat, nearly swamping it, I rowed them to shore as quickly as I could. By then, the Turks had launched a rescue operation to pick up as many survivors as possible.

Q: What was your function at the Dardanelles?

A: I was to help evacuate the British, French, and Italian consular officers who had been forced to remain after hostilities broke out. The Turks suspected them of being spies, and there was concern they might be ill treated. I got them all out, although I had no means of compelling the Turks to take action. I could only apply persuasion.

Q: That sounds like quite an achievement. Did it bring you a special promotion?

A: No, of course not. Nobody ever mentioned it. After all, virtually every achievement during war is unnoticed.

Q: But didn't that assignment involve risks?

A: Yes, but I wasn't married, and I had lived a dangerous life. I had played polo, and climbed mountains. A person who has frequently had to make sure he would not be swallowed up by a crevice or killed by a pony falling on top of him learns to sort things out.

Q: Did you go out on any other special missions from Constantinople?

A: Yes. My regular job at the embassy was pretty busy for a year or so, but early in 1917, the department sent me on a special mission overland to Syria and Palestine. The United States was still neutral then, but Washington was afraid the Turks might break off diplomatic relations with us and Americans in that area might be unable to leave. They wanted me to evacuate as many as possible, and I was able to get a number of them out overland, after the British blockaded all ports in the area.

Q: You were under 30 then—quite young for such an assignment. Were you sent because you had demonstrated courage and imagination at the Dardanelles?

A: No, because I was considered expendable. Actually, I nearly didn't come back, because Turkey did break off relations while I was still in Syria. In fact, about that time, I actually saw the Turks and the British fighting near Gaza in Palestine. On my return trip, the Turks yanked me off the train, and placed me under arrest, completely ignoring my diplomatic passport. After a week or so at Afion Kara Hissar, they put me on a train for Constantinople, but the moment I got there, I was again placed in custody, and sent right back to Asia Minor. A Greek barber at the railway station promised he would inform the Swedes—who were then representing US interests—that I was under arrest somewhere in Asia Minor. On receiving the message, the Swedish ambassador told the Turks the entire Turkish embassy staff in Washington would be detained until I was released—and I was then set free.

Q: What was your next assignment?

A: I returned to Washington, looking forward to my first leave in five years. The department, on learning I was going home to California, asked me to accompany Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long on a mission to meet Viscount Ishii of Japan in San Francisco. He later signed the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, by which the United States recognized that Japan had special interests in China, I had never heard of the viscount, and knew little of the issues, but the department evidently saw they could have my help at very little cost.

Q: And after that?

A: When I asked for an assignment that would involve me in the war effort, Under Secretary William Phillips told me the department wanted someone to help keep track of developments in our war with Germany. He apparently felt the semi-intelligence work I had already done might help—and so I went to The Hague from 1917 to 1919.

Q: Just what did you do there?

A: Well, The Hague was second only to Berne as a principal center of Allied intelligence work on Germany. We had a small staff, and as third secretary, I did a good deal of donkey work. I didn't actually deal with our opposite numbers in German intelligence. We had no CIA then, but I was expected to keep track of information about Germany developed by British intelligence in The Hague. I don't know whether the State or War Departments had...
intelligence agents in Germany, but their experts did maintain contact with Germans who passed information about military matters to us at the Dutch frontier.

Q: Didn't you return to Constantinople in 1919?
A: Well, I was assigned to go to Iran then, but just before I left Washington, the department asked me to stop off in Constantinople to help our high commissioner, Admiral Bristol, reopen our embassy there. Actually, we never fought the Turks, but the embassy was closed after they broke off diplomatic relations with us, when we declared war on Germany. The admiral's tour as high commissioner in Constantinople stretched out for several years, since we didn't conclude a peace treaty with Turkey until 1923.

Q: How long were you there?
A: About a year—and I was the only civilian on the admiral's staff during that time. After the post was open and functioning, I proceeded to Iran. The first part of the trip—to Alexandria—was easy enough, since Admiral Bristol put a destroyer at my disposal for that. Then I caught a commercial steamer to India and Basra, where I got a river boat up the Euphrates to Baghdad. But a local revolt there detained me for two summer months in daytime temperatures that stayed between 110 and 120°F. Eventually, the British sent in General Ironside—later Field Marshal Ironside—with a small contingent of troops, presumably as a token to show the Russians they would protect Iran if the Russians should attempt to take over, and the situation stabilized. Anyway, when Ironside heard I was stranded in Baghdad, he invited me to ride on his armored train to the Iranian border, and then to Tehran in one of his cars.

Q: What kind of post did we have there?
A: It was a small post, had been there since the 1880s. I had one secretary, and the two of us were the entire staff. Even routine reporting, under those circumstances, takes a lot of time—and that, plus administrative and representational chores, kept me busy. From that time on, by the way, I was chargé d'affaires at most of my posts—eighteen years, out of the twenty-five years before I became minister.

Q: What was happening in Iran at that time?
A: In retrospect, we know that was a pivotal moment in Iranian history. The British had discovered oil in the Persian Gulf toward the end of the first world war—a discovery that led to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. They had one or two people there when I arrived, but more staff gradually trickled in. They established an oil refinery in Abadan, and another at Khorramshahr.

Q: Were there significant political developments in Iran during that period?
A: Oh, definitely. Reza Shah, the father of the late shah, became ruler through a 1921 coup d'état. That was an almost bloodless revolution, and the world little noted it, but the British were watching it closely. Having been bled white during the first world war, they did not want to commit massive funds or troops to Iranian defense, as they would have in the 19th century. The Tudeh (Communist) Party was founded just about that time, and the British feared it might threaten their position, so they picked the older shah as the man to hold Iran together. Actually, Reza Khan, as he was then known, was of very humble origin, and he was almost completely illiterate. But the British saw he was a competent, energetic, and ambitious soldier. He had risen through the ranks to head a “cossack” brigade that was originally founded by the Russians, and he had the support of the men under his command. The dynasty he overthrew—the Kajar Dynasty—is almost completely forgotten today, although it had ruled Iran for some 150 years.

Q: With your extraordinary sense of history, you must have sent some fascinating reports to Washington about this . . .
A: Frankly, I haven't the vaguest recollection of what I said. I cabled many reports to the State Department, but Washington's principal source for detailed information was the press, particularly Reuters and the Times of London, which had excellent reporters in Iran, even then. The American press didn't consider these developments very important.

Q: Did you know the younger shah?
A: Yes, very well, all his life, from the time he was five. I used to play with him, when he was a little boy and he and his father occasionally had lunch or tea or dinner with me. I also knew him when I returned to Tehran as chargé d'affaires, from 1937 to 1940, and I saw him every few years after that.

Q: What was he like?
A: He understood the Iranian people—as his father did. He was acute and conscious of his father's lowly origin. And he had a deep feeling for Iran's lowest classes. He realized his father—despite great will power and common sense—had been too ignorant to be a first-class ruler. The older shah sent his son to school in Switzerland, when he was about fifteen or sixteen, and when he returned as crown prince, he resolved to avoid his father's mistakes. His life only took a tragic turn in late 1973, when the dance of the billions began, after oil prices began to skyrocket. Before that, he had never handled more than a few millions at a time, and Iran was modernizing on a fairly even keel. But after that, some people took advantage of the situation—and the shah, who was always open to advice. I often spoke to him myself, and he always listened to my views, as he did to other American advisers.

Q: Why did you go to Afghanistan in 1922?
A: I became acquainted with the Afghan ambassador in Iran, who wanted the United States to establish diplomatic relations with his country, as a newly independent nation. He said Britain no longer controlled Afghanistan's foreign affairs, as it had for 150 years. Remember, the British had taken over Afghanistan's foreign policy in the mid-19th century, fearing it would be annexed by Russia, which had already assimilated Bokhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent.

Q: How did Afghanistan regain control over its own foreign affairs?
A: Well, in 1919, the British had a little war with Afghanistan, on India's northwest frontier. They really relinquished control as a voluntary gesture, but the Afghans claimed they defeated the British militarily. They are good fighters, by the way.

Q: Had the Afghans already established diplomatic relations with other countries when you went there?
A: They were just beginning to. The Russians were there, and the British, the Turks, the Iranians, and the French. The Italians had just sent a mission there to establish diplomatic relations. The Afghans, in fact, sent a mission to Washington, trying to open diplomatic relations with the United States. On the whole, I think
we should have responded earlier than we did—but we waited until World War II. Anyway, the department authorized me in 1922 to go home via Afghanistan, so long as it entailed no extra cost for the government. I was the third American to visit Afghanistan; the first two were electrical engineers who set up a hydroelectric power plant.

Q: Did you get to know the amir? A: Oh, yes—Amanullah controlled everything. Nobody entered Afghanistan without his permission. I was his guest for about a month in the spring. He gave me a little house to stay in, with a couple of servants, and sent food from his kitchen every day. Each time I talked with him, he urged me to ask the department to establish diplomatic relations with him. His minister of foreign affairs pressed the same point, and I assured them I would convey their message to those in authority in Washington.

Q: Your sojourn there apparently aroused your interest sufficiently that you wrote a couple of reports about it... A: I prepared a short interim report, just after I returned to Washington. Allen Dulles, who then headed the Near Eastern division and was my chief, found it interesting, as did Under Secretary Phillips and others. I prepared a longer report in 1923, which the department published.

Q: That longer report was really a book—and an extraordinary piece of scholarship. How did you come to write it? A: Well, I began to pick up information on Afghanistan in Iran. Then I entered Kabul through India, and the British viceroy there—with whom I stayed—gave me more material, and I spent much of my time in Kabul doing research. On my way home, I passed through India again, and the British external affairs department there offered me stacks of material. Finally, my bride and I spent nearly every free evening in 1923 at the Library of Congress, digging up additional information.

Q: You were married about that time? A: Yes, shortly after I returned from Afghanistan. I had met my wife some years before that, in California. She was a very plucky woman, and never hesitated for a moment to go even to posts that seemed unpleasant. We were married nearly 50 years, and about half that time we were in the Foreign Service.

Q: I recently read your published report on Afghanistan at the National Archives, where they told me their one copy seems to be the only one that survived. Shouldn’t it be republished?

“For hundreds of years, Czarist Russia was a power that threw out tentacles toward the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and even the Indian Ocean. Then in 1917, it fell under the control of a strange anti-Western government.”

Q: Why did the United States establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan at that time? A: For a time, it appeared the war might actually spill over into Afghanistan. In fact, if the Russians had not stopped Hitler’s forces at the Caucasus, the Germans might well have overrun Iran and cut the Allied supply lines to Russia. If that had happened—and by that time the United States was in the war—the Allies probably would have found it necessary to open an alternate supply route through Afghanistan. In any event, Afghanistan remained neutral throughout the war, and my principal task there was to counteract the machinations and propaganda of the German, Italian, and Japanese ministers in Kabul, all of whom were very active. Three years later, by the way, I had the satisfaction of receiving the keys to their respective legations from them as a token of their surrender. That, in fact, capped my Foreign Service career.

Q: Your next assignment, after you left the Middle East in 1922, was in Washington? A: Yes—and that was my first and only tour at the State Department. Allen Dulles asked me to work for him, and I remained on his staff for two years. We worked on a number of things—on the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, which was signed in 1923, for example: Also oil was beginning to be important during that period, and I did some work on that too.

Q: Wasn’t it unusual to have only one tour in the department? A: Not in those days. Remember, during the two world wars—some ten years—few Foreign Service officers received Washington assignments or could even get home leave, and some spent their entire careers overseas.

Q: Did you then return to the Middle East? A: No, I asked for an assignment to Latin America, because I felt one must know something about that area in order to understand American diplomacy. I was there eight years—about two years each in Havana, San Salvador—where my son was born, Santiago, and Caracas—my daughter’s birthplace.

Q: Did you do any deeper historical research there, comparable to your report on Afghanistan? A: Yes, I started a comprehensive political survey of El Salvador, be-
cause I could find no good scholarly compendium on that country. I did a lot of research on that, but my manuscript—which was more than half finished—went down to the bottom of the Mediterranean with my other belongings.

Q: How would you summarize your impressions in Latin America?
A: I think we, as a country, never adequately understood that area, even though it is at our doorstep, partly because we never studied its history enough. Too many Americans assumed parallels between its past and our own that simply did not exist. For example, Latin America did not inherit the political wisdom from Spain that we did from Great Britain in our colonial days. They did inherit the Catholic church, whose missionaries exercised a great civilizing influence on Latin America. But I discovered that even 150 years of independence doesn't necessarily produce wise governments. I think we missed tremendous opportunities, over the years, to help Latin America informally, and to demonstrate our sincere interest in their political and economic progress.

Q: Your next assignment was China?
A: As a Californian, I always had an inner compulsion to go East. In fact, I had studied Chinese at the University of California. I had a brief stopover in China in 1922, on the way home from Iran. I was assigned to Peking in 1930, and I remained there nearly four years, during a very troubled period in Chinese history. Most Foreign Service officers then in China—including our minister—had spent their entire careers there. I think the department may have sent me to present some new perspectives.

China is so vast that even the concept of China becomes an abstraction. And it embraces a multitude of contrasts. I remember walking through a village some distance from Peking, and being shocked by its squalor. The unmitigated misery and filth were worse than anything I had seen in the Middle East or Latin America. But China has also produced, under the patronage of its emperors, marvelous works of art, and some of its citizens have been highly civilized. Even after four years there, I will always regard China as inscrutable.

Q: Did you get to know Chiang Kai-shek?
A: Yes, fairly well. I last had tea with him and his wife, Meiling, in Taiwan in 1968. In the early 1930s, I often went to Nanking, which was China’s capital for about ten years, and I usually saw him there. I think he was one of the greatest political leaders of the 20th century, and he has not been given enough credit for his efforts to rule under impossible conditions for about fifty years.

Q: Apparently you sent dispatches to the department mentioning a little band of revolutionary leaders, including Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai...
A: Yes, they acted as reformers in those days, and even Chiang Kai-shek believed until about 1926. There was a third man—Chu Teh, who was then almost as prominent. I would never have guessed that this triumvirate would eventually become the principal actors on the China stage. They were still ensconced in West China then. I knew little about them, except that they were in close touch with Moscow, and received funds from the Russians. But they clearly had brains and special political skill, and they took advantage of the general breakdown of China.

Q: Does this suggest anything about what Foreign Service officers should focus on?
A: Well, they have to concentrate on the government—but they shouldn’t neglect the opposition, or even its “revolutionary” fringe. But this was not a characteristic situation. Normally, political leaders last no more than a dozen years, but Mao and Chou lasted half a century.

Q: You were in China in 1931, when the Japanese invaded Manchuria. Do you recall your reaction?
A: Distinctly. I remember telling my wife that we were witnessing the beginning of the second world war. I was convinced of that. The world powers were watching. Hitler and Mussolini were flexing their muscles in Germany and Italy, and wishing Japan success.

Q: A lot of your Foreign Service career was in next door neighbors of the Soviet Union. Were you ever in Moscow?
A: Yes, twice, but I never served there. I spent about a month there in 1946, as a guest of ambassador Averell Harriman, on my way home from Afghanistan. But many of my posts were in countries acutely aware of the Russian threat. Certainly from 1919 on, I had absolutely no illusions about Russian aims, purposes, or methods. Here was an absolutely ruthless, totally unscrupulous government, with immense power. I first saw this, when I returned to Constantinople in 1919, and saw the complete collapse of Czarist Russia and the rise of Bolshevism. I saw Russians arriving there in 1920 after they fled to avoid being arrested or killed. Every day we saw well-born Russians arriving who had to sell everything they possessed to survive. There was complete chaos and confusion in Russia, but the Bolsheviks were getting a firmer hand every day.

Q: Do you think the problem is Russia as Russia, or Russia as a communist state?
A: It's the combination that makes communist Russia such a danger. For hundreds of years Czarist Russia was a power that threw out tentacles toward the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and even the Indian Ocean. Then, in 1917, it fell under the control of a strange anti-Western government.

Q: Where did you go after China?
A: I was in Cairo in 1934 and 1935. Politically, Great Britain controlled Egypt then, and it was important because of the Suez Canal. And after that, I was minister resident in Ethiopia. I arrived there some time before the Italian invasion.

Q: Did you have any premonition that war was coming?
A: Oh, yes, the Italian preparations were so obvious that nobody who was there could doubt that the invasion was imminent. Only intervention by the great powers could have stopped it. The United States could perhaps have brought enough pressure on Mussolini to force him to abandon his plans, but we weren’t willing to get involved.

Q: Did you alert Washington to what you saw?
A: Yes, I even sent a personal cable to President Roosevelt, shortly before the storm broke. I stressed that the great powers must put united pressure on Mussolini, if war was to be avoided. A year and a half later—
when it was all over, and the emperors had fled—I sent another message to the president. The Italians had taken possession of Addis Ababa and I suggested to the president that we should decline to recognize Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia. That’s exactly what he did. The British finally reconquered Ethiopia and put the emperor back on his throne in 1941.

Q: Did you know Haile Selassie?
A: Yes, I saw him often, over a two-year period. He was a remarkable man, with a great deal of shrewd common sense. He knew the strengths and limitations of his people, and he had their loyalty.

Q: You have already explained that you were chargé d’affaires in Iran from 1937 to 1940, after you left Addis Ababa. What did you do after that?
A: I was in Beirut from 1940 to 1942. The Germans were then trying to get a foothold in the Middle East, having already put planes in Aleppo, just north of Beirut. They were about to occupy Baghdad by paratroops. Lebanon was nominally still a “mandated” territory, administered by France, and the French administrators then represented the Vichy regime. I assumed the department wanted me to encourage the Lebanese to help the Allies as much as possible. I represented British interests there while we were still neutral—through most of 1941—and they were actively supporting the Free French. So I was inevitably involved when the Allied forces attacked and defeated the Vichy French in Lebanon. De Gaulle came there several times, by the way, and I conferred with him about his aims there. Beirut was politically and militarily a strategic center, being a key link between Turkey, which was neutral, and Egypt, which was under British domination.

Q: Following your retirement from the Foreign Service, you served with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and later with the World Bank. During that period, you saw economic development in the Third World coming to dominate a large part of US foreign policy. How would you relate this to the historical trends you observed in the Foreign Service?
A: Well, the term “Third World” hadn’t even been coined during my career, and those countries seemed unimportant, politically, economically, and financially. It has only gradually dawned on us—as the differences between the poor and the relatively rich broadened into a tremendous gap—that economic development is a major foreign policy issue.

Q: Weren’t you a founding father of the American Friends of the Middle East?
A: Yes, after the State Department suggested I take an interest in that area in 1950, when I left the World

Bank, some people in the department had become very concerned about the tense relationships between Israel and the Arabs. Some of us with long experience in the area felt there was a genuine need to show the Arabs that many Americans were their friends, but we also felt the White House or the Congress or both might object if the department took a public position on this at that time. As private citizens, we were able to get others interested, including Dorothy Thompson, its first president, and Kermit Roosevelt.

Q: Who were the most impressive people you knew at the State Department during your career?
A: I think Charles Evans Hughes was perhaps our most outstanding 20th century secretary of state. He was secretary in the early 1920s, and before that, he was governor of New York, and he was the Republican candidate for president in 1916. He later became chief justice. Among other things, after the first world war, he helped to improve US relations with Latin America, and he pressed for the Rogers Act of 1924, which virtually created our modern Foreign Service. And beyond his personality and brain power, Hughes had a great deal of charm.

Of our 20th century career diplomats, I think Joseph C. Grew was one of the most outstanding, closely followed by William Phillips. Grew held a variety of posts before he was appointed under secretary. He is best known today for his ten-year stint as ambassador to Japan in the 1930s. He served again as under secretary toward the end of World War II. Phillips entered the Foreign Service about the same time Grew did, and he also served as under secretary for a number of years. He served at various times as ambassador to the Netherlands and Belgium, and he was our ambassador in Italy while I was at Addis Ababa. He too had a great deal of charm. Allen Dulles was also outstanding and attractive. I knew him well as a young man, and almost to the day he died. He had an uncanny knack of sizing up complex situations in a nutshell.

Among the ambassadors I served under, I was particularly impressed by William Woodville Rockhill, my first chief at Constantinople. He was a Chinese scholar who had traveled in Tibet. His successor, Henry Morgenhau—the father of our World War II Treasury Secretary—was also very able. But I was personally closest to my chief at The Hague, John W. Garrett. He was an extremely human person, and genuinely interested in and fond of his work. Our friendship lasted all our lives and I often went to see him at his home in Baltimore after we both retired.

Q: In the light of your own career, would you today advise young Americans to enter the Foreign Service?
A: I have repeatedly done so. It is the most fascinating job in the world, and I have never regretted a single hour I spent in the Foreign Service. But one must not have exaggerated expectations. A Foreign Service career can never lead to wealth, and it does not necessarily lead to high office. When I entered the Service, no diplomatic secretary had ever been made a minister or ambassador. The hardships are often great, especially for Foreign Service wives, and promotions may be few and far between. Even without wars, diplomacy has always been a hazardous occupation. My immediate predecessor in Beirut was assassinated and one of my successors in Kabul was also murdered. Today international terrorism has made diplomacy even more hazardous.

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Simultaneously with the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—negotiated in 1968 by William C. Foster, first head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—the Johnson administration announced that agreement had been reached with the Soviets to start the SALT negotiations "in the nearest future."

The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically called on the great powers to negotiate mutual arms restraints—in a spirit of reciprocity for the forbearance shown by other countries. But what probably led the Soviets to decide in favor of SALT was the fact that they had finally reached a kind of rough parity in strategic weapons with the United States.

The actual beginning of SALT was to be further delayed for many months—first by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which made the United States unwilling to proceed; and then by the advent of the Nixon administration, which wanted to undertake its own set of preparations. Meanwhile, Gerald Smith, the new director of ACDA, was also designated to be chief US negotiator.

The prospect of SALT had generated a good deal of public enthusiasm, both in the United States and internationally; and when Smith and his colleagues finally began the SALT process at Helsinki in the fall of 1969, President Nixon sent them an open message of most unusual cordiality. It said in part: "You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever envisaged to an American delegation."

As Smith points out, the US delegation was made up of "hard-nosed cold war veterans." In addition to Smith himself—with his service under John Foster Dulles and other Republican credentials—there was Paul Nitze, representing the secretary of defense; there was Air Force General Royal Allison, representing the joint chiefs of staff; Llewellyn Thompson, former ambassador to the Soviet Union; Graham Parsons, a conservative professional diplomat, representing the secretary of state; and Harold Brown, president of CalTech (later to become secretary of defense). The alternate chairman of the delegation was Smith's deputy at ACDA, Philip J. Farley, who had a background of long service with NATO.

Nevertheless, the trust which President Nixon placed in his fellow men did not seem to include "arms controllers’; and he encouraged his special assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, to involve himself deeply in the SALT negotiations—sometimes behind the back of the US delegation, and along lines that were at variance with the delegation's instructions. Indeed, Smith reproaches Kissinger not only for meddlesomeness but for sloppy diplomacy, much of it carried out without benefit of sufficient military or other expertise, and compounded by failure to keep proper records. (Example: Kissinger at one point told the Soviets that the United States was willing to exclude submarine missile-launchers from limitations, and that there need be no limitations on modernization. According to Smith, the US delegation was able to redress these lapses only after much time and considerable effort.) Moreover, while the delegation wasted months, under Kissinger’s direction, in trying to negotiate non-negotiable ABM proposals, Soviet factories were continuing to turn out strategic offensive weapons. When Smith raised objections about some of Kissinger’s actions, President Nixon, perhaps not surprisingly, sided with the special assistant. (The president ended the conversation by shouting “Bullshit!”—the title of one of Smith’s chapters.)

In spite of these and other vicissitudes, conclusion of the final SALT I agreements in 1972 was hailed around the world as a stunning achievement—and it certainly contributed appreciably to President Nixon's re-election. Then, in the memorable period of "reconciliation" which followed this event, the rewards were handed out. Smith felt compelled to resign; many of his colleagues were forced out of their jobs; and his small agency had its budget cut by 30 percent.

But what about the substance of the SALT I negotiations? The ABM (defensive weapons) Treaty—negotiated almost entirely by the delegation—has been widely cited as a sound and well-drafted instrument. Smith nevertheless observes that, in the final analysis, the United States needlessly handed the Russians a gift. He and his fellow “arms controllers” had favored a complete ban on ABMs; but the administration rejected this idea, and the final treaty allowed each side two ABM sites.

The number was later reduced to one for each side (by an additional protocol in 1974); and then Congress directed that the one and only United States ABM site (at Grand Forks, N.D.) be mothballed. All this presumably makes little or no difference militarily; but as Smith comments, "We have in effect imposed an ABM ban on ourselves while the Soviets retain their Moscow ABM defense."

The SALT agreement on offensive weapons—the final version of which was negotiated largely by Kissinger and his staff at the hectic 1972 Moscow summit—has proven to be considerably more controversial. In part this was because it spelled out (perhaps unavoidably) and thus recognized the higher number of submarine-based missile launchers which the Soviets had begun to build before the long-delayed freeze took effect. However that may be, Smith says the "major failure of SALT I was that MIRVs [multiple warheads] were not banned" [emphasis added]. He and his arms control colleagues (but not all members of the SALT delegation) had favored such a measure, and there seems little doubt that—through a ban on testing—it would have been technically feasible. But the US military opposed this idea, and so finally did the administration. Given the larger size of Soviet missiles, it was inevitable that when the Russians later developed this technology themselves, they would be able to place a much larger number of MIRVs on them, thus threatening the existence of US

fixed land-based missiles. As a result, Americans are now confronted with the prospect of having to build a rather grotesque MX mobile missile system, at colossal expense.

Smith is objective enough to say that perhaps the Russians finally would not have bought a MIRV ban either. And yet, there is fairly strong evidence that they would have.

On the face of it, it looks as if some non-military people—Smith and his arms control colleagues—had better ideas about the real needs of American security than the military did. But whether or not we share Smith’s views about these now-historical ABM and MIRV issues, we are left with some troubling questions. Was all this just an episode of “the Nixon years,” or is it apt to be repeated in other forms?

If in the future a small agency like ACDA just happened to come up with a good idea for national security that ran counter to a major vested interest in a more powerful organization, how much of a chance would the idea stand? At this point the prospects don’t look very reassuring.

—Ralph Stuart Smith

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**Bookshelf**

**The Kremlin’s Dilemma**, by Tufton Beamish and Guy Hadley. The Presidio Press, $12.95.

No more timely topic can be imagined than the struggle for human rights in Eastern Europe, brought into the recent headlines by events in Poland. *The Kremlin’s Dilemma* is aptly named for it describes, in lucid detail, the essence of the problem faced by Moscow today: whether to continue its policy of suppressing national aspirations in the satellite states and risk an explosion or allow some degree of relaxation which might get out of hand and put in peril the Communist monopoly of power and satellite allegiance to the Soviet Union.

The authors believe that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany and Bulgaria are now becoming more of a liability than an asset to their Soviet masters. Tufton Beamish (Lord Chelwood since 1974) has a first hand acquaintance with the subject; he came to know and admire the Poles when his regiment, the Fifth Fusiliers, fought beside them in North Africa and Italy; in 1945, as MP for Lewes, he went to Poland and warned in a series of articles that Stalin’s Yalta promises of free elections and non-interference were worthless; after further visits to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria he wrote *Must Night Fall?*, an account of the methods used by the Kremlin to set up puppet regimes in those disparate, formerly independent countries in complete disregard of British and American protests. His co-author, Guy Hadley, was for many years a distinguished BBC foreign correspondent, who reported widely and in depth from Eastern Europe. Together, they have assembled an impressive array of facts, pointing out the weaknesses in the Soviet position, especially of an economic nature, which they assert could and should be used by the West to bring about concessions on human rights if the Communist nations are to benefit from Western technology, grain supplies and trade credits.

A foreword by Edward Crankshaw stresses the differences in the satellite regimes and the common error of lumping them together. In the wake of Afghanistan and the clash over human rights at the conference in Madrid, the book has a relevancy even greater than intended.

—Henry S. Villard

**Disaster Prone?**


If you liked the ’70s you will love the ’80s. During the ’80s, writes director of UNA-USA policy panel on disaster relief, Stephen Green, with populations of disaster-prone areas exploding, with energy shortages and the prospect of adverse climatic change, . . . increasingly large areas of the developing world become vulnerable to disasters of a scale hitherto unknown,” megadisasters which will, in turn, create political instability and conflict. Disasters are largely unavoidable. But the obstacles to effective relief are primarily organizational, involving waste, duplication, and lack of coordination, political where the needs of the victims are displaced by the designs of governments, and systemic with relief based on the spasmodic, band-aid approach. “The very concept of permanent emergencies underlines the shallowness of the traditional forms of disaster relief.”

Green’s theme, therefore, is that the disaster relief community, the UN, governments and volages must renovate the system and fast. Beyond the obvious improvements, Green recommends an international convention akin to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Rules of War making disaster relief a human right, where relief would be routinized, coordinated and guaranteed and, above all, free from the political whims of both donor and recipient. The inevitable question of sovereignty, Green believes, might be dealt with by extending the concept of the “common heritage” from resources to human life, itself. This is not a book for the disaster buff. It is a book for the statesman, the diplomat and the concerned citizen and should be required reading for the Global 2000 task force.

—Robert K. Olson

**Hell Bent for War**


Thomas A. Bailey has been for years one of our “standard” historians. His *A Diplomatic History of the American People* has become the authoritative text in the field. A professor at Stanford, he has trained and guided many young American historians into the craft.

His new book—*The Pugnacious Presidents*—has all the earmarks of a historian’s pot-boiler: Transparently timed for publication in an election cycle, it is essentially a short, thoughtful essay overinflated and stretched to book length.

Bailey draws some obvious conclusions. Presidents and their parties are not demonstrably linked with involvement in wars, major or minor; no president, no group of presidents, and no political party can be stigmatized as “hell bent for war,” recent campaign rhetoric notwithstanding; the United States was more pulled into already existing wars than instigating them. Protection of American lives and property or the perception of a threat to national honor or interest appear to have been the basic cause leading to US involvement in little or big hostilities.
A few observations are of particular interest though not fully explored. America's status as a major world power has always conventionally been dated from the Spanish-American War; Bailey suggests that, well before that time, the United States was behaving like a major power and was so being perceived. The two most pugnacious presidents—Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt—were "discreet or lucky enough" to stay out of all major wars. While Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson both were awarded Nobel Peace Prizes, Wilson led the nation into one of its bloodiest wars.

Bailey acknowledges the special character of his book in his bibliography. He has dispensed with the footnotes so beloved by the historian "because the major episodes in United States history that relate to wars are matters of general knowledge." That there were more than 160 armed interventions by the United States from 1798 to 1970 is perhaps not so generally known. Bailey also confesses that most of the information in the book was garnered in a lifetime of studying and teaching American history and in the preparation of twenty other books, twenty additional revisions and more than a score of annotated articles. Organizing a voluminous amount of material and information into individual chapters on each president, Bailey attempts to reach conclusions as to the pugnacity of each—and there are few surprises.

What Bailey doesn't address in this book is the shaping power of the presidency on the White House incumbent—how did it change him? We've seen through the Brady photographs the toll taken on Lincoln by the Civil War and his awesome responsibilities and to a certain extent, the same kind of phenomenon with FDR, and to a lesser extent, with our current incumbent. Bailey doesn't deal with the increasing complexity of the presidency or attempt to measure the demands of 19th century presidencies with those after Hiroshima. Neither does Bailey adequately deal with "fate," luck, or whatever would account for those factors outside a president's control which dictated or called for presidential responses identifiable as pugnacious or not. Finally, Bailey doesn't establish any kind of measuring stick for pugnacity in a president: this is particularly misleading in assessing a president—designated by the Constitution as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, empowered to make treaties, and sworn by oath to defend the Constitution. Pugnacity, in other words, appears to be a built-in desiderata for any president at any time.

—PRATT BYRD

The Middle East Revisited
THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS by George Lenczowski. Cornell University Press.

Some 28 years ago I used George Lenczowski's The Middle East in World Affairs as the text for my first course on that part of the world. This year his fourth edition was published. The first edition was 459 pages in length; the present edition has 862 pages—and smaller print. The index and the bibliography are also longer. I cite these data to suggest that there has been a quantum increase in the volume of information about the Middle East. Professor Lenczowski has organized this material in his customary workman-like and scholarly fashion. Of the
textbooks dealing with the Middle East, this one, in my opinion, continues to be the very best.

It is rare to catch the author in error, but I respectfully note that he is incorrect in describing the American observers in the Sinai as “radar technicians.” The Sinai Field Mission had no radar.

—JAMES H. BAHRI

Justice Is Served


The Supreme Court occupies a place in our government without parallel in other societies. Acting as mediator between the policy choices of state legislatures, Congress and the president on the one hand, and the Constitution on the other, it continually redefines the meaning of that historic document in terms of the economic and social conditions of the time. A careful study of the court’s decisions in such areas as the police power of the states, relations between the races, and the rights of free speech and assembly, describes better than any history book the American political ethos and its view of the individual in relation to the powers of the state.

The justices of the Supreme Court, whatever the eminence of their respective legal talents, are not usually the stuff from which an interesting, let alone thrilling, biography can be woven. Except in a narrow professional context, their opinions are more important than their personalities. Justice Douglas was different on two counts. He was a political personality in the best sense, whose strong libertarian philosophy was unashamedly reflected in his judicial opinions; and his personal life and acerbic manner kept him continually in the limelight, and occasionally on the edge of impeachment. The author of over twenty books on a variety of subjects from mountain climbing and conservation to political philosophy—many of indifferent quality—this posthumous work is one of the best he ever wrote. Although criticized by legal scholars as misrepresenting the thrust of some of the court’s most famous decisions, including opinions of his own, the autobiography nevertheless provides a fascinating inside picture of the Court in operation, as well as of its most famous members. Much better than the semi-fictional best-seller, The Brethren by Woodward and Armstrong, it sets out the way decisions are reached and how the personal philosophy of individual justices can tip the scale one way or the other.

INDEPENDENT JOURNEY by Professor Simon provides a different route to the same end. Obviously less opinionated than the highly opinionated autobiography, it sets the accomplishments of Justice Douglas against the backdrop of the New Deal and post-war readjustment. It also gives the reader a frank and not always agreeable picture of the man. Stated bluntly, Mr. Justice Douglas in his personal relations was inconsiderate, contentious and thoroughly spoiled by his rapid ascent to power as chairman of the SEC and youngest justice (at 42) appointed to the court since the early 19th century. Impossible to live with as a person, he nevertheless was indispensable in his crusty devotion to the Bill of Rights and Jeffersonian democracy.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.
Paris Peace Conference


The End of Order is a well-made book, beautifully printed, well written, and handsomely covered with a detail from one of Monet's paintings of the poppy fields.

The author, betraying some of his instincts as a dramatist, sees the Paris Peace Conference as a piece of theater. He brings his characters in and out of center stage and gives them good lines. He chooses little vignettes of conversation and comment as his dialogue, moving quickly from one short scene to another.

Mee's conclusions about the conference which ended the then world's greatest war are not particularly novel or even original. He sees Paris and Versailles as the finale of the old international system and, at the same time, the beginning of the new unordered one. He has done voluminous research in the original works as well as in the secondary sources, knitting both of them into a tapestry of color, incident, and comment. His summary conclusions about the conference are short and well-written; the emphasis is, however, on the characters and their fumbles, ineptitudes, and the pageantry of the occasion.

Major international conferences multiplied after Versailles. There were the naval and disarmament conferences in the '20s and '30s; the abortive meetings of the League of Nations; the conferences of Munich/Berchtesgarten, Yalta and Potsdam: San Francisco, Breton Woods, Helsinki and Belgrade; and, finally, the standing international conference in the UN, its general assemblies, security councils, and countless other UN meetings and assemblies.

As yet, we have no equivalent chronicles on these later conferences and peace-making ventures. The writing has been largely autobiographical, self-justifying, critical, or predominantly polemical in nature. There were no poppy fields at Hiroshima and no Monet to paint them. The deck of the Missouri is not a Hall of Mirrors; allied occupation of Germany is not the same as bringing a German delegation to France through the desolate battlefields. The large delegations of the United Nations are basically technocrats (technical bureaucrats), and the consummate politician as actor on the international stage is a vanishing phenomenon.

These changes are not necessarily bad; they make it increasingly difficult, however, to view, as Mee does, international politics as drama and political leaders as actors. Somehow, Mee makes it all hang together and his book is a success. Small wonder that it has been picked up both by the History Book Club and the Book of the Month Club.

—Pratt Byrd
BREAKOUT
from page 32

only institution with the bureaucratic potential to take full responsibility for the president's duties in foreign affairs is the Department of State.

To establish a new relationship with the White House that clearly puts the secretary in a position second only to the president in foreign affairs, three steps need to be taken:

- The role of the NSC must be narrowed.
- A similar cabinet-level foreign economic policy council must be created.
- New mechanisms for foreign policy advice and staff support for the president must be created.

The NSC Role: The first task is to redefine the relationship between State and the White House in ways that build on direct lines of authority and confidence. This means returning the National Security Council to its earlier, more limited role as a forum for resolving certain political-military issues, specifically, issues requiring presidential intervention when defense programs directly and significantly affect foreign relations. The scaled-back NSC staff and its director would support this function only, providing a neutral point for preparing issue papers for presidential decision.

The Carter administration established two high-level committees under the NSC: a special coordinating committee (SCC), chaired by the presidential assistant, to advise the president on cross-cutting issues, and a policy review committee (PRC), chaired by the secretary of state to address chiefly bilateral policy. This division now provides the basis for taking the PRC out of the NSC system and placing it at the apex of a revived interagency structure under the secretary of state.

Foreign Economic Policy: To more effectively coordinate foreign economic relations with foreign policy, a new foreign economic policy council, analogous to the NSC, should be set up. It would be chaired by the president and include as statutory members the vice president, the secretaries of state, treasury, labor, energy, commerce, agriculture, and transportation. Others would take part at the discretion of the president. However, the secretary of state would be the executive agent of the council, giving State the dominant and final voice on foreign economic questions before the president.

Foreign Policy Advice and Staff Support: It is a healthy axiom of democratic methodology that the president should have alternate sources of advice. And he needs a small, politically-sensitive group that can protect his interests, prod the bureaucracy to meet deadlines, follow-up, etc., but that does not play a major substantive role in formulating and coordinating policy. Two innovations at the White House could meet these needs:

1) A Foreign Policy Advisory Council: This small permanent council would be established by legislation as a White House office akin to the council of economic advisers. Its chairman would be the senior Foreign Service officer in active status, and its four or five other members would be senior career FSOs, chosen to achieve a mix of geographic and functional area ex-

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experience. The president would appoint the chairman and the membership for renewable two year terms, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The council would provide the president with a direct source of professional advice on foreign policy separate from the non-career politically appointed layers of the Department of State. The council would be analogous in part to the military’s joint chiefs of staff, but it would not have operational responsibilities as the chiefs do in their roles as the heads of individual armed services. The council chairman should enjoy direct, easy, and informal access to the president, as the assistant for NSC affairs does now. The chairman would also provide advice, but not policy or operational guidance to the secretary of state. The key feature of the institutional arrangement would be to protect the independence of the chairman, allowing him to convey to both the president and the secretary the viewpoint of the professional diplomat. In effect, this would help bolster the status of naysayers who could help inform presidents of the realistic limits of our ability to influence foreign events, especially for domestic political purposes.

2) An Executive Office Secretariat for Foreign Policy Staff Support: This new organization would be headed by an executive assistant to the president, appointed directly by him. Its core staff would constitute a politically-sensitive group that would seek out and protect presidential interests, conduct follow-up checks on the implementation of presidential directives, prod on deadlines of papers to be submitted to the president, and selectively monitor foreign operations. Its chief purpose would be to provide direct and centralized staff support to the president, and as directed by him, to the secretary of state when the latter must act in the name of the president to coordinate and direct the supporting activities of other government agencies engaged in foreign relations. By providing a White House-based organization capable of bolstering the secretary in his dealings with other departments, the secretary’s role as the chief agent of the president in foreign policy should be greatly enhanced.

In addition, there would be three subordinate staffs lodged in the executive office secretariat, each headed by a director:

Director, Foreign Policy Advisory Council Staff. This very small administrative support staff would assist the FPAC members in monitoring foreign policy issues and would serve chiefly as a bridge to the expertise of the specialized staffs of other agencies, namely, State.

Director, National Security Council Staff. As a scaled-down version of the present NSC staff, this body would provide staff support to the president on political-military, intelligence, and technology transfer questions for NSC meetings.

Director, Foreign Economic Policy Council Staff. While this staff would support the president in his role as chairman of the FEPC, it would also give the council’s executive agent—the secretary of state—a vantage point from within the White House to coordinate the foreign economic activities of other departments.

To be continued next month.
DIPLOMATS VIEWPOINT, from page 15

domestic arguments (e.g. Gladstone vs. Disraeli about morality in foreign policy), but the main lines were clear and continuous, and no one doubted England's intention to pursue her interests. In the United States today, as a diplomat sees it, we have moved towards a fragmented and dis-unified foreign policy to the extent that many, at home and abroad, doubt our will to pursue—steadfastly—our national interest.

Can we afford a division between executive and legislative which leaves the world uncertain of the president's authority in making foreign policy commitments? Can we afford a system of policy-making in which independent organizational entities contest a unitary, agreed policy line? Can we afford a system of leaks and press inquiry in which it is assumed that official policy is an adversary to be attacked? Can we afford the politicization of foreign policy in which electoral considerations refuse to stop at the water's edge?

Mind you, I am not criticizing or prescribing. The professional diplomat accepts his country and its political system and carries out declared policy to the best of his ability. I am merely acting as witness to history, and in that role I fear I see our cohesiveness in foreign policy deteriorating at the same time as greater pressure demands more steadfastness in response. Times are changing, mostly for the worse, it seems all too often, and we may not enjoy all the freedom of choice we would like to have, in foreign policy as in other things. These are serious, hard-pressed days, and I fear we cannot afford not to be totally serious about foreign policy today.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service
by S. L. Nadler

"This may have something to do with the leak to the press you've been wondering about."
Lessons of the Midcentury

From page 34

Sions were gained by the press and not fully clarified in subsequent discussions. One was the Acheson speech of January 12, 1950 to the National Press Club and another was Dulles’s address in New York, January 1954, before the Council of Foreign Relations that occasioned the debate about “massive retaliation.”

In the case of Acheson in 1950 it is widely believed that the Communists in Moscow and in Peking concluded that the United States would not take strong measures if the North Koreans invaded the South. This conclusion was taken as encouragement to action and so was held to be a cause, at least in part, of the outbreak of hostilities. The unfolding tragedy did not become evident until some weeks later but the blame was placed on Acheson—the press did not cease its criticism of a remark which seemed to have far-reaching consequences.

In the case of Dulles’s speech in 1954, there was a fallacious interpretation that it was the intention of the administration to lessen its reliance on conventional defense and place its major dependence on the use, or threatened use, of nuclear arms. This was not the Eisenhower-Dulles policy but it was never possible to eradicate the idea from the public debate and the thought still lingers.

The increasing use of the media to spread information and educate the public has thus, in these two cases, and in some others that might be cited—got out of hand. The advantages were real but the dangers were always present.

In all the major decisions and events in midcentury the importance of the personalities of the men are clear. The qualities of leadership were the result of strong characters developed in their youth. They were the sons of ministers, brought up in simple middle-class homes, imbued with a sense of public service and blessed with a love of nature. In each case innate intelligence was enhanced by sound education. Both boys traveled abroad with their fathers when they were young. When Acheson was eighteen he joined a work gang building a railroad in Canada. When Dulles was nineteen he went as his Grandfather Foster’s aide to the second Hague Peace Conference. The total impression of their youth was one of security, stimulating occupations and the intention of fulfilling their duty as citizens.

This kind of upbringing would be hard to duplicate—but the qualities which were basic to their accomplishments are needed now to carry out the arduous and demanding responsibilities of a secretary of state. In any case strong characters and vigorous personalities are essential to a successful performance. There is one overriding conclusion and lesson of paramount significance, that is—there is no room for vagueness of purpose or confusion in command.

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supreme thought in the mind of every young officer must always be: every day I spend in the Foreign Service I am helping my country to survive in a dangerous world—and that, in itself, may be very interesting and colorful.

Q: In summary, did you have any criticisms of the State Department while you were in the Foreign Service that may still be valid?

A: Well, frankly, I think the department and the Foreign Service have done a very good job, especially considering that we have always been the stepchildren of Congress. I shall never forget hearing a congressman, in opposing increased appropriations for the State Department, exclaim that he saw no reason diplomats should get more money to enable them to go to "pink teas and dinners with duchesses!"

I think my generation in the Foreign Service saw the United States become, for the first time, war-minded, because we felt we were in danger of being defeated. The distressing developments associated with war made everything we did for the government seem much more important, and we took life much more seriously than people in other times. But I feel that the White House—under any administration—and the State Department have too frequently been inclined to pursue what I have called a grasshopper policy—a tendency to jump from one crisis to another, instead of trying to see how crises in particular areas can be avoided or dealt with by considering their interrelationships with political and economic developments in other areas. Also, I think we tend to personalize public affairs too much—we see individuals, rather than large historic forces, as dominating the world. Perhaps that's why the American press tends to define foreign affairs in politico-military terms, emphasizing civil wars, revolutions, and other violent developments as central to history. Whenever there's a crisis, people in Washington notice it—but they are often blind to large historic trends and influences.

I believe the crying need in the present confused world is to educate public opinion to understand that, whether we like it or not, two world wars have made the United States a world power, and we must act accordingly. If we don't we run a lot of risks. I would say day-to-day decisions in foreign policy are not nearly as important as long-range planning. Western civilization is passing through a serious crisis, and in a democracy like ours, Congress insists upon exercising an influence upon foreign policy that may not always be wise. It is perhaps too much to hope that there will ever be bipartisan support for all aspects of any comprehensive foreign policy in a period of rapid change like the present, but I would hope we would always bear in mind that not only our own welfare is at stake, but that our decisions may affect the future of the entire world. We shall need intelligence, patience, and persistence to make democracy endure—and above all, we need leaders who will avoid as much as possible making world affairs part of our domestic politics.
en who, despite their high rank, have given us crucial help and encouragement. For example, in my opinion, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was possibly, until his resignation in April 1980, the most enlightened and aggressive leader the State Department has ever had on the subject of equal employment opportunity. He came to the position understanding the problems, and one of his first tasks was to establish a special executive-level task force on affirmative action. WAO spent hundreds of hours helping this task force with studies and recommending remedies. Secretary Vance frequently took time, in spite of his tremendous other burdens, to review progress and problems with us.

One of the major accomplishments of the past two years has been the development of a new foreign policy directive on the worldwide status and rights of women, the first of its kind in the history of the Department of State. Ambassador Marshall Green played a major role in developing this directive, whose first dramatic sentence by Secretary Vance reads: “A key objective of US foreign policy is to advance worldwide the status and condition of women.” With the formulation of this foreign policy directive, one recently reaffirmed by Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, women’s rights have now become internationally an integral part of the US human rights policy.

Improving the condition and rights of women, both in the United States and worldwide, is a formidable task; we are aware that we have embarked on a long journey where progress is hard to measure. But, looking back over the last decade, progress is visible while far from enough. When the Foreign Service women began to organize to safeguard and enhance their status in 1970, less than 5 percent of the Foreign Service officer corps was female; at the end of 1979, women constituted 11.5 percent of that elite group—proportionately over twice as many. While increases at the top levels were minuscule (due to slow career promotion rates), female representation at the incoming junior level went from 9 percent to 20 percent in eight years—reflecting, I believe, reforms like elimination of the “no-marriage” rule and a more active recruitment of women. As to women in the department’s civil service, while there has been no progress at the top, there has been a more than 6 percent gain among women in middle-level posts earning from about $25,000 to $50,000.

In the 36 years from 1933 (when the first woman, Ruth Bryan Owen, was named chief of a United States mission abroad) to 1969, 11 women have served in that top role (seven were political appointments, just as men have long been similarly chosen, and four were career officers). In the decade before October 1980, 26 women, one of them our first WAO president, Mary Olmsted, were named to ambassadorial posts (14 political and 12 career), a dramatic change reflecting, again, in my opinion, the positive impact that WAO and the women’s movement have had on the United States foreign affairs agencies.
WHO SHOULD BE AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR?

from page 28

gaucheries, gaffes, and general incompetencies of an egregiously unqualified political appointee. The author of that article had been the ambassador's deputy. Is it right for such a man (or woman), whose very proximity to the chief of mission involves the sharing of knowledge in a position of personal trust, to lift the veil and reveal the feet of clay? In my opinion the answer is no, it is not fair, it is not right, it is an extremity to which one should resort only in desperate circumstances. Presidentialy appointed chiefs of mission, even when they are incompetent, should be able to count on the loyal support and discretion of all their subordinates, and especially their DCM—unless it becomes necessary to tell the truth about their incompetence. As Winston Churchill wrote in connection with his appointment to become prime minister early in World War II:

The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips, he must be sustained. If he makes mistakes, they must be covered. If he sleeps, he must not be wantonly disturbed. If he is no good, he must be pole-axed. But this last extreme process cannot be carried out every day; and certainly not in the days just after he has been chosen.

In other words, loyalty to the chief of mission cannot be at the expense of the larger loyalty to the country and to those who govern it. Lest there be any misunderstanding let me make clear that “lifting the veil” on the chief has nothing to do with “lifting the veil” on policies with which one disagrees. An ambassador, or any of his subordinates, who believes such policies to be misguided has a duty to bring his views to the attention of Washington—and there are channels for this. But for the dialogue between Washington and the field to be constructive it must be confidential. “Whistleblowing” or policy criticism in a classified communication to the department of state is one thing, public disagreement with presidentially approved policy is quite another. Those who wish to disagree in public should resign and not expect to be protected by their career status against the consequences of indiscretion. Nothing that has been said about an officer’s overriding responsibility to the country should be misinterpreted as recommending license to carry policy disagreements—whether within an embassy or between an embassy and Washington—outside the official family. The president must have continuing good grounds to count on the loyalty of every one of his appointees, and of course every Foreign Service officer is a presidential appointee. The president must also be able to count on their discretion—in not, for instance, rushing into print as soon as someone has left his post and “returned to private life.”

Presidential recognition of the absolute loyalty of the Service to any administration—because it is nonpolitical—will also increase presidential confidence in career officers as desirable appointees to man the country’s first line of defense, our diplomatic missions abroad.

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Letters

News Wanted

After reading recent articles on life in a Foreign Service family I began to wonder what happened to people I went to school with in Japan. I am particularly curious about those of us who attended Canadian Academy (1957-60) in Kobe. My three-year stay there was the longest of any school I ever attended. More recently I worked at Tehran International School (Iranzamin) (1970-1975) and am curious about former students and faculty there too.

If any of your readership know how to acquire the above news or have news themselves I would be grateful for the information.

MARTHA (HERNDON) (SANII) WILLIAMSON
2681 Fitzhugh Road
Winter Park, Florida 32792

Pronatalization?

I have just read an interesting monograph by Dr. Stephen Mumford entitled: "Population Growth and Global Security: Toward an American Strategic Commitment." Dr. Mumford makes a number of important observations in his paper, included among which is a description of a pronatalistic organization.

I quote: "Pronatalistic means encouraging births either intentionally or unintentionally. There are many pronatalistic organizations in the United States, many of which are unintentionally pronatalistic. An organization providing goods or services for a family on a schedule that is not based on cost per child is pronatalistic . . . . Most medical insurance companies . . . . can thus be regarded as pronatalistic. If an insurance company, or an employer in its group medical insurance package, requires all employees to share in the costs of child-bearing . . . . then that company or employer can be viewed as pronatalistic.”

This publication crossed my desk at the same time as information on the 1981 Health Benefits Open Season. Not only does the Foreign Service Benefit Plan increase more than twice as much for the “Self and Family” option (74.7%) as it does for “Self Only” (34.8%), but also the “Self and Family” option now costs 5.39 times the amount charged for the “self only” plan. Clearly, I am unhappy about this discrimination and do not feel that my wife and I (no children) should be subsidizing my more reproductive colleagues.

While such subsidies are not, as Dr. Mumford points out, uncommon in group health plans, recognition of the problem is the first step toward resolution. I believe strongly that AFSA should press for group health insurance which does not force small families to pay the costs of larger ones. As our present foreign assistance policy encourages lesser developed countries to offer positive incentives to their citizens to reduce family size, the pronatalistic aspects of US government personnel policies should at least be amended to offer a consistent, positive example.

DAVID A. COHEN
Georgetown, Guyana

Foreign Service Stamp

I read your ad on the 200th anniversary of the Foreign Service and decided to draw a 1981 commemorative stamp for the Foreign Service. I am 14 years old and I collect US stamps. I have hoped for an ad like this to come along since last summer. I hope you like my stamp. I also hope that I will win and my stamp will be issued in 1981.

SCOTT NUGENT
APO San Francisco

Taking Part in Great Decisions

The campaign rhetoric and the TV interviews of ordinary citizens illustrate graphically the need for the public to be much better informed on international issues. Members of the foreign affairs community, active and retired, at home and abroad, have a special opportunity to help in this effort by fostering and participating in the Great Decisions program.

The Great Decisions program sponsors grass roots discussion groups who review at least eight international issues annually (usually January to March), collects ballots on the issues from the participants (50,000 in 1980) and provides a summary of the ballot results to the secretary of state, the White House and the Chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committees of the Congress. The non-partisan Foreign Policy Association administers the Great Decisions program through volunteer state and community coordinators countrywide and publishes a booklet for the use of participants in the program which gives the pros and cons of each of the eight issues.

The Great Decisions topics for 1981 (the 27th year of the program) are:

1. THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION: Dilemmas of Power and Peace
2. FROM CAIRO TO KABUL: Oil, Islam, Israel—and Instability
3. CHINA AFTER NORMALIZATION: How Good a Friend for the US?
4. SOUTH AFRICA: Can Race War Be Avoided?
5. CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: New Political Earthquake Zone
6. FOOD: Humanity’s Need, America’s Interest
7. MADE IN USA: Is US Competitiveness Slipping?
8. THE WORLD IN 1981

Dr. Mughisuddin of American University is the coordinator for the greater D.C. area. Community coordinators are:
D.C.: Gene Solon 484-1184
Md.: John Erskine 530-8152
Va.: James Roush 528-4553

Being an AID retiree, and theoretically having lots of time, I would be willing to be a contact for retirees or for foreign service personnel abroad who may wish to start a discussion group locally or inform their friends and relatives in the US of the name and address of the Great Decisions Coordinator in their area.

Participating in the program not only will bring more realism into the discussions but will also open up a new Dissent channel.

JAMES ROUSH
Fdn. for P.E.A.C.E.
P.O. Box 118
Arlington, Va. 22210

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Marriages

Hartwell-Dorman. Leslie Ann Hartwell, daughter of FSO and Mr. Ralph B. Hartwell, was married to David Brent Dorman on October 18, in London. Mr. Dorman is a former Marine security guard, having served in Colombo and Paris.

McArule-Fendrick. FSO Patricia Lynn McArule was married to FSO Reed Jackson Fendrick on September 14, in Glen Echo, Maryland. Ms. McArule is assigned to INR/NESA and Mr. Fendrick to INR/AA.

Deaths

Clarke. A daughter, Aurelie Catherine, born to FSO and Mrs. Walter Clarke on October 20 in Alexandria, Virginia. Now in Lagos, where her father is political counselor.

Howland. Harold E. Howland, FSO-retired, died on November 30 in Tampa, Fla. Mr. Howland joined the State Department in 1951 and the Foreign Service in 1959, serving at Tel Aviv and Amsterdam before his retirement in 1972. He also served as deputy assistant secretary of state. He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth, of 405 Dove Circle, S.W., Vienna, Virginia, two sons, Harold Jr., of Vienna, and Charles, of Fort Myers, Florida, a daughter, Carol Pittard, of Columbus, Md. and a brother, George, of Williamsburg, Va.

Jernegan. John D. Jernegan, retired ambassador, died on November 7 in Carmel Valley, California. Ambassador Jernegan entered the Foreign Service in 1936 and served at Mexico City, Barcelona, Tunis and Rome before his appointment as ambassador to Iraq. He then served as political adviser to the Air University, as ambassador to Algeria, as diplomat in residence at Emory University and as political adviser to CINCLANT before his retirement in 1972. He became a career minister in 1962. Ambassador Jernegan is survived by his wife, Mary, of 118 Rancho Road, Carmel Valley, California 93924 and four children.

Jorrick. Elizabeth Jorrick, FSO-retired, died on November 27 in Washington. Miss Jorrick joined OWI in 1944 and State in 1946. She served at Peking, Tokyo and Rome before her retirement in 1962 as public affairs officer attached to the Far Eastern desk. She is survived by two sisters, Mrs. Reed Gerard of Washington and Mrs. G. Thomas Love, of Louisville.

Loupe. Sylvain R. Loupe, FSO-retired died on July 1. Mr. Loupe entered the Foreign Service in 1946 and served at Paris, Bonn and Rio de Janeiro before his retirement in 1967. He received the Meritorious Service Award in 1950. There are no known survivors.

Roman. Edwin Nelson Roman, FSI-retired, died on November 6 in Bluemont, Virginia. Mr. Roman joined the Department of State in 1948 and served at Ankara, Venice and Mexico City before transferring to USIA in 1956. He then served at Dacca and Santiago before his retirement in 1972. He is survived by his wife, Valerie, Route 212-B1, Bluemont, Va. 22012, two daughters, Lynn, of Seattle and Jane, of Hawaii, and a son, Allen, of Salem, Oregon.

Spinks. Charles N. Spinks, FSO-retired, died on September 14 in Florida. Dr. Spinks joined the Foreign Service in 1948 and served in Tokyo, then Bangkok on detail to USIA. He later served in Djakarta and Canberra and again in Bangkok. He is survived by his wife, Martha, of Regency West, Apt. 533, 5575 Gulf Blvd., St. Petersburg Beach, Fla. 33706.
One of the most common of occurrences nowadays is the ever increasing cost of things that we need, even insurance, and particularly health insurance.

As you know, premiums for insurance are based primarily upon the actual experience of claims made and benefits paid in the preceding year.

Last year (1980) the American Foreign Service Protective Association not only was able to avoid an increase, but to effect a substantial decrease in premiums. And for that Foreign Service Benefit Plan subscribers can thank themselves.

But that was last year!

Unfortunately premiums for 1981 are up substantially, and while it won’t reduce the costs, at least some explanation might be helpful.

The first jolt was that for the first six months of 1980, our Self Only claims were up 79.5 percent and Self and Family claims were up 100.3 percent.

These increases translated into an actuarial basis meant that our premiums had to be increased 35 percent.

The premium cost for the Self Only subscription, both the employee and the government share, was increased 35 percent. raising the biweekly cost to the member from $3.44 to $4.64.

However, the impact on Self and Family enrollment was greater. There is a maximum government contribution computed each year as per FPM Supplement 890-1 Federal Employees Health Benefits; Appendix A, Chapter 89, Title 5, US Code Section 8906. In 1981 this maximum amount is $35.64, effectively limiting the government participation and thereby throwing the additional premium cost (above $35.64) onto the employee. This results in a Self and Family biweekly premium increase from $14.32 to $25.01 for 1981.
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