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Robert A. Fearey
on the lead-up to war

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David Callahan on Robert Gates

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

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-*Albert Einstein*

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AFSA VIEWS

Redefining Ourselves

Confronted with new challenges in foreign affairs, the Foreign Service needs to reexamine the content and shape of its mission, and take another look at how well its bureaucratic structures are suited to the requirements of a changed world. To help this reexamination process along, AFSA has drawn up the following mission statement:

AFSA believes that the Foreign Service can help shape a new strategic concept for U.S. foreign policy in the new global order.

Toward the end of World War II, George Kennan foresaw a multipolar world in which America's democratic ideals and economic system would advance and protect American interests abroad. Soviet expansionism, however, called forth the policy of "containment," which for two generations became the guiding theme of U.S. foreign policy. Today, communism is discredited, and the Soviet Union has collapsed as a strategic nuclear foe. Our system and values stand confirmed—at no small cost to ourselves and our Free World allies.

But American foreign policy can now take up the issues of Kennan's multipolar world. It is a world in which our values of democracy and free enterprise are prompting revolutionary change—not least in foreign policy. It is a world in which military and subversive threats to our national security are giving way to the threat of economic non-competitiveness, and the challenge of providing effective leadership to new democracies. It is a world in which covert intelligence and military power will therefore be lesser instruments of U.S. foreign policy—whose principal instruments will again be the traditional practices of diplomacy, now enhanced by trade, development, and the propagation of technology, science, and ideas.

To develop and carry out this new diplomacy will require first, the support and understanding of the Executive branch, the Congress, and of a well-informed citizenry; second, it will require a Foreign Service, of officers and specialists alike, whose levels of ability, training, and representativeness are a match for the challenge of the times.

AFSA, as always, will vigorously promote the practical interests of all our members employed by agencies included in the 1980 Foreign Service Act; in addition, at this critical juncture, AFSA aims to win the broadest possible support for the professional requirements of a new diplomacy.

— HUME A. HORAN

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ON THE COVER:
U. S. Embassy Tokyo, 1941.
Photograph by
Jane Smith-Hutton

FEATURES

FOCUS: TOKYO 1941

DEPARTMENTS

DRUGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

To The Editor:

I read Tina Rosenberg's article ("Unholy Alliance," November *Journal*) with interest.

While I agree with her arguments that human rights must be a cornerstone of a successful counter-narcotics policy and that considerably more progress needs to be made on human rights in Peru, Rosenberg's assertion, based on the State Department's 1990 Human Rights Report, that the department is telling ". . . two very different official stories" about human rights and narcotics in that country is both misleading and wrong. Our policy is based on an improved situation in 1991 under the new Fujimori Administration.

In his first year, President Alberto Fujimori has already done more than any of his predecessors to ensure long-term progress on both human rights and counter-narcotics in Peru. We should encourage him on this path. The administration and the U.S. Congress are committed to ensure that the economic and military assistance recently released to Peru is accompanied by progress on human rights and narcotics control, a policy with which President Fujimori agrees.

Rosenberg also has an over-simplified view of a complex situation. While she admits that there is a narco-insurgent connection in Peru, she underplays the havoc this alliance plays on the functioning of democratic institutions. In fact, the efficient and highly lucrative narcotics trade distorts the legitimate economies of the Andes and threatens fragile democracies.

For example, narcotics dollars have been a source of income for Sendero Luminoso in Peru and for the FARC guerillas in Colombia. In order to destroy labs and dismantle narcotics trafficking groups, police must get past the protection afforded to traffickers by insurgent groups. Only the military is capable of confronting these insurgents.

In 1988, then-President Barco ordered the Colombian military to address the narcotics threat. The United States began providing narcotics-related support to this effort after the policy had been implemented.

Similarly, President Fujimori does not question the need to involve his military to support police counter-narcotics operations in Peru. His concern has been that such support should be accompanied by economic aid to provide alternatives in the legal economy for peasants who now grow coca. The aid package recently released by Congress includes, in addition to $23.95 million in military assistance, a total of $60 million in Economic Support Funds for Peru. However, neither economic development nor law enforcement can succeed in areas that are not secure from pervasive terrorism. The Sendero has ruthlessly murdered a number of aid workers to demonstrate this point. Our planning for military assistance for Peru included help for securing these areas as well as help for interdicting traffickers.

On the subject of Colombia, Rosenberg alleges that President Gaviria has decided to "abandon the fight against drug trafficking, considered a U.S. problem." President Gaviria has done nothing of the kind. Cocaine seizures are up, cocaine laboratories are being destroyed, and leading Colombian traffickers are dead, in jail, or facing trial. Colombians have paid a heavy price; last year alone, narcotraffickers killed more than 500 police and 600 civilians. Colombia's struggle to maintain its commitment to democracy and development in the face of vicious terrorist campaigns by the drug traffickers has been an inspiration to the entire international community.

Drugs threaten society as surely as a failure to respect the rule of law; but we can pursue an effective counter-narcotics program and simultaneously promote respect for human rights. Conversely, a policy that abandons the drug fight in the Andes exposes democratic governments there to the continued corrupting and violent influence of drug abuse. I do not believe it is wise or responsible to do this, nor is ignoring the situation likely to improve respect for human rights.

Melvyn Levitsky
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters
Washington, D.C.

SELECTION IN

To The Editor:

The Foreign Service exams, written and oral, are intended to be vehicles of selection into what purports to be an intellectually elite organization. As ours is the quintessential verbal and cognitive profession, it is difficult to imagine what other method of selection could be used for this purpose. I have taken (and passed) the Foreign Service written and oral examinations twice and I can say that they are indeed biased. They are clearly biased against a non-college graduate, they are biased against those who have studied fields such as microbiology or nuclear physics, they are biased against those who are inarticulate, and they are biased against those who have never opened a book or read a magazine or newspaper. My experience in the Foreign Service is that virtually everyone who takes the exam is a college graduate . . . A large number of the applicants have . . . graduate degrees, and others are already employed in academic, legal, or other professional fields. Since the exam is purely academic in context, how in the world can it be held to be biased against any particular race or sex? Surely a woman or a black who has a BA in history, or an MA in political science, has just as much chance of passing the test as a white male with similar degrees.

Any qualifying test, from the Foreign Service exam to a driver's license test, carries the possibility of failure. If passing were guaranteed, there would be no need for a test . . . I strongly suggest that passing or failing the Foreign Service exam, or any exam, for that matter, is a question of one's own personal preparedness and not in any way a matter of sex or race.

The question which must be addressed frankly and honestly is whether "diversity" is more important to the State Department than "quality." . . . If we can achieve *quality and diversity*, fine. If we choose to sacrifice quality in order to

Make a diplomatic statement.

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obtain diversity, then we are on the road to institutional suicide. There is no doubt in my mind that women and blacks with the proper academic backgrounds can pass the Foreign Service exams without any sex- or race-based finagling with the results. . . . . We need to bring in the best qualified applicants, regardless of their color or sex, and the Foreign Service examination is the only rational way to do this. To tamper with the results in order to favor certain groups, lessens all of us and will only further diminish the already modest esteem in which the Foreign Service is held in the opinion of many of our fellow citizens.

Donald M. Miller
American Embassy
San Salvador

BALANCED . . .

To The Editor:

As a long-time student of Yugoslavia, please let me congratulate Michael Mennard ("The Case for the Serbs," October *Journal*) on the most objective article on Yugoslavia that I have read since the current crisis in that unfortunate country came to the forefront this past year or so.

Alexander S. Rados
Santa Ana, California

. . . TOO BALANCED . . .

To The Editor:

As the post AFSA representative and one of the two embassy officers most involved in the Sister Dianna Ortiz affair, I write to protest your article "Mutual Suspicion" (September *Journal*), in which you give equivalent credibility to the embassy's and ABC's position. You assert that Sister Dianna "was abducted and tortured in Guatemala." In fact, nearly the only thing which has been established in this matter is that she had 111 lesions on her back. How and under what circumstances she received those lesions remains unclear because of Sister Dianna's refusal to speak to any trained investigator, either Guatemalan or American, for the nearly two years since her ordeal.

Since your article was published, she has again refused to collaborate in the investigation, this time declining to meet with the special investigator (an

American citizen and former FBI officer) named by the Guatemalan attorney general's office.

Until Sister Dianna makes herself available for questioning by competent Guatemalan and American legal and judicial authorities, it is impossible to heed the cries of human rights groups and her lawyer for a more complete investigation than that already performed by the Guatemalan police.

This embassy and its officers have repeatedly demonstrated concern for the welfare of American citizens—one has only to look at its actions following the murder of Michael DeVine, which ultimately led to suspension of U.S. military aid, as an example of the importance we give to that responsibility.

In publishing this article questioning the embassy's actions and appearing to give legitimacy to the ABC news program, which was full of untruths, the *Journal* does a profound disservice to hard-working officers of great integrity, especially Lew Amselem. By publicizing this case in what superficially appears to be an even-handed manner but which neglects to present the many unanswered questions, the *Journal* is playing into the hands of those who seek political results rather than true justice in the Dianna Ortiz case.

Sue H. Patterson
Consul General
American Embassy, Guatemala

. . . NOT BALANCED ENOUGH

To The Editor:

The article that you wrote and published in the September *Journal* on the abduction of Dianna Ortiz raises serious questions about the professional quality of the *Journal* and whether it deserves to call itself "The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service."

Your article left the impression that the report aired by ABC on "Prime Time Live" was more reliable than information provided by our colleagues in the embassy. My own experience with ABC in preparing a report aired on "Prime Time Live" May 30 showed that the network was far more interested in sensationalism than balance.

You might have written an article about how challenging it is to work in an environment where human rights problems loom large and in which reckless charges and countercharges constantly threaten to catch dedicated officers in the crossfire. . . . I hope the [AFSA] Governing Board will respond to explain how your article got into our magazine and what assurance members have that the *Journal* will not be used again to trumpet the sort of story that would cheer anyone trying to discredit the Foreign Service.

Paul D. Taylor
U.S. Ambassador
Santo Domingo

RESHAPING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

To The Editor:

Henry Catto ("Under One Roof," *Journal*, September 1991) displays an appealing zest for his new job as director of USIA. Regrettably, however, he also reveals an institution-bound parochialism about the political environment in which his agency is now operating. In an age when CIA is clearly on the threshold of a sweeping redesign, and the Pentagon is moving into a radically different "force mix," USIA, over the long haul, must likewise face a redeployment of its assets.

Catto's cavalier dismissal of all reform proposals ("Given the fact that what we have now is doing a fine job, why change it?") cannot help ultimately crashing against a set of uncomfortable realities: The slogan on the banner flying over USIA headquarters reads, "Telling America's story abroad," but American culture already enjoys an appeal far beyond our borders, and many private channels transmit U.S. policy pronouncements and U.S. political, economic, and cultural news. The Cable News Network is beamed to more than 100 nations daily. American higher education attracts almost 500,000 foreign students, relatively few receiving U.S. government aid.

Paradoxically, at the same time, U.S. knowledge about other countries and other languages is perilously deficient for a multi-ethnic society whose economic future depends on a larger global market share. . . . USIA's founding legislation bars it from disseminating information within the United States except with congressional consent. . . . Explaining ourselves rather than informing ourselves is the central mission. Thus USIA can never forthrightly and in a focused manner address the nation's truly urgent need: the rejuvenation of our educational system. This is clearly a task for a domestic agency. A foreign service in the Department of Education corresponding to the overseas arms of Commerce, Agriculture, and the Defense attaché service might be one answer. It is past time that this function be relocated to meet shifting national priorities.

The transplanting of these programs would not, of course, spell the end of USIA (which reportedly is about to take over all international broadcasting services funded by Washington). Grantees could still cooperate with USIA public affairs programing in USIS centers. But a change in administration is probably the precondition to such a rational reshaping of our foreign affairs resources.

Robert Brown
Bethesda, Maryland

GETTING SOME FLAK

To The Editor:

In the November edition, Dale Herspring writes of "the flack FSOs take in Washington for their supposedly 'liberal' views." Let me be among the first of many to point out that the "preferred" spelling is *flak*. "Flack" is slang for public relations practitioner; "flak" is the acronym for the German *Fliegerabuehbrkanone,* meaning anti-aircraft gun. The term was popularly used in World War II in referring to anti-aircraft fire.

Take it from a working flack who has caught his share of flak over the years.

Wesley Pedersen
Washington, D.C.
The writer is a former member of the Journal Editorial Board.

CORRECTION

Due to an editing error, the year of Norman Thomas's candidacy for the presidency was incorrect in a Letter to the Editor written by Morris Weisz in the November *Journal*. Thomas received the Socialist Party nomination for the presidency six times, but not in 1952. ■

INNER SANCTUM FIGURE

The Washington Post, October 31, 1991
By David Hoffman

As one of Baker's two principal idea men, along with counselor Robert Zoellick, [Dennis] Ross has played a major role in many of the Bush Administration's foreign policy triumphs and failures. . . Yet, despite his central role, Ross, 42, is one of the least public of Washington figures, little known outside the hushed hallways and bargaining rooms of foreign policy. Ross represents a permanent policy establishment that influences government, while presidents come and go.

A specialist in Soviet and Middle East affairs, he impressed George Bush when he accompanied the then-vice president to meetings in Egypt, Jordan, and Israel in 1986. Ross, who at the time was handling the Middle East at the National Security Council, was asked to serve as a foreign policy adviser in the 1988 Bush presidential campaign. After the election, he was mulling a White House post when Baker wooed him to the inner sanctum at State.

. . . During nearly three years as secretary of State, Baker has relied on just a few close advisers, including Ross, Zoellick, and spokesman Margaret Tutwiler. This brain trust often seems to be on the verge of exhaustion, working long hours on the latest crisis while other topics go unattended. By their own admission, Baker's group failed to focus closely on the impending Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until it was too late. At the time, Ross was concentrating on problems that seemed much more urgent: the Soviet Union and the Middle East peace process.

Baker's style gives those few around him generous sway over where to focus policy attention—although not necessarily over final decisions. . . . Before any important meeting, particularly when Baker is traveling, Ross is often up through the night writing the "talking points" Baker will use. . . . According to intimates, for all his reliance on Ross, Baker reserves for himself key decisions about diplomatic tactics and strategy. When enmeshed in an issue such as the Middle East, Baker will ask Ross to draft a cable to another leader, then pore over it meticulously himself. . . . Ross was the lone notetaker for Baker in key meetings with Soviet officials and for nearly two years had his own channel to the Soviet leadership through a close relationship with Sergei Tarasenko, his counterpart under then-Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. It was Tarasenko and Ross—in Moscow at the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait—who together drafted the joint U.S.-Soviet statement calling for an international arms embargo. Their proposal, tapped out on an English-language typewriter they found in the Soviet Ministry, was later approved . . . and presented to the world in an unprecedented display of rapid superpower agreement. Ross had "immediate access to the secretary, and I had immediate access to the minister," Tarasenko recalled. "If at that moment we had to go through diplomatic channels, it would have been another story."

NO A.I.D POLYGRAPHS

The Washington Post, October 18,1991
Editorial

A.I.D. would have you believe that its proposed lie detector policy merely parallels the State Department's. It doesn't. It builds from the point where the State Department leaves off. The State regulations cover employees and contractors, the A.I.D. policy captures job seekers too. . . . In contrast to the State Department, the A.I.D. draft regulations do not ban probes of reli-

gious and racial beliefs and affiliations, political beliefs and affiliations of a lawful nature or opinions regarding the constitutionality of legislative policies. And . . . A.I.D. vests ultimate authority for polygraph use in [IG] Gen. Beckington. A.I.D. Administrator Ronald Roskens is out of the picture.

A.I.D.'s polygraph policy is a classic example of pointless bureaucratic me-tooism. . . . Those machines may be good tools of intimidation, but fear detectors have no place in the Agency for International Development. The administration should put a stop to this.

Those machines may be good tools of intimidation, but fear detectors have no place in the Agency for International Development.

DIPLOMACY'S STAGE

The Washington Times, October 3, 1991
By Georgie Anne Geyer

When U.S. Chief of Protocol Joseph Verner Reed leaves this month, the nation's capital will be losing its most irreplaceable human spirit, a man who has been the Bush Administration's first face and first handshake to the foreign diplomatic world. "The art of protocol is to set the stage for diplomacy, where diplomats can conduct foreign affairs," [says Reed]. "But politics is show biz. To set the stage for a state visit is La Scala."

Mr. Reed could have come to Washington from his ambassadorship to Morocco and from his subsequent job as an undersecretary at the United Nations and done the usual formal protocol job of cultivating the "big" countries. Instead, he immediately cultivated and invited to luncheons at Blair House the Third World diplomats who have most often been left on their own in Washington.

[Overseeing the care of diplomats and their families in the United States] "is like being the leader of a fairly good-sized town," he said. Or, as a close friend summed up, "Joseph treats everybody equally and makes everyone feel good."

THE NATION'S PARLOR

Gourmet, October 1991
By Naomi Barry

Atop a banal gray Washington, D.C. office building of the functional fifties exists the most beautiful ensemble of early Americana still in daily use. . . . The approximately 4,500 examples of American fine and decorative arts in the State Department collection are valued at $60 million and attest to the cultivated tastes of our forefathers.

More than 65,000 official guests are received on the eighth floor annually. . . . The State Department maintains an approved list of 12 local catering firms selected for reliability, speed, efficiency, and security, as well as quality of food preparation and presentation. The host [of receptions and dinners] chooses a caterer from this list and pays the bill out of his budget. . . . Alcohol, including wine sauces, is taboo when guests are from Moslem countries. Menus tend to be as all-American as possible—wild rice pancakes, crab imperial, and oysters Rockefeller. . . . When George Shultz entertained Mikhail Gorbachev . . . [he] wanted an apple pie like his mother used to make. "He described his taste memories, and we kept trying until he accepted what he felt was an approximation of Mother Shultz's apple pie," said Bill Homan of Design Cuisine. Homan, who is a walking catalogue of Washington likes and dislikes, said the Shultzes were fond of ginger souffle. The Bakers love corn bread with chili peppers.

Catering in the reception rooms means split-second timing to get everyone out on time, for the next event or tour is always waiting. "I come prepared for all emergencies, because there is not a minute to lose," said Mr. Homan. "One of my waiters turned up one day wearing white socks. I just sprayed his socks black and sent him out on the floor." ■

Seven Men on a Flying Carpet

By Guy W. Ray, second secretary, Mexico City
Published in the *Journal*, December 1941

Visits in 30 Foreign Service posts in the other American republics, calls on all the presidents and foreign ministers of 17 of these countries, and talks with numerous high officials and business men convinced five members of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Appropriations that the Foreign Service has made the Good Neighbor policy and hemispheric solidarity more than high-sounding phrases.The primary purpose of the trip was to inspect our Foreign Service establishments. Ten embassies, seven legations, and 13 consular posts were visited. Completing an inspection of 30 posts in less than 60 days required a pace which was far from easy to follow. . . . We'll probably never catch up on our sleep until after the war is over.

It is most gratifying to report that at every post visited the arrangements were carried out efficiently and not one single untoward incident marred the trip. . . . A great share of the credit for the trip goes to our own Foreign Service in the way in which it made the required arrangements and established contacts with the various local residents and American businessmen. . . .Members of the committee frequently remarked that during the past eight or 10 years there had been an astonishing improvement in the caliber of the Foreign Service officers and our diplomatic representation abroad. They felt, however, that there was still room for improvement. . . .Those Foreign Service officers who are stationed in the other American republics at the present time should consider themselves most fortunate. In many other parts of the world . . . the best the Foreign Service can hope for is to assist in holding back the avalanche of destruction. However, in the American republics there is room for really constructive action . . . and personal initiative. This recent trip . . . will make it easier in the future to make the committee understand our needs in accomplishing the tasks we are called upon to perform.

Intercultural communication

One of the congressmen who had taken Spanish lessons explained to a waiter in a hotel that he wanted two four-minute soft-boiled eggs. The waiter said yes, he understood, the gentleman wanted four eggs. It was explained that what he wanted was two eggs left in boiling water for four minutes. That was understood. The two eggs arrived duly fried. In answer to the inevitable protest, the waiter explained that he had obeyed orders. He had left the two eggs in boiling water for four minutes and then had fried them.

FOREIGN SERVICE QUIZ

Answers on page 56

1. How many tandem couples currently serve in the Foreign Service?
2. How many foreign diplomats are posted to the United States?
3. When was the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency created?

DESPATCH

Slapdash statistics

The Foreign Service Review Inc., a private corporation in Arlington, Virginia offering review courses for the Foreign Service oral and written exams, prints up "did you know" sheets for schools preparing students for the exam that provide an odd mix of straight information and rather abbreviated reporting of "trends." The last information sheet that came our way, dated August 8, 1991, informed applicants of the exam dates and the weighting of various sections. Then it added, "Affirmative action pressures at State work not only at the entry level but also at all promotion levels. They may have inadvertently contributed to the invasion of Kuwait. Because of the intense pressure to promote women, women are receiving appointments to ambassadorships with considerably less experience than male appointees. . . . April Glaspie, our ambassador to Iraq, was appointed at 45 with 21 years of experience. She had also skipped the critical three-year deputy chief of mission position, which is the department's testing ground for future ambassadors. Instead she 'got her ticket punched' by serving less than three months as DCM during a political officer tour."

We will leave aside the question of whether it is appropriate to make hasty reference to the complex issue of gender preference in promotion in a one-page fact sheet about the exam. We also leave to others to decide whether Glaspie acted correctly in her famous July 25 meeting with Saddam Hussein. But David B. Miller, executive director of the Foreign Service Review, who signed the August 8 letter, is wrong on two counts. First, ambassadors throughout the world will be interested to know that prior service as DCM is *de rigeur* for the top position. It will be a particular surprise to the roughly one-third of ambassadors who were political appointees. We were not able to discover how many career appointees had previously served as DCM, but casual, anecdotal evidence suggests that the percentage is very far from 100.

Second, Glaspie may not have performed her mission well; that is a separate question. But the idea that she was underqualified for her posting to Iraq is silly. Glaspie served as deputy chief of mission in Damascus for a little over a year, leaving in September 1985 to take the highly pressured job of director for Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria Affairs in NEA, where she served for three years. She enjoys a service-wide reputation for being an Arabist of great skill. Why is it that not even an ambassador of April Glaspie's caliber can be judged on the basis of performance rather than gender?

Closing Historygate

When the president finally signed the State Department 1992-1993 authorization bill into law in late October, historians throughout Washington got to retire to their libraries in quiet victory. The bill contained a provision to improve access by historians to classified government documents in compiling the official *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS).

The history provision was backed by a group of independent scholars who resigned from their work of reviewing the official FRUS series in protest against unreasonable withholding of documents. In an article in these pages in August 1990, a member of that group, Warren I. Cohen, wrote that the integrity of the series had been gravely damaged by such withholding. He cited the FRUS volume on Iran, 1952-1954, which contained nothing on the U.S. government's effort to depose Mossadegh.

The new bill provides that the editing of the FRUS series "shall be guided by principles of historical objectivity and accuracy. Records shall not be altered and deletions shall not be made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made. The published record shall omit no facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision, and nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect of policy."

2001

Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy plans a conference on December 17 in the State Department on the Foreign Service, 2001, the futuristic date apparently meant to suggest that the conference will plant the service firmly in the next century. Two afternoon panels are slated to examine problems in implementing the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and how the policy and reporting/analysis functions of the service should change in the decade to come. Among those tentatively planning to attend are Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN), former Directors General George Vest and Roy Atherton, AFSA President Hume Horan, and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, of Bremer Study Group fame. The day-long conference, which is being organized by Foreign Service officer John McNamara, is free; those planning to attend should register with the institute at 202/687-8313.

– ANNE STEVENSON-YANG

SPEAKING OUT

By David Jones

Just Fade Away

Nothing so ill becomes the Foreign Service as the nature of our leaving it

What happened to Bob? Where did Leo go? Have you heard anything from Mike? Answer: he retired. Context: he disappeared off the scope as if retirement were a private shame or a communicable social disease. Indeed, Foreign Service officers sneak into retirement after 20 to 25 years or more of exceptional service as if the conclusion of a career in the Foreign Service were the equivalent of failure. We talk of retirement in the same hushed tones that Victorians used for sex. The first news most of us have of our colleagues' retirements comes from the long-delayed lists in *State* magazine, with all the elegance of bills of lading for household effects—two chairs DR, one table LR (scratched) one FS-1 (aged). Retirement is the diplomatic equivalent of the fabled elephants' graveyard into which ancient elephants wander alone and abandoned.

The Foreign Service is curiously uncomfortable with retirement. In contrast, we do a marvelous job of recruiting. Rarely, does an organization have a higher ratio of applicants to available jobs. Likewise, the Foreign Service does a superb job of retaining its recruits. Despite a generation of complaints over "bad morale" and a shrinking role in American foreign policy, statistically the Foreign Service loses almost no one to voluntary departure. Thus the Foreign Service handles in practice substantive challenge and reward reasonably well in comparison with other agencies. Where the Foreign Service fails, however, is in managing the departure of its members into retirement.

In comparison with the Foreign Service, the uniformed military services handle the retirement of their members, from the highest to the lowest, with dignity and honor. Anyone participating in or observing such a retirement ceremony will depart with an appreciation that the individuals retiring were respected professionals whose services

to the United States were recognized and rewarded.

Two examples: On June 21, 1991, the Army chief of staff retired in a ceremony held on the Parade Grounds at Fort Myer, Virginia. Before an audience of 2,500, including a wide selection of general officers and senior Defense Department officials, General Carl E. Vuono reviewed the Third Infantry Battalion (the Old Guard), listened to a specially composed march, received high decorations, and offered the assembled throng his final official words of advice and wisdom. The event was rich in traditional pomp and circumstance. Cannon fired, bands played, flags flew. It was the exclamation point on a long, distinguished career.

On the same parade ground on June 28, 1990 the military service of a group of Army officers and enlisted men ranging from colonel to sergeant were honored as they passed into retirement. The ceremony differed only in degree from that commemorating the retirement of the Army chief: there were hundreds of friends, family, colleagues, and well-wishers; the same Old Guard marched; the same bands played; the same cannon roared. A senior Defense spokesman addressed the audience—and the honor and appreciation were no less.

Compare these images with a typical Foreign Service retirement. In late July 1991, an FS-1 with 25 years of service participated in a small ceremony in his office marked by a few words from his office director, the presentation of a plaque (with name still to be engraved), and an honor award. If he chooses, he may join a mass ceremony at some still-to-be-determined date next year where recent retirees are "honored" by the director general. This recently instituted ceremony draws but a small percentage of those eligible to attend. The general comment of those declining to attend focuses on the trivial quality of the experience.

A natural progression

To be fair, not every military retirement is the equivalent of promotion to the Elysian Fields nor every Foreign Service retirement a degrading experience. There are bitter colonels who "should have been general" and those whose transition from uniform to "civvies" is never successful. Nevertheless, the military accepts retirement as a natural part of the career process, which will occur when much of life lies ahead. The military is a career for the young. Most enlisted men begin in their teens, officers in their early 20s. Consequently, an enlisted man might retire before reaching 40, and most senior officers depart in their mid-50s (General Vuono was only 56). Thus a military career is recognized and accepted from inception as but one stage of a working lifetime, and, intellectually, the ground is prepared for retirement.

In contrast, FSOs enter the State Department at a variety of ages (the average is currently 32) without a real appreciation for their likely career limits and the subsequent personal and professional problems this pattern could create when the average 25-year Foreign Service career is completed. Foreign Service officers tend to think of themselves as GS civil servants, at least in their belief that their talents and expertise increase over the years and should not be artificially cut short.

Is the ambivalent quality of Foreign Service retirement implicit in our continued professional inability to come to terms with the statutory limits of a Foreign Service career? Are we still living with the implicit expectation that a "successful" Foreign Service career (a) is that of an officer and (b) must end as an ambassador? Regrettably, the questions are better than the answers, but following are some suggestions that would make "retirement" less of a dirty word.

Be more honest

We need truth in recruiting, truth in training, and truth through career counseling. Entering FSOs need some solid figures on career expectations. They need to know numbers of ambassadorships (career and political). They need some perspective (e.g., "Of this class, on average, X percent can expect promotion to FS-2, Y percent can expect promotion to FS-1, Z percent to the Senior Foreign Service, and XX will become ambassadors.") Adults can deal with hard realities, but ambiguities can lead only to disillusion.

Prepare for retirement

State has made tentative steps toward better retirement preparation with its retirement seminar. It should, however, be expanded and officers given the chance to attend more than once. Elements of the seminar should be considered mandatory, perhaps for every officer reaching FS-2 and secretaries and communicators at the 10- to 15-year mark. A mid-career assessment is vital in any career, and one element of such a summing up should be retirement information.

Better honor our retirees

The slink-away motif of the current retirement policy is a disgrace. Our senior ambassadors and career officials should be systematically honored upon retirement with individualized eighth-floor ceremonies. A flag that had flown over State would be a memorable parting gift. Other retiring Foreign Service personnel should be offered appropriate group commemoration, perhaps scheduled monthly, led by the director general and addressed by a senior State official.

Use their talents better in retirement

The AFSA proposal for a Foreign Service Reserve Corps is a solid idea, but it is closer to being talked to death than implemented. Foreign Service Day is a stab in the right direction, but more a social reunion than a substantive review of issues. The Army schedules twice yearly conferences for four-star retirees where senior Army staff briefs on developments and directions the Army is taking. These retired generals are, in effect, the Army's senior unofficial lobbyists throughout government, and time spent clarifying Army interests pays substantial dividends. Comparable meetings with tailored groups at which selected senior State retired officials could provide us the nucleus of experts on selected issues. At a minimum, such sessions would provide historical insights and disarm others who did not understand the current situation. ■

David Jones is foreign affairs adviser to the Army chief of staff.



Bush's Man at Langley

BY DAVID CALLAHAN

Moving into his seventh floor office at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Robert M. Gates takes the helm of an intelligence establishment in transition. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has removed the chief external threat that drove U.S. intelligence activities for four decades. In Washington, a consensus is emerging that the $30 billion-a-year intelligence complex should face the same post-Cold War belt-tightening as the armed services. And as with the military, it is also widely agreed that America's spy agencies must be reorganized to better cope with new global realities.

As Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Robert Gates will guide the U.S. intelligence community into the 21st century. His broad powers allow him not only to overhaul the CIA itself, but to promote change within an array of other organizations such as the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Organization, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. During his difficult confirmation hearings, Gates hinted that he would launch a major effort to "reassess the role, mission, priorities, and structure of American intelligence." Details of such an effort have yet to be unveiled, but Gates's challenge is twofold: First, he must shift the focus of intelligence work away from the Soviet Union and usher in a new era in which the CIA and its sister agencies monitor diverse global trends. Second, Gates must oversee a contraction and consolidation of the intelligence community that reflect the changed security environment of the 1990s.

Gates's qualifications for taking on this mammoth task have been fiercely debated. To his admirers, Robert Gates is a man of the future, a brilliant analyst and Washington insider who is ideally suited for the transition period ahead. To his critics, though, Gates's ability to lead the CIA has been fatally compromised by evidence that he politicized intelligence during the 1980s, catering to the whims of his superiors and intimidating rank-and-file CIA analysts. It has also been argued that Gates is a man of the past whose Soviet expertise is less relevant in the post-Cold War era.

Golden Gates

The story of Robert Gates's career has a familiar ring. It is the story of a young man from the American heartland who rose to power in Washington through hard work, high intelligence, and a belief in political ideas (conservatism in Gates's case) which were in the ascendant. Gates grew up in Wichita, Kansas, and came to the capital 25 years ago to take an entry level job at the CIA. Gates brought to his new career tremendous self-discipline and no qualms about putting in long hours at the office. In a town of workaholics, he quickly distinguished himself as a bureaucrat of unusual zeal. While working full-time as a junior official at the CIA, Gates completed a Ph.D. in Soviet affairs at Georgetown University. And early on he developed the habit of working seven days a week.

Gates's labors paid off. In 1974, President Ford's National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft tapped Gates to be a top Soviet specialist on the NSC staff. Gates remained in this rarefied environment near the pinnacle of power for almost five years, working for Zbigniew Brzezinski after President Carter took office. It was during this period, playing the role of policy-maker rather than CIA analyst, that Gates came to question the usefulness of much intelligence work. As he said in a speech in 1982, he found a lot of the intelligence received by the White House to be "irrelevant or untimely," "close-minded, smug, arrogant," "inaccurate or too fuzzy," and generally reflecting both poor scholarship and a lack of sensitivity to the needs of policymakers. This experience of viewing intelligence from "the other side of the fence" would later make Gates a formidable internal critic at the CIA.

Gates left the NSC in 1979 to become a top aide to Stansfield Turner, Carter's DCI. When William Casey took over the agency in early 1981, Gates quickly impressed the new director and began what would be a meteoric rise in the CIA during the 1980s. Gates's work during the Reagan era—as deputy director for intelligence (DDI), chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and finally as Casey's deputy—burnished his reputation for self-discipline and bureaucratic savvy. But as Gates's confirmation hearings revealed, there was also a darker side to this period. Gates's promotion to the pivotal post of DDI in January 1982 caused considerable resentment among other analysts at Langley. As former Deputy Director Bobby Inman later told Congress, "there was significant on-the-job training in that process, and there were clearly bruised feelings." Gates "broke some china," concluded Inman. Gates himself acknowledged that he wouldn't win "a popularity contest" at the CIA.

Blunt instrument?

If Gates's critics are to be believed, he did far more than ruffle some feathers

during the 1980s. Gates has been portrayed as corrupting the integrity of the intelligence process by slanting intelligence reports, pushing his own ideological agenda, and squelching dissent among analysts through intimidation. At best, his style at the CIA was, in his own words, "demanding and blunt." At worst, it was arrogant and abrasive enough to terrify junior analysts and alienate more senior officials. Three days after taking over as DDI, the 39-year old Gates gave an address to the agency's top analysts in which he lambasted them for shoddy work. "Obviously, CIA's analysts are capable of and do turn out high-quality work. But we also turn out work that is irrelevant, uninteresting, too late to be of value, too narrow, too unimaginative, and too often just flat wrong." Gates ended his speech by promising that he would create an open environment in the analytic division. "In an intelligence organization, it is essential that voices crying out in the wilderness, those who hold unorthodox or minority views, be heard," Gates said.

This pledge would go unfilled, according to some analysts who worked for Gates. In the words of one veteran CIA analyst, Harold P. Ford, Gates often "ignored or scorned the views of others whose assessments did not accord with his own." Other analysts echoed this charge and claimed that Gates corrupted the intelligence process to get the political assessments he wanted. Specifically, Gates is said to have pressed analysts to take a pessimistic view of Soviet intentions and behavior—the view shared by himself and his fervently anti-Communist boss, William Casey. "What I think is most important and most offensive is that Casey and Gates arrogated to themselves the power to make intelligence judgments—that they had contempt for a process designed to allow independent analysis," said Melvin Goodman, a top Soviet analyst who left the CIA because of its politicization in the 1980s.

Other analysts who worked under Gates disputed this portrait, saying he was an open-minded boss. Gates was "ready to be persuaded by evidence and analysis" and he ensured "treatment of competing hypotheses," said Douglas J. MacEachin, who headed the CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis in the 1980s. Gates himself claimed that he was "open to argumentation" and "never distorted intelligence to support policy or to please a policymaker."

Following a cold trail

Few can dispute, however, that Gates brought to his work an extreme pessimism about the Soviet Union. During the late 1980s, as Mikhail Gorbachev spearheaded a historic reform effort in the Soviet Union, Gates frequently delivered a speech entitled "War by Another Name," in which he argued that Moscow remained an implacable foe. Despite a Ph.D. in Soviet

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affairs and enough confidence in this field to overrule the work of CIA Soviet analysts, Gates failed to appreciate the far-reaching implications of Gorbachev's rule. "Gates missed the strategic retreat of the Soviet Union," said Goodman.

Gates's ideological zeal has led him often into the realm of policy advocacy. Gates gave public speeches supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative and argued within the administration for a more hardline policy toward the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In the view of critics, Gates was all too

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ready to place political opportunism before analytical honesty.

After William Casey's death in 1987, Gates was nominated to become DCI. With the Iran-Contra affair consuming Washington, however, Gates's nomination was derailed by charges that he was involved in the scandal. In early 1989, Gates left the CIA to become Brent Scowcroft's deputy at the NSC.

This job placed Gates at the center of the action during the Bush Administration's first two and a half years. With Scowcroft serving as a personal counselor to Bush, Gates was given wide-ranging powers. The chief vehicle for his influence was the so-called committee of deputies—a select group of second echelon officials from State, Defense, the CIA, and the Joint

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Chiefs of Staff, which handled policy development and implementation. Gates chaired the committee, which met as often as every day. During the crises in Panama and the Persian Gulf, the group played a key role in hammering out policy options for President Bush and his top advisers. The Gulf crisis proved to be a pivotal moment in Gates's career. From the earliest days of the crisis, Gates was included in the small inner circle advising Bush. Seldom before had a deputy national security adviser wielded such visible influence, and Gates's reputation as highly capable bureaucratic operator was further

Gates has put forward few details of the changes he has in mind, but at least two of his priorities are clear: first, Gates plans to reduce CIA backing for paramilitary operations in the Third World reflecting the decline of Soviet power. Second, Gates has promised to "dramatically expand our clandestine human intelligence collection."

boosted. Gates's performance no doubt accounted in part for Bush's willingness to nominate him to the top CIA slot—a risky move, given Gates's previous failure to secure that job.

Eyes and ears

Gates's first undertaking as DCI is likely to be a review of U.S. intelligence needs. Working with other senior administration officials, Gates plans to chart the future of the intelligence establishment through the year 2005. "At a time of revolutionary change abroad and government-wide fiscal constraints at home, U.S. intelligence

cannot remain fundamentally unaffected," Gates said during his confirmation hearing. "CIA and U.S. intelligence must change and be seen to change or confront irrelevance and growing sentiment for their dismantlement." Gates has put forward few details of the changes he has in mind, but at least two of his priorities are clear: first, Gates plans to reduce CIA backing for paramilitary operations in the Third World, reflecting the decline of Soviet power. Second, Gates has promised to "dramatically expand our clandestine human intelligence collection." This move will address the agency's well-known weakness in gathering the kind of nuanced information that only spies can provide.

It is an initiative entailing a certain irony: unlike William Casey, the renegade spymaster, or William Webster, the former law enforcement official, Gates is a quintessential analyst—a Ph.D. intellectual who is comfortable in the world of fierce and often arcane debates over intelligence. Gates the analyst and Washington bureaucrat symbolizes the technocratic face of American intelligence. Yet, as a CIA chief committed to hiring additional spies, he will be pushing for a more traditional approach to intelligence. Critics have wondered whether Gates—who has never worked in the field—is up to this task.



Ultimately, the effectiveness of the CIA in the 1990s will hinge in great part on maintaining morale in an agency facing cutbacks and reorganization. Gates has acknowledged his past failings as a manager, confirming charges that he was often demanding and insensitive. But he has pledged to change his ways. In a final statement during his confirmation hearing, Gates promised to make a particular effort to mend ties with the analysts at Langley: "I would solicit from the analysts their own ideas on how to rebuild morale, insure integrity and independence, how to avoid self-censorship and deal with the perceptions of politicization."

Gates's implicit message here is that he learns from his mistakes. Whether this is true remains to be seen. ■

David Callahan, author of* Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War, *is a frequent contributor to the Journal.

WHAT IF YOU'RE HIT BY A TYPHOON IN RANGOON?



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DIPLOMACY'S

Until the day he died, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, who served in Japan from 1932 to 1941 and was the most experienced U.S. diplomat of that era, believed that Washington's handling of the U.S.-Japan negotiations preceding the Pearl Harbor attack was unimaginative and inflexible. Grew thought that Washington gave short shrift to the embassy's carefully considered reports, analyses, and recommendations centering on Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye's proposal that he and President Roosevelt meet face-to-face in Honolulu in a direct effort to achieve a settlement of all outstanding issues. If the meeting had been allowed to take place, he believed, the Pacific War might have been avoided.

As Grew's private secretary during that eventful period, I assisted him in a small way in preparing his never-published "failure of a mission" report during our post-Pearl Harbor internment in Tokyo, discussed the issues with him at length during our two-month repatriation voyage home, and accompanied him when he called on Secretary of State Cordell Hull and attempted to present the report. I thought then, as I do now, that Grew was right, that the meeting should have been held, and that if it had been held, the Pacific War might have been avoided, without sacrifice of any U.S. or Allied principle or interest.

BY ROBERT A. FEAREY

PHOTOGRAPHS BY JANE SMITH-HUTTON

The Groton connection

Devoted to the Foreign Service and to his old school, Groton, Grew made it a practice to ask Groton's headmaster to nominate a Grotonian about to graduate from college to come out to Tokyo for two years as Grew's private secretary. The position paid only $50 a month, out of Grew's own pocket, but provided an unparalleled opportunity for the young man to view the Foreign Service from the inside and decide whether he wished to apply. Of the four afforded this opportunity, three—including myself—joined the service.

My predecessor, Marshall Green, returned home in

FINAL ROUND



Photos left to right: Embassy's library with clean up crew; staff gathered together to sing hymns on Sundays; golfing with Ambassador Grew, Lt. Mert Stone, and Chip Bohlen; and Helen Skowland and Jane Smith-Hutton display canned goods in kitchen.

June, 1941. We met in New York, where he removed any doubts I might have had about my acceptance of the job. The Grews, he said, were great, the embassy group first class, the duties of the position not too arduous, and Japan still a wonderful place, notwithstanding the gathering war clouds. In the course of our couple of days together, I offered Green an airplane ride, having at that time accumulated several hundred private flying hours. He still talks of our bombing run a few feet above a tanker moving down Long Island Sound, with the captain running for cover on the bridge.

In those days, hard as it is to believe now, U.S. Foreign Service officers called personally on the secretary or under secretary before departing for their posts. I was not an FSO, but Grew had written to his old friend, Under Secretary Sumner Welles, another Grotonian, to ask him to oversee my departure arrangements and briefly receive me. I recall waiting in the anteroom between Secretary Hull's and Under Secretary Welles's offices, chatting with two secretaries, before Welles came out to usher me in. The two said they were their bosses' entire secretarial support!

Arriving in Tokyo in early July, I was met with a bow and a giggle by my amah (servant), Kani-san, inherited

Left: Ambassador Grew
Below: Embassy Counselor Eugene Dooman

from Green, at the door of my government-provided apartment in the embassy compound. I had barely started to unpack when the phone rang—it was Ambassador Grew inviting me up the hill to his residence to get acquainted.

As I entered Grew's study, he turned from the old typewriter on which he had hunted and pecked his work at home for decades, and greeted me warmly. We talked for about half an hour, when Mrs. Grew came in to be introduced. She lamented the fact that, unlike Green, I did not play bridge. But Mr. Grew said that he had had good reports on my golf, which was the important thing. Both could not have been nicer; I left feeling that all would be well.

The next day I met the embassy staff, particularly Eugene H. Dooman, the embassy counselor, born in Japan, fluent in Japanese, and Grew's right-hand man; Edward S. Crocker, first secretary; Charles E. Bohlen, second secretary, recently arrived from Embassy Moscow and later President Roosevelt's Russian interpreter/adviser and ambassador to the Soviet Union, France, and the Philippines; Captain Henri H. Smith-Hutton, naval attaché; Lt. Col. Harry J. Creswell, Army attaché; Frank S. Williams, commercial attaché, and Marion Arnold, Grew's longtime secretary, with whom I shared an outer office.

I had known that one of my principal duties would be golf. Weekday afternoons when work permitted, Grew would quickly assemble a foursome from the embassy golfers, most often Dooman, Bohlen, Crocker, or myself, and away we would go to Koganei, Kasumegaseki, or some other nearby course. Relations with Japan had reached a point where Grew's Japanese friends could no longer afford to be seen with him, including on the golf course. On the other hand, there were those, including Prime Minister Konoye, who found carefully arranged golf games and private dinners feasible for meeting with Grew and Dooman at critical junctures.

Averting war

As the weeks passed I became aware that Grew and Dooman were heavily preoccupied with an undertaking that they believed could critically affect the prospects for averting war. Though the matter was closely held within the embassy, I learned that it related to a proposal Grew had transmitted to Washington from Prime Minister Konoye that he and President Roosevelt meet face-to-face in Honolulu, in an effort to fundamentally turn U.S.-Japan relations around before it was too late. Grew had told Washington that Konoye was convinced that he would be able to present terms for a settlement at such a meeting which the United States and its allies would be able to accept. Konoye had said that the terms had the backing of the emperor and of Japan's highest military authorities, and that senior military officers were prepared to accompany him to the meeting and put the weight of their approval behind the hoped-for agreement with the president on the mission's return to Japan. Grew and Dooman had strongly recommended that Washington agree to the meeting.

Washington's initial reaction to the proposal was favorable. The idea was said to have caught the president's imagination. According to *The Foreign Relations of the United States*, in a late August session with Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburu Nomura, Roosevelt "spoke of the difficulty of going as far as

Hawaii and elaborated his reasons why it would be difficult to get away for 21 days. He turned to Juneau, Alaska, as a meeting place, which would require only 14 or 15 days, allowing for a three or four days conversation with the Japanese prime minister." At the close of the meeting he said "that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoye, and he again mentioned Juneau." Konoye told Grew after this conversation had been reported to Tokyo that Juneau was entirely acceptable, and that a destroyer with steam up awaited in Yokohama to carry him and his associates there. An embassy officer who lived in Yokohama confirmed this.

At a meeting with Nomura at the White House on September 3, however, the president read a message, prepared at State, from him to Konoye which included the statement that "it would seem highly desirable that we take precautions toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement." When Nomura asked whether the president was still favorable to a conference, "the president replied that he was, but that it was very important to settle a number of these questions beforehand, if the success of the conference was to be safeguarded. . . ." He added that "it would be necessary for us to discuss the matter fully with the British, the Chinese, and the Dutch, since there is no other way to effect a suitable peaceful settlement for the Pacific area."

In succeeding meetings Roosevelt and Hull reiterated these two themes—that the proposed meeting must be preceded by preliminary U.S.-Japan discussions of (by which they clearly meant agreement on) "the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement," and by U.S. consultation with our Chinese, British, and Dutch allies. In a September 4 meeting with Nomura, Hull said that "this was especially necessary with the Chinese who might otherwise be apprehensive lest we betray them." Concern for Chiang Kai-shek's reactions was clearly a key factor in the administration's thinking.

Fears of betrayal

Konoye, in first broaching the meeting idea in the spring, had explained to Grew, and he to Washington, why it was necessary for him to meet personally with Roosevelt outside Japan, and why Konoye could propose terms at such a meeting that he could never propose through diplomatic channels. If, he had said, he were to use such channels to provide the specific assurances Washington sought on the China question and other issues, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, who had led Japan into the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy and who would do anything to prevent a Japanese accommodation with the United States, would immediately leak those assurances to fanatical Japanese elements and to the German and Italian embassies, Konoye would be assassinated, and the whole effort would fail. A further risk of hostile leaks lay in the codes through which the American Embassy and the State Department communicated. The embassy hoped that one of its codes was still secure, but Konoye told Grew that he believed Japanese cryptographers had broken all the others.

After Matsuoka was forced to resign as foreign minister following the German invasion of Russia in June, Konoye told Grew, and he Washington, that Matsuoka had left supporters behind in the Foreign Office who would equally leak the positive and forthcoming terms that Konoye intended to propose to the president. On the other hand, Konoye maintained that if he, accompanied by senior representatives of the Army and Navy, could meet face-to-face with Roosevelt, propose those terms and have them accepted in principle, subject to Washington and Allied concurrence and the working out of detailed implementing arrangements, the reaction of relief and approval in Japan would be so strong that diehard elements would be unable to prevail against it.

The China quagmire

Grew and Dooman supported this reasoning. From the emperor down, they told Washington, the Japanese knew that the China venture was not succeeding. Particularly after the July freezing of Japanese assets abroad and the embargo on oil and scrap shipments to Japan, the endless war in China was driving Japan to ruin. Every time a taxi went around the corner, Japan had less oil. There was solid reason to believe that the bulk of the Japanese people, except for the diehards and fanatics, would sincerely welcome a face-saving settlement that would enable the country to pull back, on an agreed schedule, from China and Southeast Asia, even if not from Manchuria. Japan had now held Manchuria for nine years, had successfully integrated its economy into the homeland economy, and its disposition presented special problems that would have to be worked out in agreement with Nationalist China. But the time was now; the opportunity had to be seized before Japan's economic situation and internal discontent reached so serious a level that the military would feel entitled to take complete control and launch Japan on a suicidal war against the West.

Grew told Washington that, because of the risks of hostile exposure, Konoye could not provide the clear and specific commitments concerning China, Indochina, the Axis Pact, non-discriminatory trade, and other issues that Washington sought before the proposed meeting. On the other hand, he argued, there was strong reason to believe that Konoye would be able to provide those commitments at the proposed meeting and that with the emperor's, the top military's, and the people's support, they would be carried out. No one could guarantee this, but the alternative was almost certainly replacement of the Konoye government and a rapid descent toward war.

Fading hopes

As the weeks passed and Washington still withheld approval of Konoye's meeting proposal, he and Grew became increasingly discouraged. Konoye warned at their secret meetings that time was running out, that he would soon have no alternative but to resign and be succeeded by a prime minister and cabinet offering far less chance of determinedly seeking and carrying out a mutually acceptable U.S.-Japan settlement. Again and again Grew urged Washington to accept the meeting as the last, best chance for a settlement. He argued that not only Konoye but, he and Dooman also firmly believed, the emperor and Japan's top military and civilian leaders wished to reverse Japan's unsuccessful military course, if this could be accomplished without an appearance of abject surrender. Japan could not pull its forces out of China and Indochina overnight without such an appearance, but it could commit itself to a course of action that would accomplish that result in an acceptable period of time, under effective safeguards.

Personalities can make an important difference in such situations. Secretary Hull's principal Far Eastern adviser was a former professor named Stanley K. Hornbeck. Coming to the post with a China background, he was personally known by Grew and other Embassy Tokyo officers to have shown disdain for the Japanese. Word reached the embassy that it was largely as a result of his influence that Roosevelt's and Hull's initially favorable reaction to the meeting proposal had cooled. It was reportedly at Hornbeck's instance that the policy had been adopted of requiring Japan to provide specific assurances on outstanding issues, particularly respecting China, before a meeting could be held. Hornbeck was quoted as saying that Grew had been in Japan too long, that he was more Japanese than the Japanese, and that all one had to do with the Japanese was to stand up to them and they would cave. The embassy heard that State's "Japan hands," led by Joseph W. Ballantine, tended to agree with the embassy's recommendations, but how strongly was not clear. What did seem clear was that Hornbeck had the upper hand and that his views were prevailing with Hull and Roosevelt.

Konoye resigns

On October 16 Konoye, having pled and waited in vain for U.S. acceptance of his meeting proposal, resigned and was replaced by General Hideki Tojo. In a private conversation with Grew, Konoye put the best face he could on this development, recalling that Tojo, as war minister in Konoye's cabinet, had personally supported the meeting proposal and had been prepared to put his personal weight behind the hoped-for agreement with the president. But Grew and Dooman now held little hope for peace, believing that the chance Konoye had presented of a reversal, not at once, but by controlled stages, of Japan's aggressive course had been lost. The Washington talks continued, and Grew employed his talents to the full with new Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and others to make them succeed. But he was privately frank to say that the die had been cast when Konoye gave up on the proposed meeting and resigned.

Reflecting this view, Grew sent a number of cables during October and November warning that the Japanese, finding themselves in a corner as a result of the freeze and embargo, not only might, but probably would resort to an all-out, do-or-die attempt to render Japan invulnerable to foreign economic pressures, even if the effort were tantamount to national *hara-kiri*. In a message of November 3 he expressed the hope that the United States would not become involved in war "because of any possible misconception of Japan's capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States." He said that "the sands are running fast," and that "an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." Earlier in the year he had reported a rumor passed on by the Peruvian ambassador in Tokyo that a Japanese admiral in his cups had been heard to say that, if war came, it would start with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The contrast between Grew's prescient warnings and Hornbeck's reported view that if one stood up to the Japanese they would cave could not have been more stark. But pro-China Hornbeck's analysis prevailed over that of our Tokyo embassy, not only with Hull and the president but also apparently with our military authorities, responsible for our Pacific defenses.

So war came. It was Sunday in the United States but Monday morning, December 8, when the news reached us in Tokyo. At about eight I walked over from my apartment to the embassy chancery, a distance of about 40 feet. Chip Bohlen came down the stairs. Had I heard the news? The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and other points around the Western Pacific and the Imperial Headquarters had announced that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States and its Allies. As I absorbed this intelligence, other embassy officers arrived, most having heard the news from their drivers.

I went down to the compound's front gate, which was closed tight with Japanese police standing all about. Outside up the street I heard a newsboy calling "*Gogai, Gogai*," meaning "Extra, Extra," and waving copies of the English language "official" Japanese government newspaper, *The Japan Times and Advertiser*, on which I could see the gigantic headline, WAR IS ON. I walked as inconspicuously as I could back along the 8-foot wall surrounding the compound to a corner where some small pine trees provided a little cover. There I scrambled over the wall, bought two copies of the paper, one to give to Grew and one to keep, and scrambled back.

Three hours later, at about 11:00 a.m., a car containing several Japanese officials drove into the embassy compound and a Mr. Ohno of the Foreign Office asked to see the ambassador. Informed that both the ambassador and Counselor Dooman were unavailable, Ohno asked to see the next ranking embassy officer, who was First Secretary



Ambassador Grew practices golf at the embassy compound.

Crocker. By that time I realized what was up and slipped into Crocker's office with Ohno and his colleagues.

After a brief exchange of greetings, Ohno pulled a paper from his pocket and said, "I am instructed to hand to you, as representing the Embassy, the following document which I shall first read to you." He thereupon read:

"No. 136 - Strictly Confidential
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, December 8, 1941
"Excellency:

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning today.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
SHIGENORI TOGO
Minister for Foreign Affairs"

After a brief silence Crocker said, "This is a very tragic moment." Ohno replied: "It is; and my duty is most distasteful."

Even before Ohno's arrival, a group of us under Bohlen's direction had started to burn the embassy code books and classified files. The code books were numerous and bulky and the files extensive. Burning them effectively was no easy task, particularly in contrast to modern techniques of destruction. The burning was carried on in metal wastebaskets indoors and steel drums outdoors in the garage enclosure. From time to time, despite our best efforts, whole or partial pages of unburned code or text would float up and away over Tokyo.

Golf and groceries

In the days of internment that followed, our group of 65 organized itself under Grew's and Dooman's direction into a smoothly running, not unpleasant routine. Fortunately, as one of my responsibilities, and with the possibility of war all too apparent, I had in August mailed in to San Francisco a large grocery order, after obtaining from each American staff member a list of what he or she wanted, paid in advance. The order arrived only a week or two before Pearl Harbor and proved to be a godsend.

As the youngest member of the group, except for Cynthia, the 8-year-old daughter of Naval Attache Smith-Hutton and his wife, I was appointed sports director. This was not an insignificant assignment. Although most of the group busied themselves pretty well writing, reading, or learning to type, there was inevitably a good deal of leisure time, and sports had definite importance for morale and fitness. So Bohlen, Assistant Naval Attache Mert Stone, and I laid out a nine-hole golf course totaling over 500 yards among and over the buildings; we set up a badminton court and ping-pong table in the garage courtyard; and I organized a succession of hotly contested tournaments in all three sports, with prizes, such as engraved silver cups and ashtrays, some ordered from outside and some sent in by friends of the Grews.

Golf had always been Grew's favorite sport, and every morning he came down from the residence for a game. He had developed misplaced confidence in my golfing skills and usually chose me as his partner

During internment, the author found a rudimentary washing machine and did laundry for the whole embassy.

Left: MacArthur signs the Japanese surrender document aboard the U. S. S. Missouri. (Photo courtesy of The Artists Proof). Below: A grocery shipment in from San Francisco.

for the team contests. We won our share, and each of us brought back several trophies engraved "Greater East Asia Black Sulphur Springs Golf Club." "Black Sulphur Springs" was a reference to the plush resort where our counterparts, the Japanese diplomats in the United States were held. Other times we used "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Golf Course."

To enliven our golf games I organized a running sweepstakes under which, if you drew the name of the next person to break a window, you won the pot. With some of the holes going over the three-story apartment houses onto small greens invisible to the driver, a great many balls ended up in the Tokyo streets. Every day except Sunday Ambassador Grew and four or five other avid poker players gathered for their marathon poker series, which continued on the repatriation ships almost to New York. The bridge players, led by Mrs. Grew, were equally committed to their almost daily game.

Doolittle raid

In mid-April I was playing golf on our private course with Major Stanton Babcock, the assistant Army attaché (another Grotonian!) when we heard explosions in the distance. We looked up and saw a rather large military aircraft slowly flying quite low over the Diet (Parliament) building with black anti-aircraft bursts visible behind and above. As we watched it disappear to the south, obviously untouched by the anti-aircraft fire, Babcock said that he was sure it was an American bomber but that he had no idea how it could have got to Tokyo. The most likely way was from an aircraft-carrier, but he had never heard of a plane of that size taking off from a carrier.

We dropped our clubs and ran up for a better view from the residence. There we encountered Grew, who said that, as he was bidding farewell to Swiss Minister Gorgé, they had seen and heard a number of large airplanes overhead. Shortly afterward, they had seen fires in different directions with lots of smoke. Sirens and gunfire could still be heard as we stood there, but the planes were no longer in view.

The papers that evening reported that nine enemy aircraft had been shot down over various parts of Japan, and several photos were shown to prove it. On examination, however, our military colleagues concluded that the photos were all of one downed plane, taken from different angles. Only later did we learn through Gorgé that we had had a ringside view of the Doolittle raid.

'Failure of a mission' report

In late December, as I recall, Grew mentioned that he had started work on a report to Secretary Hull and the president presenting his frank, carefully considered views on what he believed had been Washington's mishandling of the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations. After devoting 10 years of his life to the cause of American-Japanese friendship and seeing it end in the holocaust at Pearl Harbor, he did not feel that he could in good conscience fail to present to his superiors in Washington and to history his honest assessment of the 1941 negotiations as viewed from the embassy. It would be his own, personal report for which he alone would be responsible, but he hoped to benefit from Dooman's comments and suggestions in its preparation, and later from those of a few others in the embassy, notably Crocker and Bohlen. The report would, of

course, be entirely confidential, for Hull's and the president's eyes only, unless they wished to open it to others.

Every morning Grew worked on the report in his study at the residence, progressively bringing Dooman and then Crocker and Bohlen into the task. Marion Arnold did all the typing. One morning in March he handed me a copy and asked me to take it to my apartment, study it, and give him my thoughts and suggestions, all the way from major policy considerations to drafting points. I was to show the draft to no one, and was to bring it back to him myself with my comments.

I spent two days at the task and was rewarded by Grew's apparently sincere thanks for what I produced. To the best of my knowledge no copy of the paper exists today. Accordingly, I can rely only on memory in attempting to relate what it contained.

Essentially, Grew recapitulated in clear, concise, often eloquent terms the case for the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting that he had earlier advanced in his cables. From the moment he had arrived in Tokyo as a Hoover appointee in 1932, he recalled, he had devoted himself unremittingly to the cause of U.S.-Japanese friendship. Instead, he had seen relations steadily worsen, as Japan's aggressive course took it into Manchuria, then China, and then Indochina.

Finally, Grew wrote, in the summer and fall of 1941, an opportunity had presented itself under Prime Minister Konoye to reverse that course. Again and again, in carefully reasoned messages, the embassy had argued that the opportunity should be seized. It had clearly explained why Konoye could not present his far-reaching proposals, representing a fundamental shift of Japanese policy, through diplomatic channels, because of the virtual certainty of hostile leaks, of Konoye's probable assassination, and of the failure of the enterprise. Konoye was prepared, with the emperor's and the military's backing, to pull Japanese forces out of China and Indochina. But this had to be done by controlled stages over a specified, limited period of time, and so as not to appear to be abject surrender.

Unbending

Washington, Grew's report continued, had initially shown interest in the proposal. But this interest soon waned and was replaced by sweeping and inflexible demands of Japan that ignored the real situation in which Japan, as a result of its own misguided policies, had placed itself. The United States had, in effect, said to Japan: agree to withdraw completely from China and Indochina, to renounce the Axis Pact, and to subscribe to open and non-discriminatory trade practices, and then we will negotiate with you. The embassy had explained that Konoye sought many of the same goals as the United States, but that he had to reach them by stages that took account of hard facts. Japanese forces were by that time stationed widely over China and Indochina, the nation had undergone heavy sacrifices in pursuit of its misguided policies, and a reasonable period of time was required to turn the ship of state around. The embassy's advice that reasonable confidence should be placed in the good faith of Konoye and his supporters to implement the steps which were so clearly in Japan's interest was apparently disbelieved and rejected.

Grew in his report set forth more specifically than he had in his cables or than he later did in his books the terms which Konoye had told him he intended to present to the president. They were, as I recall:

- Japan would effectively commit itself not to take hostile action against the United States under the Tripartite Pact in case of war between Germany and the United States;
- Japan would commit itself to withdraw its forces from China lock, stock, and barrel within 18 months from the date of finalization of the U.S.-Japanese settlement agreement;
- The United States and its Allies, in return for these commitments and for evidence of the beginning of the withdrawal of Japan's forces from Indochina and China, would (a) partially lift the freezing of Japanese assets and the embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to Japan, and (b) commence negotiations for new treaties of commerce and navigation with Japan on the clear understanding that signature and ratification would depend on Japan's full compliance with its obligations under the agreement;
- Japan would complete the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina;
- The United States and its Allies, on the completion of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, would completely terminate the freezing and embargo and effectuate the new treaties of commerce and navigation;
- The disposition of Manchuria would be left to be determined after the war in Europe was over. Konoye intended to point out to the president that if the Allies prevailed in Europe they would clearly be able to compel Japan's withdrawal from Manchuria; if, on the other hand, the Axis prevailed, Japan would equally clearly be able to remain in control of Manchuria.

I also recall Grew's relating in his report an aspect of Konoye's plan that I have not seen set forth anywhere else. Because of Konoye's concern about the danger of leaks, Grew said that Konoye had told him that he planned, with the president's cooperation, to keep the terms of the agreement they would hope to achieve secret until he had returned to Japan. Immediately on his return, he intended to meet with the emperor, obtain his approval of the agreement terms and of an Imperial Rescript so stating, and then at once go on the radio to announce the terms to the people, bearing the emperor's and the highest military authorities' support. Konoye firmly believed that the people's response to the agreement would be so positive that extremist elements would not be able to prevail against it.

Although it is 50 years since I studied and made suggestions on Grew's internment report, and I kept no notes, I believe the above is an accurate rendition of what I read. The reciprocally controlled, step-by-step (*pari passu*) nature of the arrangement is particularly clear in my mind, because of Grew's emphasis on it in our discussions on the repatriation ship *Gripsholm*.

The first steps, he stressed, would be required of Japan; the United States and its Allies would not be obliged to start to lift the freezing and embargo or take any other action involving cost or risk until they were convinced that Japan was faithfully fulfilling its prior commitments, including those relating to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina and China. The United States and its Allies thus stood to gain much—avoidance of war in the Pacific without sacrifice of any Allied principle or objective—while risking nothing.

Why Konoye's intended terms were not presented in this detail in Grew's cables from Tokyo may be explained by Konoye's reluctance to go into such detail before the meeting, or by Konoye's and the embassy's lack of confidence in the security of the U.S. codes. Why Grew did not present them in this detail later on in his books, *Ten Years in Japan* (1944) and *Turbulent Era* (1952), I do not know. The specifics of the arrangement, clearly enabling the Allies to maintain control of the implementation of the settlement, would seem to add to the strength of Grew's case that the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting should have been held.

And then, the great white cross, perhaps 40 feet wide and tall, high up at the front of the ship, lit up. Our lives would depend on its safe-conduct message being seen

The arrangements through the Swiss and Spanish governments for our exchange with Japanese diplomats, businessmen, and others held in the United States finally fell into place, with June 18 as our scheduled sailing date. We would travel aboard the *Asama Maru* via Hong Kong, Saigon, and Singapore, through the Sunda Straits, and across the Indian Ocean to Lourenzo Marques (now Maputo), the capital of Mozambique. There we would meet the Swedish cruise ship, *Gripsholm*, which would have brought the Japanese repatriates from New York. They would board the *Asama Maru* for Tokyo while we proceeded on the *Gripsholm* via Rio to New York.

In the early morning of June 17 we were taken in a line of police-escorted taxis to the Tokyo Railroad Station. We walked in between lines of police to a large waiting room. There had been collected several score American and other diplomats, missionaries, businessmen, newsmen, and others who had been held at various points around Tokyo. The newsmen, who the Japanese assumed were all spies, had been held in close confinement or prison, often in solitary, constantly interrogated and, in many cases, tortured. Later, on the ship, some of them demonstrated the "water cure" torture to which they had been subjected, some many times. There was much handshaking as friends met after six months' separation and exchanged experiences.

After an hour or so we boarded a special train and rode by a roundabout route through Kawasaki directly to shipside. There were no searches or inspections of any kind on the train or as we boarded the *Asama Maru*, a fairly large liner. Aboard the ship we were joined by many more Americans and people of other nationalities being repatriated from all over Japan. Those of us who had carried aboard copies of Grew's report delivered them to him in his cabin as planned.

Soon word spread that a hitch had developed and that our departure would be delayed. The ship moved out to anchor beyond the breakwater, and the next day it moved again to an anchorage further out in the bay. For a week we sat there, with launches full of Foreign Office and other officials and police coming and going, and with constant rumors of our imminent departure or of our return to shore. One newsman, Max Hill of AP, who had spent almost his entire internment in solitary under torture, said that if we did not depart he would commit suicide. He clearly meant it, and in fact did commit suicide some years later, perhaps due in part to what he had suffered in confinement.

The long voyage home

About midnight of June 24 I went on deck. A large group of crewmen were debarking from a launch, a nearby gunboat was frantically signaling with lights, and further down the deck I heard policemen saying goodbye. I woke up some embassy colleagues in time to see the Foreign Office launch leave for the last time. The anchor came up and the ship began to move. And then, just as we were being ordered off the decks, presumably to prevent our carrying back military secrets of the harbor, the great white cross, perhaps 40 feet wide and tall, high up at the front of the ship, lit up. Our lives would depend on its safe-conduct message being seen and respected by enemy and friendly surface warships and submarines as we made our way through active war zones around Asia and across the Indian Ocean to Africa.

Years later Chip Bohlen told me a story of how, during a party in Moscow, someone had brought up the diplomatic exchanges during the war. When Bohlen mentioned that he had been on the *Asama Maru*, a former German naval officer said that Bohlen was lucky to be alive. The German had been a submarine skipper in the Indian Ocean and, one very dark and foggy night, had seen a large ship about to cross his path. Assuming it to be an Allied ship, he had ordered torpedoes into the tubes and was just about to give the order to fire,

when the fog cleared and he saw the great, lighted cross. He and Bohlen toasted fate and each other with vodka.

As we approached Lourenzo Marques, Grew worried about what he should do if he met Japanese Ambassador to the United States Admiral Kichisaburu Nomura in the street. They were longtime friends, and Grew would normally have been glad to greet him, but with their countries now at war, Grew had no desire to have a photograph of Nomura and him chatting together shown all over the Free World. He decided that if they met he would bow stiffly and pass on without pausing.

And meet they did, in the main street. Nomura was accompanied by Ambassador Saburo Kurusu, who had been sent to Washington a month or so before the outbreak of war to assist Nomura. I happened to be with Grew. Nomura smiled broadly at Grew and started over with his hand outstretched, trailed by Kurusu. Grew never slackened his pace. Bowing coldly, he ignored the outstretched hand, and passed on. The incident long rankled with him, but he never doubted that he had done the right thing.

Report to Hull

We docked in New York on August 25. The ship was immediately flooded with State Department and other officials and newsmen, almost all of whom headed for Grew. After he had met with the press and dealt with the most pressing arrival problems, the two of us were taken by limousine to the station and entrained for Washington.

There we were met by Grew's own car and driver and driven to his home at 2840 Woodland Drive. He unpacked, read some mail and made some phone calls. As we were finishing an early dinner the doorbell began to ring. One after another, a half dozen old friends, including James Forrestal and Harry Hopkins, came in to welcome Grew home and hear his account of events before and after Pearl Harbor.

The next morning, armed with the original copy of his report, he and I climbed into his car and drove to the southwest corner of the State Department, where Secretary Hull's office was located. Perhaps a dozen reporters and cameramen awaited, peppering Grew with questions and camera flashes as we worked our way through to Hull's outer office. Under Secretary Welles was away. After a few moments' wait, Grew was ushered into Hull's office. I sat outside and tried to answer questions from Hull's and Welles' secretaries about our experiences.

About 25 minutes later, Secretary Hull's raised and clearly irate Tennessee accents penetrated the oaken door. I could not make out what he was saying, but it was obvious that the meeting was not going well. Soon the door opened and Grew emerged looking somewhat shaken, with Hull nowhere in sight. Though it was still only mid-morning Grew suggested that we walk two blocks up the street to the Metropolitan Club for lunch.

When we were settled there I asked him what had happened. He replied that he had presented his report to the secretary, explaining that, although it had benefited from the comments and suggestions of the principal members of the embassy staff, who concurred in it, it was his personal report for which he alone was responsible. As the secretary knew, he had continued, the embassy's assessment of the situation in Japan during the latter part of 1941, and its views and recommendations on the course the United States should pursue, had not been accepted in Washington. There may have been factors known to Washington but not in Tokyo that would account for this, but no such factors had been communicated to the embassy, most of whose messages had received no reply at all. Nevertheless, during the internment he had felt it his duty to review the record as it was available in Tokyo and to draw up for the secretary, the president, and the department's classified files his frank appraisal of the course of the negotiations in the months before Pearl Harbor. It was his honest, confidential report—he had provided copies to no one and would not without the secretary's express approval.

Hobson's choice

Grew said that the secretary had started to leaf through the report. As he did so, his face hardened and flushed. After a time he half threw the report back across the desk toward Grew and said, "Mr. Ambassador, either you promise to destroy this report and every copy you may possess or we will publish it and leave it to the American people to decide who was right and who was wrong." Taken aback, Grew replied that this was his honest, confidential report to his superiors in Washington, and that he could not in good conscience agree to destroy it. Neither could he be a party to its publication and ensuing public controversy in time of war, when national unity was essential. Subject to the secretary's approval, he had decided that what he could most usefully do would be to undertake an extensive speaking tour around the country to inform the American people about Japan's military strength and the need to prepare for a long, though inevitably victorious, Pacific war. The secretary's response had been, "Mr. Ambassador, come back at 10:00 tomorrow morning and give me your answer on the alternatives I have presented."

I told Grew that I did not see how he could have given any other reply than the one he had. The next morning we climbed into his car again and headed down Rock Creek Parkway to Hull's office. This time there were no reporters or cameramen, and Grew was promptly escorted into Hull's office. No sounds penetrated the oaken door, and after about 30 minutes the two emerged together smiling and obviously on friendly terms.

Again Grew suggested that we walk up to the Metropolitan Club. After a while, since he had not volunteered any information, I asked him what had happened concerning his report. He said that the secretary had not mentioned it, but that he had expressed strong support for Grew's planned nationwide speaking tour. The rest of the time had been spent in a discussion of the war in Europe and other topics.

No useful purpose

Shortly afterward, with Grew's help, I obtained a position at State preparing research and policy papers for the occupation of Japan. I continued to see Grew, who in 1944 was appointed under secretary of State for the second time, and once or twice tried to draw him out on what had happened to his report, since an exhaustive search of the department's files had failed to reveal it. He never seemed to want to discuss the matter, nor did Dooman, whom I also saw from time to time.

If, as one can only conclude from reading Chapter XXXIV of his *Turbulent Era*, Grew in his later years still firmly held to the views he had expressed in his report to Hull and Roosevelt, why did he not insist on the report's being accepted by Hull in 1942, incorporated in the department's classified files, and made available to historians 25 years later in *The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Japan?* Why did he apparently destroy every copy?

I do not know, but my best guess is that he decided that pressing the report on a resistant Hull would serve no useful purpose, and would, on the contrary, cut Grew off from Hull, the department, and the support he needed from them to do what he felt was much more important at that point, to tour the country to awaken the people to Japan's military strength and the prospect of a long war. He may also have been looking ahead to the end of the war, wishing to do nothing to jeopardize his being able to influence the terms the Allies offered Japan, particularly concerning the disposition of the emperor. As for his obligations to history, he may have concluded that he could tell his story later in articles or books.

Supporting this hypothesis is the fact that, with his report removed as an obstacle, Grew was able to carry out his speaking tour in 1942-43 and in 1944-45 was able to exert important influence on Allied occupation policies, especially concerning the emperor. He was also able to publish his view of the 1941 negotiations in his books—a limited account in his *Ten Years in Japan* in 1944 and a fuller account in *Turbulent Era* in 1952, after he had retired from the government.

Fifty years later

Having reviewed the arguments *pro* and *con* Konoye's proposed meeting with the president from the vantage point of 50 years later, what should one conclude? My own views are as follows:

- The United States should have agreed to the meeting. There was certainly some basis for believing that an acceptable settlement could have been achieved at the meeting, and that it could have been successfully implemented over an 18- to 24-month period. Washington's contention that a failed meeting would be worse than no meeting at all is hard to accept. How could the aftermath of a failed meeting have been worse than what actually happened—a terrible, four-year war?
- The odds, I believe, are that if the meeting had been held, it would have produced an agreement. Whether that agreement would have been effectively accepted and implemented in Japan is less certain. Persuasive as Konoye's and Grew's arguments were, Japan in 1941 may have been too much under military domination and too committed to the goal of Japanese hegemony in East Asia to reverse course except as a consequence of defeat by superior military force. One has to suspect that Konoye, in conversations with Grew, overstated General Tojo's and other Japanese military authorities' support of the meeting proposal and their commitment to implementation of the settlement terms Konoye hoped to bring back from the meeting. But that having been said, the real possibility remains that Konoye and Grew were right, that the emperor's and the Japanese public's disillusionment with Japan's war course was so strong that Konoye's proposed U.S.-Japan settlement terms would have been overwhelmingly welcomed in Japan and effectively carried out.
- Grew's analyses, views and recommendations submitted to Washington during the summer and fall of 1941 were wholly sound. He strongly urged that the meeting be held, for all the reasons brought out above, but he always acknowledged that it might not succeed. He rightly did not accept Washington's contention that if it failed, the situation would be worse than if it had not been held. His reporting of the situation in Japan, his analysis of Japanese psychology, and his warnings of the imminence of war if the meeting opportunity was let pass could not have been more perceptive and accurate.

Might the Pacific War have been avoided? I believe that it might: that Washington failed to capitalize on a credible opportunity to avoid it, at no sacrifice of principle or interest.

The Konoye story prompts a brief postscript. One of the papers I prepared toward the end of my postwar planning work at State concerned "The Apprehension, Trial, and Punishment of Japanese War Criminals." When I left for Japan in early October 1945 to serve as special assistant to Ambassador George Atcheson, the political adviser to General MacArthur, I took a copy of this not yet finally approved paper with me and gave it to Atcheson for his information.

In mid-November Atcheson called me into his office to say that he had just had a call from General MacArthur complaining that, although a number of major, or "Class A," German war criminals had been arrested and were in jail, none had been apprehended in Japan. He said that he wanted a list of such Japanese "Class A" war criminals on his desk within, as I recall, 24 hours so that he could immediately order them arrested. I said that my work had concerned the arrest, trial, and punishment of Japanese war criminals of all the various "classes," but that it had not extended to which individual Japanese were guilty of

Below: Cooks prepare the day's food. Right: The police allowed in an outside hairdresser for Jane Smith-Hutton one day during internment.

war crimes. Nevertheless, I said that I thought I could obtain the help I needed to compile the requested list.

I thereupon called upon Herbert Norman, a leading Japan scholar whom I had known from before the war, and we spent that evening at the Dai Ichi Hotel drawing up a proposed list, with reasons included for each name.

I handed the list to Atcheson in the morning, and banner headlines a day or two later announced that all had been arrested. Some time later, MacArthur called Atcheson to say that he was sure there were more important Japanese war criminals, and that he wanted a second list. I met again with Norman, who argued strongly that Konoye should be included because of the positions of highest responsibility he had occupied over most of the Pearl Harbor decade. In compiling the first list, I had resisted this, arguing that Konoye had never been an active protagonist of Japan's aggressive course but rather, as a somewhat weak and indecisive man, had allowed himself to be used by aggressive elements. And he had seen the light in 1941 and done his utmost, at risk to his life, to reverse Japan's military course through his plan for the meeting with President Roosevelt. Norman said that, although he appreciated these points, we could not omit from our list someone who had held the positions that Konoye had held or who possessed the intimate knowledge of the Japanese pre-war decision process and of critical top-level, pre-war meetings that he did. His status would be less that of a major war crimes suspect than that of a material witness.

And so we agreed to include Konoye in the second list. But we also agreed that if he were arrested, we would get word to him of the special circumstances attending his arrest. With his far more extensive Japanese contacts, Norman undertook to find someone who would convey this message.

Konoye was notified of his arrest on December 6, and 10 days later, in the early morning of the day he was to report to Sugamo Prison, he committed suicide. We never learned whether the message Norman had arranged for Konoye to receive had, in fact, reached him. If it did, it probably had little influence. The word that reached us from the Konoye circle of intimates was that, as a two-time prime minister and longtime adviser to the emperor, and with noble lineage extending back 1,000 years, Konoye could not endure the humiliation of standing in court as a suspected war criminal. In his *Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography* (1983), Yoshitake Ota relates how, a few hours before his death, Konoye asked his son, Michitake, for pen and paper and wrote the following:

> "I have made political blunders beginning with the China war, and I feel my responsibility for them deeply. I find it intolerable, however, to stand in an American court as a so-called war criminal. The very fact that I did feel responsible for the China war made the task of effecting a settlement all the more critical to me. Concluding that the only remaining chance to achieve a settlement of the war in China was to reach an understanding with the United States, I did everything in my power to make the negotiations with the United States a success. It is regrettable that I am now suspected by the same United States of being a war criminal."

Robert A. Fearey has been with the Population Crisis Committee in Washington, D.C. since his retirement from the Foreign Service in 1979.

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The American Foreign Service Association, 1991: A year of transition

So as not to overload matters, AFSA has its elections in the off years. This year has been one of transition from the governing board headed by Ted Wilkinson to the Outreach and Continuity Board, headed by Hume Horan (president), Bill Kirby (State), Priscilla Del Bosque (A.I.D.), Bud Hensgen (USIA), Joseph Huggins (treasurer), Charles Schmitz (retirees), and Teresa Chin Jones (secretary). In some respects we have continued the initiatives of the preceding board; in others we have struck out on our own.

Toward universality: Several recent editorials in the *Foreign Service Journal* have emphasized your board's commitment to an elite Foreign Service that fully and fairly represents the best of what America has to offer. For almost a generation our service has been working at affirmative action–but too often we've shown more ingenuity in explaining why we couldn't do better, than in trying to get the job done in the first place. I've known colleagues in the field whose careers were actually advanced by their brilliant explanations for non-achievement. We want none of that defeatism in AFSA or in today's Foreign Service. We believe the quality and composition of our board point in a direction that our member foreign affairs agencies should follow. We will continue to encourage, admonish, and nag management, as needed.

Outreach and "in-reach": Outreach efforts to the public and the business community continue. AFSA helped sponsor several Washington conferences–all with some orientation toward the business sector. These addressed petroleum issues, U.S.-Mexican relations, pharmaceuticals, and the "Four Tigers of Asia." All conferences were well attended by the business and official community. We will continue to sponsor at least two conferences per year, funds permitting. We also seek out our public: on returning from Kuwait, Ambassador Nat Howell and DCM Barbara Bodine–with partial AFSA sponsorship–showed audiences around America that the spirit of *Beau Geste* still lives in the Foreign Service. We continue to work with the Cox Foundation to improve our Speakers' program–in this connection Ambassador Ed Peck and AFSA staff member Dick Thompson have undertaken speaking trips on the Service's and AFSA's behalf.

USIA challenge: The AFSA board, concurring fully with former President Ted Wilkinson's advice that AFSA win back exclusive labor bargaining rights in USIA, is considering making such an effort in 1992. You will be hearing more from us, but even at this early point, we are confident that the answer will be a resounding "yes." AFSA needs USIA, and USIA needs AFSA. USIA will be the public voice of American civilization and diplomacy in the 1990s. How can AFSA speak to these issues without USIA's full and formal participation? Likewise, the professional and labor-management concerns of USIA Foreign Service members are better addressed by us than by a union that lacks overseas experience or concern for professional issues. *We ask all AFSA members to get behind this effort and give us their help.*

Labor-management: Just a few remarks to precede the fuller account in the body of the report. Within weeks of taking office, the new board concluded negotiations with State management over an improved career system for Foreign Service secretaries. Bill Kirby led the AFSA team, and was supported by–among others–Barbara Reioux, a member of AFSA's governing board and herself a Foreign Service secretary. As a next priority order of business, your new board will press for rationalization of the career management system for other Foreign Service specialists. We note that the first-ever comprehensive study of the specialist function was headed by Ambassador Patricia Byrne and was submitted to management earlier this year. We are happy to have Ambassador Byrne on the governing board, where her advice will be particularly valuable as AFSA follows up on specialist questions with management. We are proud of Vice President Priscilla Del Bosque's vigorous advocacy of the interests of A.I.D. members.

We'll also follow up on bread-and-butter issues, including spouse employment–an issue that no longer relates only to women dependants. A Junior Officer class I mentored had five women officers with dependent husbands. The women strongly made the point to me that the well-being and efficiency of the Foreign Service obviously relates to its treatment of spouses. A letter we received put it well: "Compensation for spouses is the key issue and current (stop-gap proposals) are not the answer. There will not be an open-minded and honest answer until the department decides what it really thinks about spouses and defines its policy accordingly. The '72 Directive was a partial answer, arrived at to meet a pressing demand at that time. It is not a complete policy, and that's the reason all these other programs keep cropping up. These programs meet only the latest outcry and don't necessarily fit together at all. They do, however, deliver a message to spouses–and the declining number of married officers, combined with the number of unaccompanied officers overseas, shows how that message is interpreted."

Administrative matters: For the second year in a row, we believe that our AFSA budget will be (delicately) balanced. Unlike Uncle Sam, we cannot order the Bureau of Engraving to work an extra shift, nor can we lobby the Fed. You'll find that we have made improvements, however, even within these strict budgetary limits. The second floor has been remodeled, making it possible to offer larger or smaller rooms to our members. Better service and good prices are available under new management at the Foreign Service Club. Visit it. Bring a friend.

Hume Horan, AFSA President

State Department Issues

During the first half of 1991, management agreed to badly needed modifications in the bid/promotion/assignment cycle which many members had found so onerous. Promotion boards reverted to meeting during the summer months, with announcement of senior promotions in September and all others in mid-

October. Bids were to be in by September 1, with priority assignments being made beginning October 1. Unassigned officers receiving promotions would be allowed to revise their bid lists by telegram. These changes clearly constitute a compromise arrangement. AFSA will be looking to make further improvements in the system in 1992. We will also be assessing the use of "core" bids, which were introduced for the first time this year.

In addition to a new career package for secretaries, AFSA this year also succeeded in obtaining for the first time management's agreement that secretaries serving as communicators overseas will receive premium pay for this responsibility.

During the latter half of the year, the department began a long-overdue effort to implement new programs designed to upgrade the specialist corps and enhance the careers of Foreign Service specialists. This effort began with the creation of two new specialist tracks–Facilities Maintenance, and Information Management. AFSA is enthusiastic about working with management to realize the full potential of these programs. In both cases, however, implementation of these far-reaching changes in Foreign Service careers began without the required consultation with and agreement by AFSA. The result was a false start in each case and frustration for employees waiting to see how their own careers might be affected.

We will be exploring whether AFSA can involve itself at an earlier stage in the process when new programs such as these are being planned. In addition to providing an AFSA perspective–i.e., identifying what is best for the individual employee–and hands-on Foreign Service experience, such involvement might help overcome some of the problems that result when management fails to communicate with us in a timely fashion.

William A. Kirby, State Vice President

A.I.D.

Many serious issues faced A.I.D. during the year. The gravest issue–the future survival of the agency–will continue to imperil A.I.D.'s operations and the effectiveness of its Foreign Service. Despite talk of dismantling the agency, A.I.D.'s top management is unable to put forth a credible agenda and rationale for U.S. interests in development in today's changing world. Instead of putting forth a new vision for A.I.D. for the 1990s, management is looking for ways to do less; it is cutting back on its Foreign Service staff, especially overseas; and it is allowing other U.S. government agencies to erode A.I.D.'s role in foreign aid programs.

AFSA has begun to raise these issues with both employees and management. We have, for example, begun a constructive dialogue with management on the future of A.I.D. Some significant changes in perception are occurring: managers and employees are less willing to accept the notion that A.I.D.'s resource cuts are inevitable and unavoidable, and they are less willing to be the object of unwarranted criticism from top management, the IG, or other sources. AFSA will continue actively to counter the distorted, negative image of A.I.D., both within and externally, and to challenge management to recognize A.I.D.'s accomplishments and to use the strengths and values of its Foreign Service more forcefully and effectively. Dialogue with Congress will be critical to this effort, since the domestic economic recession is fueling sentiment for helping "America first." We have begun and will continue such a dialogue.

On the labor relations front, the Washington reorganization generated great concern and turmoil. AFSA engaged management in intensive analysis and deliberations to determine the potential adverse effects on Foreign Service employees. Although the number and rank of FS positions were preserved, there were 42 FS employees whose jobs were abolished in Washington. Our proposals for broadening these employees' job options within the principle of the open assignment system, were accepted by management. We remain concerned about the effects of the reorganization on A.I.D.'s operations and will monitor the situation in the upcoming year.

Another major issue has been the revisions to the Senior Foreign Service regulations proposed by management. Since both parties had been at impasse in the negotiations related to the revisions, AFSA proposed and management agreed to undertake a joint review to take a fresh look at the problems, issues, and possible "fixes." We put together a new work team, composed of highly respected officers to represent A.I.D. employees in this effort. Our objective is to help shape a system that is based on credible analysis–a system that offers greater fairness, predictability, and transparency for employees, while meeting the workforce needs of the agency.

The above are but a few examples of the many serious issues facing A.I.D.'s Foreign Service. We face tough times and an uncertain future. We can be effective in revitalizing A.I.D. and defending our interests only if we are strong in number, remain cohesive, and contribute our individual efforts to upholding the integrity, commitment, and dedication of A.I.D.'s Foreign Service.

Priscilla Del Bosque, A.I.D. Vice President

USIA

An expanded USIA AFSA standing committee has been meeting since early summer to discuss the possibility of challenging AFGE as the exclusive bargaining agent for USIA Foreign Service personnel. A successful challenge would mean that USIA Foreign Service members would join their State and A.I.D. colleagues who are already represented by AFSA and the Foreign Service would speak with a more unified voice.

The Foreign Service is a diminishing minority–only 33 percent of the workforce–in USIA. The USIA AFSA standing committee believes that there are urgent issues that need to be confronted by the Foreign Service, issues that AFSA as both a union and a professional organization could address if it were our bargaining unit.

Among the bread-and-butter union issues discussed have been the artificial restrictions limiting overseas housing space, the burdensome and unfair application of the contract air fare arrangement, and the extremes of some regulations limiting the sale of personal property overseas.

Professional issues brought to the table have centered around

the role of USIA in a changing world. The standing committee believes USIA should be a lead organization in the U.S. effort to support democratic initiatives in the emerging democracies. USIA also has an expanded role to play in such areas as the global environment debate and the battle against narcotics trafficking. It is critical that we engage agency leadership in a dialogue about the future of USIA and the nation's interests and needs for public diplomacy. We cannot do this now because we are not the exclusive bargaining representative for USIA Foreign Service.

We have made our views public on one subject. We have written to the President's Task Force on U.S. Government Broadcasting to say that we believe it would be a serious mistake to separate the Voice of America from USIA.

Bernard Hensgen, USIA Vice President

Treasurer's Report

This year has been a period of continued financial equilibrium for AFSA. To ensure AFSA's financial stability, I intend to institute sound management policies in all categories that fall within the treasurer's responsibilities. In that respect, I intend to work with the Membership and Development committees to raise additional revenue to meet our organization's needs. This board remains mindful of inflationary pressures, however, that will likely inflate future budgets.

Joseph Huggins, Treasurer

Administration

The 1991 election and transition to a new Governing Board provided to AFSA's staff a set of challenges that were all well met. During the transition period, the staff provided the continuity for programs and policies adopted by the old board. It also ensured responsive member services while keeping AFSA fiscally sound, despite program growth on one hand and tight budgetary constraints on the other. We bridged the gap with strong fundraising efforts.

Upkeep of the aging AFSA building and replacement of deteriorating equipment remain priorities. We completed major structural repairs and improved the appearance of the meeting rooms on the second floor of the building. During the summer we organized a highly successful Fourth of July party on the eighth floor of the State Department, thus reviving a popular but neglected tradition.

A number of administrative innovations have enabled AFSA's departments to work more efficiently. The Scholarship Fund won approval for inclusion in the Combined Federal Campaign this year, providing a mechanism for effective fundraising, and the creation of a Development Committee has strengthened AFSA's ability to raise money for the new AFSA awards as well as for scholarships. Conversion to a more sophisticated accounting system has made it easier to audit funds and to track Foreign Service Journal advertising and other revenues. We are told that our membership records are more accurate than State's–a record of which we are proud. Membership is at an all-time high. We are only 76 members shy of the magic 10,000, and we hope soon to top this goal.

Sabine Sisk, Executive Director

Retirement Issues

"Proposal: AFSA proposes that the State Department with appropriate support and assistance from AFSA, undertake to establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps comprised of Foreign Service retirees who have signified an interest in being available for recall for limited periods of active service." So began the proposal that AFSA sent to Secretary of State Baker and to the heads of the other foreign affairs agencies in mid-August 1990. The proposal suggested the benefits of having the capacity to recall Foreign Service retirees with talents or expertise to help out in national emergencies.

In September 1990, AFSA met with Baker and his principal associates. During the meeting, Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger strongly endorsed a reserve system that would allow crisis managers to know what resources were in the reserves at a given time so that they could make effective use of them. Under Secretary for Management Ivan Selin endorsed the idea as a new device for resource flexibility, and Director General Edward Perkins undertook the operational planning.

Reactions from Commerce, A.I.D., and USIA were less positive, but we believed that the initial strong backing in the Department of State would help the other agencies see their way clear to climb aboard.

Following various informal meetings with department officials in September and October 1990, AFSA filed suggestions and proposals with the department and for a while it seemed that the department was being responsive. In remarks to the AFSA-sponsored business conference in November 1990, the director general credited AFSA for proposing a "new paradigm" for Foreign Service. At various times over the course of the year, including at Foreign Service Day in May 1991, high-level State Department officials re-endorsed the initiative. The director general informed retirees at the Foreign Service Day brunch that the department intended to send out a questionnaire to retirees to test their reactions to the proposal.

High-level expressions of support notwithstanding, the department was slower than anyone would have hoped in responding concretely to AFSA's proposal to establish a true Foreign Service Reserve. The Reserve languished during the spring and summer of 1991. Explanations included 1) the reorganization of the Personnel Bureau; 2) the need to prepare for Foreign Service Day; 3) the need for formulating a questionnaire to all FS retirees to ask what they would like to do; and finally, 4) there was no money and no staff to process the questionnaire.

AFSA's general policy is to work with management and to provide it the benefit of the doubt. In the case of the Reserves, AFSA might have pushed management harder with better results. The results of AFSA's own questionnaire to retirees in October 1991 provide ample evidence that the human resources were available–all that was wanting was a bit of management vision and initiative.

Charles A. Schmitz, Vice President for Retirees

Legal Issues

Foreign Service medical care: AFSA filed its *amicus curiae* brief in January 1991 urging the Supreme Court to review a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which held that the department has sole discretion to determine employee claims of medical negligence, without according due process to the employee. The case, *Tarpeh-Doe et al v. U.S.*, involves a suit by an A.I.D. employee whose infant son was permanently disabled after being denied a medical evacuation from Liberia. The Supreme Court denied certiorari (review). AFSA will pursue alternative measures to improve the administrative claims process.

Prescriptive relief: AFSA filed an amicus brief urging the Court of Appeals to review *Miller v. Baker* and overturn the District Court's decision. The lower court held that the Foreign Service Grievance Board does not have unlimited authority under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended, to grant prescriptive relief to nontenured employees. AFSA's brief argues that the act, its legislative history, and case law provide that nontenured employees should receive prescriptive relief where the grievance is likely to succeed on its merits. The Court of Appeals decision is pending.

AFSA's right to attend formal meetings: The department denied AFSA's right to attend security awareness briefings in which the SF-312 nondisclosure form is discussed. AFSA filed an unfair labor practice charge, which was upheld by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. The decision affirmed AFSA's right to attend security awareness briefings and all other formal meetings in which conditions of employment are discussed.

Nondisclosure agreement: An amended version of the nondisclosure agreement form, SF-312, is now being used by the department. The form was amended as the result of a lawsuit filed by AFSA challenging the constitutionality of the form as vague. Amended SF-312 contains language specifying that in conflicts between secrecy requirements and free speech, free speech laws supersede the form's restrictions.

Security clearance forms: A revised background form (SF-86) is now being used by all federal government agencies as the result of legal challenges filed by AFSA and other federal sector unions. AFSA had challenged the form as overly intrusive. Amended SF-86 no longer requires employees to incriminate themselves and does not require information about employees' involvement in advocacy organizations.

A.I.D. contract negotiations: AFSA began before the Foreign Service Impasses Dispute Panel (FSIDP) for assistance since issues remain unresolved. A major issue is 100 percent official time for the A.I.D. vice president. AFSA/A.I.D. employees seek parity with the AFSA/State Agreement, in which there is a longstanding agreement whereby AFSA has two full-time representatives. Completion of the A.I.D. agreement will be a priority in the upcoming year.

Negotiation of disciplinary regulations: AFSA is completing negotiations on regulations governing disciplinary action and separation for cause that were begun in January 1989. Issues of negotiability were raised and resolved by the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board. Remaining issues which AFSA expects to resolve include providing grievance procedures to curtailed employees and grounds for indefinite suspension.

Grievances: Current regulations provide for a three-year time limit for filing grievances, except in the following circumstances: 1) the grievance materials are specifically referenced by a selection board and relied upon by the agency in a retirement proceeding; and 2) the materials are adversely affecting the grievant in some other way and no more than five years have elapsed since the date of their issuance. The foreign affairs agencies are attempting to roll this rule back to a flat three-year limit for all cases.

Legislative issues

Amendment of Foreign Service Act of 1980: AFSA was successful in lobbying for an amendment to the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended, which would give Foreign Service employees the option to file complaints of statutorily-prohibited discriminatory acts either as grievances in the grievance system or as EEO complaints in the agency EEO system.

Family leave: AFSA supports the Family and Medical Leave Act. Although President Bush vetoed the bill, it has been reintroduced and AFSA will continue its support. The bill would have allowed workers up to 18 weeks of unpaid family leave over a two-year period to care for new children and up to 26 weeks of unpaid medical leave over a one-year period. Other benefits were a requirement to continue health insurance benefits during employees' leave and assurance of the same job, or an equivalent, upon their return.

Dismantling prescriptive relief: This year, as in past years, the department sought an amendment to the Foreign Service Act that would have eliminated the longstanding practice of prescriptive relief for employees. AFSA was successful in persuading Congress that current limits on prescriptive relief adequately prevent abuse of the benefit. AFSA agreed, however, that those employees convicted of a crime would not be entitled to receive prescriptive relief.

Turna R. Lewis, General Counsel

Member Services Department

In 1991, the department's three staff members all left for school or new careers. Replacing them were Chris Perrine, returning to AFSA as director of Member Services, and member Services Representatives Deborah Leahy and Warren Tryon.

Our first work of the new year involved, naturally, the war in the Persian Gulf. This department was contacted by many returning Foreign Service families with concerns about various evacuation issues. We submitted to management a comprehensive list of needed improvements, and AFSA prompted a "lessons learned" review by management. At our instigation, two major airlines made available special discounted fares for evacuated employees to visit their families in the States.

A.I.D. mail: Many employees will remember 1990 as the year of the A.I.D. mail debacle, where, for at least six months employees suffered outrageous delays and mistakes caused by a contractor mishandling A.I.D. mail. In early 1991, AFSA obtained

the agreement of A.I.D. management to revert the handling of the mail back to State mail officials. Management accepted AFSA's proposal that employees be permitted to file claims for financial losses with a one-year limit, instead of the proposed three months. In addition, we were able to get management to send letters of explanation to the creditors of those employees affected.

Specialists: The department generated new career path proposals for specialists. As of October, AFSA had begun working on packages for the new information management specialist and facilities maintenance officer skill codes, and anticipated further changes for other specialists in the field. AFSA hoped to attain consistency among the various packages, including the establishment of regulations for the conversion of skill codes.

Secretaries: The Secretarial Career Path Package was finally presented to AFSA in July and a revised package was agreed to in August. In addition, a proposal for differential pay for secretaries serving as back-up and primary communicators was being negotiated as of early October. These packages represent a step towards greater rationality and predictability in secretarial careers.

Grievances: AFSA handled approximately 200 grievances this year, with no apparent change from last year in the flow of inquiries. The FS-1 group grievance was denied by the Foreign Service Grievance Board. Increasingly the State Department has been resisting or delaying the implementation of board decisions with which it disagrees, especially those which could be precedent-setting. Department non-compliance with board orders usually results in legal action. AFSA has expressed our concern about this issue to the Director General, in writing and in person, but legal action may be necessary as a last resort to enforce compliance.

Catherine Schmitz, Member Services Director

Communications Department

The *Foreign Service Journal* in 1991 began focusing issues around a single theme, inviting debate and discourse on such topics as the Gulf War and its genesis, the most effective U.S. stance toward the fragmenting Soviet Union, and equal opportunity at the State Department. The magazine became longer, averaging 72 pages throughout the year, and we introduced several new or returned features: "From the Field," offering personal points of view on training, management, and personnel issues; "Postcard from Abroad," providing vignettes from Foreign Service life overseas; and the editor's column, "Despatch."

Once again, advertising revenues grew despite the recession, and the magazine's real cost per member dropped. Meanwhile, we took advantage of the new advertising pages to introduce more color into the magazine.

Anne Stevenson-Yang, Editor

Professional Issues

Luncheon speakers: The major speaker theme this past year has been how U.S. policy and institutions should change to meet the new international environment. State Historian William Slany launched the series, followed by a number of distinguished thinkers, including former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, theologian Michael Novak, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and ex-CIA Director William Colby. The luncheon speaker series will continue to focus on the changes needed in U.S. foreign policy and foreign affairs institutions.

AFSA awards: The 1991 award winners were honored at a Foreign Service Day (May 3) ceremony in the Dean Acheson Auditorium. The new Delavan Award for an individual or group of Foreign Service secretaries was awarded jointly to groups in Bonn and USNATO totalling 18 individuals, with former ambassador to Kuwait W. Nathaniel Howell conferring the award on the three secretaries who could be present. Winners and their families thereafter attended the Foreign Service Day luncheon in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms.

Nominations for the 1992 awards are due January 31.

Memorial plaque: Under Secretary Bartholomew read a message from the president at a solemn ceremony on Foreign Service Day before the memorial plaque in the Diplomatic Entrance. Fortunately, no new names were added this year.

Foreign Service Day Brunch: A capacity crowd of retirees filled the Foreign Service Club on May 4 to meet old friends and discuss AFSA's programs, especially those for retirees. Director General Edward J. Perkins attended as a guest.

Public Employees Roundtable: The coordinator served as AFSA's representative on the board of this coalition of public service associations, which carries on programs aimed at enhancing the image and morale of the public service, and attracting young people to public service careers.

Richard S. Thompson, Coordinator for Professional Issues

Membership

A review of our 1991 membership statistics indicates that AFSA's membership is holding steady overall with an increase of more than 200 retired members and a very slight decline in State and AID constituencies. In an effort to build better lines of communication with the membership, the Governing Board is establishing a new Membership Committee. The committee will be comprised of volunteers from each constituency and meet several times a year to discuss the best venues for disseminating information and generating feedback on AFSA programs. If you are interested in volunteering please contact AFSA's Membership Department at (202) 625-7153.

The Membership Department is upgrading AFSA's record-keeping capabilities in order to produce more targeted mailings. By defining the membership (e.g. phone numbers, skill codes, initiation dates, use of insurance services, etc.), we will reduce the printing and postage costs of larger blanket mailings. Additionally, by keeping the membership informed on issues that are pertinent to their specific interests, we hope to increase retention rates.

Membership broken down by constituency as of October 1991, is as follows:

AFSA Membership by Constituency

October 1991

State	4,665	Retiree	3,285
AID	1,123	Associate	378
USIA	185	Jubilee	38
Commerce	48	Life	191
Agriculture	11	**TOTAL**	**9,924**

The International Associates program has 31 member companies, 11 of which have been with us since the program's inception. Each company has been actively involved in our conference program and we look forward to increasing support from the business community.

Currently, there are 142 active chapters overseas. If there is not an active chapter at your post, consider starting one. The Membership Department would be happy to assist you with materials and information. Contact AFSA at 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037 for more information.

Janet L. Hedrick, Director for Membership

Scholarship Programs

The AFSA Scholarship Programs provide financial assistance to dependent children of career Foreign Service personnel (active, retired with pension, or deceased) who have served or are currently serving abroad in foreign affairs agencies of the U.S. government, as defined in the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The annual report covers the academic year in which awards were made, that is, the fall 1990 and spring 1991 financial aid grants and the spring 1991 merit awards. This year, AFSA Scholarship Programs funded $118,414 to 123 students. The financial aid program, first offered in 1927, provides grants for full-time undergraduate studies. Grants ranging from $500 to $2,000 are awarded based on need and the amount allowed by individual schools. During academic year 1990-1991, $102,114 was given to 90 eligible students.

The merit awards, created by AFSA and the Association of American Foreign Service Women (AAFSW) in 1976, provided a total of $16,300 for 20 merit award winners and 13 honorable mentions. Merit award winners are high school seniors from schools in the United States and abroad who are recognized for their outstanding academic records, their leadership qualities, and their extra-curricular activities. Of the $16,300 distributed in merit awards, equal amounts were contributed by AAFSW and AFSA. This year's merit awards were in memory of the late Ambassador Clifton R. Wharton, who was the first black American to be appointed an ambassador.

AFSA's Scholarship Programs were expanded substantially in 1991 with the participation of the DACOR Bacon House Foundation. DACOR provided grant aid for 18 college juniors and seniors whose studies are in the field of foreign affairs.

A new perpetual award was established this year in memory of the late Susan Lowe Modi. Perpetual awards are established when donations total $10,000 or more. This year's annual awards were named for Madeline Ferrari, Isaac and Isaac Duke Parker, William and Melinda Itoh, Jane Fairweather, and James L. Holmes. Annual awards are given when contributions exceed $1,000.

Ambassador Jack W. Lydman was chairman of the AFSA Committee on Education until October 1991 when the position was assumed by Ambassador Robert H. Miller. Members of the committee included Janet Biggs, AAFSW; David Jones, State; James Casey, State; Cynthia Farrell Johnson, USIA; and Edward T. Costello, A.I.D., with staff support by Gail Volk.

Gail Volk, Director of Scholarships and Development

Insurance Programs

New Long-Term Health Care: After over a year of extensive review, the Board of Trustees for Insurance Programs is pleased to announce, with the AFSA Governing Board's approval, its intention of offering Long-Term Health Care insurance to AFSA members and their dependents. The Long-Term Health Care program will be underwritten by AMEX and administered by AFSA's long-time agent, the Hirshorn Company. We are confident that the AMEX program offers better rates and more flexibility to our members than any other plan currently available. Look for an open enrollment period in early 1992.

Personal Property Insurance: AFSA's personal property insurance plan, unlike many others, offers full replacement cost for your household effects while at post, in storage, and in transit. It is available at all overseas locations. AFSA's personal property insurance is still growing and has over 600 insureds. Contact AFSA's Membership Department for more information.

Disability Insurance: In 1989, AFSA first offered its members group disability insurance administered by the Albert H. Wohlers Insurance Company. Since then, 166 members have signed up with over $30,000 in annual premiums! The Board of Trustees is pleased with the progress of the newest AFSA plan and anticipates its continued growth.

Other Programs: The underwriters of the AFSA accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) plan have raised the maximum amount of benefit to $500,000, without increasing the premiums. Plans are also being made to increase the daily benefit amount available for the AFSA In-Hospital Income plan.

The Board of Trustees is currently chaired by Teresita Schaffer (State). Tezi has been an active committee member since the board's inception ten years ago. She replaced Hugh Wolff, retired FSO, who had served as chairman of the committee from 1984 to 1991 and will continue to provide expert consultation, as needed.

The Board of Trustees is excited about being able to offer AFSA members a new Long-Term Health Care program and looks forward to your active participation. As always, the Insurance Committee welcomes your suggestions and comments.

Teresita Schaffer, Chairman, Board of Trustees for Insurance Programs

American Foreign Service Association
Financial Statements
December 31, 1990
Combined Balance Sheets As of December 31, 1990 and 1989

	AFSA				
	General Fund	Capital Maintenance Fund	Scholarship and AFSA Funds	12/31/89 Combined	Combined
Assets					
Current Assets					
Cash and cash equivalents	$ 182,348	$ 55,749	$ 164,189	$ 402,286	$ 632,151
Accounts receivable	41,345			41,345	26,714
Prepaid expenses and other	19,698			19,698	14,590
Interfund receivable (payable)	(3,666)	171	3,495		
Accrued interest and dividends			13,989	13,989	13,989
Total Current Assets	239,725	55,920	181,673	477,318	687,444
Marketable securities, at cost			1,482,643	1,482,643	1,148,482
Land, building and equipment	360,165	126,878	612	487,655	397,315
Interfund receivable (payable), less current portion	(1,107)		1,107		
Total Assets	$ 598,783	$ 182,798	$ 1,666,035	$ 2,447,616	$ 2,233,241
Liabilities and Fund Balances					
Current Liabilities					
Accounts payable	$ 33,446			$ 33,446	$ 7,810
Accrued salaries and vacation payable	23,180			23,180	22,925
Other accrued liabilities	$ 9,862			9,862	10,980
Current portion of mortgage payable	1,199			1,199	1,083
Deferred revenue	271,074			271,074	211,996
Total Current Liabilities	338,761			338,761	254,794
Mortgage payable, less current portion	197,369			197,369	198,576
Total Liabilities	536,130			536,130	453,370
Fund Balances					
Unrestricted					
Undesignated	62,653			62,653	26,227
Designated		182,798		182,798	130,257
Restricted			1,470,764	1,470,764	1,428,116
Endowment			195,271	195,271	195,271
	62,653	182,798	1,666,035	1,911,486	1,779,871
Total Liabilities and Fund Balances	$ 598,783	$ 182,798	$ 1,666,035	$ 2,447,616	$ 2,233,241

Combined Statement of Support, Revenue, Expenses and Changes in Fund Balances

	AFSA				
	General Fund	Capital Maintenance Fund	Scholarship and AFSA Funds	12/31/89 Combined	Combined
Public Support and Revenue					
Public Support					
Contributions	$ 50,671	$	$ 123,217	$ 173,888	$ 517,594
Revenue					
Membership dues	869,246			869,246	678,042
Advertising sales	220,179			220,179	170,691
Subscriptions	$93,423			93,423	98,437
Club fees	8,050			8,050	3,741
Investment income					
Dividends and interest	1,274	7,255	123,433	131,962	110,780
Gain on sale of marketable securities					16,023
Other	66,494			66,494	18,745
Total Revenue	1,258,666	7,255	123,433	1,389,354	1,096,459
Total Public Support and Revenue	1,309,337	7,255	246,650	1,563,242	1,614,053

Expenses					
Program Services					
Journal	314,940			314,940	285,842
Labor relations	297,746			297,746	273,130
Legislative action	59,486			59,486	62,343
Club	28,044			28,044	27,744
Professional issues	22,962			22,962	51,224
Outreach	138,487			138,487	60,675
Membership	119,099			119,099	89,617
Scholarship			157,127	157,127	157,931
AFSA Fund			32,916	32,916	28,114
Capital Maintenance		3,578		3,578	
Total Program Services	980,764	3,578	190,043	1,174,385	1,036,620
Supporting Services					
Management and general	243,267	16		243,283	260,260
Loss on sale of marketable securities			13,959	13,959	
Total Expenses	1,224,031	3,594	204,002	1,431,627	1,296,880
Excess of Public Support and Revenue over Expenses	85,306	3,661	42,648	131,615	317,173
Fund Balances, Beginning of Year	26,227	130,257	1,623,387	1,779,871	1,462,698
Interfund transfers	(48,880)	48,880			
Fund Balances, End of Year	$ 62,653	$ 182,798	$ 1,666,035	$ 1,911,486	$ 1,779,871

Statement of Cash Flows
For the Years Ended December 31, 1990 and 1989

	AFSA				
	General Fund	Capital Maintenance Fund	Scholarship and AFSA Funds	12/31/89 Combined	Combined
Cash Flows from Operating Activities					
Excess of Public support and revenue over expenses	$ 85,306	$ 3,661	$ 42,648	$ 131,615	$ 317,173
Adjustments to reconcile to net cash provided by operating activities:					
Depreciation	44,745	3,578	294	48,617	44,066
Gain on sale of marketable securities					(16,023)
Loss on sale of marketable securities			13,959	13,959	
Interfund transfers	(48,880)	48,880			
Change in operating assets and liabilities:					
Accounts receivable and accrued interest	(14,631)			(14,631)	(11,161)
Prepaid expenses and other	(5,108)			(5,108)	(4,311)
Interfund receivables and payables	17,549	(171)	(17,378)		
Accounts payable and other	25,636			25,636	
Accrued liabilities	(247)		(616)	(863)	2,887
Deferred revenue	59,078			59,078	40,892
Total adjustments	78,142	52,287	(3,741)	126,688	56,350
Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities	163,448	55,948	38,907	258,303	373,523
Cash Flows from Investing Activities					
Acquisition of equipment	(8,502)	(130,456)		(138,958)	(22,178)
Proceeds from sale of marketable securities			1,035,202	1,035,202	329,385
Purchase of marketable securities			(1,383,321)	(1,383,321)	(492,825)
Net Cash (Used in) Investing Activities	(8,502)	(130,456)	(348,119)	(487,077)	(185,618)
Cash Flows from Financing Activities					
Proceeds from mortgage refinancing,					142,386
Payments on mortgage payable	(9,343)		8,252	(1,091)	(9,449)
Payments on loan receivable	(52,160)	52,160			
Net Cash Provided (Used) by Financing Activities	(61,503)	52,160	8,252	(1,091)	132,937
Net Increase (Decrease) in Cash and Cash Equivalents	93,443	(22,348)	(300,960)	(229,865)	320,842
Cash and Cash Equivalents, Beginning of Year	88,905	78,097	465,149	632,151	311,309
Cash and Cash Equivalents, End of Year	$ 182,348	$ 55,749	$ 164,189	$ 402,286	$ 632,151
Supplemental disclosure of cash flow information:					
Cash paid during the year for interest				$ 20,820	$ 8,000

Uneasy Partners

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE U.S.-MEXICO TRADE AGREEMENT

BY
JACK R. BINNS

Tremendous attention has been focused on trade negotiations with Mexico and the possible North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), at the expense of the more important Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Our trade with Mexico accounts for about 7 percent of our total, while GATT rules regulate most of the rest. Emphasis has clearly been misplaced. And the North American Free Trade Area (FTA), on closer inspection, is one of those ideas that appear to carry greater risk than advantage.

The risk is heightened by the administration's initial deadline for completing negotiations—the beginning of 1992—haste, in this case, being a possible scenario for a faulty agreement. The FTA idea was "made in Mexico" by President Salinas de Gortari—which, I hasten to add, is not a negative factor—who apparently saw it as the best or only means to attract the kind of investment needed to get back on the path of sustained development. The fact that renewed growth may be critical to the survival of his party, the PRI, was probably not far from his mind. Viewed in the context of Mexican history and identity, it would seem to be a risky strategy. Even if the FTA should succeed in attaining the needed investment and growth, which is by no means certain, increased U.S. economic presence in the Mexican economy could trigger a strong domestic backlash. Although the recent Mexican election results suggest substantial public support for an FTA, the outlook could change rather quickly if the negotiated agreement does not meet Mexican expectations either in appearance or in practice, as has been the case in Canada. One might also ask how Mexicans will react to the major reduction in their ability to control their own economy, especially fiscal and monetary policies, that is implicit in the FTA concept.

While that may be a good thing in the long term, it is difficult to square with Mexican nationalism. President Bush, no doubt wishing to help Salinas and Mexico, thought it sounded like a good idea. There was apparently no serious examination of the FTA and its implications prior to our decision to proceed. Only later did the examination get under way.

It was right and responsible that Congress, in exchange for its extension of the fast track authority, demanded and received assurances that the adminstration will take specific actions to provide retraining for displaced American workers and ensure improvement in Mexican environmental practices. These were warning flags. The onus is now on the adminstration to meet these commitments and on the negotiators to work out an agreement that serves our national trade and economic interests. Although trade negotiations are not by definition a zero sum exercise, it is not yet clear whether a win-win agreement can be negotiated and ratified, as a number of direct conflicts and

difficult issues must be resolved. The devil is clearly in the details. There are also political obstacles to overcome on both sides of the border.

Assessing the impact

The proposed FTA with Mexico and Canada is, in a very important sense, unique; not, certainly, as a free trade agreement, but as an arrangement of this type involving countries with profoundly disparate levels of income and development. The FTA with Canada is between two similar nations having comparable levels of social and economic development and personal income, as well as closely integrated economies. And many Canadians would argue that their FTA with us is looking suspiciously like a zero sum arrangement—with them on the short end. An agreement with Mexico will involve striking differences in per capita income, development levels and national economic structure. It is these differences, and the absence of comparable precedents, that ought to call into question many of the assumptions and claims made by those favoring the FTA.

Comparisons with the European Community (EC) are of limited utility. First, the income disparities between the EC's richest members (Germany before unification and Denmark) and its poorest (Greece and Portugual) were in the range of 3 or 5 to 1; in the case of the United States and Canada compared to Mexico, they are in the range of 10 to 1.

Second, the EC is far more than a free trade arrangement. It is a mechanism for economic, social, and political integration. As such, it entails substantial transfer payments from the richer members to raise the development levels of the poorer members. In other words, the wealthier members of the EC provide direct financial subsidies to their poorer partners. No such payments are envisaged in the proposed FTA. To the extent that the gap between the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and Mexico, on the other, is narrowed, it will be solely the product of commercial trade and investment, not transfer payments, subsidy, or economic assistance. "Trickle down," with all its problems

and inequities, is the name of the game.

Facts or wishes?

Assertions that the FTA will represent an export bonanza for the United States are surely exaggerated. The value of our bilateral trade with Mexico more than doubled between 1985 and 1990 as a result of Mexico's entry into GATT and the consequent reductions in its trade barriers (tariffs were reduced sharply, to a current average of just over 8 percent, as compared to averages in excess of 30 percent previously, and extensive non-tariff barriers virtually eliminated). However, Mexico's low per capita GNP and its international debt situation impose finite limits on its ability to increase imports, while other disincentives currently discourage foreign and domestic investment. Per capita GNP is about $2,600 and growing very slowly, and its current account is expected to remain in deficit for the next few years. The absence of significant barriers to Mexican exports to the United States (except in agriculture, where sanitary standards and seasonal measures constitute important barriers and are unlikely to change much in the near term) suggests only modest room for growth in those earnings.

A KPMG Peat Marwick (KPMG/PM) economic model of the potential effects of the FTA tended to substantiate these conclusions. This model indicated that benefits to the United States and Mexico would be largely contingent upon the size of capital flows into Mexico resulting from the FTA. While Mexico has made substantial progress in reducing its barriers to foreign investment, it is still not competitive. Currrently, foreign investment is either prohibited or specifically limited in the following sectors: petroleum/petrochemicals; computers; banking and financial services; automotive; transportation; mining; electrical power generation; radio and TV; and land ownership, which impacts directly on agriculture and real estate development. U.S. and Canadian negotiators will push hard to remove these barriers, but the extent to which Mexico will agree to a further opening of its economy to foreign investment is unclear. Mexico's history, the constitu-

tional basis for investment barriers and domestic political considerations make it difficult to be optimistic.

Assuming the best case in eliminating investment barriers and other disincentives, the KPMG/PM model suggests a total capital inflow to Mexico of about $25 billion during the FTA transition period. It was 10 years in the case of the U.S.-Canada agreement and could be longer in the case of Mexico. If it should be 10 years (a 15- or 20-year transition period seems more likely), that would mean about $2.5 billion in new investment per year, made up of repatriated capital and foreign investment. If trade trends continue, we could expect about two-thirds of this investment, $1.6 billion per annum, to be spent in the United States. That would represent an increase of about 6 percent over our current level of exports to Mexico. That's a lot better than nothing, but less than the more enthusiastic claims would imply. It's also likely that Canada would get a part of this action, reducing the U.S. share. Compared to the growth rates in the 25 and 50 percent range experienced in the early years of Mexico's trade liberalization, these are not particularly impressive.

Runaways

Some FTA proponents claim growth of this magnitude would create as many as 40,000 jobs per year in the United States; others believe this overstates the case. On the down side, trends indicate our trade deficit with Mexico will increase, and potential job losses from "runaway" firms, much more difficult to quantify, are likely to be substantial. Arguments that runaway industry has already done its running, to Southeast Asia or elsewhere, don't stand up.

Canada's experience with the existing FTA may be suggestive. With wage and taxation rates significantly higher than those in the United States, there has been significant flight of capital and jobs to the U.S. side of the border. Some allege that the job loss in the first two years of the FTA was over 200,000 in Ontario alone. Though no doubt exaggerated, the loss of jobs has been significant and should flash an amber light for those who see the FTA as an unmitigated blessing. Moreover, a recent GAO study of the furniture industry in the Los Angeles area, perhaps a special case, demonstrated that U.S. manufacturers will move across the border to escape environmental regulation. Anyone who believes that Mexico could, under any circumstances, come close to meeting current U.S. environmental standards must be a stranger to the country or a credulous optimist.

Though no doubt exaggerated, the loss of jobs has been significant and should flash an amber light for those who see the FTA as an unmitigated blessing. Moreover, a recent GAO study of the furniture industry in the Los Angeles area, perhaps a special case, demonstrated that U.S. manufacturers will move across the border to escape environmental regulation.

It is one thing to move light assembly operations—e.g. textiles or electronic components—far offshore to take advantage of low wages, but quite another to move heavier industrial operations or those requiring major capital investment, especially when transport costs are an important factor. But new circumstances promising low wages, lower taxes, a secure investment environment, and proximity to the main (U.S.) market produce quite a different equation, as the FTA with Canada illustrates. If these conditions were met as regards Mexico, which the NAFTA promises, it would be folly not to expect a substantial movement of industrial and assembly operations south of the border. The upshot would be the loss of tens of thousands of relatively high-paying industrial jobs in the United States. And to the extent jobs are replaced, they are likely to be at the low end of the pay spectrum. The key point is that we are moving

into uncharted areas, and that makes it very difficult to anticipate the full effects of our actions with any confidence.

A study by the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI) underscores the potential risk and the importance of careful negotiation of the FTA, which would appear jeopardized by the administration's rush to conclude the negotiations to meet the domestic political agenda. The ESI study suggests that a poorly negotiated agreement could seriously aggravate the existing trade deficit with Mexico and cost us up to 400,000 jobs; an optimal agreement, on the other hand, could produce a $9 billion trade surplus (excluding oil) and create a net 250,000 jobs by the turn of the century. As one would expect, the details of the agreement will determine whether it serves our interests.

Stumbling blocks

Having looked at the larger questions, the specific trade and technical issues the negotiators must deal with merit at least summary review. The U.S.-Canada FTA will serve as a starting or reference point for negotiations with Mexico. While no one expects Mexico to agree to an exact replica of that agreement, even with longer transition periods, it does suggest directions in which the northern nations will wish to move.

The U.S.-Canadian agreement treats a broad range of commodity categories (20 for "rules of origin") and devotes entire chapters to areas of special concern—agriculture, wine and spirits, energy (where Canada's sensitivities were not unlike those of Mexico), automotive goods, services, government procurement, investment, financial services, and temporary entry of businesspeople. Chapters are also devoted to technical issues such as "emergency action," exceptions for goods trade, government procurement, disputes procedure, and special exceptions (national security, standards, etc.). The FTA with Mexico is likely to have a similar structure.

Contentious sectors/issues are expected to include: agriculture; the automotive sector; finance and investment; petroleum/petrochemicals; pharmaceuticals; transportation; and labor market. Other potentially difficult areas, such as steel and textiles, should be amenable to resolution. Steel interests, particularly, seem to offer a basis for mutual advantage, while textile problems may be largely resolved in the Uruguay Round. Some other likely problem areas:

Agriculture:

This may prove to be the most complex and troublesome area for negotiators. Current trade favors the United States, and the U.S. government is seeking greater access to the Mexican market, elimination of nontariff barriers, and improved investment conditions. The United States also wishes to continue protecting selected crops (a critical issue for some congressional committees) and retain sanitary, pest, and other standards. The Mexicans regard many of the latter as disguised protectionism. Mexico, for its part, wants greater access to the U.S. and Canadian markets, elimination of seasonal tariffs and other barriers on Mexican produce, and an easing of sanitary and standards barriers. Mexico will seek to protect its land tenure restrictions and the *ejidos*, or communal farmland, both of which are sensitive constitutional issues. Nonetheless, it would seem that potential gains for all parties and the complexity of the issues, which offer multiple opportunities for trade-offs, provide a basis for the negotiators to find accommodation. The larger question is whether, having reached agreement in this sector, the results will be politically salable at home.

Automotive:

Objectively, this sector would appear to be one in which the negotiators could find sufficient mutuality of interest to strike a deal that would be win/win. The principal players/investors are the same in all three countries. But it is also an area of priority concern for U.S. labor in its opposition to the FTA, and that means a politically salable accord may be hard to come by.

Finance/Investment:

A top priority area for all parties. Mexico needs new investment badly,

and the United States and Canada appear willing to provide at least some of it if the conditions are right. And if the conditions are right, Japanese and European investment will also come in. Mexico has already liberalized its financial and investment regimes, though they still fall far short of the provisions of the U.S.-Canada FTA. Clearly the northerners will insist upon greater liberalization, within a reasonable transition period, but even so it is doubtful that Mexico will be willing to go as far as its future partners would like. Elimination of "reserved areas" of the economy (e.g. petroleum, transportation, electrical generation) and of limits on foreign investment in other areas are probably impossible, but further liberalization is not. Securities and financial instruments will also be a troublesome area. The strong mutuality of interest ought to impel the negotiators toward accommodation, but perceptions in Mexico could accentuate fears of potential U.S. domination and consequent limits on Mexico's freedom of economic policy action. That would spell trouble.

Petroleum/petrochemicals:

This will be a very tough nut. The United States would like to see the elimination of the (constitutional) bar on foreign exploration and production. Mexico has already indicated this is not negotiable, and Canada probably has some sympathy for the Mexican position. There may be room for accommodation on joint ventures, but that is far from certain. Mexico, however, has already shown flexibility on petrochemicals. Although the "basic" industry remains reserved, the "secondary" has been opened to private investment, and a number of formerly "basic" products have been reclassified as "secondary." Since serious differences in this sector were resolved by the U.S.-Canadian negotiators, there are some grounds to believe they can be resolved in the trilateral context. But again, this is a potentially explosive issue in Mexico.

Pharmaceuticals:

The United States and Canada will insist upon better protection of intellectual property rights, increased market access, and liberalized treatment of investment. Protection of proprietary information and patents are likely to be key. Unfortunately, the Mexican Ministry of Health has interests apart from those of the trade and financial ministries and could be the decisive player within the Mexican government. It wants to keep prices to consumers low, even if that means turning a blind eye to product piracy. This one also has heavy political overtones.

Transportation:

This sector is currently off limits to foreign investors; railways are reserved for the state, while motor, air, and maritime transport are reserved for Mexican nationals. Although the United States and Canada don't have a problem with nationalized railroads, the other restrictions will not be acceptable in their present form. Motor transport, which will become increasingly important as intra-FTA trade grows, is also among the most politically sensitive sub-sectors in Mexico. Again, it is not clear how much the Mexicans are prepared or able to concede.

Labor Market:

There are direct conflicts in this area. Mexico seeks expanded access to the United States (and presumably Canada) for unskilled workers, a position that would seem to have no chance of success. The United States and Canada will probably try to manage the issue by offering concessions for professionals and managerial workers (per the U.S.-Canada FTA) and a separate mechanism to study the issue of labor migration (the U.S.-Canada pact had several side agreements addressing tangential issues). That may not be sufficient for the Mexican government, which will be under pressure from its own constituencies, and attack from the left, for "selling out" Mexico's interests in the investment and other areas.

Disputes Settlement:

These provisions will be among the most important, sensitive, and contentious, offering many opportunities for deadlock. In a very real sense this mechanism will be pivotal for success of the FTA. Disputes are a certainty, and if they cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the entire FTA structure will be jeopardized. The Mexicans are most likely to have trouble with the notion of binding arbitration when bilateral/trilateral mechanisms fail to solve the problem—the suspicion that the northern countries can rig the outcome to Mexico's disadvantage will no doubt be near the surface and could be exploited against the Salinas government and the FTA itself.

No turning back

One more certainty: the FTA horse cannot be walked back into the stable. Political commitments have been made at the highest levels in all three countries, and President Salinas de Gortari has staked his adminstration on getting an FTA. He was clearly correct in his efforts to open the Mexican economy, deal with the staggering debt burden, and seek new investment; indeed, it can be argued that further liberalization of the economy in the GATT context, including the general elimination of "reserved" areas and other barriers to foreign investment, would be a better solution for Mexico than an FTA. But perhaps from his perspective an FTA, or something like it, is a prerequisite for attaining the political support necessary for further liberalization and, if necessary, constitutional amendment. In any event, the horse is out of the stable.

There is a wide range of possible outcomes to the FTA process, starting with an accord that is politically acceptable in all three countries, stimulates trade to the benefit of all, and gives the Mexican economy the kind of kickstart Salinas wants. This is the best, and probably Utopian, case. A partial list of the others, in a descending order of desirability, follows:

- An FTA that is accepted by all three countries; is balanced, with the negative aspects for all offset by modest advantages; produces small but steady growth in trade; and improves the Mexican economy at the margin. Assuming the negotiators can pick their way through an agenda that resembles a mine field—and that's a big assumption—this could material-

ize; indeed, it may be the most likely of the "reach agreement" scenarios. Even so, the odds on its happening seem fairly slim.

- An FTA that is accepted by each government, but is unbalanced and flawed; problems may or may not be resolved by a disputes mechanism, but continue to fester, with one or more parties feeling increasingly put upon; trade benefits are marginal and leave the polities of one or all three countries feeling misled or deceived. This scenario could lead to abrogation of the FTA, with a legacy of bitterness, or the participants might stoically accept the reality of the situation and live with it.
- Negotiators fail to reach agreement and call it quits. With luck, none of the parties would scapegoat the others, and everyone would agree that there was just not sufficient mutuality of interest to make an FTA worthwhile. Of the "fail agreement" scenarios, this is by far the best. The likelihood, however, is that failure of the negotiators would produce a backlash against the United States in Mexico. Even so, this outcome is among the least bad.
- Agreement is reached by negotiators, but is not ratified by one or more of the parties. This scenario has several variations. If the Mexicans should decide that the deal struck does not serve their interests, one might suspect the sigh of relief from the north would sound like a hurricane. This may not be far-fetched, especially if the negotiations drag on for a couple of years. With Salinas's term expiring in 1994, he may not be able to control events in Mexico after mid-1993. This outcome would clearly be the least damaging of the "fail" scenarios; the worst would be rejection by our Congress. One might hope, assuming agreement can be reached, that the administration will delay submission to Congress until the Mexicans have decided, though the risk is that the blowback would be stronger if we reject the FTA after Mexico has accepted. Maybe we'll get lucky and the Canadians will save our bacon.

Reviewing the range of possible outcomes, one wonders whether there was a serious risk/benefit analysis. It is possible, of course, that one of the Utopian or less bad scenarios will eventuate. Let's be optimistic.

Nevertheless, an idea that seemed attractive could turn out to have unanticipated and potentially damaging implications beyond the strictly economic arena. The Economic Strategy Institute study affirms the need for careful negotiations, and thoughtful consideration underscores it. The bottom line is that the details of the FTA and meaningful assessment of its potential impact await conclusion of the negotiators' work. Only then can we intelligently decide whether the game is worth the candle. To hurry this process for political or other reasons is folly. ■

Jack R. Binns, a retired Foreign Service officer, served as ambassador to Honduras. A consultant since his 1986 retirement, Ambassador Binns has been involved in Mexican trade and investment issues and currently resides in Tucson, Arizona.

BOOKS

After the Fall

THE GRAND FAILURE: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF COMMUNISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Collier Books, 1990, $9.95 softcover
THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE TOTALITARIAN STATE AND OTHER SURPRISES
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The AEI Press, 1990, $21.95 hardcover

Reviewed by Jerrold Keilson

Given the similar outlooks of former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, one would expect their books to share a similar analysis. However, Brzezinski and Kirkpatrick have written very different books, which illustrate two major schools of historical interpretation of the post-war Cold War period.

The Grand Failure is far and away the better book. Brzezinski is one of the clearest, most thorough, and rational foreign policy experts of the day. The failure of communism, as he describes it, lay in its being a "grand simplification," a way of looking at the world that permitted dogmatic answers to complex questions. Reality does not conform to simple solutions, so the early Communists were required to force both people and policies into pre-ordained ideological cubbyholes. People who resisted were fighting against the forces of history and were murdered. Brzezinski reminds us that communism, by its very nature, was a dictatorship, and that the repressive nature of the system can trace its roots back past Stalin to Lenin and Marx.

Brzezinski writes that the collapse of communism was caused by economic, technological, and political forces. After 40 years of Communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe, all the affected countries were economically worse off. Political freedoms that they could observe in the neighboring states of Europe were forbidden to them. It became clear that the promise of communism was not being achieved, while the "decadent and corrupt West" was able to provide better living conditions for its citizens. Thus, by the middle of the 1980s, communism had become a hollow structure. As people lost their belief in communism, they lost their fear of its repressive nature. The leadership also began to lose their convictions, and were unwilling to use force to control the situation. This confluence of forces led to a collapse of communism in Central Europe.

Brzezinski's underlying belief is that communism was so rotten and corrupt that it would have collapsed whether or not there was a Gorbachev. Leaders in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were more conservative than Gorbachev, yet their countries have held free elections and are making a transition to free market economies, while the Soviet Union, led by the 'liberal' Gorbachev, has changed least of all. Brzezinski concludes by speculating that Gorbachev's influence may have been overestimated by western commentators who tended to look for the impact of the individual.

Jeane Kirkpatrick's book, in contrast to Brzezinski's, is a collection of her newspaper columns, written over the past five years, with some annotations to bring them up to date. She has, in a final chapter, attempted to provide a broader interpretation of what she calls "the new Soviet revolution." In her columns Kirkpatrick attributes world developments during the late 1980s to the impact of leaders, particularly Gorbachev. She writes that "while Marxists think history is governed by inexorable laws, we believe men (and sometimes women) make history and can change it." Throughout the book and columns, she states that the changes in Communist society and the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe were results either of Gorbachev's leadership and initiatives or of the steadfast military policies of the Reagan-Bush administrations.

On the first point she suggests that, while Gorbachev is a Communist, he is also from a new generation, and that generational change has been important to the Soviet transformation. This analysis leaves out more than it includes. Global economic and technological changes, struggles in other parts of the world, famine, and environmental issues are subsumed and almost trivialized as Kirkpatrick hammers away at the importance of individuals.

Kirkpatrick makes no bones of her distrust of the policies pushed by the less ideological professionals of the Reagan Administration. She continually urges them to be more hardline against what she calls Soviet aggression in Central America, Africa, and Afghanistan. She reiterates her distrust of the Soviet Union in any arms control negotiations. In essence, she is simply restating the right-wing canard that Soviet successes can result only from the duplicitous behavior of U.S. officials who are more interested in appeasing the enemy than in standing up for U.S. positions.

Her interpretation of the collapse of communism contrasts sharply with Brzezinki's. Jeane Kirkpatrick writes that history is shaped by individuals. Thus Ronald Reagan's decision to re-arm the United States, his promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative, support for the Nicaraguan contras and Afghan mujahideen were all policies resulting from a specific individual's world view. Time and again, Kirkpatrick emphasizes the personal characteris-

tics of the players that led to the significant foreign policy changes of the 1980s.

Zbigniew Brzezinski's approach, by contrast, is one of systems analysis, in which he examines the impact of economic, technological, demographic, and political change on an inflexible ideological system. Brzezinski, arguing that changes are driven by society, not people, is the more convincing.

Jerrold Keilson, a former Foreign Service officer, works with Delphi International consultants in Washington, D.C.

Quiet Cooperation

Yugoslav-American Relations Since World War II

By John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubisha S. Adamovic, Duke University Press, 1990, $37.50 hardcover

Reviewed by Stephen N. Sestanovich

Since 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin and was expelled from the Cominform, the United States has pursued Yugoslavia's friendship and cooperation like a persevering suitor fearful of losing the beloved to another. That "other," of course, was the Soviet Union. Our unrestrained fear that its war machine could at any moment strike out for a base on the Adriatic seashore and thereby enter and muddy the Mediterranean's waters chilled our body politic to the bone.

With the Soviet threat now diminished, we see a spate of books and articles exposing just what went on during those dangerous years. One of these is the small, reader-friendly *Yugoslav-American Relations Since World War II*, by a trio of skilled observers: Lampe, professor of history at the University of Maryland; Prickett, a former Foreign Service officer with State and currently an international business consultant and economist; and Adamovic, chair of the Department of International Economics at Belgrade University. They know one another and their subject well, having collaborated in seminars and binational commissions and participated in trade negotiations.

From their unique perches, the three experts draw on their considerable experiences as "Yugoslavia watchers" to present an extraordinarily well-coordinated view of the enormous efforts that the Americans and the Yugoslavs both made during those years to achieve the goals of their respective nations.

To "keep Tito afloat" was the consuming goal of America's policy toward Yugoslavia, and every conceivable quick fix was considered and tried to assure that the unitary state of Yugoslavia never again landed in the Soviet sphere of influence. On the Yugoslav side, the guiding policy for all foreign relationships was to keep them from interfering in Yugoslav domestic affairs. The success of these two policies turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Yugoslavs when the present state of affairs in that country is taken into account. The book is therefore a political as well as an economic statement.

An accumulation of unfortunate events during and immediately after

Books

the war inhibited U.S.-Yugoslav economic relations. Events such as Colonel McDowell's mission to the Chetniks, the Anglo-American occupation of Trieste, and the denial of this long-sought prize to the Yugoslavs, the initiation of USIS activities in Yugoslavia, whose name was translated into Serbo-Croatian as "American Intelligence Service," and other similar irritants infuriated the volatile Partisan leadership. In the U.S. Congress, powerful Democrats joined a large number of Republicans to oppose any kind of relationship, much less economic cooperation, with Tito's government, citing his failure to acknowledge the shipment of massive U.S. aid to his beleaguered Partisans during the war years, his anti-American "neutralism" in the United Nations, and his Draconian methods of dealing with dissidents.

In the two years following World War II, a more or less neutral UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was the key player in Yugoslavia's recovery from the war's devastation. More than $400 million in supplies and services were distributed, the largest sum allotted to any European country, fully one-fifth of UNRRA's total budget. The fact that $300 million of that amount came from the United States was not widely advertised in Yugoslavia.

When UNRRA aid stopped in 1947-48, Tito searched for other benefactors. Ever the pragmatist, he found one in the 1881 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, signed between the United States and Serbia, which he, as the successor government of the former Serbia, quickly embraced. American officialdom honored it with equal enthusiasm.

Following the break with Stalin, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), and other entities sprang into action with lightning speed. In the aftermath of the event, the Yugoslavs not only averted hunger and disease but established a foundation for a modest initial recovery. Soon,

the almost totally government-to-government economic relations gave way to increased activity between American banks and industries and their Yugoslav counterparts.

When indiscriminate international lending and some injudicious Yugoslav borrowing plunged the country into a paralyzing debt crisis in the 1980s, the U.S. government took the lead in arranging debt relief and encouraged private banks and major international financial organizations—like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)—to help Yugoslavia avoid default on its obligations.

To accomplish this required, on both sides, a great deal of maneuvering to fit cherished principles into reality. The interaction of politics, social idealism, economic principles, to say nothing of differing temperaments in crisis situations, tried the patience of Yugoslav and American negotiators alike. A succession of outstanding ambassadors in both countries—George Kennan, Cavendish Cannon, George Allen, Warren Zimmermann, and Lawrence Eagleburger among them on the American side, and the likes of Leo Mates on the Yugoslav—were able to act with probity despite their enduring ideological conflicts.

Yugoslav-U.S. economic relations were often stymied, too, by the Yugoslav fixation on their "discovery" of workers' self-management, implementing a socialist economy based on market principles. Though failure stalked them every step of the way . . . they needed more than two decades to identify that what they were doing was amateurish, inefficient, and wasteful, however appealing the idea may have been in the beginning.

Some of the strains that continued to hamper the U.S.-Yugoslav economic relationship were not economic at all but politico-military, such as the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and Tito's vanguard leadership role in the Third World liberation movements.

These political strains, though severe, did not slow the relationship. A string of loans and credits were granted year after year. They tapered off eventually and were followed by numerous joint business ventures. The book contains poignant tales and case histories of often frustrating negotiations with Armand Hammer, Coca-Cola, Chevron Oil of California, Black and Decker, Dow Chemical, Carrier, General Motors, Goodrich, Honeywell, General Foods, and many others, including, of course, the golden arches of McDonalds.

Yugoslav-U.S. economic relations were often stymied, too, by the Yugoslav fixation on their "discovery" of workers' self-management, implementing a socialist economy based on market principles. Though failure

stalked them every step of the way (as in the case of the manufacture and distribution of the Yugo automobile), they needed more than two decades to identify that what they were doing was amateurish, inefficient, and wasteful, however appealing the idea may have been in the beginning.

This little book is a veritable gold mine of successful and unsuccessful experiences and studies for professionals who work in international economic affairs. It is also timely for those in the breaking new ground in Eastern Europe for conversion from communism to more democratic procedures.

Whether the lessons learned in Yugoslavia are transferable to situations in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, even the Soviet Union is something the authors and indeed the world anxiously wait to see.

Stephen N. Sestanovich, a retired Foreign Service officer in State and USIA, writes on inter-cultural relationships.

Imperial America

The Banana Wars

By Ivan Musicant, Macmillan, 1990, $24.95 hardcover

Reviewed by Charles Maechling, Jr.

The Spanish-American War and the emergence of the United States as a naval power were the factors that enabled American presidents to play an imperial role in the Western Hemisphere after the turn of the century. From 1900 up to the present day the Panama Canal has provided the strategic rationale for military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America.

Beginning with a description of the sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana Harbor in 1898 and ending with the invasion of Panama, *The Banana Wars* gives an entertaining but scholarly account of the most important of these interventions. The organization of the book is episodic and country by country—Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic—rather than structured around the region as a whole. Its value lies in the detailed and graphic accounts, drawn from contemporary sources, of the feats of small Marine and naval landing forces in bringing stability and sanitation to societies racked by internal turmoil and civic neglect.

Beginning with a description of the sinking of the battleship ***Maine*** *in Havana Harbor in 1898 and ending with the invasion of Panama,* ***The Banana Wars*** *gives an entertaining but scholarly account of the most important of these interventions. The organization of the book is episodic and country by country. . .rather than the region as a whole.*

If there is a fault in the book, it is its failure to deal with the political and economic factors behind these interventions. There is virtually no mention of Washington policy-making: the reader is left in the dark as to precisely what mix of strategic and "big business" motives, if any, led to the decision to put the Marines ashore. Indeed, in most cases it seems to have originally been a snap judgment to restore order and protect property, with little regard for the long-term consequences to the populations concerned. In virtually every case one is left with the impression that the immediate results were benign and the long-term results a perpetuation of the status quo and continued exploitation of the populace by their own masters.

Charles Maechling Jr. writes frequently on international law and Latin America.

Diplomatic Recollections

The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections

By Alfred Puhan, Vantage Press, 1990, $16.95 hardcover

Reviewed by Andrew L. Steigman

There are almost as many reasons for writing memoirs as there are memoirs themselves. Some retired diplomats seek only to amuse or to educate; others write out of a compulsion to justify past actions.

Few are as unassuming as former Ambassador to Hungary Alfred Puhan, who tells us in his preface that he wrote the book simply "as a legacy" for his children and grandchildren. Given his avowedly modest purpose, it comes as no surprise that the volume tells us as much about the author, his childhood, and his family as it does about his career or about diplomacy as a profession. Recruited from academe in 1942 by a call to join the new German-language broadcasting service of the OSS, Puhan went on to spend 11 years with VOA. Having survived the McCarthy years, including an encounter with Cohn and Shine, Puhan joined the Foreign Service through lateral entry in 1953.

During the next 16 years, he served abroad in Vienna and as deputy chief of mission in Bangkok, as well as in Washington in the bureaus of International Organization Affairs and European and Canadian Affairs, and capped his career as ambassador to Hungary from 1969 to 1973. Puhan tells his very readable tale largely through anecdotes.

Many of his experiences—with American politicians, good and bad bosses, and foreign leaders—will trigger comparable memories for Foreign Service readers, but only the chapter on "the cardinal in the chancery" adds significantly to the diplomatic record. As the man on the spot when Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty finally ended his 15-year stay in the American Embassy in Budapest, Puhan was at the center of the web of intricate negotiations that finally led to the cardinal's departure for Rome.

The author's account of the roles played by Washington and by the Vatican in persuading a reluctant cardinal to leave makes fascinating reading and sheds new light on a unique episode in American diplomacy. With this notable exception, Alfred Puhan's memoirs are unlikely to teach you anything new about postwar history or to make you a better diplomat—but they will provide an enjoyable evening's reading. ■

Andrew L. Steigman is assistant dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

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Editor's Note: The following imperial rescripts to the Japanese people were issued after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the Japanese surrender. The first rescript, probably drafted and translated by Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido, was printed in the English-language* Japan Times and Advertiser *on December 8, 1941. The second appeared in the same paper, renamed* Nippon Times, *on August 15, 1945 and was probably written by Marquis Kido as well. The rescripts run under their original headlines. Both were provided to the* Journal *by Robert A. Fearey, whose article appears on page 22 of this issue.

WAR IS ON

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

We, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and Our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighborly intercourse and cooperation, the regime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking regime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the

Japan Times & Advertiser

EVENING EDITION

WAR IS ON!

JAPAN'S NAVY PLANES ATTACK HAWAII, SINGAPORE, DAVAO, WAKE, GUAM ISLES

PREMIER DEDICATES UTMOST TO WAR AIM

Imperial Rescript

GREAT SUCCESSES REPORTED IN ALL AREAS RAIDED IN NAVAL ANNOUNCEMENT

BRITISH TROOPS IN THAILAND BEING WIPED OUT

UNCHANGING POLICY DECLARED TO WORLD

JAPANESE NOTE TO U.S.

. . . Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission.

existence of Our Empire. Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. The trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defense has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our forefathers will be carried forward, and that the sources of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace immutably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

HIS MAJESTY ISSUES RESCRIPT TO RESTORE PEACE

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

To Our good and loyal subjects:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our 100 million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have . . . [line obliterated] . . tion of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death, and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day. The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their home and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray, and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world. ■

IN MEMORY

Carolina L. Bridgett, 81, widow of Charles Bridgett, died on October 15 in Asheville, North Carolina. She accompanied her husband to posts in Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

She is survived by two daughters, Mrs. Fred Quarnstrom of Seattle, Washington and Margaret Bridgett of Asheville, North Carolina, and three grandchildren.

Nora Marie Deupree, 78, a retired Foreign Service officer, died of pneumonia July 20 at the Washington Home in Washington, D.C. Deupree was born in Council Bluffs, Iowa and received a bachelor of arts degree from George Washington University. She served in the Women's Army Corps during World War II and in 1948 joined the Economic Cooperation Administration. She subsequently worked for economic aid agencies for 27 years, serving in Washington, England, Portugal, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, and Nigeria before retiring in 1975. She received the Agency for International Development's Meritorious Honor Award. She is survived by her aunt and two cousins.

Howard D. Lusk, 66, an educator and Foreign Service officer, died of cancer September 9 at Georgetown Hospital.

Lusk was born in Lyndon, Kansas and graduated from Kansas State College. He received a master's degree in education from the University and a doctorate from the University of Kentucky.

Lusk joined the Foreign Service in 1959 after having served as professor of education at the University of Kentucky. He subsequently served with A.I.D. in Paraguay, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, and Egypt. He retired from the Foreign Service as A.I.D. representative to Brazil in 1986 and joined the faculty of Georgetown University, where he directed a program to bring Panamanian students to study in U.S. colleges. During his career he received many awards, including the Superior Honor Award, the Outstanding Career Award, and the Francisco de Paula Santander medal awarded by the president of Colombia.

Survivors include his wife, Florence Anderson Lusk of Annandale, Virginia; two sons, Howard Ray Lusk of Corpus Christi, Texas and Mark W. Lusk of Logan, Utah; four brothers, and three grandchildren.

Edwin Webb Martin, 74, China expert and former ambassador to Burma, died October 5 at Georgetown Hospital. Martin was born to missionary parents in Madura, India, graduated from Oberlin College, and received his master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. After postings to Bermuda and the Congo, he took Chinese language training at Yale and in Beijing. He was assigned to Hangzhou and Taipei in China, and then as consul in Rangoon. He returned to Washington to work in the Office of Chinese Affairs, serving as its director from 1958-61.

In the 1950s Martin also took part in the talks between the Chinese Communists and North Koreans at Panmynjom; served as an American representative at talks with the Communist Chinese in Geneva; and was an adviser to the U.S. delegation at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina. In 1961 he was political adviser to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific forces in Honolulu and in 1964 became deputy chief of mission in Ankara, Turkey. He then served as consul general in Hong Kong and was named ambassador to Burma in 1971.

After retirement, Martin turned to teaching and writing. He spent five years at Hiram College in Ohio as professor of diplomacy and published three books.

He is survived by his wife, EmmaRose; two daughters, Margo Cairns of Haverford, Pennsylvania and Sylvia Lindsay of Shutesbury, Massachusetts; two sons, Edwin of Chicago, Illinois and David of Upland, California; a brother and sister, and seven grandchildren.

J. Graham Parsons, 83, former ambassador to Laos and Sweden, died October 20 at a friend's home in Old Lyme, Connecticut. A native of New York and a 1929 graduate of Yale University, he did graduate work at New York University and the National War College. From 1932-36, he was a personal secretary to Joseph Grew, ambassador to Japan.

After joining the Foreign Service in 1936, Parsons served in Cuba, Canada, China, the Vatican, and New Delhi. He served as deputy chief of mission in Tokyo and ambassador to Laos and then, in 1958, became deputy assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He was appointed ambassador to Sweden in 1961. After returning from Sweden in 1967, he served as a senior Foreign Service inspector and as deputy U.S. representative at the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna. He retired in 1970.

Survivors include two daughters, Margot Hallett of Hamden, Connecticut and Jane Lyons of Baltimore, Maryland; seven grandchildren, and a great-grandchild.

Hewson A. Ryan, 69, a retired Foreign Service officer, died September 28 at Beth Israel Hospital in Boston. A native of New Haven, Connecticut, he received a BA and MA from Yale University and a doctorate from the University of Madrid in 1951. He then joined the Foreign Service and served with USIA in Bogota, La Paz, and Santiago. In Washington he served as USIA deputy director for policy and research from 1966-69. He received USIA's Distinguished Honor Award in 1964.

Ryan served as ambassador to Honduras from 1969-73 and then became senior deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. After retiring in 1976, Ryan joined the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University as professor of public diplomacy and director of the Edward Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy.

He is survived by his wife, Helene, a son, Anthony, both of Winchester, Virginia; and a daughter, Anne Sprightley, of Washington, D.C. ■

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AFSA ♦ NEWS

New objectives in diplomacy

AFSA President Hume A. Horan testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on October 31. Below are excerpts from his testimony.

The Foreign Service faces some of its greatest problems in the field, not in Washington. The evidence is anecdotal, but massive. Foreign Service posts are overburdened, undersupported, and badly in need of refurbishment and resupply. The total number of Foreign Service posts has increased by half since the mid-1950s; these posts, moreover, conduct a vastly greater range of functions (including the mushrooming of legally mandated consular and refugee services) than they did in the 1950s. These tasks, however, are accomplished with not many more officers today than 40 years ago. The number of FSOs then was about 3,200; today, it is close to 4,000.

The effect of expanded and intensified workloads on a fairly constant population base has been various: not enough people or resources are available for training (the Arabic language school in Tunis has been down to eight students from all government agencies); traditional reporting and analysis may be less inclusive and penetrating; more resources are diverted to administrative support (including that of other agencies); economies are attempted (changes in housing and travel regulations) that may in the end not save much money, but may strain morale.

By contrast, the human and financial resources available to Washington are more adequate–thereby further tilting the balance of "quality of life" in the service toward domestic assignments and away from assignments to most overseas posts. Can one expect headquarters, which ultimately passes on questions of resources, to stint itself in favor of the field? Perhaps the time has come, however, for the State Department either to increase these resources, or seriously to ask itself this question.

- **Representativeness.**

The United States is the world's most "representative" nation; we are also its first multi-ethnic democracy of continental proportions. In a world of multiplying nationalisms, we can tell America's story more credibly if we ourselves better represent the best of what America has to offer.

For this reason AFSA calls on management to work harder and more effectively to attract minority candidates who will be fully competitive in this, the most competitive of the federal services. We will do our part, with help in recruiting and mentoring. The goal is eminently doable: were we to recruit only 30 minority officers via the exam system per year, we would meet our goals. Yet we would be taking aim at only one per each million of our total minority population.

We completely reject the notion of any necessary conflict in Foreign Service recruiting between representativeness and quality. We Americans deserve a Foreign Service that is excellent *and* representative, and it is management's job to see that we get it. We say again: AFSA approves of–indeed strongly advocates–a more representative gender, racial, and ethnic balance

AFSA intervenes in post searches

How does AFSA protect your rights abroad? A recent incident highlights what we can do to help.

A.I.D. management at one post recently implemented searches of the bags and briefcases of everyone entering the mission building. This policy, unilaterally imposed without AFSA consultation, followed several thefts of personal property in the building. These warrantless searches were made without reasonable cause or suspicion.

AFSA members at the post cabled for help. AFSA replied the next day, questioning the legality of the searches and promising to take up the matter with A.I.D./W management. Two weeks later AFSA received a cable stating that the searches had stopped.

AFSA members should know that management cannot unilaterally impose a change in procedure, practice, or condition of employment without notifying AFSA. As exclusive representative, AFSA has the right to negotiate such changes unless they concern certain reserved management rights. AFSA is always ready to assist employees who have questions about changes at post or in Washington. Please keep us informed so that appropriate action may be taken to safeguard your rights.

Mark W. Smith, Legal Assistant

DID YOU KNOW . . .

If you pay over $100 dollars for travel arrangements by cash or personal credit card you will not be reimbursed by the department unless you have prior approval from the General Accounting Office (GAO). In accordance with information that AFSA had previously received, the September issue stated $50 as the cutoff amount.

In October, AFSA reported that FS personnel through grade 1 would get a 4.2 percent raise in January and that Senior Foreign Service officers would get a higher increase. AFSA has since been informed that the estimated raise for the Senior Foreign Service will be approximately 3.5 percent, although the final figure must be approved by the White House.

in the service. It does not advocate, however, statistical and computing devices as substitutes for more management elbow grease.

• **The organizational question.** At a time of limited resources, and a changed world strategic picture, AFSA wonders if the very structure and organization of our foreign affairs agencies should be re-examined. The Wriston Commission in the early 1950s set out a new structure for the Foreign Service in response to the revolutionary challenges of its time. Is something similar required now?

• **The Foreign Service family.** Foreign Service life, together with changes in the domestic economy and in attitudes toward employment, place great strain on the traditional American family overseas. Today, most American families depend on two incomes to make ends meet–and two incomes can only in certain special cases (tandem couples) be gained overseas. As a result, at many posts most of the employees are either single, have left their spouses in the United States, or are married to foreigners (most of whom are or become naturalized). The result is sometimes an atypical American community, that sometimes operates well, sometimes not so well.

Some efforts have been made to mitigate this problem–which may, in the final analysis, never be completely solvable. Nothing done at the level of embassies and consulates overseas can offer a spouse the range of job opportunities he or she would find in the United States' domestic market. But more needs to be done. The department at present will pay spouses *not* to accompany a principal to post. Why not pay those who do? But in these times where will the money come from? These issues were well expressed in a letter AFSA recently received from a Foreign Service wife at a hardship post:

"I think the whole atmosphere of life overseas has changed during (the past 10 years), and with it the role of the American diplomat abroad, and I am quite convinced this has to do with changing views about spouses. . . . Then add changes in the wider society regarding women and you get a trend in the Foreign Service of fewer spouses, fewer families overseas, less incentive for participation outside of the mission, less entertaining in the home, overworked senior officer's wives, and less loyalty to a Foreign Service career.

"Compensation for spouses is the key issue, and PIT positions, Foreign Service Associates, and similar programs, before they were watered down, are not the answer. There will not be an open-minded and honest answer until the State Department decides what it really thinks about spouses and defines its policy accordingly."

Specialists in facilities maintenance

by Deborah M. Leahy
Member Services

State is currently putting the final touches on a Facilities Maintenance Specialist program. When AFSA has approved the project, current building maintenance officers (BMOs) will be required to choose between entering the new Facilities Maintenance Specialist Program (FMS) or converting to the General Services (GSO) skill code. The program was discussed at a department-sponsored conference for BMOs–which raised more questions than were answered. BMOs were assured that the program will not go into effect until management has AFSA's concurrence.

In October, AFSA met with management in an information session. The department reversed its stand on one important issue–whether to allow BMOs at the 3 level to apply for new 2 level positions. Management will now allow current BMOs at the 3 level to apply for these new positions. At a follow-up meeting on November 1, the department clarified the application procedure. Any BMO interested in one of these new positions will apply to BEX. If selected, and after being assigned, such BMOs will be able to apply to the tenure board for an immediate tenure review. If they do not receive tenure after the second review, they will revert to their original grade levels. Other questions still remain regarding required certification programs and promotion worksheets.

AFSA understands the value of this new Facilities Maintenance career track to current BMO's. Once AFSA's outstanding concerns are met, we will proceed as quickly as possible to approve a package that is fair to all employees. We will keep our membership apprised of further developments as they occur.

Secretaries need access to top jobs

by William A. Kirby
State Vice President

Last month we stressed that the enhancement of Foreign Service secretarial careers is a task facing everyone in the service–and that we can all do better. Since then we have received fresh evidence that positive change in attitudes toward secretaries must begin at the top.

A geographic bureau, on behalf of a newly appointed ambassador, requested that Personnel assign a specific individual as the ambassador's secretary. This individual is not a career Foreign Service secretary. More importantly, this will be the fourth consecutive "limited non-career appointment" for this individual. This situation flies in the face of at least the spirit of the regulations and gives a whole new meaning to the term "limited."

AFSA has no legal right to block this appointment, but that question should never even arise. If the department is serious about new career possibilities for Foreign Service secretaries, then the appointment should have been turned down by Personnel–if not by the bureau itself–on the basis of regulations already on the books.

We have a new career track for secretaries and it will be a good one–once management begins to exercise the necessary leadership. The key point is that advancement for secretaries now depends on their receiving a combination of training and assignments that demonstrates professional growth. The secretaries are anxious to get started, but manager, both overseas and in Washington, are going to have to help make it happen by providing resources and access to assignments.

It is unfortunate that so soon after instituting the new career track for secretaries, senior management has allowed questions to arise concerning its commitment to making the career track work.

For its part, AFSA will be seeking revisions in the regulations to try to ensure that career secretaries receive the preference to which they are entitled in filling our most senior positions.

Sustain the Tradition of Excellence!

Remember to nominate outstanding colleagues for the annual AFSA awards. Awards are conferred on a senior officer, a mid-level officer, a junior officer, and a Foreign Service secretary or group of secretaries. A Foreign Service family member is honored for volunteer service, and a number of awards are given for achievement in the study of hard languages.

The deadline for nominations is January 31, 1992. Details are in the November issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* and in a letter being mailed to all active duty AFSA members. Questions? Contact AFSA's Coordinator for Professional Issues, Richard Thompson, 2101 E Street NW, DC 20037, tel: 202-338-4045, FAX: 202-338-6820.

We Need Your Views

President Hume Horan's "AFSA Views" column this month is devoted to conveying the AFSA Mission Statement–our thoughts on the challenges facing the Foreign Service at this time of rapid global change. Read it, think about it and then clip this form to send us your brief answer to the following question:

What is the single most important reform or organizational change that the Foreign Service should undertake in order to face the challenges of this new era in international affairs?

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Please return to AFSA at: 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Answers to the Foreign Service Quiz

(Questions appear on page 10.)

1. There are 633 couples, about 100 of which include one spouse from an agency other than State.

2. As of August 1991, there were 4,579, with 2,713 in embassies, legations, the delegations of the European Community; 238 at the Organization of American States, and 1,628 at the United Nations.

3. 1961

Sources: The Family Liaison Office; the Office of Diplomatic and Consular Liaison; *American Diplomacy and the Foreign Service*..

In defense of A.I.D.

by Priscilla Del Bosque
AID Vice President

After exhaustive review and extensive discussions, AFSA and A.I.D. management reached agreement on the proposed reorganization on September 18. AFSA's agreement was based on a careful analysis of the potential adverse impact of the proposed reorganization on A.I.D. Foreign Service employees.

In this regard, AFSA proposed and management agreed to a number of procedures including maintaining the integrity of the open assignment system and broadening the job options for the 42 Foreign Service employees in AID/W whose jobs were abolished as a result of the reorganization. Management also agreed to stand ready to provide special information assistance to Foreign Service employees in the field on job opportunities in A.I.D./W.

In the review of the proposed reorganization, AFSA took the opportunity to share with A.I.D. management a number of concerns about the potential effects of the reorganization on the operations of the agency. While recognizing that these concerns were not negotiable items, AFSA offered them as constructive comments for agency consideration as the results of the reorganization in the coming year are monitored. AFSA plans to poll employees in 1992 to assess the impact of the reorganization on missions' and employees' ability to carry out their work. We will be especially interested in gauging whether management, under the new structure, will work together in providing consistent and effective direction to the agency's policies, programs, and operations. Of special concern will be the ability of central bureaus to make their functions and support to the field consistent with the programs and plans of the geographic bureaus and missions–so that bureaus will avoid or minimize duplication, and support rather than disrupt approved field program objectives and plans.

The IG Backs Down

Recent AFSA messages have reported on *Washington Post* articles that raised questions about the integrity of A.I.D. employees. My October 12 letter to the editor of the *Post* was the only voice that spoke up in defense of A.I.D. employees. Questioning the IG's motives in distorting the facts and disseminating them, I raised the need for checks and balances on the IG's operations. The issue of who polices the IG struck a resonant chord among A.I.D. employees, many of whom conveyed expressions of gratitude that someone had finally spoken up about this problem.

This letter stimulated interest at the *Post* about the IG's actions and tactics of employee harassment and intimidation. On October 18, the *Post* carried another editorial, this time blasting the IG for proposing to subject A.I.D. employees to lie detector tests [See "Clippings," p.8]. This editorial appeared on a Friday; by the following Monday, AFSA was advised by A.I.D. management that the IG had withdrawn its polygraph proposal. We hope the IG's proposal is dead once and for all. If not, with your cooperation, we will fight it vigorously. A brief questionnaire will go out to A.I.D. employees, eliciting your views on your experience with the IG. Please respond to this survey; it will help us to defend you and your rights.

Senior Foreign Service Regulations

AFSA and A.I.D. management are currently at impasse in the negotiations on management's proposed changes to Senior Foreign Service regulations. A.I.D. management agreed to a joint review, and the process for taking a fresh look at the problem(s), issues, and options for addressing them began with an initial meeting on October 11. AFSA has put together a new work team, composed of highly respected Foreign Service officers, to represent employees in analyzing the problem(s) and proposed "fixes." AFSA's intent is to make a new, concerted effort to help shape a system that is based on credible analysis, well understood, and more transparent–a system that rewards performance and upward flow of talent through the ranks. More on the outcome of these deliberations and negotiations will be forthcoming.

AFSA: Developing ideas

by Gail Volk
Director of Scholarships and Development

It probably is not a surprise that the Foreign Service suffers from an identity crisis outside the Beltway. AFSA's new Development Committee hopes to gain public support for the Service and AFSA's mission with new public awareness programs. AFSA is planning to republish the highly successful Foreign Service booklet, *American Diplomacy and the Foreign Service*. The updated version will focus on the Foreign Service of today–and tomorrow. This publication will not only effectively tell the Foreign Service story to individuals, foundations, and corporations who may want to support AFSA, but will also be of interest to people considering the Foreign Service as a career.

Another AFSA initiative is the creation of a Speakers Bureau. Based on the successful speaking

tours AFSA arranged for Ambassador Nathaniel Howell and Barbara Bodine on their return from the Persian Gulf, the bureau would match qualified speakers, primarily retirees, with audiences such as civic and educational groups.

Mentoring program

Finally, AFSA is developing programs in support of a diversified Foreign Service. AFSA would like to establish a pilot program with State to provide mentoring to minority summer interns. Once interns have been selected by State, they would be matched with a local retiree, who would provide information and inspiration prior to the summer internship in Washington. When the summer program ends, the home-based mentoring relationship could continue, with the aim of encouraging outstanding interns to take the Foreign Service exam. Willing and qualified retirees would be needed from various areas for this program to succeed.

AFSA is also seeking ways in which we might act as a sponsor to a qualified minority intern through the State internship program. In addition to participating in the internship activities at State, AFSA would involve the intern in AFSA activities, and provide a mentor in Washington.

Implementing good ideas takes money, and the committee is identifying possible sources to fund these initiatives, such as corporations, foundations, and interested individuals. We ask the readership for any suggestions and reactions they might have to our efforts.

Legislative News

American priorities

by Rick Weiss
Congressional Liaison

The president signed both the 1992/93 authorization and the 1992 appropriations bills for State and USIA on October 28. A.I.D. remains funded by the continuing resolution as the Senate has delayed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill until February 1992. The Foreign Assistance Authorization Conference Report, which had passed the Senate earlier, was rejected by the House, 159-262.

The defeat of the report may be explained by comments made by Representatives Robert Walker (R-PA) and Bill Alexander (D-AR). Congressman Walker stated that "we are lifting the money out of the pockets of American working people in order to spend it on foreign aid. How much are we lifting out? For every billion dollars we spend, 333,000 American families do not get a $3,000 tax cut."

Congressman Alexander continued the same theme when he said, "Until the federal government begins to keep its promise to Americans, I cannot vote to continue this level of foreign aid. . . . I am well aware that a good case can be made for each and every item on this bill. I do not argue their validity. I do argue with the priorities. And with tight budgets and unmet needs at home, my priorities are here in America."

In other issues, the Diplomatic Security Service was included by name in the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act of 1990 that was part of an amendment to the 1992 Treasury Appropriations Bill. AFSA has worked on this issue throughout this past year.

1992-1993 Scholarship Applications available

Eligibility: Dependent students of all Foreign Service personnel in State, AID, USIA, Commerce, or Agriculture who are serving or have served abroad.

Merit Awards: For graduating high school students in 1992 only, based on academic merit.

Financial Aid Awards: For full-time undergraduate students in the United States, based on need.

Deadline: Applications become available in October 1991 and must be completed and returned to AFSA before February 15, 1992.

Contact: The AFSA Scholarship Department, 2101 E St. N.W., Washington D.C., 20037.

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