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

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"What I wouldn't give for a couple of good native servants. . . .!"

"Gee, are you really the new mascot that the Commandant sent out for our MSG contingent?"

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

"Remember, girls, come what may, the bridge game must go on!"

"Who's going native? I'm just trying to express my appreciation of local culture!"

"Women's lib or no women's lib, you're coming home and organizing that cocktail party, or else!"


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

THE FOREIGN LEGION IS ALIVE AND WELL AND LIVING IN AUBAGNE

HOWARD R. SIMPSON

THE RANKS are straight, the white kepis tilted slightly forward, the chin straps tight under the sun tanned faces. The sun is almost directly overhead and its rays are hot. The order rips out and hundreds of rifles sweep up and slam into the present arms position. A momentary silence hangs over the spotless parade ground, broken only by the snapping of the tri-color and the regimental flag in the brisk wind.

Another order and the drums roll, a single trumpet sounds the salute to the dead and the flags slowly dip. After the minute of silence the full band breaks into a famous slow march and the Premier Etranger, the 1st Infantry Regiment of the French Foreign Legion, prepares to pass in review led by its bearded, leather-apronned sappers, their axes slung over their shoulders.

The quartier Vienot of the Foreign Legion at Sidi-Bel Abbès in 1930? The Foreign Legion headquarters at Nhatrang in 1952? Or maybe a dream, a hazy amalgam of past images and the boyhood remembrance of Beau Geste?

None of these. This is April 30, 1975, at the Foreign Legion's home at Aubagne, twenty minutes by car from Marseille. The occasion is the annual celebration of "Camerone" in remembrance of a battle fought years ago in Mexico. The monument erected on the scene of the battle along the road from Vera Cruz to Puebla bears the inscription, "There were here less than sixty opposing an entire Army. Its weight crushed them. Life more than courage abandoned these French soldiers the 30th of

---

The author is alive and well and serving as principal officer in Marseille. A frequent contributor to the JOURNAL, *Mr. Simpson entered the Foreign Service in 1951, after newspaper and magazine experience. The illustration is also by his hand.*

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April, 1863." A bit more detail helps to explain the mystique of "Camerone." The ten hour battle saw over 2,000 Mexican troops attacking the reduced Company of Legionnaires. As the end approached the five remaining survivors fired their last cartridges and charged with fixed bayonets. Captain Danjou, the Legion Commander, was killed on the spot but his wooden hand, the result of an earlier wound, was recovered and brought back to France. It remains in the museum of the Legion at Aubagne and is brought forth, in its box, each day of Camerone as a part of the ceremony.

What is this Foreign Legion? This anachronism? This strange martial link with the past in a period when the professional military must be flexible and open to new ideas to survive? A pretty ceremonial Corps? Far from it. The Foreign Legion, greatly reduced in size, remains what it has always been: a tough, professional fighting force. Its officers are among the best in the French Army and its veteran non-commissioned officers, with their task of turning recruits of all nationalities and all backgrounds into Legionnaires, are indisputably among the most professional in the world.

The image of Legionnaires struggling through the sand of the Sahara in heavy blue coats under burdensome kits, their long Lebel rifles weaving above their white kepis can be abandoned.

Today's Legionnaire may be a paratrooper, an expert in military engineering and construction, a technician in the care and handling of ground to ground missiles. But his prime mission remains that of being a highly trained, physically fit combat soldier ready to go into action anywhere at anytime.

Legionnaires are based in the French Pacific Territories where they have carried out the construction of Nuclear Testing facilities; in Djibouti where their mobile desert patrols provide security and protection; in Calvi, Corsica, a prime training center; at Aubagne or at Marseille's Fort Saint Nicolas, the Legion recruit depot where the young volunteer takes his last steps as a civilian entering the gate of the centuries-old Fort.

On this day of April 30, 1975, the heavy boots bite into the well swept gravel and the band plays the Legion's march: "Tiens! Voila du boudin. . .Voila du boudin. . . Pour les Alsaciens, les Suisses et les Lorrains!. . ."

A well known figure takes the salute. General Marcel Bigeard, Secretary of State for Defense, legendary French Parachute Officer, hero of Indochina and Algeria, survivor of the Vietminh prison camps, many times wounded, many times decorated, stands at attention in his civilian suit and smiles at the officers he has known under different skies as they swing past with their companies. Later Bigeard, who flew down from Paris that morning and landed on the parade ground in a chopper, speaks to the Legionnaires and evokes the supreme irony of the day. . .the morning papers are front paging the fall of Saigon. Standing nearby as he speaks is the widow of Colonel Gaucher, Legion Commander at Dien Bien Phu, killed in the first heavy artillery barrage of the attack.

(Continued on page 31)

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It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. — George Washington

A Foreign Policy for the Era of Interdependence

A. JAMES REICHLEY

THE EARLIEST European settlers of North America spoke and wrote often of their desire "to serve God"—and also of their aim "to get rich." These frequently antagonistic goals, evident at the very birth of American history, have helped to shape enduring conflicts in US policy toward the rest of the world. Moral idealism, deeply ingrained in the American character, has fostered a conviction that the United States has a special mission to lead the way to human salvation. Simultaneously, the pursuit of material self-interest—Yankee gogettiveness—has propelled us to unprecedented national wealth and power.

A second and related conflict has pushed and pulled at American foreign policy to such a degree that the nation's course in world affairs has sometimes seemed erratic, and currently appears confused. The question, recurrently debated for half a century, is: should we vigorously assert our views and interests in international affairs, or should we use our geographic isolation to avoid debilitating foreign entanglements?

During the first hundred years or so of its history, the United States heeded George Washington's admonition to "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Americans concentrated on opening up the vast areas of their own rich continent. Still, from the beginning there was a profound sense that the United States was destined to make an important, perhaps climactic, contribution to human progress, if only as a model of republican virtue—"a city on a hill" to inspire other peoples struggling to escape poverty and despotism. For Abraham Lincoln, the United States had already become "the last, best hope of earth."

Toward the end of the 19th century, democratic evangelism and the exuberant growth of American business combined to draw the United States onto an interventionist course. Internationalism remained strong until it was submerged by the tide of disillusion that followed World War I. Isolationism dominated the 1920s and much of the 1930s, finally yielding its influence over US policy only after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941.

At the end of World War II, the United States found itself by a wide margin the most powerful nation in the world, both militarily and economically. But this primacy sprang from conditions that were bound to be temporary. It was the result not only of the American monopoly over atomic weapons, which was over by 1949, but also of the fact that all other great powers, victors and vanquished alike, were exhausted or in ruins. Only the United States came out of the war stronger than it went in—its economy expanded, its military capacity vastly increased, its homeland untouched.

The high price of containment

American policymakers determined to use this power to rebuild the non-Communist world, lest weakness again bring on tolerance of aggression, the repeated miscalculation that had led to World War II. When Stalin began the Cold War by imposing Communist rule on the Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern Europe, the Truman Administration reacted by providing massive economic aid for the reconstruction not only of our wartime allies in Western Europe, but also of our former enemies, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Soviet intransigence in Europe and the conquest of China by the Communist armies of Mao Tse-tung were met by a policy of containment, designed to prevent further expansion by the Communist powers anywhere on the globe.

The containment policy, which in recent years has had a rather bad press, was in many ways a strategic success. The dominoes, after all, did not fall. Western Europe and Japan became increasingly prosperous partners in the camp of the democracies. Communism did not advance much beyond the line it had reached by 1950. Still, containment cost thousands of lives in Korea and Vietnam, caused the United States to be identified with corrupt and dictatorial regimes in some developing countries, and ultimately helped to undermine the value of the dollar.

Richard Nixon, once among the most belligerent cold warriors, perceived as President that the United States was over-extended, and that

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American opinion no longer supported a foreign policy placing the United States in the role of policeman to the world. By the end of Nixon's first term, containment gave way to detente, the policy of negotiation and even cooperation with our Communist adversaries.

Coping with the new majority

Today, a complex confluence of events, especially the turbulent developments in the Middle East, has brought US foreign policy to a new point of decision. It must still take into its calculations the fact that only the Soviet Union wields enough military might to threaten our national existence, and our differences with international Communism remain extreme. But our relations with the governments of the Soviet Union and China, as well as with some of the Communist satellites, are now considerably more civil and relaxed than they were when the Nixon Administration took office in 1969. Some of our most pressing international problems now involve countries that never before seemed to count on the international scene—the countries grouped under the euphemistic label of the "developing world." They constitute the new majority of the world's nations.

Many of these developing countries regard the United States—indeed, all industrial countries—with a new belligerence and even, in many cases, open hostility. Blaming past "exploitation" by the West for their current economic troubles, they clamor for a system of international egalitarianism—based more on the precepts of Robin Hood or Jesse James than on those of Karl Marx—in which the wealth of industrial countries is simply redistributed to those that have been less productive. The success of the OPEC cartel in massively increasing its share of the gross world product has only whetted the developing countries' new appetite. After all, it was the oil weapon that for the first time enabled the developing world to inflict a major economic setback on the advanced world.

A second set of problems involves the deteriorating relations between the United States and its allies among the industrial democracies. Friction has arisen partly as the result of some faulty diplomacy, but partly, too, because relaxation of Cold War tensions naturally reduced the need for solidarity among the democracies. The oil crisis at first seemed to accentuate the tendency among the democracies to pursue separate, even conflicting, policies. More recently, improved diplomacy and awareness of common danger have drawn the major oil consumers closer together. Some of our allies, however, continue to regard us —and one another—with considerable distrust.

At this critical juncture, US foreign policy is to an unprecedented extent dominated by a single man: Henry Kissinger. Nixon's resignation last summer left Kissinger, at least temporarily, in a position of authority far greater than that held by any former Secretary of State—even Dean Acheson or John Foster Dulles.

Kissinger's tactical skill is probably unequaled in the annals of American diplomacy. But amidst multiple crises, he has not got around to developing a new overall structure for US policy. Detente has no direct bearing on the problems we have with our allies or with that Third World of developing countries. Kissinger's virtuoso performance as universal mediator provides no enduring remedies for the economic, social, or political problems that underlie global instability.

Moreover, Kissinger runs such a one-man show that the institutional network, in the State Department and other governmental agencies charged with administering US policy, has been thrown into confusion. The US ambassador to one Latin American country recently told a visitor that, because he no longer has a clear sense of the rationale of US policy, he now must buck on to Washington many problems that he once dealt with on the spot.

Sorcerer or sorcerer's apprentice?

High-ranking State Department officials in Washington concede that American policy at present is largely an extension of the Secretary's personality. The situation reminds Stanley Hoffmann, chairman of the Center for European Studies at Harvard, of the old folktale about the sorcerer's apprentice who unleashed chaos by using his master's magic wand. He says: "We cannot yet tell whether Kissinger will turn out to be the sorcerer or the sorcerer's apprentice."

Foreign policy should not be rigidly structured. But a policy conducted almost wholly on an ad hoc basis may lead to eccentric or potentially damaging moves—such as the US "tilt" in favor of Pakistan in the 1971 war between Pakistan and India, and the various "shocks" delivered by Nixon and Kissinger to Japan and Western Europe. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change, puts it, "What we need now in foreign policy is architecture rather than acrobatics."

Kissinger himself, when he was a professor of government at Harvard, recognized the inadequacy of a foreign policy that lacks broad, long-range objectives. Writing of the last century's most skilled master of realpolitik, he regretfully concluded: "Whenever Metternich operated within a fixed framework, when an alliance had to be constructed or a settlement negotiated, his conduct was masterly. Whenever he was forced to create his own objectives, there was about him an air of futility. . . He understood the forces at work better than most of his contemporaries, but this knowledge proved of little avail, because he used it almost exclusively to deflect their inexorable march, instead of placing it into his service for a task of construction."

A search for fresh strategies

Kissinger's academic critics are prolific in their recommendations for new strategies. Most formulations are derived from one or another of the major thrusts of US foreign policy in this century. They fall into three convenient groupings:

MODIFIED CONTAINMENT. Advocates of this approach, who may be thought of as "the sons of the cold warriors," hold that the main objective of US policy should still be to keep Soviet power in check. "The underlying aim of our foreign policy," says Samuel Huntington, professor of government at Harvard and editor of FOREIGN POLICY

magazine, "ought to be to make sure that no other country gets to the position of predominance in the world that we held twenty years ago." The chief trouble with this approach is that it lacks positive ingredients needed to deal with the new complexities in world affairs.

CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY. Another school of thought, a direct descendant of Wilsonian idealism, maintains that the United States should make the encouragement of democratic government a central goal of foreign policy. Richard Ullman, professor of international affairs at Princeton and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, for one, proposes that the United States give help to "free societies squarely on the basis of the intrinsic value of preserving and extending nonauthoritarian political systems."

Several difficulties, however, confront the United States in promoting democracy abroad. For one thing, our means for influencing the internal politics of most foreign countries, short of blatant intervention, are severely limited. For another, it seems evident by now that the Anglo-American forms of representative government do not easily take root in many foreign cultures. "I don't know why we put such emphasis on exporting democracy," Dean Acheson told a group of journalists whom he was entertaining in his Georgetown home one night in the late 1950s. "The Anglo-Saxons are the only ones who have ever really had the knack for it. Some of the world's most civilized peoples have never had any talent for it at all."

Acheson overstated the case, as is shown by the enduring success of democratic regimes in the Scandinavian countries, and the current commitment to democracy of Germany and Japan, among other non-English-speaking nations. Yet he probably was right in suggesting that democracy can flourish only in the soil of hospitable social and moral institutions and traditions.

Finally, it seems clear that our vital world interests will require us to continue to cooperate with at least some authoritarian regimes that we may not like. If purely military reasons for such cooperation are now diminished, economic reasons are likely to increase. We are certainly not about to make the installation of democratic governments in Iran or Saudi Arabia the primary objective of our dealings with those countries.

NEO-ISOLATIONISM. A third group, whose views descend not only from those of conservative noninterventionists, such as Senator Robert Taft Sr., but also from those of liberal isolationists, including Senator Robert LaFollette Sr., contends that the United States should to a large extent withdraw from its international commitments. The argument is based, writes Robert Tucker, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins and author of "A New Isolationism," on "the conviction that sustained foreign involvement—and particularly one holding out the constant prospect of military intervention—poses a grave threat to America's institutions and well-being."

The neo-isolationist view has value as a counterweight to excessively idealistic or ambitious approaches to foreign policy. But it seems to underestimate the risks involved in political and military withdrawal from world leadership. Political isolation would probably lead all too soon to economic and social isolation as well. As Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger says: "The United States could probably survive militarily without allies. The outreach of the Soviet Union would not for the foreseeable future be great enough to overcome us. But if we withdrew from the world, we would have to face the likelihood that countries like Spain, France, Britain, Germany, and Japan would eventually fall under Soviet hegemony. We would be denied access to the energy resources on which our economy depends. And we would find ourselves shut out of important strategic areas like the Indian Ocean."

Economics at stage center

In addition to their separate deficiencies, policies of modified containment, championing democracy, and neo-isolationism share another shortcoming. All of them seem irrelevant to the economic issues that are now moving toward center stage in international relations. Worldwide inflation, access to supplies of raw materials, maintenance of markets, frictions arising from the growth of multinational corporations, reorganization of the international monetary system, prevention of mass starvation among the poorest one-fourth of the human race—these are the issues that increasingly demand the nation's attention.

The evident gaps in all our traditional foreign-policy arrangements plainly show that the United States needs to develop a new strategy, adapting old traditions to the new problems of a new age. A fair idea of the shape that such a structure will take can be gained by answering the question: "What do Americans really want of US foreign policy?" Most people would list at least four essentials:

MILITARY SECURITY. Diplomacy as ever remains the first line of military defense. Despite the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union, some risk remains that the superpowers will be drawn into conflict by some of their client states. This danger can burst upon us at almost any time, since the United States and the Soviet Union have only limited control over the behavior of their clients, as has been demonstrated again and again in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Another threat, just developing, arises from the prospect that several Third World countries will soon join India in acquiring the capacity to produce nuclear arms. Unfortunately, it is well within the realm of possibility that one or another of these countries, or perhaps extranational organizations of political extremists, might practice nuclear terrorism or blackmail. Such a course would ultimately be suicidal, but in the meantime nuclear brigands could inflict horrendous damage. Abram Chayes, professor of law at Harvard and an expert on disarmament, takes this danger quite seriously. "History shows," he says, "That a main source of violence and upheaval in international affairs comes from groups that have access to the means for violence, but who have little stake in the status quo and have come to value change more than they value life itself." So far, efforts to develop safeguards against the hazards of nuclear proliferation have made little headway.

PROTECTION OF OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. Our international eco-

nomic objectives include access on reasonable terms to resources, markets, and opportunities for investment. Throughout most of history, a great power could achieve some of these objectives through force or the threat of force—gunboat diplomacy. The approaching end of this era was signaled in 1956 when Britain and France, yielding to pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, abandoned their effort to seize the Suez Canal from Nasser's Egypt. Now, as Robert Tucker observes, there is a growing assumption, at least among the democracies, "that the rising material and moral costs of employing force effectively inhibit—or very nearly so—the strong from resorting to force against the weak."

As a last resort, the United States no doubt would still employ force, as Kissinger contended not long ago, to prevent "strangulation of the industrialized world." But in situations that do not approach this extreme, the threat of force has lost its historic credibility in the settlement of economic disputes.

As a result, the United States—and other advanced nations—must now safeguard international economic interests through international arrangements that also satisfy the realistic aspirations of Third World countries. Fortunately, as the economic strength of the developing countries increases, their interests are gradually apt to converge with those of the advanced world. The underlying—and frequently overlooked—significance of the new relationship between the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries is that as the wealth of the producers has grown, their dependence on the continued economic health of the consumers has also risen.

The value of OPEC revenues is tied to the value of the dollar and other currencies in which the oil producers receive payment. Maintenance of the demand for oil depends on the continued economic vitality of the industrial countries. In addition, as Robert Roosa, former Under Secretary of the Treasury and now a partner in Brown Brothers Harriman, points out, "The interest of the OPEC countries in converting exhaustible oil into permanent earning assets calls for investing most of their surplus in the oil-consuming countries."

The oil crisis, if the principal countries on both sides behave rationally—a fair bet barring a renewed Arab-Israeli war—will probably find its way to some kind of mutually satisfactory resolution. "It will be solved," says David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan, "because the economic consequences of it not being solved would just be too terrible." But the shocks, both political and economic, that it has created have made clear the need for new rules for international trade in vital raw materials—rules that both producers and consumers would have a vested interest in observing. That is much easier said than done. Two economic levers to promote the observance of contracts, however, would be steps by consuming countries to stockpile scarce materials and to adopt more effective conservation techniques.

The bonds of heritage, which spring from sources deep within the human heart, play an unavoidable—and legitimate—part in the formulation of policy. But they can complicate the task of policymakers and should not be permitted to interfere with the rational pursuit of broader international objectives.

Transmission belts of progress

As matters stand now, world trade and investment are hampered by a vast clutter of impediments imposed by developed and developing countries alike. The Trade Act of 1974 gives the United States the means to take the lead in breaking down such barriers. In the round of negotiations that is now beginning, reduction of nontariff impediments is even more important than further cuts in tariffs. At a minimum, United States negotiators should seek action to deal with impediments to trade caused by quotas, subsidies, and export controls. And the agenda should be broadened to include new agreements governing investment controls as well.

The United States would also be wise to provide leadership in resolving some of the problems involving multinational companies. To a great extent, the multinationals have become the transmission belts of economic progress to the developing world. As a nation that has reaped great profits from the growth of the multinationals, we have a compelling interest in the elimination of abuses that, if they persist, are apt to stir first resentment and then resistance to an American commercial presence abroad. In particular, we should promote development of international agreements to make sure that the multinationals cannot juggle their books to avoid paying a fair share of taxes in foreign countries where they operate.

SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER NATIONS THAT SHARE OUR VALUES. As a nation of immigrants, the United States has natural ties with many countries from which large groups of Americans trace their descent. A contributing reason for our entrance into both World Wars was the sense among many Americans of British extraction—and others who felt the affinities of language and culture—that the United States must not let Britain go under. More recently, American Jews have played an influential role in promoting US support for Israel.

The bonds of heritage, which spring from sources deep within the human heart, play an unavoidable—and legitimate—part in the formulation of policy. But they can complicate the task of policymakers and should not be permitted to interfere with the rational pursuit of broader international objectives.

A more important bond to certain nations is a feeling of shared political, economic, and even spiritual interests. Such a sense of community is an enduring foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, now that the military threat to Western Europe no longer seems so frightening. Shared interests, as much as proximity, shape our close relationship with Canada—and, despite great differences in cultural tradition, cement our ties with Japan. They also provide a more fundamental reason for our support of Israel.

Our current frustrations over foreign policy should not obscure the fact that the economic advances of the industrial democracies since World War II constitute the greatest social success story of all time. It should be one of

our primary foreign-policy goals to keep that story unfolding.

RESPONSIBILITY TO POSTERITY. For the United States, as for other countries, this goal has usually affected foreign policy last and least. But if humanity is to get through many more decades, the long-term survival of the human race must be accorded a higher priority in foreign policy as well as in our domestic laws. Food shortages, environmental problems, and the population explosion, which were thought of a generation ago as national concerns, are now recognized as planetary in scope and call for urgent international solutions. The recent record of such efforts does not inspire much confidence. For example, the United Nation's deadlocked law-of-the-sea negotiations may have set off history's greatest territorial grab: a race by coastal states to stake claims of sovereignty over large portions of the oceans.

The limits of largess

In contrast to the wide concern about these four aspects of foreign policy, relatively few Americans seem much moved by the fate of what some now call the Fourth World—those poorest of the poor countries that produce few commodities valuable in trade and show little aptitude for developing industries. These countries are important to the United States, as Fred Bergsten, a Brookings Institution economist, points out, not only for humanitarian reasons or because some of them already have substantial military capabilities, but also because it is simply imprudent for the developed countries to permit stores of bitterness and rage to build up in lands that together contain a quarter of the earth's population.

The problems of most Fourth World countries spring more from deficiencies in their political and economic arrangements than from a paucity of resources. Some are riven by tribal enmities or hobbled by government corruption. Others seen unable to establish sufficient social order. Another common trouble is their tendency, often rooted in ideology, to pursue social visions at the expense of economic reality. For example, they adopt policies that lure farmers off the land and into urban unemployment; they inhibit native accumulation of capital and punish instead of reward entrepreneurial effort. In the face of rapid population expansion, such policies overwhelm their struggles to escape from poverty.

Expanded support by the United States and other developed countries—along with the newly rich oil producers—for multilateral institutions such as the World Bank would help some of the poorer countries. In addition, conscience and prudence dictate that we do what we can to help the Fourth World countries fend off famine and other forms of pressing want. But we should clearly indicate that it lies far beyond both our capacity and our intention to make up fully or indefinitely for economic failures resulting primarily from political folly.

The economic gains of such countries as South Korea, Malaysia, and Tunisia have to a great extent been the results of social order and incentives for enterprise. If India, the impoverished new nations of Africa, and others would put their economies in order, they might follow in their footsteps by taking advantage of their hidden potential. The United States can provide models and aid for economic development. But the political will to make needed social and economic changes will have to come from the developing countries themselves.

The common theme running through all of the international problems of the '70s is, of course, interdependence, the new catchword of diplomacy.

The United States must attune its own foreign policy to this new global fact of life. Interdependence should become, not merely an inescapable problem, but a positive goal of our foreign policy—the more interdependence the better! The greater the stake the various countries of the world develop in one another's economic health and social tranquillity, the more inclined they will be to promote political cooperation and to avoid military confrontation. During the Nixon Administration, Kissinger wisely made this insight the inspiration of the United State's policies toward the USSR and China. Oddly, he has remained hesitant to apply that principle to our dealings with Third and Fourth World countries—or even to our relations with our allies in Western Europe and Japan. Criticizing the Secretary on this score, Zbigniew Brzezinski has proposed that "we should make an unambiguous commitment to cooperative solutions with all willing parties." The United States has an essential role to play in fostering a convergence of global factions. But we can only do so effectively if we stop acting apologetic, at international forums, about our own imperfect democracy.

No escape from leadership

Events of recent years, particularly the Vietnam war, have made clear to most Americans both the limits of our national power, and the rapid erosion of support among the developing countries for United States policies. But we would be tragically wrong to conclude from these sobering realizations that the United States either can or should evade the obligation of international leadership.

The United States does not really have the option of staying on the sidelines like Sweden—or even of following a narrowly nationalistic course like France or China. Our role must be shaped by two dominating realities. First, though our strength relative to that of others is somewhat reduced, we remain the most powerful single nation in the world. What we do profoundly affects the rest of the world—and what the rest of the world does inevitably affects us. For the sake of our own economic security—and probably in the long run our military security as well—we must remain committed to an activist world role.

Second, we are the products of a national tradition that makes it impossible for us to escape a sense of concern for the fate of other peoples. On the eve of the Republican National Convention in 1968, Henry Kissinger, then a foreign-policy adviser to Nelson Rockefeller, told a journalistic friend: "It would have a devastating effect on the American people if they ever came to believe that American ideals are no longer relevant to the world's future." These ideals, of course, are as relevant as they ever were. They require that we continue to strive for peace, freedom, and dignity for all mankind. ■



T'abhor the makers, and their laws approve,
Is to hate traitors and the treason love. — John Dryden

The Uses (and Abuses) of Secret Power

HARRY HOWE RANSOM

I BEGIN, with apologies, by mentioning two of my own books: "Can American Democracy Survive Cold War?" (1963) and "The Intelligence Establishment" (1970). The titles say much about the development of a debate that promises to be with us for some time.

The first title/question posed the dilemma of an American democracy facing a perceived threat (perceived at least by the foreign policy elite) to national security. An assumed monolithic "world communism" provoked the creation of a vast arsenal of foreign policy instruments, including espionage and covert political operations overseas. Managing this mammoth security apparatus required highly centralized control. Indeed, at times it required deception, lying, and deep secrecy. At the same time, of course, democratic government required information and disclosure if the people's representatives, especially in Congress, were to play a meaningful role in government. The problem is that the pursuit of national security threatens what we are trying to protect, namely, American democracy.

American wars have always required compromises with democratic principles. If truth is the first casualty of war, perhaps the second is the legislature's role in policy-making. As long as substantial—even if manipulated—consensus prevails about the nature of the threat, and as long as the methods for preserving national security have general support, widespread secrecy is tolerated. But today perceptions of the threat have been sharply altered, the national security consensus is evaporating, and Americans find themselves debating the merits of a huge national defense system that includes secrecy and covert operations. The growing consensus is that the secret parts of the cold war apparatus need more rigorous supervision. Recent events, including Watergate, have made Americans exceedingly suspicious that the invocation of "national security" is aimed at hiding narrow, partisan interests.

The cold war apparatus would soon be perceived as "The Intelligence Establishment." This establishment included the massive and secret intelligence bureaucracy that grew up after World War II. The Central Intelligence Agency, created by Congress in 1947, is one part of the federal intelligence bureaucracy that has come to include some half dozen major and a dozen minor intelligence units. The total cost exceeds $6 billion annually, with an estimated 200,000 employees. The term "establishment" implies that these agencies wield great influence but are not accountable by normal democratic standards.

Within the bureaucracy, of course, there are elaborate procedures of accountability. The operating principles are reflected in statements by two important figures in the system, one a director of Central Intelligence and the other a senior senator responsible for "watchdogging" the intelligence system. Richard M. Helms told newspaper editors in 1971: "The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service." He went on to argue that necessary secrecy precluded proof of honor. John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, put it another way: "You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such and shut your eyes and take what is coming."

These operating principles and corollary assumptions have dominated the operations of the intelligence system for over a quarter of a century. They might be called

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the "on faith" and "close your eyes" principles. Put differently: Since the ends justify the means, let us not question, or even know about, the means.

We now know that the cold war intelligence bureaucracies have been used on occasion in a manner resembling their use in a police state; weapons of protection against external enemies have been turned inward, placing the Bill of Rights in jeopardy. It is past time to examine the assumptions behind such unhappy consequences.

ASSUMPTION ONE: The nation needs a Central Intelligence Agency.

One of the "lessons" of World War II was that the nation was surprised at Pearl Harbor primarily because "knowable" information was not at the right place at the right time. Thus the need for a central intelligence unit. There was bitter controversy from the start about the nature, functions, and organization of the new unit. Some feared the creation of a peacetime operation that smacked of totalitarian methods. They sensed that centralized intelligence would give the Chief Executive a crucial upper hand over Congress and public opinion. Others, in the military and the Department of State, feared that intelligence was being transferred from their domain, with the result that their peculiar needs would be neglected. The dominant motive behind the creation of the CIA was, I believe, the feeling that the future military strength of the United States required that the President be constantly confronted with the power "realities" in the world. The idea of central intelligence was valid, holding the promise of producing objective, timely information. The scheme went off the track when it included undertaking operational assignments. The CIA became, particularly after 1949, a prime agency of the cold war. By 1950 and the Korean War America was again mobilized and its foreign policy increasingly militarized. The disparate functions of intelligence analysis, espionage, and clandestine political operations became dangerously intermixed. As Harry Truman described it (speaking informally in the 1961-62 period to Merle Miller): ". . . those fellows in the CIA don't just report on wars and the like, they go out and make their own, and there's nobody to keep track of what they're up to. They spend billions of dollars stirring up trouble so they'll *have* something to report on." A caricature, no doubt, but the problem was and is real. In sum, the first assumption is valid, but the bureaucratic momentum propelling the system must be slowed and pointed in another direction.

ASSUMPTION TWO: The CIA can be used with surgically precise discretion and properly controlled.

Given the CIA's disparate functions (espionage and political action in addition to intelligence analysis), most of which are carried on in deep secrecy, this assumption must be challenged. While elaborate control procedures have evolved within the structure, secret intelligence systems have a life of their own beyond the purview of Congress and even, sometimes, of the President. The tightest possible security is applied by a universal "need to know" rule, and by a highly compartmentalized structure. Sometimes the "need to know" rule is applied to keep responsible policymakers pure.

Even information-gathering operations can have unintended and counterproductive results. One thinks of the U-2 shot down over Russia in May, 1960, or of the capture of the USS *Pueblo* by North Korea, or of straying reconnaissance aircraft over China. These illustrate the kinds of problems that can be caused by intelligence missions. Were presumed benefits worth the costs, especially the diplomatic costs, exacted in these instances?



Covert political operations, on the other hand, are inherently difficult to control. If the CIA ships an agent off to Brazil with a satchel of money for use in parliamentary elections, he is usually instructed not to report because of danger of disclosure. At some point in such operations controls become incompatible with the doctrines of deep cover.

The assumption that clandestine operations can be kept under democratic controls hits a logical barrier. Democracy demands disclosure. In addition, covert operations of this sort are indistinguishable from acts of war, and war is destructive of democratic values.

ASSUMPTION THREE: America needs to fight fire with fire.

Since the Russians, spearheading a revolutionary doctrine, are aiming at world domination, and since they engage in all forms of covert political action, the United States must in self-defense also apply these secret weapons to maintain a power balance. That has been the argument for almost three decades. In the words of a former Secretary of State: "a desperate struggle is going on in the back alleys of world politics," and we must join the fray.

Beginning in 1948 agents of the United States Government began selective attempts to manipulate the internal politics of other nations. This was done on the assumption, generally valid, that America's principal adversary was attempting in various parts of the world to, in Lenin's phrase, "give history a push." The United States, first under Truman and then under all succeeding Presidents, determined to push the other way, aping, in the process, the devious methods of the adversary. American agents began to subsidize secretly foreign labor unions, newspapers, and particular wings of political parties. Soon they were involved in the widest range of covert activities and spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year in foreign areas. Governments fell, occasionally political leaders were murdered in the backlash, and the full range of dirty tricks—forged documents, "black" propaganda, bribery—were applied to containing communism.

True, this array of secret instru-

ments, secretly applied, was often reactive to what the other side was doing. Sometimes we were simply fighting fire with fire. But covert operations escalated as each side reacted to the behavior—real or imagined—of the other. As in the arms race, were each side to stand back and assess objectively the costs and benefits it would probably be discovered that neither has gained much additional security. Indeed, covert operations may have simply made problems worse and prevented accommodations that more truly serve security interests. One problem is that the nature of the threat is defined by the same unit of government that is to act against the threat. The opportunities for bureaucratic self-serving are endless. The risks of provoking an ultimate war are frightening.

ASSUMPTION FOUR: A super-secret elite committee can adequately supervise covert political operations.

Those who defend the secret system point to the existence of a "Forty Committee," which, in the President's name, supervises overseas CIA covert political operations. Mr. Ford stated in a September, 1974, press conference: "The Forty Committee . . . reviews every covert operation undertaken by our Government." According to Henry Kissinger, a control committee of this sort "has existed under various names with this basic composition ever since 1948."

The assumption is that a group of faceless men, operating in supersecrecy, can in effect determine the fate of a President Diem or Allende, an Iranian Shah or a Caribbean dictator, and do all this in an accountable and responsible manner within the American governmental scheme. If their secret ventures are "successful," only a very few will know about it; if they fail, there may be some public disclosure, but the full facts rarely emerge and officials are rarely called to account. The Congressional role in all of this is entirely *post facto*. Put another way, acts that may be just short of war, and that certainly constitute aggressive behavior, are commissioned by a group of four or five officials representing the huge security bureaucracies. The CIA is represented, the Pentagon doubly represented, by the Defense Under-Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, while the State Department and the President's National Security Advisor are combined in one person, Henry Kissinger.

Proposals for covert political operations may be generated from the Presidential office or from lower levels in the bureaucracy, such as CIA, State, or Pentagon. Proposals over the years have varied, from minor projects, such as financial aid to foreign labor unions, newspapers, or political party factions, to large-scale paramilitary operations, such as a secret war in Laos or Bay of Pigs.

The "Forty Committee" concept is the antithesis of accountable decision-making; it is a closed system, appropriate perhaps for wartime, but unacceptable as a permanent procedure if democratic values are to be nourished and sustained.

Even granting the legitimacy of covert operations—a debatable concession—it is doubtful that a small group of the government's top security executives, preoccupied with managing vast bureaucratic empires, can adequately analyze proposals for covert operations and give sound judgments of approval or disapproval. Here, for example, are some of the basic factors that must be considered: costs in resources and manpower of a proposed covert operation, an estimate of chances of success, an estimate of the probabilities of disclosure, a calculation of the damage that exposure would cause, and a net estimate of all of these factors. An additional problem is that most of the time the organization proposing the operation is also supplying the information on which calculations will be based.

The "Forty Committee" concept is the antithesis of accountable decision-making; it is a closed system, appropriate perhaps for wartime, but unacceptable as a permanent procedure if democratic values are to be nourished and sustained.

ASSUMPTION FIVE: Our domestic turmoils of the past decade were, at least in part, instigated from abroad, making it necessary to spy on large numbers of American citizens.

The story in this connection is still unfolding. Available information points to a finding that no significant evidence supported the fears of Presidents Johnson and Nixon that foreign, presumably Communist, sources were influencing the antiwar movement at home with the riots, bombings, and campus unrest associated with parts of that movement.

America's ideological adversaries no doubt took pleasure in America's turmoil resulting from what many of them viewed as "imperialist" excesses. Doubtless our adversaries in North Vietnam stood to gain from the political divisiveness in America caused by the war in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, there was a failure in domestic intelligence about American public opinion if the leadership thought domestic unrest was caused by foreign stimulus or conspiracy. Indeed, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, created by President Johnson, concluded that there was no foreign conspiracy behind racial riots in the United States in the late 1960s.

What happened is that the leadership became increasingly blind to domestic political realities and to the basic irrationalities in the war policies it pursued.

ASSUMPTION SIX: Congress can play a significant role in making national security policy, even though it is cut off from full access to the product of the intelligence community.

The President is the undisputed chief of government for the conduct of foreign relations, but in formulating policy his Constitutional authority is shared with Congress. Congressional authority can be exercised in a meaningful

way only if Congress has access to the same information about foreign affairs available to the executive branch. Clearly this has not been the case.

In 1949 Congress unwisely gave to the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to decide what information from the intelligence system would be disclosed, even to Congressional committees. Logic demands that the relevant committees of Congress, such as appropriations, armed services, and foreign affairs, should have, as a matter of routine, full access to all intelligence reports, estimates, and special studies that are available to the executive branch. Logic notwithstanding, Congressional efforts to achieve this have failed to date. Opposition by the Intelligence Establishment has been based upon a variety of arguments.

One problem is selectivity. The argument is that the volume of intelligence "paper" is far too great to be manageable on Capitol Hill. The counterargument is that the principle of selectivity invites manipulation of Congress by the Intelligence Establishment. A second argument involves security, which allegedly cannot be protected if information is supplied to Congress and its legislative staffs. Classified information would, it is said, be quickly leaked to the press if distributed, even in limited circles, to Congress. The counterargument is that the Congress has a record with regard to security information that is no better, and no worse, than that of the executive branch. A third argument has sometimes been advanced on the basis of executive privilege. The assumption is that intelligence reports sometimes constitute special, privileged advice to the President. The counterargument is that this does not apply to intelligence estimates and reports, which are supposed to be objective descriptions of the outside world containing facts rather than advice.

Without full access to intelligence information, the Congressional role in national security policy-making is a sham. Unless Congress has such access, it cannot assume the tasks assigned to it by the Constitution, and the people have great difficulty in holding their representatives accountable. Indeed, an uninformed Congress can be as much a danger to the Republic as a Congress manipulated by an informed (or uninformed) President. More important, the principles of responsibility and accountability will be meaningless if there is an informational imbalance between President and Congress.

ASSUMPTION SEVEN: Congressional and press exposés will destroy or gravely damage the Central Intelligence Agency.

As of this writing, a Presidential commission is examining charges of intelligence irregularities, and two major Congressional investigations are under way. Some say all this bodes ill for the intelligence system. The Director of Central Intelligence told a friendly House appropriations subcommittee on February 20, 1975, that press charges of improper conduct by the CIA "placed American intelligence in danger." He asserted that criticism of the CIA in the news media and elsewhere had damaged relations with allied foreign intelligence organizations, endangered the lives of secret agents of the United States abroad, and adversely affected the morale within the Agency. Essential to this argument is the assumption that all of the Agency's secret activities are essential to national security and that "mistakes" or "missteps" are few and infrequent. The current mood of "exaggerations and misrepresentations of CIA's activities," said the director, "can do irreparable harm to our national intelligence apparatus and, if carried to the extreme, could blindfold our country as it looks ahead."

Such an analysis assumes that the system is internally self-correcting; that a vast bureaucracy can police itself and put its own house in order; and that the welfare or even the lives of secret agents of the United States may be more important than the rights of American citizens and the protection of the Constitutional structure. The assumption that the intelligence system is such a delicate mechanism that it cannot withstand the light of day should in itself raise suspicions. It may be that secret operations are inherently incompatible with democratic government. If we must choose, let us make the choice on facts supplied from truly objective sources. The Intelligence Establishment and its leaders have too long been the sole interpreters of the nature of the threat and of the costs and benefits of maintaining the intelligence status quo.

ASSUMPTION EIGHT: A perpetual war system—for example, a quarter century of cold war—need not corrupt democratic ideals.

In wartime Americans have acquiesced in temporary dictatorships "for the duration," expecting a return to peacetime normalities at war's end. In World War II the accepted slogan was "Trust in God and General Marshall." Congress became a rubber stamp; voluntary censorship was accepted by the press; doctrines of military secrecy were pervasive, and few complained. Even a Vice President of the United States (Truman) did not have access to the secret of the Manhattan atomic bomb project until Roosevelt's sudden death made him President.

Waging war requires a strategic approach, developed in secrecy, which in turn involves a degree of deception, which in turn requires centralized management and control, which in turn requires executive domination over the legislature, which in turn dilutes the democratic idea of consent of the governed, even in its modified representative sense.

During the Civil War Lincoln suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*. Later the Supreme Court declared his action void, but it had already done its work. The war with Spain over Cuba in 1898 did not last long enough to make deep inroads into individual liberties, but the war spirit brought strong pressures on dissenters. In World War I censorship of the press was accepted, and strong pressures were brought on German-Americans and other "dissidents." This was followed by a "Red scare" in which a vigorous Attorney General did violence to the Constitutional rights of thousands. In World War II grave injustices were imposed on a large number of Americans of Japanese descent. The denial of their basic rights, in the name of "national security," was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court. Other executive actions constituted the "temporary

Continued on page 29

I would not have borne this in my
flaming youth while Plancus was consul.—Horace

Foreign Consuls in the United States

CHARLES S. KENNEDY, JR.

CONSULAR OFFICERS of all nations suffer in one degree or another from split personalities; they are charged with seeing that their own regulations laid down by law or Departmental/Foreign Ministerial instruction are enforced and at the same time try to help their own citizens in a foreign country overcome some of the more arbitrary and nonsensical regulations of the host country. No American consul feels completely confident in throwing that first stone at a foreign bureaucracy when he is required by our law, for example, to ask each applicant for an American visa whether he or she plans to go to the United States to perform an immoral sexual act. (Were I asked, my reply would be, "just what do you have in mind and where do you suggest I go?) As an American consular officer I have long been interested in how my foreign colleagues fare in the United States and wondered if they have the same frustrations that I have had abroad. In the past few months I was fortunate to have the opportunity to speak to foreign consuls representing 20 countries in eight American cities. This sampling was both illuminating and encouraging.

The consular corps in the United States is by far the largest in any country in the world. There are almost 400 posts manned by career consular officers in 56 different cities. These officers have been sent by 80 different countries. The geographic size and dispersion of economic and political power in the United States dictates that foreign missions must establish posts away from Washington if they want to do their job. No country worth its salt can afford not to have a consulate in New York City to look after its commercial interests and take care of its citizens who reside nearby or who are visiting that area. There are presently 76 consular posts* in New York City. Next in importance is the California area with San Francisco, for the moment, leading Los Angeles with the number of consulates, 42 for the former and 40 for the latter. It may only be the infectious boosterism of Southern California acting on foreign consuls serving in Los Angeles, but in my conversations with them I gained the distinct impression that Los Angeles' role in foreign interest was growing to the detriment of San Francisco's role, and in a few years there may be more consulates in Southern rather than Northern California.

Chicago has 28 consulates, New Orleans 27, Houston 23 and Miami 20. Other major cities have consulates but one does wonder why Portugal has maintained a consul in Newark, Costa Rica one in Salt Lake City (to report on the Mormon Tabernacle Choir?) or what there is about Garden Grove, California that requires a Nicaraguan consul in residence?

History of the Consular Corps

The consular establishment has been with us since the beginning of our nation. In July, 1778 France sent Conrad Alexandre Gerard to the new republic with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul General, and consular officers have been pouring in ever since. The consular corps has seldom intruded into the pages of American history which is probably a tribute to its effectiveness. However, every once in awhile we catch glimpses of foreign consuls doing their work and having their difficulties with us. Louisiana became a state in 1812. At that time many of its citizens were quite unhappy at the change and considered themselves more Spanish or French than American. There were both Spanish and French consuls in New Orleans and they had their hands full, especially with our war

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**Unless otherwise stated I am referring to consular posts manned by career officers, not honorary consuls.*

against Great Britain starting the same year as Louisiana's statehood. The United States gave out letters of marque rather freely and among those given official permission to become privateers against British shipping were members of Jean Laffite's family. These pirates, now privateers, entered into the conflict with enthusiasm, but they were not too particular whom they attacked and neutral Spanish ships were often captured. The Spanish consul complained bitterly and actually forced the United States to act. There was a small but effective raid by American troops on Laffite's lair on Lake Barataria and the brothers Laffite, Jean and Pierre, as well as numerous cousins, were captured. They were soon released on bail, however, and eventually joined General Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans. The reaction of the Spanish consul to this turn of events is mercifully not available. After the Battle of New Orleans the French consul, Louis de Tousard, helped some of the French-speaking men of the city who were in the militia and wanted a discharge. Consul de Tousard gave them certificates of French citizenship, thus entitling them to be excused from military duty. Andrew Jackson, who was not certain that the British would not return for another attempt on New Orleans, responded with characteristic directness. He banished the consul to Baton Rouge for ten days, not allowing him to return until the end of the war was confirmed.

During the Civil War the British kept their consulates in the South although they had not recognized the Confederacy. Richmond became more and more annoyed with the British consuls' interceding to keep their subjects out of the Confederate army and protesting when their subjects' property was threatened by military confiscation. These actions were especially galling since most of the British were really permanently residing in the South and represented at that time a not insignificant portion of the white population. The Confederate Government tolerated these actions as long as there was any chance of British recognition, but by the fall of 1863 it was obvious that this was not forthcoming and the consuls were sent packing.

At the end of the last century, in 1891, there was a nasty incident in which an Italian consul, Pasquale Corte, unsuccessfully tried to save the lives of eleven Italian-Americans who were killed by a vigilante mob in New Orleans because they were considered to be members of the Mafia and implicated in the murder of the New Orleans police chief.

This century has seen consulates as the frequent targets of attacks by emigre groups protesting against the government of their homeland, or by other groups who want to show their displeasure over foreign events. In the periods prior to our entries into World Wars I and II and during the Cold War our federal authorities have looked with jaundiced eye on some of the activities of the consulates of our foes-presumptive, yet despite these problems, the consular establishment has continued to grow. The mayor of Atlanta, for example, is actively seeking more consulates in his effort to make his city an international trade center.

What Do They Do?

The work of this large consular establishment is as varied as the nations which send their officers to the United States. Each country has its own set of priorities, but the work generally falls into five broad categories: 1) the normal statutory duties of consuls, issuing passports, visas, notarizing documents, registering births, marriages and deaths of its citizens in the United States, taking care of its seamen and protecting its citizens' interests and property; 2) trade promotion and economic reporting; 3) information work such as informing Americans about the country, encouraging tourism, explaining the country's policy if it is at all controversial, and the normal representational duties including attending social functions; 4) developing close ethnic ties with groups which have come from the "old country" and have settled in America; 5) political reporting on regional developments in the United States as they might pertain to the consulate's country.

Consular Services

No matter what the size of the post or where it is located, the consuls are always busy with just the routine consular duties. The Japanese, for example, require visas to visit Japan, and more and more Americans are visiting Japan. The Polish Consulate General in Chicago issues immigrant visas to elderly Polish-Americans retiring to their homeland. Moreover after some articles appeared in regional papers on how life in Poland is less expensive than in the United States, there have also been inquiries about settling in Poland by non-Polish Americans. The Canadians have a very busy program of screening and issuing immigrant visas to Americans.

Foreign students in the United States keep consuls hopping, too. The number runs into the millions, and not only do the consuls have to find out why some young lad or lass has not written home, but they must try to smooth things over with the police after some youthful escapade and generally act *in loco parentis*. Some countries have strict rules about military service and young men coming from, say Turkey, Iran or Greece have to maintain their scholastic standing and return after graduation, all of which requires monitoring by the consulates.

Next to students, seamen probably give more trouble to consuls. The Philippine Consul General in Seattle has a continuing problem. The Philippine Department of Labor recruits Filipino seamen for foreign ships and they sign an approved work contract. Once, however, their ship gets to Osaka, or another Japanese port, the captain may make them sign a less satisfactory contract by threatening to put them ashore if they do not. By the time the sailors get to Seattle, they are very unhappy and complain to the consul general. She then puts pressure on the captain to live up to the original contract. A principal complaint is that these Liberian or Panamanian flag ships are usually run by Greeks and the officers speak only Greek, and the Filipinos just don't like Greek food.

In some countries the arrests of foreign citizens can cause real difficulties for consular officers. Foreigners can be picked up by police, put in jail, tried and imprisoned without the consul knowing anything about it or being able to give any assistance. Here in

America most consuls don't find arrest cases to be much of a problem. They are usually informed and their citizens get the same treatment as Americans in the judicial system. There were some complaints from Mexican, Yugoslav and Polish consuls that they were not always informed of arrests. The problem rests probably in part with the police in a small community not knowing of their duty to report foreign arrests and also in good part in those arrested not wanting to have their difficulties brought to the attention of their consuls. Abroad I have visited some very irate American citizens in jail who have told me that it is none of the United States Government's damned business that they are in trouble.

Trade Promotion

While the normal consular services to citizens are required, the real drive today by many countries is to use their consulates as salesmen for the goods of their country. The British are a good case in point. Since the mid-60s the emphasis has definitely shifted to British trade promotion. Many of the British foreign service officers now serving in consulates were originally from the Board of Trade or from the Commonwealth Office, which was very much trade orientated. Other officers are given commercial training and experience. The British system, as it has evolved, is based on analyzing what can be produced competitively in the United Kingdom and sold in the United States at a good profit and then seeking out markets for these items. There is a computer service with over 10,000 manufacturers subscribing in Great Britain. Consular officers feed trade opportunities into this system and follow up inquiries and bids. Consular officers are quite aggressive in searching out trade opportunities and find that the consular title helps open doors. One British Consul General described his role in part as being that of "selling the reliability of the store." He feels that the many reports about present British economic difficulty make it necessary for him to assure the American business community that goods ordered will be delivered on time and meet specifications.

The Canadians have also put prime priority on trade with the United States. The emphasis that Canada places on trade can be seen on entering one of the large Canadian Consulates General. There are special offices reserved for Canadian businessmen on trade trips to the city, a conference room for trade meetings, a show room where, on appointment, Canadian goods can be displayed to potential customers. There is a large staff of trade officers who are specialists in commodities such as machinery, wearing apparel, food products, defense and marine supplies.

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The Philippine Government is also pressing for more of a market in the United States and has informed its consuls general that the state of the Philippine-American balance of trade for their area will be reflected in their efficiency reports. If the balance becomes too bad, the consuls general are warned they will be removed (*pour encourager les autres*). On the other hand, the German consulates leave trade promotion in the hands of private companies and organizations such as the German-American Chamber of Commerce. The Japanese consulates also do not get directly involved in trade promotion, but they are very active in creating a climate which is beneficial to Japanese trade. The Japanese consuls find there is unease about Japanese investment in the United States such as in canneries in Alaska or in the establishment of Japanese banks here. Through contacts with the news media, business organizations and other groups, they try to still the fears about Japanese commercial takeovers. In Los Angeles the Japanese Consul General is trying to woo the Japanese businessmen out of their isolation from American life and get them to participate in local community affairs. Language problems and tradition will not make his work easy.

Information

Information activities by consulates vary from low-keyed passing out of travel brochures to those who ask, to an all out effort to win American public opinion to support a certain country. Israel is the prime example of the latter. The main business of its consulates is to win and keep the support of the American public for Israel. In Chicago the Israeli Consulate General covers a district of 13 midwestern states. Its officers are constantly on the move not only addressing Jewish groups but appearing on TV talk shows, attending seminars in the numerous universities and colleges in the area, talking to newspaper editors and local officials and in general trying to reach opinion makers to present Israel's case. Until the Middle East War of 1973 there was little opposition to Israel's cause and the Chicago area's million Jews gave strong support. Since the war, however, it was found that there was also a large number of Americans of Arab descent in the area, about half a million, who had been relatively inactive. This is no longer the case. There are also vocal Arab student groups in the universities, especially at the universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, and a surprisingly large number of professors and instructors of Arabic background who are teaching at the smaller midwestern colleges, and who are now for the first time presenting the Arab side to their students. This requires an even greater effort in the information field by the Israeli consuls, and they are making it.

Naturally there is a sizable effort on the part of all consulates to attract Americans to visit their country and spend tourist dollars. The Canadians work very hard on tourism. In a way it is more of a defensive action. Since so many Canadians spend their vacations in the United States, Americans are needed in the North to keep things in balance.

A Brazilian consul complained to me that many American newspa-

pers did not seem to understand about the geography of our southern neighbors. If there is a disturbance in Costa Rica, for example, the papers are likely to have a headline "Turmoil in Latin America," with resulting cancellations of trips to Brazil by Americans.

Maintaining Ethnic Ties

America is a country made up of various groups of emigrants from the nations which send their consuls here, and many countries find it to their advantage to maintain and strengthen ties with the old country. Two of the main advantages are that the ethnic groups will travel back to see their country of origin or send money to their families there, or act as a pressure group or at least a receptive audience for that country's interests and to reflect this support through their representatives. These ethnic pressure groups can be very effective as all of us in the Foreign Service know well.

The Greek Consulate General in Chicago has a 15 state area, about the size of Western Europe. There are over 600,000 Americans of Greek origin scattered throughout the area and innumerable Greek-American organizations, all of which want the Consul General to attend their festivities. The Greek-Americans had not been very active politically until the Cyprus crisis in the summer of 1974. Greek consular officers found themselves having to discourage the recruitment of Greek-American regiments wanting to go to Cyprus to fight. They had to explain to the enthusiastic volunteers that such recruitment was illegal. The consular officers have to be careful that they don't become involved in Greek-American political rallies since there is a fine line, but there is a line, between encouraging support of the home country and interfering in internal American politics.

The Polish Consul General in Chicago, supported by nine officers, resides in a city which, if all those of Polish descent are counted, ranks right after Warsaw as the largest Polish city. He also has 28 states under his jurisdiction, including the entire West. It is impossible for him to cover his entire district, but he does attend as many of the major Polish-American gatherings as he and his staff can. The Yugoslav Consul General has the same problem. There are over 650 Yugoslav-American groups in his district, and he and his officers cannot meet with them all. He feels that here is a real opportunity for developing better Yugoslav-American relations but he just can't fully exploit it at present. He finds that Americans are becoming much more interested in their ethnic roots and write to the Consulate General for genealogical information. He feels that it is a pity there is neither the money nor the staff to do anything in this regard.

The Canadians and British probably do less ethnic handholding than most other nations since trade is of primary concern and their citizens or subjects fade into the populace and do not form colonies. There is also no large French colony in the United States.

The Germans are not very active in promoting German-American organizations. German migration to the United States is no longer very important and the old German districts in our major cities are dying out. There are still some German-American papers in the Midwest and the German Consulate General in Chicago supplies them with news items. In one area the German consulates are still active, and that is in restitution payments to Jews who are survivors of the Nazi times. These payments include some health benefits, all of which require servicing very much the same way our consular officers service Social Security payments abroad.

The Korean-American community is much newer than the established Chinese and Japanese ones. Most of the immigrants arrived in the past ten years, and have settled in the Olympic Boulevard area of Los Angeles. There are approximately 65,000 Koreans in Los Angeles, which is the largest such group in the United States. Many of the Koreans came to Los Angeles from Vietnam where they had worked for American firms, mainly as technicians. Used to American business methods, these Koreans have done well, now owning over 250 gas stations, 70 Korean restaurants, some supermarkets and investing successfully in real estate. There are also many Korean women in the nursing field. The Korean Consul General and his officers spend the majority of their time working with this community. There are over sixty Korean associations in Los Angeles and the Consul General finds that he seldom has a free weekend because of his social obligations to them. Perhaps as the Koreans become more established in the United States the consular role will diminish.

The Brazilian Consulate General in Miami finds itself in an ambiguous position. As they are representing the major country in Latin America in a city which now has very strong Latin American ties, the Brazilians try to participate in as many joint South American festivities and meetings as possible. The problem is that many of these parades, fiestas, picnics and the like are labeled "Spanish-American Week" or "Hispanic-American Day" with the result that the Portuguese-speaking Brazilians feel they have to abstain. They are pleased, however, that there is a Portuguese language program at the local university and give it their support.

There is another reason for consuls keeping close contact with their country's ethnic community. Many countries have emigre groups of the extreme right and left as well as from the moderate center which are opposed to the government in power. These groups serve as a source of embarrassment abroad and possible danger within to the government sending the consuls, and therefore it behooves those consuls to report on what these opposition groups are doing.

Political Reporting

Political reporting on regional events in the United States carries a low priority in most consular posts. As one European consul said, "political reporting is done mainly for the amusement of consuls general." The British have periodic meetings of chiefs of post in Washington where they report on the mood of the United States. The Canadians are probably the most interested in regional political events, especially in the areas near their border, since such events could be of importance to Canada. Other consuls do report on items of significance, but it is obvious that the embassies carry by far the

major portion of the reporting load.

Honorary Consular Corps

While career consuls carry on the greater part of the consular work in the United States, there is a very large honorary consular corps. There are over 920 honorary consular posts in the United States located in 233 cities! To give an idea of the range of these posts, one can find honorary consuls in Ishpeming, Michigan (Finland), Anaheim, California (Peru), Cecilton, Maryland (Costa Rica), Orange, New Jersey (Lebanon) and Decorah, Iowa (Norway). For the most part they are located in major cities, except in California and Florida where they are quite scattered. Honorary consuls may or may not be American citizens, and they usually are engaged in some other work, often as lawyers or connected with import-export activities. A good number of these consuls do very little as far as offering consular services, their titles serving for social purposes. Others take their positions quite seriously and do perform excellent work for the country they represent. Generally honorary consuls are not paid except for actual expenses they may have incurred in helping a distressed citizen or the like. Usually they cannot issue passports or visas but can notarize some documents and serve as a good source of information, often of a commercial nature, in the area they serve. They are particularly useful if a citizen of the country they represent gets into either medical or legal trouble. It means that a career consul will not have to be sent out to help, and the honorary consul usually can do a better job of helping since he or she has better contacts in the area.

The countries which have the honorary consuls in the United States are:

1) Dominican Republic	-58
2) France	-54
3) Norway	-49
4) El Salvador	-42
5) Costa Rica	-39
6) Italy	-38
7) Guatemala	-35
8) Finland	-35
9) Honduras	-34
10) Sweden	-33

With the exception of Senegal, which has 21 honorary consuls in the United States, the African countries have not created many honorary consulates. I would not be surprised to see a major rise in the honorary consular corps when these countries realize that they can get almost cost-free representation in many parts of the United States by appointing Americans to these positions.

In our major cities the consular corps usually meets once a month for a luncheon, has a dean, and can act as a body to approach local or state officials either about problems or for social occasions. The opinion of career consuls is that the consular corps in American cities is not very important. Each consulate is busy following its own set of priorities and so there is not much they have in common, also there are almost no problems caused by local authorities that would hinder consular operations and draw the corps together as happens in some countries. The most significant issue facing many consular corps is parking privileges, and this is not a cause that will send many career consuls to the barricades. Another problem with the consular corps, according to career officers, is that honorary consuls are often in the majority and are far more interested in debating points of protocol than discussing substantive issues. The fact that most honorary consuls are Americans also inhibits the free discussion at corps meetings of career officers about their dealings and problems with American institutions and people.

There are problems, of course, but the consuls find that they are dealing here with a system that works and is responsive, even down to village levels where they have never heard of consuls or, in some cases, of the country which sent them.

Problems of Consular Posts

In my study of foreign consular operations in the United States, I had imagined that the multiplicity of federal, state, county and municipal jurisdictions, and the fact that each is often quite independent of the other, would pose very difficult problems for consuls plying their trade. This has not proved to be the case. Consul after consul has told me that the willingness of Americans to do their business over the telephone and the courtesy and helpfulness extended to them by local officials make working here an enjoyable experience and in considerable contrast to other countries in which they have served. There are problems, of course, but the consuls find that they are dealing here with a system that works and is responsive, even down to village levels where they have never heard of consuls or, in some cases, of the country which sent them. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, which I thought might be disliked by some of the consuls because it chases their nationals and deports them, was instead generally held in high regard. There were complaints about INS, to be sure, that in Alaska it was over-zealous in dealing with Filipinos and that Yugoslavs were turned back at an unusually high rate in Chicago, but most consuls said that INS was helpful and fair.

The main concern of career consuls was security, and with reason. To give some flavor to the problem, here is an excerpt of the minutes of a meeting held in 1974 in Los Angeles by the consular corps with state, county and city officials and with representatives from the Department of State on the security issue. The British Consul General in his presentation said that,

"The increased climate of violence here and throughout the world made all this (police services) necessarily more difficult. Local examples of this included the demonstration at the Bel Air Hotel in Beverly Hills in 1972 involving the Turkish Consul-General in which a considerable number of arrests were made; the murder of the Turkish Consul-General and his Vice-Consul in 1973; the bomb incident in the British Consulate-General during the Cuban crisis, as well as threats and demonstrations connected with Biafra, Bangladesh and the IRA; the necessity for the Consul-General of Israel to live in a penthouse citadel; the recent invasion of the Austrian Consulate-General by members of the Jewish Defense League, armed with automatic

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FSJ BOOK ESSAY

Resignation in Protest

THE HIGH government official who sees serious wrongdoing, say the authors of this book, may justify staying on if he can thereby mitigate the effects of the evil. Or he may quit with a public protest. "But to resign in silence or with false reassurance to the public that there is nothing wrong may be the least ethically defensible course of all: the buying of a separate peace at the expense of the entire process of responsible government."

Resignation in silence by high public officials, as this book demonstrates, has been very much the pattern in the United States during the period 1900 to 1970 which the authors analyze. They identified persons who had served in US federal departments at the rank of assistant secretary or higher, or in senior White House posts and who did not leave with a presumption that it was because of ill health or advanced age. This left 389 persons who resigned as a matter of personal choice at a stage in their careers when they could have expected to have good future prospects.

"Of this group of 389 American top officials who resigned of their free will and in their prime between 1900 and 1970, 355 (91.3 per cent) left government without any trace of public protest. Only 34 (8.7 per cent) resigned with public protest." By comparison, of 78 British resigners similarly screened, "42, or more than half, left office in a public declaration of protest against a government policy." In other words, while public-protest resignation is an extremely rare phenomenon in 20th century US politics, it is a relatively common occurrence in Britain.

What is the reason for this difference? By analyzing the further political careers of the persons in question, the authors come to the conclusion that the penalty for resignation under protest is significantly higher in the United States than in Great Britain. Of those who resigned in public protest in Britain, 45.2 per cent (19 of 42 persons) are found to have subsequently returned to other equivalent or higher full-time government posts, whereas of those who resigned silently, 41.7 per cent (15 of 36) returned. So in the UK the chances of returning to high public office are about the same whether an official resigns quietly or with a public protest.

In the US, on the other hand, "of the 355 who left quietly, 73 officials (20.6 per cent) were subsequently appointed to federal government positions as senior as, or more senior than, those from which they had resigned. [But] among the 34 who resigned and went public, only one (3 per cent) was subsequently reappointed to an equivalent or higher post." The quiet resigners also did much better than those who went public in receiving federal government appointments to part-time posts.

To readers who have followed the recent debate in these columns about loyalty and dissent in the Foreign Service, it should be emphasized that the book "Resignation in Protest" does not deal with career officials but with politically appointed policy officials. The authors have only this to say about the equivalent problem in the permanent career services:

"[The] natural tendency on the part of the civil servant to defer to what in Britain in called his 'political masters' is quite appropriate. The career public servant should have his conscience in harness and his tongue under tight bit. Democracy links moral judgment with political responsibility; and the duty to exercise judgment in major questions of policy ought to be exercised by those who are endowed with responsibility. The system could not work if, as Harold Laski feared, passionately conservative civil servants refused to do the bidding of a Labour government. Thus, in America as in Britain, the career public servant is imbued with the ethic of service rather than of ethical autonomy. Resigning and going public is quite properly alien to the service ethic except in the direst circumstances."

Since the book does not deal with the ethical dilemmas of career public servants, there is no sense arguing with the authors about the above paragraph—but one may note that the "direst circumstances" are in all probability exactly those to which resignations by public officials, too, were limited. Nobody, whether a policy official or a career official, is apt to resign for reasons of policy except if his deepest feelings of right and wrong are involved. The difference, of course, is that the resignation of a high policy official is widely remarked and can create a scandal and public debate, whereas "public" resignations of lower-ranking career officials have results only in terms of the individuals' gratification or peace of mind.

One possibility seems to be ignored in this most interesting book: Could it not be that an officer (career or political) wishes to dissociate himself from policies that he regards as distasteful or ineffective even though he may not be imbued with a sufficiently messianic certainty that total right is found on his side and total wrong ("evil") on the side of those who pursue the policy with which he chooses to part company? The authors are especially hard on recent top-echelon officials of the US government who were known to be opposed to American policy in Vietnam but stayed at their posts despite misgivings and finally resigned without linking their departure to the Vietnam issue.

They quote, with obvious disapproval, statements by departed top US officials that they had been made to regard themselves as members of the President's team, and note that the teamwork ethic—found especially in the business and law office backgrounds of the political appointees in question—tends to mute dissent, especially from team members whose direct responsibility does not concern the issue on which they might voice their dissents. Also, it would not be proper for a lawyer to "blow the whistle" publicly on his client. Thus the authors say:

"George Ball's conduct is instructive of the legal ethic in the public service. As President Johnson's Under Secretary of State, and, later, Ambassador to the United Nations, he became the

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RESIGNATION IN PROTEST—*Political and Ethical Choices Between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life, by Edward Weisband and Thomas M. Franck. Grossman/Viking, $10.00.*

'house dove,' an early and frequent advocate against Vietnam escalation. His advice was not taken, and yet it was inconceivable to him that he might turn public critic. His role was to advise his client, the President. But when his advice was rejected, the counselor's role required him still to make every effort to defend his client to the best of his ability, no matter that he personally disapproved of what his client had done."

There is a related point found in James C. Thomson, Jr.'s "How Could Vietnam Happen?": "Once Mr. Ball began to express doubts, he was warmly institutionalized: he was encouraged to become the in-house devil's advocate on Vietnam. The upshot was inevitable: the process of escalation allowed for periodic requests to Mr. Ball to speak his piece; Ball felt good . . . (he had fought for righteousness); the others felt good (they had given a full hearing to the dovish option); and there was minimal unpleasantness."

The authors seem to have interviewed Mr. Ball himself on this point and quote him in rebuttal: "Why should I have resigned in protest over Vietnam policy just because I disagreed with it? My main responsibility and my principal interest was Western Europe. Perhaps five per cent of my time was spent on Vietnam. It simply wasn't my responsibility." And he added that after all, "it wasn't as if I were the Honduras desk officer being put in the position of having to approve a US military action in Honduras."* Charles Frankel and John Gardner, who are also criticized in this book, have made similar rebuttals—that they had other work to do and left only when they found that they were not able to do it.

There is a more fundamental counter-argument to resignation in protest, and the authors address it squarely: that American political appointees in the executive branch, usually lacking an independent public base or political sounding board, cannot really create much of a stir with their resignations (the "what ever happened to Walter Hickel?" argument), whereas in Great Britain, where people don't embark on ministerial assignments as a brief interlude but as part of a longer-term political career, they return to the back-benches of Parliament after resignation and continue to have a sounding board there for the articulation of their minority views. (Perhaps it is no accident that Elliot Richardson, who resigned "with voice," had a background of elected office—and did return to appointive office not very long after speaking out.)

Logical almost to a fault, the authors draw the conclusion that we should emulate the British parliamentary system and amend the

In my article "More on Loyalty and Dissent" in the February Journal *I remarked that in Mr. Ball's case "it would have been better if he had spoken out more clearly and had left," but this was for reasons different from those cited in the book "Resignation in Protest." I thought that Mr. Ball, by seeking to remain, muted and muffled some of his points-for instance by speaking of an "uneasy coalition between neutralists and the NLF" or "probing the possibilities of a deal with Viet Cong elements," rather than forthrightly accepting the implications of what he was really advocating.*

constitution to require the President to select his cabinet from among Members of Congress. They recognize that there are great difficulties in this proposal but warn that the present political system does not encourage persons with inside knowledge to come forward and lead opposition to policies with which they disagree: "Not only would the open advocacy of antiwar policies by a McNamara or Ball have rallied opposition but it would have insured legitimacy and responsible leadership for the forces of dissent." And they cite as examples Anthony Eden, Duff Cooper, and Lord Salisbury. "A system which encourages McNamara's silent resignation and prohibits going public in the Anthony Eden style makes it inevitable that the countersystem will invent a Daniel Ellsberg."

The trouble with this argument is that it was not lack of information that handicapped the opponents of the war. The Pentagon Papers were an embarrassment to the government, but they did not change many minds, and besides they were cannibalized by the media so that only the damaging portions became known. What happened is aptly described by the authors: "By ceaselessly needling the Administration, prying into its files, publicizing and lionizing its defectors, the media, in the United States, have become politicized as the countersystem's instrument of dissent." In the opinion of this reviewer the foregoing is correct, but the vulgarization of debate cannot be justified by the alleged unavailability of respectable leaders of the opposition.

Interesting and even fascinating in places, the book "Resignation in Protest" suffers from the Manichean fallacy, that every issue involves a battle between good and evil. There are often not two points of view, but three or four; not every issue lends itself to dramatization by resignation under protest; and there are times when "going public," despite some advantages in clearing the air, can be a disservice to the nation. The authors themselves seem to realize that their sweeping generalizations may have carried them too far, for on the next to last page they modify their thesis in a manner that serves to restore perspective:

"But it is unrealistic to expect many senior officials at the top of what Disraeli called 'the greasy pole' to be unmindful of costs. Only a fanatic would climb to the top of that pole in order to immolate himself, no matter how brightly his light would shine. It would be unhealthy for the executive branch to be heavily populated by men and women of such unshakable ethical autonomy, for they would probably make government both more difficult and more dangerous in their unbending self-assertiveness and reckless rectitude."

—MARTIN F. HERZ

FSJ BOOKSHELF

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS AND THEIR MISSIONS, *by Elmer Plischke. American Enterprise, $4.00.*

THIS BOOK is one of the Foreign Affairs Studies published by the Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, of Washington D.C. Plischke is professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. He is also the author of other monographs and studies on diplomacy.

This study is confined to comments and statistics on Chiefs of Mission and senior officers in the Department of State, including the Secretaries of State. One chapter discusses the presidential aspirations and Congressional service of diplomats, another the geographic origin, sex and age of diplomats, another discusses diplomatic ranks, titles and career status. The chapter on diplomats as authors is especially interesting.

The appendix tables—16 in all—have just about every bit of information you ever wanted to know but were afraid to ask.

—RICHARD F. BOYCE

VIETNAM: BEYOND THE WAR, *by Joseph Salzburg, Exposition, $12.50.*

HUNDREDS of thousands and perhaps into the millions of people, both Americans and other nationalities, have served in Vietnam beginning in 1954 until the current total withdrawal in April of 1975.

After finishing "Vietnam: Beyond the War," the question arose in my mind of the reason or purpose of this book. When I realized what a better understanding I had of the people and the country even after having served there, it dawned on me that Joe's purpose was to provide those who had served there and who might be serving there with the same increased understanding that it provided me. Although the book centers mostly on the immediate Saigon area and the Military Region III area which was administered from Bien Hoa, it does give a sufficient insight into the entire country of South Vietnam which might have provided us food for long range planning. It draws attention to the capabilities of that country and its diverse peoples and what might have been accomplished had they been permitted to exist under other than a wartime economy. As the book points out, that beleaguered country has been on this wartime economy pretty much since the invasion by the Japanese and it is difficult to find people in Vietnam who have known the country in peacetime unless they are past their middle years. —NICHOLAS G. PAPPAS

FOREIGN CONSULS

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weapons; the entry into the offices of the French Consulate-General of demonstrators who threw ink over members of the consulate staff, defacing walls and property; problems arising from threats and threatened demonstrations experienced by the Australian, Japanese and Lebanese consular representatives (a bomb explosion in the Lebanese consulate). In fact, any representative of a foreign government is nowadays increasingly subject to this kind of problem."

This list stopped as of January 1974, but the incidents continue. The latest was in March 1975 when there was a bombing at the Costa Rican Consulate General over Cuban recognition.

There does not seem to be any real solution to the security situation as long as violence is accepted as a semi-legitimate form of political action. The police also complain that while consuls want protection they are often unwilling to make official complaints against violent demonstrators because their governments don't want them to testify in court or provoke undue publicity. We have somewhat the same inhibitions at our foreign posts. This can prevent a case from coming to trial and adds to the atmosphere of permissiveness.

Besides the overriding importance of the security problem there are other problems, such as taxes. Each state has its own tax laws and interprets our treaties and conventions with foreign states in its own way, which means that the Japanese consul in Georgia does not pay a tax there, but when he drives into Alabama, he does, even though this is also part of his consular district. The problem is most pronounced in the contrast between New York State and California. The former is quite liberal in waiving taxes for foreign officials and the latter is not.

In some cities there is no provision for consular parking either at the consulate or at the airport, which causes some irritation. For example, the Brazilian ambassador's car, complete with flags flying from the fender, was ticketed by Miami police while waiting for the Ambassador and a Brazilian admiral who were making an official call on the Consul General.

Conclusion

Despite the security and tax problems, my impression is that the consular establishment in the United States is well satisfied. There are very few inhibitions placed on consuls doing their business, whether in the protection and welfare of their citizens, promotion of trade, information work, or furtherance of cultural ties with their emigrants settled here. Despite the normal difficulties the system works quite well. One consul said he could do twice as much work in the United States as he could in his home country (which is considered to be one of the advanced ones) because of the efficiency of his American secretary and the capability of doing business over the telephone.

The American consular officer can take comfort and assurance in knowing that foreign consuls are treated well here and can with justification ask for reciprocal treatment abroad. ■

USES (AND ABUSES)

from page 18

dictatorship" of World War II. As Franklin D. Roosevelt put it in 1942: "When the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong."

These examples suggest that wars are incompatible with democratic values; that individual liberties tend to get second place after security. The onset of the cold war, beginning in earnest in 1947 and persisting to this day, has severely strained democratic values. Abetted by the technology of information collection, storage, and retrieval, such restrictive efforts as loyalty oaths, security investigations, and statutes to control Communist Party activities, crime and civil disorder have all eroded individual liberties as the nation searched for security. The assumption, then, that national security can be pursued at no cost to the very values that national security programs are designed to protect is doubtful indeed.

THE INTELLIGENCE Establishment that has grown and flourished over the past quarter century symbolizes the role of a strategic élite that has, beyond the normal pluralistic controls of democratic government, shaped the nation's destiny. Although some intelligence estimates over the years may have raised questions about specific tactics—such as the bombing of North Vietnam—the Intelligence Establishment never questioned basic cold war policy. That policy derived from what John C. Donovan has described as

> . . .the élite mind-set (and it was set) with its obsessive fear of Communist expansion, its voracious hunger for foreign markets (but not until recently in the so-called Communist world), its limited perceptions of the social revolution in the Third World (combined with a blindness or indifference to social pathologies at home), and its predisposition to rely upon military technology in shaping a global order conceived in terms of lessons derived from experience with Hitler's aggression. . . (*The Cold Warrior*).

For nearly thirty years a war-system approach has dominated American foreign policy thinking and has influenced the decision-making structure. When the existing National Security Council and CIA structure were proposed in 1947, a wise military man (who happened to be Secretary of State at the time) sounded a note of alarm. Marshall objected to the National Security Council being so heavily weighted with military representatives, because, as he put it in a confidential memo to the President, the direction of policy, foreign and domestic, should be dominated by the nonmilitary branches of government. Marshall was especially apprehensive about the CIA. He feared that the powers of the proposed agency are almost unlimited and need clarification. Before enactment into law in 1947, the NSC structure was revised to include only the Secretary of Defense as a statutory NSC member, but the CIA powers in the statute remained vague. Dean Acheson, who succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State, was more pointedly skeptical about the CIA. He later

recalled in his memoirs: "I had the gravest forebodings about this organization [CIA] and warned the President that, as set up, neither he, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it."

George Marshall and Dean Acheson were not just making a pitch for a predominant role for the Department of State in national security policy. They were reminding the President of the critical and logical need to keep the ends of policy in a dominant position over the means of policy, and all this in the interest of responsibility and accountability. One must fault President Truman for not fully comprehending this distinction and for approving a war structure that has endured through the years. Truman was strong in confronting General MacArthur on the issue of civilian control, but he was weak in some of the more subtle aspects of the civilian-military intelligence balance. That weakness has had far-reaching consequences.

Intelligence leaders ask us to accept "on faith" that they are honorable men, serving only the public interest. We are told, in effect, to ask them no questions as they pursue their secret deeds. But the American Constitutional system stipulates a government of laws, not of men. And a system of executive-legislative-judicial checks and balances is the only way to mitigate the corrupting influences of power and to deter the special temptations of secret power.

Major reforms are long overdue. First, the name of the CIA should be changed to FIA—Foreign Intelligence Agency. Second, the Covert Operations Division of a revamped "FIA" should be abolished, or, if convincing arguments can be made for its necessity, it should be placed elsewhere in the government. Third, Congress should create a Joint Committee on Intelligence Activities that is permanent and well staffed. This committee should redraft the statutes and charter for the entire intelligence system. Fourth, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a panel of about ten distinguished private citizens, should be revitalized and made up of citizens who would be constantly alert to abuses and inefficiencies in the Intelligence Establishment.

Above all, we need to abandon the war system, reshape some of the basic assumptions, and undertake a new set of risks for the future. It is indeed a matter of examining new risks, realizing that in most major foreign and defense policy issues there are few no-risk options. The grim fact is that the present system entails the most terrifying kinds of risks, not only of destroying our civilization in nuclear holocaust but also of gradually eroding our democratic principles. We can do better than this. The way to start is by challenging some of the basic assumptions about the Intelligence Establishment, keeping in mind that knowledge is power, secret knowledge is secret power, and secret power is incompatible with accountability and responsibility, which are the linchpins of democracy. ■

THE FOREIGN LEGION IS ALIVE AND WELL AND LIVING IN AUBAGNE

Continued from page 8

Bigeard speaks of the outcome in Vietnam as inevitable, compares the "disciplined, dedicated" regime in the North with the "soft, disparate" government in the South and states that there is no substitute for patriotism. The Legionnaires listen, some of them remembering Tay Ninh or Nam Dinh, the dancings of Hanoi, the snap of bullets near Hai Doung, or the cold morning air of the Aures and the burning sun of Mascara. Most of them are young and have no such memories.

Later, at lunch, an officer explains the constant shift of nationalities in the Legion. After World War II, a great influx of Germans. (*I remember a cold morning in the Thai country of North Vietnam as a Legion Parachute Battalion returned from a reconnaissance on the small village of Son La. Suddenly, among the brush encrusted granite peaks that seemed to rise from a Chinese painting, we heard the deep lilt of a German marching song punctuated by the thud of boots. The thin, bearded French Legion officer in command quickly ordered silence when he saw there were foreigners present.*)

Now, a considerable number of Spaniards, Italians, East European and Yugoslavs. Americans? "No, very few. They do not adjust well." English? "Yes, some. Often romantics."

We were drinking the wine of the Legion. A robust red and a tangy rosé with the flaming grenade of the Legion on the label. The grapes are grown and harvested on the Legion's own property near Aix en Provence. The Legion has learned to take care of itself over the years and it takes care of its own. The vineyard is run by Legion veterans, some physically handicapped. A retired Legionnaire with problems can always turn to a Legion sponsored organization with members throughout the world. They will attempt to find him a job, put him in contact with fellow Legionnaires, see that he is clothed, fed and has a roof over his head.

At the close of the luncheon the official guests drift off to their cars and the Legionnaires prepare to continue the celebration. Camerone is one day when the officers are likely to look the other way if too many empty bottles appear on the mess tables. The wife of one Legion veteran told me she was accustomed to a late buzzing of her doorbell every April 30 that would signal the delivery of her smiling but rubber-legged husband by an official Legion escort. And it all began with a simple decree.

"LOUIS PHILIPPE, Roi des Française
A tous, present et a venir, salut.
Sur le rapport de notre Ministre, Secretaire d'Etat
du departement de la Guerre,
Nous avons ordonné et ordonnons ce qui suit:
ARTICLE I: Il sera formé une légion composée d'étrangers.
Cette légion prendre la dénomination de
LEGION ETRANGERE. . .

PARIS, 10 Mars 1831
LOUIS PHILIPPE

LETTERS TO FSJ

Commentary on "Excess Baggage"

■ In "Excess Baggage" (April JOURNAL) the Superfluous Spouses produced an interesting and thoughtful piece on what is clearly a widespread problem. It nevertheless left one retired (40 years in the Service) couple with questions and doubts. We decided to write his/her comments without detailed prior consultation or post drafting coordination.

HERS: I was startled by the authors' use of the two adjectives, excess and superfluous. If there is any profession in which the role of wife and mother does not seem to me superfluous it's the Foreign Service. The job of keeping the psychic and physical well-being of one's family, not to mention oneself, in good repair while hopping about the globe takes some doing and can hardly be called trivial.

Further perusal of this illuminating article made me wonder if the reason for the discontents of the SS's wasn't more fundamental than the five problems they listed. That such an intelligent and vital group of women should find these problems so disturbing makes me wonder if their discomfort arises from the more basic difficulty which faces any professionally trained woman when she exchanges the stimulation of her own job for the less exciting tasks of running a house and caring for children. Such adjustments are more onerous abroad and it is a pity that all women contemplating marrying into the FS don't have fair warning of the problems involved.

The fact that the SS's needed to start a consciousness raising group raises questions on how to make Embassy living for a wife more satisfying to the career-minded young woman of today. Some qualifications such as medicine, social work or teaching can be used abroad but at many posts even these fields are closed to foreigners. Although the Department has been slow to recognize that FS life is hard on the wife, it has made some spectacular strides since I entered the fray many years ago.

It seems to me endlessly frustrating to feel jealous of one's husband's job and to downgrade the often dull but very necessary jobs performed by the wife. The value of any job is usually in the eye of the doer and maybe we women are aping man in looking down on any work that doesn't have a price attached to it. I can't help wishing that these bright and able SS's would put their good minds to such problems as why the number of FS children needing psychiatric care seems to be growing and why more isn't done within the average Embassy to make life more meaningful and interesting for all who are a part of it. I'm sure secretaries could tell Embassy wives a thing or two about boredom and frustration.

As I look back over my years as a wife in the Service I wonder if we weren't luckier in a way than our more liberated sisters of today. It was easier for us to cooperate with the inevitable and though we often felt the division of labor between the sexes wasn't fair, we accepted it and managed to have interesting and fulfilling lives as well as a great deal of fun. I hope the SS's may say the same when they reach what must seem to them the antiquity of retirement.

HIS: The Spouses cite five problems which make them feel that "life overseas [is] just another kind of prison for women." I could make out a similar list of problems which bugged or bored me during our FS life and I suspect that my wife never really recognized the validity of some of them until after we retired. In any event, in our experience this kind of problem is most successfully solved or lived with when it is met on a family basis. In this operation a wife certainly has every right to expect a sympathetic and cooperative attitude from her husband, and vice versa. The burdens on a husband of his wife's inability to take the peripatetic aspect of FS life, or on a wife of her husband's feeling about the amount of representational entertaining his job demands, deserve real efforts by the partner to adjust even if it means that final sanction, change of career.

This is not to say that there's no point in seeking help and support from friends of one's own sex in thinking through one's attitudes, and the Spouses' decision to do this sounds like an admirable exercise in imagination and initiative. But unfortunately what seems to have happened is that the personal nature of the problems was soon overtaken by a generalized enthusiasm for women's lib. This valid but not very relevant interest sent them back to thinking of their own problems in terms of this Cause. To me, this is a path to frustration. A cause needs a soap box, a crusading spirit and a hard line approach. Solution of problems of personal relations requires a willingness to compromise, a sensitivity to the other person's feelings and a let's-work-it-out-together approach. If a good try with this formula doesn't work, the one for whom the problems are greatest will have to decide whether the balance of advantage to him/her lies in living with them or terminating the relationship from which they spring.

A marital partnership, like a business one, involves mutual commitments and develops problems which may be soluble within its individual, personal framework but which are usually only exacerbated by firm stands on principle by one partner or the other. A woman who "must often ask her husband to take a leave of absence or change careers" and if he refuses "decide whether she is ready temporarily to separate herself from her family in order to study in the States," sounds to me as though she is laying down an ultimatum rather than searching for a viable development of the partnership. I've never seen any reason why women's lib (short of the way out fringe, that is) and marriage can't coexist happily and harmoniously. I suspect that the Spouses' bark may be worse than their bite but if it isn't they seem to be well on the way to proving this opinion wrong.

ANNE AND JAMES PENFIELD
Longbranch, Washington

■ Those introverted American wives in Colombia who designate themselves "Excess Baggage, Superfluous Spouses," have aptly hit the nail right on the head. They are. They're in the wrong business.

With so much unanswered in this troubled world how sad, really, their inability to reach out.

ELIZABETH HASELTON
Washington

LEGAL NOTICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ARPOD J. ARTWOHL, BUD BARBEE, ROBERT G. BJORING, LAWRENCE J. BRADLEY, JOSEPH W. BROWN, JOHN O. CARLSON, MANUEL DA COSTA VINCENT, MANUEL C. DA ROSA, JR., HAROLD R. DERR, EBER F. DIEHL, JR., WILLIAM G. FOHRMANN, RICHARD W. GAGE, WALLACE R. GNAEDINGER, BILLY F. HARMON, FERNANDO A. MARENCO, JACK B. MORRIS, LOYAL T. THOMPSON, FRANK D. VIRGILIO, NELSON O. WOODFORD, WALTER W. ZAPKE and all other persons similarly situated, as a class,

Plaintiffs,

—v—

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

NOTICE TO MEMBERS
OF THE CLASS

72 Civ. 1803 (RO)

JAMES A. WEINER, as Administrativc Officer, United States Consulate General, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, CLARENCE A. BOONSTRA, as United States Consul General, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, RALPH SCARRITT, as Counselor for Administration, United States Embassy, Brasilia, Brazil, WILLIAM M. ROUNTREE, as United States Ambassador to Brazil, WILLIAM P. ROGERS, as Secretary of State of the United States of America, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenors,

—v—

ARPOD J. ARTWOHL, et al. and all other persons similarly situated, as a class, and CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you may be a member of a class of persons who are defendants to a counterclaim filed in the above-captioned case now pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

In this case, the alleged rights of the members of the class and the United States Government to several bank accounts now being held by the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City are being litigated. These bank accounts were created through the sales, in Brazil, by United States Government employees, of automobiles imported into Brazil from the United States. When the employees sold the automobiles they received a portion of the proceeds, and the remainder was placed in these bank accounts to be distributed to charities to be designated by the sellers of the automobiles. Some sellers have designated charities, and the money subject to those designations has been distributed to the designated charities. The bank accounts now consist of the funds for which no designation has been made plus accumulated interest.

In July, 1971, the named plaintiffs, through their attorneys, Gerwin & Ehrenclou, filed a suit against the Chase Manhattan Bank in a Court of the State of New York, asking among other things, to distribute the remaining deposits among themselves and the rest of the class of persons similarly situated. The Bank, in April, 1972, brought in the United States of America and the Secretary of State as parties to the proceedings and asked the New York court to dispose of the deposits in accordance with its determination of the persons lawfully entitled to the funds. The United States had the proceedings transferred to the United States Court in May, 1972. In March, 1973, the United States and the Secretary of State filed a counterclaim, naming as defendants all persons who, as government employees possessing a right to designate a charity as described above, have failed or refused to make such designations. This notice is being published pursuant to an order of the Court to notify each member of the class of his rights with respect to this suit.

If you are a member of this defendant class—that is, if you sold an automobile in Brazil as described above and have not designated a charity to receive a portion of the proceeds of such sale—you will be bound by the results of this case. If you take no action at all, you will be represented in this suit by whoever represents the entire class. For the time being, the class is being represented by the law firm of Gerwin & Ehrenclou, Esqs., 150 East 58th Street, New York, New York. You do, however, have the right to appear individually, by your own attorney, and conduct your own case asserting your rights to a portion of the bank accounts and defending against the government's counterclaim as it applies to you. If you wish to appear individually by your own counsel, you must file a notice of appearance within sixty days of the date of this letter with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The above summary of the pleadings in this case is not intended to be a complete description of all the claims in this suit. It merely summarizes the major issues in the case. In order to obtain a complete statement of all allegations, it is necessary to requisition the file in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Foley Square, New York, New York 10007, where any person may read the papers on file.

Very truly yours,
PAUL J. CURRAN
United States Attorney

FREDERICK P. SCHAFFER
Assistant United States Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

STIPULATION AND
ORDER

72 Civ. 1803 (RO)

ARPOD J. ARTWOHL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

—v—

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Interpleading Plaintiff,

—v—

WILLIAM P. ROGERS, et al.,
Interpleading Defendants.

JAMES A. WEINER, et al.,
Intervenors,

—v—

ARPOD J. ARTWOHL, et al.,
Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and betwcen the attorneys for the respective parties herein that the Court's Order dated March 13, 1975 and filed March 14, 1975 endorsed upon and granting the motion of intervenors, James A. Weiner, et al., brought on for hearing on March 7, 1975, shall be implemented as follows:

1. The form and content of the notice by publication authorized by said Order shall be as set forth in the Notice To Members Of The Class attached hereto as Exhibit I.

2. Said notice shall be published twice, at one week intervals, in the Army Times, Navy Times, Air Force Times, and Fedcral Times, and once in the State Department Newsletter.

3. In addition to the above-mentioned publications, authorized by the Court's Order dated March 13, 1975, said notice shall also be published once in the Foreign Service Journal.

4. Such publication, coupled with the mailing of the approved form of notice to the members of the defendant class at their last known addresses (which mailing occurred in May and November of 1974), shall constitute complete compliance with this Court's Order of March 13, 1974, directing that an approved form of notice be given to the members of the defendant class.

Dated: New York, New York
Dated: June , 1975

PAUL J. CURRAN
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
Attorney for Intervenors
James A. Weiner, et al.

By: _____
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By: _____
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MATTHEW F. DONOGHUE, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
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One New York Plaza
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By: _____
PHILLIP MULLER, ESQ.
A Member of the Firm
Tel: (212) 676-3723

SO ORDERED:

HON. RICHARD OWEN
United States District Judge

AFSA NEWS

A REBUTTAL TO AFGE

The silly season is upon us again.

Unfortunately, the antics of AFGE Local 1812—its irresponsible use of innuendo, half-truths, outright misrepresentation and a clearly illegal public forum—occurred at a time when AFSA was not free to respond fully.

The AFSA Board election rules required that we refrain from any full assessment of the record of the current board, lest it influence the election.

But we are not compelled to remain silent in the face of the kind of misstatements often reflected in AFGE's NEWS AND VIEWS. A few examples from the May 30 issue will illustrate our point:

AFGE's Charge: AFSA overlooked the problem of the "near miss" in negotiating this year's promotion precepts with USIA, while it was taken account of in negotiations with State.

False: We considered and rejected the inclusion of the device used in the State Department at this time. The reason: State has very low promotion rates and has developed a severe backlog problem in midcareer ranks. USIA has not. For every name you add to the promotion list, one must come out. You cannot help one officer without hurting another. The overwhelming interest of USIA officers, as expressed to us in recent years, is that the system allows outstanding performance to be recognized promptly. We are going to continue to try to improve the system, and solve every problem we find, as it occurs. We understand the frustration of officers long in grade, and of the near-miss above all, but before we agree to a change in the rank-order lists, we need better evidence than is now at hand that it will *eliminate* injustices, not *create* them. We certainly do not believe, as AFGE seems to suggest that USIA should always blindly follow the procedures of State without full assurance that it is the best solution to the problem.

(We appreciate AFGE's greater understanding of, and support for, the more predictable GS system. That's why they should stop trying to take over an organization designed, to represent people whose career aims AFGE doesn't understand.)

AFGE Charge: Of the 9 representative positions on the AFSA Board only one is allotted to USIA.

Cunning Half-Truth: As professional communicators we should all appreciate the device used here. "Of the 9 representative positions . . ." which are allotted on the basis of the percentage of USIA membership in AFSA of total Foreign Service membership, one seat goes to USIA. With continued increase in our membership, we should attain a second *representative* seat by next year.

What AFGE failed to mention, but knows very well, is that recent AFSA Boards have had a USIA member in one of the general officer positions. So that we, in fact, have had two seats on the Board until just recently. AFGE also omits to mention that *all members of the AFSA Board are career Foreign Service people* representing officers, staff and specialist interests. Nor did AFGE mention that AFSA's USIA negotiating team and advisory groups consist entirely of Foreign Service personnel, unlike AFGE's local 1812 of which only a part of the membership is Foreign Service.

A large percentage of AFSA's negotiations with management are three agency wide—e.g., allowances, per diem, travel regulations etc. The non-USIA members of these committees are actively engaged in working for the benefit of USIA Foreign Service personnel.

AFGE's national committee contains NO Foreign Service personnel, so who really represents USIA Foreign Service interests? USIA/AFSA has a strong voice in Foreign Service affairs. We influence our colleagues in State and AID and we welcome their influence on us. AFGE is content to talk to itself. So be it.

AFGE Assertion: AFGE has a clear stand on the Stanton Panel report, while AFSA is undecided.

Funny if it weren't so serious: AFGE's position is indistinguishable from that taken by the Agency. (Talk about company unions!) As a consequence, they are playing no role in the crucial deliberations now underway to decide the future of the Agency and of your careers.

AFSA has mapped out a position *fully supported by our colleagues in State and AID.*

We have testified before the Murphy Commission and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and *have spoken with one Foreign Service voice.*

Where the Stanton Panel has argued for taking vital functions out of USIA and scattering them around Washington, *our Foreign Service colleagues have stood with us and testified that such a dismemberment would be a tragic mistake—that the unity* of the public affairs function must be preserved.

What AFGE said was predictable. We understand the Murphy Commission members had a hard time trying to stay awake during their testimony.

When AFSA spoke—*the only organization representing employees in all foreign affairs agencies*—the Commission sat up and took notice.

We are not timidly going to go along with management on this issue. We are interested in the protection of YOUR careers, and not the Director's. He can take care of himself very well. AFGE should stop worrying about him, and start worrying about its members.

AFGE's Con Game: AFGE has filed a petition for a new representation election in USIA. It claims one will be held in 60 days.

That would be fine for them. They would like to see the ballots go out when most of the Foreign Service employees in the field are between posts. If enough of AFSA's ballots are lost, AFGE would figure to win.

We had a meeting the other day with AFGE and the national union representatives who tell them what to think.

They want us to sign a blank check, so that they can decide who is eligible to vote in the election. The funny thing is, at the same time they are trying to eliminate most of the Foreign Service Information Officers from eligibility, they're in court trying to eliminate most of the Specialists as well. Who's going to vote? AFGE board members only?

We guarantee you that we are going to do everything necessary to ensure that a fair election is held. We love a good fight, and we're looking forward to this one.

But AFGE is wrong if it thinks that Foreign Service people are not able to defend their rights, and no charges of "delaying tactics" are going to be effective where the protection of our members is concerned.

We have filed formal charges of an unfair practice against AFGE. Before this election is held, they are going to do a few things, including:

1. ***Stop using Agency presses to attack AFSA. It's against the law, and their high-paid lawyers know it.***

2. ***Decide whom they want to represent. They want the same people to vote in this election whom they are seeking, in a court action to force to return to the GS rolls. They can't have it both ways.***

AFSA PRESIDENT'S FIRST REPORT

The newly-elected AFSA officers and Board members devoted their first month in office largely to efforts to determine AFSA's current state of affairs and to learn how persons of diverse views might work together constructively. Sharp differences have been reflected in the first several meetings.

Upon assuming office, and prior to the first Board meeting of the newly-elected AFSA leadership, the new President, John Hemenway, gathered together for two breakfast meetings at the AFSA Club (at his personal expense) the out-going AFSA Board, AFSA staff members and all officer candidates, both successful and unsuccessful. On these occasions the AFSA President pledged to work in full cooperation with all friends of the Association, emphasizing that anyone who wished to make a contribution would not be turned away.

At the first Board meeting on July 15, and again the next day on July 16, Hemenway declared a policy of complete openness for all Board meetings. What this means in practice is that our AFSA Board meetings are open at all times to all Association members, members of the Foreign Affairs Agencies, members of the public, and that records used by the Association are to be made freely available for public inspection, upon request. Further, at publicly-attended meetings, if the Chair believes it appropriate and not disruptive to the purpose of the meeting, those in attendance may ask questions of the Board or make contributions. Meetings will be closed only to protect Association bargaining positions and then only if such a closed meeting is not opposed.

Since the minutes of the first actual business meeting of the Board on July 16 reported events not recalled by the President, the President announced at the next meeting that all future meetings would be tape recorded. The Board unanimously agreed to purchase a tape recorder for this purpose so that an accurate record may be kept. To insure against mechanical failure and for convenience, two tapes will be made, one by the President and one by the recording secretary of the Board.

AFSA chief accountant, Mr. John Tierney, confirmed grim financial problems to the President, the main burden of which was, to use Mr. Tierney's words, "AFSA is broke." In the President's view, the most serious of our problems concerns the more than $100,000.00 which was appropriated from the scholarship fund during the past four years to meet operating expense deficits.

In addition, the roof of the AFSA building has a serious leak and the real estate in general needs renovation and redecoration. Perhaps to test our endurance, the month the new Board took office the air conditioning broke down in the midst of a second Washington heat wave.

Your new President believes that all of our problems will yield to diligence and intelligent effort. AFSA will tighten its own belt (not your belt) in producing better effects for the membership for less expenditure. First the new Board must get all the facts. Our annual audit is still underway. Treasurer Ed Stumpf generously is giving up two weeks leave in August to work full time for the Association without compensation. The President also has worked full time without compensation since he was elected, and Secretary Pete Velott, having recovered from a vehicle accident, and others are serving on the same basis. By the end of August, working together, the officers of the Association should be able to report to the Association concerning the facts and their plans for future full utilization of the Association's considerable assets to promote members' interests effectively.

During July the Board moved quickly and harmoniously to act on the important matter of consultations concerning precepts for the 1975 promotion boards. Unfortunately, Board action was not as harmonious in the matter of the promotion list of career ministers forwarded to the Senate for confirmation on July 15. John Hemenway wrote a letter to Chairman Sparkman requesting that he be allowed to testify against one of the appointees to career minister who never at any time during his federal service ever held a diplomatic assignment overseas. In that letter, Hemenway also requested delay on another appointee as career minister of information pending full investigation of serious allegations made against him in writing by an AFSA member assigned to USIA. The Board disapproved of John Hemenway's letter, which was written on AFSA stationery, and wrote its own letter, also on AFSA stationery, signed by Vice President Newberry, saying that AFSA had no objections to Senate confirmation of any of the nominees, which the Board

presumed had been selected in conformity to the precepts. Like all materials in AFSA records, these letters and related correspondence are available should members request copies. Next month's FSJ will contain an editorial on the matter of whether career ministers should be appointed in the Service who have never served overseas in the career diplomatic service at any time in their career. An article which is highly germane to this situation was written seven years ago by Ambassador Riddleberger who was a member of Selection Board 1 (career minister board) in 1967 and who objected to the irregular promotion to career minister of a man who Idar Rimestad revealed had never served overseas. (See: "A Communication from James Riddleberger," FSJ November 1968.)

If any AFSA member has personal views on the subject, please communicate them to the President directly or to your favorite Board member.

At the earliest September Board meeting, the President hopes to be able to recommend a candidate for AFSA executive director whom the Board will find qualified and acceptable. A search committee currently is working under the guidance of Treasurer Stumpf. There is much to do during this transition period, so to those members waiting for responses to letters, please try to be patient through the hot month of August.

For those AFSA members who may appreciate a cryptic message from their President, I would like to add, "You will understand that the recent election caused a few ripples in our pond which are still shimmering and reflecting distorted images over the surface. But the water is clear and the fish in the pond are all healthy!"

JOHN D. HEMENWAY

AFSA's Staff Attorney

AFSA is pleased to announce that we have just hired a highly competent attorney, Ms. Catherine Waelder, to join our professional staff. The Association has believed for some time that the addition of an attorney to our ranks would greatly increase AFSA's ability to represent effectively Foreign Service employees who have grievances and to assist the Association

in negotiations, court actions, and other matters requiring legal and labor expertise.

In April of this year the AFSA Governing Board established a committee to explore the possibility of hiring an attorney to work as a full time member of the Association's professional staff. From the finalists, the committee narrowed the field further and, as a result of this process, Ms. Catherine Waelder joined the Association on June 12.

Ms. Waelder (who prefers to be called Cathy and is from Philadelphia), graduated from Smith College in 1971 with an A.B. in American Studies and received a law degree from the National Law Center of George Washington University in February of this year. She is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar and has applied for admission to the District of Columbia Bar. In addition to academic preparation in labor law Ms. Waelder has worked full time with a firm engaged in labor law practice in Alaska. Ms. Waelder will ultimately handle most grievance cases for the Association, as well as offering legal advice to the Governing Board and AFSA negotiation committees.

Ms. Waelder will be available to advise Foreign Service employees with potential grievances and represent them before the Grievance Board. Ms. Waelder is located in our office in Room 3644, New State, and can be reached on extension 28160. Every Tuesday morning she will be available at 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. in Room 859 (extension 27160) for the convenience of our members with USIA. Even if you do not have a grievance or a legal problem, we encourage you to stop by our office and meet Ms. Waelder.

AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS

The 1975-1976 AFSA Scholarship Program Awards have been announced by Ambassador Arthur L. Richards, Chairman of the Scholarship Committee. The names of the recipients, the scholarships which they have received, and the colleges and universities to which the students are going follow:

Edick A. Anderson III, *American University*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**

Mark Anderson, *George Mason University*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**

Maria C. Bargas, *Tulane University*, **Isabel Preston Hill Scholarship;**

Matthew Bargas, *Louisiana State University*, **Isabel Preston Hill Scholarship;**

Sylvia E. Bargas, *Newcomb College*, **Isabel Preston Hill Scholarship**

Christine Bastek, *University of Connecticut*, **Oliver Bishop Harriman Scholarship;**

Paul Bastek, *Dartmouth College*, **Oliver Bishop Harriman Scholarship;**

Jessica C. Blalock, *Montgomery College*, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship;**

Michael J. Blalock, *University of Maryland*, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship;**

Mary S. Brogley, *Marquette University*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**

Lindsay C. Brooks, *Kenyon College*, **John Foster Dulles Scholarship;**

Luanne Buchanan, *St. Olaf College*, **Clare Timberlake Scholarship;**

Christopher Chadbourne, *University of Michigan*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**

Jan M. Dropik, *Northwestern University*, **George H. DeMange Memorial Scholarship;**

Thomas H. Estabrook, *Pennsylvania State University*, **Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen Memorial Scholarship;**

James A. Haentzschel, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute*, **Vietnam Memorial Scholarship;**

Jacqueline M. Hargreaves, *University of Virginia*, **Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship;**

Julie Herse, *California State University*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**

P. Christopher Hodge, *University of California at Berkeley*, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship;**

C. Nicholas Hodge, *Montgomery College*, **Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship;**

Stephanie Horner, *Mount Holyoke College*, **Selden Chapin Scholarship;**

Karen J. Hyde, *Lindenwood Colleges*, **Douglas W. Coster Memorial Schoalrship;**

Michael A. Ivy, *University of Maryland*, **Arthur B. Emmons Scholarship;**

Gabrielle A. Jackson, *New England College*, **Maurice L. Stafford Memorial Scholarship;**
Ann C. Jurecky, *Northwestern University*, **Margaret F. Berger Memorial Scholarship;**
Mary F. Jurecky, *Lake Forest College*, **Margaret F. Berger Memorial Scholarship;**
James E. Kerr III, *University of California at Berkeley*, **Clare Timberlake Scholarship;**
Richard H. Lamb, Jr., *George Washington University*, **Charles B. Hosmer Memorial Scholarship;**
Martha F. Lyman, *Columbia College*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Jocelyn F. Moreland, *Brown University*, **John Campbell White Scholarship;**
Anh H. Nguyen, *Old Dominion University*, **John Foster Dulles Scholarship;**
Hoai H. Nguyen, *George Mason University*, **Howard Fyfe Memorial Scholarship;**
Quynh H. Nguyen, *Marist College*, **Charles B. Hosmer Memorial Scholarship;**
Thu H. Nguyen, *George Mason University*, **George Mason University;**
Valerie A. Price, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**
Margaret M. Purcell, *Colorado Women's College*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Mary G. Purcell, *Colorado Women's College*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Russell M. Rick, *University of Hawaii*, **Douglas W. Coster Memorial Scholarship;**
Bernadette Ryan, *Montgomery College*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**
Madeleine Ryan, *Montgomery College*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**
Mark Ryan, *Wabash College*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**
Tracy O. Sapp, *Smith College*, **Ruth Hazen Hopkins Memorial Scholarship;**
Norman U. Schute, Jr., *University of California at San Diego*, **Paris Scholarship;**
Melinda G. Sedgley, *University of Virginia*, **Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen Memorial Scholarship;**
John G. Shaw, *University of Maryland*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Timothy W. Shaw, *University of Colrado*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Terri N. Shimomura, *Princeton University*, **Charles E. Merrill Trust Scholarship;**
Lisa A. Slezak, *Indiana University*, **Julius C. Holmes Scholarship;**
Marie H. Slezak, *Oberlin College*, **Julius C. Holmes Scholarship;**
James L. T. Smith, *College of William and Mary*, **David K. E. Bruce Scholarship;**
Peter C. Springer, *Clemson University*, **Clare Timberlake Scholarship;**
Sarah P. Springer, *University of South Carolina*, **Clare Timberlake Scholarship;**
Charles Streeper, *Principia College*, **Edward T. Wailes Scholarship;**
Elizabeth M. Tsoy, *University of Maryland*, **Vietnam Memorial Scholarship;**
Anna Tueller, *Brigham Young University*, **Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship;**
Matthew A. Tueller, *Brigham Young University*, **William Benton Scholarship;**
Michael Vogel, *University of Texas*, **Vietnam Memorial Scholarship;**
Martha J. Wagner, *Augsburg College*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Kristen M. Wellde, *University of Virginia*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Michael S. Wellde, *University of Tampa*, **AAFSW Scholarship;**
Margaret S. Woods, *University of Guam*, **AAFSW Scholarship**

The AFSA Scholarship Committee presently consists of Ambassador Arthur L. Richards, Chairman, Dr. Christine Hugerth, Alan W. Lukens, Mrs. Louis Mark, Dr. Andrew Schwartz, Mrs. Christopher Squire and James R. Vandivier.

AFSA wishes to express its appreciation to all those who have supported the Scholarship Program over the years and most especially for the splendid contributions and cooperation of the American Association of Foreign Service Women.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. PATTERSON VICE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNING BOARD, AFSA ON AID BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS JULY 29, 1975 & HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS JULY 21, 1975

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify with respect to the Agency for International Development Authorization Bill. Recent events in AID are of great importance to the Foreign Service, namely the emerging programatic and organization weaknesses existent in the Agency which we believe are of such significance to all three Foreign Affairs Agencies (AID, State and USIA) that it is imperative that we bring them to your attention. The Association's testimony concerning these matters will include proposals for reform.

Before proceeding directly with our testimony, a few introductory words may be in order. For over 50 years the American Foreign Service Association has been the independent professional association of the men and women who serve their country abroad in the Foreign Service of the United States. In its role as a professional organization the Association has long been concerned with the organization of the government to carry out its foreign affairs responsibilities, and over the years has played a major role in organizational reform, including, among others, the "Task Force" reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In addition, for over two years AFSA has, under Executive Order 11636, been the exclusive employee representative of all Foreign Service personnel in AID, USIA, and State as a result of winning contested elections in all three Agencies.

It is in both of these capacities, as a professional and employee organization, that we are appearing before you today. I wish to state most emphatically, Mr. Chairman, that the Association believes significant changes are required, not only for the proper conduct of US foreign development assistance but in order to enhance the personnel and administrative management of the Agency for International Development. The Association will recommend a plan which we believe will rationalize that conduct, save the taxpayers money, and guarantee equity and fairness to AID's Foreign Service employees.

1. *The Importance of Preserving and Strengthening the Development Assistance Functions of Foreign Policy.* For over twenty-five years this nation has been administering "temporary" bilateral assistance programs utilizing "temporary" agencies to carry out this task. In the Association's opinion, a further continuation of this situation is unacceptable on both professional and employee grounds. AFSA recognizes, and many in AFSA would support, the view that excessive emphasis has been placed in times past on bilateral assistance, that we have had difficulties in justifying programs whose basis in many cases was primarily to support short-term foreign policy objectives, and in other cases to support development or other largely humanitarian goals on the grounds that these were in the long-range national interest. We anticipate that support for large-scale bilateral assistance programs will con-

tinue to decline, and that in future years there will be little or no support for large-scale bilateral infrastructure or industrialization schemes. Instead, American participation in this form of development assistance will increasingly be through multilateral agencies. Nevertheless, the Association believes it is a serious mistake to view bilateral assistance and humanitarian aid as temporary and transient aspects of American foreign policy, and we reject the notion that multilateralization of all foreign assistance is a viable alternative.

In fact, it is highly probable that the United States will maintain a capability for bilateral assistance for immediate foreign policy reasons; because of non-shared US interests in assistance targeted to key areas, e.g., population control; and because of the need for quick and effective humanitarian programs and disaster relief, an area in which the record of the multilateral agencies is spotty at best. However, the United States is in danger of losing the expertise built up for over two decades to even undertake a very limited program. In 1968 there were over 5500 Foreign Service employees, today there are less than 2500.

Of primary importance is the need for the United States to have a professional development structure which can deal with both bilateral and multilateral assistance issues and operations as these impinge on US interests. Unfortunately, in addition to the severe decrease in Foreign Service personnel to carry out any mandated development task, the Association does not believe that AID as presently structured meets this basic need. Accordingly, we are convinced that the time has come to recognize that the developmental assistance function is a long-term feature of American foreign affairs and to structure the government to take this into account.

II. *The Necessity for Change.* AID has been severely criticized in recent years by various committees of the Congress, by the GAO, by various study commissions, and by the Association for its inefficient administration, for the conversion of a Foreign Affairs Agency into essentially a domestic agency, for its inept and at times inhumane personnel system, for lack of effective controls over contracting procedures, for excessive reliance on expensive and often inept contractors, for devoting excessive resources to administration at the expense of substance, for over-politicizing the Agency with respect to both personnel hiring and contracting, for maintaining a consistent bias in favor of GS employees as opposed to the Foreign Service and against AID Foreign Service personnel in comparison to their State and USIA Foreign Service colleagues, and for failing to move rapidly and forcefully into new areas of development assistance, such as information systems, or monitoring of multilateral assistance programs.

The Association believes that problem after problem can be traced wholly or in part to the lack of recognition that US foreign policy includes foreign development assistance activities. The conduct of a foreign development assistance program must reflect overall foreign policy objectives. These are not always foreseeable and are assuredly subject to change. But the structural and organization alterations suggested here will not impede future change, rather they have been selected to make such adaptation easier. Policy guidance from a single source will make program direction itself more adaptable. An increasingly professionalized corps of development specialists will be more ready for the challenge of new tasks than a system based on *ad hocery*. An organization resting on planning infrastructure and general information networks will be more prepared to receive and transmit new messages than one which is without this technology. Access to a wider variety of development approaches will provide sufficient versatility in carrying out programs. In sum, an organization charged and equipped to be broker, moderator, monitor and coordinator of US foreign development assistance programs will be more responsive to the evolution and changes of foreign policy and realities.

III. *AID's Violations of Executive Order 11636.* Before proceeding further, Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring up another matter which has direct bearing on this testimony and the recommendations which follow.

Executive Order 11636 provides Foreign Service employees of AID, State and USIA the right, through their elected exclusive employee representative, to participate in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and procedures. The agencies have the mandatory obligation to bargain with AFSA on any matter concerning personnel policies and practices and any matter affecting Foreign Service employee working conditions. Unfortunately, with AID, this has not been the case.

The Agency has displayed intransigence and contempt for employees falling under the aegis of E.O. 11636. In recent months AID has violated the Executive Order and specific agreements reached with AFSA. The Agency has also refused to abide by decisions reached by appellate bodies created under the Executive Order. These violations, Mr. Chairman, all too well illustrate the Agency's disregard for both the spirit and the letter of the Executive Order. Rights guaranteed AID employees under the Order have been systematically and ruthlessly violated. The Association on its part has gone to court, initiated unfair labor practice complaints and is participating in grievances and other adjudicatory appeals designed to halt these illegal and unethical actions.

This is an incredibly sorry picture which AFSA cannot condone. The situation together with the points enunciated earlier concerning the efficacy of change in the conduct of a US development assistance program have led us to prepare this testimony, the essence of which is to call for the restructuring of AID in a manner consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States and in the interest of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity for the personnel of all three Foreign Affairs agencies.

IV. *Measures to Improve the Foreign Development Assistance Function.* Mr. Chairman, in accord with the objectives set forth earlier in our testimony, the American Foreign Service Association would like to recommend the following concrete steps:

1. The Congress should officially acknowledge that foreign international development assistance has become a continuing part of US foreign policy and that appropriate structural adjustments via enabling legislation are therefore required.

2. That leadership of the USG international development assistance program should flow directly from the Secretary of State. Under "Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 104—Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Certain Related Acts" the Secretary of State has delegated to the Administrator of AID most organizational, operational and personnel matters. However, as is noted under Section 7(c) of that Authority, the Secretary can exercise executive control over AID if he so desires. The Secretary's exercise of this existing authority would at least eliminate the country ever again being witness to the unseemly activities of AID in pressing for one kind of AID bill while the Secretary wanted another, and should eliminate the capacity of the Agency to flout openly the orders of the Foreign Service Grievance Board and other adjudicatory bodies under Executive Order 11636.

The Association believes that the Secretary should exercise such control immediately by temporarily assigning the delegation to the Deputy Secretary of State pending the development of a program and enabling legislation outlined as follows:

A. An amalgamation of the administrative support functions of State and AID should be undertaken in a phased manner. This we believe will lead not only to greater efficiency and lower

costs but enhanced career opportunities. Such an amalgamation should lead in a step-by-step process to the merger of offices concerned with security, employee management relations, travel and personnel support functions, and payrolls.

B. A career system should be established around a core of development-oriented Foreign Service Development Officers with the same career status presently accorded FSOs and FSIOs. At the same time a system, perhaps similar to a modified Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited (FSRU) authority, should be created to facilitate the acquisition of specific technical expertise when and as needed. Such a career system should do something about AID's huge Civil Service bureaucracy, which has made AID increasingly a Washington-focused agency, dominated by individuals who know little or nothing about overseas conditions. This aspect of the problem could be resolved by either phasing out or converting to FSRU or FSDO all civil service personnel except those in essential occupational specialties having no overseas equivalent positions and who should therefore remain GS. A separate assignments and promotion system for all Foreign Service personnel in the new development structure is envisaged.

C. A systematic long-range career development program should be created with particular attention to (1) disseminating the knowledge of and techniques for foreign development assistance programs and (2) undertaking research to learn more about the generic development process than we now know. Since a great majority of AID's research at present is sectoral and unidisciplinary, our proposal would be of great value to the whole foreign development assistance community.

D. Under the new arrangement (1) all US bilateral and multilateral policies, programs and personnel should be integrated; (2) there should be a more formal leadership and coordination role of all US official foreign development assistance activities: and (3) there should be a central and catalytic role within the community of private, voluntary, and university development resources.

V. *Conclusion.* Perhaps I can conclude, Mr. Chairman, with something of a historical perspective. The world of foreign development assistance is now one of systems, interdependence and professionalization. And we helped make it this way. In such a world the United States should accept the legitimization of foreign development assistance and structure itself accordingly. Organizational palliatives are no longer enough. They have, in fact, led to instability in the conduct of foreign development assistance thereby undercutting a significant aspect of US foreign policy. By this testimony, the Association through recommended structural revisions has presented a radical conceptual change which we believe will go a long way toward rectifying an increasingly counterproductive situation. We hope that it will be accepted by the Congress of the United States.

AAFSW NEWS

The Collectors' Corner

Old books bring to mind rainy day visits to the attic and hours of rummaging through musty books . . . or sitting out a thunderstorm in grandfather's library, surrounded by the scent and textures of leather in the furnishings and books that filled the shelves.

As the pace of living has quickened and the cost of living has risen—and old houses with attics and libraries have given way to high-rise space-conscious apartment dwellings—collections of books have, of necessity, become smaller and collectors more selective, while children watch television on rainy days.

For the selective collector, the topic specialist, and the individual interested in reminiscing over old illustrations and authors, Book Fair '75 will have a Collectors' Corner. stocked with care, for a third year, by Mildred Bell.

Book Fair '75 Collectors' Corner has more classifications than in previous years. In addition to the usual categories, there is a fine collection of books on ships and the sea. There are autographed and first edition books on a wide variety of subjects, and the books vary in age from mid-18th century to last month.

In preparing the Corner, Mrs. Bell has set aside an assortment of rare and unusual books to be placed on sale at 10 a.m. October 6. Copy #53 of "The Loving Shepherdess" by Robinson Jeffers and autographed by him and illustrator Jean Kellogg . . . a limited edition copy of Morte d'Arthur—illustrated by Aubrey Beardsley . . . a 1755—2 volume edition of The Spectator (in French) . . . handsome gold-tooled leather-bound early Ruskins . . . unusual illustrated childrens' books . . . These and other selected titles will go on sale on a first come first served basis on the first public day of Book Fair '75.

If you are a book buyer who prefers to browse, you just might find your rare or special title in the Book Fair's general sales area. The Foreign Language section has, in a wide variety of languages, choice photographic books on many countries, a most unusual collection of books relating to the Napoleonic Period as well as some antique linguistics books in French. Titles and authors in the religion and philosophy areas provide a stronger coverage of both subjects than heretofore . . . and books in the New Book and Nearly New Sections will make Christmas shopping for literate friends a breeze.

Fresh assortments of books will be placed on the shelves daily throughout the Fair and since, for the most part, volunteers working at sorting and pricing books are not as knowledgeable as Mrs. Bell, you might come across that special book any hour (from 10-4) of any day (October 6-10) . . . and, according to Mildred Bell, "That is what makes a Book Fair."

NOTE: Books, stamps and art objects may still be contributed by calling Lois Heginbotham at 493-9192.

Youth Picnic

The second annual Foreign Service Youth Picnic was held June 21, Saturday, on the spacious green grounds of the Landon School in Bethesda.

The approximately one hundred guests represented 16 colleges, 19 high schools, 5 junior high schools and at least 3 American schools abroad. One guest admitted it was her first picnic in the United States.

When the guests registered at the entrance, they searched the list for familiar names from old posts or current schools.

The color scheme was red, white, and blue. Striped paper ribbon bows were donated. Blue denim table cloths, American flags, pinwheels and many signs punctuated the feeling of festivity.

The ultimate compliment of appreciation of the AAFSW and the AFSA who financed the event was the fact that everyone, committee and guests, asked for another picnic next year,—"exactly like this one."

Chairman of the event was Mrs.

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

Listings in this Special Services column are 40c per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail to Special Services, FSJ, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

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EDUCATION

PARENTS—selecting a private secondary school in the United States? Contact specialists in Northeastern residential high schools. PRIVATE SCHOOL GUIDANCE, 1471 Ridge Road, North Haven, Conn. 06473. (203) 281-3746.

Philip M. Faucett, Jr. who was well assisted by AAFSW committee members and their teenagers. Mrs. Frances Bourne and Mrs. Eugene Schelp, food, Mrs. Glen Cella, treasurer, Mrs. Weston Emery, Mrs. Robert Flaten and Mrs. Christopher Squire, publicity, Mrs. Frank S. Wilson and Mrs. Philip Metzler assisted by Jon Parker and Jo Povonia of the State Department, games.

Teenagers who also assisted were Carol Faucett, Peter Bourne, Margo Squire, Malcomb Wilson, Peter Gordon, Don Leake, Dave Seibert, Karen Flaten, Christine and Caroline Emery and Mary Lee Cella.

TAX TIPS

Deductions for Home Leave Expenses

No decision has yet been handed down on the AFSA-sponsored home leave deduction case that was heard in the US Tax Court in the District last December. Here are some tips concerning deductions for home leave expenses:

1. If IRS has challenged your deduction for home leave expenses, we suggest that you continue to appeal your case within IRS but that you should delay going to the Small Tax Court until a decision has been reached on the pending court case.

2. If you are domiciled or even temporarily resident in one of the states within the Ninth Judicial Circuit (Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii or Guam) where the Stratton case was heard and decided in our favor, you should file your return in Fresno, California. In most instances, IRS allows the deduction if you file in Fresno.

3. If you are domiciled in the Ninth Judicial Circuit and IRS has audited your return filed elsewhere because of deductions for home leave expenses, you should request the IRS agent to transfer your file to their office in the state of your legal domicile.

4. *Bear in mind that home leave expenses should be listed in Part I of Form 2106 (not Part II as erroneously stated in the March 1975 FSJ). They are an adjustment to income (line 14, Form 1040 for 1974) whether or not you itemize deductions.*

Foreign Service People

Marriages

Bracken-Hunter. Katherine W. Bracken, FSO-retired, was married on August 14 to Capt. Samuel Dulany Hunter, USNR-retd. in Dania, Florida. Miss Bracken served at Izmir, Isfahan and Calcutta and as head of GTI and Central American Affairs in the Department before her retirement. Captain and Mrs. Hunter will live in Dania, Florida.

Crichton-Jenkins. Lucy Cabell Crichton was married to FSO Kempton Jenkins on July 19, in Washington, D.C. Mr. Jenkins, a widower, is serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mozafarian-Smith. Soheila Mozafarian was married to Glenn Bruce Smith, son of FSIO and Mrs. Glenn Lee Smith, on June 26, in Teheran. They will reside at 6556 El Nido, Goleta, California 93017.

Deaths

Goplen. Esther M. Goplen, wife of FSIO-retired Orville H. Goplen, died on July 6, in Cocoa Beach. Mrs. Goplen served with her husband at Oslo, Reykjavik, Frankfurt and Koblenz before his retirement. In addition to her husband of 112 West Suwannee Lane, Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931, she is survived by twin sons, John and Richard, adopted in Iceland.

Harrison. William M. Harrison, former FSIO, died on July 21, in Kansas City, Missouri. He served in Saigon, Sidney, Taipei and Johannesburg and with VOA before retiring in 1967 to become co-publisher of the North Missourian. He is survived by his wife, Kathryn, of Gallatin, Missouri.

Lane. Dorothy Bent Lane, wife of FSO-retired Clayton Lane, died on July 15, in Sarasota. Mrs. Lane was internationally known as a painter and was active in art associations, in the lecture field and in the media. She accompanied her husband to posts at Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, Johannesburg, Calcutta, New Delhi, Beirut and Damascus. In 1943 she represented the OWI in Calcutta. She is survived by her husband of 500 S. Washington Dr., Sarasota, Fla.

Manning. Henry J. Manning, FSO-retired, died on June 30 in Denver. He entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and served at Shanghai, Saigon, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Dacca, Cairo and Lagos. Mr. Manning is survived by a son, William J., of 3065 Sedgwick Ave., Bronx, New York and a brother of Denver, Colorado.

Ruch. Kenneth J. Ruch, FSO-retired, died on March 2, in San Francisco. The JOURNAL has not received any further information.

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