The History of the Service

The History of the Journal

Lawrence Eagleburger on Success in the Foreign Service

Visions of the Future by:

George Shultz • George Kennan • Alexander Haig • Walter Stoessel
Leonard Marks • Charles Percy • Frank Carlucci • Jodie Lewinsohn
Dante Fascell • Malcolm Toon • Peter McPherson • Donald Devine
Charles Mathias • William P. Rogers • Ronald Spies • Bruce Laingen
Charles Whitehouse • David Newsam • Edmund Muskie • U. Alexis Johnson
Richard Helms • Hans Tuch • Thomas Boyatt • Daniel Mica • Claiborne Pell
Alfred Atherton • Theodore Elliot • Jacob Beam • Richard Fox
Jim Leach • Stephen Low • Kenneth Dam • Michael Armacost
Jonathan Dean • Seymour Finger • Evan Galbraith • William Bacchus
CONGRATULATIONS

to the American Foreign Service Association and to
the Foreign Service Journal on your Sixtieth Anni-
versary.

OPEN SEASON IS UPON US.

If you are not already enrolled in the Foreign Service Benefit
Plan follow the good example of seventy-five percent of your
colleagues and sign up for the only Federal Employee Health
Benefits (FEHB) Plan that is designed SPECIFICALLY and
EXCLUSIVELY for Foreign Service Personnel and their families.
We offer more than good protection at reasonable cost. We offer
the personalized services of a professional staff that knows and
cares about the Foreign Service. With us you are more than a
social security number. Look for our Brochure in your Open
Season packet or write to us or call us at (202) 393-4221 for further
information.

All AFSPA members and prospective members are cordially invited to
attend our ANNUAL MEETING:

DATE: November 15, 1984
TIME: 12:00 Noon
PLACE: East Auditorium-Room 2925 D
Department of State

Send suggested agenda items to: AFSPA, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W.,
Suite 1305, Washington, D.C. 20006
In just three short years Ford Escort has become the best-selling car in the world. (Based on worldwide production estimates 1983 calendar year.) Maybe it's because Escort offers the traction of front-wheel drive, the smooth ride of four-wheel independent suspension, and a choice of beautifully functional body styles.

Whether you choose Escort wagon with its 58.8 cubic feet of cargo hauling room or Escort GT with its 1.6 liters of High-Output horsepower, you'll be driving a car that's a world leader and a world beater.

Discounts for the Diplomat.

Ford Motor Company offers Special Diplomatic Discounts that apply to any Ford and Lincoln/Mercury car or light truck. Just clip the coupon below and send it to us for more details.

Please send me full information on using my diplomatic discount to purchase a new...

Write to: Diplomatic Sales, Ford Motor Company
815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 785-6047

NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
COUNTRY
STATE
ZIP
CONTENTS

Constant and Changing ........................................... 26
Barry Rubin

Since the Rogers Act of 1924, the modern Foreign Service has undergone many difficulties and reforms.

Remaining Effective .............................................. 32
Notables from the past and present speak out on where the Foreign Service should go and how to get it there.

The Politics of Guts .............................................. 41
An Interview with Lawrence Eagleburger

The recently retired under secretary for political affairs discusses the changing nature of success in the Service.

A Foreign Service Filament ...................................... 46
Smith Simpson

The Journal has been both a forum and a link for the Service, but its mission has often been ambiguous.

Association Views ................................. 3
Letters ................................................. 4
Books: Essay ............................................ 8
Books: Reviews ......................................... 16
Clippings .............................................. 22
People .................................................. 34
Association News ............................... 58

“\The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service”\n
The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs, published monthly except August by the American Foreign Service Association, a private non-profit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily reflect the official views of the foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. government, or AFSA. The Editorial Board is responsible for general content, but statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in the ASSOCIATION NEWS and the ASSOCIATION VIEWS, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

JOURNAL subscriptions: One year (11 issues), $15. Overseas subscriptions (except Canada), add $5 per year.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional post office. Postmaster: Send address changes to FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Microfilm copies: University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 (October 1967 to present).

The JOURNAL welcomes manuscripts of 1500-4000 words for consideration by the Editorial Board. Author queries are strongly urged, stamped envelope required for return. All authors are paid on publication.

© American Foreign Service Association, 1984.
2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.
Phone (202) 338-4045.

ISSN 0015-7279.
Organizations, like people and nations, must grow and adapt if they are to survive and prosper. In the past, the story of the modern Foreign Service and AFSA has largely been one of how well we have been able to accomplish this. In the future, we can expect that the pressures on us to redefine our mission will accelerate as technology and politics change the practice of diplomacy.

This brings us to the choice which always faces us—adapt or be left behind. If you believe, as we do, that the professional Foreign Service is something worth fighting for, then you will be concerned by the vast array of challenges facing us—challenges to our ability to protect ourselves, to do our jobs effectively, to provide for our families, and to ensure an equitable retirement. If we as a Service refuse to meet these challenges, then the Foreign Service will become an anachronism long before another 60 years pass.

The time has come for all of us to join in a common enterprise—to preserve, strengthen, and improve the diplomatic career. In the pages of this magazine and through REDTOPS and cables, we at AFSA try to inform the Service of important developments on the horizon. We do so not to alarm but to mobilize. The record is clear—whenever we in the Service have taken charge of our own future, we have succeeded in guiding change into directions that strengthened the Foreign Service. But on those occasions when we abdicated our responsibility, we ended up meekly and bitterly accepting whatever came our way.

Our task, though formidable, is relatively simple. We must demonstrate our ability to do our job and make sure that the unique needs and requirements of the Service are recognized—in the Whire House, by the Congress, and by the public. We must put our case forward in a strong, clear voice; a voice that comes not just from a few of us, but from all of us. The challenges we will face over the next few decades are too important to be left to the few to decide; we must all play a part in determining the Service’s destiny.

This nation generally recognizes what is in its best interest, and for that reason we look with hope toward the future of the Service. But a healthy and confident Service is not a favor that will simply be granted by a grateful citizenry; it is an achievement that can only be obtained through diligence and perseverance. If history teaches us anything, it is that we will have the future we deserve.

DENNIS K. HAYS
President

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
Governing Board
President: DENNIS K. HAYS
Vice President: ANTHONY S. REEVES
Second Vice President: CHARLOTTE CRAINER
Secretary: IRVING A. WILLIAMSON
Treasurer: JANET JENKINS
AID Representative: ROY A. HARRELL
State Representative: JAMES A. DERRICK
Thomas J. Miller
JAMES SPAN
JAME WILLIAMSON
USIA Representative: RICHARD ARNOLD
Retired Representative: WILLIAM CUMMINGS
ROGER PROVENCHER
JOHN THOMAS

Staff
Executive Director: LYNN IGGEN
General Counsel: SUSAN L. HALE
Members’ Interest & Grievance Counselor: SABINE SIME
Members’ Interest & Grievance Representative: BETHANDRA WILLIAMS
Comptroller: ALISON BURGH
Memorandum Coordinator: L. J. SCOTT
Admin. Assistant: WANDA DICKIE
Legal Assistant: GREGORY A. LEWIS
Executive Secretary: DEMETRIA PAPPANASTAS
Secretary: SUPASI LAPCHAROEN

Congressional Liaison
ROBERT M. BYERS

Scholarship Programs
DAWN CUTHREL

Face-to-Face Program
RONALD A. DURTH
The American Foreign Service Association, founded in 1924, is the professional association of the Foreign Service and the official employee representative of all Foreign Service employees in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development and the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Active membership in AFSA is open to all current or retired professionals in foreign affairs overseas or in the United States. Associate membership is open to persons having an active interest in or close association with foreign affairs who are not employees or retirees of the foreign affairs agencies. Annual dues: Active Members—$3.117, Retired Active Members—$50 for members with incomes over $20,000, $25 for under; Associate Members—$15. All dues include $10.75 allocation for journal and association news subscription under AFSA Bylaws. All AFSA members are members of the Foreign Service Club, owned and operated by AFSA.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037
Membership inquiries, comptroller, scholarship programs, insurance programs, membership inquiries, comptroller, (202) 632-8160
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037
Membership inquiries, comptroller, scholarship programs, insurance programs, financial aid representatives, (202) 632-0160
Governing Board, general counsel, labor-management relations, (202) 632-2548
members’ interests, grievances, (202) 632-8160
Foreign Service Club, (202) 338-5730
Finding the RIGHT HOME at the RIGHT PRICE in the RIGHT PLACE and obtaining the RIGHT FINANCING

is what the real estate business is all about.

My associates and I will provide the personal, professional service you need in purchasing or selling your home in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

**SHANNON & LUCHS**
**THE FULL SERVICE REALTORS®**
Shannon & Luchs has its own Mortgage Company, Closing and Escrow Division, and Property Management Offices.

“Nice People To Do Business With”

SHANNON & LUCHS
REALTORS® • Established 1906

---

Please send information on purchasing a home in:

- [ ] Virginia
- [ ] Maryland
- [ ] D.C.

Please send information on: selling my home  
renting my home

Name...........................
Address..........................................................
City.................................................. Zip
Phone...........................................
Present Post ........................................
Arriving Washington .................... (approx. date)

SHANNON & LUCHS
313 W. Maple Avenue
Vienna, VA 22180
Attn: Ed Rankin

Bus. (703) 938-6070  Res. (703) 845-0431

---

**LETTERS**

**Constructive Criticism**

The evil of apartheid is not primarily the political and economic subservience it fosters but, as Steve Biko so eloquently described, the psychological and spiritual harm it does to all parties affected by it. It is so easy, from our positions of comfort and distance, to prescribe patience to those who are oppressed, demanding Gandhian non-violence from a land which Gandhi himself abandoned. The policy of “constructive engagement” as outlined by Chester Crocker in the February issue of the **JOURNAL** is extremely ethnocentric and is well deserving of the criticism Paul Tsongas expressed.

Steve Biko, an eloquent and qualified spokesman for the aspirations of the black majority of South Africa until he was murdered by the Pretoria regime, outlined three steps that the U.S. could take to show the sincerity of its professed solidarity with the struggle of Azanian blacks (Azania is the true name of South Africa):

...the U.S. can and must influence the political direction within South Africa... If the Carter administration means business in its human rights policy, it should put pressure on Pretoria to guarantee freedom of the press for blacks and freedom of movement for blacks... In the second place, Washington can exert such economic pressures on South Africa that it will become considerably less profitable to invest in South African industries... Thirdly, in the diplomatic arena it would be a tremendous psychological boost for the blacks in this country if the U.S. downgraded its diplomatic presence in Pretoria....

Regarding the subject of divestment from South Africa, Biko had this to say:

The argument is often made that loss of foreign investment would hurt blacks most. It would undoubtedly hurt blacks in the short run, because many of them would stand to lose their jobs, but it should be understood in Europe and North America that foreign investment supports the present economic system and thus indirectly the present system of political injustice.

South Africa is the last bastion of Nazi
Congratulations to the Foreign Service Journal on your 60th Anniversary of publication.
What do Ike, JFK & Nixon have in common?

They were moved by FIDELITY STORAGE

From presidents to plenipotentiaries, Washingtonians choose Fidelity Storage, the company with more than 75 years of experience. Fidelity is one of the area's largest moving and storage companies, with six locations throughout the metro area—from the District to Virginia to Maryland. Fidelity's warehouses are the largest and most advanced containerized facilities inside or outside of the Beltway, with super-secure vault storage for your silver and other valuables. We are the only State Department contractor with both a quality control program and fulltime inspector to ensure the highest standards.

We have moved Patton, MacArthur and Doolittle. From generals to general service officers, join a moving crowd.

Inbound or Outbound, Storage or Air Freight, call Fidelity Storage
(703) 971-5300 • PO Box 10257, Alexandria, Va. 22310

philosophy on this planet. There is no other country on earth in which citizens are denied the rights guaranteed by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights solely on the basis of their race. By allying ourselves with the government that perpetuates this injustice, as "constructive engagement" certainly does, we bring down upon ourselves the opprobrium deserved by the vilest of racists. This is not in the interest of the United States.

LEE ELBINGER
Foreign Service officer
Muscat, Sultanate of Oman

Vietnam Survey

A research study is being conducted at Cleveland State University on women who served in Southeast Asia in any capacity (i.e., officers, nurses, administrators, etc.) during the Vietnam War. This is an extension of research and information that has been collected by others since the early 1980s. By means of a questionnaire, I want to learn more about your experiences in Southeast Asia and how you feel they have influenced your life today. This could lead to possible networking for these women veterans. In order for this study to be representative of the many women who served in Southeast Asia during this period, your help is needed. A prompt response to my inquiry would be greatly appreciated and all replies will be held in strict confidence.

MARGARET A. GIGOWSKI
Department of Psychology
Stilwell Hall
Cleveland State University
1960 E. 24th Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Subscription Rates

Because of its recent increase in size, the JOURNAL has raised its outside subscription rates. The following rates now apply to all new subscriptions and renewals:

One-year (individuals and institutions) — $15.00
One-year (overseas, not FPO addresses) — $18.00
Single issue — $2.00

Members may purchase holiday gift subscriptions for $12 for one year (add $3 for overseas subscriptions). Checks should be made out to AFSA and mailed to 2101 E Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. Offer good until December 15, 1984.
Sola Power Line Monitors Pinpoint Power Problems, Identify Causes, Specify Solutions

Selection of the most appropriate Sola Power Conditioner for each installation is dependent upon line voltage conditions, type of equipment to be regulated and the degree of protection necessary for smooth efficient operation.

Sola Power Line Monitors help simplify selection by identifying dangerous or disruptive power line disturbances that can cause sensitive electronic equipment to malfunction, lose memory or even crash. The monitor pinpoints one or more power problems. After the audible alert sounds, turn the monitor over to read the probable causes and suggested solutions for the indicated problem.

The Sola Power Line Monitors can be used to examine potential sites for electronic equipment or to monitor power already being fed to mini-computers, P.O.S. terminals, medical and test equipment, word processors, or communications systems. The unit is completely portable, simply plug into any standard power outlet. Choose either the Standard non-printer that indicates power failures, low line voltage, high line voltage, voltage spikes, voltage drops and high frequency noise with an L.E.D. or one of the printing models that also provides a permanent record of the type of disturbance as well as the time and date of occurrence. In addition, all printing models monitor line frequency. The deluxe printing model also monitors temperature and the load’s DC power supply.

SEND FOR FREE CATALOG

General Electronics, Inc.
4513 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
(202) 362-8300
TWX 710-822-9450 (GENELEC INC WSH)
Turn Your Home Into Cash

You've probably accumulated considerable equity in your home as a result of rising property values and the regular mortgage payments you've been making over the years.

And if you're a homeowner in Maryland, Virginia, or D.C., your credit union can help you put that equity to work with a Loanliner Home Equity Loan.

Special Advantages of a State Department Federal Credit Union Home Equity Loan

- High credit limits
- Replenishing line-of-credit
- No "points" at closing
- No annual membership fees
- No prepayment penalty or balloon payments

Home Equity loans are available NOW. Ask for details at any of SDFCU's branches, or call one of our local or toll-free phone numbers.

If you don't belong to SDFCU, call or stop by one of our branches today to join.

---

Rochelle Jaffe is pleased to announce the opening of
Travel Books Unlimited
4931 Cordell Avenue (Off Old Georgetown Road)
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
301-951-8533

SPECIALIZING IN:
- Maps from the world's leading cartographers
- Travel Books and Guides — The most extensive selection available
- History Books — Background reading for the serious traveler
- Language Dictionaries — All levels
- Travel Narratives — For the armchair traveler
- Language Cassettes — Most foreign languages

MAIL ORDERS ACCEPTED PUBLIC PARKING
SPECIAL ORDER ANY BOOK IN PRINT MONDAY—SATURDAY 10:00-9:00 ACROSS THE STREET

---

Books

Vietnam Redux

By Robert M. Hathaway


Thirty years after Dien Bien Phu, twenty years after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and nearly a decade after the ignominious collapse of South Vietnam, Americans seem obsessed with discovering the meaning of their unhappy experience in Indochina. In the late 1970s, the publishing industry confidently pronounced that there existed no audience for books on Vietnam. Today, however, we cannot consume enough books about America's misadventure in Southeast Asia. Monographs by the score have appeared during the past several years. Happily, some are quite good.

Certainly one of the best is Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History, written as a companion to the recent public television series. Sweeping in scope, measured in tone, Karnow's is a big book: 670 pages of text, followed by a chronology, useful thumbnail biographies of the principal Vietnam-
"Chrysler Corporation extends its warmest congratulations to the Foreign Service Journal, the U.S. Foreign Service and the American Foreign Service Association in honor of their 60th anniversaries. Since 1984 also marks Chrysler’s 60th anniversary, I can honestly say, ‘We’ve been with you all the way.’"

Lee A. Iacocca
Chairman

★ Chrysler Corporation
ese, French, and U.S. actors, and brief notes on his sources. Karnow’s extensive experience in Asia enables him to understand what Washington decisionmakers could never acknowledge: that the war would ultimately be won in Asia, by Asians, for Asian reasons. Once this fundamental reality is recognized, Karnow’s decision to allot more than 150 pages to events before 1955, when the United States began to supplant the French, seems eminently sensible.

The American war in Vietnam, Karnow writes, was a misguided endeavor, a “tragedy of epic dimensions,” which nobody won. He finds U.S. involvement in Indochina a sorry record of one misjudgment after another. There is little of the “noble cause” remembered by Ronald Reagan. But at the same time, Karnow’s history is remarkably free of the passions that long clouded consideration of the war. He successfully eschews oversimplifications and stereotypes, and while admiring the skill and determination of the communists, avoids romanticizing or idealizing them. His portrait of conditions in Vietnam since the fall of Saigon is damning. By 1981, he judges, the Hanoi government had shown itself “an inept and repressive regime incompetent to cope with the challenge of recovery.” The nonspecialist seeking one book on the war could do no better than to settle down with Karnow. It replaces all earlier studies as the standard account.

Complementing Karnow in a number of respects is a volume by another American journalist, Arnold Isaacs of the Baltimore Sun. Isaacs’s Without Honor explores exactly the period to which Karnow gives least attention: the years of denouement, 1972—75. And, where Karnow is distant and even-handed, Isaacs is angry and appalled by the human tragedy of war. He directs his ire at the leadership of both sides for causing and perpetuating such pain, but particularly at those in Washington who displayed “a morally obtuse willingness to spend Asian lives forever for nothing more than a vague concept of American prestige.”

This is not, however, simply another splenetic attack on the United States. Without Honor carefully explores the process by which “peace with honor” disintegrated under the twin burdens of Saigon’s incompetence and Hanoi’s determination. The policies of the Thieu government after the signing of the Paris accords, Isaacs believes, reflected neither political nor military realities. Thieu’s insistence on defending every inch of South Vietnam, whether militarily feasible or not, simply dissipated Saigon’s strength. The belief that the United States would eventually return in force to rescue its ally was equally ill-founded. Washington, Isaacs believes, encouraged Thieu in these fantasies. This was not realpolitik; nor was it moral. And it certainly was not in Thieu’s interest nor the United States’.

Isaacs focuses almost exclusively on events in Indochina, where he was assigned (he was evacuated from Tansonnhut airfield just before Saigon fell). He ignores the Washington side of the story and makes no attempt to understand the communists; they are but a shadow here. What he lacks in scope, however, he compensates for in style. His description of a group of Cambodian women—“backs hunched under their thin sarongs like little punctuation marks of sorrow and despair”—vividly evokes the ultimate costs of war.

Like Isaacs, Stuart A. Herrington leads us through the period between the Paris accords and the collapse of South Vietnam. His Peace With Honor? is a highly personalized memoir of his service as an Army intelligence officer in Vietnam from 1973—75. As an analysis of South Vietnam’s demise, it suffers from a fundamental misconception: that by 1973 a different U.S. course could have altered the ultimate out-
FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL WORLDWIDE PERSONAL PROPERTY INSURANCE FLOATER

underwritten by London Insurers and exclusively administered by HUNTINGTON T. BLOCK INSURANCE
2101 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone 202/223-0673
Toll free 800/424-8830
Telex 892596

foreign affairs recreation association

THE ALTERNATIVE TO A HOTEL ROOM
Housing by FARA — For the Members of FARA

- Tastefully furnished: efficiency, one and two bedroom apartments (Completely refurbished in June 1983)
- Color television in every apartment
- Full kitchens
- Weekly maid service
- New centrex telephone system with secretarial service
- Off-street parking available
- Coin operated laundry room in the building
- For your convenience, American Express, Master Card, and VISA accepted
- Children free

FARA’s Apartment Alternative is Located in the Columbia Plaza, One Block from the Department of State.

IN THE PLAZA: Pharmacy, specialty food center, liquor store, an elegant Chinese restaurant, dry cleaner, beauty parlor, and a tailor shop.

WALK TO: The Kennedy Center, the Watergate complex (with shops, restaurants and malls), George Washington University Medical Center.

METRO TO: Downtown DC and museums, northwest DC, Virginia, and National Airport.

All of the Above Services and Conveniences for the Best Rates in the Neighborhood.

FOR RESERVATIONS: FARA Housing, room 2928, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.
Call: (202) 463-3910. Hours: 8:00-4:30, Monday–Friday.
Dear District Moving & Storage:

We’re changing posts, again, and I’d like to be as organized as possible, this time. As many times as we’ve moved, I still find myself forgetting some of the details. Last time, for instance, I forgot to stop our utility service until we were at our new location. We didn’t need that! I’ve heard you have a checklist that makes moving easier. Can you fill me in?

Waiting with Baited Breath

Dear WWBB:

The checklist you refer to is the District Moving & Storage’s “New Assignment Abroad Checklist”. With it you can organize your move and make it smoother—and many times easier. The “Checklist”, with more than 60 valuable tips, organizes what needs to be done before the packers arrive, suggests what to do during the packing phase, provides tips on airfreight inclusion and what to bring in the accompanied baggage. I suggest you send away for the free “Checklist” today by calling us at (301) 420-3300 or sending in the coupon below.

Roland Kates
Vice President

People Moving Abroad Ask
DISTRICT MOVING & STORAGE

How Can I Make Moving Easier?

Dear District Moving & Storage:

Dear WWBB:

The checklist you refer to is the District Moving & Storage’s “New Assignment Abroad Checklist”. With it you can organize your move and make it smoother—and many times easier. The “Checklist”, with more than 60 valuable tips, organizes what needs to be done before the packers arrive; suggests what to do during the packing phase; provides tips on airfreight inclusion and what to bring in the accompanied baggage. I suggest you send away for the free “Checklist” today by calling us at (301) 420-3300 or sending in the coupon below.

Roland Kates
Vice President

If you’re interested in receiving District Moving & Storage’s FREE “New Assignment Abroad Checklist”, please call (301) 420-3300 or fill out this coupon and send to: District Moving & Storage
3850 Penn Belt Place
Forestville, Maryland 20747
We’re right on the beltway!

☐ Yes, please send me the free “Checklist” described above. I will be moving soon and am anxious to make my next move as easy as possible.

☐ Send me labels I can use to assist me in my move.

☐ I am interested in more information about District Moving & Storage. Please have your representative call me at the number below.

☐ The best time to contact me is: ____________________________

Name ____________________________________________

Address __________________________________________

City ______ State ______ Zip ______

Phone (D) ______ (D) ______

WELCOME TO DISTRICT MOVING & STORAGE
DISTRICT MOVING & STORAGE, INC.
3850 Penn Belt Place
Forestville, Maryland 20747
301 • 420 • 3300

WASHINGTON, D.C. BOUND?

RENT-A-USED CAR from $12.95 per day
RENT-A-NEW CAR from $17.95 per day
FREE MILEAGE ALLOWANCE
Ideal When Shipping POV or on Home Leave

Call DRIVE-A-BARGAIN (703) 683-6400
2850 Jefferson Davis Hwy., Arlington, VA 22202
For Fast Pick-up at Crystal City Metro

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
gon's fall in April 1975. Duiker then offers sketches on politics and government, the economy, culture and society, and foreign affairs, with an emphasis on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam since formal unification in 1976.

Duiker suggests that the U.S. failure in Vietnam lay not so much in political or military shortcomings in Washington or Saigon, but in conditions arising out of the southeast Asian past. When considering why Vietnam's Confucian tradition made it more receptive to Marxist nationalism than to western liberalism, he describes the function served by Confucianism in a manner that could well be applied to Marxism: "to provide the state with a political philosophy and a system of ethics to maintain social order and to promote the material welfare of the mass of the population." At the same time, Duiker makes it apparent that South Vietnam lacked the cultural heritage that promoted the development of democratic institutions in the West.

James Pinckney Harrison's *The Endless War* also recognizes that what we Americans call the Vietnam war was in fact only part of a much larger drama. Less than a quarter of this volume covers the years of heavy U.S. involvement after 1964, and this section is the most conventional. William Fulbright does not appear in Harrison's text, nor does Robert Kennedy. The Eisenhower administration's brief flirtation with assisting the beleaguered French at Dien Bien Phu is passed over in a single sentence.

Instead, Harrison bids us look to Asia. Before we can understand how the communists managed to defeat enemies far more powerful than they, we must ask how Ho Chi Minh and his followers took command of Vietnamese revolutionary nationalism. They succeeded, he believes, by shrewdly merging Vietnam's two revolutions—the national and the social, the anti-imperial and the anti-feudal. Above all, they were able to mobilize the peasantry by relying on skillful organization and a powerful ideology, the theory of a people's war. Patiently building a village-level infrastructure over decades, the communists blended traditional nationalism, continuity of leadership, a consistent program of political reform, propaganda, and selective terror into a mass revolutionary movement.

While one must applaud Harrison's relentless focus on the Vietnamese side of the story, his volume leaves the reader dissatisfied. The section on communist organization and ideology promises to be crucial but in fact contains little that is remarkable or new. Moreover, a wooden, me-
Insure household goods with Security, and move overseas with peace of mind.

As a Foreign Service Officer, you’ll benefit from special low rates and invaluable reassurance. You can insure all household goods and personal effects, including automobiles, anywhere outside the U.S. Security’s Government Service Policy covers goods in-transit and at your overseas residence. Call or write Paul Wood, the Manager of our Insurance Division. You can also store the valuables you want to leave home with Security—the world’s most experienced moving and storage company.

Call (202) 797-5625
1701 Florida Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009

... unmistakably

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street N. W. Washington, D.C. 20007
In Georgetown, (202) 338-2500

chanical style, an indiscriminate enthusiasm for statistics of unknown or questionable reliability, and an admiring "gee-whiz" tone in writing of the communists detract from his analysis.

The tenth anniversary of the 1973 Paris peace accords inspired a number of conferences and symposiums around the country. In Peter Braestrup’s Vietnam as History and Harrison E. Salisbury’s Vietnam Reconsidered, we now have the revised transcripts of two of these conferences. Together these books suggest that we have at last begun to achieve a consensus on some of the war’s principal controversies—but also that any number of questions about U.S. participation in that conflict remain.

Braestrup’s volume records a two-day conference at the Smithsonian Institution’s Woodrow Wilson Center; Salisbury’s a four-day gathering at the University of Southern California. A handful of individuals attended both meetings, but the roster of participants at each highlights a major difference between the two books. The Wilson Center scholars had a decidedly “establishment” air about them. Many were government historians or associated with the military, and the journalists and academics present were not given to extremism or intemperance. The participants in the California conference were altogether a different breed. Of editor Salisbury, Karnow has written that for a time in 1967 his dispatches from Hanoi emphasizing the wanton character of U.S. bombing made it seem as though he had replaced Ho Chi Minh as the Johnson administration’s primary adversary. Other attendees at the California gathering included Daniel Ellsberg, Chicago Seven defendant David Dellinger, CIA critics Frank Snepp and Ralph McGehee, and radical historian William Appleman Williams. Perhaps because of these participants, Vietnam Reconsidered is the livelier of the two collections—though not necessarily the better.

What seems particularly remarkable in reading the Braestrup book is the widespread sense that, given the times, U.S. entry into a disastrous war was the only conceivable decision the Washington policymaking process could have produced. This somber conclusion seems justified and, yet, terribly unsettling. In one very useful article, John Mueller argues that the Vietnam war was no more unpopular than the Korean war during comparable periods and that the antiwar movement had very little effect either in shaping public opinion or in electing antiwar candidates. In fact, the unruliness of the protestors may even have frightened potential opponents of the war away from open resistance.
In Salisbury’s volume a considerable amount of space is devoted to the press controversies of the period. In this regard, Phillip Knightley’s comment bears repeating: “The significant point about the flush of stories attacking U.S. involvement,” Knightley reminds us, “is not that they were written—that was inevitable—but that the United States provided the access and freedom that enabled them to be written.” The experiences of other democracies, Knightley adds, using Britain’s management of the news during the Falklands campaign as an example, make U.S. practices in Vietnam particularly commendable.

Ultimately, these two volumes are useful in outlining the state of contemporary thinking on the war’s many unresolved issues. That they do not always furnish satisfying answers is not surprising, though this does suggest a difficulty inherent in books of this nature: too often the participants talk past rather than to one another and there is little sustained analysis. And that, more than any other commodity, is what this unhappy chapter in our past deserves.

A contribution of a different sort—and a highly useful one—is offered by The War in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, 1945–1982, compiled by Richard Dean Burns and Milton Leitenberg. The most recent addition to the War/Peace Bibliography series, this volume provides a comprehensive bibliography of books, articles, and doctoral dissertations pertaining to the war. Its breadth is indicated by its chapter headings: General Reference Aids; Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; Vietnam; from the First to the Third Indochina Wars; the United States and the Politics of Intervention; Strategy, Tactics, and Support Efforts; Ecocide, POWs, War Crimes, and Casualties; and the War at Home. Among the 6200 citations are a few in French but none in Vietnamese. The editors occasionally provide brief annotative comments to guide the reader, although fuller evaluations would have been a welcome addition.

Even without a subject index, this volume furnishes an important research tool to the serious student of the U.S. role in Indochina.

What are we to make of this spate of recent scholarship? For one thing, it becomes increasingly apparent that many of the positions held by the antiwar movement simply do not survive critical review. The infamous Christmas bombing of 1972 did not flatten Hanoi or decimate its civilian population. The National Liberation Front never exercised the autonomy its proponents claimed. The communist negotiating stance was, in the main, as in-
CONGRATULATIONS!

To the professional men and women of the Foreign Service on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Service, and to the Foreign Service Journal in its 60th year of publishing. We are proud to be associated with such an outstanding publication.

We are celebrating too—our eighth consecutive year of serving, through the Journal, the real estate needs of Foreign Service officers and staff.

Evelyn Cotterman
Long & Foster
Real Estate, Inc.
59 offices in metro Washington

tractable as the Nixon administration always said.

But having conceded this, the larger truth is that most good research on the war vindicates the substance of the antiwar critique. In Vietnam as History, Harvard's Ernest May repeats an O’Henry story that might well serve as a parable for U.S. involvement. A young man, so the tale goes, hesitates at a crossroads. He finally chooses one direction, enjoys various adventures, and is eventually killed by a French nobleman. We are then carried back to the crossroads and follow the hero as he takes each of the remaining forks. No matter which road he takes, he always winds up dying at the hands of the same nobleman. This, to May, symbolizes the U.S. predicament in Vietnam: there were numerous alternatives, but ultimately they all led back to the same ending. “Short of treating all Vietnam as the Romans treated Carthage,” May writes, “the Americans had no more chance in the long run against communist nationalism than the British and the French had against liberal nationalism in the United States and Mexico.” This conclusion will not please everyone. But it may well be the most cogent message the American reading public receives as it continues its quest for a deeper understanding of the past—and hence, the present.

Robert M. Hathaway is a staff historian for the Central Intelligence Agency. This article does not necessarily represent the views of that agency or the U.S. government.

Reviews


Make no mistake about it: this book is the most significant contribution to foreign affairs literature in 15 or 20 years. One need not—and most FSOs will not—agree with everything the authors say to recognize this work as an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the foreign policy process. It is a must for those in the Foreign Service, and is the kind of volume that ought to be on the current purchase list for FSI’s mid-level course.

The basic thesis of this book can be succinctly illustrated by two quotes:

For two decades now, not only our government but our whole society has been undergoing a systemic breakdown when attempting to fashion a coherent and consistent approach to the world. The signs of the breakdown can be found in public attitudes and politicians’ promises; in the behavior of the Congress, the press, and the foreign policy establishment; and within the offices of the White House, the State and Defense departments, and other foreign policy agencies. [It] has produced policies with a peculiar blend of self-righteousness and self-doubt.

The record suggests that the crisis or breakdown in the way we make foreign policy is a systemic one... Our presidents have trapped themselves in webs mostly of their own making—in basing policies on ideologies that bore little resemblance to foreign realities, and in shaping much of their action for the sake of short-term political advantages. This web has been tightened by changes in our political subculture—by the increasing power of ideological purists within the Democratic and Republican parties and the emergence of a new professional elite that, unlike the establishment predecessor, deepens rather than bridges divisions.

The above is a pretty sweeping critique of what’s been going on under both political parties. The authors are well placed to know what they are talking about because they were participants in these changes. Gelb is a former director of political-military affairs at State under the Carter administration and previous holder of similar positions in the Defense Department; Lake, now teaching at Mount Holyoke College, was director of policy planning under Carter and Vance; and Destler is one of the more astute scholars studying and writing about foreign affairs.

This review cannot outline their analysis in full, but mention here, if only to encourage the reader to digest the whole book. The authors believe that presidents, beginning with Lyndon Johnson, began to focus on short-term concerns as the postwar anticommunist consensus broke down over Vietnam. They have gone through much maneuvering at the White House level in attempting to cope with the political schizophrenia in our political system which shows up repeatedly in polls indicating the American people believe there can be “peace and containment without losses and all at a relatively minor cost.”

The result has been a loss of confidence in presidents, a resurgent Congress, and growth of an adversary attitude in the media. Congress has not contributed constructively to the policy process, but has “made it very much harder for the president to succeed with his policies without offering any serious alternative.” The media, which acted “responsibly” throughout...
the 1950s and early ’60s by withholding material on the Bay of Pigs and not fully criticizing the Vietnam buildup, has switched to an attack mode in recent years. This is particularly so of television, which has a thirst for instant, disposable news, and can relay a president’s gaffe around the world, thereby reducing “his flexibility in determining which foreign policy issues are crucial and which [be] can downplay.”

From the Foreign Service perspective, the two most interesting chapters in the book will be “From Establishment to Professional Elite” and “Courtiers and Barons: The ‘Inside’ Politics of Foreign Policy.” The first deals with the evolution of those who make policy, particularly those who fill the valuable political-appointee spots for each administration. The authors contend that during the 1960s, power passed from the old Eastern establishment of bankers and lawyers, who took time off from their real careers to manage the affairs of state, to a new professional elite of full-time foreign policy experts, whose main bread-and-butter work at academic institutions and think tanks was foreign policy. The members of this new elite earned their reputations by developing ideas and publicizing them on op-ed pages. The result has been the destruction of the center in favor of the extremes. This has been exacerbated by “a tripling of the number of policy aides serving senators and representatives.”

The chapter on policymaking is unsettling. It implies that the highest levels of the American government resemble nothing so much as the feudal systems of the 13th and 14th centuries, and that a president who wants to survive his own administration had better spend some time getting it all together. The evolution of the system has become non-rational: Members of the new foreign affairs professional elite spend much time carving each other up to achieve prominence, turning policymaking into a “blood sport,” and leaving even members of the same administration to engage in “execucide.” Gelb and Lake worked in Democratic administrations, but they scarcely spare their former colleagues on these points, although, when it comes to substantive issues, they are perhaps a bit softer on Democrats.

While superb on analysis, the authors are merely good on prescribing remedies for the malady. They assert (correctly in this reviewer’s view) that a substantial consensus on foreign policy is unlikely to reappear soon, given the complexities of today’s problems. Furthermore, the United States must move away from the radical swings of policy from one administration to the next, and from believing that a “quick fix” can substitute for policy and an

Whatever your location, Woodies can still do your holiday shopping for you

Hurry! Send us your shopping lists! Our E.S.P. Shopping Coordinator can still select gifts from Woodies holiday merchandise, then mail them to you or alternate destinations. Use American Express, Visa, MasterCard or Woodies preferred account. Call 347-5300, ext. 2274 during store hours, or Telex 892509. Or, write to Jane Eisenbroun, Woodward & Lothrop, 10th and F Sts. NW, Washington DC 20013

WOODWARD & LOTHROP

There’s a New State in Washington

And, we’re located right where you want to be... the State Department, George Washington University, the Kennedy Center and most government agencies. Our guests stay in spacious suites, with fully equipped kitchens, for less than the price of most rooms in Washington. Our rates for weekends, and longer stays, are equally attractive.

Should you require a meeting/conference/entertainment room, we have several to meet your needs, seating 10 to 75 associates. Catering is also available. For your dining pleasure we recommend our Cafe, featuring a wide range of appetite-pleasing entrees. Come by and visit our new state in Washington.

STATE PLAZA
FORMERLY SHERRY TOWERS HOTEL
(202) 861-8200  2117 E St. NW, Washington DC 20037  (800) 424-2859

NOVEMBER 1984 17
COME TO A CITY BAZAAR
On your lunch hour

NOVEMBER 16
11:30 - 3:00

St. Margaret's Church
Connecticut Ave.
(Across from Universal North)

HAND MADE AND
HOME BAKED ITEMS

Cecil Brathwaite, Al Chapman,
Ardis Finamore, Charlie Tanguy,
Edith Scott, and John Stempel

For information call: 232-2995

World-wide Prescription Service

Bring or mail a prescription from your doctor or a State Department order to this store for delivery anywhere in the USA or overseas.

- Orders are filled immediately and mailed the same day.
- Pay Peoples low prices plus postage and packing after receipt.
- Your doctor stateside can order a refill by phone.
- Complete line of National Brand and Peoples Brand health and beauty aids, sundries, and cosmetics is also available.

79 years of reliable service to the diplomatic community.

PEOPLES DRUG

2125 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 338-6337

FOR INFORMATION CALL: 232-2995

"organizational fix" can solve any problems. They suggest that the president should not try to choose a foreign policy spokesperson in advance, but wait and see how relationships develop. While they favor the secretary of state for this role, they do not exclude the national security adviser.

One of the more intriguing themes of the book is that reliance on well-trained, politically sophisticated career officials would go far toward reducing the impact of ideological and institutional rivalries which have made it harder to resolve differences pragmatically and maintain needed continuity. At the same time, however, their strongest pitch for the career Service also suggests why we have been in such hot water recently:

Egged on by White House aids, our recent presidents have come to see the State Department as almost the enemy. But State and its officials also have much to offer—expertise on international realities; a needed brake on the White House proclivity to seek political spectaculars; an important institutional memory. Moreover, a secretary who gives priority to his presidential connection can make the department work for him—and the president.

The book also pleads for intellectual honesty; common sense in policymaking; new awareness of real political self-interests; and a focus on educating, not the silent majority, but the "three to ten million Americans who hold the trust of their communities by virtue of their leadership positions in business, educational, and civic organizations, and in state or local politics."

This book contains much food for thought. It will receive a good deal of attention, and it should. It ought to be high on the agenda of Under Secretary for Management Ronald Spiers's next Wye conference. The Foreign Service has much to offer presidents to ameliorate the conditions the authors describe, if we but take up the challenge.

—JOHN D. STEMPPEL


This collection of 10 articles emerged from a series of public lectures held in 1982 at University College, London. The title of the volume suggests the participants’ collective perspective on the Spanish push toward democracy, which has met with varying degrees of success. The general theme of the volume argues that the transition to democracy in Spain, while impressive in its superficial achievements, remains incomplete. Significant remnants of the old Francoist system have not been won over to the benefits of democracy nor absorbed into the country’s new political, economic, and cultural institutions.

The essays cover subjects one would normally find in such a survey of contemporary Spain: the role of the military and of the church, the continuing problem of ethnic nationalism and center-periphery tensions, Spain’s relations with the United States and NATO, the mass media and literature, the status of economic affairs, and the place of women in politics. In addition, two essays discuss the transition to democracy from an historical vantage point: the first covers the legacy of Francoism, while the second describes the relationship between the three currents of post-Franco ideology—continuity, rupture, and reform. The essays, written by nine Spaniards, four Britons, and one Israeli, are, as one might expect, highly uneven in coverage and in quality. The highlights of the book are Juan Antonio Ortega’s piece on the transition to democracy in Spain, Salvador Giner’s analysis of center-periphery relations, and Paul Preston’s discussion of the Spanish army’s “fear of freedom.”

—ROBERT P. CLARK

In the acknowledgments for this book, the author refers to the "hectic period" in which the book was "put...together." Just so. This slight book on the preparation of
the American Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace continually betrays the haste with which it was assembled—and it seems, from materials that came easily to hand. Indeed, this prefatory confession is perhaps the last point at which the author is in complete command of his subject.

The book offers a superficial history of the pastoral letter, extracting what drama it can from the disagreements among the bishops and between some of the clerics and the Reagan administration, which seems to be Castelli's *bête noire*. There are genuinely important questions surrounding the letter—concerning the bishops' understanding of nuclear strategy, the implications for lay Catholics of political pronouncements by a hierarchy with claims to authority, the relationship between the bishops' efforts and the recent, more general attacks on U.S. strategic policy, and so on—but Castelli only hints at such issues or simply ignores them. Instead, he devotes long, unanalytical pages to what are essentially extracts from his interviews with the participants and to barely edited transcripts of the meetings in which the letter was drafted.

Even the reader who has an interest in such archival material and who can forgive the hopeless asides with which it is enlivened (we learn that Bishop McCarthy is "perhaps the best story-teller in the bishops' conference"), will be dissatisfied. Castelli's preferences persistently and crudely intrude themselves, so much so that it is impossible to depend on his reporting. He is clearly committed to anti-nuclear activism on the part of the church and confines his criticism almost exclusively to the bishops who dissented from the letter and to the present administration.

It would be a pity if these and other failings dissuaded readers from examining the letter itself, which is reprinted as an appendix to Castelli's text. Whatever one concludes about the letter's political realism and strategic wisdom, it at least bears the marks of deliberation and care, and of a sense of the tragedy inherent in a grave and intractable moral dilemma. These are qualities essential in a treatment of the morality of nuclear policy, but ones absent from this tendentious book.

—Steven R. Sturm


Arms Control and European Security.

Sigal's thorough and thoughtful study of nuclear forces in Europe is focused on medium-range missiles—the Pershing II, the ground-launched cruise missile, and the Soviet SS-20. He does not deal with aircraft and adds a chapter on battlefield nuclear weapons almost as an afterthought.

It was of course the NATO deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles last November that caused the Soviets to break off nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States. Sigal refers to the "perverse consequences for stability" of putting missiles in Europe and quotes a statement made by Helmut Schmidt before the 1962 Cuban missile crisis: "everyone capable of objective reasoning must concede that the stationing of enemy IRBMS so to speak on its very threshold [Turkey] must produce the psychological effect of a provocation on any great power. One need only imagine how the Americans would react if the Soviets were to station IRBMS in Cuba."

Sigal defines the West's dilemma: How can NATO deter the Warsaw Pact by nuclear threats that it plainly has little or no incentive to carry out? Sigal, like everyone else who has explored this problem, has no an-
From the Think Tanks

Adjustment Crisis in the Third World. Edited by Richard E. Feinberg and Valentina Kallab. U.S.-Third World Policy Perspectives #1. Overseas Development Council. 1984. 181pp. $12.95. This study argues that world economic recovery alone will not be enough to help depressed Third World economies burdened with heavy debts. Other steps—more borrowing, structural changes—must be taken to alleviate adjustment problems and the threat of further political instability and possible default.

The Americas in 1984: A Year for Decisions. Report of the Inter-American Dialogue. The Aspen Institute, 1984. 82pp. It is a time of crisis in Latin American economies and political systems are under severe pressure, the Organization of American States has come close to collapse, and inter-American understanding is badly frayed. According to this report, a series of steps needs to be taken, including renewing national commitments to the OAS, improving U.S. public awareness of Latin America, and above all, adopting measures to make the debt owed by Latin countries more manageable.

The United States and the Persian Gulf: Past Mistakes and Present Needs. By Alvin J. Cottrell and Michael L. Moodie. Agenda Paper, National Strategy Information Center. 1984. 45pp. $3.95. This report discusses the vital influence of the Persian Gulf area on international security and economic health and the growing threat to what remains of the region's stability. It advocates that the United States take preventive, not merely reactive, measures, including enhancing the U.S. naval presence in the area, prepositioning supplies, developing an effective rapid deployment force, and providing military and political support for friends in the region.

The West German Peace Movement and the National Question. By Kim R. Holmes. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. 1984. $7.50. German nationalists are only a small portion of that country's peace movement, but under their influence the idea of a unified and neutral Germany has become more acceptable, writes Holmes. Although this is not an immediate threat to NATO, western leaders should realize that the German question is far from resolved and make efforts to orient the German national identity into a western geopolitical direction.

The school that comes to your child.

Complete home-study course for elementary-level students. Kindergarten through 8th grade. An American education anywhere in the world. Ideal for enrichment. Home is the classroom, you are the teacher with Calvert's approved instruction guide. Start anytime, transfer to other schools. Used by over 300,000 students. Non-profit. Write for catalog.
The Beirut Bombing

"So why wasn't there a permanent, impenetrable barrier that had to be opened? What does it say for security procedures when two men in a van can take out the No. 1 U.S. target in the whole wide world? One report even suggests there was a warning two weeks ago. We can find some excuse for the security failures the first time, very little excuse the second time, none at all the third."

New York Daily News, September 21

"Shadowy fanatics with unknown names once again have defied the world’s most sophisticated intelligence agencies to deliver their bloody message. Their target, the American embassy in Beirut, was supposed to be a secure refuge from the havoc wreaked by the car bombs of other suicidal men in earlier Beirut carnage.... But despite the extreme difficulty of guarding against these suicidal zealots, U.S. officials have some explaining to do. Why, with the painful first-hand knowledge of the way Beirut terrorists use lethal car bombs, did they occupy the new embassy structure before the last barrier—a massive metal gate—was in place? Why were the U.S. Marines pulled from the first line of defense in favor of Lebanese guards before all security precautions had been completed?"

Chicago Tribune, September 23

"U.S. officials had ample historical evidence that East Beirut was not immune from terrorist attacks. In September 1982, President-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed by an explosion at the East Beirut headquarters of the same Phalangist Party whose militiamen were hired to provide security at the U.S. annex."

Philadelphia Inquirer, September 23

"The Reagan administration must be made to answer for faulty security arrangements that enabled Islamic terrorists to blow up the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut. Not only is a General Accounting Office report issued after the third outrage of this kind in the past 18 months damning in its critique, but administration officials privately acknowledge that security was inadequate when the car bomb exploded Thursday...."

"Although quibbles have been raised about the ‘cost effectiveness’ of a world-wide program to make embassies less vulnerable, the amount of money involved is paltry compared to the sorrow, mayhem, and loss of prestige that comes from each successful terrorist attack. (The president) must take fast, effective action, using the latest techniques, to protect citizens bravely serving the country in foreign trouble spots."

Baltimore Sun, September 24

"We cannot give in to terrorists and close our embassy in Beirut. But our people deserve protection, not excuses. There was talk of retaliating against those who bombed the barracks. Similar cries are heard now. But wanting to lash back is one thing; finding a valid target is another.... A trigger-happy strike at some shadowy target is as likely to kill innocent Lebanese civilians as it is to wipe out the terrorists. As frustrated as Americans are with the toll being extracted in lives and dollars, we must not let our thirst for vengeance turn us into terrorists, too."

USA Today, September 24

"The effort to protect U.S. installations abroad from terrorist attack now appears to be energized, in the wake of the Beirut bombing. This is as it should be.... At the same time, the United States has to be careful not to change the basic tenor of its operations abroad, with suspicion generally replacing trust, and barricades substituting for democracy’s openness."

Christian Science Monitor, September 26

"It becomes plain that lives were lost in vain in the bombing of the American embassy building in East Beirut. The authorities knew that the place was ‘highly vulnerable to surveillance, sniping (rocket propelled grenades), and vehicular bombing’ in the pre-attack words of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and that necessary security arrangements had not been made. Warnings of a specific action were discounted...."

"Is it Mr. Reagan’s responsibility? You bet it is.... Mr. Reagan had already determined Lebanon to be an unsafe place for fully armed American Marines. Yet he has kept thinly defended American diplomats in Beirut and failed to take adequate precautions for their safety."

Washington Post, September 26

"Our own, private-sector, suggestion would be to embed in the roadway the type of retractable, shark-teethlike metal spikes
that are commonplace at most rental-car parking lots in the U.S. Any heavily laden car or truck carrying explosives would blow its tires and hobble out of control long before reaching the embassy building. If Avis and Hertz can figure out how to protect their parking lots, why can't our security officers protect an embassy?"

*Wall Street Journal, September 26*

"I have to say this for our Foreign Service personnel—they know their mission, they know they have to be there. Such courage—they're not in uniform, they're not fighting people. But their courage—because the other alternative would be to simply close down our embassies worldwide and come back here to fortress America and have no representation there. And that, we cannot do. We cannot give the terrorists a victory."

*President Reagan, September 26*

"The moment a truck-bomb threat was suspected at the White House, trucks loaded with sand blocked all the entrances until concrete barriers were put in place on Pennsylvania Avenue and side streets. No tragic delays, no Weinberger defeatism . . . . If the president can protect the White House so quickly and effectively, he can order the airlift of similar protection of the place the American flag flies in Beirut . . . . If he does not have the means or guts to defend our embassy, he should have the good grace to close it down."

*William Safire in the New York Times, September 27*

"Nothing can excuse the unconscionable vulnerability of our embassies from Amman to Cairo. If military heads had rolled following last year's slaughter at the Marine compound, would American lives have been lost last week in Beirut? Unanswerable, of course. That a certain tough-mindedness emanating down from the Oval Office would have made things vastly more secure is unquestionable."

*Washington Times, September 28*

"The probability of another vehicular bomb attack was so unambiguous that there is no logical explanation for the lack of effective security [at the embassy annex] . . . . Intelligence portrayed a situation where those responsible for security at U.S. installations in Beirut—both in Washington and on the scene—should have been on full alert and should have taken every precaution possible to thwart just such an attack as occurred."

*House Select Committee on Intelligence, October 3*
ASIAN STAMPS WANTED
We are knowledgeable & willing buyers of all Asian stamps and old envelopes. We have the specialized collector clientele to appreciate your holdings.
Ship for an immediate fair offer. Be certain to include your phone number. Material remains intact pending your acceptance; if we cannot pay what you consider fair, we will return it at our expense.
Respectfully, Michael Rogers

WE BUY IT ALL!
Fair prices paid for collections, not just the cream.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, November 1974: "The Foreign Service and AFSA both celebrate their golden anniversaries this year. The Service as the institutional dimension of U.S. diplomacy and the Association as its human dimension have shared more than a common birthday over the years. Both experienced the isolationism of the '20s and '30s, the crisis of World War II, the ravages of McCarthyism, the vilification and ultimately the vindication of the China hands, and the burdens of Vietnam. Today, both share the new challenges of America's involvement in the ever-changing challenges facing the international community; both share the new relationships growing out of our own rapidly evolving institutions...."

"For me, the essence of the AFSA of recent years is its conversion from a passive reflection of the Foreign Service to an active force generating and managing change in that Service....The future of AFSA and the Foreign Service should properly be the subject of constant Service-wide debate. The proposition that Foreign Service professionals through AFSA should help to determine that future will remain, I hope, undeniable."

Thomas D. Boyatt
AFSA President

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, November 1959: "There have been many discussions, philosophical or otherwise, as to our role and objectives as an Association....[One member] pointed out that on our postcard forwarding the annual membership card we had listed at the last, as apparently of least importance, the following [membership benefit]: 'To stand shoulder to shoulder with your colleagues and associates in safeguarding and advancing the interests and standards of the professional Foreign Service.' This, of course, is of the essence and should rightly be our first concern and privilege as members."

AFSA Annual Report

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, November 1954: "One of the aims of AFSA is to establish a center around which might be grouped the united efforts of its members for the improvement of the Service."

Brockholst Livingston

Maur Hill can give your son the preparation he needs to meet the challenges ahead of him.

For further information, write:
Academic Dean
Maur Hill Prep
10th & Green Streets
Atchison, Kansas 66002
(913) 367-5482

Maur Hill has everything an outstanding college preparatory school must have — modern buildings and residence halls, complete athletic facilities, a highly qualified faculty, latest instructional methods and more...

- curriculum geared to individual ability
- a wide range of interscholastic and intramural sports
- emphasis not only on learning how to learn, but on how to live successful, meaningful lives
- attention to growing mentally, spiritually, socially, and physically
- a special program for foreign students wishing to learn or improve in English

It sits high on a hill at the entrance of Maur Hill Preparatory School in Atchison, Kansas.
AFSA invites all members to attend the first in a series of lunchtime meetings at the Foreign Service Club.

Foreign Policy Formulation:
What Role for the Foreign Service?

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15:
AMBASSADOR LAURENCE SILBERMAN

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6:
AMBASSADOR MALCOLM TOON

12:00 Lunch
12:30 Speaker

The price of the luncheons is $10 per event. 60 places are available at each luncheon and reservations may be made for either or both programs by phoning Nancy Bartels at 338-4045 before November 13 (Silberman) and November 30 (Toon). Cancellations must be received 24 hours in advance or member will be billed.
CONSTANT & CHANGING

The Foreign Service has evolved continually during its history, but it faces many dilemmas that have remained constant

BARRY RUBIN

The foreign service was established to provide continuity and professionalism in foreign policy in a complex and dangerous world, yet it serves a government and society characterized by change and debate. Mediating between foreign problems and Washington’s methods and solutions, the service often seems in danger of being ground up between the two. The Foreign Service today finds itself in the midst of a paradox: Despite its emphasis on quality and loyalty, it is frequently either ignored or distrusted by the nation it seeks to serve. Furthermore, the Service must work within structures of policymaking and personnel management that often seem designed to limit its effectiveness.

Much has changed during the Service’s history; the diplomats of today bear little resemblance to politically connected amateurs of the last century. Working conditions—training, conditions of employment, and job security—have generally improved, and despite complaints of recent years, politicization of the corps through appointments and promotions is far from the rule. Nevertheless, some issues have proven to be perennial, cropping up throughout the Service’s existence. These include such topics as encroachment by other agencies, unhappiness with administrative and personnel management, constant reorganizations, and debates over the merits of generalists versus specialists. In recent years, these issues seem to have become more acute, as the Service’s recruitment pool has dramatically broadened while the needed changes in its ethos and philosophy have lagged behind.

One of the most constant difficulties facing the diplomatic corps has been its troublesome relationship with the American public and many political leaders. The distrust aimed at the Service seems to spring from the basic historical attitudes of U.S. society, which saw diplomacy as a necessary evil. In Thomas Jefferson’s words it was “the pest of the peace of the world, the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are manufactured.” Protected by ocean from most foreign threats, Americans considered foreign policy a low priority and something more likely to create dangers than alleviate them. This, and democratic idealism, meant that Americans never really accepted the ideas of realpolitik viewed as central to European practices and to diplomats in general. Given these suspicions and doubts about the utility of their craft, FSOs often faced an unsympathetic public, media, and Congress. In earlier days it was feared diplomats had succumbed to European foppishness and snobbery. During the McCarthy era, FSOs were thought to be vulnerable to communism.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the American diplomatic service was small and divided into three completely separate groups: the clerks and officials working in Washington; the consul, who looked after commercial matters and citizens’ rights abroad; and the ministers and their secretaries, who ran embassies. The last group in particular was ruled by the spoils system, and the 1883 Civil Service Act did not cover diplomats. Many of the ministers were out-of-office politicians or cronies of powerful figures; the secretaries were usually young men from wealthy families who had no clear career plan and sought an enjoyable stay abroad.

Certainly, nineteenth-century diplomatic labors in Europe were pleasant and relatively light. Missions were only open from 10 to 12 and from 2 to 4. The diplomats had easy entry to European aristocratic society. Far less glamorous were the duties and perquisites of U.S. consuls, who often worked in hardship posts and took their pay from fees rather than salaries, and of underpaid government clerks in Washington. One historian described State in 1898 as “an antiquated feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it.”

In the 1890s, as the United States assumed a more active international role and the Progressive movement preached the value of professional training and scientific management, the best diplomats recognized the need to improve the corps. Men like Henry White, William Rockhill, Francis Huntington-Wilson, and others believed that diplomacy was becoming too important to be left to the spoils system and dilettantes. They lobbied for a trained career service with better pay and conditions, examinations for admission, and a merit system for promotions. The consuls had their champion in Wilbur Carr, who worked at State from 1892 to 1939.

The personal friendship between diplomat Wil-
William Phillips and President Theodore Roosevelt helped the reformers get a hearing. In those days, the diplomatic service was completely separate from the home office, so when Phillips decided to return to Washington after many years abroad, he had to resign and work as a messenger before being given more important assignments. Phillips’s influence helped begin a movement for reform, but it was not until World War I demonstrated the importance of U.S. participation in world politics that both the Executive and Congress accepted the need for serious change.

**The Rogers Act** of 1924 marks the real beginning of a professional Foreign Service. This law standardized admissions and promotions, as well as providing new travel and representational allowances, a pension plan, and higher salaries. It also provided something the diplomats had not wanted: a unified Service including the consuls. Admission was to be through written exams on language, law, international relations, and economics, as well as an oral exam. The latter was often used to restrict membership to those of the “proper” class, gender, and background. The “gentleman’s club” ambience of the Service was to last a long time.

The postwar years also saw numerous attempts to raise the Service’s morale and improve its image. The Foreign Service Institute opened in 1925, and in lectures there high officials tried to instill the ideas of service and well-roundedness so common in the 1920s. Allen Dulles, then chief of State’s Division of Near East Affairs, emphasized that each diplomat needed both experience and intuition, sound and accurate judgment, and a solid grounding in the history and theory of international affairs. He should travel widely in the country where he was assigned—at his own expense—and stay away from any clandestine activities.

Joseph Grew, a veteran diplomat who later became under secretary, called on FSI students in 1926 to be “a new generation of red-blooded young Americans, straight-thinking, clear-speaking men, whose watchword is ‘service’ and whose high conceptions of integrity, sincerity, and patriotism are steadily raising the standards of...the honorable profession they follow.” Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes spoke of a “New Diplomacy” based not on “the divining of the intentions of monarchs” or “the mere discovery and thwarting of intrigues” but “on the understanding of peoples.”

FSOs, then, were no longer to be cultured dilettantes but heroic professionals. Indeed, the Service was small, based largely on personal relationships, and had a high esprit de corps. Memories of veterans often portray this interwar period as something of a golden age. This time also saw the beginning of specialization with the start of a corps of Soviet experts that would include such distinguished officers as Charles Bohlen and George Kennan.

Yet the idealistic phrases of FSI lecturers were often in sharp contrast with the underhonored, underpaid, and understaffed realities of the 1920s. The Depression made matters far worse: pay was cut, the dollar’s purchasing power declined, and allowances were reduced. Recruitment, promotion, and paid home leaves were suspended. President Roosevelt and many other New Dealers considered the Foreign Service a stultified, reactionary group that was unlikely to support his policies. At the same time, the Service came in for further neglect because foreign policy itself was a secondary priority for Washington during the 1920s and ’30s.

The onset of World War II, however, again reminded Americans and their government of the Service’s importance. Between 1939 and 1945, the Service grew from 1000 to 3700 members. FSOs played a valuable role in the struggle to win the war and in diplomatic negotiations. They served in more places—including war zones and recently liberated territory—worked longer hours, and dealt with a greater variety of issues than ever before.

As foreign relations became a more visible and important issue, however, decisions were taken out of the hands of FSOs and even of the State Department itself. The War and Navy departments and the president played central roles, of course, but a number of new agencies appeared on the scene that had a presence overseas as well as a policymaking role in Washington. One FSO wrote in disgust, “Before long our foreign policy will be in the hands of everybody but the State Department.”

While the new agencies created after the war—the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and a unified Department of Defense among them—also provided the State Department with competition, the irreversible entry of the United States into worldwide responsibilities made the Foreign Service more important than it had ever been before. FSOs were involved in whole new areas of responsibility and needed new areas of expertise in intelligence analysis, managerial skills, congressional relations, politico-military affairs, public and international informational activities, foreign labor questions, and other areas.

These developments meant the further expansion of the Service and its activities in Washington. The corps was opened for a special influx of war veterans—10,000 people transferred from wartime agencies to the State Department. The department’s personnel (including FSOs) grew from 4000 in 1939 to 11,000 in 1946, when 40 percent of all employees were new. By that year, 18 percent of FSOs were political officers, 22 percent worked on economic issues, 13 percent on trade and commercial problems, 24 percent...
MEANWHILE, THOUGH, FSOs were helping the United States cope with the dramatic new situation of a world in which it was one of the two greatest powers and engaged in a diplomatic and political struggle with the other. The 1946 Foreign Service Act raised salaries, provided for “selection out,” and improved home leave. Recognizing the need for an increasing variety of skills within the Service, it also created a Foreign Service Reserve to mobilize outside specialists. Yet already a dark cloud was beginning to cast its shadow: the security scare.

The greatest number of security problems, although still proportionately tiny, took place not among the Foreign Service employees, but among newly arrived transferees from wartime civilian agencies that had not had systematic security investigations. The Hiss case increased the controversy surrounding the State Department, as did attacks on the reporting of the China hands—despite their accuracy. It was common in the last half of the 1940s for members of Congress to call the department “a hornbed of Reds.” The rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy turned this grumbling into an all-out assault on the department and the Foreign Service. Although the Truman administration tried to tighten security regulations while defending the Service, its defense was swept away in a wave of headlined, sensationalist accusations.

The Wheeling, West Virginia, speech of February 1950 that launched McCarthy’s national career and the McCarthyist era was aimed primarily at the Foreign Service. “The reason we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores,” he said, “but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this nation.” At the State Department, “the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous.” Central in this “great conspiracy” were FSOs like China expert John Service who, McCarthy falsely claimed, had “urged that communism was the only hope of China.”

State’s immediate reaction to McCarthy’s speech was optimistic. “Now, he will have to prove it. Then we will have an end to the matter,” was a comment often heard among FSOs. But McCarthy’s supporters and imitators, including senators Robert Taft and Richard Nixon, added to the chorus. Ironically, measures had already been passed to overcome security weaknesses, but their interpretation was tightened with each passing month, particularly after Dwight Eisenhower became president. The Loyalty Security Board confronted employees with gossip and rumors which they were then challenged to disprove. Some used the security system to strike at personal rivals. One FSO was charged with having associated with the leader of the Japanese Communist Party, until he demonstrated that he had done so on the ambassador’s orders. Even when charges were dropped, such incidents continued to haunt FSOs, especially when their names were suggested for ambassadorial positions. Officers and spouses sometimes avoided admitting socially that they worked at State, and officials often feared to make policy recommendations lest their views be used against them in the future.

Scars from this era stayed with the Foreign Service for years to come. Ironically, the very group that New Dealers had considered so reactionary was now portrayed as dangerously radical. “Shall [an FSO] report only what will harmonize the temper of the times,” editorialized the JOURNAL, “knowing the dangers of honesty and the risk to his career and reputation?” The inevitable result of these unwarranted attacks was damage to the reputations and even livelihoods of Americans who had served their country in a far more disinterested and patriotic way than their accusers. Foreign Service careers became less attractive. Recruits might be given a presidential commission saying that the U.S. government was “reposing special trust and confidence in your integrity, prudence, and ability” but the $57 a week paid them in 1946 (about the same as skilled blue-collar workers) did not compensate for personal abuse and an uncertain future.

There were, however, relatively few dismissals, most of the damage being to the spirit and promotion chances of FSOs and to recruitment efforts. On top of
all this, funding cuts suspended recruitment from 1952 through 1954. One FSO commented at the
time, "If I had a son, I would do everything in my
power to suppress any desire he might have to enter
the Foreign Service." In a January 1954 letter to the
New York Times, five distinguished former FSOs warned that the obsession with security was destroy¬
ing "accuracy and initiative.... The ultimate result is
a threat to national security." The Foreign Service,
George Kennan gloomily concluded, "was weakened
beyond hope of recovery."

If the Service was being battered from outside, the
situation was not altogether rosy on the inside, either.
"Managerial control is next to impossible," com¬
plained a congressional report. No longer was the
Service or the department small enough to be run on
the basis of personal relations or amateur manage¬
ment. FSOs, however, resented professional administra¬
tors of whom, said one officer, "Instead of pressing
our pants they are trying to wear them." As the corps
continued to be pressed by many new tasks, however,
it still needed more people and more skills. And with
enlargement came the need for new personnel man¬
agement techniques.

As a result, Henry Wriston, president of Brown
University, was selected in March 1954 to head a
special Committee on Personnel. His commission pro¬
posed the merger of most of the Civil Service posi¬
tions, which dominated the Washington slots, into
the Service. Managers and experts on Congress, intel¬
ligence, labor affairs, and other areas would be made
into FSOs while officers would be given the opportu¬
nity to fill some of the more specialized assignments
in Foggy Bottom. At this time, of 197 FSOs with
more than 20 years' service, only 45 had held assign¬
ments in the United States. Midcareer entry and an
energetic recruitment program would also expand the
corps.

"The theory... that the corps should be made up of
generalists only," Wriston explained, "was far better
adapted to... a second-class power with a tradition of
isolation, than it is to the leader of the Free World.
He called for 'a genuinely representative, democratic¬
ally oriented Service.' Wristonization resulted in a
tripling of the Foreign Service's size. Some 1400 peo¬
ple transferred from the Civil Service rolls, and the
new order was symbolized by the appointment of FSO
Loy Henderson as State's chief administrator.

WHILE WRISTONIZATION PERMITTED
expansion, it may have ended up
turning the old specialists into gen¬
eralists. An FSO commented, "The
break-up of experienced teams of specialists and the
failure adequately to rebuild them [took place] within
a personnel system which has now become much too
fluid." Contemporary studies found that only 15.8
percent of FSOs had spent more than six years in any
region and that only 32 percent were in any one part
of the world for more than three years.

Nonetheless, throughout the latter half of the
1950s, the Service gradually adjusted to the Wriston
reforms and morale began to recover from the McCar¬
dthy era. President Kennedy even romanticized the
FSOs somewhat, offering them new challenges and
demanding an even wider interpretation of the "New
Diplomacy." At the same time, however, he some¬
times viewed them as inimical to change.

Throughout the 1960s there was much debate and
many reports about reorganizing the foreign policy
process and revising the roles of the State Department
and the Foreign Service in decision-making. Nor was
this debate limited to outside the Service—many ca¬
cer officers were also critical of their department's
structure and performance. For the first time, a grass¬
roots reform effort developed, perhaps reflecting the
rebellious spirit of the 1960s. The activists were tired
of the endless frustrations faced, as one of them put it,
by "first-rate people having to operate in a third-rate
system."

In 1965 a group of FSOs formed the Junior Foreign
Service Club to discuss the problems of the diplomatic
corps. A year later, they submitted a memorandum to
the secretary of state explaining that "a feeling of
professional uneasiness and uncertainty now appears
prevalent among junior FSOs which, justified or not,
tends to lower morale and create a climate for resigna¬
tion." In January 1967 it called a general meeting
which drew an overflow crowd. Out of these efforts
came a task force to study internal problems and
State's declining influence on foreign policy. This in
turn led the administration to develop a report which
was published as "Toward a Modern Diplomacy,"
which recommended a more rational assignments
policy, greater incentives for specialization, and mid¬
career tenure. At the time, however, these efforts did
not have much effect, although some did later appear
in the 1980 Foreign Service Act.

Later that year, leaders of the movement, dubbed
the "Young Turks," sought election to the board of
the American Foreign Service Association. After a
hard-fought campaign they won office with large ma¬
jorities and lobbied the incoming Nixon administra¬
tion for reforms. Improvements were recommended
by a series of task forces set up by Deputy Under
Secretary for Management William Macomber, but
Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kiss¬
ginger were already revising the policy process in
quite a different direction. Given their mistrust of
State and the Foreign Service—which Nixon disliked
from the early 1950s and Kissinger saw as tied up in
bureaucratic considerations—they bypassed State on
many important issues.

Within the Service, however, personnel issues con¬
continued to be controversial. Wristonization had left the diplomatic corps top-heavy: there were more FSOs over 45 years old than under 35 years old by 1960, and twice as many officers in the top four ranks as in the bottom four. Promotions were slow and many FSOs believed they were unfairly distributed. One diplomat wrote, "Foreign Service personnel operations have deteriorated into arbitrary and capricious rewards and punishments, lacking essential elements of due process in grievance procedures. Gossip circulating in secret channels among management officials determines careers."

A tragic demonstration of this problem was the suicide of Charles Thomas, an FSO with 19 years experience who, failing to win promotion, was "selected out" at the age of 45. Arguing that his records had been misread and misplaced, Thomas spent two years trying to win a review. Unable to collect a pension or earn a living, he took his own life in April 1971 to make it possible for his wife and children to collect a government annuity. The embarrassed State Department gave his widow a job and promised that in the future no one with long service would be terminated before being eligible for a pension. Congress posthumously restored Thomas to active service.

Bitterness about such treatment produced a near-revolt against administrators and inequitable grievance procedures. "People are afraid to argue with their bosses," said one FSO, "because, if they do, it will be reflected in their next efficiency report." Publicity and the possibility that Congress might legislate new regulations forced the department to improve grievance procedures, including granting the right of FSOs to seek corrections of inaccuracies or prejudicial statements in their files.

During the 1960s and '70s, the Foreign Service also fell prey to pressure that its composition in terms of sex and race should more closely reflect that of the American populace it represented. During the 13 years after 1957, the percentage of women in the Foreign Service actually decreased, standing at 5.3 percent in 1970. FSO Alison Palmer filed the department’s first sex discrimination case in 1971 after three ambassadors to African states refused to accept her as a labor officer. She received a letter from an Equal Employment Opportunity officer warning that a high department official expressed "apprehension" that the protest might hurt her chances for promotion, but Palmer finally won her case.

Even then, however, improvements were limited—between 1970 and 1980 the percentage of women in the Service rose from 5.3 to 11.5 percent of the corps, from 174 of 3304 to 413 of 3581. Today, only about 16 percent of FSO positions are held by women. The proportion is somewhat higher among the professional Civil Service, and among USIA and AID personnel. Even though incoming classes of junior FSOs often have a high percentage of women, men still receive their superiors’ confidence and support more easily, kinder evaluations, and faster promotions. The situation is far from satisfactory; even sexual harassment remains a problem.

Other rulings ordered that wives of FSOs no longer be assessed in their husband’s evaluation reports, and after 1971 women FSOs no longer had to resign if they married. State also came under increasing pressure to assign officers married to each other—tandem couples—to the same post or to give one of them leave without loss of benefits during the tour of duty. By 1979 some 100 such teams were stationed all over the world; a recent report identifies well over 200 such couples.

The Service’s racial composition was also changing. During the Carter years, blacks and other minority groups were given five-point advantages on the entry exam. Of 200 new FSOs accepted in 1979, 39 were minority group members, and a sizeable portion were women. Yet, a 1983 U.S. Commission of Civil Rights report noted, "Minorities and women currently are almost totally absent from top appointed positions, other than ambassador, at the State Department."

White male FSOs are often bitterly critical in private about the alleged quality of female and minority colleagues, arguing they were hired or promoted to fill quotas and not on ability. The best women and minorities, they say, generally quit to take better opportunities outside the Service, leaving the less-qualified behind. The shrinkage of available high-level jobs has contributed to this resentment among senior male officers. Women and black FSOs argue that such private comments reflect bias at State. They attribute resignations to poor assignments, bad treatment, and slow promotions. These attitudes may well disappear as the Service community adjusts to such changes, but another issue may well be more significant. Diversifying the recruitment pool inevitably broadens department culture and introduces people who may be more inclined to question, hold different perspectives, and stress other priorities. Yet the State Department has a record of discouraging, rather than rewarding, such independent thinkers.

Of all the political issues of this period, none had greater impact on the Foreign Service than the Vietnam war. While FSOs were told a Vietnam tour would help their promotion prospects, one top official who later studied the process concludes that it actually slowed down advancement. About 600 FSOs served in Vietnam, about half of them as part of the pacification program that was nominally under AID control but in practice was guided by the military command. Some FSOs sent to Vietnam were relative-
ly untouche by the experience; others faced personal dilemmas over whether to report atrocities, dissent on policy, or take the safer path of going along. They split sharply on their attitude toward the war, but everyone saw the distortion and suppression of information and statistics, hardly the best experience for teaching FSOS to be honest reporters. After the Cambodian invasion, dozens of FSOS sent Secretary of State William Rogers an unprecedented petition of protest. Rogers refused a White House demand for the names in order to protect their careers.

In recent years, the Foreign Service has also had an increasing number of its high-level positions taken by political appointees. The Service had always faced the frustrating problem of political appointees filling many ambassadorial positions. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, however, this was compounded by the tendency of the White House to appoint more and more nongovernmental foreign policy professionals—academics, think tank analysts, journalists—to important jobs at State and the NSC. Some FSOS—like Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, Richard Moore, and David Aaron—quit the Service only to return at higher posts than colleagues who had remained. As a result of these developments, many senior FSOS were left walking the halls without assignments commensurate with their skills.

A GENERALLY BRIGHTER NOTE was represented by the 1980 Foreign Service Act, which provided a new pay schedule, mandatory retirement at age 65, and a tenured Senior Foreign Service. It also revised promotion and retention standards based on performance, provided bonus pay for outstanding service, and made grievance procedures slightly more favorable to the career staff. The act also allowed for the commissioning of certain AID and USIA employees as Foreign Service officers. Previously, the personnel systems of these two agencies had reflected their ambiguous position within the foreign affairs community. Although most USIA and AID employees did serve both in Washington and abroad, they were usually specialists focusing on such subjects as information or agriculture, not generalists concerned with diplomacy. Their relationship to the Foreign Service changed constantly, as did their designations, from Civil Service to Foreign Service reserve or information officer, and again to other various terms. All too often, those in the diplomatic corps tended to view these USIA and AID employees as mere technicians whose role and position was not to be confused with their own. The 1980 act, however, seeks to integrate them into the Service and make them subject to the same benefits and risks as the diplomats. Whether this union will be successful is still far from clear, for many obstacles must be overcome to make the system compatible with the needs of both specialists and generalists. Yet, whatever the result, the commissioning of these new officers does represent a significant broadening of the Service.

The same time, though, there were new dangers and problems for FSOS and their families, especially those serving abroad. Spouses of FSOS, many with their own careers, were becoming reluctant to leave Washington. "While life in the Foreign Service is stimulating and has undeniable rewards of personal growth, travel, and international friendship," said Leslie Dorman, former president of the Association of American Foreign Service Women, "we experience the alienation of culture shock, the isolation of language inadequacy, the hazards of climate and endemic disease, the trials of evacuation, and the pervasive fear of terrorism." Between 1968 and 1978, there were 252 attacks on U.S. diplomats or property abroad, culminating in 1979 with the taking of the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran as hostages. Since then, diplomacy has become an even more dangerous business, with Foreign Service personnel increasingly the victims of kidnappings, bombings, and shootings.

The hostages became national heroes, and their plight drew the Foreign Service closely together. For a brief time the public seemed aware of the dangers facing American diplomats and seemed to support their efforts. More recently, the bombings of embassies in the Middle East has refocused public attention on the dangers they face. Whether the sympathy this has aroused will be enough to overcome traditional public distrust of the diplomatic corps is still unknown.

The Service may be facing a rather discouraging future. Increasing skepticism on the part of incumbent administrations as to whether diplomats will accept their policies has led to greater reliance on alternative agencies and staffs, such as the NSC. This has been accompanied by a steady decline in top-level jobs available to career officers. Yet, the Service is not sitting still, accepting such a gloomy prognosis. A variety of exchange programs—with Congress, the Defense Department, business, universities, and other sectors—have been initiated so that FSOS will have opportunities to gain experience in new areas and the broader perspective demanded by decisionmakers.

Mythology to the contrary, the Foreign Service has gone through many changes during its history to adjust to developments in domestic and international politics. And it must continue such evolution if it is to remain a vital part of the foreign policy process. Many of the central issues facing the Service—the strains of personnel and management systems, the challenge of other agencies, the need to continue attracting talented recruits, the distrust of the executive branch—are hardly new, even if they do seem more concentrated now. Yet the history of the Foreign Service demonstrates that, despite all the difficulties it has faced over the years, it has survived and improved.
How Can the Foreign Service Remain Effective for the Next 60 Years?

Richard Helms
Former Ambassador
Former Director, CIA

I do not believe the Foreign Service needs to be unduly concerned about its future. In a nation where policies change with administrations every four to eight years, a professional corps of U.S. foreign policy custodians is essential. If the Service did not exist, it would have to be invented. The need for the group’s existence is not negated by the contention that our political leaders do not pay adequate attention to its advice. One reads that Foreign Service morale is poor because an administration does not provide it with enough ambassadorships or high positions in State. Such debate tends to be feeble. It is a service organization; its highest goal should be service to our country. The Service was not founded to direct U.S. foreign policy and no one is likely to change our domestic-oriented political leaders or the way they formulate their ideas and policies. In short, the Service has a bright future if it does not mistake its mission.

Charles Whitehouse
Former AFSA President
Ambassador, Retired

At the risk of appearing to take a gloomy, perhaps curmudgeonly, view of the future of the Foreign Service, I can only note that it must prove, far more effectively than it does today, that its members represent a uniquely capable, dedicated, and resourceful group of men and women who bring special skills and experience to serving our country. Does a Service which, as the current bids reflect, finds Dublin, Capetown, and Valetta the most desirable posts meet these criteria? Does a Service in which a steadily growing number of officers serve abroad without their spouses meet these criteria? Does a Service in which assignments are made through an elaborate mating dance meet these criteria? I think not. To my mind, very significant attitudinal and societal changes will be required if the Service is to remain an effective force or even to exist at all.

William P. Rogers
Former Secretary of State

The Foreign Service is a constructive and powerful force in the conduct of foreign policy, a result of an effective selection process and a dedication and consistency of performance that is in a class by itself. All of us who have had the privilege of working closely with the Service are of this view. My hope is that in the years to come even greater progress will be possible and that the most capable young people in the country will continue to be attracted to the Service.

Donald J. Devine
Director, OPM

I have one suggestion. Too often leaks to the press and careless conversations on the part of a few convey the impression that the Foreign Service is not totally reliable and that special care must be taken to control the flow of information to protect against unauthorized disclosure. If leaks, and particularly leaks about the administration which it serves, could be eliminated or sharply reduced, the effectiveness and standing of the Service in the years ahead would be enhanced. On balance, though, the U.S. Foreign Service is the best in the world, and if it continues effectively to meet new challenges it will continue to be the best.

The mission of the Foreign Service is to carry out the policies and programs of the president and his appointees faithfully and competently. To do so in the crucial years ahead, career supervisors and the political leadership must possess management tools which permit them to reward good performers. A sound performance-appraisal system is indispensable to this end. An optimum performance-management system will include policy-driven criteria, especially when dealing with officers who perform work at senior levels. The performance-evaluation system should provide managers with the information about how well those under them are carrying out official government policies.

How effective will the Foreign Service be in the 21st century? I am optimistic. The trend throughout the federal government, as well as in private industry, is to improve performance-management techniques and to refine performance-appraisal systems. This is conducive to creating higher morale, greater monetary rewards for superior performers, and improved accountability to the American people whom we serve.
I CAN CONFIRM your assumption that the Foreign Service is currently effective in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. As we face the future, however, the big question is whether the Foreign Service will evolve as dynamically as the international environment in which it operates.

The key words for the future are high technology, multilateralism, and economic interdependence. Bilateral relations will always be important, but most new problems overflow national boundaries and straddle domestic and international affairs. The complex issues of technology transfer, international debt, and terrorism are current cases in point. FSOs should consider broadening their horizons as much as possible. Assignments outside areas of specialization, outside the department, and indeed outside of government will be extremely valuable to officers who will face difficult issues in the high-tech, electronically fused world of the year 2000 and beyond.

Increasingly, government will have to work closely with the private sector to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Foreign Service will have a unique role in bringing the best assets of both to bear on the continuous process of pursuing U.S. interests around the world. Foreign Service officers and specialists must expand their horizons to develop and maintain the necessary skills and intellectual mobility.

TO REMAIN EFFECTIVE for the next 60 years, the Foreign Service should strive to set ever higher standards of professionalism and dedication, and the Congress must encourage and help the Service in this quest.

The Service must seek constantly to increase the number of officers who speak needed foreign languages. More emphasis must be placed on achieving higher language skill levels and on maintenance of those skills.

The Service must recruit the best candidates—highly intelligent persons willing and able to serve under difficult and dangerous conditions abroad. But we must be willing to pay what it costs to attract and keep them.

The Service must deal with the professional interests of its members' spouses. We do not want a Service of separated families—it would not be sustainable over the next 60 years or project adequately our American values of family and home.

Finally, each administration must responsibly choose only well-qualified political appointees. There have been many superb political appointees named for high State Department and ambassadorial posts, but others have not had the background or experience for the job.

The Foreign Service has problems but they are manageable. I am sure that the Service will improve upon its already distinguished record of dedication and achievement over the next 60 years.

IT IS DIFFICULT to predict what the Foreign Service needs to do to remain an effective force over such a long stretch of time as 60 years, and I won't attempt to do so. For the immediate future, however, there are some serious problems that must be addressed.

Major among these is the need to rethink and rationalize our diplomatic representation abroad. The current structure of our embassies follows the established norms for a diplomatic mission, but our interests and our objectives are unlike most other countries'.

The increasing involvement of domestic government agencies in relations with foreign governments has led, in recent years, to the increasing fragmentation of the Foreign Service.

It is now time for a study, commissioned at the highest level of government, of what representation we need, for what purpose, and how it is to be provided. The study should not be influenced by the parochial interests of any agency or department but guided by the need for effective and efficient coordination and direction of our relations with other nations. If not done, the Foreign Service faces an uncertain future, and even more serious, our foreign policy runs the risk of increasing incoherence in direction and management.

AN EFFECTIVE Foreign Service must reflect what we are as a nation: a people dedicated to the dignity of the human spirit, open to change, proud of our ethnic diversity, setting an example in commitment to our beliefs. To do so, we need to be relevant, responsible and resourceful, and proudly representative.

Relevant? Relevance means a stronger awareness than has been our record to date of the currents of change, both at home and abroad. It means a Service whose analysis and reporting is alert and perceptive enough to have an impact in Washington.

 Responsible? The Foreign Service in a democracy must evidence a deep sense of responsibility to the public will, reflected in our elected political leadership. But we should also be known as an idea-oriented Service, ready to take risks, rather than the keepers of conventional wisdom.

Representative? A Service dedicated to elitism in professional competence must reflect as well the diversity and freedom of opportunity of our country. And it must be seen to represent those values of our society that have made us strong, not least that of family and of the contribution that the spouse has traditionally made to an effective Foreign Service.
IN THE YEARS AHEAD, the Foreign Service must adapt to major additions to the diplomatic agenda. Our record in this is not good. Our traditional view of diplomacy as essentially political did not prepare us to assume roles in development and information in the postwar years. Our inability to convince others of our dedication to trade lost us the commercial function. Political leaders’ doubts regarding our sensitivity to domestic currents have seen us bypassed in foreign policy.

Already we have many new agenda items: arms control, transfer of high technology, allocation of radio frequencies. Others lie ahead in potential conflicts over transnational data flow, the availability of positions in space, the impact of outer space development on national sovereignty, and the implications of biotechnological innovations. The Foreign Service must begin to develop officers who understand technology and speak the language of the technicians. If not, others will replace us who can.

Perhaps only after one has been out of the Service for a few years does the awareness dawn of how isolated the Service is, immersed in its own pressures, concentrating on other societies, and rooted in the protection of traditions and turf. Presidents and political leaders may not wait for such a traditional service to catch up. They will look elsewhere for the help they need. It is time for the Foreign Service to prepare itself to be responsive to the needs of the future.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE, as the professional diplomatic corps of our democracy, must be responsible to the American people. Its effectiveness depends on the attitude of its political masters, the American people and their elected representatives.

The Foreign Service will have the respect of its masters if it, first, serves and is perceived to serve the United States. If it appears to be serving its own ends, it will lose respect and hence effectiveness.

Second, the Service must be professional in the implementation of foreign policy. Professionalism means both expertise and loyalty. There is no room for those whose performance is less than excellent, nor for anyone who publicly criticizes approved policy. At the same time, FSOs have a duty to dissent in house when they disagree with policy.

If it remains dedicated to service and professionalism, the Foreign Service is likely to be used and heeded in both the implementation and formulation of foreign policy. It is the responsibility of senior officers to instill these qualities in their juniors and to measure their performance by these criteria. It is also the responsibility of AFSA, especially if it is truly to be a professional association.

IN AN ERA of accelerating change, forecasting the future is particularly risky and depends on the assumptions one makes. Assuming that George Orwell was wrong, the world in the next century will continue to be organized politically on the basis of a multiplicity of nation states. Thus nations will need cadres of professionals to conduct their relations, both bilaterally and through the multilateral institutions.

The Foreign Service will be as valuable then as it is today. The adaptability of FSOs, their ability to interpret the United States to the world and that world in turn to the U.S. government and people, and their devotion to the ideals of public service will remain resources of unique value.

But these qualities alone will not ensure that the Service can continue to assist the president and the secretary in the formulation and conduct of the nation’s foreign policy. The more complex the foreign affairs agenda becomes, the more acute will become the challenge we already face today—how to provide senior decision-makers with both the functional and area expertise of the specialist, and the broad, conceptual perspective needed to understand and manage the interrelationships of our national interests and priorities. How well we succeed in developing human resources to do both tasks will in large measure determine the role that the Foreign Service plays in 2044.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE has always worked under difficult conditions. Over the past 60 years, U.S. foreign policy has veered from isolation to interventionism, from unconcern about the world to attempts to remake it. The proper balance between morality and prudence has not always been found. Throughout these tumultuous decades, however, one fact has been confirmed: The Foreign Service is essential to the achievement of our international objectives.

Today the role of the Service is even more important. Events abroad affect us whether we like it or not because we live in an interdependent world. There must be continuity to U.S. policy—changing administrations cannot repeal history or geography—and the decision-makers need expert and impartial advice.

Over the next 60 years, many things will change, but these circumstances will not. The Foreign Service can be effective only if its members are true to their calling. They are the guardians of America’s historical memory; they are the educators of public officials; they are the executors of the national will. If every FSO will weigh his or her actions against these criteria, then I am confident that the Service will be most influential in shaping U.S. diplomacy.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE needs to retain and enhance its professional integrity, creativity, and courage as well as be recognized by the president and his secretary of state for its vital role in developing and carrying out the nation’s foreign policy.

The Foreign Service officer, in order to serve his country effectively, must be able to think of his profession and career as a vocation rather than as a mere job. This does not, of course, mean that he shouldn’t enjoy his work nor that he has to take himself overly seriously. In return for the officer’s individual commitment, he must have equal opportunity to rise to the top in the career and must not be discriminated against by the president for reasons of political consideration when ambassadorial appointments are made. Neither is the case today.

The nation’s citizenry and particularly its political representatives must be convinced that the Foreign Service is an indispensable element of the U.S. government that can be depended upon to perform its mission with integrity, patriotism, and excellence.

In 2044 the Foreign Service will no longer exist. All ambassadors will be politically appointed, mostly Buick dealers under Republicans and minority college professors under the Democrats. In a strange twist of fate, male Ivy League WASPs will be a distinct minority and so will “man” more ambassadorships than at any time since 1955. Ministers counselor will report directly to their power bases. The MC for commercial affairs will report to the American Chamber of Commerce; the MC for labor to the AFL-CIO; the MC for intelligence will belong to the national security adviser, fulfilling that official’s long-cherished dream of having his own Foreign Service. The Civil Service will have absorbed the Foreign Service corps, and remaining personnel with foreign experience will be managed in alternating years by OPM and OMB. Presidents and foreign ministers will directly carry on diplomacy, thanks to undreamed of communications and Star-Trek-like beam-up transportation. Unfortunately, world leaders in 2044 will not understand each other any better than they do today, and tomorrow’s high tech will still be down half the time. Small wars will be plentiful.

If you think these musings are apocryphal, whimsical, or facetious, reconsider. The question before us is what the Foreign Service needs to do to remain an effective force for the next 60 years. The beginning of the answer is to realize that the real battleground is bureaucratic and institutional. AFSA is uniquely positioned to lead the fight and merits the full support of all of us.
Social and economic issues are growing in complexity, and the pace of technological change is ever increasing. To deal effectively with the world of tomorrow, the Foreign Service will need to be even more superbly educated than it is today. This is particularly true for AID officers who must help developing countries relate to the increasing economic opportunities afforded by new scientific knowledge and rapidly evolving technology. Only by effectively transferring technology will we be able to raise growth rates dramatically in the least developed countries and spread prosperity and progress to all the world’s nations. AID’s future leaders will need to be experts in technology transfer. Further, all elements of the Foreign Service must ensure, on a sustained basis, the career opportunities necessary to attract and hold top-of-the-line professionals.

In summary, there is no way to predict specific needs 60 years into the future, but one thing is clear: life will become more complex. If we have adaptable, top-quality people, they will be able to take advantage of change, and they will ensure that the Foreign Service remains an effective force.

I see no circumstances in which a trained, professional Foreign Service will cease to be relevant to the protection and advancement of U.S. security interests. Those who feel that such a Service is an anachronism, a holdover from the past, are dead wrong.

The Foreign Service is totally dependent upon the quality of its people: their political acuity, their knowledge of history, their patriotism, their familiarity with other countries and cultures, their managerial abilities, and all the other skills required to manage U.S. foreign relationships. It is the most competitive institution in the country.

The Service today faces difficult challenges, but they can be met. Violence and terrorism threaten us daily. Some of our important skills have been reduced beyond the point of safety as a result of budgetary restrictions combined with rising consular and administrative requirements. Societal changes, particularly the role of spouses, present difficult conundrums. Our resource base needs drastic improvement to improve our capability to serve the country’s political leadership. Our recruiting and training need improvement to bring the best Americans to this Service and ensure that they increasingly reflect our society’s composition as a whole. We must seek innovative thinkers unafraid to tender objective advice but prepared to follow the instructions of our political superiors when they are given. In short, the Foreign Service must modernize itself and its outlook in a variety of ways if it is to do the vital job that our countrymen demand of us.

To be effective in the future, the Foreign Service must, as it has been, be informed, able, responsible, and dedicated and it must make a better effort to hone its scientific skills. But this is not enough to ensure an effective Service.

The Washington body politic must have a more enlightened appreciation of the essential ingredients of an effective foreign policy process. We need a recognition by our political leaders that the recent excessive politicization of the Foreign Service has damaged our image abroad immensely. It disturbs me to note the unwarranted suspicion by our elected leaders of the loyalty to a newly incumbent regime of the seasoned professionals who have served a previous administration. Such an attitude prevents that degree of continuity in our foreign policy which will command the loyalty of our allies and the respect of our adversaries and, in the process, ensure some degree of stability in this turbulent world.

As long as the principal emphasis in appointments is on political and ideological reality rather than informed competence, and as long as professionals in high positions lack the guts to correct this regrettable trend—as has been the case in the recent past—I cannot be sanguine about the prospects of either the formulation of an enlightened and responsible foreign policy, nor of its implementation by an effective, respected Foreign Service.

The best hope for having an effective Foreign Service in the next 60 years lies in persuading the public that the diplomatic profession is just that—a profession.

Too often we hear that technological advances in transportation and communication have diminished the importance of the Foreign Service, since decisions can go right to the president or his close advisers. But these advances have also made professionalism and competence in the Service more critical than ever. Consider only this fact: for the first time in history, two nations have it in their power to destroy each other as well as the rest of the human race. Managing such a potentially destructive relationship calls for the most competent and sophisticated diplomats this nation can produce. Moreover, managing East-West relationships may prove less difficult than managing North-South strains or the complexities of economic interdependence.

Obviously, we cannot let the Foreign Service become a dumping ground for political cronies or unqualified individuals, and morale problems in the Service must be resolved if the best talent is to be attracted. The national interest will be best served by strengthening the Foreign Service in the years ahead. No one is better qualified to relay that message than the Foreign Service itself.
THE PROBLEM, as I see it, is not what the Foreign Service needs to do to remain an effective force in the next 60 years, but what the United States government needs to do to the Foreign Service to give it that possibility. This, in my opinion, would be to return to the sound principles of the Rogers Act of 1924: to make the Foreign Service—a highly selected and unashamedly elite body of professionals, held to high standards of discipline, performance and deportment, but respected accordingly—a self-administering service, to be entered only at the bottom and by strict and impartial competitive examination.

The Foreign Service should not be confused with the various bodies of technicians and specialists that are involved in other capacities in the external relations of our government, and it should be quite immune to political manipulation. It would be desirable that it be regarded as the normal and primary, though not exclusive, source of appointment to ambassadorial positions and to senior positions in the Department of State, these latter to include, incidentally, the position (yet to be established) of a permanent under secretary of state, on the British pattern, wholly divorced from political affiliation or influence.

OVER THE NEXT 60 years the Foreign Service will have to meet growing challenges to maintain a leadership role in foreign policy.

We must continue to provide a solid, professional Service capable of analyzing foreign policy issues with acuity and defending U.S. interests with steadiness and skill. In the last decade, the Service has become more representative of the U.S. population; this trend should be encouraged, within the context of our traditional high standards. We also need to work harder to promote a better understanding of the Service among the American public.

At home our task will be to give direction to foreign policy yet remain sensitive to domestic concerns. Abroad, we must actively champion American values and interests but not yield to ethnocentrism.

Developing state-of-the-art management, particularly of our human resources, will enable us to handle the rising demands on the Service. The Service should reward creative thinking and expertise, and preserve incentives through a true merit system.

Meeting these challenges with vigor and courage will be necessary to attract and retain the quality of Foreign Service officers necessary to maintain our tradition of excellence.

IN THE NEXT CENTURY, satellites, fiber optics, computers, and other electronic wonders will transform our society and affect our relations with the world. The most remote posts are now as accessible as the principal capitals of the world, and the State Department agenda has grown far beyond the traditional social, political, and economic issues. Now, at the United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union, we debate whether satellites will be permitted to broadcast radio and television programs to neighboring countries. At UNESCO, we argue about the principles of a New World Information Order. At OECD, questions arise about tariff restrictions on data traffic.

These problems will become more complex as the web of interdependence impinges on local sovereignty. To meet this challenge, the Foreign Service officer will need training in the technical aspects of communications to sort out the significant policy questions from the clutter of megawatts and kilohertz.

The recent ITU conference on high-frequency broadcasting demonstrated that State is aware of the importance of communications issues. Government agencies and private-sector interests came together in a delegation which functioned harmoniously and effectively. I hope this experience will set the standard for the future.

If the Foreign Service is to remain effective in the conduct of foreign relations, it must become more relevant to the tasks at hand, and it must regenerate a strong sense of community.

The Service has too often downplayed its own importance and, as a consequence, either lost functions to others more willing to do them—as for example, commercial representation abroad, and educational and cultural affairs—or become less influential—as in international scientific affairs or foreign assistance. The Foreign Service, to survive, must equip itself to carry out changing responsibilities or it will become irrelevant, limited to traditional reporting, consular work, and housekeeping abroad for other agencies.

The Foreign Service must also remain a community in the face of growing internal tensions. It must simultaneously accommodate, for example, the interests of single professionals, of those with families, and of tandem couples. As more spouses seek recognition and employment, this must not have negative results for the careers and status of members of the Service. If the interests of any one group can override those of others, the result on esprit de corps will be devastating. Without high morale, the Service will simply be unable to cope.
MODERN DIPLOMACY requires trained and disciplined professionals willing to adapt to changing environments, accept new risks, and relentlessly seek new paths of understanding among nations. Thanks to modern technology and the ease of global communications, we are in a new age of diplomacy. Our increasingly interdependent world places new demands on our society. The Foreign Service is our advance guard for initiating our response to these pressures and for cementing our alliances. It must help us to maintain our flexibility and yet lend continuity to a foreign policy which might change with the political cycle.

To sustain the Service, we must ensure its attractiveness as a career to highly qualified individuals, focus on the demands of modern family life, reward distinguished service through merit promotions, and provide ample opportunity for promotion. We must also ensure the safety of our officers and their families overseas.

Given the fast pace of technological change and its effect on the international community, we must integrate better a knowledge of science and technology with traditional foreign policy expertise. The Foreign Service must be equipped to formulate policy with a view to technology if it is to be the primary source of U.S. foreign policy guidance in the modern world.

In the next 60 years, even with desktop television contact with foreign officials, there will be a need for a strong corps of foreign affairs professionals. The U.S. public and political leadership will probably continue to withhold full support for this corps, but the Foreign Service can act to obtain a serious hearing for its views. It can increase its expertise through a far more developed program of training, including a much expanded Foreign Service Institute of recognized top standing, and through an improved assignment system which avoids both overspecialization and excessive spread. It can cultivate institutional solidarity and mutual aid, getting more out of its human resources. It can engage in a more determined outreach program.

Most importantly, the Foreign Service can seek to transcend classic limitations of bureaucracy by systematically encouraging intellectual openmindedness and creative thinking. To survive as a viable, useful institution, the Service cannot limit itself to the traditional functions of the expert—implementing and advocating policy and educating political leaders in foreign affairs. Instead, it must try to rise to a higher level of expertise and disciplined imagination, learning to tell the political leadership through creative policy alternatives how it can move toward fulfilling its desires, realistically taking account of pitfalls and difficulties. It will be an absorbingly interesting, demanding task.

If the Foreign Service is to sustain its influence and responsibility in foreign affairs and public policy, it must meet stiff competition from other agencies. The Foreign Service will not be competitive unless it can provide policymakers with four things:

- Professional expertise: The Foreign Service must develop greater strength on politico-military, economic, and technical and scientific issues. It must reward functional expertise.

- Strategic thinking: The Service must demonstrate its ability to place the welter of daily events into a larger, strategic context.

- Courage and discipline: FSOs must have the self-confidence to present informed views to policymakers and then dedicate their best efforts to carrying out the policies decided upon. The emphasis must be on service to the president as America’s elected leader, and loyalty to his programs.

- Knowledge of domestic context: FSOs must deepen their understanding of the linkage between domestic and foreign policy. In framing recommendations, the Service must take into account the political sense of our nation and forcefully project our principles and values.

An increasingly sophisticated, responsive, and comprehensive handling of foreign relations will be demanded in the future. The Foreign Service must continue to demonstrate its competence and reliability if it is to take the lead in formulating and implementing foreign policy.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE has only one asset—its people. To remain effective over the next 60 years, more work must be done to maintain the current high-quality FSO corps. In the face of declining attractiveness of government as a career, the increasing role played by other agencies in foreign affairs, and the mounting personal disadvantages in living overseas, the Foreign Service must run harder to stay even. Not only must we address such issues as pay, benefits, and working conditions, including greater opportunities for working couples, but we must come to grips with the seemingly intractable obstacles to maximum performance during the last two decades: mission definition, a more rational allocation of personnel resources, and an organizational structure that clarifies lines of accountability and responsibility.

The good news is that foreign affairs is becoming more central to our country's interests, indeed even its very survival. The president can and should look to the Foreign Service as his instrument to orchestrate our foreign policy resources. No recent president has fully accepted us in this role, but future presidents may find the need overwhelming. Let's position ourselves to take advantage of the opportunity when it arises. The first priority is to get our own house in order.

The FOREIGN SERVICE should strive above all to maintain its identity. It lays no claim to an independent hierarchy, but it would wish certain things to be understood. The Service should be recognized as the channel of official communication with foreign states and as the agency which transacts our government's business and protects U.S. interests abroad.

The Service contributes to the making of foreign policy and consequently believes it merits a recognized role in the process itself. It has been bypassed often in the handling of national security and arms control. These areas seem to have become the preserve of a new establishment which has already usurped too much of the high ground of diplomacy.

The preservation of the career principle is another matter of consequence. The Service should welcome the addition of new skills which it lacks, such as the effective presentation of its case. It is vulnerable, however, to inroads upon its membership abetted by well-known outside pressures.

Fortunately, the Foreign Service can count on many good friends, including satisfied businessmen and concerned members of Congress. The academic community also relies on the department's research, much of it based on Foreign Service input.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM has offered complaints about the Foreign Service and cited its low morale as long as I can remember. Mid-level and senior officers at the the Foreign Service Institute often voice concerns about the Service. But judging from their spirit and ability, the Service is alive and healthy and will be around for a long time. If it did not exist, we would invent something just like it.

Abroad, the Service is highly respected for its dedication and competence. In hard languages it probably compares favorably with any diplomatic service in the world. Yet this high regard is not shared at home. Because the Service's effectiveness is crucially dependent on its credibility at home, our efforts should be directed toward enhancing our expertise and professionalism—the elements which can strengthen respect. We must deepen our language, area, and functional competence and keep our officers at their jobs long enough to be able to take advantage of their expertise.

Professionalism goes beyond expertise to cover the relationship between the professional and the client who, in our case, is primarily the policymaker. Our professionalism can turn an administration's policies into workable programs if a relationship of trust can be established. But we must take care to hold up our end of this trust and confidence. Members of the Service have been too willing to blame others for past lapses of confidence in this relationship.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE should be guided by four basic principles. First, rigorous standards must be maintained to ensure that those entering the Service are exceptionally intelligent, well informed, and fully prepared to accept the discipline and rigors of Foreign Service life. The majority should enter at the lowest grades, but a small number of particularly able or specialized individuals should be admitted in the middle grades.

Second, the Service should regard itself as more like the military than the Civil Service. It should foster a strong sense of esprit de corps, loyalty, and dedication so that presidents will appoint more career officers to ambassadorial and equivalent posts.

Third, the Foreign Service must give higher priority to career opportunities abroad for spouses. A vigorous effort to arrange, on a reciprocal basis, opportunities for spouses to work in the local economy without losing diplomatic status would be a useful first step.

Finally, because of the growing interest of diverse agencies in foreign affairs and the increased relevance of domestic issues to foreign policy, the Service should expand its program of assignments outside the State Department. In particular, it should press for greater representation in the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and on the National Security Council staff.

TO REMAIN EFFECTIVE, the Foreign Service must continue to be made up of first-class people. In order to attract the best, sound and adaptable policies must be followed regarding recruitment and examination, adequate financial rewards must be provided, and constructive solutions found to family problems and the role of spouses. Junior officers should be involved early on in the substance of foreign policy. The Service should remain separate and distinct, with high standards for promotion based on merit. Every effort should be made to ensure that appointments to top posts are also based on merit and qualifications.

Demands on the Foreign Service will change with the times. We must have officers who are familiar with the international aspects of technological issues, telecommunications, space, and environmental concerns. The Service must be equipped to deal with military matters, trade, and economic questions, imposing new demands on the selection process and the training of FSOs.

Lastly, a comprehensive program should be aimed at informing the public about the Service and encouraging political leaders to see and rely on the Service for what it is: a professional, loyal corps of men and women composing an essential element in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

IN MY TIME AS SECRETARY, I was impressed, as I believe every secretary of state has been, with the caliber and dedication of the Foreign Service.

Coming from a career in politics, however, I was sensitive to the complexity of domestic and foreign policy and to the special problems the diplomatic professionals face in reconciling their own perceptions with the changes in current policy as administrations change. The Service today suffers from the impression which, fair or not, is held by presidents, by many in Congress, and by the public, that its members give more attention to foreign interests than to the affairs of the United States. In the years ahead, the Foreign Service, without itself becoming political, must find an effective way to demonstrate to political leaders and the public what those who have worked with it know well: its dedication to the interests of the country and its indispensable professional capacity to project and protect those interests abroad.

Mass communication has made public opinion a vital element of foreign policy. The Foreign Service should recognize this by redirecting its energies and talents to influencing the media and the public on issues affecting the United States. By becoming active in shaping public opinion, our overseas missions would see their authority with host governments enhanced. Naturally, the approach to this challenge must differ from country to country, but the constant goal should be to promote and defend the United States and its policies. A higher public profile will carry the risk of occasional mistakes, but this is an acceptable risk that is far outweighed by the rewards.

The ambassador should play the key role in this effort, but many elements of the mission must be involved. A shift of focus in this sense also implies internal changes for the Foreign Service personnel system. Recruitment, training, assignment, and promotion should all be adjusted to take account of the increased need for a public role.
"If you don't have guts, I don't care if you get to be secretary of state—you're not a success"

MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK: THE POLITICS OF GUTS

AN INTERVIEW WITH LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER

From 1982-84, Lawrence Eagleburger served as under secretary of state for political affairs. Prior to that, he was assistant secretary of state for European Affairs and from 1977-81 served as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia. He is now president of Kissinger Associates.

By what standards should we judge modern Foreign Service officers? How would you define a "successful" FSO?

There are several kinds of success in the Foreign Service, and we should not necessarily be bound by one definition. I believe that when you can go to somebody who has spent most of his life in one country or one region, and you know the advice you get is based on 20 to 25 years of experience and good judgment, that person is successful—whether he ever becomes an ambassador or an assistant secretary.

Now, whether he thinks he is successful or not, that's a different question. We in the Foreign Service—and I was as much a victim of this as anybody else—tend to define success by the title you put in front of your name: have you been an ambassador or will you be an ambassador; that is more important even than being an assistant secretary or anything of that nature. And under that definition, there's a limit to how many people can be successful.

Let me try to give you what I think are the important qualities as they would fit with a number of different definitions of success. The first is intelligence—not necessarily brilliance, but you've got to have a questioning mind. Second, you have to be able to express yourself well, both in writing and orally. I'm sounding like an efficiency report, but I think both intelligence and communications ability are important, because you can know everything there is to know about a place but if you can't say it or write it so that somebody else can use it, it's of no use. These attributes are essential to success but they by no means guarantee it. Assuming that somebody can express himself well and is intelligent, the single
"You've got to be able to translate intellect into action. And you can't do that if you can't make the system work."

most significant quality is guts. And if you don't have that, in the last analysis, I don't care if you get to be secretary of state—you're not a success.

What do you mean by guts?

The willingness to tell your betters that you think they're wrong—and why. The willingness to say that to a congressional committee with the cameras on you. The willingness to tell people what you think, even if that will hurt your career or get you in trouble. Nor whether you're willing to stand on a street corner in the middle of a revolution as bullets whistle around your head. That's not the kind of guts I'm talking about.

Guts, in my view, is a quality hard to find in the Foreign Service, partly because we've beaten it out of people over time. At the same time, you have to have the guts, after you've had your day in court and lost, to salute and march off and do what you're told. I don't consider it guts to then persist in the argument. You can't run a system that way. So you've got to be prepared to do things you don't necessarily believe in unless they are so morally abhorrent that you can't—and under those circumstances you should resign.

You recently said that many FSOs have more guts than when you entered the Foreign Service, and that you think this is a good thing, but that with so many people challenging authority it has become difficult to manage a coherent, effective foreign policy. Then you said that the youngest officers are becoming increasingly "more disciplined, perhaps less imaginative." Which is better, gutsy imagination or discipline?

Obviously the best of all is imagination and discipline. I came from a pretty conservative university generation, not conservative politically but in accepting the system. When I talk about comparing the generation of the Foreign Service officers who came in in the 1970s with mine, we look at life a lot differently because of what we grew up with.

The 1970s generation, coming from the turmoil of Vietnam, had learned to challenge authority in ways we would never have contemplated. They brought a lot of zip and verve and imagination, and questioning of things everybody had taken for granted. And it is good to question in the Foreign Service because, by the very nature of the institution we work for, it is easy to fall into the trap of simply doing it because that's the way it's been done. That generation didn't let that happen.

What some of them also came in with, though, along with a willingness to challenge authority, was an unwillingness to accept authority. You cannot run an institution like the State Department or the Foreign Service, and you cannot serve the purposes of the government of the United States, if you can't translate intellect into action. And you can't do that if you can't make the system work.

What I think we're seeing now is a natural reaction to the post-Vietnam era, which is a more, shall I use the word? steady generation of college students, not as prepared to accept authority and tradition as my generation, but certainly more so than the post-Vietnam generation. They may be less imaginative but they also understand that any institution has to function as such.

The trick of any effective manager in the State Department is to take those qualities and try to mold them into something that is as close to that golden mean of intelligent and disciplined as you can get. But, on the other hand, if you have too much discipline you end up accepting anything. If I had my druthers, what I'd like is the zip and challenge of authority from the generation of the 1970s, but a greater sense of the needs of an institution.

In Foreign Policy of last summer, R.G. Livingston described you as being everything a classical diplomat is not: operational rather than analytical, outspoken rather than discreet, venturesome rather than cautious, and more attuned to domestic politics than interested in other countries' politics. Do you agree with this assessment of yourself and the implication that this is what made you advance so far? Is his assessment of the Foreign Service as a whole accurate?

Let me take the second half first. I think that implied stereotype of the Foreign Service is not accurate. I think it once was, but precisely the things we have just talked about have substantially changed that. What we haven't tested, because we haven't had time, is the degree to which the institutions of the Foreign Service and the Department of State will squeeze out of those younger generations the imagination as well as the indiscipline. And one of the things that has bothered me about the Foreign Service and the State Department is that we discourage the development of the right kind of imagination and spirit, so I can't say the generation of the 1970s won't be a group of cream puffs by the time they've been in the Foreign Service 20 years—although I suspect not.

I think the stereotype of at least middle levels down is not correct. And, as far as Gerry's description of me, the person least likely to be able to judge that is the person talked about.

Do you think some of those described characteristics are more important, operational rather than analytical, etc.?

You need both. The operator who isn't analytical can make horrible mistakes. The analyst who isn't operational is largely irrelevant. As institutions, the Foreign Service and the State Department—and you'll notice I keep talking about both because, although there are differences, both need these same qualities—those institutions need a mix and our tendency, as a Foreign Service, is to try to define success on far too narrow a base.

In our July/August issue, Barry Rubin of the Center for Strategic and International Studies maintains that in the government's foreign affairs apparatus, how a decision is made is usually more important than its merits in terms of eventual adoption. Is it enough for an FSO to provide advice and expertise, or is the ability to manipulate the bureaucracy even more important? Will this become increasingly so in the future?

It is at least as important. But this is not a State
Department or Foreign Service problem—it’s a problem of modern-day bureaucracy. It’s also a problem in American business. What you need is an institution made up of a lot of people who both know the substance and have the know-how to move the decision.

In my generation, there was a pretty strong view that the Foreign Service, if it was to remain apolitical, had to be there to give advice and then you sort of folded your notebook and sat back. If that was true, it was also unfortunate. If your advice is to mean anything you’ve got to know how to make it have an impact on the decision-making process. One of the idiosyncrasies of our Foreign Service is that it is second to none in understanding the processes of foreign governments, but not its own.

So you would argue that if the Foreign Service plays a more aggressive role in the policymaking process and works more in the bureaucracy, it will be abandoning an ideal of disinterested professionalism?

No. You are still disinterested if, having given the advice and having it accepted by your immediate superiors, you are also then capable of having it become government policy. Any other kind of disinterest is counterproductive. You’ve got to be prepared to take on those who disagree with you in open and sometimes rough arguments. But you’ve then got to accept responsibility for the decisions you have helped make.

The traditional advice has often been that, if you’re going to be disinterested, you give the advice and then step back—avoiding having to pay the price for having given it. And that I don’t respect. But that does mean that the Foreign Service becomes more politicized.

When FSOs reach advanced and highly visible levels, they often speak before the press and can become publicly identified with certain issues. Can’t that hurt them when a new administration comes in that disagrees with that policy? For example, Malcolm Toon has told us that your close association with Henry Kissinger damaged you during the Carter administration.

Up to a point. They still appointed me as ambassador to Yugoslavia, which is where I wanted to go. The answer to that question is terribly difficult because both sides of the argument are right to a degree. Let’s put it on a different ground than association with Kissinger or Dean Rusk or whomever. If, over the course of the last four years you’ve been arguing the administration’s line on arms control, for instance—as you should, whether you believe it or not—and the administration is defeated and somebody else comes in with a different view, you may well end up paying the price of advocating a view that the new administration simply doesn’t accept.

For the senior FSO in a highly visible position, that’s part of the baggage you carry with the job. Though you should be doing that articulating not in a partisan way but in terms of the substance of the issues, a new administration that substantially disagrees with the views you have been articulating may force you to pay the price.

There is no doubt that this is politicizing the Foreign Service to a degree. You have to weigh that every time against the golden mean of a Foreign Service that is politically uninvolved and is there only to give advice. The question is, Which way do you get a more effective American foreign policy? If the Foreign Service is what it says it is—a source of great expertise on foreign affairs—then that source has to be prepared to act reasonably to forward the policies it espouses. But just as you can be too withdrawn from the process, you can be too deeply engaged. There has to be some balance.

I don’t normally like to talk personally, but the one thing I do feel pretty good about is that, while I have my own political views and have never been afraid to tell people what they are, at the same time I’ve been largely successful in being able to serve several different kinds of administrations. I therefore think it can be managed.

A Foreign Service officer sent out as the head of a negotiating team may or may not believe in the negotiating instructions, but he carries them out. And if he’s the right kind of fellow, he carries them out to the best of his ability. It could well be that the agreement he finally reaches becomes a political issue with the other party. Do you therefore take the FSO out of that kind of responsible job because he may have to pay a price for it? If you’re going to follow the principle of keeping the Foreign Service from being involved in disputatious issues to its extreme you take the Foreign Service out of almost everything other than sitting there in an ivory tower and giving advice that nobody pays any attention to. Once you get into the business of negotiating you are automatically in the position of espousing positions which some later politician may oppose.

This administration has been criticized for the number and quality of its political appointees. As under secretary, were you satisfied with the procedures for ensuring that political appointees are qualified and in appropriate positions? How does the right of the president to appoint his own people fit with the needs of a career system that needs high-level positions as an incentive?

I’ve never been satisfied with the appointment process, except maybe when I was deputy under secretary for management and ran it. At that point Henry Kissinger was having a tremendous influence on who was and was not appointed, but that depends very much on the relationship between the secretary and the president. That particular time in American history was certainly atypical.

The argument always ought to be much less over the number than over the quality of appointments. I’ve seen some people appointed to embassies where, no matter how hard I searched, I couldn’t figure out what qualities they had that uniquely qualified them to be ambassador to that country. That’s not peculiar to this administration. On the other hand, I have seen the Foreign Service fuss around about appointments which were in fact of pretty good quality. So I think both sides are to some degree guilty.

In the last analysis, it gets down to satisfying both the right of the president to make appointments and
“Promotions aren’t necessarily given to the right persons. I’m not impressed by the promotion system”

the needs of the Service to have a rational personnel system. There is no pat answer. The Constitution gives the president the right to appoint whomever he may choose, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. And that is a right and a responsibility that no president will easily give up. But how do you reconcile that with the need for quality ambassadors, secretaries, assistant secretaries, and so forth? I don’t know. We have not done it well in the past.

David Bruce was as superb an appointment as you can find. And I could name a number of others currently at posts: Arthur Burns in Bonn and Mike Mansfield in Japan, for example. Just I don’t think you can find better people. There are, unfortunately, some others whom I shall not name that I wouldn’t put in the same category.

Though the president has the right to pick whom he chooses, sensible people in the White House and in the personnel system would also recognize that in the last analysis the president is judged, among other things, on the quality of his foreign policy, so if you get a real jerk in a job, he’s not going to help the president get reelected. And I’m talking about any president. So I guess we will have to count on the instinct for political self-preservation.

Unfortunately, we have never as a nation found the right mechanism for making these kinds of appointments. Nor am I sure that we ever will, although something akin to the way the American Bar Association rates nominees for judgeships might work. If it got started, maybe then it could be made to last, recognizing that presidents always are going to want to appoint some of their friends or some of the people to whom they are beholden for getting elected to some jobs abroad. But the issue must become one of quality, not of quantity.

Would it be logical for AFSA to take this function, as an analogue of the ABA?

No, because I don’t think it is an analogue of the ABA. This is not an insult or an attack, but AFSA is not the fount of all knowledge on foreign affairs. It is a part of it, but it is largely the representative of a party to the dispute, and I think it’s got to be broader than that.

AFSA has protested Reagan administration appointments in regard to both quality and quantity. In ambassadorial appointments, for instance, the Association says the number is the greatest since the Kennedy administration. Do you agree with this assessment?

I can’t say it’s the worst since the Kennedy administration. I’m not qualified to make that judgment and I’m not at all sure AFSA is either. In most of the cases where I have seen AFSA protest—and I haven’t looked at all of them—I have thought AFSA was right. But don’t ask me about how many; I don’t know.

If we could move from the quality of political appointees to the quality of Foreign Service officers—do you believe that FSOs are adequately trained to carry out their jobs and, in particular, are enough officers sufficiently trained in appropriate languages? Does it make sense to transfer officers to completely different continents after they have developed expertise in another region?

The answer to all of the above is yes. As far as languages are concerned, there are never enough officers. But within the constraints of a budget and a personnel system that needs people in certain slots on occasion, the American Foreign Service is probably as well trained in languages as any other—or better. And this from a society that is less likely to be bilingual than many European countries, for instance. We’ve not only not done badly—we’ve done pretty well.

Training in general, though, we don’t do very well. There are reasons for that. Most FSOs don’t want to be trained because it takes them out of the competition while they’re off at school. That gets you back to whether there is something wrong with the whole promotion system. God knows there is, but it is also partly because FSOs tend to think about getting into that next job and getting a good efficiency report. Unlike the military, our promotion system doesn’t give much in the way of additional benefit for training.

We do have a real training problem. It has to do with things like training officers at an early enough stage to be good managers. By and large, we are not good managers, partly because we don’t have the chance to manage people or programs until we’re well along in our career. Training in itself is not going to solve that problem.

But there is a real need for additional training. And my sense of it is that the under secretary for management, Ron Spiers, is working very hard on that.

Last, it is true that if you spend all your time in one area you can find that that causes a certain professional deformation. So it can make sense to train officers in an area and then move them somewhere else—but not all the time. The foreign policy of the United States is global, not simply European or African or Latin American. You do need regional and functional expertise, but also an understanding that a problem can be related to a number of other issues, and that therefore the answer isn’t always as simple as it looks.

Are promotions being given to the right people?

Not necessarily. I’m not particularly impressed by the promotion system, and I think there are lots of things that need to be done. On the other hand, given the constraints that must pertain to any governmental system of promotion, we do better than most. In one sense, however, the military does better: there is an honorable career ending at the rank of colonel. I find it terribly difficult to understand a system that permits a relatively large number of unassigned senior officers to wander around for a year or two with no jobs. That’s a reflection on the system, but it’s also a reflection on the people. At some point both the system and the person have to fish or cut bait, but I don’t think we have learned to cope with that psychologically or institutionally.

Do you think that the Foreign Service will continue to be able to attract top-quality people?

Your question implies that it now does. By and
large the Foreign Service does recruit good people, usually very good people, but whether they are "top-quality" people I'm not sure.

Will the Foreign Service continue to do so? My suspicion is yes, because what we have attracted in the past and what we will continue to attract are people who are enamored of the kind of life. They come into the Service not because of the salary but because it's exciting, it's interesting, you get a chance to live abroad. On the other hand, and this will make a difference, you also get shot at more than you used to.

One emerging problem that bears on this is the working-spouse issue. We're going to have to come to grips with that. As you know, my wife, Marlene, has been active in this area, and the more I've watched the debate and the discussion the more I am convinced it can become a major problem. The question of terrorism, assuming it stays at about the level we've come to expect, or whether you live overseas or in the U.S.—I don't think those will be anywhere near as destructive of a system as our inability to come to grips with this question of how you deal with spouses, male or female.

According to press accounts, you left the highest career position because you were entering a period of heavy financial obligation to your family. What does that say about the personnel system, particularly the current administration's attacks on its retirement elements and other components?

I left for a number of reasons, one of which was clearly financial. But I will also tell you right now that you will never convince the average American that $70,000 a year is not a lot of money. It is politically unrealistic to expect that senior FSOs will ever be paid what they think they're worth. It just won't happen. It is true I've got two boys to educate, and that's expensive. It is also true that I think the Foreign Service life over a period of time puts a lot more pressure on the financial situation than a sedentary life in Keokuk, Iowa. But it's a choice I made. And I don't regret a minute of it. In addition, without that 27 years my ability to go out and make money somewhere else would be substantially less.

The Foreign Service must fight hard for adequate compensation and for the right benefits. But we should never argue that we should be paid as much as our equivalent in the American business community because it's not going to happen. The reason I left was that 27 years was enough. Too many people don't know when the time to leave has come.

Some people would argue that over the last two administrations the department and the Foreign Service have played much less of a role in the formulation of foreign policy. If this is true, how can it be regained?

I've heard that argument for years. In my early days I was not in a position to judge, but later I found that the Foreign Service is by no means the only, but is certainly the single most important, influence on foreign policy decisions, and that hasn't changed.

Sometimes it has a greater influence, sometimes less. In terms of day-to-day decision making, the Foreign Service is the single most influential element. But it is by no means the only one, and on some big issues it can get knocked aside. It's very much a question of the character of the secretary of state.

I think Henry Kissinger would be the first to admit that when he was national security adviser, the department was pretty well out of the operation. When he became secretary, State was critical to the decision-making process. To me that says that the single most important factor in the influence of the Foreign Service is the character of the secretary and the president and the relationship between the two. And that has nothing to do with the Foreign Service, whether we are all geniuses or idiots.

There are often unseen areas in which State and the Service have influence: even in the days when the department was on the sidelines, the National Security Council staff had a large number of FSOs. And the influence on the decision-making process from individual officers was still pretty high. And, most important of all, a great deal of foreign policy is the consequence of little decisions made day by day—how cables are answered, for instance. Foreign policy, over time at least, is the accumulation of a lot of little decisions. And those are handled day after day, year after year by the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service sells itself short on how much influence it has because, on a particular glamorous issue at a particular time it didn't get its day in court. When that happens, it has a real right to complain. But, in the last analysis, the Foreign Service has far more impact on the policy process than we give ourselves credit for.

What do you think the Foreign Service should do to maintain its effectiveness?

The first thing is to find some way to be a little less of a closed society. We're too smart for that. We talk to each other too much and therefore on occasion become a bit narrow in our view of ourselves and the world. That is the Foreign Service's single most difficult problem. We are, after all, not the only source of wisdom on foreign policy.

How would you work to overcome that?

One of the best things that's ever happened to the Foreign Service was the Pearson amendment. The more officers look for ways to get out of the system for a while, and into the Congress, the Defense Department, or whatever, the better for the Service. The Foreign Service and AFSA should fight to expand out-of-department assignments.

Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the next 60 years of the Foreign Service?

Optimistic, because I have long since come to the conclusion that the country can't get along without a Foreign Service and therefore it's not going to try. I'm convinced of that. We do have to fight all of these questions we have discussed as they come up day after day because attrition can simply kill us. But by and large, I have no real concerns at all about the Foreign Service because the nation needs us.
A FOREIGN SERVICE FILAMENT

The JOURNAL has helped bind the Service together, but its mission—like that of the Service itself—has often been poorly defined

SMITH SIMPSON

Men that look no further than their outsides, think butth to an apparition of life, and quarrel with their constitutions for being sick; but I, that have examined the parts of man, and know upon what tender filaments that Fabric hangs, do wonder that we are not always so.—Sir Thomas Browne (1605–1682)

One who looks no further than the contemporary outside of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL thinks of it simply as a magazine, a mere appurtenance of the Service. But one who carefully examines its insides over its 60-year span is impressed by how much more it is than that. It is not only a vehicle of thought with respect to U.S. foreign relations, and, more particularly, overseas experience, but a means of expressing professional perspectives. It thus serves invaluable as one of those tender filaments joining Foreign Service officers to one another, to the foreign affairs agencies, and, to some extent, to the American public and its congressional representatives.

The JOURNAL provides an instrument for probing inside the diplomatic establishment and diplomacy itself, revealing the other filaments upon which our diplomatic fabric hangs—especially that never-ending “quarrel with our constitution” we call “low morale” and “lack of a sense of mission.” But a review of its 60 years is also a pleasurable experience. Ties with old friends and acquaintances are renewed. The thinking and experiences of colleagues are heard of but never met are brought into focus. The reader becomes more sharply aware of those with a genuine professional spirit, for these are clearly among the contributors. Brought to light are the remarkable but unknown careers of diplomats like Roy T. Davis, who so won the hearts of Costa Ricans that when he left they lined his railroad route. These men and women have been lost from the view of diplomatic historians but nevertheless served their country and profession well.

Moreover, those who have not known the charm of a poem by Mariquita Villard (July 1935), or the warmth of an essay by Walter F. Boyle on the qualities demanded by representational responsibilities (January 1931), or who are unfamiliar with the erudition of Henry L. Deimel’s articles on the New Deal have missed something in life. A compilation of “the best of the JOURNAL” would give a deep and immediate insight into the many-sided profession we have adopted. It would also provide a continuing boost to Service morale and sense of mission, adding some binding cement to a constantly fractured and fragmenting calling.

After its founding in 1924, the JOURNAL went through four stages. The first, from 1924 to 1929, when Henry L. Stimson was secretary of state; the second from 1929 to the New Deal; the third, from the New Deal through World War II and the Foreign Service Act of 1946, down to 1971; and the fourth, from Executive Order 11636 to the present. Each stage has its own credentials; each places its own distinctive stamp on the magazine; each reflects a different role and Service contribution.

In the election year of 1924, the congressional agenda is jammed and congressmen are impatient to get back to their districts. Nevertheless, the Rogers Act miraculously makes its way through the labyrinth of Capitol Hill and is approved by President Coolidge. Consular and diplomatic services were legislatively fused, an American Foreign Service Association replaces the Consular Officers Association, and from a disappearing American Consular Bulletin emerges an American Foreign Service Journal, all in a matter of months. To legislate the merging of the services is one thing; to achieve it is another, especially when the diplomatic officers want no part of it. The JOURNAL will assist the long process by bringing the two groups together in a common enterprise, but at the beginning, its staff of eight, four on the editorial and four on the business side, is divided equally between consular and diplomatic officers, and they are clearly labeled as such, an indication of the struggle fusion will face.

The staff consists of officers on active duty who must squeeze the magazine into long, busy days and nights, for the department, as always, is understaffed. Since consular officers have had a Bulletin for five years and acquired a publishing skill, the first editor is Felix Cole, a consular officer associated with the Bulletin. When he is transferred overseas four years later, his successor is a retired consul general, Augustus E. Ingram, and one can almost hear the sigh of relief that a fulltime editor has been found. The third editor, Herbert S. Bursley, who succeeds Ingram in 1935, is

Smith Simpson, a retired Foreign Service officer, is the author of Anatomy of the State Department and The Crisis in American Diplomacy.
as far as contributing signed articles is concerned. They also fear being swamped by a much larger corps—in January 1924 there were 128 diplomatic officers to 518 consular—and therefore concentrate on their careers. Furthermore, diplomatic missions are grossly understaffed, leaving little or no leisure for writing. Consular outposts, on the other hand, are often less overwhelmed and lack the frenetic social activity that devours the leisure of diplomatic officers serving in capitals. They are also often in regions that provide the local color and unusual experiences so commonly missing in the cosmopolitan environment of diplomats.

A psychological factor may also contribute to this consular monopoly. The well-tailored diplomats generally have well-tailored intellects, while the consular officers seem to care less what colleagues may think of their published material. Consular officers are less vulnerable to corridor gossip in assignments and promotions, since Wilbur J. Carr, the father of the merit service, exerts his considerable influence to screen out the favoritism that still plagues the diplomatic fraternity. All of this leads to what one letter writer calls “a constitutional timidity” among the diplomats.

If, however, the consular officers dominate the feature articles, the diplomatic contingent has its innings in social reporting: Washington receptions and dinners, golf and tennis tournaments, and the migratory comings and goings of officers on assignment and vacation are profusely chronicled, sometimes filling four pages in an almost fawning tone. We even learn that Margaret Hanna, a high ranking civil servant in the department, has had her hair bobbed. When similar news is solicited from overseas, the pages of social chit-chat expand. “Ambassador Fletcher,” runs one item, “is often on the links of the Cosmopolitan Club at Acqua Santa, near Rome, and is considered the best player of the club.”

This social tone gives a completely false view of diplomacy and diplomats, incidentally undermining the efforts of those trying to persuade Congress and the American public that the Foreign Service is the nation’s “first line of defense,” and should be appropriately funded. The Journal seems completely oblivious of this and is clearly getting in the way of the Service it is intended to serve.

After six or seven years, consular officers in the field begin to protest against so much “frivolous material.” They couple their complaints with requests for lists of interesting books, reviews of professionally oriented works, and other such germane publications. As for diplomatic officers, either they are not reading the magazine, take the fluff as normal, or are not about to contest an editorial policy they believe reflects a departmental point of view. The staff responds quickly to these demands but seems handicapped by a paucity of talent. A few civil servants in the department contribute lists of “Books I Have Read Recently and Found Interesting.” G. Howland Shaw is the only Foreign Service officer who contributes to this effort. Later, one or two full-length reviews appear—again by civil servants.

Regardless of its limitations and deficiencies, the
This, he concludes, has contributed to "the tradition that diplomacy is the business of trivial folk, and of them only" (January 1932). Obviously, the old rule "rigidly excluding tendentious material" has been blown out the window with a lot of other stuffiness by the Stimson gale.

The JOURNAL even experiments with editorials, but, to keep itself above the fray, they are signed by individual officers. The first is by Dana G. Munro (December 1929), who tries to respond to the "many men in the Service who are profoundly discouraged," "the appalling number of recent resignations," and "the prevailing discontent in the Service." Later, Munro himself will lose heart and join the Princeton faculty. After a second editorial signed by G. Howland Shaw, a maverick who later becomes assistant secretary under Cordell Hull, the editorials peter out.

Foreign Service reticence and restraint seem to have won out over an emerging gumption.

Shaw, however, continues to use the LETTERS department to get some of his more explosive views in circulation. In August 1929, five months after Stimson takes office, Shaw questions whether "the reform of the Foreign Service" sparked by the Rogers Act has gone far enough or whether it has simply improved the lot of officers without touching such basic issues as what they should be doing, the quality of their performance, and the quality of the diplomatic establishment as a whole. With bread-and-butter matters prevailing over basic professional issues, Shaw asks whether "reform" has not been simply "selfish and trivial," and asks for a "radical plan for reforming the Foreign Service." The Foreign Service officer, he suggests, should be asking not "What can I get?" but "What can we do?" Three years later, from his post as counselor in Istanbul, Shaw continues his provocative role, appealing for greater individualism in the Service and directly challenging its clubby and conformist mentality (June 1932). This comes six months after MacMurray’s article but is by an officer on active duty and therefore pretty "tendentious" stuff, but the JOURNAL does not flinch.

In the same spirit, William P. Cochran (May 1932) pleads from Mexico City for a more serious education and training of officers and for keeping them informed of foreign policy throughout their careers. He also makes clear that consular officers, who can now be given diplomatic assignments, should be included in this training—a plea which will be echoed repeatedly in the JOURNAL. Walter F. Boyle, a genial consul in Auckland, contributes a graceful essay on what it takes to represent the United States abroad. It is so well received that enthusiastic requests come in from the field for its publication in pamphlet form, though there is no sign of this being done. An indication that young, newly entering officers do not share the inhibitions of the older comes from John M. Cabot, who begins contributing on his first overseas diplomatic assignment (February and April 1930). Both of his
travelogue contributions are lead articles, as though the JOURNAL is expressing its delight at having diplomatic officers provide this type of material.

There are other indications of change. A column of book reviews becomes a regular feature and is competently done by John Carter, a well-read civil servant formerly with the New York Times. Later, an entire page of book reviews appears, written by Cyril Wynne, a Harvard Ph.D. in the Office of the Historian. A four-page "Bibliography of Foreign Service Study" is printed, listing subjects and books with which candidates for the Service should be familiar and providing a convenient reading list for officers already serving.

These are visible signs of change. More significant is a subtle one. In various ways the JOURNAL indicates that a sense of mission is trying to emerge, albeit in larval form. Former Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, who seems to have developed a vision not possessed in office, contributes a truly astonishing piece published in October 1930. Kellogg writes:

The members of the Foreign Service of the United States have, for many years, acted as American outposts of peace... The mission of these men is to promote the international understanding which permits nations, however different their traditions and ideals may be, to deal intelligently with each other... Few Americans realize the immense value of these officers in maintaining peace. We hear of those international disputes which have gone so far that there must be recourse to conciliation or arbitration proceedings just as, in the past, we have even had to face war because there seemed to be no other settlement. But what we do not realize... is the host of little misunderstandings which are dealt with instantly by our Foreign Service outposts and are thus prevented from developing into dangerous causes of disagreement.... The Foreign Service, with their comrades in the Department of State, truly constitute our first line of defense... preventing misunderstanding and building up the good understanding which is the greatest assurance against war.

If there is any clearer statement of the mission of our diplomatic establishment I do not know it. To the JOURNAL's credit it runs the statement on its first page, but it then proceeds to treat it as simply a nice magazine piece. There is no effort to keep it in the foreground so that officers presenting the department's budget to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress can clearly state this mission and the need for adequate financial support.

Two years later, DeWitt Poole gives a speech approaching this concept of mission from a different angle, and the JOURNAL reprints it as the lead article in January 1933, captioned as "Strongest Possible State Department Best Assurance of Peace." Poole's main thrust is that "it is one of the strangest ironies... that public money is poured lavishly upon the instruments of war and with hesitation and niggardliness upon the means of peace." Congress, he points out, voted in its last session "$14,000,000 for our first-line diplomatic defense, or a disproportion of 50 to 1 in favor of arms." He concludes, "I propose the upbuilding of a stronger American State Department and Foreign Service as a definite, practical objective in the campaign for peace."

Again, this is a Homeric call to conceptualize diplomacy as a mission of peace and to give the Foreign Service a sense of purpose that will lift it to the professional plateau it should occupy. But, again, the JOURNAL treats it as simply eloquent language and fails to perceive its significance. A sense of mission is struggling to assert itself, but the staff—still active-duty officers—apparently sees its mission as only to get out a monthly magazine. As a magazine, it has improved and is publishing some professional material. But as a definer of the Foreign Service's mission, it produces a feeble flame.

These signs of change are not overwhelming. The JOURNAL's usual fare continues to provide a ticket of admission to far-away places and exotic subjects, with consular officers still providing the bulk of material. Aside from the larger professional issues raised by MacMurray, Shaw, and others, specific bread-and-butter problems—such as pensions for widows of officers—are only occasionally touched on, and then in Letters. Change does not overtake the policy of rigidly excluding the espousal of action "aimed to influence legislative, executive, or administrative action with respect to the Foreign Service." An exception is made when it comes to erecting a memorial plaque to honor diplomatic and consular officers dying at posts in tragic or heroic circumstances, for it requires a joint congressional resolution for installation in a government building.

The world depression of the 1930s erases the victories Stimson won for the diplomatic establishment. The personnel of every government department is slashed 15 percent, all government employees are required to take a month's furlough without pay, and Foreign Service allowances are eliminated. Officers abroad move from houses to cheap apartments, and some even send their wives and children home to live with parents to make ends meet. When the nation goes off the gold standard, the dollar's purchasing power plummets, multiplying hardship even more for those abroad. An ironic item appears in the JOURNAL: "Wanted: A nice poorhouse, with all modern conveniences, where a Foreign Service officer can spend his 30-day furlough without pay" (September 1932). The furlough provides the JOURNAL with some articles on how officers abroad spend the payless month.

Although Stimson's successor as secretary, Cordell Hull, is a former representative and senator, he refuses to go to bat for the diplomats—or desiring to get involved in "administrative matters." The JOURNAL prints without comment his testimony before a congressional committee, in which he leaves it to Congress to decide what should be done for a worldwide organization supposed, in the midst of a global depression, to provide the nation's first line of defense. Wilbur Carr confides to his diary that Hull shows "a woeful lack of ability to place his case before the committee."

The JOURNAL must adjust to the first Democratic administration in 12 years, as must the Service and the department. It prints a portrait and a brief biographic sketch of President Roosevelt, puts Hull on its
cover (April 1933), and runs a vague, rambling greeting by the new secretary. Then, beginning in August 1933, it bravely runs a series of articles on the New Deal by an economist who transferred to State from Commerce in 1931, Henry L. Deimel Jr. This is the first time the JOURNAL has undertaken to explain a new administration and its policies. And it is well it makes the attempt, for the situation is confusing even to those at home.

So competently written are these articles that the magazine publishes a second series by Deimel, “On the Course of Events” in the United States. This is equally professional, although the editorial staff is disturbed by Deimel’s recognition of labor’s importance in current events and by the New Deal’s aims in its quest for social justice. On what is usually the editorial page, the staff prints a note on “Forthcoming JOURNALS” which publicly reins in, if not reprimands, Deimel: “To balance the emphasis given to the labor situation in Henry Deimel’s ‘On the Course of Events’ in this issue, he will endeavor to lay more emphasis in the future on other important elements in the national life” (September 1934). Here is subtly revealed the conservatism of the diplomatic corps, which leads FDR and his associates not to trust the diplomats. It is also a portent of what lies ahead, for when Under Secretary Sumner Welles approves the creation of a labor attaché program in 1944, the JOURNAL will take no notice of the innovation.

By 1936 or ’37 the Stimson phase has clearly shaded into the New Deal. Some of the innovations of the Stimson years are reinforced and even accelerated, this time stimulated not by the secretary, but by the dynamics of the New Deal and the deteriorating international situation. Japanese aggression in the Far East is accompanied by Hitler’s in Europe. Gone from the JOURNAL is most of the high society stuff. More material on the New Deal appears in the magazine. With the death of Cyril Wynne, book reviewing is under the direction of a maverick, J. Rives Childs, and is farmed out to more Foreign Service officers and even outsiders—including the president of Yale—and the books reviewed are of larger, less vocational concerns. Women begin to appear more than occasionally as contributors. Letters express a simmering discontent with the state of the Service and the magazine itself, although one officer praises the JOURNAL for “growing bigger and better’ (March 1936). In early 1937, a pair of new, dynamic, fresh-visioned editors take over—George H. Butler and Edward G. Trueblood—and in October they are reinforced by the appointment of George Kennan to the board, where he joins Henry S. Villard and Charles W. Yost.

In the midst of all this ferment and improvement, the JOURNAL is confronted with its first competitors. To keep overseas representatives better informed of domestic events, in 1936 the department institutes its wireless news service, broadcasting daily news bulletins. In 1939 comes the Department of State Bulletin, which publishes all the official material the JOURNAL has been printing, including the appointment and assignment of officers.

The JOURNAL responds with a two-installment piece by Selden Chapin in November and December 1937 on what he diplomatically calls “certain possible defects in the structure and administration of the Foreign Service” and “certain remedies for discussion.” It comes like a thunderclap—nothing so direct and coldly analytical has ever appeared in its pages. In addition to demonstrating that the JOURNAL can do something its competitors cannot, the articles stimulate a discussion that reverberates at length in the magazine’s columns, leading to the sponsorship of an essay contest seven years later on this very subject.

Unfortunately, Chapin’s essay approaches the subject of reform from a structural point of view—how many classes and what functional categories should there be, compensation, and the like, rather than starting from the concept of mission. Mission he dismisses with a vague definition—“The cultivation of the entire system of interests arising from the relations established between nations.” He ignores the need for developing planning so that daily efforts will be guided by long-range national interests. He ignores the need to correct working conditions that, as James W. Gantenbein will complain two years later, are producing “intellectual vapidty” and encouraging officers to act “according to formulas, precedents, and what seems likely to be agreeable to others” (October 1949). But whatever its limitations, the article was, given its time, a bold stroke.

Chapin’s article helps to land him in the catbird seat of reform, but before the 1946 act is passed, the breathless years of the New Deal are overtaken by the even more breathless years of world war. How officers on active duty manage to get out a creditable JOURNAL—and by this time it has achieved high professional quality—is hard to explain. Allan Dawson, one of the distinguished officers of the Service, praises the magazine in 1945 for its “courage and open-mindedness,” adding: “It is now, thank God, far from the smug and stodgy house organ it used to be” (February 1945).

One of the stimulating wartime articles the JOURNAL publishes is by Villard, describing the role of Foreign Service officers in the liberation of North Africa. Villard has the inside story and the JOURNAL registers one of its rare scoops. The New York Times runs a summary of the article, as does the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the magazine is flooded with requests for copies. This “little-read house organ,” as Newsweek calls it, is in the news and its editors exult: “The JOURNAL has never received such publicity.” But the magazine misses the real point—the exploit of Robert Murphy and his consular team, which saved thousands of lives and countless time, is a perfect illustration of diplomacy being as essential as military force to a nation’s defense. The JOURNAL could have used the incident to illustrate the need to amply staff the Service with the best possible people in both war and peace.

This need is precisely what the department shrinks from pressing when the Selective Service Act is enacted, and it ceases recruiting for the Service. A Foreign Service Auxiliary is devised to beef up the diplomatic establishment for its wartime duties and those recruited are granted deferment from the draft. As the
war approaches its end, mounting casualties result in the drafting of Foreign Service officers, who in turn are replaced by auxiliary officers. The role of the Service is not safeguarded by the secretary of state, and an effort to conceptualize diplomacy and the mission of the Foreign Service in the American mind never materializes. Either the JOURNAL does not see this or lacks the courage to state it. Finally, in an editorial in early 1945, it does protest the absurdity of drafting experienced FSOs and then having to train the people who will replace them.

Throughout the war years, Shaw does not stop prodding the Service to think about and correct its deficiencies and anticipate the postwar world. He has a pithy article on “Post-War Problems of the Foreign Service” as early as February 1944, pooh-poohing a JOURNAL editorial arguing that since any Foreign Service officer can do anything, there is no need for specialists in the Service. From the editorial and Shaw’s reply comes a lively exchange of views which draws attention to the need to do some systematic thinking about the Service’s future.

The JOURNAL FINALLY RECOGNIZES this need when Edward Stettinius pushes through a sweeping reorganization of the department and then succeeds the ailing Hull. The magazine sponsors an essay contest on “Suggestions for Improving the Foreign Service and Its Administration to Meet War and Post-War Responsibilities.” Sixty essays—an extraordinary number during a burdensome year of war—are submitted, with that of James Orr Denby winning first prize. Among the winners, those earning honorable mention, and those “accorded a high rating by the judges” are some of the most thoughtful and promising officers, a few of whom will rise to the rank of ambassador and consul general. The JOURNAL publishes quite a few of the essays and summarizes the highlights of all. The magazine sends copies of them to Stettinius, to Brigadier General Julius Holmes, who has succeeded Shaw as assistant secretary of administration, and to the director of Foreign Service personnel. Interest in the issue is obviously widespread and the JOURNAL leaves no stone unturned to ensure that officers’ views are considered by those responsible for reform. By this time, work is underway on the temporary expedient of a Manpower Act to permit the Service to accept officers of the auxiliary and the armed forces through a Manpower Act to permit the Service to accept officers of the auxiliary and the armed forces through a sweeping reorganization of the department’s Civil Service staff with the Foreign Service School “similar to those at West Point and Annapolis...to provide a firm professional education,” with suitable training in foreign affairs, economics, public speaking, and the subtleties of languages. He goes on to discuss how this education would improve reporting and allow the aptitudes of officers to be applied across a “broader range of action.” He stresses the need to correct conditions that require officers to “devote the major portion of their energy to routine administrative duties.” He also argues that there should be closer collaboration between embassies and consular posts and that consular officers must be trained and encouraged to report on a wider range of “compelling new issues.” All this, Denby points out, demands a larger Service, one that includes specialists and an adequate support staff.

There is more in the other essays, including True-blood’s argument that women should be given more room in the Service, but Denby’s is enough to suggest both the present-day relevance of the essays and the JOURNAL’s role as a catalytic agent. No longer is it, as in its earliest stage, merely a weather vane, recording the direction the wind is blowing. It is now a stimulant, influencing the shape of thinking in the diplomatic establishment. Notwithstanding the competition of the Bulletin and, beginning in 1947, the new Foreign Service (later Department of State) Newsletter within the establishment, and the National Geographic and Foreign Affairs outside, the JOURNAL under the editorial chairmanship of Henry Villard (1939–48) and with the active participation of George Allen, Charles W. Yost, Edmund A. Gullion, and Louis J. Halle reaches a high point of editorial brilliance and influence which it has rarely, if ever, reached since.

The Manpower and Foreign Service acts of 1946 were expected to resolve the basic problems of the Service, but no sooner are they in place than unresolved problems arise and the JOURNAL is crowded with their discussion. Doubts about the soundness of the acts’ principles bring a steady rain of letters and articles. Moreover, wartime agencies are being absorbed by the department and the relationship of their personnel to the Service must be defined. The generalist-specialist issue becomes acute, and when the Marshall Plan is proposed, a controversy is ignited over whether the new agency should be part of the State Department or independent. The amalgamation of the department’s Civil Service staff with the Foreign Service—which will eventually lead to Wristonization—also becomes a hot subject.

In an effort to clarify the situation and restore some confidence in the Foreign Service, the JOURNAL has the director of personnel respond to letters about these concerns. It is, however, a difficult task, and, while one reviewing the period admires the clarity and steadiness of the editors’ vision, readers at the time chide them for being too reticent, too cozy with department officials, too promotion conscious. Yet, it is doubtful how much could be explained in view of the department’s own confusion, especially since such international issues as the Korean war and Berlin blockade make most of the issues troubling officers seem secondary at best.

To add to the diplomats’ concerns, the Eisenhower administration brings a secretary of state who is un-
willing to defend his career colleagues; indeed, at times he seems suspicious of and even hostile to them. John Foster Dulles is unwilling to challenge McCarthyism, and so he sacrifices officers such as John Carrer Vincent. He even supports a reduction-in-force to weed out substantial numbers of officers appointed during the 20 years of Democratic administration. McCarthyism adds to the chaos and agony within the Service, all of which is clearly reflected in the JOURNAL, as officers scattered around the world use the magazine to ventilate their views and frustrations. This service can be rendered by no other publication.

The magazine also addresses other controversial professional subjects, such as the role of propaganda in postwar diplomacy, even reaching out eventually to a British authority for an article on “The Art and Practice of Diplomacy” (November 1952), as though to caution readers that beneath the frothy hullabaloo there is a quieter, professional job to be done.

But despite the thoughtful editorial guidance of the JOURNAL during this hectic period, the inadequacy of most Foreign Service thinking is reflected in an AFSA statement of what the Foreign Service is and does (October 1953). It is strong on loyalty and claims of professionalism but is so hopelessly weak on mission that it has a wishy-washy tone. Had it repeated or consulted Kellogg’s statement of 1930, it would have done better. But in the 1950s, the Foreign Service is too involved in daily crises and chores, too overwhelmed by the McCarthy commotion, and too diverted by career uncertainties for AFSA to devise an adequate one-page statement of the Service’s mission, illustrating how far ahead of the bulk of the Service, including AFSA officers, the JOURNAL’s editors are, for its own editorials are far better than this.

RESPONDING TO THE ebb and flow of officers’ rotation, the editorial board from the late 1940s on is wracked by constant change. This is true also of staff. Jane Wilson, given the title of managing editor in 1940, becomes the first editor since Ingram not from a Foreign Service background. After eight years, she resigns and is succeeded by Joan David. There is a temporary sag in the JOURNAL’s quality, for David lacks foreign affairs experience and must steady herself in an unfamiliar environment. When David resigns after three years, her replacement, Lois Perry Jones, lasts four years and is succeeded by Gwen Barrows, who serves for seven. She is succeeded by a retired USIA officer, Loren Carroll, who chairs under the supervision of the Editorial Board and gives way after four years to Shirley Newhall, who was assistant editor during the tours of Barrows and Carroll and serves the longest of all editors, 14 years. The present editor was appointed in 1981.

By the end of the third stage, the JOURNAL acquires its present form and style, and while performance over the years is somewhat uneven, it never loses the editorial independence gained under the high-ranking, forthright Villard. The “courage and openness” for which it was praised in the mid-1940s is preserved, although the practice of monthly editorials is abandoned.

The current stage of the JOURNAL begins in 1971 when Executive Order 11636 imposes upon the department a labor-management format. Many of the senior officers on which the JOURNAL has drawn for its editorial boards become part of management and no longer participate in the magazine. The vision and vigor of boards diminish, and the acute, professional editorials of the Villard era disappear. But Executive Order 11636 and its incorporation in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 has emancipated the JOURNAL from departmental influence, so that it can print searchingly analytical articles which, before, would have been impossible. But the purpose of the magazine—whether and to what extent it should serve as a house organ, a fraternity or guild periodical, or a foreign affairs magazine competitive with Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy—is obscure. AFSA concentrates on immediate, largely bread-and-butter issues, adding to the difficulty of defining the mission of both the JOURNAL and Service. Consular officers, feeling they and their interests are being overlooked, again start a consular officers’ organization and a publication of their own. In October 1983 comes a belated recognition by the JOURNAL that consular duties do indeed have a broad diplomatic significance and merit treatment, but, this number apart, consular officers rarely contribute—an interesting reversal of their early dominance of the magazine.

This is the stage in which the JOURNAL loses some of its close connections with the academic community, which has always had a sympathetic interest in the Service and a close affinity with the diplomatic community. This interest and affinity is not energetically cultivated by the JOURNAL. At the same time, the labor-management system reduces the circulation and influence of the JOURNAL within the department itself, although the influence of AFSA has greatly increased.

Still, whatever its handicaps and limitations, the JOURNAL continues to provide a forum for officers and spouses, facilitating an exchange of views which State magazine and the Open Forum Journal cannot provide. It is also doing better financially and expanding its number of pages. When the Renaissance historian of art, Vassari, was asked why it was in Florence and not elsewhere that artists flourished, he replied: “The spirit of criticism, the air of Florence making minds naturally free and not content with mediocrity.” This is what has taken place to no small degree in the Service, and the JOURNAL has helped considerably to provide that “air” which has enabled those not content with mediocrity to express themselves with complete freedom. The JOURNAL can be proud it has had that part in nurturing the spirit of analysis and criticism and freeing the minds of Foreign Service officers from the clichés which were once so pervasive.

But the issue of mission must be tackled systemically and thoroughly. Without that the JOURNAL cannot make its supreme contribution to the professionalization of the Service and morale which should be its prime objective. This is a subtle issue, and as Sir Thomas Browne warns, if one looks only at the outside of things, one can quarrel with symptoms and overlook the “tender filaments” upon which a “fabric hangs.”

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
1985-86 AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships for Foreign Service Students

Applications are now available for dependent students of Foreign Service personnel who have been or are currently stationed abroad for the AFSA Scholarship Programs. The AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards are for graduating high school students only and are based on academic excellence. These awards are $500 to each winner, usually 22 per year. The Financial Aid Scholarships are for undergraduate educational study and are based solely on need as established by the College Scholarship Service, Princeton/Berkeley. Grants range from $200 to $2000 for individuals, with a $3000 limit for families. Write for applications and information now from the AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. The deadline for completion of applications for these scholarships is February 15.

Other Scholarships Available to Foreign Service Students

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to dependent students of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information directly to the schools, colleges, and universities indicated.

Secondary Schools

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California: Scholarships based on demonstrated financial need are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service agencies or of U.S. military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12 inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dana Hall School: The Congdon Merit Scholarship is awarded on a competitive basis to an entering sophomore resident student. In addition to the $1000 prize, the winner is eligible for financial aid up to full tuition when warranted. Financial aid for all grades is also available based on need. Applications must be completed by February 1. Inquiries should be addressed to: The Congdon Prize Scholarship, Dana Hall School, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181.

Grier School: A $1000 reduction in tuition is available to daughters of Foreign Service personnel. Additionally, girls may compete for scholarship support on the basis of demonstrated financial need and all-round abilities. For information please contact: Admissions Director, The Grier School, Tyrone, Pennsylvania 16686.

Mitt Hall's School: For the daughters of Foreign Service personnel, a $2000 reduction is available. Miss Hall's enrolls 200 students from grades 9 through 12. This reduction is offered in recognition of higher travel costs and represents 20 percent of the total tuition cost for 1985-86. For further information, contact Diederik van Renesse, Director of Admissions, Miss Hall's School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

Middlesex School: Scholarship offered on the basis of proven financial need for grades 9 through 12 to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service family. For complete information write to the Director of Admissions, Middlesex School, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

The New Hampton School: A $1000 abatement on tuition to Foreign Service boys and girls. The school enrolls approximately 300 students in grades 9 through postgraduate. For further information write to Admissions Office, The New Hampton School, New Hampton, New Hampshire 03256.

Northfield-Mount Hermon School: A $1000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of State Department personnel stationed overseas, grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of higher travel costs. Additional financial aid is available on the basis of need. At present, students from 44 states and 44 countries are enrolled. For further information contact Adrienne Carr, Northfield-Mount Hermon School, Northfield, Massachusetts 01560.

Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts: The Charles and Jane Stelle Memorial Scholarship is awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. The award is based on financial need. For further information, and to apply for this scholarship, write to Joshua L. Miner, Dean of Admissions/John McClement, Director of Financial Aid, Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts 01840.

St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware: The Norris S. Haslertan Scholarships are awarded to sons and daughters of Foreign Service families where need is indicated. For complete information write John M. Niles, Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 19709.

Vermont Academy: An Edward R. Cheney Memorial Scholarship is being awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. Those interested should write to the Director of Admissions, Vermont Academy, Saxtons River, Vermont 05154. The academy enrolls approximately 246 students in grades nine through postgraduate; coed since 1981.

The Cambridge School offers a scholarship of up to $1000 for a Foreign Service student in grades 9 through 12, based on need. Please contact the admissions director at The Cambridge School, Georgian Raod, Weston, Massachusetts 02193.

Colleges

Dartmouth College, S. Pinkney Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are the children or grandchildren of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiry to the Director of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded to children of Foreign Service personnel. Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the
scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the federal government or of a state government. Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Yale University: A Scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son or daughter of an American Foreign Service officer who demonstrates financial need according to the university's criteria. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son or daughter of a member of the United States military services, or of an employee of the federal government. Information is obtainable from the Director of Financial Aid, Box 2170 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

Deaths

Ellsworth Bunker, former ambassador to South Vietnam, died September 27 in Brattleboro, Vermont. He was 90.

A graduate of Yale University, Mr. Bunker spent 32 years in private business for a sugar refining company before entering the diplomatic corps. During World War II he chaired the Cane Sugar Refiners War Committee. In 1948, he was elected chairman of the board of National Sugar.

In 1951, he was appointed ambassador to Argentina, the beginning of his diplomatic career. Other assignments took him to Italy, India, and New Guinea. In New Guinea he was able to mediate for the United Nations in a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian. In 1963 he again acted as mediator in a dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Yemen.

The following year, Mr. Bunker was appointed ambassador to the Organization of American States. This assignment took him to the Dominican Republic, where he helped to negotiate an end to their civil war. In 1967, he was appointed ambassador to South Vietnam. He was the highest ranking American official in that country during the war and served in Vietnam longer than any other senior American.

In his last diplomatic assignment, Mr. Bunker served as co-chairman with Sol Linowitz on the Panama Canal negotiations which led to the 1977 treaties giving control of the Canal to Panama. Upon completion of the negotiations he retired to a farm in Dummerston, Vermont.

In addition to his other achievements, Mr. Bunker was the first salaried president of the American Red Cross from 1953–56. He was also the first person to receive two Medals of Freedom with Distinction, the first in 1963 and the second in 1968.

He is survived by his wife, former Ambassador to Nepal Caroline Laise Bunker, and three children, Ellen Gentil, John B. Bunker, and Samuel E. Bunker.

H. Louise Ramey, a retired Foreign Service officer with AID, died of cancer July 18 at her home in Minneapolis. She was 67.

Ms. Ramey earned bachelor's degrees from DePauw University and Simmons College and worked for 12 years as officer manager of a personal money management firm in Los Angeles. In 1951 she joined the Paris mission of the Economic Cooperation Agency. Her career working on U.S. economic and development programs for foreign countries spanned 22 years and her posts included Vienna, Lagos, Saigon, and Washington. Ms. Ramey was deputy director of the AID mission in Indonesia when she retired in 1973.

After her retirement, Ms. Ramey lived in Jekyll Island, Georgia, where she was active in the Audubon Society and the American Red Cross. She had recently moved to Minneapolis. She leaves no immediate survivors.
ALFRED JACOBSON, a retired Foreign Service officer, died of cancer June 30 at George Washington University Hospital. He was 75.

Mr. Jacobson earned a doctorate in law at the University of Vienna in his native Austria. He worked as a journalist before coming to the United States in 1938. During World War II he served in U.S. Army intelligence and counterintelligence.

He joined the State Department in 1952, entering the Foreign Service in 1956. He worked as an information officer in Rome until 1963, when he transferred to USIA in Washington. At the time of his retirement in 1970 he was European branch chief of USIA's press and publications service.

Mr. Jacobson was a member of the USIA Alumni Association.

He is survived by his wife, the former Lizabeth Gorodetzky, of McLean, Virginia.

Holiday Ball

The Annual Holiday Ball will be held Thursday, December 27, at 9 p.m. It will take place at the World Bank on 19th Street, between G and H streets. The dance is semi-formal and the cost is $10 per person. It is open to all young people (ages 15–22) who are part of the diplomatic community in Washington (not just American Foreign Service dependents, but also those whose parents work for the World Bank or IMF, or who are members of the foreign diplomatic community).

Small dinner parties for 12–20 young people, hosted by volunteer mothers from each of the sponsoring organizations, will precede the ball. Dates are not required.

To obtain further information about the ball, or if you wish to host or co-host a dinner, call Nancy Stempel at 320-4109 or Charlotte Harrell at 642-8613.

BOBBIE BERGESSEN — BARBARA CHERRY
IDA YORK — MARY DEWITT

"Nice People To Do Business With"

SHANNON & LUCHS
REALTORS® • Established 1906

8003 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Md. 20814
(301)986-9292

COMING or GOING
You can count on
PERSONALIZED SERVICE
from
W. C. AND A. N. MILLER
DEVELOPMENT CO
A Complete Real Estate Service Since 1912
NEW HOUSE SALES • BROKERAGE SALES
RENTALS
4701 Sangamore Rd.
Bethesda, Md. 20816
229-4000
229-9016

JOEL TRUITT
PERSONAL TOUCH
Construction: Under my direction, we are general contractors with broad capability and over 10 years experience, ranging from authentic restoration, remodeling, new construction, repairs, design and drafting.

Property Management: For private residences, multi-unit and commercial property, and condominium associations.

JOEL TRUITT—BUILDER—PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
737 Eighth Street, Southeast, Washington, D.C.
547-2707 — Quality Since 1972

Will Your Home Still Be A Castle When You Return?

Personalized Property Management by Mrs. Wyatt

• Serving Foreign Service personnel since 1959.
• Planning for necessary expenditures
• Leases tailored to fit owners’ needs
• Updates on real estate laws and regulations
• Frequent inspections • Sales
• Licensed in D.C. and Maryland

Call Mrs. Wyatt — 202/362-7397

WALSH, MESMER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
4713 MAPLE AVE., BETHESDA, MD 20814
COMMERCIAL TOWNHOUSE

Free-standing 3-level brick townhouse has high ceilings, custom cherry paneling, and fireplace, with French doors leading to courtyard. Central Old Town location, perfect for professional offices, specialty shop, or easy conversion for residence/business.

Old Town Alexandria $305,000

Merrill Lynch Realty

1805 Belle View Blvd. Ron Piskorski
Alexandria, VA 22307 (703) 768-9100

Evers & Pernick

REAL ESTATE INC.

202-364-1700

You Have The Questions

How much can you afford to spend?
What is the best financing for you?
Should you sell or refinance your present house?
What do you need to know about the new mortgages?

We Have The Answers

Give Us a Call or drop us a line.
We’ll be glad to help.

Jenifer Mall, Suite 260
4400 Jenifer Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20015

BEGG Inc.

2121 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 387-9450
SALES • RENTALS • INSURANCE
• MANAGEMENT • INVESTMENT • COMMERCIAL •
Specializing in the management of:
Private residences and apartments, Condominium complexes, Commercial sales and management.

Our sales staff of over 100 experienced agents
includes the following presently or formerly associated
with the Foreign Service.

Mrs. Virginia Mariott
Mrs. Betty Battle
Mrs. Efrem Caliwaer
Mr. Robert Campbell
Mrs. Wendell Canwell
Mr. Donald Haber
Mrs. Anne Hawkins
Mrs. Ilsa Heinzen
Mrs. Pamela Jova
Mr. Thane Kuhlman
Mrs. Barbara Lawrence
Mrs. Jeanne Livingston
Mrs. Susanne Madden
Mrs. June O’Gara
Mrs. Ellen O’Gara
Mrs. Ellen Swohart
Mrs. Giselle Theberge

BRANCH OFFICES:
Maryland (301) 657-2760 Cherry Chase, (202) 686-9556
Virginia (703) 893-2300

For Caribbean and European properties:
Begg International Inc. (202) 238-9065

“Specializing in the Finest Residential Properties for over 34 years”
telex no: 440036UI

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE WOMEN
P.O. Box 8068, Washington, D.C. 20024

• NEWSLETTER
• FORUM
• Monthly Meetings
• Scholarships
• Community Service
• Holiday Ball for Teenagers
• Language and Writers Groups
• BOOK FAIR (Book Room, Tel. 223-5796)
• Housing Assistance and Information
   Room 1248, Department of State, Tel. 632-3573

Foreign Service women, wives, or employees, active or retired, may join AAFSW. The annual dues are $15.00 which includes a subscription to the Newsletter. Send dues to Membership Chairman at address above.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE

TAX RETURNS


AMENDED TAX RETURNS. Amended returns for 1981-5 required to take advantage of revised IRS revenue ruling 84-86 permitting those required to allow 5% of income for household expenses. One federal & state $75 ea. yr. or $50 for one federal return for ea. yr.—Milton E. Carb, Enrolled Agent, 835 S. Washington #8, Alexandria, VA 22314, (703)684-1040.

TAX COUNSELING on any problem. No charge to AFS members for telephone advice. Bob Dussell (ex-FS), enrolled to tax practice by the Treasury Dept., 3601 N. Fairfax Dr., Arlington, VA 22201, (703)841-0158.

TAX PROBLEMS, returns and representation. T.R. McCrory (ex-FS) Enrolled Agent, and staff. Returns now completely computerized. Business Data Corp., P.O. Box 57256, Washington, DC 20037-0256. (703)671-1040. INVESTMENT GUIDANCE.

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT


WASHINGTON MANAGEMENT SERVICES: Use our TELEX service to inquire about professional services for the FS community serving overseas. Immediate response to your property management needs. Residential property management is our only business. Call, write, or TELEX Mary Beth Otto, Washington Management Services, 135 Q St. NW, Washington, DC 20005, (202)343-3830, TELEX 350136.

GRIEVANCES

GRIEVANCE COUNSELING: Retired Senior Foreign Service officer attorney who served on Grievance Board staff will assist grievance presentation. Richard Greene, 161 Laurel Rd., Princeton, NJ 08540, (609)921-1422.

REAL ESTATE

NORTH MYRTLE BEACH. Thinking of a vacation or retirement home, or other investment in coastal South Carolina? If so, call or write Bill Dozier (FSO-retired), Dozier Associates, P.O. Box 349, North Myrtle Beach, SC 29582, (803)249-4043.

LOWELL REAL ESTATE, Box 1101, Route 6A, Orleans, Massachusetts 02653, (617)255-0400. Land, retirement homes, summer cottages, condos, motels, investments—we are 35 miles at sea, on Cape Cod.

PROPERTY CLAIMS

MOVING LOSS & DAMAGE CLAIMS: Professional preparation and processing of claims for the recovery of money due from property loss and damage when moved by the U.S. government. NO UP-FRONT MONEY. Fee for this service is 10% of the amount recovered. We get all estimates. Write or call and ask for one of our agents. PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIMS, INC. 2000 Virginia Ave., McLean, VA 22101. (703)241-8787.

BRIDGE CLASSES

ALL LEVELS. Convenient locations, days and evenings, games too. Contact Steven Hglund, ABCL, 1414 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. (202)387-8907.

GIFT & SHOPPING SERVICE


HELP WANTED


APARTMENT RENTALS

FARA APARTMENT RENTALS: Fully furnished efficiency, 1 and 2 bedroom apartments. One block from State Department. Prices from $45-70 per day, plus tax. Call (202)465-3910. Write FARA Housing, Rm. 2928, Dept. of State, Washington, DC 20520.

BOOKS

IF YOU ARE LOOKING for an out-of-print book, perhaps I can find it. Dean Chamberlin, FSO-retired. Book Cellar, Freeport, ME 04032.

CURRENT PAPERBACKS airmailed within 5 days at reasonable prices. Send for monthly list to Circle Enterprises, Box 1051, Severna Park, MD 21146.

INVESTMENTS


EXCHANGE RATES

Classified advertising in the FOREIGN EXCHANGE is open to any person who wishes to reach the professional diplomatic community. The rate is 50 cents per word per insertion. Telephone numbers count as one word and zip codes are free. To place a classified ad or to receive our rate card for regular display advertising, write or call the Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20037, (202)338-4043. Checks should accompany all classified insertion orders. The deadline for FOREIGN EXCHANGE ads is approximately 5 weeks before the publication date.

November 1984 57
Mathias stresses USIA credibility in AFSA lecture

USIA "has been the object of intense politicization" that undermines its credibility, Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R.-Maryland) told an audience of agency employees at an AFSA-sponsored lecture on September 27. The talk, held in the Capitol Hill Holiday Inn, adjacent to USIA headquarters, was the first in a series of noon-time "Dialogs on Public Diplomacy" sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee.

"One analysis provided to the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee showed 114 political appointments to USIA during this administration, compared with 24 during the previous administration," Mathias said. This politicization affects the agency's credibility, he said, an issue that was brought out in the confirmation hearings for Leslie Lenkowsky, whose nomination as USIA deputy director was rejected by the committee last spring.

The agency is still struggling with its sense of mission 30 years after its founding, the senator continued. The questions of when information becomes propaganda and how information should be "married" to culture have not been answered. On the other hand, Mathias said, "within the last few years, a host of new programs have been launched—some successful, some still unproved, and others not so successful." These innovations "represent a growing awareness in the Congress and in the country of the importance of public diplomacy."

"The power of the United States rests as much upon the ideas we represent as on the raw power we can deploy," Mathias told the group. "This being so, public diplomacy obviously deserves the same priority we give to military programs or to traditional government-to-government diplomacy."

This importance of public diplomacy "means that USIA, as the centerpiece of U.S. public diplomacy, should, like Caesar's wife, be above suspicion." The controversy surrounding the Lenkowsky nomination was, therefore, "to a large extent" about the agency's credibility.

"In the long run," Mathias observed, "the nomination controversy served a useful purpose. It forced us to confront the ambiguities that make your jobs so difficult and to reflect on the proper role for USIA in public diplomacy. In the end, I concluded that USIA should be exactly what its name suggests—the United States Information Agency. It should represent the views of the entire U.S. government and of the rich and diverse fabric of American political, intellectual, and artistic life. Let the chips fall where they may."

"One of the best ways to achieve this is by placing more, not less, reliance on career professionals," he continued. "This is important throughout the Foreign Service, but it is especially important in an agency like USIA, where the consequences of partisanship are so far-reaching and can undermine not only the credibility of USIA but of the United States itself."

Concluded Mathias: "Public diplomacy cannot succeed if the messages we fashion for it are so biased, so strident, or so clogged with half-truths that they will be rejected by the intelligence of the people with whom we have to communicate."

Other speakers in the program include NBC State Department Correspondent Marvin Kalb, who was to give a talk on November 1, and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, who will speak on November 29. For further details on these programs, call AFSA at (202) 338-4045.

AFSA protests non-implementation of weight allowances

The Association was recently notified that the State Department and AID had not implemented all provisions of the agreement on increased weight allowances [ASSOCIATION NEWS, July/August]. The agreement in part provides that excess weight in storage on May 1, 1984, will be funded by the agencies as of that day.

However, more than three months after the agreement was signed—and without informing AFSA—the department questioned the "legality of amendment of travel orders" and requested the comptroller general to issue a ruling. In a letter of protest, AFSA's general counsel charged the department with attempting to abrogate a negotiated agreement and requested immediate confirmation that the agencies are complying with the agreement. No response has been received from either the comptroller general or management. We would like to hear from employees who continue to be billed for excess storage expenses under the old weight limits.

Cromer of AID named as second vice president

Charlotte Cromer, an assistant population development officer in AID, has been named second vice president of the AFSA Governing Board. She replaces Douglas Broome, also of AID, who left the board for an overseas assignment in May.

Cromer served previously on the board as AID representative and as second vice president in 1974-77. From 1981-83 she was the AFSA representative in Manila. She has been in the agency for 20 years.

AID constituency representative Richard Delaney resigned his seat on the board last summer. A new representative will be named by the board to replace him shortly.
Some myths about federal retirement

Congress's Federal Government Task Force recently issued a paper entitled Ten Myths About Civil Service Retirement that systematically refutes some of the misstatements about the federal retirement system that have been appearing in the media in recent months. The information it contains should prove highly useful to Foreign Service people who find themselves in the position of having to defend their retirement benefits. As the chairman of the task force, Representative Mike Barnes (D.-Maryland), points out in a letter accompanying the report, "Keeping the federal retirement system intact for both new and current federal employees will require a great deal of work on all our parts." Ten Myths "is a tool that we have developed in anticipation of that important battle."

As we all know, the Foreign Service retirement system is separate from that of the Civil Service, so the figures quoted in this study (dollars, number of retirees, etc.) relate to employees and retirees covered under the Civil Service system. Nevertheless, the structure of the two systems is basically the same, and the charges leveled at the Civil Service system by its critics would in their minds apply generally to the Foreign Service system as well. Following is a summary of the main points in the report:

Myth No. 1: The federal retirement system is the nation's most generous retirement program.

• Many private pension programs, particularly among the Fortune 500, replace a greater portion of an employee's pre-retirement income than the federal plans do. A number of studies conducted by actuarial experts over the past year support this statement.

• Most private plans require no employee contribution. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1982, some 93 percent of the pension programs included in its broad survey did not require any employee contribution. Federal employees of course contribute 7 percent of their salaries to their retirement.

• For a more accurate comparison, it is necessary to consider the complete pension "package" available to many private sector employees. Measuring a private base pension against a federal annuity (which is the only retirement component of federal employment) contrasts just one element of a company's income-replacement package. Other add-ons may include thrift plans, stock incentive plans, and other financial benefits which significantly enhance, and sometimes dramatically expand, the company's base pension.

• Private employees benefit from tax exemption retirement programs. The 401(k) tax deferral plan enjoyed by many private employees is not available to federal workers.

• Federal annuities have only one component, and that component is fully taxed. Critics have conveniently overlooked the fact that the annuity of the average federal retiree age 62 or older ($1064 per month after taxes) provides little more disposable income than the typical $750 monthly Social Security check. And Social Security is only designed to supplement, not replace, a private pension.

Myth No. 2: No private pension plans cost as much as the federal pension plan.

• As indicated above, precise comparisons are difficult because of the additional components present in so many private pension plans. The Congressional Budget Office has determined, however, that if retirement practices typical of private employers were adopted for federal employees, the employee's (i.e., the government's) costs would be 22.8 percent of pay. The most recent actuarial estimates show that the cost of the present Civil Service system is 25.8 percent of pay.

Myth No. 3: Federal retirees receive tax-free annuities and other special benefits.

• Federal annuities have only one component, and that component is fully taxed. Critics have conveniently overlooked the fact that the annuity of the average federal retiree age 62 or older ($1064 per month after taxes) provides little more disposable income than the typical $750 monthly Social Security check. And Social Security is only designed to supplement, not replace, a private pension.

Myth No. 4: Federal employees retire at 55 while private-sector employees have to wait until they reach age 65 to retire on a full pension.

• The average retirement age for both private and federal workers is 61. Furthermore, most private pension systems permit retirement at age 55 with 10 years of service. In contrast, employees between ages 55 and 59 who retired from the government in 1982 averaged 34.2 years of service.

Myth No. 5: The federal retirement system requires a costly buy-out similar to that of Social Security in 1983 or it will become insolvent.

• Today, the Civil Service retirement system has five times the reserves it needs to pay federal annuities as they come due. Moreover, current funding mechanisms ensure that the program can continue indefinitely without congressional intervention.

Myth No. 6: Future generations will have to pay off the federal retirement system's half-trillion-dollar unfunded liability.

• This allegation is always voiced any time the federal retirement system is under debate. First of all, the system's unfunded liability is not a budgetary item. Simply stated, it is an estimate, based upon abstract assumptions, of the value of all federal pension benefits if they had to be paid simultaneously at some future date. Obviously, this never would occur, and as a prominent actuary recently testified before a congressional committee, "Unfunded liability has nothing to do with the solvency of the current system. It cannot be equated with present or future debt."

Myth No. 7: There is no limit to the amount that a federal annuitant can receive. Too many federal retirees are taxpayer-supported millionaires.

• More than half of all federal annuitants receive less than $1000 per month. Indeed, the average federal annuity in 1982 amounted to $1041 per month, while the average survivor annuity was $463. Furthermore, under present law no employee, irrespective of grade level or years of service, can receive a retirement annuity exceeding the current salary of GS-15, Step 10. As for being taxpayer-supported millionaires, only 1.6 percent of all retired federal workers receive annuities of $3000 a month or more. These individuals retired from the highest professional and managerial levels in the career service, and their annuity levels are relatively modest when compared with the plans routinely available in the corporate world.

Continued next page
Myth No. 8: All federal employees receive a pension.
• More than half of all persons who work for the federal government never receive a retirement annuity: most request a refund of their contribution when they leave. Actually, only 23.2 percent of the employees who have worked for the government exercise their option to retire.

Myth No. 9: All federal employees receive full Social Security benefits.
• The only federal retirees who receive Social Security benefits are those who have earned them through outside employment. It is true that a number do qualify and that, in the past, many benefited from the “tilt” under which the Social Security formula replaced low wages at higher income-replacement rates. In 1983, however, Congress reduced Social Security’s income-replacement rate for public employees, so they no longer enjoy this advantage.

Myth No. 10: The federal government spends more for Civil Service retirement than for welfare.
• The government provided $46 billion this year in direct assistance to the poor. In contrast, it will pay about $21.6 billion in retirement annuities, an amount largely offset by employee-agency contributions to the retirement fund, and trust reserve earnings. Furthermore, to equate annuity payments from a staff retirement system (which are earned benefits) with welfare constitutes outright misrepresentation.

As Representative Barnes has pointed out, preserving the present structure of the federal retirement system poses a real challenge in the months ahead. Refuting the myths and keeping the facts straight are critical first steps.

Prospective jubilee members invited to submit names

As mentioned in the last issue of the Retirement News, all members of 50 years’ or more standing have been invited by the AFSA Governing Board to come forward and be made honorary lifetime members. One or two of our retired members have written with helpful suggestions about this search, including mention of the remarkable December 1936 supplement to the Journal, with its group and individual photographs and complete index. Sure enough, a copy was still in our archives. We plan to come out with a preliminary list in December, subject to suggestions about those whom we may have missed.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

“Please, Corporal, a pink slip notice of a security violation would have been enough.” —Bob Sherman, Washington

Winners of the monthly Life and Love contest receive a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club. Honorable mention winners receive a free carafe of wine.

Competition #16

Apply now for 1985-86 AFSA Scholarships

Applications should be requested immediately by students interested in AFSA scholarships for academic year 1985-86. Eligible are dependent students of Foreign Service personnel who have been or are currently serving abroad. Inquiries should be made directly to AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator Dawn Cuthell, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Please state agency affiliation (State, AID, USIA, FCS, or FAS).

Merit Awards are for high school seniors graduating in the spring of 1985 and are awarded on the basis of academic excellence.

Financial Aid Grants are for full-time undergraduate study in the United States and are based solely on need. Grants range from $200 to $2,000 for individuals, with a $4,000 limit for families.

Apply immediately. All materials must be returned to the AFSA Scholarship Office by February 15.

Fiscal year 1984 audit shows modest surplus

The Association’s audit for fiscal year 1984, which ended June 30, shows a small surplus of $4912. Copies of the audit, performed by the firm of Leopold & Linowes, are available for review by members in the AFSA headquarters building.

The budget for fiscal year 1985 was published in the September issue.
It's nearly Xmas-time. So I ask the family what they want. They tell me they want only one thing.

"Never!" I yelled. "What you're asking me is to hire one full-time accountant--secretary--tutor--stockbroker who has no desire to make money and no need to sleep. It just isn't humanly possible!"

"You're right," they said. "That's why you're going to order a computer from Softgraf USA, where you get a special foreign service discount on the most competitive prices..."

"Oh"

Computers--printers--peripherals--
Softgraf prices are better than GSA prices
Leading Edge--Columbia--Seequa--Hewlett Packard 110.6/150--
Epson--Panasonic--All the software your family needs--
Computers only 15% over our cost

Softgraf USA

VAN DORN PLAZA, Alexandria, Virginia 22304
Hours: M-F: 10-9, Sat: 10-6, Sun: 12-5
Phone: (703) 370-5000
Chrysler.
Showing the world what innovative engineering is all about.

And now you can get big diplomatic discounts on our most exciting new vehicles for 1985.

Plymouth Voyager, the Magic Wagon. With seating configurations for two, five or an option for seven people, Voyager offers amazing versatility. And it handles, garages and parks like a car. You've got to drive it to believe it.

Dodge Lancer ES is a remarkable new sedan with aerodynamic lines, electronic fuel injection and sport handling suspension for great performance. An ingenious fifth door in back is an added dimension not found in most European sport sedans.

And as an active member of the diplomatic corps, you're entitled to big discounts through Chrysler's 1985 Diplomatic Purchase Program. Choose from a complete line of Chrysler-built cars, including full-size luxury sedans, convertibles, station wagons and sports cars.

For full details on the Diplomatic Purchase Program and the vehicles included, contact:
In U.S.: Any Chrysler-Plymouth or Dodge dealer or the Diplomatic Sales Office, Chrysler Corporation, P.O. Box 670, Sterling Heights, MI 48311-0670. Phone (313) 978-6706. TELEX 0235264 CHRYEXIMDET.
Overseas: TELEX 861320 CHRYNEWCAR. Attn: Diplomatic Sales.
Or mail the postage-paid reply card enclosed in this magazine.

Chrysler Corporation
We don't want to be the biggest. Just the best.