The Foreign Service Journal, December 2013

36 DECEMBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL advocating for a course of action—different in some way from current U.S. policy—on an issue of their choice related to the Arab Spring. Syria, drone policy in Yemen and assistance to Egypt were the most popular topics. Any Analogy Will Do Those writing about Syria universally advocated U.S. mili- tary involvement, whether through providing weapons and training to opposition fighters (using U.S. military advisers), imposing a no-fly zone or supporting a NATO-led ground intervention. What struck me most about these papers were their uses of history and analogy. One cited Kosovo as a prec- edent, and another raised the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan—only to dismiss their relevance to Syria. It seemed to me that my students picked (or interpreted) an analogy to fit the position they had decided on, rather than taking a broader view of history to inform their decision-mak- ing process. Rather than probing deeply into similarities and differences, they reached quick conclusions. A NATO inter- vention worked in Kosovo, so it could in Syria. Conversely, U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan need not occur in Syria, given the many dissimilarities. I quickly recognized that my students were far from alone in using historical analogies to justify preferred policies. At a seminar on Bahrain on Capitol Hill, one panelist argued that it was natural for the Bahraini government to crack down on protesters. After all, he observed, other governments do the same when significant portions of the population rise up— look at Kent State in 1970. (No, I’m not kidding!) The panelist beside him flinched. When asked subse- quently to explain her objections, she invoked the American Revolution—for reasons that remain unclear to me—as a counter-analogy to argue against crackdowns. To go back to Syria, consider the op-ed by Turkish politi- cal scientist Soner Cagaptay and former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey in the May 17 New York Times . They argue for arming the rebels or imposing a no-fly zone, pointing to Bosnia and Kosovo as “proving the value of American leader- ship.” Or take the campaign by Senator John McCain, R-Ariz., invoking his service in the Vietnam War, to urge Washington to impose a no-fly zone and undertake other military actions beyond the current policy of furnishing light weapons to the opposition: “I’ve been in conflicts where there was gradual escalation, and that approach doesn’t win.” Whether the arguments cited above are right is not the point. There’s no doubt history can be a useful tool in devel- oping and defending one’s position. Sen. McCain, Amb. Jef- frey and others are right to draw on their extensive experience and historical knowledge. But a quick reference to historical- analogy-as-justification should prompt listeners to raise their antennae. Such rhetoric is seductive, for it says: “Trust me; I’ve learned the lessons of the past.” An analogy isn’t necessarily a bad starting point, of course. But how is Kosovo like Syria? How isn’t it? What are the prob- lems each situation presented to the United States? Are the regional and domestic contexts similar or different? And how do the key countries and leaders involved see the situation? It is easy to cite an analogy to justify one’s position. But as my Georgetown student so succinctly put it following our simulation, assessing a foreign policy challenge is much harder. For the most difficult problems in foreign policy, asking the right questions rarely leads to an obvious answer (except, perhaps, in hindsight). But ideally, it will lead to a way for- ward that is both informed and clear about our assumptions, why we have made them and what (if anything) might cause us to change them. Thinking in Time by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May (Free Press, 1988) expands on this framework to offer a marvelous guide for using historical reasoning in the policy process. The Foreign Service Angle What value can a Foreign Service officer bring to the table in an internal policy debate? On the surface, there’s an easy answer. Our knowledge of a given country or region—its lead- ers, influences, economy, people and culture—can inform recommendations, giving policymakers a nuanced under- standing of the situation under consideration. Examples abound: George Kennan’s Long Telegram; the contributions made by three FSOs who participated in Presi- dent John Kennedy’s ExComm; the China hands’ analysis of the prospects of the Communists and Nationalists; and the efforts by State Department professionals to improve post- invasion governance in Iraq. My students were far fromalone in resorting to historical analogies to justify preferred policies.