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President's Views

On the Front Lines of Diplomacy

By John K. Naland

This month, I am scheduled to testify before the Subcommittee on National Security of the House of Representatives Government Reform Committee. The topic is Foreign Service staffing overseas, with specific focus on the June 2002 General Accounting Office report entitled "Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts." In my testimony, I will focus on several areas:

Short-Staffing: I will stress that the most important thing that lawmakers could do to improve overseas staffing would be to pass the FY 2003 and FY 2004 appropriations bills funding the completion of Secretary Powell's three-year effort to rebuild our workforce by hiring 1,158 new employees above attrition. That increased staffing would give State the ability to fill all of its overseas positions for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

Skills and Experience: Unfortunately, even if State hires the 1,158 new employees by the target date of September 2004, the department will not yet have attained its goal of "getting the right people in the right place at the right time with the right skills." For example, it will take several years for the planned "training float" of additional student positions at FSI to permit all employees bound for language-designated positions to receive the necessary training. It will also take several more years of promotions to refill the FSO mid-ranks that are now depleted as a result of low junior officer intake during the mid-1990s.

Staffing is an ever-moving target. If the administration and Congress set new requirements, it is vital that they also provide the necessary increased funding for them.

Disincentives to Overseas Service: Hiring a lot of new employees is only half the job. Those new hires (and we veterans) must also be retained. I will tell the lawmakers that the lack of locality pay overseas is a growing disincentive to overseas service. I will also say that State can and should do more to improve the quality of life at hardship posts.

Fair-Share Service: On the issue of staffing hardship posts, I will report that the vast majority of Foreign Service members believe that service at differential posts should be a part of every employee's career and that they supported AFSA's proposal earlier this year that State adopt a fair-share assignment rule. Unfortunately, State turned down our proposal, arguing instead that State's senior leadership would achieve the fair-share goals by applying existing bidding rules. I will tell the lawmakers that, while I do not doubt the determination of State's current leadership to accomplish this, their predecessors had failed to do so and, absent new rules, their successors might also fail.

Workforce Planning: Finally, I will highlight the fact that staffing is an ever-moving target. For example, in the coming years we may need more consular officers to interview a higher percentage of visa applicants. Given the ongoing war on terrorism, we could well need additional Diplomatic Security special agents. We might need to open or expand posts in the Middle East. We might need to put additional staffing into public diplomacy. If the administration and Congress set such new requirements, it is vital that they also provide the necessary increased funding for them. Otherwise, we will be forced once again to leave positions vacant and to rush employees to post without adequate language and other training.

The next two years will be critical ones in the effort to strengthen U.S. diplomatic readiness. AFSA is committed to working with Secretary Powell to achieve this vital task. ■

John K. Naland is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.

LETTERS

CORRECTION

Due to an inadvertent editing error on p. 35 in the story "Encounter at Palazzo Corpi" in the July-August issue, the Turkish word "gel" was mistranslated. The correct meaning is "come."

We Are the Foreign Service

As a first-tour Foreign Service officer, I want to congratulate and thank Roy Perrin for his advocacy for junior officers related to the new salary scale policy. At the same time, we should thank the leadership in Guatemala, especially Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, for similarly strong support of the junior officers on that issue. Amb. Bushnell reminded us that we are the Foreign Service, and that we should not blame "them" for policies that we do not like. But neither should we accept the status quo. Instead, we should raise our voices in just the type of creative dissent that the June 2002 issue salutes.

Let's hope that in the future, we can more often advocate policies that benefit U.S. citizens and people in the countries in which we serve, and less often have to seek fair treatment of ourselves and other Foreign Service personnel.

Mary Lou Bartoletti
Consular Officer
Embassy Guatemala City

Our Not-So-Secret Weapon

I would like to compliment the *Journal* and John Naland for his column about retirees, "AFSA's Secret Weapon" (July-August *FSJ*). Here in Florida we're not so secret, however.

The Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida recently celebrated its 20th anniversary and now has some 850 members. I'm fairly certain we are the largest and most active of the more than 20 Foreign Service retiree organizations outside of Washington, D.C. We meet five times a year around the state to share good food and good companionship and to hear interesting speakers, ranging from a hospice director to a newspaper publisher and a Frank Lloyd Wright expert. We've also had our own Marc Grossman, Thomas Pickering and Grant Green from the Department of State. We hope to host Secretary Powell one of these days.

We have taken public stands in letters to the media and to our elected representatives on increasing the foreign affairs budget, rapid confirmation of career officers to ambassadorships and other vital but nonpartisan issues. FSRA conducts three Elderhostels a year about the Foreign Service, family life overseas, etc. Last year's programs were sold out and we expect the same this year. We have a Speakers Bureau to provide experienced speakers on foreign affairs issues to schools, colleges, civic clubs and libraries. We don't have a big pot of money, but we have made considerable donations to the FSN Emergency Fund following disasters and to the Senior Living Foundation. FSRA members have volunteered to participate in Foreign Service recruiting endeavors here in our state. We have collected over 130 tales, stories and vignettes of Foreign Service life and are attempting to find a publisher to put them into book form in the near future.

We have also been distributing our newsletter to 23 other Foreign Service retiree organizations, and someday we may be able to develop a more structured network for retirees around the country to work for the common good.

Irwin Rubenstein
FSO, retired
Chair, Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida
Plantation, Fla.

Praise for Fiction Issue

Permit me to congratulate you and the *Journal* staff on an outstanding July-August issue. The added attraction of a section of fiction pieces adds considerably to the general interest of the articles. Keep up the good work!

Henry E. Mattox, Ph.D.
FSO, retired
Editor of the American Diplomacy Web site (americandiplomacy.org)
Chapel Hill, N.C.

LETTERS

Praise for "In Memory"

Congratulations to the person who did the obituaries in the July-August issue. I used to read only those of persons I had known, but now I read them all because of the human-interest input they include. Good initiative.

Scott Behoteguy
FSO, retired
Sarasota, Fla.

A Clarification

Much to my chagrin, I realize that the first sentence of the third paragraph in my July-August letter, "The Same Deity," implies that Judaism — as a religion — accepts the crucifixion of Jesus but not the resurrection. I should have written that "I believe Jews generally accept that a historical person named Jesus was crucified but not that he was the Messiah."

Patrick N. Theros
Ambassador, retired
Washington, D.C.

Breckenridge Long Award, Again

Some speak before they think. Others write before they read carefully. The latter appears to be the problem with Guy Farmer's letter in the July-August issue. There was nothing in my remarks justifying the actions of either John Walker Lindh or Lori Berenson. My words were addressed to two successive *Washington Post* op-eds by a former FSO, the first of which was highly callous with respect to the deaths of innocents in our problematic "war on drugs" and the second of which was without a glimmer of compassion for the self-inflicted fates of two dreadfully misguided young Americans.

I hold no brief for the actions of Lindh or Berenson. They deserve punishment. But for Farmer and the op-ed writer to link both, without qualification, to al-Qaida and the Sept. 11 terrorists is a bit of a stretch. Even

Ashcroft's prosecutors stopped well short of that with Lindh. Berenson was no Baader-Meinhoff or Patty Hearst in her connection with the Shining Path. Even — or perhaps particularly — in the battles against terrorism there are nuances to be considered.

I refuse Guy's nomination and wish him a more nuanced existence out in Carson City.

Gunther K. Rosinus
FSO, retired
Potomac, Md.

Celebrating Your Courage

Many congratulations on publishing Jerri Bird's article on the torture of Palestinian-Americans in Israel (June *FSJ*). It is extremely refreshing to see such an article in an American publication. My grandfather worked for most of his life in Palestine, my father was a career diplomat in the British Foreign Service and a specialist in the Middle East and I myself have worked in many countries in the Middle East for some years. I can imagine that you will be receiving a vast number of e-mails and letters objecting to this article from many in the U.S. and elsewhere who perhaps are unaware of the true situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories. As you read those complaints, I hope you will remember that there are many out there who celebrate your courage.

Sam Richmond
Newcastle, U.K.

Proving Your Independence

I was delighted by your June issue. Publication of the articles by Ed Peck and Jerri Bird prove that the *FSJ* is independent, not a house organ of the State Department.

Peck's article may suggest more courage by dissenters than all deserve. I recall a subordinate abroad who came to tell me he planned to write a dissent to one of my telegrams. I listened to him, agreed, and we sent another message with his views. He seemed chagrined that he did not have the opportunity to dissent.

Speaking as a retiree who has been a Middle East peace activist for over 20 years, Jerri Bird's article did not surprise me — only its publication. I had long known, from newspaper reading and stories of Palestinian-American friends, about Israel's wholesale violations of international law and practice in the Occupied Territories. But to find that American citizens within Israel proper were also denied their rights came as a shock. As a three-time consular officer I was always notified when an American citizen was detained or arrested, and I was always

permitted to visit our citizens in detention.

The Israeli government will stick to its own interpretation of international law in the Occupied Territories. But inside the 1967 borders? I cannot imagine any American consular officer tolerating without protest the violations that Jerri Bird described.

I look forward to reading the department's apologia in your next issue.

C. Patrick Quinlan
FSO, retired
Edina, Minn.

Graduate Exchanges Work

In his letter on cultural diplomacy in the June *FSJ*, Sheldon Avenius claims that high-school student exchanges are more effective than post-graduate Fulbright exchanges because they are more cost-effective and result in greater attitudinal change.

This is an old debate. Younger students are more impressionable and the cost of their exchanges is much less, but who can predict which teenagers will go on to become leaders in their chosen professions? The plus for sending graduate students is that it is possible to examine their academic and extra-curricular activities and choose the future winners.

In my book, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War*, to be published next year by Penn State Press, I show how Soviet society and attitudes were changed by the thousands of graduate students, senior scholars, scientists, engineers, writers, and other members of the intelligentsia who came to the United States and Western Europe on exchanges between 1958 and 1988. They came, they saw, they were conquered, and the Soviet Union would never again be the same. Gorbachev's reforms did not begin in 1985. They had been gestating in the minds of Soviet citizens who had seen the West and realized how communism was failing them.

In the old USIA, culture took second place to information with its emphasis on pamphlets, press releases, and the print media. "Culture vultures," we cultural officers were derisively called. Yet, it was cultural exchanges that brought real change to the Soviet Union and prepared the way for the end of the Cold War, at a cost that was miniscule in comparison with expenditures on intelligence and the military over the same 30 years.

Yale Richmond
FSO, retired
Washington, D.C.

Debate Time on Selection-Out

AFSA members might usefully ponder the theme of a recent article in *The Virginian-Pilot* calling for our military establishment to jettison selection-out, which inhibits internal debate on key issues and requires premature retirement of highly skilled officers. We might do well to consider the same for our corps of professional diplomats.

The up-or-out principle was rarely applied to Foreign Service officers before the self-styled "Young Turks" seized control of AFSA in 1968. In the late 1950s, Loy Henderson repeatedly blocked efforts to punish "Wristonees" (Civil Service personnel who were forced into the Foreign Service) through selection-out.

It is no coincidence that the Dissent Channel (as described in the June issue) was instituted shortly after selection-out became a ritualistic feature of the Foreign Service. This was also the period when many FSOs ran afoul of misbegotten tragedies in Vietnam, Iran, Central America and elsewhere, ostensibly aimed at "containing" Communism. Before 1968 a diplomat could assert and apply a healthy conscience and independent analysis without unduly shortening his career.

Ben Read (our top management officer during the Carter administration) told me shortly before he died that AFSA vigorously lobbied for the Foreign Service Act of 1980. He said the AFSA leadership, zealously dedicated to selection-out, favored a statutory basis for terminating the careers of most Foreign Service officers after 20 years.

A debate on the merits of "dissent" would be too narrow. The focus should be on the principle of selection-out as the centerpiece of our personnel system. A parallel analysis of the actual role of the Department of State in formulating and implementing foreign policy within a national framework overloaded with representatives of the military and intelligence communities would provide a useful context.

John J. Harter
FSO, retired
Virginia Beach, Va.

Praise for MED

I am writing to let you know about the extraordinary service I received recently from the staff of the State Department's Office of Medical Services while expecting the birth of my first child.

I arrived in the States on a work-related trip from my post in China right before the Sept. 11 attacks. Since I was in my last trimester of pregnancy, MED recommended that I not return to China until after giving birth. Because of this cautious and humanitarian decision, I received the very best care from high-risk specialists and my daughter was born without incident. Throughout the time I spent in the States, Kay Boyer, R.N., was always helpful and seemed to follow my progress with genuine interest and concern.

I am so impressed that MED chose life over everything else. When you work for a big faceless organization like the federal government, you don't

expect to find that people at the heart of it are more concerned about the safety of a baby than they are about squeezing a few more hours of work out of the mother.

Gwen B. Lyle
Commercial Officer
Consulate General
Guangzhou, China

Praise for May and June Issues

We finally got our *Foreign Service Journal* deliveries sorted out here in Montevideo. I especially liked the May issue focusing on family life abroad and the working situation (lack of employment opportunities) for family members. I hope these voices will make a difference in D.C.

I read top to bottom Ellen Rafshoon's piece on Harry Bingham in the June issue. As a journalist by profession, I have to say it was excellent.

Marlene M. Nice
Community Liaison Officer
Embassy Montevideo,
Uruguay

No Pidgin

As the General Services Officer in Istanbul from 1990 to 1993, I oversaw the maintenance unit, and was the immediate supervisor of the Turkish FSN maintenance chief. The same individual I supervised then is on the job today.

Ruby Carlino ("Encounter at Palazzo Corpi," July-August *FSJ*) has built an interesting short story around some of the Palazzo Corpi legends known to all who have served in Istanbul over the last century. However, I can tell you with absolute certainty that the maintenance supervisor does not speak some sort of Turko-pidgin English, and would never have said, "They get tools and we open this up."

Dwight Rhoades
FSO
Washington, D.C. ■

CYBERNOTES

U.S. Terror List Addition Causes Concern

> It's less important to have unanimity than it is to be making the right decisions and doing the right thing, even though at the outset it may seem lonesome.
>
> — Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Aug. 27, 2002, on the topic of international support for a proposed U.S. overthrow of the Iraqi regime, at Camp Pendleton.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, is the first part of the Uighur separatist movement in China's Xinjiang province to be designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. The decision to add the group to the U.S. list of terrorist organizations was announced by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage during his early-September visit to Beijing. Embassy officials said that ETIM had been planning attacks against U.S. interests abroad, including the embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The Foreign Terrorist Organization List, begun in 1997, plays a critical role in the U.S. fight against terrorism, and is meant to draw the attention of foreign governments and encourage them to take action to isolate these organizations and prevent their movement across international borders. But the move points to the complexities inherent in the war on terror, especially as it is conducted in the culturally-remote Central Asian theater.

According to Radio Free Europe correspondent Zamira Eshanova (**www.eurasianet.org**), the U.S. action has prompted concern on the part of both Uighurs and international human rights organizations, who worry that Beijing will take it as a green light to intensify its crackdown across the board on Uighur efforts to preserve their national and cultural identity in the name of the campaign against terrorism.

The Uighurs, a Muslim minority in China with a population of some 7.2 million, have been fighting for independent statehood since 1759, when China invaded the Uighur Kingdom of Eastern Turkestan and annexed it, later changing its name to Xinjiang ("new territory"). The largest Uighur revolt was suppressed by Chinese communists in 1945.

Enver Can, president of the Munich-based East Turkestan National Congress, says that the Uighurs have never been religious extremists, and states that among the many Uighur organizations around the world, the ETIM is virtually unknown and perhaps doesn't warrant classification as an independent Uighur group at all. According to Can, the ETIM is a small group of people who fled first to Central Asia, and when governments there began deporting Uighurs back to China they went instead to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they received shelter.

"We would ask the U.S. government to be very, very, very careful…," stated Maya Catsanis, Amnesty International's press officer for the Asia-Pacific region. Catsanis urges the U.S. to be mindful not to let its own counterterrorism campaign give free rein to governments like China's to pursue their own campaigns against the Uighurs and other groups peacefully expressing their wish for independence or the right to preserve their national and religious identity.

Despite warnings from U.S. President Bush and appeals by then-U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson, Beijing had greatly stepped up arrests, detentions, sentencing, intimidation and censorship

50 Years Ago

Probably one of the most important qualifications of a Foreign Service officer should be an awareness of the extent to which blind chance can shape and even determine his work. Its operation in history leads one to suspect that diplomacy is at least as much a "game" as it is an "art."

— James J. Blake, in "Chance in Diplomacy: The Webster-Ashburton Treaty," *FSJ*, October, 1952.

CYBERNOTES

in Xinjiang after Sept. 11, 2001. Between Sept. 11 and the end of 2001, it is estimated that 3,000 people were detained and scores sentenced to long prison terms for "separatist offenses."

The Race between Fact and Fiction

It's not always easy to distinguish truth from fiction. In today's hyper-informed global village, documentary reports from every possible corner of hither and yon routinely shock, surprise and amaze far better than the most finely-wrought invention could. And with the Internet acting as a vast and instantaneous open market for any and every voice in the world, separating the real from the unreal can be downright daunting, as a recent blunder by the *Beijing Evening News* testifies.

According to the *Los Angeles Times* (**www.latimes.com**), on one fine evening in June, the *Evening News*' readers were treated to a hot news story from Washington: the U.S. Congress had threatened to move out of the District unless a fancy new Capitol was built. "Don't get us wrong. We actually love the dilapidated [old] building," House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., was quoted as saying. "But the cruel reality is, it's no longer suitable for use by a world-class legislature. Its contours are ugly, there's no room to maneuver, there aren't enough bathrooms, and let's not even talk about the parking." If a new building wasn't erected, the *Beijing Evening News* reported, lawmakers were prepared to pack up and move to Memphis, Tenn., or Charlotte, N.C.!

It was fiction. With a leap of trust in the authority of the Fourth Estate and its Internet incarnations and faith in the belief that the Americans are capable of almost anything, the state-run *Beijing Evening News* had, with a straight face, lifted the piece as-is from *The Onion*, based in New York and arguably the best of the satirical U.S. "news" publications (**www.theonion.com**).

As the *Beijing Evening News* learned, being aware of your preconceptions can prevent embarrassment. And consulting any of the several interesting satirical sites available on the Net is a great way to test your grip on reality. Besides, they can be counted on to produce a healing belly laugh in even the most jaded student of current affairs. Apart from *The Onion*, there is *The Daily Sedative*, a mainstream howler (**www.dailysedative.com**), and *BBspot*, a site devoted to tech humor and the techie's take on the news (**www.bbspot.com**). Another site, *SatireWire*, has regrettably been discontinued; the author is no longer updating the site, but maintains a list of his all-time best gags (**www.satirewire.com**).

For completeness, you may want to consult the *Yahoo! Internet Life Magazine*'s list of the top ten satirical sites (www.yil.com/issues/guide.asp?volume=Ø8&issue=Ø6). ■

SITE OF THE MONTH: www.SoYouWanna.com

Planning a high tea, and haven't a clue what to serve for eats? Got a great idea for some freelance work, and need to write a business plan? Your kid's become a Buddhist, and you want to know what it means? Want to buy a cell phone, or a laptop, and don't know where to start? Do you have a book in your head, but can't get it out? Do you want to learn to play poker? You can get substantive, practical answers to these and hundreds more questions without spending another penny on yet one more Dummies tome. Just click your way to *SoYouWanna.com*.

This award-winning Web site has comprehensive, "how-to" explanations in sixteen categories, from apartments (e.g., how to buy a home) to beauty & fashion, to education, to etiquette & custom, to money, technology and work (e.g., how to ace an interview). In each category, there are at least 20 to 25 entries. The write-ups are well organized and generally readable, though at times the effort to be chatty is overdone. For those of you who are really in a hurry, there are condensed versions, the "mini-wannas."

There's also a bulletin board for those who seek more interactivity, an e-mail newletter, and an online store that guarantees safe shopping. The clincher on this fabulously useful site is the "Cocktail Conversation" department down at the lower right of the home page, where you'll find the most intriguing top-ten lists, a host of movie reviews, and a pros-and-cons primer on today's "hot-button" issues.

J. KIRBY SIMON FOREIGN SERVICE TRUST

The J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust is pleased to announce that it has been approved for participation in the 2002 Combined Federal Campaign of the National Capital Area. The Trust's 2002 designation number is: **7044.**

The Trust, founded in 1995 in memory of Kirby Simon, a Foreign Service Officer who died that year while serving in Taipei, is primarily committed to funding community service and humanitarian projects conducted, on a voluntary basis, by Foreign Service Officers and Specialists, members of their families, and other U.S Government employees located at American diplomatic posts abroad. Since its inception, the Trust has approved 127 grants, in amounts ranging from $250 to $4000, for activities conducted in 68 countries.

The Trust has helped Foreign Service personnel to initiate a wide variety of projects - for example, in support of orphanages, libraries, women's shelters, schools, housing for HIV/AIDs patients and others, income-generating activities, medical facilities, arts and music programs and educational publications. The goods and services funded by the Trust include refrigerators, washing machines, computers, books, soccer balls, printing services, play equipment, musical instruments, mattresses, bus fares, skill training courses, toilets, paints and brushes, and wheelchairs. A description of all Trust grants made through 2001 is available on the Trust's Website: kirbysimontrust.org. (The 2002 grants will be posted in late October.) A photographic exhibition depicting many of the Trust's grants will be mounted at the Foreign Service Institute in the future.

The Trust is exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and contributions to it are tax-deductible. The Trust's representative in the Capital Area is a Trustee, Colette Marcellin, who can be reached at (202) 647-4473. Web address: www.kirbysimontrust.org.

Persons without access to the Combined Federal Campaign for the National Capital Area are welcome to contribute to the Trust by sending contributions to the Trust at 82 Edgehill Road, New Haven, CT 06511.

The Trustees of the J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust are: Liisa Ecola, Cynthia Ely, Herbert J. Hansell, John George P. Kent, Colette Marcellin, Daniel Morris, Courtney Nemroff, Kathleen Sheehan, Claire B. Simon, John G. Simon.

SPEAKING OUT

How to Truly *Transform Afghanistan*

BY EDMUND MCWILLIAMS

Those of us in the Foreign Service who have served in Afghanistan over the past 40 years have seen that country's fortunes run the gamut from the relatively halcyon era of Zahir Shah's rule through the politically turbulent rule of President Daoud to the tragic period of the Soviet invasion and occupation. There were essentially no American witnesses for the last and most painful epoch in Afghanistan's recent history, encompassing the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, subsequent civil wars and the brutal rule of the Taliban, which was based on aberrant interpretations of Islam that were as foreign to most Afghans as to most of the Muslim world.

Over the past year a new generation of Americans has returned to Afghanistan, not only as witnesses, but, to a greater extent than at any time in the previous decades of the bilateral relationship, as shapers of the country's future. Following the swift, though by no means bloodless, eviction of the Taliban and their al-Qaida patrons by U.S.-led international forces in October 2001, and the reopening of Embassy Kabul last December, U.S. civilian and military officials have been leading international efforts on the ground to transform Afghanistan.

In March, I made a private journey of my own back to Kabul, partly in search of old friends but mainly to assess prospects for the rebirth of a nation that I, like so many of my fellow Foreign Service officers, had come to love. Sadly, the impressions I gathered then, reinforced by subsequent conversations with more recent visitors to Afghanistan, are not encouraging.

Many Afghans fear that U.S. interest will not last long enough to secure a full transformation of their country.

A Country Divided

The capital itself embodies the country's mixed prospects. Kabul's northeast has become a boom town, with bustling shops and fierce competition for office space and housing among the latest "occupation force" — thousands of U.N., diplomatic and NGO personnel. But the southwest district, a lawless wasteland where ethnic and tribal rivals compete for dominance, typifies the incomplete and possibly temporary results of international efforts to restore Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community.

The broader Afghan political/military landscape is similarly dominated by ethnic or tribal-based warlords (the term of art is "regional leaders") whose mini-realms function as local arbiters of power. While open confrontation with President Karzai's government is rare, so too is genuine central control. Many of these independent regional leaders are much more responsive to their own interests (and foreign influence) than the urgent needs of the Afghan nation-state. One recalls the British aphorism that Afghan warlords can be rented but never bought, underscoring the transitory nature of purchased loyalty.

Meanwhile, the ethnic and tribal fault lines that have long crisscrossed Afghan territory and history seem to be growing more active. Perhaps out of necessity, the U.S. forces entering Afghanistan a year ago allied themselves with the most significant anti-Taliban force in the field, the Northern Alliance. That force consisted primarily of Panjshir Tajiks and other northern forces organized essentially along ethnic lines. Except for warlords in the south, notably in the Kandahar area, and small forces loyal to Hamid Karzai, Pushtuns — the largest Afghan minority — did not play a notable role in the defeat of the Taliban or, most significantly, in the capture of Kabul.

Since pushing the Taliban out of Kabul, the U.S. has done little to allay growing fears among Pushtuns, and others not part of the Northern Alliance, that the U.S. is enabling the Tajiks to gain unprecedented power in Kabul. Pushtuns I spoke to there earlier this year, and have talked with since my visit, have cited a growing list of Tajik/Northern Alliance affronts they believe have transpired with U.S. acquiescence:

- A pogrom mounted against

Pushtuns living in the north earlier this year has led to an exodus of approximately 50,000 Pushtuns who had lived in the north for generations.

• Pushtuns captured as "Taliban" fighters in the north have been subjected to inhumane conditions in Northern Alliance detention facilities which, while not under U.S. control, are visited by U.S. personnel searching for al-Qaida or senior Taliban personnel. Many of these "fighters" were in fact themselves victims of the Taliban, dragooned into Taliban ranks as war erupted in late 2001. Some have been ransomed back to relatives in the south by their Northern Alliance captors; others were victims of mass killings following their surrender in the battle of Kunduz.

• Pushtuns deeply resent the manner in which the U.S. was seen as blocking a potential groundswell of support for Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former Afghan king, at the June national assembly (Loya Jirga). The appearance of U.S. officials in the entourage surrounding Zahir Shah as he renounced any ambition to lead Afghanistan, on the eve of that gathering, was seen by many Afghans as a sign of an American role in that announcement.

• Pushtuns have tended to be, by far, the most common victims of tactical "mistakes" by U.S. forces in recent months. The human cost of these errant strikes and Washington's reluctance to acknowledge them and make restitution has diminished the U.S. in the eyes of many Afghans.

• The still-unsolved murder of prominent Pushtun Vice President Haji Quadir is yet another bone of contention in U.S.-Afghan relations.

Staying the Course

During my visit to Afghanistan in March, Mary Robinson, former chairwoman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, told me that the fundamental challenge in Afghanistan was not human rights abuse, but rather, security. "Without security," she observed, "there are no human rights."

Open confrontation with President Karzai's government is rare, but so is genuine central control.

Similarly, the Afghan contacts who escorted me inside and outside the capital warned that Taliban adherents and other opponents of the regime were still active, a point underscored both by the periodic assassinations of Afghan officials and attacks on U.S. and allied forces and a more pervasive sense of fear and uncertainty. Even in Kabul, many Afghan women told me they continue to wear head-to-toe veils because the Taliban-era men (the "vice and virtue" thugs) who whipped and clubbed them for failing to obey strict dress codes were still in the streets and markets. "They don't all wear the black turbans now, but we know them."

Recent reporting from Konar Province and other eastern and southern provinces indicates preparations are under way for organized fundamentalist resistance to U.S. forces and to the weak central government, drawing on the centuries-old Afghan capacity for stealth, deception and betrayal. Monitoring the anti-Soviet war from Embassy Kabul (1986-88) and as a special envoy to Afghanistan based in Pakistan (1988-89), I observed the effective use of such tactics to wear down and defeat the much stronger Soviet force.

While U.S. and international forces are vastly better equipped, trained and more nimble than the Soviets were, we and our Afghan allies are vulnerable to the same guerrilla tactics of ambush and assassination. Such losses in the field will likely weigh far more heavily on strategists in Washington and other Western capitals than they did on the totalitarian Soviet leadership.

As a result, many Afghans are apprehensive that — as happened over a decade ago following the withdrawal of the Soviet occupiers — U.S. interest and involvement will not be sufficient to secure a full transformation of Afghanistan that goes beyond military liberation to achieve political and economic reconstruction.

It is true that there is still genuine appreciation for U.S. action in ousting the Taliban from power. Most Afghans even appear prepared to accept the significant civilian casualties from the U.S. bombing campaign as the cost of transforming Afghanistan into a peaceful, democratic state. But the growing disillusionment of Pushtuns with the underfunded and largely ineffective government led by President Hamid Karzai (himself a Pushtun) and their fear of continued dominance of state security organs by Tajiks have made them increasingly reluctant to give active support to U.S. and allied forces. As a result, efforts to establish an Afghan national army have barely gotten off the ground. There have been massive desertions among the early trainees, especially Pushtuns, many of whom chafe at an officer corps that is mainly Tajik, staffed by the U.S. military's key ally, the Northern Alliance.

To supplement that effort, the Karzai government, the United Nations and many NGOs have called for an expansion of the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force to areas outside of Kabul. Only

the ISAF, they argue, can act as arbiter between and among rival regional forces and begin the very difficult but essential task of decommissioning arms, including those in the hands of warlords.

Until recently, the Bush administration rebuffed such calls, but it has now expressed a willingness to at least consider doing force expansion. This is a welcome development, but it is essential that the new mission be broad enough, and U.S. support strong enough, to ensure that ISAF forces do not themselves become targets. Moreover, the ISAF must have a clear mandate to support central government authority against the ambitions of warlords who have been emboldened by their relationships with U.S. forces. Indications the U.S. may use its diplomatic leadership to induce other governments to fulfill pledges they made to provide financial assistance to Kabul are also welcome, though tardy.

Even if this approach works, Afghanistan's history underscores the fact that there are no guarantees. But we can be sure of one thing: absent sustained U.S. assistance for stabilizing the security situation, real transformation will remain on hold and increasingly doubtful. ■

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A REMARKABLE TURNAROUND: U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

Dana Cooper

THE WORLD'S TWO LARGEST DEMOCRACIES WERE ESTRANGED FOR 50 YEARS, BUT THEY NOW GET ALONG. HOW DID THIS OCCUR? IS THE NEWFOUND FRIENDSHIP LIKELY TO ENDURE?

BY DENNIS KUX

Since 1999, relations with India have seen a remarkable turnaround. After half a century of estrangement, the world's two largest democracies are finally getting along. President Bill Clinton enjoyed a hugely successful visit to India in March 2000 and President George W. Bush has continued the effort for friendlier and more cooperative ties. And, despite the revival of intimate U.S. security links with Pakistan, since the events of Sept. 11, 2001, the improved relationship between New Delhi and Washington has so far held firm. What lies behind the shift from estrangement to engagement? How and why did this occur? This article will explore these questions and consider

whether the newfound friendship between India and the United States is likely to endure.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the strategic underpinnings of U.S. interaction with India. For most of the four decades of the Cold War, the United States was a military ally of Pakistan, India's enemy. For its part, India, after adopting a policy of neutralism and nonalignment to avoid entanglement with either of the two contending global power blocs, moved closer to the Soviet Union, the chief foe of America. By the end of the 1960s, Moscow had become New Delhi's principal source of sophisticated military equipment.

The fact that the nuclear tests were a* fait accompli *helped lance the boil of nonproliferation that had previously infected bilateral relations.

The situation changed radically after 1989, when the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from Afghanistan. In 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself deprived New Delhi of its closest security partner. Even though India has subsequently established close security ties with Russia, the much-diminished successor state, the large-scale inflow of Russian arms has stirred scant U.S. concern. Washington no longer regards Moscow either as an enemy or as a major threat to its security. In the case of Pakistan, that nation's importance for the United States diminished with the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. And, after Islamabad refused to heed Washington's warnings about its nuclear weapons program, American economic and military aid was suspended in October 1990. This action effectively ruptured U.S.-Pakistan security ties. During the decade of the 1990s, bilateral relations further soured because of Islamabad's support for militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir and its lackadaisical approach to anti-narcotics efforts.

Yet there was little significant warming between Washington and New Delhi for nearly a decade, despite the disappearance of the two principal bones of bilateral contention, the Indo-Soviet and U.S.-Pakistan security links. India's economic reforms launched in 1991 led to expanded economic relations and Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's 1994 visit to the United States focused on promoting further growth in trade and commerce. Still, during Bill Clinton's first term India remained largely off Washington's radar screen, except for the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. In both New Delhi and Washington, an underlying mistrust continued, the lingering legacy of past differences. When South Asian Affairs Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel, in a 1993 press background briefing, slipped in commenting that the United States had never recognized the accession of Kashmir to India, foreign policy mandarins and media pundits in New Delhi took this as "proof" that America was still following a pro-Pakistan policy.

At the start of Clinton's second term in 1997, he decided to seek a new and friendlier chapter in relations with India, stressing common interests and values, placing reduced emphasis on the nuclear issue and initiating a series of high-level visits that would culminate in a presidential trip. The effort was, however, derailed, first by internal political disarray in India and then by the decision of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government that took power after winning elections in early 1998 to test India's nuclear weapons. The angry U.S. response to the May 1998 tests and the imposition of economic sanctions caused relations to plummet once more.

Dennis Kux spent 39 years in the Foreign Service, retiring in 1994 with the rank of career minister. A South Asia specialist, he served overseas in Pakistan, India, Turkey, Germany and the Ivory Coast, where he was ambassador. Following retirement Mr. Kux has written extensively on U.S.-South Asia relations and has been a frequent media commentator. He is the author of India and the United States, 1941-1991: Estranged Democracies *(Sage and National Defense University Presses, 1993), described by* The New York Times *as "the definitive history of Indo-American relations," and* The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies *(Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Presses, 2001). He is presently a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and co-executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations-Asia Society Independent Task Force on India and South Asia.*

Key Benchmarks

But the downturn did not last long. Nine rounds of talks between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India's Jaswant Singh helped clear the air and gave both Washington and New Delhi a more distinct picture of what each wanted and could expect from the other. It finally began to dawn on foreign policy-makers in both capitals that with Cold War differences history, there was considerable convergence between U.S. and Indian interests and policies. Moreover, the fact that the nuclear tests were a fait accompli helped lance the boil of nonproliferation that had previously infected bilateral relations.

The Talbott-Singh dialogue was followed by another key benchmark — the forceful intervention by President Clinton in July 1999 to pressure Pakistan to withdraw its forces after its rash attempt to seize strategic heights near Kargil on the Indian side of the line of control in Kashmir. Although the Americans acted from fear lest Pakistan's action trigger broader conflict, possibly involving nuclear weapons, India interpreted the presidential arm-twisting of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as a sign that Washington no longer automatically backed Pakistan on Kashmir.

The Kargil episode set the stage for the enthusiastic welcome that Bill Clinton received during his March 2000 visit to India. The president charmed both India's parliament and the public during a wildly successful five-day trip — the first by a U.S. chief executive in two decades. India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a more muted but still successful return visit to the United States in September 2000. By the time Clinton vacated the White House in January 2001, he had succeeded in achieving his goal: a new chapter in U.S.-India relations had begun.

Yet it was uncertain whether his successor George W. Bush would continue the effort or would revert to the more traditional Republican preference for Pakistan. It soon became clear that the new president wanted to take up with India where Clinton had left off. Bush was especially impressed that India, despite its one billion people and severe economic and social problems, had made a success of democracy unlike many third world nations. Once the word was out that Bush "liked" India, his foreign policy advisers found a strategic rationale to buttress the president's stance — common American and Indian security concerns about China.

For their part, the Indians saw it as very much in their interest to reciprocate the Bush administration's embrace. Even if New Delhi had little desire to become a partner in a U.S.-led grouping to contain China, it wanted to develop security ties with America, the global superpower, and firm up economic ties, especially the links that had burgeoned in the latter half of the 1990s between U.S. and Indian information technology sectors. Reflecting this attitude, the Vajpayee government responded to the Bush administration's controversial missile defense proposal more positively than America's own traditional allies in Europe and Asia. New Delhi also downplayed differences with Washington over environmental issues and the Kyoto Protocol, which India strongly supported in contrast to Bush's defiant opposition.

Osama bin Laden's terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, put the new U.S.-India relationship to an early test. India promptly endorsed Bush's stance and promised full cooperation. In the process, Delhi hoped to turn the "war on terrorism" to its advantage as a lever to end Pakistan's decade-long covert support for the anti-India insurgency in disputed Kashmir. But when Pakistan itself joined the coalition, ditching its former Taliban allies, New Delhi feared that Washington would tilt toward Islamabad once more. In particular, Indians fretted that the Americans would turn a blind eye to Pakistani support for infiltration by Islamic militants across the Kashmir line of control, the de facto border in the disputed state.

The Bush administration, however, adroitly managed to walk both sides of the street at once, gaining Pakistan's cooperation in the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida without jeopardizing the new ties with India. The price was Washington's acceptance of the Indian contention that Pakistan's activities in Kashmir amounted to terrorism and should end. When faced with India's threat of war against Pakistan after the Dec. 13, 2001, attempt to blow up the Indian parliament and after terrorist attacks in May 2002, the United States acted forcefully. The Bush administration repeatedly pressed President Pervez Musharraf to stop supporting cross-border infiltration. Along the way it also spurned Pakistani requests for advanced military hardware, such as F-16 fighter-bombers, the supply of which would be certain to cause a severe backlash in India.

Forging Stronger Ties

Surprisingly, it is in the security field that the new relationship with India has moved ahead fastest. After nearly four decades of almost no interaction between the two defense establishments, the Bush administration has launched a host of new initiatives. A steady stream of high-level military visitors has traveled to and from India. Sales of U.S. military equipment and training of Indian military personnel in the United States have resumed. There have been joint naval patrols in the Malacca Straits and joint special forces exercises in Agra near the fabled Taj Mahal. Given India's traditional aversion to U.S. naval activities in the Indian Ocean and to the presence of foreign troops on Indian soil, these two activities dramatically underscore how much the relationship has changed. India and the United States have taken significant steps toward establishing the sort of ties that the American military enjoys with a host of friendly nations around the globe.

Surprisingly, it is in the security field that the new relationship with India has moved ahead fastest.

In a very different sense, the emergence of the Indian ethnic community in the United States has played a major role in paving the way for improved relations. Before the liberalization of immigration laws in the early 1960s, Americans of Indian origin numbered no more than 25,000. The 2000 census counted 1.7 million. On the whole — and in contrast to many other immigrant groups — Indian-Americans are well educated and economically successful. In medicine, the sciences and especially in the computer field, the Indian ethnic community has made a name for itself.

Indian-Americans also brought to the United States a political savvy acquired from experience with India's own democratic system. And as the community progressed economically, it became active in the political arena, making generous financial contributions to election campaigns. This led to the birth of a bipartisan India caucus in the House of Representatives in 1993, founded by Representatives Frank Pallone, D-N.J., whose district has a large concentration of Indian-Americans, and Bill McCollum, R-Fla. The caucus quickly grew in size and now has about 130 members. It has become a force for better bilateral relations as well as a dampener on anti-India legislation on the Hill. Its growing clout is measurable: in 1989, an amendment barring U.S. economic aid to India was defeated by a mere four votes, 204-208. Anti-India congressmen like Dan Burton, R-Ind., continued to propose the amendment annually, but after the birth of the caucus it received fewer and fewer "yes" votes. Finally, after 1997, when the anti-India amendment lost by 260 votes, Burton threw in the towel.

The fact that English has emerged as the de facto national language of India has provided a further significant bond. This has been true not only in the high-tech area where India boasts a large pool of well-trained, English-speaking engineers, but in literature as well. A few decades back, the sole well-known Indian writer in English was the recently deceased R. K. Narayan. His tales of small-town life in South India earned him praise in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as an Indian Chekhov. Narayan stood almost alone, but since then many young Indian authors have won prestigious prizes and best-seller status in the West for their literary efforts.

Business and commercial links between the United States and India have, however, not prospered to the extent expected after India launched its economic reforms in 1991. American investment, following a significant initial rise, has slipped back to about $500 million annually, split between direct and portfolio investment. Nor has trade surged. Thanks mainly to burgeoning information technology-related sales, Indian exports have passed the $10 billion annual level, but Indian imports from America have leveled off at about $4 billion annually. Although the United States is India's largest trading partner, India ranks only No. 25 for the United States. Both trade and investment figures pale in comparison with U.S. economic interaction with China, with which India, because of its size and population, is often compared.

Despite many reforms, India continues to be considered a difficult place to do business. Especially for large-scale undertakings, Indian bureaucracy remains a formidable bar to rapid action. Inadequate infrastructure, restrictive labor laws and serious power shortages pose significant restraints. Nonetheless, the Indian economy is currently growing at a better than 6 percent

annual rate and many American companies are happy with their Indian operations, especially those in the information technology sector.

India has become far more open to the global market than it used to be, despite continuing high tariffs. Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, McDonald's (no beef hamburgers, however) and most other major U.S. consumer products are now readily available. After the end of the central government monopoly on television, Indians have access to about as many TV channels as Americans, including four 24-hour news channels. For better or worse, TV advertising in India bears a striking resemblance to what appears on U.S. screens.

The Road Ahead

Looking ahead, what are the potholes in the path of what U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwill terms the "transformed" relationship? The major problem relates to Pakistan. The Bush administration has asserted that it has delinked relations with the two sparring neighbors, and will allow each relationship to develop on its own separate track. In theory, such an approach is fine, but in practice it is difficult to implement because both India and Pakistan regard the other's relations with America as a zero-sum game. Thus, if New Delhi concludes that Washington has put insufficient pressure on Islamabad to deliver on President Musharraf's repeated promises to end support for cross-border infiltration in Kashmir, U.S.-India relations will suffer. Now, as in the past, the way around this problem lies in somehow effecting a major reduction in India-Pakistan tensions. Trying to achieve this difficult goal, however, quickly lands one in the marshland of the half-century-old Kashmir dispute.

The last time Washington actively tried to "solve" Kashmir was four decades ago; ever since, the United States has been content to limit its role to conflict avoidance. During 1962 and 1963, John F. Kennedy strove without success to get India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's Ayub Khan to agree to a settlement. The problem, as veteran diplomat W. Averell Harriman counseled

Kennedy, was that any solution acceptable to India was unacceptable to Pakistan, and vice versa. In the year 2002, not that much has changed, and prospects for an early resolution are dim.

The current dilemma the Bush administration confronts — apart from the impact of U.S. actions on relations with India and Pakistan — is that left to themselves, the two protagonists are unlikely to overcome their differences and are thus likely to face periodic crises over Kashmir. If the United States wants to prevent these, and the related risk of military conflict between nuclear-armed enemies, it cannot limit its high-level engagement to times when India and Pakistan are on the brink of war. It needs to undertake a sustained effort to get New Delhi and Islamabad into a process of serious dialogue on the issues that divide them, including Kashmir. This task will not be easy, especially as India has refused to begin talks until it is satisfied Pakistan has ended its clandestine support for the anti-India insurgency.

What had been the major issue between India and the U.S. in the 1990s, the nuclear problem, is off the radar screen for the time being. The Bush administration has eased sanctions on export of dual-use items to India, overcoming a stiff rear-guard action from nonproliferation proponents. India has embraced the U.S. national missile defense initiative. Still, the issue is unlikely to go away. More than anything else, concern about possible nuclear war triggered Clinton's intervention to defuse the Kargil crisis in 1999 and, together with worries about the impact of India-Pakistan conflict on the war against terrorism, spurred Bush administration efforts to reduce tensions over Kashmir during the past year. Clearly some confidence-building measures are desirable to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the two countries. The more complex policy challenge, which the Bush administration has so far chosen to duck, is to find some way to bring India (and also Pakistan) into the global nuclear regime without upsetting the system established hy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Then there is the China factor. If security policy planners in the Bush administration see ties with India strategically important mainly as a way to provide the United States with a partner in containing China, they are making a mistake. Although common concerns about Beijing do exist, they do not provide a sound basis for improved bilateral ties. While worried about China as a security threat, India has no interest in becoming part of a U.S.-led anti-China grouping. India sees itself as an independent player in the international arena with a major regional and eventually global role. New Delhi has been working to improve relations not just with the United States but with other major power centers, including Europe, Japan, China and the nations of Southeast Asia. Even though Indians acknowledge that substantially greater economic growth is needed to claim genuine Great Power status, they believe that the country's more than one billion people — one-sixth of humanity — warrant a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Nonetheless, the U.S. has remained unwilling to support India's bid for Council membership. In the not-too-distant future, however, Washington will need to shift gears or face a significant bilateral problem.

In dealing with political issues, Washington and New Delhi need to show continued sensitivity to each other's views. For America, apart from supporting India's membership in the U.N. Security Council, this mainly means avoiding actions in South Asia, especially regarding Pakistan, that India sees as threatening its interests. For India, this means avoiding a reversion to the knee-jerk anti-Americanism that prevailed until recent years and is still favored under the guise of anti-globalism by the far left and right extremes of the political spectrum. Substantial expansion in economic ties would provide greater ballast against political upsets by broadening and deepening the links between the two countries. Whether or not this occurs depends mostly on India's continued pursuit of economic reforms to enable it to play a role in the world economy more commensurate with its size and potential, but also on American willingness to eschew protectionist trade policies.

As the Bush administration nears the two-year mark, prospects that the world's two largest democracies will be able to maintain friendly and cooperative relations remain on the whole encouraging. In both capitals, there exists bipartisan agreement — in Washington between Republicans and Democrats and in New Delhi between the BJP and the Congress Party — in favor of an improved relationship. With India's representative government firmly institutionalized despite serious problems of corruption and — as in the United States — major campaign finance difficulties, the two countries share the values common to democracies. Although coincidence of national interests will remain the key factor in sustaining friendly ties, shared values matter — and this has become increasingly true between India and the United States. ■

ECONOMIC REFORM IN INDIA: HOW DEEP? HOW FAST?



Dana Cooper

ECONOMIC DATA APPEAR TO SUPPORT BOTH OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM, BUT A LOOK BEHIND THE NUMBERS REVEALS SEVERAL ENCOURAGING TRENDS THAT GIVE THE OPTIMISTS AN EDGE.

BY JOYDEEP MUKHERJI

It has become something of a truism that India's economic reform program is the key to the Indo-U.S. relationship. Accordingly, to the extent that India emerges as a magnet for profitable investment and mutual trade across a range of products and industries, U.S. involvement with India will necessarily quicken and deepen. But because economic trends in India appear to support both optimism and pessimism, it is not easy to put the reform effort embarked upon in 1991 into perspective.

Consider this: economic growth, as measured by the increase in gross domestic product, has been a steady

5 to 6 percent annually for the last two decades in India, impressive by global standards. India now makes and buys more cars than China, the only other nation with roughly comparable demographics, and is increasingly making its mark in high-technology industries. The Internet, for example, would be far less developed and less convenient to use without the contribution of Indian talent in software and telecommunications. At the same time, about one-third of all Indians cannot read or write and an estimated 400 million of them earn less than a dollar a day, the largest concentration of poverty in the world.

State governments are establishing new economic reform policies designed to attract foreign investment.

Will economic reform help shrink the gap between the two Indias and propel the country into the major leagues of world powers, and how fast can it do so? To answer that question we must look at the progress of several encouraging trends at work behind the data, so to speak, where economics and politics meet.

A Mixed Legacy

The persistence of mass poverty next to pockets of rapid modernization is a product of India's history. India gained political freedom in 1947, prior to other colonial countries, but its citizens and its private sector did not enjoy much economic liberty until barely a decade ago. In the first half of the 20th century, when British-ruled India still suffered from periodic famines, India's economy is estimated to have grown by only 1 percent annually. The economic growth rate rose to 3.5 percent annually during the 1950 to 1975 period as independent India, in common with most developing countries, pursued an inward-looking development strategy based on high trade barriers, a dominant public sector, and strict controls on both domestic and foreign investment. With government officials deciding on the allocation of resources, the result was poor investments and low economic growth. Corruption, inevitable when so much discretionary power is vested in bureaucrats and politicians, began to absorb more and more public resources, undermining the ability of the public sector to deliver health care, education and physical infrastructure like roads and electricity.

Decades of a low overall growth rate and poor public spending held the growth of per capita income to less than 2 percent annually from 1950 to 1990 in India, less than half the level of the developing world as a whole, including sub-Saharan Africa. Many Asian countries abandoned controlled, inward-looking economic strategies during the 1970s and 1980s in favor of export-led growth based on the private sector and market forces, rapidly surpassing India in reducing poverty. India, however, clung to its old economic policies until its government nearly defaulted on its debt in 1991. At that point, India began to gradually liberalize its economy by cutting trade barriers, removing restrictions on the private sector, lowering taxes, and seeking foreign investment. More recently, New Delhi began to privatize some of its government enterprises, including large energy, mining and telecom companies.

The legacy of India's pre-1991 development strategy was mixed. While the country failed to eradicate mass poverty, it did achieve food self-sufficiency and create the foundations of a modern economy, developing many pockets of excellence in education, technology and industry. The education system may have failed many, but since 1965 it has produced thousands of well-trained graduates annually, whose numbers are impressive in absolute terms even if they are a small share of India's one billion people. Those investments began to pay off handsomely in the 1990s as the economy was opened up to competition and businesses were deregulated.

A decade of gradual economic reform has created a vibrant private sector and growing private wealth, both in cities and in the countryside. New centers of growth, such as information technology and other service sectors, blossomed in the new deregulated economy. India's middle class has grown to reach perhaps 150 million today, a consumer market that is

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several times larger than the total population of many countries, spurring the growth of consumer industries competing to cater to their needs.

Encouraging Trends

The momentum for change will most likely continue in the coming years, thanks to several encouraging trends. First, India's vibrant democracy has helped advance the reform program. Much as in America, the democratic system may at times limit the pace of change by forcing reformers to painstakingly build coalitions across powerful interest groups and party lines to implement any new measures. But at the same time, democracy, and the country's federal system of strong state governments, have successfully spread the impulse for reform widely throughout India's political arteries, making the reform effort resilient and less vulnerable to reversals.

State governments are now playing a bigger role in undertaking economic reform, including establishing new policies designed to attract foreign investment. Competition between the states, long a common practice in America, is relatively new for India and the initial results are quite encouraging. The success of southern Indian states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in attracting investment in information technology has spurred politicians in other states to copy their practices. State politicians know that their voters are acutely aware of developments in other states, thanks to India's active and largely pro-reform media. In addition, a decade of growing prosperity has convinced much of India's increasingly assertive middle class to support deeper economic liberalization.

Second, India is uniquely well positioned to take advantage of the current globalization of the service sector, mainly because of its large pool of highly qualified human resources. As more of the economic output of developed countries comes from the service sector, more of the value of the products sold by major companies will consist of services embedded in them. Successful companies in the developed world shifted much of their manufacturing work during the last two decades to Asian countries other than India, in order to cut costs and maintain competitiveness.

The boom in the service sector has been better than had been expected only a few years ago.

The same competitive pressures will encourage them to shift more of their service work to lower-cost countries, helped by the Internet and better telecommunications.

India missed the earlier waves of export-oriented foreign investment in manufacturing that transformed many East Asian countries, especially China, into a huge export platform for multinationals selling to Western markets. (More than half of China's exports, for example, come from enterprises owned fully or partially by foreigners.) India was closed to foreign investment until recently, and its poor physical infrastructure even now deters many foreign investors who can locate to other countries with better power, roads, highways and ports. The service sector, however, is not as badly affected by such infrastructure handicaps.

India's large base of skilled manpower (who speak English), its Western-style laws and institutions, and easy telecommunication liuks with the outside world allow it to enter the global economy in the footsteps of other successful Asian countries through building a massive platform for exporting services. Indian and foreign companies are quickly investing in a range of industries such as software, call offices, back office work, accounting, medical transcription, and research and development.

Service-Sector Boom Shatters Stereotypes

The boom in the service sector has been better than had been expected only a few years ago. Exports from IT services grew 30 percent in the year ending March 31, 2002, to reach about $7.5 billion, despite a downturn in the dominant U.S. market, and are projected to reach $9.6 billion this year. Earnings from back-office and other IT-enabled services are estimated to have grown over 70 percent in 2001, to about $1.5 billion. Such IT-related services now employ 100,000 people; but employment may reach 1.1 million by 2008, generating more than $16 billion in exports, according to industry enthusiasts. The total IT-services industry, including software, back-office and other IT-enabled services, is projected to export $50 billion by 2008.

The political impact of the new IT industries may

be even greater than the economic impact, for they are shattering old stereotypes and creating new aspirations among Indians. The IT industry has provided a visible channel for lower-middle class and middle-class people to become wealthy through sheer talent and hard work, without resorting to corruption or relying on political or personal connections to get ahead. The lesson is important in a country like India where many decades of poor economic growth and heavy government controls over business had created a perception that wealth was usually attainable only through inheritance or through political shenanigans. The new IT millionaires, who are lionized by the Indian media and courted by Indian politicians, are indirectly legitimizing the capitalist pursuit of wealth through a market economy. Foreign investment in IT elicits no political opposition and is helping to slowly erode resistance to such investment in other sectors.

The political impact of the new IT industries may be even greater than the economic impact, for they are shattering old stereotypes.

To the momentum of current policies, and their political implications, must be added demographic trends. In the coming years these will give a powerful impetus to the reform process, making India a more open economy with growing trade and investment links with the outside world. Much of the country's current leadership in politics and business was born before independence while the bulk of the population is under 40 years of age. Generational change will soon bring new leadership at all levels of government that is less beholden to outdated ideas and more impatient to overcome India's economic backwardness on the global stage.

Tough Problems Remain

The economic changes during the last decade have been dramatic by Indian standards, reversing the country's isolation from the global economy and steadily unshackling its private sector. However, they did not put India on the very fast trajectory seen in some East Asian countries during their peak years of economic growth. India's GDP grew about 7.5 percent annually for two years in the mid-1990s in response to the initial stimulus of economic liberalization but soon slumped back to the pre-crisis growth rates of 5 percent to 6 percent annually as the pace of the first wave of economic reform decelerated. As in many other countries, the political will to undertake difficult reform measures weakened as the sense of economic crisis faded. The slow pace of economic reform keeps India from growing as fast as its potential, in turn slowing the pace of poverty reduction.

In particular, India has, so far, found it easier to nurture new companies in the private sector than to address deep-seated problems in the public sector, including in government institutions and in government-owned companies. For example, the combined budget deficits of India's central and state governments reaches a very high 10 percent of GDP, and their growing public debt has risen to around 75 percent of GDP. About half of every rupee of tax revenues going to the central government now goes to paying interest on the growing debt, leaving very little money for building schools, hospitals, roads and other urgently-needed infrastructure.

The failure of public institutions to provide adequate levels of such basic services makes it more difficult for many poor Indians to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by a decade of economic liberalization. Educated Indians can find lucrative jobs in the export-oriented service sector but illiterate Indians cannot. The lack of roads in many rural areas raises the cost of transportation, making it difficult for many farmers to sell their crops to the increasingly affluent urban market. The lack of reliable supplies of electricity prevents the development of cold storage and other facilities that could increase farmers' incomes by allowing them to market more of their perishable goods, spurring the development of rural industry and generating off-farm employment.

India's fiscal problems also constrain the growth of the agricultural sector, which provides employment for most people. Cash-strapped governments

have reduced public investment in irrigation, an essential ingredient in raising agricultural productivity and farmers' incomes. Agricultural commodities are still subject to laws that regulate their sale and movement, similar to those laws that restricted Indian industry until a decade ago. The Indian government recently announced plans to liberalize the agriculture sector, but progress is likely to be slow.

Democracy does not ensure that government policies will maximize economic growth, but it does help avoid extremes.

Make Haste, Slowly

In India, as in America, democracy does not ensure that government policies will maximize economic growth, but it does help avoid extremes. Indian policy-makers are shifting economic policies slowly in the right direction for promoting growth and prosperity, but are loath to abandon some populist policies that continue to weaken the government's own finances. As a result, the Indian economy can be expected to continue growing steadily at a respectable rate, around 5 percent to 6 percent annually, over the coming years. Based on current trends, the middle class may account for most of the population in several Indian states, especially in the west and south, within a decade from now. The gap between large pockets of poverty and the many enclaves of a modern dynamic economy will persist for some time, but the wealth is likely to become more and more widespread, thanks to continued economic reform.

The optimists are likely to be proved right about India, but slowly. ■

Seeking the Middle Ground: Indian Politics in Flux

Dana Cooper

After nearly 50 years of Congress Party rule, the rise of coalition government and a reinvigorated federalism are transforming the political equations in India.

By Walter Andersen

Watching a session of India's parliament provides a snapshot of the incredible complexity of both Indian society and Indian politics. Seats in the visitors' gallery are equipped with headsets that provide translations of the many languages being used on the floor of parliament. India recognizes 17 languages in its constitution, but there are over 30 languages that claim more than a million speakers, most of which belong to two very different linguistic groupings — Indo-European, spoken mainly in the north and center, and the Dravidian languages of the peninsular south. An inspection of the backgrounds of parliamentary members reveals the presence of representatives from across

the broad spectrum of Hinduism, as well as Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and others. Moreover, Hindus, though some 83 percent of India's billion people, are not a cohesive group; they are divided by caste, language, sect and region, as are other religious groups.

It is not therefore surprising that a coalition government made up of 24 partners governs this complex country. Beginning with the 1989 general elections, India's ninth since its independence in 1947, no party has won a majority of the 543 elected seats to the national parliament in New Delhi. All but one of the governments since the 1989 elections have been coalitions. This is a big change, however. For almost all of India's first 50 years, the Congress Party dominated the country's politics.

Though it never won a majority of the popular vote, the Congress Party won a sufficiently large plurality in India's first-past-the-post constituencies against a divided opposition to keep itself in power at the national level from the first parliamentary elections in 1951 to the exit of the last Congress government in 1996, with only two short-lived interludes of coalition government in between. It was inextricably linked with the freedom struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi, who had transformed the pre-independence Indian National Congress into a mass organization with a base in all parts of the country. Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi's choice to lead the Congress, was the first prime minister of independent India and remained in office until his death in 1964; during that long period he built up the groundwork for a state that was democratic, socialist, secular and nonaligned.

Today large parts of this legacy are being challenged, and the Congress Party has declined. Many of the party's supporters at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy — increasingly desperate for progress on basic bread-and-butter issues, and feeling left out of the economic reform plans — sought a better deal in new regional and caste parties, and the Bharatiya Janata Party, that rely heavily on appeals to identity. Though the Congress Party hit an electoral nadir in 1999, with its poorest parliamentary showing since independence, it has regained some stature with recent successes at the local level, and now controls 14 of the 28 state governments (though the biggest, most politically decisive states are not among them). But the drive and programmatic ideas necessary to rebuild support in the crucial Hindi heartland of north-central India seem lacking.

The Congress Party's steady decline and fall from power and the rise of the BJP-led coalition government at the national level prompted a host of dire predictions from commentators within and outside of India, most of them centered on the Hindu-nationalist character of the BJP. But although the BJP government has been criticized for not taking a sufficiently firm stand on the outbreaks of violence against the non-Hindu minority, the transition from Congress Party rule to coalition governments has, so far, been the harbinger of some surprisingly healthy developments in the body politic. First, the country's federal system has been rejuvenated: a meaningful decentralization of political and economic power to the state and local level throughout the country is under way. Second, a premium has been put on consensus-building: commitment to a search for the ideological center has become the standard for any political party seriously pursuing national power. The BJP-led government's stability and staying power are a measure of its grasp of these new realities.

Coalition-Building Key

The BJP, the dominant group in the current coalition government, was for most of its existence the quintessential outside party, seldom able to win more than 5 percent of the popular vote in parliamentary elections. As late as the 1984 parliamentary elections it won only two seats, before its electoral takeoff later in the decade. Jawaharlal Nehru had labeled the BJP's predecessor party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (founded in the early 1950s), a religious, communal party with no place in a country that was secular and had just experienced a violent partition prompted by appeals to religion. This stigma against the Jana Sangh/BJP stuck for decades. But a combination of superb organizational work, the collapse of the Congress Party in large parts of the country and a more sympathetic view of Hindu nationalism enabled the BJP to expand rapidly during the 1980s.

It emerged as the largest party in the 1999 elections

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with 183 of 543 seats (the Congress Party won only 113 contests). The BJP had already replaced Congress as the largest single party in the 1996 parliamentary elections, and polled almost as many popular votes as its rival (about 25 percent each) in the 1999 elections. But as the party on the outside, the BJP realized earlier than the Congress the necessity of building a coalition, and it finally succeeded in the 1998 elections. The National Democratic Alliance that formed around the BJP was a broad array of some two dozen parties united by their common desire to oust the Congress from power. The BJP's long-time leaders and colleagues, Atal Behari Vajpayee (prime minister) and Lal Krishna Advani (the deputy prime minister and home minister), astutely made compromises necessary to bring the various parties together under the NDA banner. Most significantly, the BJP leadership did not insist on including controversial elements of its Hindu-nationalist agenda — such as the construction of a temple dedicated to the Hindu god Ram on a site in Ayodhya also claimed by Muslims — in the NDA's program; it accommodated allies in key ministerial posts; and it selected its most conciliatory national figure, Atal Behari Vajpayee, as the prime minister.

India's federal system has been rejuvenated, and a premium has been put on consensus-building.

The NDA has proved resilient, despite its heterogeneous nature. Most of its constituents were satisfied with the usually contentious seat-distribution process for the 1999 parliamentary elections; the initial Cabinet selection process went smoothly and subsequent ministerial changes, including the most recent in July 2002, have not triggered revolts. The coalition has also survived such batterings as the violent Hindu-Muslim rioting in Gujarat in early 2002. Gujarat's state government, controlled by the BJP, was widely blamed for not protecting Muslim victims. Some NDA regional parties were very critical of

the national BJP leadership for refusing to replace the state's BJP chief minister afterwards, but only one small constituent group abandoned the coalition at the time of an unsuccessful censure vote against the NDA in parliament (though some coalition partners abstained from the vote). This incident put considerable strain on an alliance containing several regional parties that rely heavily on Muslim votes.

As the party on the outside, the BJP realized earlier than the Congress the necessity of building a coalition.

The fear of a Congress Party revival keeps the coalition together in the face of these challenges. Several of the larger regional parties in the NDA face the Congress as their chief local rival and do not want early elections at a time when the coalition might be in a vulnerable position. Moreover, some regional parties face a strong challenge from the Congress Party in state assembly elections in late 2002 and early 2003, and do not want to go into those elections alienated from the central government in New Delhi. Unless the BJP totally abandons the conciliatory approach it adopted when the NDA was formed, including a formally neutral stance on the Ayodhya temple issue, the NDA coalition is likely to survive its full five-year term, which ends in late 2004.

Holding the Center

The BJP's move to the ideological center at the time the NDA took shape aroused considerable criticism within the ranks of the party as well as from loosely affiliated groups that are collectively referred to as the "Sangh Parivar," a "family" of organizations around the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The RSS defines itself as a cultural organization that trains men and boys, almost all of them Hindu, to be on the cutting edge of social and political change. Its major objective is to create an enhanced sense of social solidarity and nationalism among Indians. Both Vajpayee and Home Minister Advani were once full-time workers in the RSS and retain close links to its leadership.

Criticism of the BJP's ideologically centrist approach was brought out into the open by the party's poor performance in the February 2002 local elections in four states, including the loss of its majority in India's mega-state of Uttar Pradesh (with over 150 million people). Charges that the Vajpayee government's efforts to placate its allies resulted in a demoralization of the party's Hindu nationalist cadre came from the party's right. These critics argue that the party had expanded rapidly in the early 1990s because it emphasized its Hindu nationalism agenda — especially the demand that a Hindu temple dedicated to the god Ram, one of the major deities of Hinduism, be constructed in the town of Ayodhya at a site widely believed by Hindus to be the precise place where Ram took human form. This issue, which had an emotional appeal that transcended caste and linguistic boundaries, was used by the BJP to counter the efforts of other parties that were mobilizing support based on appeals to caste and language loyalties.

The problem, however, is that the Ayodhya site was also occupied by the Babri Masjid, a Muslim shrine constructed by a Mughal general in the early 16th century and named after the first Mughal emperor, Babar. Many Hindus believe that a Ram temple was destroyed to make way for the Babri Masjid, and periodic efforts have been made over the past century to take control of the site. For some Hindus, the presence of a Muslim shrine was a humiliating reminder of the country's conquest by people of Islamic faith. In 1992, destruction of the Babri Masjid by a mob unleashed Hindu-Muslim rioting. In February 2002, communal rioting broke out in Gujarat after a train carrying Hindu pilgrims back from Ayodhya was torched. Most of the subsequent thousand-plus fatalities in Gujarat were Muslim.

The question of possession of the disputed site is now before the High Court of Uttar Pradesh, which has ruled that no construction activity is permitted while the issue is under judicial review. The Vajpayee government headed off a confrontation with Hindu activists in March 2002 by putting pressure on the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the organization leading the campaign to construct a Ram temple, to cancel an illegal consecration ceremony at the site. At the same time, several hundred Hindu activists were rounded up and violence was avoided. But the VHP's repeated statements questioning the court's authority and promising to continue their struggle make it clear that the issue is not resolved.

Looking to 2004

The BJP's electoral setbacks in early 2002 have strengthened the position of those in the party

demanding a more Hindu-oriented agenda. This was evident at the party's April 12 conclave in Goa, where the delegates refused to sanction the dismissal of the controversial Gujarat state chief minister, Narendra Modi, despite the demand of some NDA coalition partners that he be replaced. The party's executive also rejected Modi's offer to resign. Vajpayee reflected the conference's mood in an angry speech in which he said, "No one should challenge us about Indian secularism and no one should teach us about tolerance. We were secular even in the early days when Muslims and Christians were not here." The June 2002 appointment of Vinay Katiyar, a BJP politician who is from a historically disadvantaged caste and is closely associated with the agitation for a Ram temple, as the president of the Uttar Pradesh state party organization suggests that the BJP may use a Hindu agenda to broaden its support base in this key state once again.

Another significant BJP difference with the RSS is its approach to the current Indo-Pakistani crisis.

The Cabinet reshuffle in July 2002, also clearly aimed at important local elections late this year and the parliamentary elections in 2004, was apparently directed toward revitalizing the party's Hindu-oriented base. Advani, associated more closely with the Hindu agenda than Vajpayee, was named the deputy prime minister, and a close associate of Advani was appointed party president. These decisions confirmed Advani's status as eventual heir to Vajpayee, and may have signaled the BJP's intention to take a more active role in advancing the party's traditional Hindu agenda. Advani's elevation, however, does not threaten Vajpayee's position. The two men have worked closely together in politics for five decades and view themselves as a compatible team that has guided the party to the center of power. Advani deferred to Vajpayee in 1996 so that Vajpayee could become prime minister and has loyally stood by his side since then.

Nonetheless, the BJP walks a fine line between reviving Hindu activism and retaining the backing of its coalition partners. The party leadership clearly wants to enthuse the activists but they also must deal with the reality that the BJP is unlikely to win a majority on its own in the next parliamentary elections. Recent midterm elections suggest that it might even emerge with fewer seats than in 1999. The party will almost certainly need the support of coalition partners to form the next government and most of those prospective partners are strongly committed to secularism, as it is interpreted in India: no official favoritism toward any particular religion and refusal to accept religious categories as a legitimate basis for political action.

BJP vs. RSS

In rejecting the demand of the RSS that the parts of Kashmir with Buddhist and Hindu majorities (Ladakh and Jammu, respectively) be separated from the rest of the state, Advani upheld an essential element of Indian secularism: namely, that religion cannot be used as a criterion for political action. The RSS proposal flies in the face of the Indian political mainstream's aversion to the two-nation theory (one Muslim, and the other Hindu) that India's founding fathers rejected. (That theory, adamantly held by the Muslim League and given the nod by Britain, had led to the disastrous partition of the country.) It would also violate the notion of India as a multicultural country. Though the RSS and BJP have differed on this and other significant issues, neither organization is likely to abandon the other anytime soon. The BJP needs the active support of the cadre from the RSS and its affiliated organizations during election campaigns. And for the RSS, the BJP is the political party that best represents its views in the political arena.

Another significant BJP difference with the RSS is its approach to the current Indo-Pakistani crisis, sparked by the Dec. 13, 2001, attack on India's parliament by masked gunmen. The RSS called for immediate aggressive action against Pakistan, charging that it supports cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and within India itself. Vajpayee, though reacting to the attack on parliament by implementing a policy of coercive diplomacy toward Pakistan, has demonstrated patience in giving international diplomacy a chance to stop this cross-border movement. In May 2002 the parliament unanimously affirmed its backing for whatever steps the Vajpayee government takes to stop cross-border terrorist activity. This political unanimity makes it dif-

ficult for any single party to take credit for defending the country from terrorism. The crisis, moreover, did not play a role in the early 2002 state elections, which revolved around local political issues.

The BJP also differs from the RSS in its approach to economic reform. The RSS, whose support is historically rooted in the north Indian urban trading class, is not opposed to domestic reforms but is against efforts to make India a more active player in the global market place. Before coming to power in 1999, the BJP itself criticized the move away from economic self-sufficiency, but changed its stance when it assumed power. Rejecting the opposition of the RSS and the right wing of his own party, Vajpayee successfully pushed for such controversial proposals as opening the Indian market to foreign direct investment in insurance and the print media. The prime minister and his key economic advisers apparently believe that a more active involvement in the world economy offers India significant advantages: access to high technology and investment believed necessary to sustain a high economic growth rate, a more effective voice in international economic decision-making, and an enhanced international standing generally. This government, like its immediate predecessors, however, is reluctant to make the politically tough decisions to encourage substantially greater foreign (and domestic) investment, such as privatizing the current inefficient system of electrical power distribution and reforming labor legislation that gives the government highly intrusive powers.

Coalition governments and economic reforms have cumulatively worked to decentralize political and economic power. States in India's federal system command more economic and political power than they did during the long years of the Congress Party dispensation. How this revitalized federal system will affect party politics is not yet certain.

What is certain is that coalition politics will continue for some time, forcing any serious aspirant for political power in New Delhi to avoid ideological extremes. ■

INSIDE THE INDIAN FOREIGN SERVICE



Dana Cooper

AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, THE INDIAN FOREIGN SERVICE IS ONE OF THE OLDER AND BETTER-ORGANIZED DIPLOMATIC SERVICES. AN INSIDER DISCUSSES THE IFS'S ORIGINS AND CURRENT CONTOURS.

BY KISHAN S. RANA

Among the countries of the developing world, India has one of the older and better-organized diplomatic services. Part heir to the 'Political Service' of the renowned colonial Indian Civil Service, the Indian Foreign Service was established in 1948, a year after independence. From the outset the IFS was imbued with a sense of uniqueness and relative isolation from the rest of the central government, due primarily to the circumstances of its creation as virtually a personal project of India's first prime minister, the urbane and worldly national movement leader Jawaharlal Nehru.

In 1946, on the eve of independence, Jawaharlal Nehru articulated India's commitment to approach the world with "clear and friendly eyes" and spoke of the newly liberated country's right to choose an external policy that reflected its independence and was not a pawn in the hands of others — the basic policy of nonalignment. Nehru functioned as his own foreign minister for his entire prime ministership, from 1947 until his death in 1964. It was Nehru who set up the Indian Foreign Service and, with his towering personality and penchant for micro-management, stamped it indelibly with his style as well as his worldview. For nearly two decades, both the IFS and the Ministry of External Affairs basked in Nehru's reflected glory.

It is not our purpose to discuss the Nehruvian foreign policy legacy, but some instances of his passion for detail help shed light on facets of the Indian Foreign Service. It was not unusual, for example, for Nehru to write replies to incoming cipher telegrams from ambassadors, which were then sent out in the name of heads of territorial divisions, or even their deputies. In the very readable memoirs written by Badr-ud-din Tyabji, former ambassador and secretary in the MEA, *Memoirs of an Egoist* (Roli Books, 1988), this has been described as the syndrome of the time: "leave it to Panditji" — pushing up all decisions to Nehru, however minor.

Working on the staff of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1981-82, I came upon a set of long notes exchanged in the mid-1950s between Nehru and the Civil Service head of MEA, called the Foreign Secretary in Indian terminology. Nehru sent him a four-page note describing the criteria that should be applied to the selection of ambassadors. The Foreign Secretary sent a two-page rejoinder the same day, gently pointing to the practical difficulties in finding ideal choices, to which Nehru sent a further long response the next day. No decision was taken, the more so as selection of envoys was principally the prime minister's prerogative, with the Foreign Secretary acting as his adviser. The exchange reflected Nehru's passion for philosophical debate and his speed of thought, but also a certain disinclination for hard decisions.

The fact that for the first 30 years new entrants had to rank among the top 20 to 40 individuals in the Union Public Service Commission annual combined Civil Services examination merit list, out of the 20,000 to 40,000 who sat for the exam (which was the only entry route into the high civil services, including the sister service, the Indian Administrative Service), reinforced the sense of elitism.

In recent years career opportunities in India have greatly expanded. Yet the civil service, and the IFS in particular, continue to attract top talent. What are the contours of this diplomatic service today? What are its strengths and weaknesses?

The IFS Today

Structure. The first thing to note about the Indian Foreign Service is that it is exceptionally small in size, by comparison with not just India's needs but also the functions performed. To operate some 115 embassies and permanent missions and 40-odd consulates abroad, plus man the MEA, there are only some 750 officials of the rank of desk-officers and above (i.e., third secretaries and higher). By comparison the "tail" is much longer, consisting of about 2,800 non-diplomatic support personnel, according to the MEA *Annual Report* published each March.

MEA simply does not have the personnel it needs for vital tasks, and the number of missions abroad is too large. Ideally, looking to the experience of other major services, the ratio of officers at headquarters to missions should be around 1-to-1.5 or -2: in India it is 1-to-4. The IFS cadre needs urgent expansion to at least 1,000, and with it a pruning of support staff, via upgrading many to function as junior desk officials. With this must come also a reduction in the number of missions and posts. But as long as assignments abroad are seen as an essential "right," vested interests block these cutbacks.

The results are plain to see. Public diplomacy, for example, is in its infancy in India, not because its methods are not understood, but because the structure for handling this work does not exist. Today, the official heading the external publicity division is the MEA spokesperson; this same person heads the entire publicity and

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information apparatus, and handles some aspects of public diplomacy as well, as there is no dedicated unit for this purpose.

Further, although all but one of the foreign ministries of the 19 countries of the E.U. and the G-8 have carried out structural changes since 1990 to cope with changes in the post-Cold War world (according to a comparative study by the Italian Foreign Ministry), MEA has so far limited itself to adding a new territorial division to handle relations with the strategically important Central Asian countries. Deeper structural change has yet to materialize, though some reforms are under consideration.

From the outset the IFS was imbued with a sense of uniqueness and relative isolation from the rest of the central government.

There has always been an abundance of ideas — the problem is with action! The initiative of External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to re-examine the Service's structures, set into motion at the end of 2000, was moving slowly toward concrete action until he and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha swapped jobs in July, and it is now unclear if the planned actions will be implemented. These included creation of a Foreign Service inspectorate (vital to undertake periodic inspection of all missions, ensure uniformity of standards, and help to enhance their performance) and placement of IFS officials within the administration of some states to help in their international contacts. There are also plans to expand the strength of the cadre, though not to the level needed; that would require a major decision of the government, especially to link the expansion with cuts in the support staff.

Still, there is some expectation that the Jaswant Singh initiative may yet lead to some real improvements; the new minister has not revealed his thinking as yet. The recent reform proposals echo suggestions contained in the Pillai Committee Report of 1966, the only public document on the IFS and its reform. But the exercise that Jaswant Singh launched was different in one important respect — it was the first effort that originated at the ministerial level, and from within MEA.

Training. Training for new entrants has improved dramatically in the past 15 years, with the establishment of the Foreign Service Institute in 1986 in New Delhi (set to move to its new campus in a year or so), and with a continuous improvement in training content. New entrants spend three months attending a common foundation course with all other entrants to the civil services for that year at the National Academy of Administration, located in the Himalayan hill-resort town of Mussourie, and then come to the Institute for a year. Their program encompasses lectures, workshops and visits to many partner agencies, including formations of the army, navy and air force. It also calls for about five months of travel to different locations in the country to see the challenges of economic and social development, as well as two separate tours to neighboring countries. Concerning languages, new recruits undergo training in the assigned foreign language at the first station of assignment, and are confirmed in service after passing the language test.

What the IFS misses, however, is mid-career training — the Institute does nothing at all at this level, nor for senior officials. MEA is simply not able to spare anyone.

Recruitment and personnel management. The examination system for selection of civil servants, administered by the Union Public Service Commission, now has some 300,000 applicants annually competing for about 300 to 400 jobs in all the "central services" — the other services are the Administrative Service, the Customs, Audit and Accounts, and the Police Service. The written exam is at two levels, with only about 20,000 who qualify at the first stage (the serious candidates) appearing for the second exam. Within a couple of months after the results announcement, all Civil Service entrants join the "foundation course" at Mussourie mentioned earlier, and thereafter separate to attend training at their own services.

The IFS takes an average of around 10 new entrants each year, though in 2001 the number was stepped up to 18. A notable feature of recent years is the progressive widening of the intake — in terms of the regions and groups represented, the educational background and the presence of rural candidates. Around 20 percent of new recruits are women.

British colonial administrators borrowed the concept of a single open examination for the Civil Services from China. It has provided India with a stable, unified administrative structure, which has its faults — princi-

pally that it has become a vehicle for corruption, and a victim of political pressures, and the two are intertwined — but no one has come up with a remotely comparable or viable method of selection for new entrants into the Service.

Human resource management is the key issue for all organizations, the more so for diplomatic services that mainly deal in intangibles. Throughout the Indian administration promotion by seniority is the norm; the only obstacle to promotion is outstanding incompetence. Since 1950 the constitutionally-mandated affirmative action policy of reserving 22.5 percent of government service jobs for individuals from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes has been in effect. Now some even demand that this policy ought to apply also to promotions.

Against this background, maintaining the traditional systems of rotation among "hard" and "soft" posts and motivating individuals to perform their best are challenges. Many of us lament that the system does not work optimally, but we should be thankful that it works at all.

A Learning Curve

Like many other diplomatic services, the MEA is still on a learning curve when it comes to coping with the new domestic players in diplomacy. Today as it shifts from the classic gatekeeper role in external affairs to that of the privileged coordinator, every foreign ministry has to handle three broad clusters of players — the official agencies beyond the foreign ministry, the non-state agents (chambers of commerce, academic institutions, think tanks, NGOs and the like), and the ordinary citizens who too are involved players in virtually every country. (The best definition of these new roles is provided in the opening essay by Brian Hocking in the book he has edited, *Foreign Ministries: Change & Adaptation* [Macmillan, 1999].)

All government agencies are autonomous actors in the foreign arena. They will accept the foreign ministry as a coordinator only if they perceive this brings value to their interests and concerns. It is entirely possible for the Indian foreign ministry to do this, but to win credibility it

AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association • October 2002

EYE ON REFORM

Renewing Esprit de Corps

AFSA's Foreign Service Reform Initiative has already served as a catalyst for the adoption of a number of significant personnel reforms over the past year. These reforms have covered a number of key areas, including: making the Foreign Service Core Precepts less risk-averse, adopting a leadership and management training requirement, and expanding promotion opportunities for Foreign Service specialists.

The latest effort seeks not so much to change the personnel system, but to breathe new life into the concept of esprit de corps in the Service. AFSA believes it is time to renew Foreign Service morale, and has proposed that the director general send a letter to all new Foreign Service employees outlining the rewards and challenges of a Foreign Service career. The goal of the letter would be to enhance the sense of pro-

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PREMIERE OF "AMBASSADOR: UNDER FIRE OVERSEAS"

AFSA Works with National Geographic on TV Special

■ BY TOM SWITZER, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

National Geographic held promotional screenings of its new TV special, "Ambassador: Under Fire Overseas," at the State Department Aug. 21 and 22. Attendees included some 400 department personnel, AFSA President John Naland, AFSA Governing Board Treasurer Amb. Thomas Boyatt, and several AFSA staffers. Producer Robin Goldman warmly thanked AFSA for its substantial advice and support over the past year. This superb documentary premiered nationally Sept. 4 on PBS.

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AFSA SUPPORT FOR COLEAD

Promoting U.S. Engagement Abroad

■ BY SHAWN DORMAN

AFSA members may not realize that a unique and growing coalition of foreign affairs organizations is headquartered at AFSA and works closely with AFSA on efforts to support U.S. engagement abroad. The Coalition for American Leadership Abroad (COLEAD) is a broad-based non-profit organization dedicated to furthering well-informed public debate about international issues affecting U.S. interests and supporting adequate resources for foreign affairs. There are currently 44 organizations, including AFSA, that make up COLEAD. The main purpose of the coalition is to foster "engagement in world affairs and the strengthening of American diplomacy," says COLEAD president and former FSO Harry Blaney III.

AFSA was largely responsible for the creation of COLEAD in 1995, and was one of the eight founding members of the coalition. At that time, AFSA leadership was focusing on the debate about American

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AFSA FINANCIAL AID SCHOLARSHIPS

AFSA Eases College Costs for 70 Students in 2002

In addition to the Academic and Art Merit Scholarship Program for high school seniors (covered in the July *AFSA News*), AFSA sponsors need-based renewable financial aid scholarships every year for

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AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

AFSA Efforts to Make Family-Friendly State Jobs a Reality

When asked to name the single most important thing that the State Department could do to retain its employees, respondents to the State Department's March 2002 employee satisfaction survey put "permit greater flexibility in work hours, job share, telecommuting, and other family-friendly issues" just behind "pay me more" in terms of importance. Responding to this, AFSA undertook three actions based on our belief that employees could benefit from more information on the opportunities available for family-friendly assignments and how to take advantage of them.

First, AFSA convinced the State Department to include — for the first time — information on alternative work schedules in the annual Open Assignments message. That 2003 assignments cycle guidance now says:

"Overseas posts and domestic offices are authorized to allow employees to work on alternative work schedules (3FAH-1 H2331). Another family-friendly option is job sharing. Bidders interested in job sharing need to identify another person interested in taking a half-time job and then contact the bureau to determine if there are openings for which a job share is appropriate. Part time opportunities may also occasionally be available as an alternative to leave without pay, if there is no ability to fill a position full time. Bidders should contact individual bureaus and posts to determine if any of these plans are, or could be, offered."

Second, to assist employees in identifying bureaus that have adopted family-friendly work schedules, AFSA obtained from State a list of bureaus utilizing flexible work schedules and/or compressed work schedules. Unfortunately, the list is not broken down by Foreign Service/Civil Service employees or by positions, but it may still give employees some sense of which bureaus are most open to flexible-hours programs. We have posted it for reference at www.afsa.org/news/family.html.

Finally, AFSA now announces the creation of a discussion forum on the AFSA Web site where bidding employees can exchange information on flexible work schedules or seek out other bidders for job shares. That forum is in the members-only section of our Web site at www.afsa.org/secure/corridors/ which can only be logged into by AFSA members whose names and e-mail addresses are in our database (if you cannot log in, please e-mail member@afsa.org to update your e-mail address in our records or, if needed, to join AFSA). Once on the site, click on the discussion forum entitled "State Career Corner." You can also access this site via a link at www.afsa.org/news/family.html.

Reminder: AFSA Governing Board Election

Nov. 14 is the deadline for nominations of candidates to run for the AFSA 2003-2005 Governing Board. See the call for nominations in the September *AFSA News* or contact Susan Reardon by phone: (202) 944-5505 or e-mail: exec@afsa.org for more information.

To all AFSA members: Please make sure AFSA has your correct mailing address so that we can send you an election ballot. All address changes must be in by Dec. 1. You can change your address by using the card in this issue, sending an e-mail to member@afsa.org, or making changes directly on the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org/directory.cfm.

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National Geographic • Continued from page 1

In a candid look inside embassies around the world, this program reveals the uniquely demanding — and sometimes dangerous — challenges facing America's ambassadors. More than a dozen U.S. diplomats are interviewed, as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Four ambassadors in different regions grant intimate access to their daily lives, revealing what diplomacy means to them personally, and how their lives and families are affected by the realities of their chosen career.

Amb. Prudence Bushnell, featured as the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, is used to difficult situations. She was previously ambassador to Kenya, and survived the 1998 bombing of Embassy Nairobi. "I've come to realize that terrorist acts are a part of modern life and part of being an ambassador is never letting your guard down," she said.

This is something that Amb. Wendy Chamberlin also realized as she arrived at her new post in Islamabad, Pakistan, just one month before the Sept. 11 attacks last year. Chamberlin shares details of her historic meeting with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in which he sided with the U.S. in the war on terrorism. But when Chamberlin's two teenage daughters were forced to return to the United States for security reasons on a second evacuation, she faced a wrenching decision: her post or her family. She decided to leave her assignment early.

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BOOKFAIR 2002

The Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide invites you to visit the 42nd annual BOOKFAIR. BOOKFAIR will be held in the Exhibit Hall of the State Department from Oct. 18–27. Open to employees, retirees (with retiree passes) and spouses, and escorted guests Oct. 18 from 2-5 p.m. and Oct. 21-25 from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. Open to the public the weekends of Oct. 19-20 and Oct. 26-27 from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. Questions: call (202) 223-5796 or (202) 362-6514.

V.P. VOICE: **STATE** ■ BY LOUISE CRANE

Congress and the Foreign Service

Sometimes I think Rodney Dangerfield's "I don't get no respect," sums up the feelings of many Foreign Service employees about Congress. It resonated with me during the July debate on whether or not the visa functions should be removed from the Bureau of Consular Affairs and moved into the Department of Homeland Security. Some members of Congress made unflattering and unfounded remarks about the lack of dedication in the ranks of the Foreign Service when it comes to issuing visas. The gist of the argument was that all Foreign Service officers are wannabe ambassadors who see working the visa line as something to be gotten over with as quickly as possible. These comments were then echoed on the op-ed pages by several so-called "experts" on the Foreign Service.

Since those debates, I have been wrestling with the question of how we can get some respect from Congress for the Foreign Service. One way is to get some "face time" with members of Congress when they are on official travel overseas. Visits by congressional delegations help broaden Congress' outlook on foreign affairs. In addition, they can offer an opportunity for Foreign Service personnel to inform Congress about issues unique to government employees working abroad. The next time a codel is scheduled to come to your post, try to get a session with the "troops" on the notional schedule. If the schedule's too full, try enlisting someone at post to speak with the delegation on behalf of the Service to raise issues of concern such as locality pay and spousal employment.

I continue to wrestle with the question of how to get more respect from the Congress for the Foreign Service.

The attention Congress has been paying to the consular function warrants our increased efforts to call to their attention the work we do on behalf of American citizens every day around the world. If you are especially proud of your efforts to help a stranded citizen, let me know. AFSA will be happy to inform the appropriate representative or senator of how the Foreign Service helped his or her constituent.

At the same time, you receive a lot of congressional correspondence, many asking about visa cases. One refrain I heard many times in July: "Who are they to criticize how we issue visas? They're the ones who always criticize us for denying visas, asking us to overturn denials and make exceptions for their constituents."

But these congressional inquiries are one way that citizens can get the attention of the bureaucracy. There are fewer and fewer live voices at the end of our telephone calls to the government. Government at all levels has grown increasingly faceless, which is where Congress comes in. Citizens write to their representative to protest some act of the bureaucracy or to grab the bureaucracy's attention.

AFSA works the Hill for you. We write letters and brief Hill staffers. You can contribute, too. Write a letter to your congressional representative (remember not to use government time, equipment or supplies) or encourage your family to write on your behalf. I was impressed with a recent letter the parents of a junior officer on a consular hardship tour wrote to a particularly acerbic congressional critic. This letter, and others like it, can help. □

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Continued from page 2

AFSA Seeks Post Reps

As the transfer season draws to a close and you settle into your new job, consider volunteering to be your post's AFSA representative. AFSA reps can help protect the interests of Foreign Service employees overseas, and serve as a vital link between AFSA and AFSA members overseas. Post reps can be instrumental in solving quality-of-life issues at post, and AFSA headquarters stands ready to be of assistance.

For details about becoming an AFSA rep, go to www.afsa.org/postreps/index.html or contact the AFSA membership office by e-mail: member@afsa.org or phone: (202) 338-4045, ext. 525.

USAA for Specialists

AFSA reminds Foreign Service specialists that the USAA Insurance Company has agreed to open up its membership to them during the fourth quarter of this year. That decision was made in response to a request Secretary Powell made to USAA earlier this year at AFSA's suggestion. State's Bureau of Human Resources is coordinating with USAA and, once the details are set, HR will send out a message informing specialists how to contact USAA.

We have had inquiries from retired specialists asking whether they can join USAA. Unfortunately, the answer is no. Under USAA's rules, only active service personnel can become members. This means that retirees — former enlisted military, FSOs and Foreign Service specialists — cannot join if they have not previously been members. However, once you have joined, you can remain a member after you retire.

Welcome to New Membership Rep

AFSA welcomes Lindsay Peyton to the AFSA staff as the new Membership Representative. Lindsay is a recent graduate of George Mason University. She has worked as a legislative assistant and campaign coordinator for Virginia House Delegate David Albo and spent about three years working for Tech 2000 Inc., where she was the database manager and process writer. Lindsay can be reached at (202) 338-4045, ext. 525 and her e-mail address is Peyton@afsa.org.

AFSA President to Call on Foreign Service Retirees in Florida

AFSA President John Naland plans to meet with members of the Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida during their annual meeting on Nov. 9 in Mt. Dora, Fla. The FSRA of Florida has about 850 members and is the largest FSRA in the country. Read more about the FSRA of Florida in the letter to the editor from the group's chair, retired FSO Irwin Rubenstein, in this issue of the *Journal*.

DACOR Conference on India

Diplomats and Consular Officers, Retired (DACOR) is hosting a conference "India: 21st Century Superpower?" on Oct. 11 at the World Bank Auditorium in Washington, D.C. For more information, contact DACOR at (202) 682-0500.

Record Interest in Foreign Service Careers

A record 33,497 people signed up to take the Sept. 21 Foreign Service written exam. This is about 10,000 more than signed up last year, and 21,000 more than the year before. Minority registrants reached an all-time high at 40 percent of the Sept. 2002 registrants.

Donate to FSYF through the CFC

This year, you can donate to the Foreign Service Youth Foundation through the Combined Federal Campaign. FSYF's designation number is 8488. Employees may give as a payroll deduction or make a one-time contribution. The FSYF appreciates each donation. For more information about the FSYF, go to www.fsyf.org or call (301) 404-6655.

Open Enrollment for Long-Term Care Insurance

The open enrollment period for the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program runs through Dec. 31. The decision about whether to enroll is a complicated one and depends on your individual needs. AFSA urges members who decide to enroll to research the options offered through the federal government program and look at other options as well to find the best program and price. There are resources available that can help in the process.

The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program is administered by Long Term Care Partners, LLC, a joint venture company between John Hancock Life Insurance Company and MetLife, the country's largest carriers of group long-term care insurance.

During the open enrollment period, Long Term Care Partners, in cooperation with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), is conducting an LTC insurance education campaign. The OPM Web site contains information about LTC insurance: go to www.opm.gov/insure/ltc. Certified LTC insurance consultants are available to answer questions at the toll-free number: 1 (800) LTC-FEDS (800-582-3337). Information is also available at www.ltcfeds.com. The Web site offers online applications and an interactive calculator to provide customized price quotes. The AFSA Web site also has information on LTC insurance, at www.afsa.org/retiree/ltc.html.

The Federal Employees News Digest has put together a free report covering the key points to consider before purchasing long-term care insurance. It can be downloaded from www.fendonline.com/LTCreport.html.

Fund for American Diplomacy joins CFC

For the first time, federal workers can now designate their Combined Federal Campaign pledge to the Fund for American Diplomacy (FAD), AFSA's public education and outreach charity. The FAD supports efforts to educate diverse audiences about the role of diplomacy and the significance of foreign policy, and how they influence U.S. economic prosperity and national security. FAD programs are highly varied, from week-long education programs for seniors through Elderhostel to a national high school essay contest on the role of the Foreign Service. No AFSA dues go toward FAD programs. The FAD is listed under the CFC's "Educate America!" Federation. The FAD CFC number is 2460.

You can also donate to the AFSA Scholarship Fund through the CFC (CFC number 2422). Most federal agency deadlines for CFC donations are in December. The State Department's deadline is Dec. 13. Retirees can now make CFC donations via a check or through an annuity deduction. Contact Lori Dec at dec@afsa.org or 1 (800) 704-2372, ext. 504 for more information.

Open Season for Health Insurance and TSP

The open season for changing your health insurance policy runs through Dec. 10. For more information, go to www.opm.gov/insure. Open seasons for the Thrift Savings Plan run from Oct. 15 to Dec. 31, and from April 15 to June 30. For TSP details, go to www.tsp.gov.

Family Member Matters: Call for Writers

AFSA is seeking contributors for the Family Member Matters column, which runs every other month in *AFSA News*. Family member writers should focus on particular issues of concern or interest to Foreign Service families. Examples include employment, security, evacuations, health care overseas, and any of the numerous lifestyle issues unique to the Foreign Service. Columns that address ways family members overcame obstacles or hardships are particularly welcome. We also welcome looks at the lighter side of Foreign Service life, and humor is encouraged. Submit your 400- to 500-word essay to *AFSA News* Editor Shawn Dorman at Dorman@afsa.org. There is no deadline. All submissions are seriously considered, and authors of selected submissions receive a $60 honorarium. □

V.P. VOICE: **USAID** ■ BY JOE PASTIC

Let's Plan for Promotions

The 2002 promotion results were similar to the 2001 results. Overall, 12 percent of the USAID Foreign Service (119 people) was promoted this year, compared to 11 percent in 2001, 8 percent in 2000 and 1999, and 9 percent in 1998. The most notable difference this year is the large number of promotions from FS-02 to FS-01.

We extend sincere congratulations to our colleagues who won this year's crapshoot. Hold on there! How dare I refer to this most important ritual with disrespect? Because it has been impossible to give helpful guidance to the many members who have asked me how they too might get promoted. I am not referring to colleagues who could be accused of laziness or lack of dedication. These are people who have been in grade many years and have been ranked for promotion more times than not. Among these people are those who have served prominently on high-profile task forces, others in positions above their personal grades.

The hopefuls ask for clues to the promotion mystery. Many have been regularly top-ranked, but still, are always the bridesmaid. We cannot just blame the agency or the panels. The agency tries every five years to overhaul the process. The panel members are mostly our own, and the public members are sincere and try to do the right thing.

Structure can come from a multiyear promotion plan.

Each year the agency dutifully implements all reasonable suggestions collected from panel debriefings. Some ideas are not pursued because implementation of them would require legislative change or consultation with Congress. I'd like to lay out one of those ideas that I find compelling.

Panels presently base certain vital initial decisions on only the most current evaluation, representing only the past year. The first decision is whether to send an employee's file for review by the Performance Standards Board. The second decision — heavily influenced by the current-year evaluation — is whether to rank the employee for promotion. In doing this, the panels also refer to the previous five evaluations, but they are free to interpret these previous evaluations in their own way.

The important factor now absent from the process is the reference point. The employee, rater, appraisal committee and promotion panel all need structure and reference points when reviewing past-year performance for promotion consideration. Structure can come from a multiyear promotion plan. Prepared jointly in advance by the employee and agency workforce planning/career development experts, such a plan would set forth critical milestones and benchmarks that, once accomplished, objectively and concretely establish that portion of the employee's "proof" of promotion eligibility. It would follow that each employee not be considered for promotion each year, but at the completion of his or her promotion plan. Intermediate-year review would focus on a critique of plan progress and to single out unsatisfactory performance.

Employees with tangible guides for assignments, skill areas, and benchmarks — motivated by the promotion associated with those accomplishments — will not only have the benefit of managing their own careers but will also be more inclined to take responsibility for their success or lack thereof. To work, this approach requires motivated employees and sufficient agency workforce planning resources and commitment. AFSA will provide motivation to the Foreign Service. Can the agency provide the resources and commitment? □

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Hopeful Signs for Upcoming Legislation

CAPITAL GAINS: AFSA's legislative affairs staff has been making the rounds on Capitol Hill to push for inclusion of Foreign Service members in new capital-gains tax legislation. AFSA has been working with the Uniformed Coalition and the American Bar Association to amend the tax code to remove the capital-gains tax penalty against Foreign Service and military members who cannot meet the 2-in-5 years residency requirement. Thanks primarily to the support of Senators John McCain, R-Ariz.; Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont.; and Ranking Member Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, the Senate is expected to pass a bill, S. 2816, that covers both the military and the Foreign Service. Adding to the chances for success of the effort is the fact that Secretary Powell has been involved from last year, at the request of AFSA, and has written several letters at key points to senators in support of the effort.

Because the House earlier passed a bill covering only the uniformed military, AFSA has been meeting with key House members to seek their support for

including coverage for the Foreign Service in the final version of the bill to be negotiated at a Senate-House conference committee.

HOMELAND SECURITY: As you all know, the House of Representatives has voted to leave the visa function in the State Department, rather than moving it to the Department of Homeland Security. The Senate Government Affairs-reported Homeland Security bill, which should be voted on in September, does not propose to move the visa function out of State either.

LOCALITY PAY: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has still not decided if it will seek legislation to extend locality pay (now only available to employees in Washington) to overseas Foreign Service members. AFSA understands that Under Secretary for Management Grant Green recently re-emphasized to OMB the importance of acting on this in the upcoming FY 2004 budget cycle. AFSA has locality pay at the top of our legislative agenda and will keep you apprised of developments.

VIRTUAL LOCALITY PAY (of interest to employees nearing retirement) and PIT RETIREMENT BENEFITS: These are included in the FY 2003 Authorization bill. While the House still needs to appoint conferees, AFSA is optimistic that this bill will pass in the fall. □

Reform • Continued from page 1

fessionalism, responsibility, service and esprit de corps and to help prepare new employees for the practical demands and rigors of Foreign Service life. It would reinforce and perpetuate a distinctive Foreign Service culture characterized by Service discipline, dedication to duty, and patriotism.

AFSA sent the first draft of a proposed letter to members requesting feedback and input. Nearly 100 members responded, and the final draft reflects their input. AFSA sent the proposed letter to Director General Ruth A. Davis on Aug. 2, and is awaiting a response.

Excerpts from Proposed Letter:

"The Foreign Service is more than just a job: it is a demanding and rewarding way of life. The rewards and challenges of a career in the Foreign Service are unique. The Foreign Service has a vital mission and a proud history. It was established to provide the president with a dedicated and skilled corps of professionals who possess keen understandings of the affairs, cultures, and languages of other countries and who are available to serve in assignments throughout the world as ordered. Foreign Service members work closely with other colleagues on the State Department team and at other federal agencies to accomplish the State Department's mission of creating a more secure, prosperous and democratic world for the American people. Diplomacy is an instrument of national power, essential for maintaining effective international relationships, and a principal means through which the United States defends its interests, protects its borders, responds to crises, and achieves its international goals.

"The Foreign Service is a distinct corps of employees from whom more is expected and to whom more is given. There is a balance between the rewards and challenges of this service. While even the challenges contain elements that attract many people to the Foreign Service, it is important that you understand the commitment that you will be undertaking.

"Those of us who have spent many years in the Foreign Service have found that the rewards of representing our great nation have far outweighed the demands laid upon us. I am confident that you will have the same experience. In joining this corps of dedicated Americans, the expression 'the United States of America' will take on a new meaning and importance for you. You will become part of something greater than yourself, something that began in 1776 when our first diplomat Benjamin Franklin set sail for Europe. You will see the world in a way most others can only dream. You will make your family and friends proud and perform an invaluable service to America. Welcome to the Foreign Service and the State Department team!" □

FS VOICE: **FAMILY MEMBER MATTERS** ■ BY KELLY MIDURA

Now Why Would I Want to Go There?

There has been much discussion lately about the lack of bidders on "hardship" posts. It's clear that many people consider today's FSOs to be wimps, interested only in cushy, career-enhancing posts in the developed world.

There is another reason officers aren't bidding on the Ouagadougous of the world: spouses are crossing them off the list. I certainly have, after asking myself the following questions:

Should we bid on a hardship post for the sake of my husband's career?

I have seen no evidence that service in hardship posts accelerates a State career. On the contrary, it seems that the best way to get promoted is to serve in highly visible places with highly visible people. It does not appear to matter how hard it is for an officer (or his spouse) to accomplish the most basic tasks during a hardship posting.

I have seen no evidence that service in hardship posts accelerates a State career. It seems that the best way to get promoted is to serve in highly visible places with highly visible people.

Should we bid on a hardship post because it's our turn?

We have served at four hardship posts, including one of the poorest countries in the world, one of the most devastated by AIDS, and one of the most crime-ridden, followed by one tour in Washington and our current post in Europe. Yet the next time we bid, my husband will be "eligible" for Fair Share, categorized with officers who have spent most, if not all of their careers in non-hardship posts. How is this "fair?"

Should we bid on a hardship post for the money?

By the time we bid on our next overseas post, we will be in Washington, D.C., with a child entering college. I will be fully employed in D.C., but would have little chance of that status overseas. Why would I give up my salary just in time for tuition bills? In addition, my husband's salary would probably drop: today's piddling hardship differentials usually do not even match Washington locality pay. Free housing does not make up for a lost second income and the considerable expenses of relocating and living overseas.

Should we bid on a hardship post to broaden our horizons?

I learned a great deal during our tours in Latin America and Africa, but I often did not know what I was getting into when we bid on those posts. When we bid on Zambia in 1991, we relied on an outdated post report describing Lusaka as a "clean and attractive city." (Neither was true.) Nowadays, I can read *Real Post Reports* (www.realpostreports.com), post queries on discussion lists such as AAFSW's *Livelines* (www.aafsw.org), and e-mail spouses at post. My research is no longer restricted to materials provided by State, and, in the case of many hardship posts, I conclude that I've been there and done that.

So, why would I agree to bid on hardship posts when there is no compelling professional, financial or personal reason to do so? Hardship assignments should be compensated not only by generous pay and career incentives for officers, but tangible support for spouses, such as support for portable careers and decently paid, professionally challenging embassy employment. At the moment, no substantial reason exists for anyone with a family to bid on these "hard-to-fill" assignments. If State wants to encourage officers and their spouses to bid on hardship posts, it would do well to address bread-and-butter issues that matter to families, and stop admonishing officers who simply have their priorities in the right place. □

Kelly Bembry Midura is a Web site designer and writer who has accompanied her husband, Chris, a public diplomacy officer, to La Paz, Guatemala City, Lusaka, San Salvador, Washington and Prague.

FOREIGN SERVICE YOUTH AWARDS CEREMONY

Honoring Teens for Volunteer Work

The 2002 Foreign Service Youth Awards were presented on July 25 in the Treaty Room of the Department of State by Under Secretary for Management Grant S. Green. These prestigious annual awards are given to Foreign Service teens who have contributed significantly to their communities, while facing the challenges of an internationally mobile lifestyle. The award program is organized by the Foreign Service Youth Foundation, the Department of State's Family Liaison Office and the Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide. The awards are sponsored by Harry M. Jannette International and Wood-Wilson Company, Inc. of Dallas, Texas.

First-place award winners Anne and Eva Kolker (ages 15 and 13) were recognized for helping orphans in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Eric Wanner (17) also received first place, honored for his commitment to the teen population at his post. Eric developed a first-of-its-kind Teen Community Liaison Office Program. Each first-place winner received a $1,000 U.S. savings bond.

Honorable mention recipients were Tristan Allen in Pretoria, South Africa; Chelsea Hudson in Havana, Cuba; and Joseph Jackson in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Under Secretary Green also presented a Certificate of Appreciation to Michael Yamamoto for an Eagle Scout project he designed to help raise international awareness in his Virginia community. □

Q&A

Retiree Issues

BY WARD THOMPSON, RETIREE LIAISON

Health Benefits

Q: Why should I pay attention to the upcoming Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) open season?

A: It is always important for employees and retirees to study open season materials carefully. FEHB open season runs from Nov. 11 through the end of December for retirees. Although most members do not change plans, there may be changes in the plans that you should be aware of, not only in premiums but also in deductibles and copayments or coinsurance for particular services. The administration told carriers to try to constrain premium increases in 2003 by considering an increase in out-of-pocket costs for services or to adjust deductibles or co-pay waivers. Carriers were also told that any benefit increases must be cost-neutral through offsetting benefit reductions. Members, especially retirees with Medicare, should look carefully at prescription drug copayment rules.

For more information, go to www.opm.gov/insure and click on FEHB and open season 2003.

Q: Why aren't there better dental and vision benefits?

A: Except for HMO packages that include dental coverage at no extra cost to members, for years FEHB plans have not been allowed to add or increase dental or vision benefits. This derives from the long-standing government philosophy favoring traditional hospital, surgical and medical benefits and protection against unforeseeable health care expenditures. Some plans do offer separate dental and vision benefits outside the FEHB program.

Q: Why the pressure on premiums?

A: The industry-wide trend toward higher health care costs continues to be pushed by prescription drug costs and, recently, escalating hospital costs. Underlying these factors, according to the administration, are technological changes, increased consumer demand, health plan consolidation and increased provider leverage.

Q: How can our COLA be smaller than the percentage increase in health premiums?

A: The annual cost of living adjustment (COLA), applied to federal annuities and Social Security benefits, is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), in which medical costs constitute only one of several elements, most of which have not been hit by inflation. Health care costs are an increasing burden for people on fixed incomes.

Q: Is it true that employees pay lower FEHB premiums than retirees do?

A: Federal workers have had a "premium conversion" benefit since 2000, whereby they pay for health insurance premiums with pretax dollars, thus reducing taxable gross annual income. Federal annuitants were excluded from the program because their entitlement to the benefit was not made clear under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. AFSA supports legislation to remedy this inequity.

Q: If Medicare is my primary payer, why do I pay the full FEHB premium?

A: The FEHB program, based on the entire pool of eligible federal civilian employees and retirees, uses a single set of premiums which already reflect variations in health care needs as age and family situation change, as well as expectation of outside coverage including Medicare. As you qualify for Medicare and/or long-term care, it becomes even more important to look at costs and benefits of your FEHB plan as a part of your coverage mix. □

National Geographic • Continued from page 3

"This is not a career-enhancing move," she said, "but I'm a mother first."

In Tokyo, one of newly appointed Amb. Howard Baker's first official duties was offering — in person — our nation's apology to the families of the victims of the fatal collision of an American submarine and a Japanese fishing ship. Baker's presentation of his credentials to the emperor of Japan in an ornate ceremony is also shown.

Meanwhile, first-time ambassador Robert Royall learns the ways of Tanzania, his new home, in a crash course. But it's not all pleasantries and protocol. With extreme poverty, terrorist threats, and strained relations to contend with, ambassadors must learn much more than how to entertain foreign heads of state.

> We were pleased to facilitate the production of this outstanding documentary, which presents some of the most positive images of American diplomats seen on U.S. television in recent years.

AFSA is grateful to National Geographic for doing an excellent job of explaining to the American people exactly what their diplomatic corps does to advance our vital national interests. We were pleased to facilitate the production of this outstanding documentary, which presents some of the most positive images of American diplomats seen on U.S. television in recent years. More information about the special is available at www.nationalgeographic.com/tv/specials/ambassador. □

Scholarships • Continued from page 1

undergraduates. For the 2002-2003 school year, AFSA has bestowed $123,500 in undergraduate financial aid awards to 70 students who are children of Foreign Service employees. The students must maintain at least a 2.0 grade point average, take at least 12 credits a semester, and attend a U.S. accredited college or university. Awards range from $1,000 to $3,000 and are payable to the school. Awards are intended to reduce loans and work-study and cannot reduce any grant the school is providing to the student.

Financial aid scholarship money comes from individual donors as well as from organizations and trusts. For example, DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) annually provides $30,000 to AFSA for aid to juniors or seniors majoring in foreign affairs. This year 13 students received the DACOR awards. Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide (AAFSW) contributed $8,000 to fund eight $1000 scholarships. The following trusts bestowed several awards in their names: Oliver Bishop Harriman Memorial Scholarship, Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, and Dorothy Osborne Xanthaky and Theodore Xanthaky Memorial Scholarship.

AFSA continues to add two or three new perpetual scholarships each year from individuals who leave bequests in their wills, want to honor a loved one, want to give to AFSA while living, or want a tax break. Establishing a perpetual scholarship is a great, and permanent, way to pay tribute to the Foreign Service: only the interest from the original donation is used as the award while the principal remains protected in perpetuity.

AFSA financial aid scholarships were awarded to 64 students last year. AFSA's policy is to help the neediest students with higher award amounts. Each family's financial situation is assessed using the College Scholarship Service PROFILE, which can be found at www.collegeboard.com.

Applications for AFSA scholarships are available Oct. 1 and are due at AFSA by the following Feb. 5. For an overview of the AFSA Scholarship Program, application information, and a complete listing of the 2002-2003 Financial Aid Awards, go to the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org, and click on the "Students" tab and then "Scholarships." For more information contact AFSA Scholarship Director Lori Dec at dec@afsa.org or (202) 944-5504. □

Q&A

Personal Finances

BY CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER MARY GINN

AFSA is proud to announce the first edition of a new Q&A feature designed to address personal financial issues facing Foreign Service employees around the world. In April's Foreign Service Journal, *we asked you to send in your financial questions related to investments, retirement planning, saving for your children's education, property management and any other related topics. After reviewing the questions received from readers so far, AFSA's Advertising and Circulation Manager Ed Miltenberger chose expert Mary Ginn, who has been an independent financial consultant for nearly 20 years, to answer them. Please send further questions to Ed at miltenberger@afsa.org.*

Q: My wife and I have paid Virginia taxes and voted in Virginia since 1988, when I purchased a house there. I have been posted overseas since 1990, renting out our home until the tenants purchased it in July 2002. We used the proceeds from this sale to buy a condo in Colorado in July. Will we have to pay taxes when we sell the house in Colorado?

A. You will have to pay federal and Virginia state taxes on the sale of the rental house in Virginia, unless this was a Starker Exchange. For the Colorado house you will not pay federal or state taxes if it is your primary residence for two of the last five years of ownership and if the capital gain is less than $250,000 for single and $500,000 for a couple. A rental property incurs a federal tax liability of 20 percent of the capital gain and 25 percent of all depreciation.

Q: Would our taxes be lower if we switched our legal state of residence from Virginia to Colorado? If so, how can we do that?

A. Yes, the taxes in Colorado appear to be lower. (A state-by-state breakdown is included in the AFSA Tax Guide published each February in *AFSA News*.) To obtain residency in Colorado, you will need to obtain a driver's license, register to vote and open a bank account there. Be sure to notify Virginia that you have done so by using federal Form 8822.

Q: When I attended the Retirement Seminar a few years ago, about 20 percent of the participants were considering living in a country other than the United States after retirement. What are some of the financial/tax implications of retiring overseas?

A. If you are working outside the United States, foreign earned income of less than $80,000 per year is not taxable once you have lived overseas for 12 consecutive months (though you may spend up to 35 days of that period in the U.S.). However, you are supposed to pay taxes in the country of residence on all income, including investment income derived from offshore accounts. Also, no matter where you live, you are required to report any income from non-U.S. sources to the IRS if you are a U.S. citizen.

If your spouse is not a U.S. citizen, that can have additional estate tax consequences which need to be carefully considered. These may include a limited marital deduction, as well as estate and investment ramifications. □

COLEAD • Continued from page 1

involvement in the world, concerned that America might take a turn toward isolationism. As stated in the COLEAD charter, "Coalition members share a deep concern about the increasing absence of public interest, awareness and understanding of international affairs. We believe that over the longer run, this lack of understanding will have serious negative consequences for U.S. policies and programs abroad. The Coalition will work to overcome ignorance about world affairs in America and promote educational programs to redress this problem."

The debate about the role America should play in the post-Cold War world has taken on increased significance in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The coalition members believe that the foreign affairs community must answer the growing criticism of American engagement abroad and encourage new approaches, while improving its communications with the American public. The coalition seeks to bring together the foreign affairs community, at the national and grassroots level. AFSA retirees who have returned to American communities across the country are especially well placed to become involved in COLEAD efforts to broaden support for American engagement in the world.

Among the 44 member organizations are the Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide (AAFSW), the American Academy of Diplomacy, the Academy for Educational Development, the American Public Health Association, CARE, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the National Peace Corps Association, the Henry L. Stimson Center, and the United Nations Association of the USA.

Coalition members share concern about the insufficient levels of funding for U.S. international programs, and they lobby Congress to increase the funding for State Department operations, cultural diplomacy, the Peace Corps, international development programs, and other foreign affairs efforts. Coalition members meet often to discuss strategy, working closely with AFSA's legislative affairs staff. Key areas of focus for the COLEAD include: protecting the global environment; promoting sustainable development and resource use; dealing with non-proliferation and enhancing security; expanding world trade; and promoting human rights.

Last October, COLEAD and the State Department co-sponsored the "National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations," which brought together leaders of the foreign affairs community from inside and outside government to dialogue about support for U.S. foreign policy goals. Secretary Powell addressed the 400 participants, and the conference was broadcast on C-SPAN. Topics included human rights, international health issues, regional issues, and international trade issues.

Relative to other sectors and interest groups, the foreign affairs community is fairly small and does not have significant financial resources. COLEAD is helping this community gain a stronger voice, and is the only broad-based association of foreign affairs organizations. If you are part of a group that might want to join COLEAD, or if you want more information about COLEAD activities, go to the Web site at www.colead.org; e-mail colead@afsa.org; or call (202) 944-5519. □

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needs to cultivate an inclusive attitude, and modify the past mindset of exclusivity and the corresponding turf-warfare reflex. There are exceptional senior MEA officials who are able to get other ministries on board on specific issues, but this is not the general practice as yet. Cooperation with non-state players is good in some areas, such as with the apex bodies of business and some branches of non-official international organizations, but almost nonexistent with high-profile NGOs and human rights activists.

Though performance enhancement methods, many of them borrowed from business management, have crept into the diplomatic work arena, the infrastructure to maximize productivity is not uniformly in place. Methods to improve performance encompass annual action plans, benchmarking and service optimization (for example, in consular work, public affairs, and commercial promotion). MEA uses annual plans, but has not got around to tying resources into these, or carrying out a real delegation of financial powers. (This is a general weakness of the Indian system: even the budgeted funds of ministries, duly approved by parliament, can be spent only with the approval of the Finance Ministry, either directly for big-ticket items, or through the "financial advisers" it appoints and supervises in each ministry.) A ministry-wide computer network does not exist, though most territorial divisions have their own local area networks; they do not talk to one another, or to the higher officials. An intranet or virtual private network linking MEA and the missions remains on the drawing board.

Strengths and Weaknesses

What are the accomplishments of the IFS, and its points of strength? What might one expect from this set of professionals? My comments are necessarily subjective, because within a "brotherhood" one may not find the distance for dispassionate scrutiny, and also because there exist no real tools for comparing foreign ministries and diplomats. With these caveats I offer the following.

Indians are individualists for the most part, and this

shows in a huge variation between the best and the worst among diplomats. Major missions are natural concentration points for talent, not just at the level of the head of mission. Anyone who has dealt with Indian counterparts in Washington, D.C., New York or Paris will bear witness that the best can hold their own against anyone. But if the true measure of a good system is that it evens out the peaks and troughs by elevating the performance of the lower half, then the IFS has a way to go.

The IFS is exceptionally small in size, by comparison with India's needs and the functions performed.

In multilateral diplomacy during the 1970s and 1980s, in what we might call the heyday of declaratory diplomacy, Indians seized the high ground at conferences, U.N. assemblies and committees — alas, not all of it very productively. In bilateral diplomacy, which is necessarily practiced on a much broader canvas, there are the bright stars, and the rest. And it is often noted that the discrepancy between the peaks and troughs of ability and performance among different persons is glaring. Management and business culture specialists observe the same trait of individualism, and a relative weakness at teamwork, when they look at the Indian corporate world.

One of the strong features of the IFS was an early shift to economic diplomacy. The first oil shock of 1973 delivered a body blow to the Indian economy at a time when it had barely recovered from the disastrous droughts of the late 1960s (when P.L. 480 provided succor, before the Green Revolution became a reality), and from the Bangladesh War of 1971. Economic diplomacy became a matter of survival for India, and the IFS adapted rapidly, quickly learning to blend political and economic objectives, and practice integrated diplomacy.

The service produced role models like Bimal Sanyal and Vishnu Ahuja, both senior heads of MEA's Economics Division, who demonstrated that being proactive involved a vast amount of internal diplomacy with the other ministries and agencies, but reliably produced results. The two mobilized public-private partnerships at home, at a time when even this concept was in its infancy, to push for project and consultancy contracts in the Gulf region, and to win placement for Indian technicians. Simultaneously, they motivated Indian missions to blend political and economic diplomacy, a craft I, too, learnt in my first ambassadorship in Algeria (1975-79). Today there is hardly a diplomat or a mission that fails to treat economics as virtually the first priority at the majority of posts, on the premise that good political relations are a given condition in most countries but it is economics that explores the full envelope of action, and valorizes the political relationship as well.

Is there an Indian negotiating style? Stephen Cohen, one of the gurus of South Asia scholarship in the U.S., has a brilliant chapter in his book, *India: Emerging Power* (Brookings Institution, 2001), titled "The India That Can't Say Yes." Cohen's thesis is, first, that Indians are intent on establishing the moral and political equality of the two sides and are especially touchy over "status"; second, they are patient and will wait till the terms improve; third, they negotiate for information; and fourth, they tend to have a good institutional memory, better than that of the Americans. Cohen also speaks of "a defensive arrogance and acute sensitivity to real and perceived slights," and concludes that India seems to relish "getting to no." He adds that MEA has tight control over foreign negotiations and is difficult to bypass.

Behind the "Indian Negotiating Style"

Some of the above criticism comes from experience with India-U.S. relations of the pre-1991 era, when India's South-centered diplomacy (including leadership of the Nonaligned Movement, G-77 and the like) produced inevitable confrontation with much of the West. However, Strobe Talbott, whose 10-odd rounds of discussion with Jaswant Singh between 1998 and 2000 are the most intensive dialogue carried out by India with the U.S. or any other partner, may not agree with all of Cohen's characterization.

Indian negotiators are often hemmed in by an impossible brief, which is relatively rigid, to the point that no fallback positions are provided or flexibility given to the negotiators. The result is "positional bargaining" and an impression of negativism. For example, this was the case in the past with WTO meetings and other multilateral economic fora. By contrast, at Doha in November 2001, a strong Cabinet minister leading the Indian delegation, with the personal clout to obtain flexible instructions, managed to produce a good result, overcoming the rigidi-

ties of the brief and past policy.

Many individual negotiators are brilliant, adept at winning trust and working to achieve results. And generally, in multilateral settings Indians are often a popular consensus choice as rapporteurs and committee chairmen. But in regional diplomacy, being adept at tactics is not enough when policy has been unimaginative or defensive. This has been the case, for example, in India's past stance vis-à-vis ASEAN, when opportunities for close association were passed up in the 1980s. Defensiveness has crippled India's approach to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, where a fear of all the smaller neighbors ganging up blocked innovative ideas to overcome the impasse created by Pakistan's obduracy.

Indian negotiators are often hemmed in by an impossible brief.

India's economic reforms, launched in 1991, coincided with the end of the Cold War. Both have affected the way India looks at the world, and the goals it pursues externally, in bilateral, regional and multilateral settings. India remains nonaligned in the original sense of the term, but real Indian involvement with NAM and G-77 has waned. Instead, there is a clearer perception of self-interest, and a willingness to say so. This translates into hard-headed pragmatism, where ideological rhetoric of the past is absent, and does not cloud actions. This is especially visible in pursuit of eco-political objectives. In the Sept. 11 attacks, India finds vindication of the battle it has long waged against terrorism, plus the opportunity to pursue new relationships in Central Asia and elsewhere that move beyond a fixation with Pakistan.

As a service, the IFS has no political bias and it is well harnessed in the pursuit of national goals. Yet it has the latent capacity to perform far better, provided that real reform can be implemented in the MEA and its processes incrementally — for that is the only "Indian way" that produces results. ■

Opportunity and Challenge: Indian Foreign Policy Today

Dana Cooper

New Delhi has been working on its post-Cold War priorities with measured realism, but uncertainties abound in the new period of adjustment.

By K. Shankar Bajpai

The pulls and pressures of both the world at large and domestic factors always condition the pursuit of foreign policy, but from its birth as an independent nation in 1947 India was obliged to function under the overwhelming demands of the former. The Cold War was for so very long the central fact of international life as to severely limit India's search for an independent role. The deceptive lull following dissolution of the Soviet Union, misconceived as the end of history, had barely allowed a reorientation to get under way before the explosion of terrorism imposed its own still indefinite demands. On the whole, New Delhi has been working on its post-Cold War priorities

with measured realism, but uncertainties abound in the new period of adjustment.

The evolution of ties between India and America, still nascent, represents one of the more productive new elements in each country's thinking. It also brings out many of India's major issues. The exploration of military cooperation between the two illustrates a major shift in India's approach to international strategic engagements. The opening up of India's economy, while far slower and more limited, and driven (and constrained) more by internal considerations than the more necessary calls of globalization, also has a significant eye on the American market. Drugs, AIDS, the environment, globalisation and economic inequities, weapons of mass destruction and the whole range of nuclear proliferation problems — all these great global issues on which multilateral action is needed are also being intensively discussed. (Despite being seen by many American policy-makers as a proliferator, India actually shares their concerns over looming dangers.)

The same is true of relationships of mainly bilateral concern to India but which are so full of wider international aspects, or imponderables, as to be incapable of clear-cut national handling. These issues are as varied as China's future role, developments in the Persian Gulf area and their enormous impact on India's economy, and, of course, the great new international approach to terrorism. Delhi has become far more conscious of and active regarding relations with countries to its east; and the problems and opportunities of Central Asia are a new, still inchoate but increasingly active set of inputs into planning.

In addition to the India-U.S. relationship, which is dealt with extensively, and magisterially, elsewhere in these pages — the following issues are at the top of India's foreign policy agenda: Pakistan's antagonism, and the related need for reconciling the compulsions of the global war on terrorism with the terrorism directed at India; the stability, or lack of it, of the South Asian neighborhood; and the growing problem of India's energy needs.

Past as Prologue

To get a practical grasp of the thoughts, attitudes and objectives that shape India's approaches to its post-Cold War priorities and challenges, it is useful to review the historical roots of India's foreign policy-making. The factors that determined India's international interactions when it took charge of its own destiny 55 years ago are still, to some degree, operative today. Those influences start with the persistent, never-fulfilled, desire for *policy-making autonomy*. Whether working for autarchic economic policies, or working out nonalignment, India's intellective classes felt independence was incomplete until we could develop a foreign policy that was entirely Indian. This longing was frustrated by the compulsions of the Cold War, which erupted almost simultaneously with our independence. Hence, partly, the aversion toward partnerships, military or economic, and the touchiness about outside interference in bilateral relationships. The realization that such freedom of choice is simply not available to anyone anymore — that we came, in fact, to a party that was already over — is still to work its way through India's collective consciousness.

An *innate isolationism* reinforced this urge to act alone. Historically, India was a world unto itself, acted upon from outside rather than reaching outward itself. India did once have an outside presence — witness Angkor Wat or Borobudur, the Indian-inspired monuments in Cambodia and Indonesia, respectively — and its frontiers were never as all-inclusive or protective as many like to think. But these were essentially trading links, and do not alter the basic fact that India never sought to act outside those natural frontiers that its inhabitants felt defined its unity. Indeed, the only Indian name, used since Vedic times, to cover the regions that constituted the traditional concept of India is "jambu-dwipay," or the great island. Initially used cosmologically, it reflects the way Indians have usually thought of their land, as cut off from the rest of the world. Considering both the number of invasions India endured prior to independence and the active role in

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world affairs it has taken since, this element may be hard to accept, but the average Indian's preference for not engaging with the world abroad has been a significant factor in our thinking.

The nature of India's *nationalist movement*, specially the influence of Gandhi, is also important. Non-violence seemed all the more relevant an ideal after the horrors of World War II, which strengthened the conceptual aversion to the role of military force, notwithstanding Delhi's resort to its use, and molded India's views on issues ranging from military alliances to disarmament and the U.N.'s role. After two great wars, a widespread idealism flitted briefly across the world, and hopes of a new world order based on international law and multilateral institutions were not confined to the underprivileged states. Both its own traditions and the state of the world, with another war threatening, encouraged a feeling that a new message was needed and India might just have it. To dismiss both the notion and its believers as humbug is easy enough, but that would depreciate the strength and sincerity at work therein, and ignore the extent to which moral preachings were the currency of the day.

Another powerful influence was *anti-colonialism*. Almost the first, and largest, colonized country to gain independence, India felt its freedom was partial and vulnerable until all colonies were freed. Decolonization was a top foreign policy priority, and remained so despite much friction with many powers. Almost as influential was socialism, universally the doctrine of the colonized. Not only was socialism popular in the culture of the 1920s to 1940s that formed most anti-colonial leaders, but socialists in the imperialist countries were the first few friends the nationalists had anywhere, and socialist principles seemed the fairest way to meet the terrible inequities of society in the colonies.

Above all, however, was the imperative of *maintaining unity*. Indians had always been told that they were too full of diversities to be able to keep together when the cementing force of British rule was removed. Indian nationalists dismissed this assertion as imperialist divide-and-conquer tactics, and held to a profound belief that we were all brothers, and that whatever differences our colonizers exploited would disappear with them. Yet India's new leaders were unable to meet the crucial challenge of Hindu-Muslim relations. The idea that the area between the Himalayas and the ocean constituted a coherent whole had animated its inhabitants and outsiders alike for millennia. The nationalist cause was deeply rooted in history as well as idealism, with tens of millions of India's Muslims sharing in the vision. But it was hard to define; it had to be felt from within. Compared to this almost mystical sense of India's unity, the cold, hard logic of the argument for partitioning India on communal lines sounded simple and persuasive, as India was to find to its continuing cost. (The irony was that in the majority of the areas in what was finally to be Pakistan the local leaders were opposed to partition, but the Indian nationalists gave in and accepted it.) There was no way any line could have been drawn fully separating the two communities, even if all Muslims had preferred to opt out. The ensuing horrors were to have lasting consequences in embittering attitudes between the two — eventually three — new states, but the strongest effect on policy-making was to leave a profound commitment to maintaining, first and foremost, the unity of what remained of India.

New Elements

Much has changed, especially in the world in which India must willy-nilly make its way. India's world-view remains strongly rooted in the circumstances in which it emerged on the international scene, yet it is not as though we are mired in the past. There is sufficient adaptability to seek ways that are better suited to current and forthcoming needs and purposes. Strategic and economic realities are stimulating new thinking, if as yet tentatively, and striking new elements are already at work.

Some change is evident in economic thinking, for example. A powerful private sector, a tradition of entrepreneurship, the erosion of economic frontiers with the evolution of a global economy, the growth of new technological and brainpower-based businesses at home, and the evident failure of state-controlled economies worldwide have gradually opened up our ways of doing business. As remaining constraints wither, India's place in the international economy will become a major element in its foreign policy. The slowness of change, however, marks the persistence of old fears and faiths. For instance, though anti-colonialism would seem a part of the past, and there is no burning issue to keep up the good fight, the apprehension of "neo-colonialism," and particularly "economic imperialism," is not negligible. It strengthens the inwardness that constrains India's readiness to interact with the world in ways appropriate to its size and capabilities, not to mention its national interest.

One dramatic new factor is India's realization of the need for military strength. Britain had developed India as a base of power, relying on it for extension from Suez to Hong Kong; and at the end of World War II India had one of the largest armies in the world, and one of the world's largest industrial bases. The potential to be a significant military power was deliberately rejected. India was accused of hypocrisy, of using military power readily enough — in Kashmir, in Hyderabad, in Goa — but it really took the 1962 conflict with China to drive home the need for an effective military, though the thinking has remained defensive. The development of a nuclear weapons capability and delivery systems has introduced still incalculable dimensions to India's potential military role, and many questions about the theory and practice of military power await development.

One dramatic new factor is India's realization of the need for military strength.

While hesitantly mentioned, the concern for unity — both territorial and political — remains the most potent of the historic influences at work today. India's political evolution is one of history's most remarkable achievements. No democracy has ever encompassed so many diversities — religious, linguistic, racial, regional — and in such huge numbers. Yet within a couple of decades after independence India empowered ever wider sections of the underprivileged of its society, compressing processes of democratization for which the established exemplars of the system needed generations, and usually bloody revolutions. India has witnessed more than its fair share of violence, but has managed to go a very long way toward consolidating its unique nationhood mainly through peaceful means. Some of the sharpest challenges — separatist extremism in the Tamil and Sikh communities — have been met, but others remain, mainly in the Northeast and in Kashmir. Though colonialist prophecies of disintegration left marks on Indian minds, the issues involved are now sensibly discussed, and the overcentralization of power in New Delhi is no longer considered necessary to restrain "fissiparous" tendencies — indeed, it is now widely seen as an impediment to the further development of a vibrant nationhood. Still, the old underlying fears are politically live and act to prevent the degree of devolution that might best meet the present challenges. While this is mostly a matter of domestic arrangements, it becomes vitally relevant to foreign policy because of the Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir.

Current Challenges

India's development as a military power, which offers so many possibilities for its role both as a fellow worker with the United States and as a stabilizing factor in its region in its own right, also complicates a major issue for New Delhi's policymakers: relations with neighbors. South Asia, as it is now commonly called, was essentially a unified conglomeration under British rule: Nepal was proudly, if only technically, independent, Sri Lanka had a separate link with London, and Bhutan enjoyed lack of defined status; but together with present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and India, they were all dominated by the Raj in Delhi in practically the same ways. Once independent, they feared India was out to dominate them afresh. The suspicion of Indian hegemonism, usually accompanied by perceived advantages from India-bashing for domestic political purposes, deprived the region of all the immense benefits of working together for a whole host of common purposes — communications, weather forecasting and flood control warnings, health, drug control, sports and, above all, economic ties. All the infrastructure of fruitful interaction that existed before India's independence was willfully abandoned, with all states of the region looking in every direction except toward each other.

In the last two decades, with regional cooperation being developed elsewhere in the world wherever possible, the South Asian version — the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985 — has been overdue, tentative and woefully limited, and India bears a heavy responsibility for this. Indo-Pakistani differences are a built-in brake on progress and, sadly, except for Bhutan and the Maldives, and to some extent Sri Lanka, the neighbors have almost enjoyed seeing India in conflict rather than working out advantageous cooperation with New Delhi. This is particularly unfortunate in economic matters, especially in the field of energy. Nepal's great hydroelectric potential, and Bangladesh's huge natural gas deposits, provide the basis for a truly impressive regional take-off, but the psychological hang-ups are beyond the reach of reason. (Americans should know something of the irrationalities one has to deal with among neighbors if one is — by a very, very long way —

the biggest power around.) While illustrating the continuing hold of outdated notions, they make the production of a sensible framework of South Asian cooperation a key objective for Indian diplomacy.

Hitting India's national interests in more direct and far-reaching ways is Pakistan's attitude toward India. Until the events of last Sept. 11, the mess Pakistan was making of its own affairs and interest in India for other reasons had begun to overcome international susceptibility to the simplistic arguments of Muslim separateness. Whether India's case was better understood or not, there was little support left for Pakistan. Sept. 11 had the paradoxical effect of changing this by making the creators and employers of the Taliban beneficiaries of the new international campaign against terrorism. It is, of course, an old Wild West tradition to co-opt the gunslinger into the posse — and the Afghanistan intervention has resembled nothing so much as a Wild West outlaw hunt writ large — but as the continuing victim of the gunslinger, India may be forgiven for wondering how it is expected to embrace him. We have been put in a fix, and dealing with it is by far the most pressing and serious of our issues.

The Kashmir Impasse

Whether the militancy in Kashmir is Pakistan-controlled or arises from the manifest dissatisfaction of many Kashmiris with New Delhi can be argued endlessly, but two facts are incontrovertible: one, Pakistan could not succeed as well as it does without such genuine dissatisfaction with India's rule; and two, New Delhi could work out settlements with the Kashmiris tomorrow if there were no Pakistani-directed terrorism from outside. India has to meet Kashmiri aspirations; it has unquestionably mishandled the situation and must remedy it, but this is its domestic duty. In relation to Pakistan, what emerged from partition cannot be tinkered with now without incalculable consequences.

Whereas sanctifying the status quo is the maximum concession New Delhi can envisage, Pakistan seeks a basic change in the status quo. The continuing terrorism

inflicted on India is the most effective weapon Pakistan has ever found to pressure India: like most states, India is unable to develop graduated responses to this new instrument of policy, and has been driven to threaten the ultimate sanction of war. While presently defused, the resulting crisis remains dangerously risky. The international community — that euphemism for America — therefore increasingly urges India-Pakistan talks. This seemingly reasonable, practical, even inevitable view is the "continuing cost" India pays for the oversimplified view of its complex, almost tortuous case. That case is not simply that cross-border terrorism has to stop before any new talks can begin, but also that Kashmir cannot be dealt with in isolation. Attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute, while necessary to meet Pakistani compulsions, cannot be on Pakistan's insistence that such a solution is a prerequisite for détente. On the contrary, the attempts have to be part of a process that embeds the issue in the wider context of détente, which alone can create changes of circumstances in which the issue can be sensibly discussed.

Had Pakistan agreed to what India learned from its experience with China — namely, that if you cannot resolve your main difference it helps to develop relations in other fields — there might today have been positive elements at work to prevent things from getting out of hand. Instead, there are none whatsoever — no pressures at work within either government, or country, no sense of benefits from a changed relationship, no trust in each other's bona fides and no dialogue. Even matters both sides have an interest in sorting out are left out — for example, avoiding nuclear miscalculations or accidents. We are talking to each other through America, which is a major change for an India historically opposed to foreign involvement. However vehemently New Delhi may insist that Americans are only a channel of communication (not mediation), it is only American involvement alongside India's show of resolve that can have any effect on stopping cross-border terrorism and creating the basis for talks, and it is up to New Delhi to make the most of this reality. This working out of the U.S.-Pakistan-India interconnections is a formidable diplomatic undertaking.

Beyond the Region

Similar challenges, albeit less pressing, could arise in other areas of potential cooperation with the United States. India's energy needs are growing, and will grow even faster as its economy grows. Already dependent on imports for 80 percent of its energy, India will have to compete with other growing economies. The security of the Persian Gulf, India's main supplier, is thus even more important for India than for America, but presents a classic example of how commonality of interests may be less compelling than differences over means. America has relied, as its chief regional instrument for stability, on Saudi Arabia, from where untold harm has been done to India by the funding of Islamic extremism; whereas India has worked closely with both Iraq and Iran, both of which are anathema to Washington. India fully supported the Gulf War, but paid heavily for it with the evacuation of 350,000 Indian workers from the region and loss of their remittances, and astronomical oil prices. No one in the Indian leadership holds any brief for Saddam Hussein, and as already noted, India is in agreement with America over the dangers of spreading weapons of mass destruction; but the problems that could arise from another war in the region need no elaboration.

India is often thought to have great power ambitions as well as pretensions. Loose rhetoric in India may encourage this notion, but it is not something animating India's policy-makers or people. With its civilization, size, strategic situation, strengths present and potential, and the talents of its peoples, for India to play a major role in the evolution of our times could hardly be considered a manifestation of hegemonistic ambition. And, if the U.N. Security Council is to be expanded, India's demand to be included among the permanent members is, again, hardly unreasonable, but it is not on the short list of foreign policy priorities.

The projection of power outside its borders has not been India's natural inclination. True, it has intervened, commendably, to save existing regimes in the Seychelles and Maldives, and more controversially, but essentially in the hope of preventing upheaval, in Sri Lanka. India is now engaged in joint efforts with the U.S. Navy on behalf of the peaceful openness of the Indian Ocean sea lanes; and it was in the front line against terrorism long before last Sept. 11. But the claim to inwardness, to being happiest left alone, remains valid. India is learning, however, that "the world is too much with us," and that it must engage with the world and, in that process, meet the challenges discussed here. Its interaction with the United States is a promising if still uncertain and vulnerable new factor. ■

NO MORE AMBIGUITY: INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

Dana Cooper

IN 1998, INDIA TRANSFORMED ITS STATUS TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. ITS NUCLEAR POLICY IS BASED ON TWO PILLARS: MINIMUM DETERRENCE AND NO FIRST USE.

BY VIJAI K. NAIR

Without abandoning its belief in the propriety of total nuclear disarmament, India bucked U.S. pressure and world opinion in 1998 to transform its status to a nuclear weapon state. India's apparently contradictory national security policy is the product of history. It is the product of the Indian establishment's exceptional understanding of the dynamics of the global nuclear weapons environment as it developed and sensitivity to the changing implications for the nation's security interests.

In 1947, lacking the political experience of governments guiding their states through the modern-day jungle of inter-

national relations, the leadership of newly-independent India saw nuclear weapons as a destabilizing factor that threatened the global security environment within which India had to exist as a sovereign nation. The conviction that nuclear weapons are abhorrent to the larger human values and that their possession — by whomever or however few — is a threat to mankind as a whole characterized the times. This view was forcefully articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru, who, as India's prime minister and his own foreign minister, steered India through its first 17 years. During this time India became a leading proponent for the cause of total and complete nuclear disarmament, a philosophy that remains a bedrock of Indian policy even today.

India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. The call made in the [U.N. Security Council] Resolution that we should stop our nuclear programs or missile programs is unacceptable. Decisions in this regard will be taken by the government on the basis of our own assessments and national security requirements, in a reasonable and responsible manner.

— Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, June 8, 1998, in a statement before the Upper House of Parliament in response to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172.

The victors of the second world war, the only states that had acquired the phenomenal power accruing from the possession of nuclear weapons, were quite happy to humor Nehru along on the assumption that his exhortations on behalf of disarmament would help contain lateral proliferation of nuclear weapons to the original coterie. Of great consequence for India as the Cold War era unfolded was the fact that the U.S. and its Western Bloc allies adopted an "if you aren't with us you're against us" view toward India: they perceived India's nuclear weapon potential as a threat to their national interests, and proceeded to evolve and implement a wide range of so-called disarmament policies that threatened the existence of India's sovereign nuclear option.

As it happened, Nehru's idealistic belief in the goodness of man and a global brotherhood was abruptly shattered in 1962 when Chinese President Mao Zedong surreptitiously took over 30,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin plateau and unleashed the People's Liberation Army through Sikkim and the North East Frontier Agency (now the state of Arunachal Pradesh) to deliver a stunning defeat to the Indian military. (China claims yet another 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, a claim Beijing supported by military offensives in 1967 and 1987 and continues to make with regular frequency to this day.) The main fallout of this conflict did not materialize until 1964, when China crossed the nuclear threshold, bringing about an exponential increment in its power quotient and bringing the effect of nuclear weaponry directly to bear on India's national security perceptions.

The dilemma for India was whether to sign on the dotted line of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and eschew nuclear weapons in keeping with its basic philosophy of nuclear disarmament, or to actively pursue the nuclear option to deter China from factoring its nuclear capability, legitimized by the NPT, to seize the territories it claimed. It was becoming clear to the Indian leadership that the nuclear nonproliferation drive was not meant as a step toward disarmament, but rather to legitimize the

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selective possession and use of nuclear weapons for national and collective security. India's embrace of the Eisenhower Atoms for Peace program and pursuit of nuclear technology for power and other peaceful means had, in effect, given it the potential to exercise the "nuclear option" if the security environment required. In the event, the Indian leadership decided to walk two seemingly incongruous strategic paths at once — espousing the cause of nuclear disarmament, on the one hand, and simultaneously creating a fallback capability to deter China in the event real and total nuclear disarmament failed to materialize.

All this is water under the bridge — albeit water that drove the wheel that turned India's evolution into a nuclear weapon state in 1998. But what is India's current nuclear policy? How does it fit into the larger matrix of American strategies? And what part might it play in driving the dynamics of nuclear strategies among India's friends and foes?

An Unambiguous Policy

India's nuclear policy is articulated unambiguously in the *Annual Report 2001-2002* of the Ministry of Defense, put before parliament in March. As the *Report* states: "India remains a consistent proponent of general and complete disarmament and attaches the highest priority to global nuclear disarmament. India's policy on disarmament also takes into account changes that have taken place in the world, especially in the 1990s. The nuclear tests of May 1998 do not dilute India's commitment to this long-held objective. ... As a nuclear weapon state, India is even more conscious of its responsibility in this regard and, as in the past, initiatives in pursuit of global nuclear disarmament continue to be taken. ..."

The *Report* further states: "India's nuclear weapons capability is meant only for self-defense and seeks only to ensure that India's security, independence and integrity are not threatened in future. India is not interested in a nuclear arms race. This is the rationale behind the two pillars of India's nuclear policy — minimum deterrence and no-first-use." The document also explicitly rejects warfighting doctrines and the concept of launch-on-warning.

India's nuclear weapons policy requires, further, that the following be assured:

- Absolute and positive control by the highest civilian authority of all national strategic assets so that strategic weapon systems are not used outside the parameters of nationally legitimized policy.
- Low-level alert status of strategic forces to preclude any possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch, and assure that a reaction by strategic forces complies with the conflict status.
- A deployment policy that gives the political leadership confidence that the proposed launch sequence is not jeopardized by a pre-emptive nuclear strike by an adversary. This would include a built-in guarantee of retaliation if the situation so demands.
- A moderate force level, well within the national technological and resource horizons, so that it does not upend the national socio-economic well-being.

The closest New Delhi has come to spelling out its nuclear doctrine is the *Draft Nuclear Doctrine*, released Aug. 17, 1999, by the National Security Advisory Board. The merit of this document lies in the fact that for the first time ever the Indian government made public its thought process on evolving nuclear security policies, a critical step in the development of a nuclear weapons strategy and its management policy. The draft doctrine lays out the broad parameters for development of India's nuclear strategy, which is predicated on fielding a minimum credible deterrent, a weapons capability based on a 'triad' (a capability to deploy and launch nuclear weapons from platforms on land, at sea or in the air) and limited to retaliation-specific situations.

According to the draft doctrine, India will only initiate a nuclear attack in retaliation to a nuclear strike on its civil and military assets: any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor. The magnitude of the retaliation clearly points to 'counter-value' targets, or area targets having a high density of population and economic infrastructure. Deputy Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Raj Kadyan recently explained: "India has maintained that even a tactical nuclear strike on its forces will be treated as a nuclear first strike, and shall invite massive retaliation."

India has proceeded with development and induction of systems, infrastructure and hardware to include:

- **Delivery systems** that would reliably penetrate hostile airspace in the technological environment that will prevail two decades into the future; and reach extreme ranges prescribed by the nation's nuclear strategy from secure launch sites, both mobile and static, from sea, land or air. In the existing environment this entails an IRBM

that would threaten retaliation against targets visualized 360 degrees around India; subsurface launched missiles to guarantee survival of the strategic deterrent; and cruise missiles to enhance accuracy and penetration.

• A **warhead inventory** in keeping with the targeting policy dictated by the nuclear strategy, with yields commensurate to the required levels of target punishment dictated by strategy.

• A national policy for **integrated command and control** with an enlightened leadership.

• **Validation of hardware** to be incorporated in the nuclear infrastructure, some of which may have to be tested under pressures and temperatures of a nuclear explosion.

Threat Assessment

The *Draft Nuclear Doctrine* is predicated on assumptions that have been identified and resolutely adhered to by successive Congress, United Front and BJP regimes. First among them is the recognition that nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimized through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 1995. Second, India has no intention of rolling back its nuclear weapons strategy, as has been clearly stated through its rejection of the resolution of the Sixth NPT Review Conference calling for such a reversal.

India's nuclear policy, its nuclear doctrine and nuclear strategy are structured to cope with four very disparate threat perceptions. They are:

China. In addition to occupying large tracts of Indian territory, China rejects Indian sovereignty over Sikkim, and lays claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh up to the Brahmaputra River in the Assam plains. India's concerns also include China's defense cooperation with Myanmar, its deployment of surveillance and communication systems on the Coco Islands, acquisition of strategic port facilities and the construction of strategic surface communications connecting Yunan Province to the Andaman Sea, its assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs (documented in *Jane's Intelligence Review* and *Time* magazine, among other places), and its frequent incursions across the line of actual control.

No progress whatsoever has been made on the border dispute by the Joint Working Group and its specialist cell, the Experts Working Group, set up soon after the Agreement for Peace and Tranquility was signed in 1993, as the first step in a hoped-for dialogue. The stonewalling tactics Beijing has employed indicate that it has no desire to resolve the Sino-Indian territorial issue now, or in the near future, pointing to a conflict of interests with China in the long term.

Not only is China a long-established nuclear weapon state with a carefully thought-out nuclear strategy in place, but it continues to take gigantic strides in modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal. The country is creating a subsurface nuclear capability that gives it the potential to deploy nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. China has also tested and produced tactical nuclear weapons, and introduced a nuclear war-fighting doctrine in the PLA for use against qualitatively superior conventional forces. Further, China's nuclear doctrine includes use of nuclear weapons to settle territorial disputes and its 'no-first-use' strategy is directed only toward non-nuclear weapon states, a group from which India was excluded well before May 1998.

If China were to resort to armed conflict to resolve its territorial claims along India's northern borders, it would find itself logistically handicapped and pitted against a qualitatively superior force. Under the circumstances, it may resort to localized tactical nuclear strikes to facilitate achievement of its military objective. Although China's current deployment of its strategic assets suggests a land-based threat from the north, New Delhi cannot rule out employment through Myanmar on its eastern flank or the threat from sea-based nuclear weapons that the expanding potential of the PLA Navy and the bases China is creating in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar potentially afford.

Pakistan. The threat from Pakistan is equally explicit and immediate. Having created a nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan has met the imperatives for a deployment policy and has articulated a policy, which unabashedly links the nuclear weapons program to its ongoing hostility with India. Ambassador Munir Akram threatened to use nuclear weapons to wrest control of Kashmir from India at the United Nations on May 25, and was echoed by similar rhetoric from Pakistani President Musharraf in Islamabad. New Delhi must assume that Islamabad's recently-created National Command Authority has formulated an employment policy directed toward India, even though Pakistan's recent round of nuclear missile-mongering is aimed more at drawing international inter-

vention into its dispute with India. The verbal threats from Pakistan's leadership were meant not so much to deter India from launching an offensive into Pakistan to destroy Islamabad's surrogate terrorist infrastructure as they were designed to heighten international concerns to a level that would force extra-regional powers to intervene in Kashmir on behalf of Pakistan.

New Delhi is fully aware of the infirmities of Pakistan's nuclear potential and its strategic disadvantages (reports in the Western media notwithstanding), whereby a nuclear exchange would result in its annihilation as a nation-state even though it may be able to inflict considerable death and destruction on India. As far as the actual act of a nuclear strike against India is concerned, Pakistan seems more than adequately deterred. And, given India's no-first-use policy and the fact that its nuclear capability was not developed to deal with the military threat from Pakistan, in any case, Pakistan has no cause to fear a nuclear attack from India. But it would be a serious miscalculation on the part of Pakistan and Western governments to infer that India is deterred from initiating a conventional strike to wipe out terrorist camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir by Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability at this point in history.

Counterproliferation. Yet another threat — one which may not necessarily involve nuclear weapons — emanates from the philosophy of counterproliferation espoused by the U.S. and the strategic means it has developed and incorporated into the war fighting doctrines of its theater commands. Counterproliferation refers to the use of military action to prevent proliferation or disarm proliferate countries. In spite of a limited estrangement in U.S.-Pakistani relations in the 1990s, they are today full-fledged allies in a war against terrorism, with troops conjointly addressing the Taliban and al-Qaida operating in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. Under these conditions the U.S. strategy clearly lays down that the theater commander must initiate counterproliferation operations designed to destroy all nuclear weapon systems and attendant national nuclear infrastructure of any country that

goes to war with its ally. India cannot turn a blind eye to such a possibility, and needs to include certain defensive measures to safeguard its strategic assets and wherewithal.

Restrictions on Trade and Development. Last but not least is the threat posed to India's capacity to keep its nuclear arsenal contemporary to the changing dynamics of nuclear capabilities and doctrines among the nuclear weapon states. Failure to keep the nuclear capability current would soon render its "minimum credible deterrent" redundant in the face of the capabilities being developed and deployed by China. This threat comes in the form of the imposition of restrictive technology transfer regimes (such as the Australia Club, the London Club, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, etc.) and the manipulation of the arms control regime by the developed countries, which would prefer to see India's nuclear potential wither in keeping with the basic tenets of the NPT — i.e., limiting nuclear weapons capabilities to the five original nuclear weapon states.

The Indo-U.S. Equation

India does not perceive a threat from the U.S. in the foreseeable future and has no intention of developing strategic capabilities that would cause the U.S. security concerns. However, the Indian strategic force structures could have an incidental effect on U.S. forces deployed in the Asian region as a consequence of its requirements to deter China. The benign nature of the overall Indo-U.S. relationship, therefore, suggests the value of instituting appropriate confidence-building measures, provided U.S. nonproliferation policy permits, to alleviate the fallout of this incidental capability.

New Delhi recognizes that it is in the common interests of both India and the U.S. to ensure that their strategic competencies do not facilitate proliferation to other states and non-state entities. It is similarly in the interest of both parties to institutionalize a practicable fissile material control regime that would deny access to fissile materials to possible proliferators and cap their own inventories at a level that would ensure the continued efficacy of their

strategic forces, maritime propulsion assets and other strategic systems. India has taken active measures to deny nuclear weapons technology, materials and equipment to non-nuclear weapon states through suitable controls on national assets, a credible export control regime and a matching enforcement policy.

Each country has security concerns for which it exercises its sovereign prerogative to formulate, develop and implement specific policies and capabilities. If the U.S. has come to the determination that it needs to create a suitable national missile defense system in deference to its national security interests, India is not one to be critical, especially as such a defensive measure does not impinge directly on its national security. By the same logic, India reserves its sovereign right to upgrade its own strategic capabilities to meet the changes in the regional nuclear environment that may be brought about by China as a consequence of its perceptions of the impact of the U.S. national missile defense system on its own nuclear weapons capabilities. Modifications to India's strategic forces would, perforce, be limited to meeting the regional threat and therefore have no bearing on U.S. national interests.

In conclusion, India fully recognizes that the world today is markedly unipolar, with the U.S. the single superpower, and therefore it needs to understand how Washington views India's role in this strategic scenario so that it can be sensitive to American concerns. At the same time the U.S., with its exponential power quotient, is expected to understand the legitimate concerns of the states to which it relates. New Delhi unabashedly acknowledges the pre-eminence of the U.S. and expects to develop a positive relationship with Washington — but in doing so it cannot abdicate its sovereign responsibility to secure the state's national interests by all means necessary, including nuclear weaponry, over which it has unqualified control. The nuclear threat is real and live — a threat that requires India to generate and field the means to defend itself without falling back on external beneficence. ■

PALESTINE: THE PROBLEM AND THE PROSPECT

ALL PARTIES TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, INCLUDING ARAB AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND THE U.N., NEED TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO HELP BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT ABOVE ALL, THE U.S. MUST LEAD.

BY TERRELL E. ARNOLD

The brutality of Palestinian and Israeli actions since the second intifada began two years ago, and especially during the past few months, has focused world attention on finding ways to stop the cycle of death and destruction in Palestine. Widespread agreement exists that the only way out of the conflict is an approach that recognizes the interests of both parties, includes restraint from both sides, and is aimed at a comprehensive peace settlement. However, no solution is possible unless it takes into account the severe imbalances that exist between the capabilities, actions and situations of the Israelis and the Palestinians.

It is important to have a clear fix on how this situation came about, because, as is often the case, the remedies are tied irrevocably to understanding and treatment of the causes.

The diplomatic and legal starting point for the creation of Israel was the Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917. In that document, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James (Lord) Balfour gave the following ground rules to the British Zionist Federation:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that *nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine* [my italics], or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

While he no doubt was acting to safeguard broader British colonial interests in taking this approach, Lord Balfour stated the correct principles for building the new state. But he failed to anticipate how the process would unfold in practice. Instead of recognizing Palestine as the home of the people who had lived there for centuries, the League of Nations treated the Balfour Declaration as a mandate that, while specifying no timetable, gave the Jewish people — a small minority in Palestine at the time — a national home, if they could achieve a majority of the population. The triumph of the Israelis and the tragedy of the Palestinians began with the way the Zionist Federation and later the leadership of Israel carried out the mandate.

To achieve and retain a majority of the population, Zionist organizations encouraged mass Jewish migrations to

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Terrell Arnold entered the Foreign Service in 1957, retiring from the Senior Foreign Service in 1984 with the rank of minister counselor. Among his many overseas postings, he served as economic officer in Cairo (1960-61), economic and consular officer in Calcutta (1962-64), economic and commercial counselor in Manila (1971-75) and consul general in Sao Paulo (1978-80). In Washington, he was chairman of the Department of International Studies at the National War College (1981-83) and deputy director of the Office of Counterterrorism (1983-84), among other assignments. Since his retirement, he has been one of the chief emergency management trainers for the Department of State and has provided crisis management, performance measurement and other consulting services to State and many other federal agencies.

Arnold is co-author of Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism *(DC Heath, 1986), author of* The Violence Formula: Why People Lend Sympathy and Support to Terrorism *(DC Heath, 1988) and co-author of* Terrorism: The New Warfare *(Walker & Company, 1988) a high-school textbook. A regular speaker on terrorism and violence issues in the Department of State's Elderhostel lecture series, he often speaks to service club and university audiences about terrorism and violence in society.*

Palestine, mainly from Central Europe. They also forcefully, and sometimes violently, started removing Palestinians from all areas of Palestine west of the Jordan River. These tactics were applied well before the Arab-Israeli wars that began soon after Israel was declared a state in 1948, and they are still common practice.

The Zionist program was so effective that by mid-1955, there were 1,200,000 Jews in Israel, compared with only 50,000 or so Jewish residents at the time the Balfour Declaration was issued. By that same year, about 750,000 Palestinians (by U.N. estimates) had been displaced, mainly into refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza. Their numbers have steadily grown since then: in 2001, the United Nations reported approximately three million registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, compared with a total Israeli population of about 6.3 million, predominantly Jews. An additional 800,000 Palestinian refugees are resident in the contiguous states of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. More than 60 percent of the Palestinians are under the age of 18. They have limited economic and educational opportunities. They are extremely vulnerable to recruitment, indoctrination and training by extremists.

Making matters worse, even though the West Bank and Gaza are nominally under the jurisdiction of the Palestine National Authority, Israel exercises critical control over conditions in both sectors. Twice in the past decade, for stated security reasons, the Israelis sharply curtailed traffic between Palestinian and Israeli areas, causing abrupt and severe damage to the Palestinian economy. Recent curfews and denials of border crossings for workers in Israel have compounded the problems of unemployment, malnutrition of the young, and general frustration.

Lord Balfour stated the correct principles for building the new state of Israel 85 years ago. But he failed to anticipate how the process would unfold in practice.

National Interests

The Israelis, the Palestinians, Arab and Western governments, and the United Nations all share varying degrees of responsibility for the failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and address its human costs. The U.S. has always favored Israel in the conflict and still does. Arab governments favor the Palestinians but have done little to help them move toward the command of their situation that would facilitate statehood. Especially since the Camp David accords, U.S. assistance of more than $3 billion per year has been provided to Israel. By comparison, very little aid has been provided to the Palestinians, either by the United States, Arab governments or the U.N. The resulting institutional and human underdevelopment has severely limited the ability of the Palestinian leadership to carry out its responsibilities.

Lacking strong and widely approved leadership, the Palestinian National Authority not only has equivocated over efforts to suppress the ongoing series of suicide bombings, but also has shown itself incapable of controlling its extremists (e.g., Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Brigade). PNA Chairman Yasser Arafat's inability to stop the suicide bombings has been a continuing bone of contention for the Israelis, who cite his earlier history of outright opposition to the very existence of Israel. As a result, despite his key role in earlier peace efforts, Arafat appears less than ideal for controlling extremists or for pursuing any future peace process.

The Israelis, for their part, use the suicide bombings as a justification for systematic and often indiscriminate action against Palestinians in general. In the process, over the past several months, the Israel Defense Forces have given us all a valuable lesson: Although the IDF is said by experts to be among the top military forces in the world, it has demonstrated conclusively the limitations of formal military power as a defense against terrorism. Despite wrecking much of the West Bank and Gaza, the IDF has failed to stop the suicide bombers, who continue to target the Israeli public precisely because they lack the numbers or the weapons to face the military.

The enormous differences in the economic, managerial and war-fighting capabilities of the two parties underlie much of the conflict. These differences enable the Israelis to control the lives and destinies of the Palestinians, as seen in the systematic expulsion of the Palestinians from their homes and property, in the assassination of Palestinian activists, and in the ongoing creation and expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Such actions are at the root of much of the hatred, uncertainty and frustration felt by Palestinians. In the worst sense, these actions inspire the suicide bombers and other extremists at a personal level that is hard for leadership to control.

Meanwhile, in the midst of the current chaos, it is easy to forget that many of the longstanding interests of the United States and the West in

the Middle East would exist even in the absence of a Palestine conflict. But resolving that dispute is key to assuring successful pursuit of those larger political, economic and religious concerns.

The U.S. The most immediate U.S. interest is helping to shut down a conflict that has become a serious and escalating generator of hatred against Americans and the United States. Toward that end, Washington must do what it can to cut off fuel to the conflict by working with other governments to limit the flow of weapons to both sides. It also must play a strong diplomatic role to get the parties to back off and to shut down the terrorism generators on both sides of the conflict. Such intervention will have the further benefit of convincing both parties and the international community that the United States is seeking a fair and equitable solution.

Once that is done, the next step will be to define and stabilize the boundaries of the Palestinian state and Israel. Washington must then help both parties create an environment in which each party views the other as an equal and without fear. Such tasks mean the U.S. must stay involved in the process; just helping the parties to the first day of peace will not be good enough.

The Palestinians. The fundamental goals of the Palestinians are to establish and govern a state of their own, and to enjoy free and unencumbered access to and from their own exclusive territory, including freedom of movement between the West Bank and Gaza. They want to be free of interference in their internal affairs, and to be recognized and treated as equals by other states. They seek free access to both Christian and Muslim sites in Jerusalem to accommodate their own Christian minority. Finally, they would also like to establish their capital in the Muslim sector of Jerusalem.

Israel. The Israelis want to preserve their national identity, and some of them want this to be a Jewish state. They also want to be free of threats and attacks, and to be treated as an equal by their Middle Eastern neighbors as well as by the rest of the world community. Those aims are hard to argue with. But other objectives of the current government are less defensible. It seeks permanent, unchallenged boundaries around as much land as possible, including all of the West Bank and Gaza, and as much control of water resources as it can get. It seeks to avoid either a return of the Palestinians whom Israelis have displaced or compensation for the land taken. And it wants Jerusalem as Israel's exclusive capital. Such a

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The enormous differences in the economic, managerial and war-fighting capabilities of the two parties underlie much of the conflict.

dream is not attainable without trampling the rights of the Palestinians and engendering unremitting bloodshed, but Israelis, or at least the hard-liners, have yet to recognize this reality.

Arab governments. Most Arab governments have asserted they would accept any diplomatic solution reached by the Palestinian leadership. However, their interests hardly end there. They also want to see a political and economic regime in Jerusalem that recognizes the interests of Muslims worldwide, including free access to Islamic holy places for their people. This pattern of interests no doubt underlies their support for the proposal made by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah earlier this year. Under that proposal, Israel would return to its pre-1967 war boundaries in exchange for diplomatic recognition by all Arab governments

Other interested parties. Muslims now comprise about one-sixth of the world population, and a large number of them are neither Arabs nor citizens of Arab countries. Interest in access to the holy places of Islam is therefore as global as the Christian interest in Jerusalem. And in a broader sense, the outcome of the peace process in Palestine will be closely watched by the whole world for signs of just how well, or how badly, the rights of both parties, but particularly the underdog Palestinians, fare in any settlement.

The Tasks Ahead

As the Palestinians see it now, their safety and survival depend on the decisions, even the whims, of a hostile government. Thus, to shut down the terrorism generators and to stop the suicide bombers, the highest single priority today is to change the conditions that sustain that perception. Toward that end, the tasks for the next several months are clear.

Moderate the extremists. Both the Palestinians and the Israelis must moderate their extremists. For example, the recent furor about Arafat's abortive bid to bring Hamas into his government shows a lack of political feel for the situation. Instead of criticizing such steps, Israel should encourage them. After all, it followed the same approach earlier in its history, bringing Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, as well as other members of the Irgun and Stern terrorist groups, into the government in the hope of moderating their behavior (admittedly with mixed results). There are no guarantees this strategy will enable Arafat (or any successor) to coopt Hamas, but it is well worth trying.

For their part, Israel's leaders have regularly used violence to achieve national interests. In addition to bloody attacks against the British in the lead-up to independence, they used terrorist tactics to convince the Palestinians to leave their land (e.g., the attack on the village of Qibya in 1953). Similarly, the assassination of Palestinian militants has long been a matter of official policy. For the state of Israel to survive and prosper, its future leadership must reject such methods.

Stop Israeli incursions. The Sharon government insists that its military incursions into the West Bank and Gaza are necessary to fight terrorism, but the deliberate social disintegration and economic disruption they have caused only undermine Arafat's authority, strengthen the extremists, and provoke retaliation by militants, including new suicide bombers. The Israelis then cite those attacks to justify the next round of harsh military reprisals, which predictably engender more Palestinian violence. This vicious cycle is self-defeating, as the economy of force use factor is on the side of the Palestinians, not the Israelis.

It should be obvious that, after four generations of refugee status, the Palestinians will neither leave their land voluntarily nor desist from fighting back. A graceful backing-off by both parties under a framework such as the Abdullah proposal would buy the Israelis peace more quickly and surely than any military campaign in the West Bank.

Many of the long-standing interests of the United States and the West in the Middle East would exist even in the absence of a Palestine conflict.

Shut down Palestinian attacks. The Palestine National Authority must persuade its population to refrain from suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli civilians. Such violence allows Israel to assert that all Palestinians are terrorists or terrorist sympathizers, which superficially excuses IDF attacks on Palestinian civilians. But for Arafat and the PNA to succeed in shutting down Hamas and other groups, the Israelis need to halt military incursions, assassinations and settlement activity.

Get on with the transition. Delay is destructive. The longer it takes to resolve the Palestine question, the more likely it is that further terrorist attacks will occur. Moreover, the more remote a prospect Palestinian statehood appears to be, the more excuses and opportunities Israelis and Jews from outside Israel, including the United States, have to expand existing settlements and construct new ones, thereby rendering an already volatile situation steadily more explosive.

Define national borders. The

boundaries of Israel and Palestine must be defined, recognized and respected by both sides. So-called buffer zones that go beyond the agreed-upon lines cannot be permitted, and fences, which have figured in recent internal Israeli debate about how to "contain" the Palestinians, are a perverse notion on their face. For the Israelis to build and maintain a fence around the West Bank and Gaza is in the same class with creating an enclosure or prison compound to house a subject population. It would say that the Palestinians have no rights, they can be confined without any processes of law, and they can be kept that way at the whim of their neighbors.

By contrast, much if not all of the present conflict could be dealt with if those boundaries were in place and accepted. Above all, the very launch of serious negotiations toward that end would give the Palestinian leadership strong arguments with which to counsel patience and deprive extremists of support.

Get rid of the "refugee" label. The label "refugee" itself is a great barrier to stabilizing the situation. Thinking of oneself as a displaced person creates an unhealthy sense of uncertainty and insecurity that interferes with living and planning, because nothing is seen as permanent.

In addition, the Israelis must either find some basis of agreement with the Palestinians on the issue of return, which is still on the United Nations agenda, or move on to compensation for confiscated property, which is a longstanding subject of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.

In practice, it may be that many of the Palestinian properties taken over in the earlier years have been torn down and turned into shopping malls, roads and other facilities, and thus are not returnable. While compensation is hardly the same as the right of return, some combination of the two measures may pave the way for permanent resolution of the overall conflict.

Restore the Palestinian infrastructure. The primary effect of the Israeli attacks has been the destruction of Palestinian places of business, government offices and other infrastructure, educational and cultural facilities, and medical services. Beginning immediately, the United Nations should take the lead in marshaling the resources and expanding or initiating the programs necessary to rebuild infrastructure and stabilize and improve the living conditions of the Palestinian people.

Remove the settlements. Even though removal of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is an absolute requirement of any peace agreement likely to be accepted by the Palestinians, Israelis continue to start new settlements in the Occupied Territories and to expand the older ones. This provokes continuous clashes between Palestinians and Jewish settlers, many of whom are American citizens or have vocal friends and relatives living in the United States. Their lobby will be fractious when the settlements have to be closed, but perhaps Palestinians whose properties were confiscated earlier could move into these settlements in lieu of other compensation. Such an outcome could greatly facilitate the peace process.

Resolve long-term economic issues. Many of the borders Israel wishes to keep relate to access to and control over water. The present distribution of that resource is heavily weighted toward the Israelis, not only in absolute terms but also in per-capita water use terms. Any long-term resolution of the present conflict has to focus on redistributing access to

water in this very parched region on a basis that is equitable for all of its inhabitants. However, even with a fairer distribution of supplies, more water will be needed to sustain growth, and large-scale desalination of seawater is probably necessary. Ideas for regional cooperative action such as desalination of seawater have been proposed for the Palestine/Jordan Valley region for more than 50 years. The peace process is a good place to revisit such proposals.

Settle the status of Jerusalem. The 1948 United Nations partition of Palestine included three components: the state of Israel, Palestine and the Holy Places. None of the three religions that have an historic interest in the Holy Places can claim a unique right to them, so the U.N. should take on the task of administering these sites for all humankind.

Deal with human trauma. One of the major effects of Israeli raids and Palestinian suicide bombings is an accumulation of potentially destructive trauma in both populations. If untreated, this legacy will perpetuate the cycle of violence on both sides, with terrible consequences. Israeli and Palestinian leaders, as well as the U.N. and interested national governments, must work immediately to identify the victims of trauma in the region and undertake counseling and treatment.

The longer it takes to resolve the Palestine question, the more likely it is that further terrorist attacks will occur.

The U.S. must lead. A peaceful future in the Middle East requires accommodation by everyone involved, based on principles of fairness, equity and mutual respect. But the parties to this dispute do not possess equal power, wealth or capabilities — leaving a gap that has to be bridged by the careful, realistic intervention of the United States and other interested governments.

If Washington, in particular, does not exert strong leadership that is attentive to both sets of interests, the situation will fester, and the terrorism generators that brought us the Sept. 11 attacks will flourish without restraint. And sooner or later the combination of hate, frustration and resentment will unleash a weapon of mass destruction. ■

APPRECIATION

RICHARD I. QUEEN
1951-2002

Richard Ivan Queen, 51, a retired Foreign Service officer, died Aug. 14 at his home in Falls Church, Va., of complications related to multiple sclerosis. He was among the 66 Americans taken hostage by Islamic militants at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. He was held captive for 250 days, a third of that in a dark and windowless basement room, and was released only when worsening symptoms of what would later be diagnosed as multiple sclerosis convinced Iranian doctors that he required sophisticated medical care.

Mr. Queen was born in Washington, D.C., and grew up in Westchester County, N.Y. He graduated from Hamilton College in Clinton, N.Y., in 1973 and then studied Eastern European history at the University of Michigan, where he received a master's degree.

Joining the Foreign Service in 1978, Mr. Queen was posted to the consulate in Isfahan, Iran. It was closed as the revolution heated up, and in July 1979 he was reassigned to Tehran as a consular officer, an assignment he had requested. He "wanted to be a witness to history," he said, and "thought it would be extremely exciting to go to a country in revolution."

Just four months after he started work in Tehran, Islamic militants seized the U.S. embassy compound, and took the hostages, demanding that the U.S. return to Iran the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had been admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment. The U.S. refused and eventually severed diplomatic relations with Iran.

On July 11, 1980, Iran's revolutionary leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, ordered Mr. Queen's release. As Mr. Queen later said, "They were afraid of having a dead hostage." A short time later, the deposed shah died. Finally, on Jan. 20, 1981, after protracted negotiations between Iranian representatives and officials of the outgoing Carter administration, the rest of the hostages were freed, after 444 days in captivity.

Later that year, Mr. Queen published a book about his experiences, *Hostage to Iran, Hostage to Myself* (G.P. Putnam, 1981), in which he described the ordeal. In March 1980, he had been moved from the basement to quarters in the embassy's chancery. He organized a library from stored books of the closed Tehran American School, and spent hours reading. But he also began to experience tingling sensations, dizziness, double vision and difficulty coordinating movement — symptoms of the onset of his MS.

Following his release, Mr. Queen met regularly with the families and friends of the remaining hostages. He resumed his Foreign Service career, going to London as a consular officer in 1981. The following year he was posted to Toronto, where he served until 1985. As his health continued to deteriorate, the range of assignments he could accept was limited, and he retired in 1995 after serving as a consular officer in the Office of American Citizen Services in Washington.

Mr. Queen's marriage to Moire MacDonald ended in divorce. He is survived by his brother, Alexander, and mother, Jeanne Queen, of Stone Ridge, N.Y.

"THE BEST IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE..."

When asked about his experience, Richard Queen is reported to have said that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, but that he also had chosen to go. That well exemplifies what kind of person he was — a classic example of the best in the Foreign Service: a dedicated, competent, outgoing public servant, a proud and patriotic American.

When I knew him in Tehran, however briefly, he was a tall and robust young man, excited about being there, however difficult and often tedious was his assignment at the visa window, day after day. The next time I saw him, he was among those who welcomed the rest of us home in January 1981.

I watched him in the years since, as he gradually succumbed to the ravages of the terrible illness that has now caused his death. He said once that he bore no grudge against those who held him hostage, and I respect

his memory for that — however much I find it difficult to share that judgment.

Richard Queen's life and death are testimony to today's scourge of terrorism, whose roots lie in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Subjected to the isolation and abuse that surely contributed to the illness that in time caused his death, his passing is a reminder of the Tehran regime's culpability in that hostage crisis, which it has never adequately acknowledged, much less offered apology or compensation.

— Amb. Bruce Laingen, fellow hostage

"Empathy and a Desire for Public Service..."

A warm, open personality, a real interest in people and other cultures, and empathy made it possible for Richard to understand the point of view of others. When coupled with a desire for public service and real ambition to succeed he was able to cope with the bane of many first-tour officers — working on a high-volume, high-refusal visa assignment without losing his perspective.

These same attributes and a quiet pride in his country served him well as a hostage, allowing him to interact with his captors without falling into the Stockholm Syndrome. As a result he was, in large part, responsible for probably the only positive morale factor for the hostages, the organization of the library for their use.

— Richard Morefield, FSO, fellow hostage

"Tehran Tested Richard Twice..."

Tehran tested Richard twice: first, for several months on the visa line, and then as a captive for 250 days. Both were tough, but Richard acquitted himself magnificently in both circumstances.

As a vice consul he was always courteous, patient, and professional. When we reopened our consular section in early September, after an eight-month closure, Richard and his colleagues faced over 30,000 applicants.

Richard had a wonderful curiosity about Iran and things Iranian, and I remember some of our discussions about that country and its rich culture and history. Persian was a challenge, however, and a few months at FSI left him still struggling with the language.

In a memorable moment, Richard nearly brought the entire consular operation to a halt. Interviewing a student visa applicant, he wanted to tell the young man that his grade point average (mo'adel) was inadequate. Unfortunately he replaced "mo'adel" with "maadar," and the sentence came out, "I'm sorry I cannot give you a visa. Your mother is inadequate." The baffled applicant could never quite figure out why he did not get the visa.

Had tragedy not struck, I think Richard would have had a great tour in Tehran. It is a shame that the double calamities of the hostage crisis and illness changed so much for this wonderful young man.

— John Limbert, Ambassador to Mauritania, fellow hostage

"We Honor Him... and Treasure His Memory"

All of us who were his colleagues respected him for many things, but two in particular stand out: first, his willingness to serve his country in a difficult place; and second, his lack of bitterness or rancor about his Tehran experience. He was once quoted as saying, "It happened to me, but I will not let it get to me." He showed courage, dedication, and devotion to duty and country. We, his colleagues, honor him for this, lament his passing, and will continue to treasure his memory.

— Amb. Ruth A. Davis, Director General of the Foreign Service, Aug. 20, 2002, from a letter to Alexander Queen on the death of his brother, Richard.

"We Truly Regret His Passing..."

Not only during the hostage crisis in Iran, but throughout his entire Foreign Service career, Richard represented the best of American diplomacy, and we truly regret his passing from us.

The thoughts and prayers of the State Department are with you and your family.

— Colin L. Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, from a personal letter to Richard's brother, Alexander. ■

In Memory

William Osgood Boswell, 88, retired FSO, died on Aug. 8 at his home in Bethesda, Md.

Mr. Boswell was born on Oct. 24, 1913, at Vancouver Barracks, Wash., the son of Col. Walter O. Boswell, U.S. Army, and Anne Dekker Orr of Pittsburgh, Pa. He was a graduate of Phillips Academy, Andover and Stanford University, where he received his bachelor's degree in 1936.

After two years in private business, Mr. Boswell joined the Foreign Service in 1939 and was assigned to Le Havre as a vice consul. After a brief return to the then-Foreign Service School in Washington, he was posted to Martinique (and Georgetown, British Guiana) for a few months in early 1941. He was transferred to Lisbon as third secretary later that year. In early 1945 he joined the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, as political advisor.

Following World War II, Mr. Boswell was posted to Vienna in 1946 and promoted to second secretary and consul. In 1947 he was transferred to Paris. He returned to Washington in 1950, and in 1953 was sent to Rome as first secretary. Two years later, he was assigned to Milan as consul general. He was a member of the 1958-59 Senior Seminar class, and became director of the Office of Security in 1959. In 1962 he was sent to Cairo as deputy chief of mission with the personal rank of minister. He returned to the department in 1965 and held several personnel assignments. His last position before he retired in 1970 was director of the Office of International Conferences.

Mr. Boswell was a former president of the American Foreign Service Association, a member of the board of directors of both DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) and the Ross Mountain Club of New Florence, Pa.

He is survived by his wife, Janine Werner Boswell, five sons (including former FSOs Steven and Eric Boswell) and four grandchildren.

Mary Stellmacher, 82, wife of retired FSO Edward Stellmacher, of Tucson, Ariz., died on June 21 of pancreatic cancer. She accompanied her husband of 58 years, Edward, on assignment to Cali, Guatemala City, Juarez, Piedras Negras, Munich, Manila and Hermosillo.

Mrs. Stellmacher will be remembered by her family and by everyone who knew her as a true goodwill ambassador, who dedicated her life and career to her husband and her family. She devoted herself to her role as diplomat's wife, and her culinary talents will be remembered by all fortunate enough to attend a function that she and her husband hosted. Mary's gourmet cooking and Edward's musical talents complemented each other, and combined to make a memorable and positive event for host-country citizens as well as members of the diplomatic community.

She is greatly missed by her family: Edward, her spouse; Phillip Stellmacher, her son; Linda Stellmacher-Lester, her daughter; James Lester, her son-in-law; Barbara Stellmacher-Squires, her daughter; Stephen Squires, her son-in law; Kellen Stellmacher-Squires, her grandson; and Kyla Stellmacher-Squires, her granddaughter.

William Rex Crawford, Jr., 74, retired FSO, and twice ambassador, died Aug. 4 at his summer home in Greensboro, Vt. He had cancer.

Mr. Crawford, who resided in Washington, was born in Philadelphia. As a child, he accompanied his father, a professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, on tours as an exchange professor in France and Chile, and as cultural attache at the U.S. embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Mr. Crawford received his bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1949 and an M.A. in Middle East studies from the University of Pennsylvania in 1950. He also studied at the Institut des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris. He served as an ensign in the U.S. Navy from 1948 to 1949.

Entering the Foreign Service in 1950, Mr. Crawford was posted to Jeddah as a political officer and then, in 1953, transferred to Venice as a vice consul. He studied Arabic at the Foreign Service Institute in 1955, continuing his efforts at the FSI language school in Beirut in 1956. In 1957 he received a dual assignment, to the British colony and protectorate of Aden as principal officer and to Taiz, the seasonal capital of the Imamate of Yemen, as charge d'affaires.

He returned to Washington in 1959, was assigned to the Lebanon desk in 1962, and was promoted to

serve as director of the Office of Israeli Affairs in 1963. He received the William A. Jump Award for outstanding government service in that year. In 1964 he was posted to Rabat as political counselor. Returning to the U.S. in 1967, he spent a year at Princeton University as a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. In 1968, he was assigned to Nicosia as deputy chief of mission.

Mr. Crawford returned to Yemen in 1972 as ambassador. In 1974, following the assassination of Ambassador Rodger P. Davies in Nicosia, he was transferred there to succeed him. His tenure in Nicosia, begun in the wake of the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern third of the island, was marked by heightened tension between the Greek and Turkish communities and great strain in relations among Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the U.S. He retired in 1980 as senior deputy assistant secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

After retirement, Mr. Crawford served as executive director of the National Committee to Honor the 14th Centenary of Islam, and as president of the Eisenhower Fellowships, a Philadelphia-based international leadership exchange program. He also sang with the Washington Opera and the Washington Cathedral Choral Society.

Mr. Crawford's first wife, the former Virginia Vollrath Lowry, whom he married in 1950, died in 1987. He is survived by his second wife, Celia Faulkner Crawford; a daughter from his first marriage, Sarah Crawford-Najafi of France; two stepsons, Winthrop T. Clevenger and Peter R. Clevenger, both of New York; a brother, Dr. John Crawford; and a grandchild.

Sue Merrick Maule, 69, wife of retired FSO Robert W. (Bill) Maule, died on Aug. 4 in Bremerton, Wash., after a three-month battle with pancreatic cancer.

Mrs. Maule was born in Seattle. She met her husband at Pomona College in California, from which both graduated. She also earned a master's degree in botany from the University of Minnesota.

Mrs. Maule accompanied, and assisted, her husband on assignments to Brussels, Baghdad, Port-au-Prince, Vienna, Beirut, Montreal, London and back again to Montreal, where Mr. Maule served as consul general. She was active in community affairs at every post. Her linguistic ability and her interest in music helped her play an important role in the representation of the country abroad. In Montreal she founded a small musical group, Octet Plus, which continues successfully to this day.

After retirement she and her husband divided their time among homes in Washington, Vancouver Island and Portugal, interspersed with extensive world travel.

Mrs. Maule is survived by her husband Robert, her sister Jean, daughter Alison, son Brian, foster daughter Mary, and eight grandchildren. Her daughters Michele and Andrea predeceased her.

John Alexander McKesson III, 80, retired FSO and ambassador, died May 21 in New York City.

Mr. McKesson was born in New York. He received a degree from the Lycee Janson in Paris in 1939, a bachelor's degree from Columbia University in 1941, and a master's degree from the same institution in 1942. He served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy overseas from 1942 to 1946.

After joining the Foreign Service in 1947, Mr. McKesson was posted to Reykjavik. He returned to Washington and was detailed to the Economic Cooperation Administration, a predecessor of USAID, in 1948. In 1949 he was assigned to study German affairs at Columbia University, and was posted to Berlin as an economic officer in 1951 and to Bonn as a political officer two years later. In 1954 he was transferred to Saigon, again serving as a political officer. In 1957 he was posted to Paris. He returned to Washington to work in Personnel in 1962. He was selected to study at the National War College.

Soon thereafter, in 1963, he was assigned to Dakar as deputy chief of mission, concurrently accredited to Bathurst (now Banjul) as consul. In 1967 he became director of the Office of Central African Affairs at the Department of State. His last assignment before he retired in 1975 was as ambassador to Gabon.

Following retirement, Mr. McKesson lived in New York City. He was a vice president of the French firm Sentimeg, which managed projects in Africa, from 1975 to 1979. He then taught international relations at New York University from 1983 until the mid-1990s. An avid collector of African art and artifacts, he served as assistant editor of the quarterly magazine *Art d'Afrique Noire* from 1978 to 2000.

Mr. McKesson's wife, Erna Jensson McKesson, died several years ago in Paris. He is survived by a son, John A. McKesson IV of New York.

Stella Elizabeth Davis, 85, a retired FSO with USIA, died July 13 at

the Magnolia Retirement Center in Albany, Ga.

Ms. Davis was a native of Albany, the daughter of Donald Gunn and Bertha Mock Davis. She attended Mt. Holyoke College, and for career development courses, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington and the London School of Economics. Before joining the Department of State staff as a clerk in 1943, she worked for the Albany Chamber of Commerce, in the office of Georgia Senator Walter F. George, as an advertising manager for Farrell Lines, Inc. of New York City, and for the FBI.

Pretoria was Ms. Davis' first posting, from 1943 to 1945. In 1951 she was assigned to Addis Ababa as a public affairs assistant. She joined USIA in 1953 during her assignment to Nairobi. From 1956 to 1958 she served as assistant press officer in Saigon. In early 1958 USIA selected Ms. Davis for Swahili language training, and at the end of the year she was posted to Dar es Salaam as branch public affairs officer. She received several promotions there before returning to Washington in 1963 to work at USIA as an information specialist. In that year she received a superior service award from Edward R. Murrow, then director of USIA. In 1966 Ms. Davis received the Federal Woman's Award as one of the six most effective women in senior federal positions. She served as cultural affairs officer in Accra from 1967 to 1971, and then as public affairs officer in Addis Ababa. Ms. Davis retired in 1973 to return to Albany because of the illness of her sister Helen.

Following retirement Ms. Davis served as chairman of the Albany-Dougherty County Bi-Centennial Committee, 1975-76, and was honored for this work as Albany's Woman of the Year for 1975. She was active in the Albany Museum of Art as a trustee and docent, gifting her extensive collection of African art and artifacts to the museum and devoting many years to teaching African-American children about the art and culture of Africa.

Ms. Davis continued to travel to

many areas of the world during retirement. For 25 years she spent summers at her shore-side cottage in Sullivan, Maine. Ms. Davis was also a regular golfer, and member of the Radium Country Club. A lifelong Catholic, she was an active member of St. Teresa's Church.

She is survived by her sister, Mrs. Burr F. (Bert) Coleman; a nephew and his wife, Andrew and Cathy Coleman of Cheshire, Ct; a niece, Maura Coleman of Cooperstown, N.Y.; and two grandnephews and many cousins in the Albany area.

Walter W. Birge, Jr., 89, retired FSO, died June 19 in Kingston, Mass.

A native of St. Louis, Mo., he was raised in Greenwich, Ct. and New York City. Mr. Birge graduated from the Groton School in 1931, and Harvard College in 1935. In 1935-36, he worked as secretary to U.S. Ambassador Weddell in Buenos Aires. In 1937-38 he studied at the London School of Economics. Returning to the U.S., he studied for the diplomatic service at the George Washington University from 1939 to 1940.

Mr. Birge joined the Foreign Service in 1941, and was posted to Nuevo Laredo as vice consul. Subsequent tours of duty took him to Istanbul, Baghdad, Saudi Arabia, Prague and Dakar. While in Prague, he rowed for the Czech Rowing Club, and after the communist takeover there in 1948, was instrumental in helping many to escape across the border to Germany, earning him the nickname of "The Scarlet Pimpernel of Prague."

In 1953, Mr. Birge retired from the Foreign Service to become director of the Czech division of Radio Free Europe. In 1957 he became export manager for Ranco Co., of Columbus, Ohio, and later was International Division vice president of the Ohio National Bank (Banc Ohio). Based in Brussels, Belgium, he represented the state of Ohio in Europe from 1975 to 1980.

Mr. Birge served on Harvard's Schools and Scholarships Committee, interviewing candidates for Harvard for more than 40 years. In 1997 he received the Hiram Hunn Memorial Schools and Scholarships Award, presented nationally to the alumnus whose work as a seeker of young talent and interviewer is outstanding. He was also on the Visiting Committee for Athletics at Harvard and on the executive board of the Harvard Varsity Club. In 1988, Mr. Birge was given the Harvard Club of Boston's Special Award for his interest in and devotion to Harvard athletics. And for all this, Harvard awarded him an Honorary Major Varsity H.

Mr. Birge is survived by his wife of 35 years, Virginia (Ness); his sons, Walter W. Birge III of Concord, Mass., and Major Eric Hartman-Birge of Stuttgart; and three grandchildren. He is also survived by stepsons Brian Sweney, of Chicago, Il., and Neil Sweney, of Kingston, Mass. ■

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

BOOKS

Realists vs. Liberals

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
John J. Mearsheimer, W.W. Norton, 2001, hardcover $27.95, 448 pages.

REVIEWED BY DAVID REUTHER

These pages usually review books on foreign policy, country studies, or the personal adventures of journalists or Foreign Service personnel. But high above that cacophony reigns international relations theory, the subject of John J. Mearsheimer's book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.*

As Mearsheimer explains, there are two major schools of international relations theory, the "realist" and the "liberal." *Tragedy* is a bold and aggressive presentation on behalf of the former camp, which contends that it doesn't matter whether a country is ruled by Mao, Roosevelt, Reagan or Richelieu; what predicts state behavior is the structure of the international system and the power of its individual units: nation-states.

Specifically, Mearsheimer's volume targets the liberal school's claim that a democratic peace means that security competition and war between the great powers have become "an obsolete enterprise." The assumptions of liberalism can be seen in the organization of the State Department, which has a Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor reporting to an under secretary for global affairs.

By contrast, realism postulates that every nation-state is solely responsible for its own survival in an anarchic world. This requires each state to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other entities. And because there is no way to determine how much power is enough, the ultimate aim of the giants in the international system is to be the hegemon — the only great power in the system. Thus, there are "no status-quo powers in the international system ... great powers are primed for offense."

Mearsheimer sees the United States as a docile, status-quo power, not a global hegemon, contrary to realist theory.

What are theoretical strategies for most states in the anarchic world of what Mearsheimer calls "Offensive Realism?" Under his assumptions, appeasement and bandwagoning are not useful for dealing with states aspiring to be hegemons, for both "call for conceding power to a rival state." He sees only "balancing" (assuming the burden of checking the aggressor) or "buck-passing" (passing that burden on to others) as viable policies.

Mearsheimer rounds up the usual 20th-century powers for his data points: Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy. He also adds Great Britain and the United States, but in a way that deviates from realism's assumption that all states act alike. Specifically, he takes the definition of a key realist variable — power — to mean *land* power, the ability to occupy ground, noting that "large bodies of water severely limited the power-projection capabilities of armies."

This interpretation explains why England did not invade Europe during the 17th, 18th or 19th centuries when all power indicators (and the predictions of Offensive Realism) suggested it should have, and why Mearsheimer ranks the United States as a regional rather than a global hegemon. But it also implies that the U.S. is a docile, status-quo power, contrary both to realist theory and to how much of the world, which also uses realist criteria, sees us.

Mearsheimer argues that the "tragedy" in his title refers to the never-ending struggle for dominance among nation-states that inevitably leads to war. But a more accurate reading is that realism's variables are too broad to be helpful and its security dilemma becomes a self-fulfilling, pessimistic prophecy where conflict is seen as something not to be managed and minimized, but a useful tool along the never-ending road to power.

In fact, the theoretical sleight of hand that keeps Americans from seeing ourselves as others do, and as the doctrine of realism requires — as an aggressive hegemon — is precisely what causes us to be bewildered by foreign reaction to U.S. foreign policy. And that misperception may be the greatest tragedy of all.

David Reuther, a retired Foreign Service officer, is a member of the AFSA Governing Board.

Calculating Tradeoffs

Creating A Life: Professional Women and the Quest for Children
Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Talk Miramax Books, 2002, hardcover, $22.00, 334 pages.

REVIEWED BY TAMERA FILLINGER

When Wendy Chamberlin recently resigned as U.S. ambassador to Pakistan to return to Washington to care for her daughters, she noted ruefully that it wasn't a "career-enhancing move." But as she commented in an interview with *The New York Times*: "There are many people who can be an ambassador, a better ambassador than I've been. But nobody else can be my daughters' mother."

Amb. Chamberlin's decision was poignant — and a great advertisement for Sylvia Ann Hewlett's *Creating a Life: Professional Women and the Quest for Children.*

Hewlett, a policy analyst and critically acclaimed author, actually set out to write a different book, one based on interviews with highly successful women who were turning 50 at the millennium. But when she discovered that none of her subjects had children (a source of great disappointment for the majority of them), that fact led her to the research that became *Creating a Life.*

She found that 42 percent of women in corporate America are childless at age 40 (compared to 25 percent of men) though only a small proportion intended to be. This figure rises to 49 percent of the highest-achievers (those earning over $100,000 a year). This occurs because women tend to spend their time and energies in post-college work and graduate school during their 20s, then establishing a reputation within an organization and working toward promotion, director, partner, etc. in their 30s. It is only then that many women who have devoted primary attention to their career track realize that their chances for marriage and children, especially the latter, are diminishing quickly.

She also identifies other factors that aggravate the problem, such as a stubbornly traditional division of labor at

home and a fertility industry that lulls women into a false sense that they can get pregnant deep into middle age.

Although Hewlett's research focuses on high-achieving women in the corporate world, the parallels to Foreign Service life are evident. It is highly unusual for overseas FS personnel to job-share or work a reduced-hours schedule so they can spend more time with their children while filling a full-time position (and only slightly more common in Washington). Because there is no maternity leave in the federal personnel system, women must use sick leave or annual leave for time off to have a child — a policy that disadvantages both those who have already used their leave for other reasons and newer hires who have not yet accumulated much leave.

Although Hewlett's research focuses on the corporate world, the parallels to Foreign Service life are evident.

Furthermore, the current State Department medical requirement that women depart post six weeks in advance of their due date to deliver a child in the U.S. depletes a large amount of leave before delivery, often leaving little for recovery.

School considerations and the lack of jobs for male spouses also adversely affect female Foreign Service officers. And tandem couples face additional problems. Beyond the pressures of both employees finding career-enhancing jobs at the same post, what happens when the kids are evacuated?

Hewlett ends her book with detailed suggestions for government and private sector initiatives to support a better work/family balance. But her most important piece of advice for young professional women is simply this: figure out what you want your work and personal life to look like at 45 and plan accordingly. ■

Tamera Fillinger was an FSO legal adviser with USAID, serving in Nairobi and Jakarta from 1992 to 1999. She left USAID to spend more time with her young children and now practices law part-time in Washington, D.C.

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REFLECTIONS

Running Toward Reconciliation

By Matthew Murray

My Sunday morning run through the "Haven of Peace," Dar es Salaam, provides ample time to reflect on life here in Tanzania. Starting up a hill outside our residence in the Mikocheni neighborhood, I am further refreshed by friendly taxi drivers who greet me in Swahili as I jog past.

As I turn the corner, with "Jambo" (hello) and "Habari za asubuhi" (good morning) still hanging in the air, I come across the construction site of the new embassy. Two miles later, I pass the site of the old U.S. embassy where so many Tanzanian lives were lost or scarred in the terrorist attack of August 1998. This new building seems a symbol of our renewed bilateral relationship since the bombing of four years ago, but there has been other violence in recent years, stemming from a secessionist political movement on Zanzibar and periodic Muslim-Christian tensions.

At the half-mile point, I reach Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road, named after the man who succeeded the father of the nation, Julius Nyerere, as president. Mwinyi failed to capture the hearts of the population as his predecessor had done, but his son is now deputy minister of health and he toils in a country where an estimated one in seven adults has HIV/AIDS and countless numbers die of malaria.

The new U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam seems a symbol of our renewed bilateral relationship since the bombing of four years ago.

Next, I spot farmers hard at work on tiny plots of land. We in the U.S. would consider plots this size to be gardens but Tanzanians consider them to be their livelihood. Eighty percent of the population struggles to make a living off of a piece of land often less than one acre in size.

A few feet further on I get my first view of the Indian Ocean at Kenyatta Drive. If my eyes could strain to see farther, I might be able to make out the outline of the exotic isle of Zanzibar. The majority of Zanzibaris offer a friendly smile or wave to visiting Americans but ironically, one of the convicted bombers reportedly originated in these islands.

On the coast, I spot a gaggle of herons, starlings and egrets flocking, as if awaiting a secret signal to take off into the wind. The birds remind me of many of Tanzania's natural wonders, including Mt. Kilimanjaro, the Serengeti National Park, the Selous Game Reserve and the Ngorongoro Crater. I recognize salesmen zooming past on bicycles headed to or from the local fish market to peddle the fresh catch of the day. Turning onto Ocean Road, I see dhows with their huge sails flapping in the breeze. One can imagine the boats carrying slaves to Zanzibar or up the coast to Bagamoyo, little more than a century ago.

Turning back toward town, I see one of the latest foreign investments, the Holiday Inn, rising in the background. On the corner is the Mobitel office — a reminder that more Tanzanians may rely on cellular phones than on landlines in the not-too-distant future. Passing the Nyerere Cultural Center, I head into "Little India," where a "Namaste" (hello) or "Salaam aleikum" (peace be with you) is more likely to open doors than the local vernacular.

On the homestretch, I feel the sun at my back and note the smiling faces of children dutifully running to church or the mosque. Ahead of me, I see a rainbow that reminds me of God's promise to Noah that a brighter future was in store. As I race home, I fervently hope that this promise will someday be fulfilled for all Tanzanians — Christian, Muslim and others— even if it happens long after I depart. ■

Matthew Murray is a political/economic officer in Dar es Salaam and also serves as the post's AFSA representative. He previously served in New Delhi. The stamp is courtesy of the AAFSW Bookfair "Stamp Corner."

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

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