FSJ

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
NOVEMBER 1976 60 CENTS

Cuba in the Mid-70s
by Barry Sklar

To Support and Defend the Constitution
by Thomas D. Boyatt

Their Revolutions—and Ours
by David D. Newsom

• • STOLEN LUGGAGE • FIRE DAMAGE • BODILY INJURY LIABILITY • BREAKING AND ENTERING • SHIPPING LOSSES OF ALL KINDS • PET LIABILITY • LIGHTNING DAMAGE • TRANSIT/WAR RISKS • PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY •



travel-pak... BEFORE YOU MAKE YOUR MOVE!

Planning on living abroad for awhile? When the plans center around your household possessions—and personal belongings, include TRAVEL-PAK in your strategy.

TRAVEL-PAK has been carefully designed to provide insurance protection on the household and personal possessions of people who will be living outside the United States for prolonged periods of time.

Coverage is provided—on the way—while there (including storage, if requested)—and back again. Along with liberal protection on your possessions—TRAVEL-PAK includes liability coverage—for protection against incidents for which you or your family could become liable.

It's good, sound business practice to include TRAVEL-PAK when you plan to make your move.

Complete the coupon below and return it to us for complete dollars and cents details about TRAVEL-PAK . . . or if you're really in a hurry ca*ll!*

travel-pak

WHEN YOU'RE GOING TO LIVE ABROAD!

James W. Barrett Company, Inc.

Insurance Brokers
1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-296-6440

SEND FOR DETAILS—TODAY

8-A

Tell me about **TRAVEL-PAK.**

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

FSJ

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

NOVEMBER 1976: Volume 53, No. 11

Cover: "Street Scene, Tehran," mixed media
OVALINE TYBURSKI

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

While the Editorial Board of the JOURNAL is responsible for its general content, statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under Executive Order 11636 on the editorial page and in the AFSA News, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

Membership in the American Foreign Service Association is open to the professionals in foreign affairs overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with foreign affairs.

Membership dues are: Active Members—Dues range from $13 to $52 annually depending upon income. Retired Active Members—Dues are $30 annually for members with incomes over $15,000; $15 annually for less than $15,000. Associate Members—Dues are $20 annually.

For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); $6.00; two years, $10.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life.*

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.

"For of all sad words of tongue or pen,
The saddest are these: 'It might have been!' "—John Greenleaf Whittier

Reflections on the End of the Register

THOMAS A. DONOVAN

The proper relationship, in public as in private, between a diplomatic service and its supporting intelligence agencies can never be easily defined. So it is that the Department's long expected decision, taken for evident intelligence reasons, to do away with the old unclassified Biographic Register will be welcomed by some and deplored by others. For those in the Service, I suppose, the change will be taken as a matter of little importance. Those with a demonstrated need to know can always manage to look at the new restricted edition in the Ambassador's safe, securely locked up along with the DCM's correspondence with cronies in the Office of Personnel on who gets transferred and who gets invited back for a second tour of duty.

There will be others, however, who can only conclude—and I confess I am of these—that the Service is now a poorer thing. For the old Register was a symbol, in its way, of the open and relatively aboveboard diplomatic traditions of the career we entered into with such elevated aspirations these many years ago. Seen in this light, the Register was more than a merely useful tool for sophisticated after-duty analysis of changing fashions in Department promotion policy. It was more also than agreeable reading for Service spouses—though one cannot think but with regret of the new emptiness in the lives of our American counterparts of George Orwell's Mrs. Lackersteen, the English colonial service wife of his novel *Burmese Days* to whom the Burma Civil List ("which tells you the exact income of every official in Burma") was a source of inexhaustible interest.

But no one can be surprised at the way things have turned out. The trend of the times has been too strongly against the continued publication of informative documents of this kind, as was evident from the fact that the now shut-down Senate Intelligence Committee, despite its legal Senate mandate and the issuance of subpoenas, "in no instance [was] . . . able to examine the [intelligence] agencies' files on its own." Our officials, in all branches of government, are too firmly committed to contemporary intelligence mythology to permit the continued publication of documents which, though hitherto harmless enough, can now be presented as useful to our enemies.

Perhaps the best face we can put on this development is to tell ourselves that we have been lucky to keep our Biographic Registers and Foreign Service Lists going as long as we have. Many other countries have never allowed themselves such monuments to their freedom and prosperity. The Russians, for example, had already reached the point we find ourselves approaching as long ago as 1937. It was only in that year, as steps were underway for the great purge trials and the massive replacement of old-line Soviet diplomatic personnel by intelligence agency careerists, that the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at last discontinued the issuance of its yearly *Annuaire Diplomatique* listing the names and grades of Soviet officials above a certain level assigned to the Commissariat in Moscow and to Soviet embassies and consulates abroad.

The Soviets, of course, had their own ample reasons for discontinuing their diplomatic yearbook. A 1937 or 1938 edition would have made it all too clear what appalling changes were being worked on the Soviet diplomatic service. Now no one supposes, of course, that such changes are contemplated for our own Service. One cannot but wonder, nevertheless, whether our own people who decide these matters have faced up to the full implications of their decision on the Register. One must ask, that is, whether this modest step toward suppress-

Continued on page 27

Thomas A. Donovan, FSO-retired, served at Prague, The Hague, Frankfurt, Warsaw, Berlin, Khorramshahr and in the Department before his retirement in the late '60s. Since then he has been active in politics, conservation groups and the education field.

Diplomacy comes in all sizes.



1977 Continental Four-Door Town Car

Ford's 1977 diplomatic lineup comes in full-car sizes like the Continental, Marquis and LTD. Trimmer sizes like the new Thunderbird, LTD II, Cougar and Cougar XR-7. Personal sizes like Mark V, Granada and Monarch. Compact sizes like Comet, Maverick, Mustang II, Bobcat and Pinto.

Pick the car that's sized right for you, then check out the special diplomatic discount savings you can get on any 1977 Ford-built car or light truck. Delivery will be arranged for you, either stateside or overseas. And you can have the car built to Export* or Domestic specifications.

Mail us the coupon below and we'll send you complete information on the Ford-built car of your choice—and how you can get it at our special discount. What could be more diplomatic?

*Cannot be driven in the U.S.

1977 Thunderbird

1977 Granada Four-Door Ghia

Please send me full information on using my diplomatic discount to purchase a new_____

WRITE TO:
DIPLOMATIC SALES: FORD MOTOR COMPANY
815 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006/Tel: (202) 785-6047

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ STATE_____

COUNTRY_____ ZIP_____

FORD EXPORT CORPORATION Ford

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1. TITLE OF PUBLICATION: FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL		2. DATE OF FILING: 9/13/76
3. FREQUENCY OF ISSUE: 12 times a year	A. NO. OF ISSUES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY: 12	B. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: $6.00

4. LOCATION OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION *(Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printers)*: 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

5. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHERS *(Not printers)*: 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

6. NAMES AND COMPLETE ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR, AND MANAGING EDITOR

PUBLISHER *(Name and Address)*: American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

EDITOR *(Name and Address)*: Shirley R. Newhall, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

MANAGING EDITOR *(Name and Address)*:

7. OWNER *(If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.)*

NAME	ADDRESS
American Foreign Service Association	2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES *(If there are none, so state)*

NAME	ADDRESS
American Foreign Service Protective Association	Suite 1305, 1750 Penna., Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006

9. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES *(Section 132.122, PSM)*

The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes *(Check one)*:

☒ HAVE NOT CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS ☐ HAVE CHANGED DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS *(If changed, publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement.)*

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION	AVERAGE NO. COPIES EACH ISSUE DURING PRECEDING 12 MONTHS	ACTUAL NO. COPIES OF SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAREST TO FILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED *(Net Press Run)*	8033	7800
B. PAID CIRCULATION 1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS, STREET VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES		
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS	7873	7136
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION *(Sum of 10B1 and 10B2)*	7873	7136
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES	100	300
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION *(Sum of C and D)*	7973	7436
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED 1. OFFICE USE, LEFT OVER, UNACCOUNTED, SPOILED AFTER PRINTING	60	364
2. RETURNS FROM NEWS AGENTS		
G. TOTAL *(Sum of E, F1 and 2 should equal net press run shown in A)*	8033	7800

11. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF EDITOR, PUBLISHER, BUSINESS MANAGER, OR OWNER: Shirley R. Newhall Editor

"One if by land, and two if by sea;
And I on the opposite shore will be,"—
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

Paul Revere's Other Ride

LEOPOLD J. LECLAIR

Paul Revere, patriot, silversmith, dentist, engraver and man of many other parts, is eulogized frequently and justly in these Bicentennial days. The versatile revolutionary's multiple exploits and accomplishments, both legendary and real, are appropriately recalled as America celebrates its big birthday; his presence is to be found in every aspect of our national history—the arts, the sciences, the government, the economy as well as the very revolution itself. Indeed there is a tendency to view Revere as a banal subject because he is such a ubiquitous figure in the account—but especially, most of us would agree, because of Longfellow's romantic tribute to Revere the after-hours horseman.

There is however another Revere journey, as successful in its outcome as the first, which has been less publicized than his Lexington ride. More modest in purpose, far more tranquil in passage, far greater in distance, it bears recounting if for no other reason than it took place in the 20th century. A bicentennial event of sorts, it occurred two centuries from the year 1756 when Revere had been commissioned a second lieutenant in His Britannic Majesty's forces fighting the French in northern New England.

This time Revere's objective was not Middlesex County. Nor was it to fight the French; the purpose was in fact just the opposite: to improve American relations with the French in their own hinterland.

In 1956 the American Consulate General in Bordeaux, capital of southwest France, faced a touchy situation in Franco-American relations as a result of the arrival in the area of thousands of American troops. While the US military were there at the express invitation of the French Government and represented an American commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, these facts carried little weight with the residents of Gironde and Périgord, the two French districts most affected. The average farmer or townsman of these areas still had etched in his

---

Leo LeClair, FSIO-retired, has been a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. *Mr. LeClair now lives in Peterborough, New Hampshire.*

memory another military presence—that of the Germans in the 1940s—which however different in purpose had decisively soured most French minds on the subject of soldiers of any kind. Even French troops in the communities had found chilly receptions among local residents. No matter how friendly the purpose of the American forces, nor how vital their presence to overall European security, the French inhabitants could not bring themselves to cheer.

"The Frenchman thought the GI had the consumption of cognac uppermost in his mind; the GI, already isolated by language differences, leave restrictions and loneliness, felt the French were interested only in his wallet."

So it was in 1956 in southwest France. The American Army was all over the landscape. There were camps in all the main cities or their suburbs, beginning with Bordeaux itself. Angoulême, Poitiers, La Rochelle, Périgueux—each of these provincial capitals had highly visible GI populations. The behavior of the troops was in general beyond reproach; but as is often the case in such circumstances, unsavory incidents tended to be blown up far beyond their real proportions by the press and by the best bad-mouther of all, common gossip. Thus one US jeep accident involving a French injury became ten; one corporal's unpaid bills took on the dimensions of an industrial bankruptcy; one captain's philandering became an entire season of X-rated films.

The situation was particularly chilly in Périgueux, capital of one of the most beautiful provinces of France, the Dordogne. Population 40,000, largely an agricultural center, the city has an enviable reputation as a gourmet paradise. Its people are tough but hospitable, full of their own ancient history yet intensely practical. To Périgueux had come the United States Army's 7851st Unit, a supply mission charged with essentially warehouse duties. The unit was small—no more than a couple of thousand men. At best, its relationship with the local community could be described as "correct." Stiff, distanced, formal—it consisted largely of protocol receptions at the residences of the mayor or the French regional prefect—roughly the equivalent of US state governor—reciprocated at the quarters of the colonel commanding the 7851st. At the level of the GI and the Périgueux man-in-the-street, where the potential sources of irritation were most abundant, there were only barroom encounters, distrust and chill. The Frenchman thought the GI had the consumption of cognac uppermost in his mind; the GI, already isolated by language differences, leave restrictions and loneliness, felt the French were interested only in his wallet.

One of the American consuls assigned to Bordeaux at

the time had it as his particular responsibility to seek ways to improve relationships such as the one which prevailed in Périgueux. The avenues available to him, which ran from bridge tournaments to basketball matches to hospital volunteers, had been unproductive. The bridge and basketball games and the hospital visits made no ripples, and a Franco-American joint sense of mutual need and effort remained lacking.

It was here that Paul Revere's second ride began to take shape.

The American Consul, browsing in his own United States Information Service library one cold February morning, stumbled on the fact that Revere was of French Huguenot descent and that his ancestors had come from the village of Sainte-Foye-la-Grande, only a few miles from Périgueux. The original family name had been Rivoire. Paul's father was named Apollos Rivoire—the same name as the son, unAnglicized. The father, who had come to Boston as a boy refugee and apprentice in the 1710s, had in later life changed the spelling of his name to Revere "so that the bumpkins could pronounce it easier," as he had explained to his famous son.

Furthermore, the Consul learned as he read on, there was still a Rivoire house standing in Sainte Foye, although the Rivoires had all left the area over a century ago and it had passed into other hands. Indeed it was now the rectory of the parish priest!

While all this was recorded history, it was certainly not known in Périgueux. The Consul mused on the rich possibilities in the Revere roots as a means of bringing the Americans and the Frenchmen in Périgueux together. What a happy ingredient, he reflected, for a joint celebration.

But it would require the assistance of Paul Revere.

A few days later the Consul, invoking the spirit of Revere, went to visit his good friend the deputy mayor of Périgueux, a genial and wise Frenchman anxious to make his city a friendly locale for the Americans. The deputy had already, along with a small group of Périgourdins, formed a France-Amérique committee, but it had met with mediocre success. The Consul talked with the deputy mayor about Paul Revere, whose French background was news to His Honor. The deputy agreed that the distinguished émigré's name provided a precious link. He would bring the matter to the attention of the City Council and of the France-Amérique committee. He did, and a few days later both groups endorsed his suggestion that the American patriot's French origins should be commemorated jointly with the Americans residing in the Périgueux area.

Reporting the story later, the American Consul has stated that it was at this point in the development of events that the spirit of Paul Revere—never a man to shun useful publicity—whispered in the diplomat's ear for the first time:

"You're going back to the United States in a few weeks for home leave. Why don't you go up to my home town and reconnoiter? Granted I met with quite a lot of trouble during my own scouting expedition in the Boston area on that fateful April night in 1775, why not give it another try?"

The Consul listened attentively. And shortly he indeed

went home to the United States on leave and made it his business to go to Boston. The results of his visit, in the winter of 1956, were more than gratifying. First he found a direct descendant of Paul Revere, named, appropriately enough, Paul Revere. Descendant Paul was modest, gracious and helpful. A successful and extremely busy man in the Boston banking world, the first thing he said was that he wished he were able to attend the Périgueux festivities himself. His calendar, alas, wouldn't permit it. He gave the Consul a list of names and institutions which might be interested in taking part in the Périgueux plans. As the Consul approached each of them, enthusiasm for the project grew.

An especially enthusiastic supporter was Mark Bortman of Brookline, a prominent member of the ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston, whose charter dates back to 1638 as the first military company established in the Western Hemisphere. It may very well be that the original Paul Revere was whispering in Bortman's ear too—even though Revere was never a member of the Ancient and Honorable. For Bortman promptly had a highly fruitful idea. He would approach Boston City Hall with a proposal to send a replica of Revere's famous Liberty Bowl to the city of Périgueux as a commemorative gift. (The original bowl is on display in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.) Bortman further declared he would come to Périgueux if a Paul Revere Day were to take place and would present the Revere bowl in person on behalf of the City of Boston.

Another Bostonian whose ear the spirit of Paul Revere obviously caught was Miss Margaret French, President of the French Association of Boston. When the Consul informed Miss French of the plans, she said she too would be delighted to come to France and attend ceremonies.

Paul Revere's shade then guided the American diplomat's steps to the Museum of Fine Arts, where a bonanza materialized. The Museum's prints curator agreed to loan a collection of Revere's original engravings to the Museum of Périgueux, providing suitable precautions for their care and safekeeping could be assured.

Then Gebelein Silversmiths of Boston agreed to loan pieces from their extensive collection of authentic reproductions of Revere table and tea silver for display with the Fine Arts prints in the Périgueux museum. And finally in Rome, New York, the manufacturers of Revereware, the copper-faced kitchenpots and pans which are to be found in many contemporary American kitchens, said they would gladly donate a complete kit of their wares as an example of the durability of Revere's craft and name.

More than once in the course of his negotiations with American participants in the plans, the American Consul marveled at the inspirational powers of Paul Revere. Upon his return to France early in the spring of 1956, the Consul reported his successes to both French and American authorities on the scene, in Bordeaux and in Périgueux. Under the continuing spell of the good Midnight Rider, plans fell into place rapidly. It was decided there would be a Paul Revere Day in Périgueux on—what better day—April 19, 1956—180 years to the day

after the famous *first* ride. It would be sponsored jointly by the City of Périgueux, the American Consulate General in Bordeaux and the Command of the US Army 7851st Unit.

The day would start in the morning with the opening of the exhibit of Reveriana, including the original engravings, at the municipal museum. There would be appropriate speeches by the mayor, the commandant, the distinguished guests from Boston and Consular officials. Then Bortman would present the replica of the Revere bowl to the Mayor, as a gift from the people of Boston to the people of Périgueux. The presentation would take place in the Mayor's office and would of course be followed by the traditional French *vin d'honneur*. A luncheon would be hosted by the US Army camp for all the participants in the gala events. In the afternoon the camp's band would give a concert on the main square of Périgueux for the general public. There would be private Franco-American dinners at night in honor of the Boston visitors, and finally the day would end with a concert of the very latest in phenomena from the New World: rock-and-roll, performed by a number of young worthies from the US Army who had brought the new art form with them to Périgueux.

What is magical, and due of course to the guidance of Paul Revere, is that it all took place exactly as planned. Mark Bortman and Margaret French arrived on schedule, bowl in hand. The engravings arrived framed and ready to hang, as did the other precious Reveriana. The aficionadoes of America's new music at the US Army's 7851st Unit rehearsed themselves to a spit-and-polish finish and gave a rousing rendition of "Blue Suede Shoes" and other rock *lieder* which had respectable Périgord matrons stamping their *sabots* for more. The entire day was an unqualified success.

So much so that it was decided that very evening by officials of Périgueux's City Hall that the one event which no one had thought of should be scheduled as promptly as possible—the rededication of a town square in honor of Paul Revere. The site was selected, and it was agreed that the ceremony should take place at the earliest possible date.

With that, Paul Revere, undoubtedly content that his second ride had been as successful as his first, went back home to rest among the shades of the Granary Burying Ground in Boston.

Paul Revere's second ride ends thus, a tribute to the American hero's memory and inspiration. But there is a curious and unhappy postscript. The square in Périgueux was never renamed in honor of Revere. No one really seems to know why not. American and French officials were transferred in the regular course of events, or were not re-elected. Military personnel were reassigned, the unit was relocated later in the '50s. On the French side politics may have had a role.

The Revere Liberty Bowl is of course on display in the Périgueux Museum, as it has been ever since it arrived in 1956. But there has never been a Paul Revere Square—a sad note for both Americans and Frenchmen, who can take pride in the great man's *second* errand of rescue. Maybe Paul Revere should undertake a *third* ride before the year is out?

Alamar Housing Project

Cuba in the Mid-1970s: One American's Impression

BARRY SKLAR

The United States and Cuba, in the late summer and early fall of 1975, came closer together than perhaps at any time since their 15-year estrangement had begun. Steps taken by both countries, along with pronouncements by leaders of both governments, led to speculation among knowledgeable Latin Americanists in Washington that just over the horizon lay the prospect for a genuine rapprochement between the neighbor antagonists.

In the first nine months of 1975, the United States Government announced the relaxation of the trade embargo on Cuba, restrictions on the travel of Cuban diplomats at the United Nations were liberalized, and the United States voted along with 15 Latin American nations to end the 11-year-old OAS diplomatic and economic ban against Cuba. Early in the year, the Cuban Government returned three accused hijackers to the United States and in August, after a series of communications between Senator Sparkman and Premier Castro, the Cuban Government returned to Southern Airways nearly $2 million in ransom money taken from hijackers of a plane in 1972. Trips to Cuba by various members of Congress in this period reflected congressional interest in the normalization of relations.

While enduring and praying through a violent tropical storm over Jamaica enroute to Cuba in mid-September 1975, I wondered whether or not it was my good fortune to have been invited by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of my visit was to discuss some of the major issues concerning the Congress with regard to the question of the normalization of relations. The same thought entered my mind as I stood on the pavement outside the terminal building of Jose Marti airport at 2 A.M. looking in vain for representatives of the Foreign Ministry who were supposed to meet me. That same thought entered my mind again, less than a week later, as the Argentine Ford in which I was riding headed straight for the center pillar of a bridge going over the main highway between Havana and the city of Matanzas. The subsequent 12-day stay in the Hospital Provincial de Matanzas proved to be somewhat of a boon (albeit painful) because of the insights it provided on certain aspects of Cuban life.

While my primary mission was to hold discussions with foreign ministry officials, it was fortunate that my itinerary included stops at

---

Sklar, a specialist in Latin American Affairs, has been covering Latin America for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, since 1971.

The report of his trip was published in U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations. United States-Cuban Perspectives-1975: Conversations on Major Issues with Cuban Officials. (by Barry Sklar) Committee Print. 94th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., May 4, 1976.

some of the examples of the government activity in the fields of housing, education, and public health. A government's foreign policy, especially that of Cuba, is intricately linked to its domestic policies and programs, and I was anxious to try to grasp the relationship for myself. Therefore, the new housing projects, the proliferation of schools and medical centers, and the thriving fishing port were of particular interest.

I was also quite fortunate in having a good deal of time to be alone during the first part of my trip so I could walk the streets of the Vedado section of Havana, take pictures, and talk to non-official people. The following is not an assessment of life and internal developments in Cuba because that cannot be made on the basis of a month-long trip (especially when 12 of those days were spent in a hospital due to an automobile accident). These are impressions of one American's glimpses of present day Cuba.

My preconceived image of revolutionary Cuba, austere and simple, brimming over with revolutionary symbols, was given a minor jolt as the Ilyushin of Cubana Airlines winged its way north from Kingston to Havana. Of course, I did not really expect to see attendants dressed in olive green guerrilla fatigues but neither did I expect the Cuban stewardesses to be in fashionable dress, heavy makeup, and bouffant hairstyles similar to their counterparts on other international airlines. The import of this seemingly frivolous observation became evident to me later in my trip when considered along with other simple observations, such as the tuxedoed maitres d' and the ostentatious decor of the better restaurants. Cuba wants to be known as a revolutionary nation but it also wants to be known and accepted as a "civilized" nation and strives to offer the amenities that the term suggests.

Politically and economically, Cuba has come of age as a nation in the sense that the revolution has become institutionalized and less dependent on the caudillistic, overly personalistic direction of Fidel Castro, although Fidel is firmly in control of the Party and the military. As evidence of this, Cuba's first socialist constitution

Political billboard in Havana

was discussed in the important First Party Congress meeting in Havana in December 1975, overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum on February 15, 1976, and placed into effect on February 24.

Cuba's maturity as a nation is vividly reflected in the confident words and manner of its people. This confidence is expressed by people from different sectors of Cuban life. Prior to the automobile accident, my major contact was with mid-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies. These people, especially those who served as my guides, were young, hard-working public servants. Many of those with whom I came in contact ranged in age from the late 20s to the late 30s and seemed very secure and knowledgeable in their work. At one time the Cubans felt the need to "sell" the Revolution to outsiders, perhaps to convince themselves that they were going to make it. Now they have such confidence in themselves as well as in their government that they do not go out of their way to talk about their accomplishments. Their method is usually to show the visitor the area of interest, whether it be the Alamar housing project or the fishing port of Havana and allow the points to be made on their own merit.

As an accident victim in Matanzas Province, from a selfish point of view I was especially happy to see the same confidence expressed by the doctors in the orthopedic section of the hospital. They too, for the most part, were very young, Cuban-trained, and extremely proud of the Cuban public health system which was virtually built from scratch after the flight of most of Cuba's doctors after the Revolution. Not only were the doctors confident of their medical skills but they were also self-assured about the Cuban political system. My hospital room became the center for late night/early morning political marathons, characterized by good-natured discussion of the systems of the United States and Cuba.

Some of the patients in the hospital, most of them *campesinos* from the areas surrounding the city of Matanzas, as well as some of the people that I met in the hotel and on the streets of Havana expressed the same confidence in the Cuban system. I also spoke to some who did not like or agree with what was going on for various political and economic reasons. On the surface, it seems that many Cubans have accepted the new system now functioning in the nation and many of them feel that the system and the country will endure for a long time to come.

In the context of international politics, the confidence expressed by the young people has significance for the present as well as for the long-range future. The key pillar of support for the Cuban system is the generation of people who have been educated and fostered by the Revolution. A significant percentage of the youthful Cuban population (37 percent under 15 years, 57 percent between 15 and 64, and only six percent over 65) know no other way. These are the people with whom the nations of the world will be dealing in the future.

Cuba is a nation of highly politicized people. The Government, through the ambitious educational system, the mass organizations such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the Union of Communist Youth (UJC), the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), and the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), the communications media, and the beautiful illustrative posters and billboards, has effectively instilled the teachings and ideology of the Cuban Revolution. All segments of society are well-versed in Cuban revolutionary thought. I listened with amazement as a *campesino* in the hospital quoted Fidel to make a point and another identified the recorded voice of Che Guevara and told the

circumstances behind the statement, soon confirmed by the radio commentator.

An exhibit commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, housed on the busy thoroughfare, La Rampa, was a very popular spot for Cubans, young and old, strolling in Vedado on a Saturday night. I try to draw a parallel by imagining an exhibit in the United States on health care and community clean-up campaigns, along with documents recording the establishment of the sponsoring agency, being frequented by hundreds of interested people as they stroll by its prime 16th and K location on a Saturday night. It is a parallel that defies imagining.

I react similarly to the book display in the gift shop at the hotel in Varadero Beach which, for the most part, was comprised of political material by authors such as Fidel, Che, and Lenin, and some children's books on the exploits of the guerrilla fighters in the struggle against Batista. As Americans buy books to read while taking the sun, the Cubans were buying these political works to pass the time on the beach. Politics and ideology have become an intricate part of the Cuban society. The situations and circumstances, of course, are different, but the fact that the Cuban people are drawn to these exhibits and purchase these works illustrates the political tone that pervades Cuban life.

From this, one might deduce that the Cuban people by definition would be anti-United States, realizing that they can cite chapter and verse about the problems that their country has had with the United States, and because many of the hardships and inconveniences they still experience are attributed to policies of the United States such as the embargo (*el bloqueo*—the blockade). On the contrary. The Cubans make a very clear distinction between the policies of the Government of the United States and its people. This point was reinforced by my Cuban experience which went beyond the contacts with "official" Cubans, and included discussions with Havana school children, patients and personnel in the hospital, young army recruits in Havana, hotel workers,

Another political billboard in Matanzas

and vacationers in Varadero. There was never any animosity expressed. One evening in the hospital, a group of people gathered around my bed to chat and a woman stopped, curious to know what was happening. When she was told that an American was the center of attraction, she threw up her hands and shrieked in mock horror to the delight of her compatriots. It was told to me by a very serious and politically keen official that Americans would always be well-treated but the Cuban exile (returning to Cuba—if that day ever comes) would never be accorded the same treatment.

After 15 years of isolation, there is still evident a United States presence, old and new, in Havana. The old is represented by the former capitol building, modeled after the US capitol; the prerevolutionary Fords and Chevrolets, seemingly held together with chewing gum and rubber bands and a lot of Cuban ingenuity; and the old-fashioned marble top soda fountains, which I thought had disappeared into oblivion long ago, still in wide use. The new US presence is heard on the radio in the form of rock music from Miami and news broadcasts picked up on good receivers. In my hotel room overlooking the Malecon, I awoke to the report of the traffic helicopter over Biscayne Bay and one afternoon listened to the Redskins-Giants game. Some of the Cuban popular music has a rock beat to it and there were times, for instance, during the playing of an Eydie Gorme record in Spanish, that I wasn't sure if I were tuned in to Miami or Havana. One Cuban radio program is introduced by a recording of an announcer, speaking in English, in the style of soul music personalities in the United States. One disgruntled young Cuban with whom I spoke on the street said his main gripes against the Government were that he was not able to see American rock groups and unable to buy fancier clothes and denims. His favorite radio station was a rock station in Miami.

The Soviet influence, of course, is much more concrete. Since 1968, the Soviets have given massive economic support and the Cubans are well aware that it was the Russians who saved the nation in the days when the full effects of the US embargo were being felt. Influence of the Soviets in the political system is seen in Cuba's draft constitution with the "National Assembly of People's Power" similar to the Supreme Soviet, the Council of State resembling the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the distinction made in the Cuban constitution between state and government bodies, similar to the Soviet system.

The Soviet presence, however, is not that visible and if one could not identify types of trucks and jeeps, and did not notice the heavy Russian ship traffic in the port, one might wonder about the intensity of Soviet influence in Cuba. Russian presence became an inside joke with my guides as I constantly asked where all the Russians were. A few were seen in the lobby of the Hotel Nacional and in the streets near the hotel. Much more visible were Canadians, Japanese, Mexicans, and Argentinians. Toward the end of my stay, one of my guides laughingly remarked, "Tomorrow you will see your Russians." Early the next morning we drove to the fishing port where the Russians have been instrumental in helping the Cubans develop a most successful and lucrative fishing fleet and industry. It wasn't early enough, however, as I discovered that the Russians apparently have not been able to grasp the concept of "Hora Cubana" and were not available to brief one who arrived 15 minutes too late.

The Russian influence is there, but it clearly has not overtaken Cuban life. The repressive atmosphere and life-style which one usually associates with Communist societies of the Soviet Union and East Europe are not evident in today's Cuba.

There is freedom of religion, for instance, but it is religion within the confines of Cuba's Communist system. From discussions with people after a worship service, a lay religious leader, and government officials, it seems that as long as the practice of religion does not involve criticism of the government there are no problems. The problems of religion in Cuba, however, lie in Marxist dogma which plagues religious organizations in most Communist countries. Organized religion is considered out of the mainstream by official Cubans who explain that most people, especially the young, choose to stay away from it. Highly organized aspects of Cuban life, such as activities sponsored by the mass organizations, peer group pressure, and the fact that religious involvement precludes one from rising in the party are reasons why it is mainly the old who are seen at church and synagogue services.

One of the first things that strikes a foreign visitor about Havana, other than noting that the miniskirt is very much in vogue, is that there are hardly any uniformed police or military visible in the streets. It was after a few days in Havana that I first noticed a traffic policeman. The only military visible were guards for the embassies and young recruits in fatigues during their off duty hours.

Contrary to some journalistic accounts, Havana and its people are far from dull and somber. On one particular Saturday evening, Havana was alive with people enjoying the many cafes and restaurants. To be sure, the clothes purchased with ration coupons are much simpler than they would be in a capitalist economy with unlimited imports from abroad, but everybody is clothed and one does not see barefoot children or beggars in Havana. Food is rationed but everyone has enough to eat.

The developing economy and the government effort to obtain employment for all have put virtually the entire adult population into the workforce. According to the 1970 census, only 0.6 percent of the economically active population over 15 was unemployed. Cuban sources today say that unemployment has been totally eradicated. One sees some make-work projects being performed and cases where several people are employed in positions which could be handled by one or two people, but the system seems to have its benefits in total employment, earned salaries, and self respect.

With everyone earning a salary, a fixed amount spent each month on food, clothing, and rent, Cubans have substantial spending money. This in part explains the long lines outside restaurants, with Cubans from all sectors of society frequenting the most expensive establishments in town. Prices for luxury goods are very high and these are usually allocated to those deserving a material reward for exceptional work or other accomplishment.

"The political prisoner problem is also acknowledged but officials contend that the bulk of them are old line Batistianos who refuse to be rehabilitated."

Cubans acknowledge, in varying degrees, that their political system is restrictive, that it does not allow freedom of speech and dissent as we know it, nor is there freedom of the press. They contend that there is political freedom but it takes place within the Party structure and the mass organizations of the people. The popular power system, first tried in Matanzas Province and now extended to the newly established 14 administrative divisions of Cuba, is looked to as an opportunity for more grass roots representation.

The political prisoner problem is also acknowledged but officials contend that the bulk of them are old line Batistianos who refuse to be rehabilitated because they are holding out for the day when the Castro government will be overthrown. Official Cubans adamantly insist that they will never permit international investigation of the prisoner issue.

Cuban officials argue that their system is the proper one for their country in its stage of development and that it has enabled the government to benefit more Cubans than at any time in the history of the nation. The educational system has benefited the young and old in the city and country, the public health system which provides free medical care to the entire population has facilities in practically every town, and the emphasis on building new housing to alleviate the crowded conditions in the cities and to modernize the life style of the *campesino* are offered as examples to illustrate the point.

To be sure, as many journalists have pointed out, the buildings of old Havana are deteriorating as are the once fashionable homes of Miramar, but to judge Cuba from that image is to misread Cuban history. It was a basic tenet of the Cuban Government in the early days of power to place emphasis on programs in the rural areas at the expense of the larger cities. For those Americans who long to see the glorious examples of Spanish colonial architecture in old Havana, the improvement of relations with Cuba should be of prime interest. Several officials indicated that plans are to level most of the old city to make room for much needed warehouses and apartment buildings.

Life in Cuba in the mid-1970s must be considered in the context of a complex set of circumstances. Cuban society does not fit the stereotype of a Communist state, although there is no doubt about its politics. The blend of Latin and African culture in the Caribbean setting gives Cuba a distinctive flavor of its own. The flavor seems strong enough to endure pressures from within and without for a long time to come.

The prospects for a closer relationship in the near future seem dimmed by Cuban activity in Angola and the presidential election in the United States, among other factors. However, when and if the day comes, the American visitor should memorize one handy phrase which should be said emphatically at least every five minutes to the Cuban driver: *"Despacio, por favor"* (Slow down, please).

"The Constitution is now the bond of our union,
the shield of our defence and the source of our prosperity."
— Gouverneur Morris

. . . to support and defend the Constitution . . .

THOMAS D. BOYATT

"I do solemnly swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . ." How often has each of us repeated these words whose meaning and very cadence express what our Bicentennial celebrates? How seldom has any of us pondered what this oath requires of us?

In the fall of 1975 the House Select Committee's investigation of the Cyprus crisis caused me to think very seriously indeed about our oath of office. In the context of executive-legislative conflict I had to decide what the oath meant to me and to take responsibility for the resulting conduct before Congress, colleagues and the Secretary. I would like to share this maturing experience, which many more will face in the years ahead, and to explain the genesis of one Foreign Service officer's hard-won views on ethical conduct of Foreign Service professionals.

The issues involved are controversial and positions strongly held. I discovered no stone-chiseled verities but rather found a need for a Service-wide debate and the development of some consensus on norms of conduct needed to confront new realities and new problems. I hope the discussion that follows will contribute to the debate.

Tom Boyatt, DCM in Santiago and former President of AFSA, has been a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. *Tom writes, "The country is beautiful, the Chilenos as simpatico as ever, and the problems are stimulating." AFSA members will remember the many accomplishments of the Association in employee benefits and safeguards under Tom's stewardship.*

Old Rules . . .

The three decades from World War II through mid-Vietnam encompass virtually the entire careers of the great bulk of FSOs. This was also a very special era for US foreign policy. The traumatic impact of World War II and the cold war upon a previously isolated citizenry, the simple identification of "free world" friend from Communist foe, and the availability of vast resources which could be channeled to foreign affairs without apparent domestic cost encouraged a globally interventionist foreign policy based upon a broad national consensus. Under the umbrella of a bipartisanship that reflected this consensus Congress ceased to employ its constitutional tools to check and to balance. Both parties and both Houses became servitors, at least in foreign affairs, of the Imperial Presidency. The national security nexus, whether represented by the brothers Dulles or by the Kennedy/Johnson establishment gentlemen-in-residence, became the final—indeed the only—arbiter of the national weal. The President's men went about their foreign policy business in pursuit of agreed goals without worry that the Congress would use advice and consent, oversight, authorization or appropriations to shape foreign affairs.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946, coinciding in time with this unique era for foreign policy, created a special relationship between the Service and both the President and the Congress. Given the realities of national consensus, bipartisanship and Congressional abdication in foreign affairs, the Foreign Service's links to the President soon developed into a special relationship while our links with Congress atrophied. In response to the conditions of the '40s, '50s and '60s an unwritten code of conduct for FSOs quickly developed. The code incorporated absolute loyalty to the hierarchial executive (President, Secretary of State, etc.,), limited internal debate, and no external debate. Issues were discussed with greater or lesser openness within the Executive Branch, and a monolithic facade was presented to the public, the press and the Congress. Dissent on any issue became insubordination at best and treason at worst; most FSOs thought McCarthy demonstrated the costs of even internal dissent. Soon conformity, caution, more or less slavish obedience within the system and total isolation from outside elements (particularly the Congress and the people) were the hallmarks of the prevailing code of conduct.

My description of the environment in which our Foreign Service existed for almost two generations is heroically simplified and may be overdrawn. But I think the description is essentially accurate. And this environment and its code of conduct prevailed during the formative years of the current leadership of the Foreign Service.

New Game . . .

Vietnam and Watergate, causes and symbols of the fundamental changes in the domestic environment, also marked the end of a na-

tional consensus on foreign policy directions. Instead, there is a turbulent, often acrimonious, debate on foreign policy goals and procedures. There is no longer bipartisanship on foreign policy; instead, the Republicans and Democrats vie between and among themselves on major and minor issues. Congress is no longer acquiescent; instead it is reasserting itself and attempting to expand its influence on foreign policy by using its constitutional prerogatives of oversight, control of the purse strings and even advice and consent. The Foreign Service is no longer a closed and cautious institution. Instead its people have ever more contact with the public and increasingly assert their right, indeed their responsibility, to present independent views.

The Congressional dimension is the most important aspect of the radically changed foreign policy-making environment. *Journal* readers would do well to review Robert Pastor's excellent article in the December 1975 *FSJ* "Coping with Congress's Foreign Policy." Dr. Pastor perceptively analyzes the significance of "a Congress intent on not only influencing foreign policy, but on making it." The examples of Congress's new assertiveness range from the use of authorizations and appropriations bills for policy leverage to the passage of laws which restrict or narrowly direct the Executive, such as the Case Amendments or the Eagleton Amendment. Former Congressional Assistant Secretary Bob McCloskey has made the point many times that the era of a friendly Congressional committee chairman serving up waist-high fastballs for Ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries to belt out of the park has definitely passed. Congressman Lee Hamilton presided over summer-long hearings on "The Role of Congress in the Formulation of Foreign Policy." Senator Humphrey (very possibly the next Senate Majority Leader) appeared before the Hamilton Sub-Committee to urge his Congressional colleagues to sustain their new assertive role in foreign policy regardless of whether a Republican or Democrat enters the White House in January 1977. Both Presidential candidates call for more openness and Congressional consultation in the foreign policy process. There is simply no room for doubt. The rules of the policy process game have changed dramatically and fundamentally. The question for all of us now is should a Foreign Service ethical code based on total loyalty within the Executive Branch and external silence be changed to conform to new realities? And if so, how?

The Starting Point for Change—The Constitution

My first lesson in the disparities between old rules and new realities occurred at a hastily called meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger last October. Larry began the first of several encounters by saying, "The Pike Committee wants you, but they can't have you." From the newspapers I knew that the Pike and Church Committees planned investigations of United States intelligence failures and, by extension, of foreign policy failures. I had heard that the Pike Committee would concentrate on the "3 C's": Cyprus, Chile and Cambodia. It had not occurred to me that the investigators would go beyond the usual stream of agency heads, Assistant Secretaries and Washington lawyers and reach down to the working level. Larry and I agreed to seek legal advice on proper action in case I was subpoenaed and then to meet again.

That evening, F. Allen (Tex) Harris* and I discussed the situation at length. The conflict between obedience to superiors in the Executive Branch and responsiveness to the Congress, and perhaps the law, became immediately apparent. Suppose I was ordered not to appear before the Congress and was then subpoenaed by the Pike Committee? In the days of consensus and bipartisanship we in the Foreign Service had merely to follow the orders (or acquiesce in the views) of the President's most immediate extension—the Secretary, the Ambassador, the Counselor, or whomever. As long as this system was not challenged by the Congress, absolute obedience within the Executive satisfied institutional demands and individual consciences. My problem was very different: how to respond to conflicting demands by the Executive and Legislative Branches. We turned first to the Constitution.

To begin with, by our oath of office we solemnly swear upon entering the Service to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic," and affirm that we "will bear true faith and allegiance to the same . . ." The Foreign Service officer does not swear that he will support and defend the President or that he will bear true faith and allegiance to the Secretary of State or to any other official or person. Here was the vitally important first principle. Foreign Service officers owe allegiance to neither individuals nor offices, but to the Constitution and the system of laws established under it. The language of our oath was carefully chosen in the full spirit of the American independence movement. I suspect the drafters shared Harold Ickes's acerbic view that the President (and by extension other officers of the Executive Branch) "is neither an absolute monarch nor a descendant of a putative sun-goddess." The point is the Constitution has first claim on our loyalties.

Reliance on the Constitution as the basis for a Foreign Service officer's code of ethics does not indicate specific courses of action. The Constitution, in Professor Corwin's oft-quoted phrase is "an invitation to the Congress and the Executive to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." The Foreign Service professional ready to support the Constitution must still determine what should be rendered unto Caesar and what unto the Senate. I faced the same problem with the Pike Committee.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 calls upon FSOs to carry out the lawful orders of the President and the Secretary. Legal advice, political analysis and more than a little soul-searching led me to the judgment that the Secretary could not legally order a Foreign Service officer to refrain from responding to a summons—much less a subpoena

**I would like to record publicly my thanks to my lawyer, "Tex" Harris, for his counsel throughout this affair. He researched the law, attended dozens of meetings in the Department and accompanied me to several sessions before the Committee all for the princely sum of one dinner at a Basque restaurant.*

—by the Congress of the United States to appear before it. Apparently the State Department came to the same conclusion because the next morning Larry Eagleburger informed me that the Department was prepared to produce me as a witness before the Pike Committee.

Congressional Access and Accountability of Foreign Service Professionals

My impending testimony before the Pike Committee generated heated discussion within and without the Foreign Service. Retired FSO and Senate staffer, David McKillop, recounts in an article in the May *Foreign Affairs Newsletter* the outraged reaction of a senior FSO to the view that working-level officers in the State Department should be allowed to testify before the Congress. This FSO echoed the position of the Secretary, senior levels of the State Department, AFSA, 200 petitioning Foreign Service colleagues, *The New York Times*, and most columnists commenting on the matter. All contended that Congressional access to working-level professionals would rekindle McCarthyism and stifle freedom of expression within the Foreign Service. In spite of my respect for the individuals holding this view, and particularly for the 200 colleagues who petitioned the Secretary under the leadership of an old and valued friend, I believe they are very mistaken.

The McCarthyism charge was simply not born out by events. I appeared before the Pike Committee and staff under oath six or eight times. Never was there any activity by any person on or connected with the Committee that could even remotely be construed as an effort to "get" me, the Foreign Service, or anyone. US policy regarding Cyprus appeared to have alienated all three parties in a tri-partite dispute and to have damaged our position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Pike Committee was trying to find out what happened in Cyprus and why. How else could they perform an oversight function?

The argument that Congressional appearances by working level officials—whether McCarthyesque or not—will inhibit free expression within the State Department likewise cannot be sustained. Congress does not control Foreign Service careers. It is the State Department hierarchy which writes efficiency reports, makes or withholds promotions, passes out assignments and in general controls the life of its employees. If retaliation is the problem, the Executive Branch is much more to be feared than the Legislative. Even in McCarthy's heyday, while it was the Senator who ranted and raved, the State Department established the security boards, made the investigations and wrecked the careers.*

"A hidden record invites this sort of criticism and tempts an administration to remain silent while the careerists 'take the rap.'"

Moreover, the knowledge that the Congress under appropriate safeguards had access to testimony by officers at all levels will encourage rather than inhibit dissent. The officer who has had the courage to express dissent against prevailing orthodoxy within the Executive Branch, which can harm him, will not be concerned that the Congress, which cannot hurt him, also has access to his views. On the contrary, knowledge of real Congressional oversight will encourage working-level officers to express dissenting views because such views will necessarily be taken more seriously and will be more likely to influence policy. By the same token, "policy level" officers of the Department will treat dissenting views with a great deal more respect if they know that they may eventually be called on to explain why such dissenting views were dismissed.

The problems predicted to occur with Congressional access to the career Foreign Service just never materialized. On the positive side of the ledger there are several important reasons why FSOs should be accountable to the Congress and ultimately the people for their actions and views:

- The Congress cannot conduct its constitutionally mandated oversight function without access to Executive Branch testimony and documents. Without real oversight the system of checks and balances does not function well.
- If working-level officials are "protected" by imposed silence, then the career Foreign Service can always be blamed (as it was in the case of China) for what goes wrong in international affairs. An open record would have shown clearly who really "lost" China.

In my own situation a savvy Washington reporter responded to Secretary Kissinger's assertion that the bureaucracy must be "protected" from Congress by asking in print, "Why? So they (the career professionals) can go on making mistakes at the expense of the American people?" A hidden record invites this sort of criticism of the Foreign Service and tempts an administration to remain silent while the careerists "take the rap."

- The Congress and the American people, as well as the President, must *know* they are well served by the Foreign Service if we are to participate in the policy process rather than provide administrative support for those who make and implement US foreign policy. As part of a policy role for FSOs we must be accountable for our actions and views before competent Congressional committees in confidential matters and before the people on matters proper for public discussion. As a friend of mine put it, "If we want to be treated like big boys, we have to act like big boys."

**While Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Eagleburger were arguing for the need to protect the career Foreign Service from the Congress, AFSA was trying to secure passage of a legislative grievance system for the Foreign Service. The point was made to Larry that the Secretary could hardly stand four square against abuses of the career Foreign Service by the Legislative Branch without supporting with equal vigor measures in law to prevent similar abuses by the Executive Branch. The message was not lost and to their credit both Mr. Eagleburger and Secretary Kissinger supported grievance legislation. Their support convinced key House Committee members, who had killed three previous Foreign Service Grievance Bills passed by the Senate, to vote favorably in 1975.*

- In many cases only working-level officials have the in-depth knowledge necessary to testify on specific situations. The Pike Committee decided to analyze Cyprus as a case study, and then chose to summon for testimony an FSO who had spent three years on Cyprus, who spoke Greek, who knew the *dramatis personae* personally, and who had spent the last three years as Director of Cypriot Affairs. The Committee's action in the circumstances was logical.
- Finally, it is sad but true that "policy-level" officials have little credibility with Congress. The first time I went before the Pike Committee I accompanied two Assistant Secretaries. When one requested that the Committee go into Executive Session, the Chairman cleared the room of everyone but myself with a comment to the effect that policy-level officials had been coming to the Hill and lying for 20 years. I don't accept that. Nevertheless, Congressional skepticism about testimony from those who must justify past actions and who owe their present and future positions to the President and the Secretary is understandable. It is particularly understandable when one remembers how often in recent years the Congress was told by policy-level officials that peace was just around the corner in Vietnam and that democracy was just around the corner in the Greece of the Colonels. Congress is looking for someone to "tell it like it is" and is justified in summoning career officials for this purpose.

Lawful Orders and Restricted Testimony

Granting Congressional access to career officials and the accountability of such officials to Congress, the question still remains as to what subjects are proper for an FSO to address in Congressional testimony. This same question faced both the Department's administrative hierarchy and myself with respect to what I could say to the Pike Committee.

Gordon B. Baldwin argues convincingly in the *1976 Wisconsin Law Review* that both Constitution and case law give the Secretary a "foreign affairs advice privilege" which empowers him legally to withhold the identity of State Department employees offering controversial criticism of US foreign policy and highly sensitive information relating to foreign governments. The courts in all probability will never test Dr. Baldwin's view. As soon became apparent, in issues involving the separation of powers both Branches prefer lecturing to litigation, rhetoric to resolution. Neither the President nor the Congress can afford to go all the way in the courts on such issues because the costs of losing are too devastating. Therefore, the question of Congressional oversight vs. Executive confidentiality is settled not by law but by the varying political haul and tug between the two Branches.

Regarding the Pike Committee, the Department over a period of weeks took and then abandoned several positions: First, I was ordered not to address any classified matters; then I was allowed to deal with classified subjects in Executive Session but only as they related to facts and not analysis and policy; then I was ordered to respond to every question asked me except those relating to policy advice. At each stage I was summoned to the Hill and questioned. On each occasion I presented the Department's view because the Secretary's guidelines regarding Congressional testimony constituted a lawful order as outlined by the Foreign Service Act. In addition, proceeding in this fashion forced the two Branches to fight the issue out directly and not through the career Service. Following each session a political/public relations battle ensued between the Executive and Legislative Branches as each sought broad public acceptance of its view. These clashes illustrated the real world resolution of constitutional differences through political struggles. As a result of the confrontations the Department's position progressively softened concerning the scope of my testimony. At my last session before the Pike Committee I was asked if I had submitted a dissent memorandum on the Cyprus issue. I answered truthfully that I had. The Committee then shifted to an effort to obtain the Boyatt Memorandum including a threat to subpoena it.

The Department, faced with a subpoena battle and the charge of a cover-up, finally agreed to send the entire Memorandum to the Committee but to intersperse comments and policy recommendations from other officials. This compromise was sensible and serviceable: Chairman Pike obtained a complete record of facts, analyses and policy recommendations. He was in a position to make an informed judgment as to whether there had been intelligence and policy failures before, during and after the Cyprus crisis. Secretary Kissinger protected the position that specific policy recommendations should not be identified with specific individuals. In a situation of Executive-Legislative conflict the career Foreign Service met the demands of both Branches of government without compromising professional standards.

Conclusion

In the June Department of State *Newsletter*, Director General Carol Laise and other colleagues eloquently discuss the Foreign Service's search for a new identity and mission. Never has the Service been better positioned for such a quest. The Foreign Service has performed its tasks with great dedication and the public has often been reminded of this by the death in action of all too many colleagues. Both Presidential candidates are calling for more openness and professionalism in the foreign policy process; and recent campaign laws have made the politicization of the Foreign Service more difficult. What better occasion than the Republic's Bicentennial to develop a new sense of identity and mission, and to elaborate a new code of ethical conduct. I would argue that such a code should provide for Congressional access to career professionals and accountability by us for our views and actions. Practical guidelines for testimony by careerists is the prerogative of the Executive and will be settled on a case-by-case basis via Professor Corwin's invitation to struggle. These are appropriate matters for debate. It seems to me beyond debate, however, that a Foreign Service ethical code should flow from that Constitution which we are sworn to support and defend.

An excerpt from the first book by a
top-level CIA official with operational experience.

U.S. Foreign Intelligence, 1939-1941

RAY S. CLINE

One accidental reason that the war in Europe and its alarming portents for the whole world impinged at all on the consciousness of Americans was that the end of the 1930s was the age of radio. This period saw the beginning of the first dramatic international news "roundups" ever to reach the ears of citizens of the United States direct from Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Paris, and London. The voice of Hitler screaming about Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland at Nuremberg in September 1938 came live across the airwaves while translated passages of the speech were broadcast and H. V. Kaltenborn analyzed their meaning for Europe's future. Edward R. Murrow and William L. Shirer quickly became household names in the United States, commanding enormous listening audiences. American broadcast news came of age. President Roosevelt and most officials in Washington got most of their up-to-date information about foreign crises from this source or, a day or two later, from the foreign correspondents of the press.

These open source news items, plus the knowledge of foreign countries accumulated by the relatively small number of American university scholars, businessmen, missionaries, and enterprising tourists who traveled abroad constituted a large part of the information possessed by the citizenry of the United States and their officials in Washington. Beyond this, in the category of open sources, although not available to every citizen, was the reporting of the Foreign Service.

Some brilliant minds were in the State Department, as we later discovered when George F. Kennan, Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen, and Llewellyn E. Thompson educated a generation of officials on the Soviet Union in the postwar era. What was in these minds was a long way from percolating to the consciousness at the top of government in the prewar period, however, and courtly Cordell Hull, Roosevelt's choice as Secretary of State because of his qualifications as a popular politician from a Southern state, was able to contribute very little to the knowledge of foreign affairs needed by Roosevelt.

Everyone in Washington claimed to be an expert on Europe—as is still true today—so no one relied much on the Foreign Service for in-

Excerpt from Chapter I of Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, *by Ray S. Cline, to be published November 30, 1976 by Acropolis Books, Ltd., Washington, D.C. 20009.*

Dr. Cline served as CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and as State's Director of Intelligence and Research. He is now Executive Director of CSIS, Georgetown University.

terpretation of the crucial events unfolding there. Hull concentrated mainly on Japan, where he had an exceptionally able Ambassador, Joseph Grew, but the Ambassador had never had passed on to him in Washington the benefit of the astonishing glimpses into the Japanese mind afforded by intercepted messages, and it is far from clear that Hull fully grasped the import of the messages shown him from time to time. There was no intelligence evaluation staff in the State Department to insure the Secretary was well informed and to tie together the best of Embassy reporting with the best of data from the military intelligence agencies.

Foreign Broadcasts

In February 1941 an intelligence unit was created for collecting open source data of a particularly rewarding kind. This intelligence unit proved so useful in providing information to government officials who covered foreign affairs that it has been in operation ever since.

The Federal Communications Commission, at the suggestion of the State Department, established a Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service to record broadcasts of foreign origin, translate speeches and news items, and report the important findings to other agencies. Being up-to-date and reliably filled in on the details of statements by foreign political and military leaders was obviously sensible for US diplomats, policy planners, and military staffs. Thus was born the intelligence service that is indispensable to Foreign Service officers and ambassadors—and even to the American press—as a reference file. Its name was settled upon later as the "Foreign Broadcast Information Service" (FBIS) and it eventually ended up as a "service of common concern" managed by CIA. Its reports, its analytical summaries, and its files are still invaluable.

Liaison was quickly established with a similar monitoring service for Europe that operated under the British Broadcasting Corporation for the benefit of the government in London. Editors, translators, and information analysts began exchanging data and skills with the net result that the British record of broadcasts from Europe was exchanged for the US take on other parts of the world. Throughout the war and for the next three decades, this unique information service covered a worldwide beat, copying and translating hundreds of thousands of words daily and transmitting the product electronically for prompt availability wherever needed in Great Britain, the United States, and their outposts overseas. It is a bread-and-butter service now taken for granted by intelligence officers and policy officials alike, but it is interesting that as early as 1941 an open source like radio broadcasting was recognized as a legitimate intelligence source for government along with diplomatic and military reporting and cryptanalysis. Government officials recognized that they needed this service of common concern. In a sense the FBIS was the first truly "central" element in a structure that cried out for better coordination of activities, collation of data, and systematic analysis.

"There was no secret agent intelligence network at the time, since espionage had never been seriously conducted by the United States except in time of war."

State Diplomatic Reporting

The State Department throughout the prewar years relied mainly for its appreciation of foreign events on reporting from the embassies it maintained in every major capitol abroad, staffed by American Foreign Service officers and—as an assist to the Army and Navy—military attaches. The numbers were not large, however, and foreign situation reporting was only one, and not necessarily the best rewarded of the many duties of embassy officers—observing diplomatic protocol, socializing with other diplomats, and attending to the trivia of commercial and consular relations. There was no secret agent intelligence network at the time, since espionage had never been seriously conducted by the United States except in time of war.

In 1939 the entire State Department in Washington had only about 1,000 people working in it, of which about half were administrative. Considerably fewer served abroad. In Washington, as overseas, State had no separate intelligence organization or activity as such prior to the end of the war in 1945. Secretary Hull, in general, thought of his organization as a "Department of Peace" and left plans and preparations for meeting the military thrusts of the time to the Department of War, which he correctly anticipated would run things if hostilities broke out.

In November 1940 State set up a new unit labeled functionally as an "intelligence" section under the name "Division of Foreign Activity Correlation." It was small—total personnel numbered 18 in 1943—and it concentrated on extracting information about foreigners from the Passport and Visa units and interviewing foreign political leaders and foreign-born citizens visiting the Department. As Dean Acheson, an Assistant Secretary of State in 1941, later said, the State Department as a whole was "unequipped" for appraisals of foreign capabilities and intentions based on painstaking correlation of intelligence. In fact, he observed, the Foreign Service establishment collected intelligence abroad with the same techniques John Quincy Adams used in Russia or Benjamin Franklin in France, only differing in employing the typewriter and telegraph to transmit reports. What was reported was reviewed only by desk and supervisory officers in the line of command, not by special intelligence analysts. It was an amateurish system depending almost exclusively on the experience and intuitions of the Foreign Service officers abroad and those at senior levels in the Department. It was oblivious to claims of a special professional skill inherent in intelligence work. Sherman Kent, an outstanding intelligence analyst and historian of intelligence doctrines, in his great book written after the war, *Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy,* stressed that the task of selecting and analyzing strategic evidence relating to issues of peace

and war is "a specialty of the very highest order" quite different from line duty in either the diplomatic or military service. He rightly considered both State and the military departments hopelessly unprepared to carry out strategic intelligence analysis. If this was true in 1946 when Kent was making his observations, one can imagine what the situation was like in 1941.

Army and Navy: Military Collection and Evaluation

Except for the brilliance of their cryptanalytic work on Japanese diplomatic and military communications, the War Department, which then contained the Army Air Force and the Navy Department, were almost as inept as the State Department in dealing with foreign intelligence. They were better off only in the formal sense that they had specific units for collating and analyzing information from attaches abroad and from their intercept stations. The War Department's Military Intelligence Division (G-2) had 22 officers when war broke out in 1939. They had reached a total of nearly 500 men in Washington in December of 1941. At this rate of expansion, it was obvious few officers had any real intelligence experience.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles, who had become Chief of Intelligence in May 1940 after serving as Military Attache in London, testified at the Pearl Harbor inquiry that his unit was almost wholly preoccupied with "anti-subversive precautions," i.e., counterintelligence measures to protect United States Army facilities against sabotage. He also controlled the military attaches abroad, of which there were 60 by 1940. But the Army had no paid agents abroad and little access to information beyond local gossip picked up, as General George C. Marshall later said, over after-dinner coffee cups.

The Navy was perhaps just a bit more sophisticated about the need for foreign intelligence, since its ships visited many ports across the seas, but it was equally unprepared structurally and intellectually for dealing with the tasks at hand. In mid-1940 the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was still in a state of disorganization due to the rapid rotation of officers at a time when the pressure on officers in the Navy was to get assigned to sea duty. As late as mid-1941 ONI had only 150 officers and civilian analysts in Washington, most of whom were new to the job. Captain T. S. Wilkinson, the third officer to head ONI in 1941 alone, took over on October 15th—with virtually no previous intelligence experience.

Like General Miles, Wilkinson felt his Domestic Branch for counterintelligence and prevention of subversion or sabotage was critically important. His Foreign Branch collected basic information on foreign countries, especially navies, but ONI was expressly forbidden in 1941 to undertake any comprehensive "evaluation" of the significance of the reports. This function was reserved for the more prestigious War Plans Division of the Navy Department, headed by the higher ranking and more imperious Rear Admiral R. K. Turner.

The Navy was better represented abroad than the Army, having in the 1940-1941 period about 130 officers posted as attaches and observers in foreign capitals and at principal foreign ports. The information collected was restricted mainly, however, to technical data about ports and navies and was not much more helpful in divining foreign plans and intentions than was that collected by the Army or State Department personnel abroad.

Most of what ONI got from all sources went straight to Admiral Turner who recast it as he saw it in relation to war plans to send to fleet units. He was aided in this process by snippets of information from Embassy reporting passed along through Captain R. E. Schuirmann, the Navy's perceptive special liaison officer with access at the senior working level in the State Department. The State Department did not divulge US policy views or negotiating positions or outgoing diplomatic messages to the Navy, or to the War Department, any more than the Navy and War Department confided in the State Department details of their strategic war plans. Policymakers, like intelligence officers, worked in bureaucratic compartments largely unaware of what was going on in any area other than their own.

This structure of foreign information agencies working in separate parts of the Washington forest and doing their poor best to comprehend what was going on abroad constituted the foreign intelligence establishment of the day. In view of the general fragmentation of decision-making, the absence of a common data base and the lack of any centralized evaluation of foreign events, frustration with the system expressed at the time by President Roosevelt, and later remarked on by General Marshall, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Dean Acheson, is entirely understandable.

Intercepts: MAGIC

The one bright spot in the whole chaotic picture of prewar intelligence was in the contribution made to policy officials by a breakthrough in intercepting and reading Japanese foreign diplomatic and military messages sent, mostly by radio, to other capitals or naval units at sea. Cryptanalysis, the science of deciphering or decoding messages deliberately scrambled for transmission, is several hundred years old, but it came into firstline prominence in the age of worldwide cable and radio networks. In World War I reading

"In the early 1920s the State Department, the Army, and the Navy had operated a very successful joint "Black Chamber" for decoding foreign cablegrams borrowed from cooperative overseas telegraph companies or intercepted electronically."

enemy messages, as the British were able to do, was important to success. As World War II approached, its value was magnified many times over. The British were successful again in the preliminary phase of World War II in 1939-1941, but the United States in this respect also had a valuable contribution to make from its own work in cryptanalysis.

In the early 1920s the State Department, the Army, and the Navy had operated a very successful joint "Black Chamber" for decoding foreign cablegrams borrowed from cooperative overseas telegraph companies or intercepted electronically. This interagency facility was closed down in 1929 on the grounds later said by then Secretary of State Henry Stimson to be that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." This was the time of the equally idealistic Kellogg-Briand Pact "outlawing war" as an instrument of foreign policy—a declaration with no enforcement sanctions.

By 1939 it was painfully clear that non-gentlemen were in charge of affairs in large parts of the world. The United States Army and Navy, never having doubted this fact, were plugging away with the slender resources allotted them to read as many international messages as they could. By 1940 the two military services had something on the order of 750 personnel assigned to intercept and read radio signals. Most of these were radio technicians, but a few were skilled cryptanalysts and linguists. Indeed, with the singular good fortune that allowed the United States to find leaders like George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in the long-neglected armed forces when the military crisis came, the American government in 1940-1941 benefited from having some authentic geniuses in cryptanalysis available when they were most needed.

The Navy was concentrating on Japanese codes and ciphers, achieving some initial successes in breaking them in 1939 and 1940. Then William F. Friedman, relatively little-known civilian Chief Cryptanalyst of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, and his close associate, Frank B. Rowlett, broke Japan's top-level PURPLE diplomatic code in August 1940. Eventually, by the time of Pearl Harbor, the Army and Navy were deciphering reams of Japanese messages. The translations of these messages were christened collectively MAGIC, a marvelously appropriate code word for the few who knew what it meant. Both signal intercept services, though small and little-known or respected in their own combat-oriented organizations, were providing General Marshall, President Roosevelt, and a few top Army and Navy officers with astonishingly relevant intercepted intelligence about Japanese and, indirectly, German military activities, as well as some glimpses of diplomatic policies.

This extraordinary achievement proved of enormous value throughout World War II, but in the early period it was never exploited effectively, in part because it was distributed only to the very top officials and nowhere synthesized skillfully with diplomatic reporting and other data about foreign affairs available in Washington. Of the three main tasks of an intelligence system—1) collection of information, 2) evaluation or analysis of the data for meaning and relevance to decision-making, and 3) appropriate dissemination of findings to permit exploitation by policy and action authorities—only the first was fairly successful. As Roberta Wohlstetter pointed out in her book, *Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision,* there was a plethora of data on the probability of Japanese attack but nobody sorted out the meaningful "signals" from the irrelevant and confusing "noise" to piece together the impending danger. As a result, Pearl Harbor will go down in history as a disaster for the United States rather than the intelligence triumph it might have been.

The Non-barking Watchdog: Joint Intelligence Committee

One feeble effort was made to coordinate these efforts a little better in the military context. This occurred late in 1941, too late to help at the time of Pearl Harbor. In 1939 President Roosevelt took over personally, as Commander in Chief, the supervision of the somewhat desultory deliberations of the Joint Army-Navy Board, which had existed for many years to insure "cooperation and coordination" of all "joint action of the Army and Navy relative to national defense." In 1940 and 1941 it began to develop some coherent plans on munitions procurement and aviation development in the two services. It was not a staff agency but simply a committee capable only of making interservice recommendations. It was, nevertheless, in 1941 the only rudimentary high command the nation had, and it decided to make a stab, at least in principle, at providing an intelligence base to underpin its deliberations. General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the capable Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. ("Betty") Stark, ordered the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as a central information group serving the Joint Board. The order was approved October 1, 1941 for setting up the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Committee. Army G-2 and ONI wrangled over procedures and office space with their service colleagues for weeks, however, and the first, somewhat sterile administrative meeting of the JIC took place on December 3, 1941—too little and much too late. If the Joint Board and the JIC constituted the watchdog of the nation's military security, as it seemed to on paper, its significance was a little like the non-barking dog in one of Sherlock Holmes' famous cases; the intelligence watchdog was not yet ready to bark when the blow fell.

These elements engaged in collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence before World War II were too small, too few, and too uncoordinated to be adequate for the job of supporting the President and his immediate advisers in making wise decisions about defense policy and foreign affairs. By 1941 Roosevelt acutely felt the need for a central intelligence process whereby he could be effectively and systematically informed about events on the international scene. He created a new institution in July 1941, called the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI); it became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) after Pearl Harbor. OSS was the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Thus the United States was only making experimental moves toward getting its intelligence house in order when war came.

"Every nation has a right to carve out its own happiness in its own way, and it is the height of presumption in another to attempt to fashion its political creed." — Alexander Hamilton

THEIR REVOLUTIONS — AND OURS

DAVID D. NEWSOM

It has been common, over the last four decades, to liken the independence revolutions of the 20th century to the American Revolution of 1776. This thesis needs to be re-examined. Our Bicentennial year is a good time to do so.

Speakers in the United States have spoken about the special American understanding and affinity for the new nations because "we had our revolution, too." In the new nations, there have been references to the inspiration which American traditions gave to their independence movements.

This rhetoric, while accurate in some respects, has tended to fog perceptions of each side by the other. It has tended to give Americans an exaggerated idea of our ability to influence the development of these new nations. It may, in part, be the cause of the special coolness which exists today between many of the nations of the newly independent world and the United States.

David D. Newsom, Ambassador to Indonesia, joined the Foreign Service in 1947, after experience as a newspaper reporter and a Pulitzer traveling scholar. He received the USIA commendable service award, State's merit honor award, the Civil Service League career service award and the Rockefeller Public service Award. Ambassador Newsom became a Career Minister in 1969.

Citizens of the new nations read the American Revolution in the light of their circumstances and experience. The results are often unwarranted expectations and a failure to comprehend the true nature of the American experience. When the true nature of the American experience is seen, it is often considered more of a threat than a model.

Similarly, many Americans see events in the former colonies in this century in the images of 1776. As a consequence, there is an inadequate understanding on our part of these nations and their view of us and the world. There is an inadquate understanding, also, of the continuing uniqueness in the world of the concepts of man, law, and government which were at the heart of our revolution and the formation of our nation. Those in the new countries who do perceive this still look to America to represent and foster these concepts—which remain among the most revolutionary in human experience.

A close examination of our history and that of the new nations of this century suggests that our revolution and its results were far removed, in character as well as time, from what has happened in the past thirty years. In matters of institutions, concepts, race, social conditions, and economies, the two experiences differ widely.

From their reading of our revolution, the new nations expected to find in the United States, in this century, their greatest champion in their opposition to European colonialism. They felt that we would understand, more than others, their emphasis on national sovereignty and national dignity. Their disappointment in finding that we often saw things differently led frequently to strong anti-American expressions.

We Americans, seeing the new nations in our own image, expected the emergence of countries close to us in identity, in form and attitudes. We looked for strong extensions of the democratic experience. We looked for respect for the rights of the individual. When the opposite happened, we were puzzled, irritated, and often disillusioned.

In the economic realm, we looked for new opportunities when these nations broke loose from Europe. The new countries, assuming a basic empathy on our part, looked to the United States for substantial help.

Both of us tended to ignore the natural impact on attitudes of the enormous gap between their economic circumstances and ours.

The ardor on each side cooled when the climate grew less pro-

pitious for outside capital and when aid funds declined. Most recently, in their emotional reaction to circumstances, many of the new nations have looked upon the United State as the principal obstacle to the new economic measures which they espouse.

Instead of finding a strong bond in a common independence experience, we seem at times to be at opposite ends of the political and economic spectrum.

It is true that many of the leaders of the new countries found inspiration in the writings of our own revolution. It is true that their movements, like our own, were against domination by an outside power. Echoes of some of the same chauvinism, bombast, and sensitivity which characterized our young republic can be found in many of the new nations. The differences, however, have proven to be more fundamental than the similarities.

To stress the differences is not to deny the validity of the principles of our revolution and their continued appeal to men who respect individual freedom everywhere.

Neither should an examination of the differences denigrate the particular experiences of the new nations. A realistic perception of their special problems should give us a better basis for understanding their emotions and their aspirations. Hopefully, it will give us a sounder basis for living effectively with them.

The first major difference relates to the development of indigenous political institutions.

By 1776, there had already been in the United States one hundred and fifty years of development of indigenous political and judicial institutions. Although developed on a British model, the legislatures of the thirteen colonies were adapted to the special circumstances and feelings of the New World. Democratic institutions, including the recognition of human rights and an independent judiciary, were well implanted by the time of our independence.

This has seldom been the case in the new nations of this century.

The roots of European political influence never went very deep in any of the countries which are now part of the "Third World." British rule in India, for example, scarcely lasted 150 years and less than a century if one dates from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the subsequent reforms.

In Africa, Belgian rule lasted barely two generations; German rule was wiped out without a trace. British rule was equally short-lived in most of the colonies. The Portuguese stayed longer, but did little to develop local political structures.

In most cases in Asia and Africa, the colonial regimes were implanted upon indigenous autocratic institutions, whether they were kingdoms, sultanates or tribal structures. There were, as in India, institutions involving public discussion and participation at the local level, but they did not customarily extend to the higher authority. In many cases, the colonial power ruled through traditional authoritarian institutions.

When independence came, the European power, often under the pressure of public opinion at home, sought to create the structure of democracy. There were constitutions, prime ministers and parliaments, and independent judiciaries and elections, but rarely did they have a genuine base. More often they remained a facade, or they were, in time, changed into a form more befitting the political requirements and the traditions of the country. Even the structure left behind by the colonial power, however, was seldom, in reality, democratic.

During the colonial period, the laws and regulations by which the colony was administered were often highly authoritarian. The new country might let the facade of democracy slip into decline, but the colonial administrative laws were retained. The true legacy of the colonial period, therefore, was not democratic, but the authoritarian traditions of colonial rule. The leaders found the emergency powers, the arbitary arrest, the indefinite incarceration more useful than the thinly-established democratic facade. When, in addition, the new rulers turned back to more authentic local traditions, they turned back to traditions that were fundamentally autocratic.

The birth pangs of many of the new nations were also often difficult. Internal conflicts which had been hidden or suppressed during the colonial period erupted or became more acute. Severe problems of economic development and finances arose. In such cases, the new governments turned, of apparent necessity, to centralized autocratic rule as internal stability, development and order became high priorities.

Finally, in countries where personalities have often been more important than institutions, the shape of politics emerged to glorify the personality. Leaders came forward, often out of imprisonment or exile, and assumed power by the direct transfer of authority from the former metropole. Elections became the means of confirming the authority of the dominant personality and his group, not of selecting them. Many of the leaders tended more and more to take unto themselves the trappings of glorified one-man rule.

Many Americans, thinking in terms of the image of our own independence, imagine that the fundamental traditions of many of the new nations are democratic. They express the hope that the departures from democracy are aberrations. A truer examination of the new nations would suggest that the autocratic traditions are as fundamental to their historic development as the democratic traditions are to ours.

Even the terms have different meanings. Take *freedom*. To the Americans of 1776, freedom meant respect for the individual and his rights. It meant the freedom to decide, by democratic means, on laws and the application of laws. It meant freedom of enterprise and freedom of trade. Strong political institutions had developed, incorporating principles of individual choice and political expression. Freedom meant the right to continue to enjoy these political and personal liberties without the interference of a distant monarch. Freedom was a highly individualistic concept.

Freedom for the new countries is essentially freedom from the rule and presence of a nation of a different race. Freedom encompasses independence for a people or a group. Freedom can be within traditional autocratic traditions that do not necessarily encompass freedom for the individual. To us, freedom for a group perpetuating an autocratic system is undemocratic; it

is not considered such to many in the newly independent world. To them, freedom is a group, not an individual concept. A labored and pressured consensus is to be preferred to a vote. Lacking the traditions and experience of individual democracy, they are prepared to submit to authoritarian leadership, provided it is their leadership.

There is a fundamental difference in the concept of government. Most of those who participated in the creation of the United States regarded government as a necessary evil. Our founding fathers had other interests—as farmers, lawyers, merchants. Those who were temporarily soldiers wanted to return as soon as possible to civilian life—including George Washington, himself. There were then—and have always been in our nation—socially acceptable alternatives to the position and power of governmental office. This has not been true in most of the new nations.

Except in the most advanced new countries, the path to prestige, power and often wealth, lay mainly through governmental, including military, positions. Commerce and business in general were often the prerogative of a minority—sometimes a despised minority. The newly educated class was educated for ruling. The houses, the cars, the titles, the perquisites of the former colonial civilian and military officials were the coveted symbols of position and power. To lose one's position in government was to risk losing one's total favored position in society. Far from seeking to leave government, those in the newer nations cling tenaciously to positions of governmental power.

In the early American republic, the Army that won the revolution could not wait to demobilize. In many of the new countries, on the contrary, the Army remains a fundamental source of power. As civilian rulers quarrel or governmental facades crumble, the Army steps in to preserve national unity. In societies which have fundamentally authoritarian traditions, this step is understood and often welcomed and respected.

In the political realm, therefore, there is very little basis for equating the indigenous democratic traditions, the egalitarianism, the sense of public responsibility, and the philosophy of minimum government of our revolution with the essentially autocratic, often military, traditions of the states that were once modern European colonies. Our relative stability has given us little basis for understanding traditions of an authoritarian rule which seeks to protect and perpetuate itself, and, in so doing, prevents the development of institutions which, like ours, will have a strength of their own. Many of the new nations face political insecurity, uncertain successions and a continuing contest for power and prerogatives which we have never known. Individual rights become secondary to the challenge of these problems.

"In the early American republic, the Army that won the revolution could not wait to demobilize. In many of the new countries, on the contrary, the Army remains a fundamental source source of power."

Socially and economically, also, the circumstances were, and are, very different.

Our revolution was by a transplanted people against rulers of their own ethnic stock. Race was not a factor. Eighty-two percent of our population in 1780 was of white European origin.

By contrast, every independence movement since World War II has been by an indigenous race against rulers of another stock.

The American colonists saw themselves as Englishmen and initially as fighting for the rights of Englishmen in North Amierca. Only after they considered that they were refused treatment as Englishmen did they strike for independence.

In contrast, the populations of the newly independent nations of today never wanted to be Englishmen, Frenchmen, Belgians, Portugese. They started out by wanting to recapture their indigenous heritage, and with few exceptions they had little interest in preserving what was alien to them. The independence movements of the 20th century were not only against political and economic domination; they were also against the humiliation of racial discrimination.

In North America in 1776, there may have been strong feelings against many British and against Tories. There were, however, no clubs which excluded Americans of European stock. There were no areas of cities cordoned off for Europeans only. There were no institutions to breed, in the leaders of the new American nation, the deep feelings of hurt pride and resentment which 20th century colonial practices bred in many in Asia and Africa. The feelings of many in the new nations of this century are nearer the feelings of the American Indians or of the slaves than to the Virginia or Massachusetts settlers. If we assess the attitudes of the new nations on the basis of what we understand of our own and we leave out this distinctive difference, we will fail to appreciate the importance they currently attach to racial dignity and equality, and the latent antagonism which exists, in some, toward the European and North American nations.

There were marked differences, too, in education. While there were different traditions in each of the thirteen colonies, all had developed educational institutions and relatively high literacy rates. There were flourishing universities already established on an American model. Our people spoke one language from New Hampshire to Georgia.

By contrast, many of the new nations had inadequately developed educational systems and high rates of illiteracy. Universities, if they existed, were often modeled on European curricula, with little relationship to the local circumstances. A country as large as Zaire had eight high school graduates and no university graduates at the time of independence. All of the major new countries except Indonesia had major problems in deciding on a national language.

Economically, in 1776, our population of slightly under four million, including a half million slaves and perhaps 300,000 Indians, was on the edge of a vast, undeveloped

Continued on page 29

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Not to Myth the Point

A REVOLUTION IS NOT A DINNER PARTY, *by Richard H. Solomon. Anchor Press (Doubleday), $9.95.*

Professor Richard H. Solomon, a highly regarded student of contemporary China, took leave of his academic career in 1971 for a stint as a Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council. But while his five years with the NSC and his "more than six" trips to the People's Republic of China must have been fascinating, stimulating and perhaps provoking, they must also have been rather frustrating (especially for a former professor), for surely the sensitivity of his position placed strict constraints on what he could say and publish. In "A Revolution Is Not A Dinner Party," which he did with the collaboration of Talbott W. Huey, Solomon found a vehicle of expression that in no way compromises that position.

The book is intended for people who feel uncomfortable about their lack of knowledge of China and the Chinese, and who perhaps are confused by the changing images of China that have been imposed by America's policies and press evaluations. In just the last five years ". . . the pendulum of our perceptions had swung from the extremes of fear to fascination. . . ." So the book is a candy-coated pill which will quickly and very painlessly dispel the discomfort about China, but it will not be (nor is it intended to be) a permanent cure for the ailment. "A Revolution Is Not A Dinner Party" cites some of the myths and images Americans have had about China and the Chinese and in a brief text—with almost as many photographs and pictures as there are pages—explains their roots in recent history and describes the main characteristics of China today. The titles of the chapters set the tone of the book: (1) Mything the Point, (2) Eating, (3) Words, (4) Emulation, (5) Isolation, (6) Swimming, (7) Contradictions and (8) Again Mything the Point.

The general reader will find the book easy to read and the well selected pictures enjoyable; the acquired information should help him avoid "mything the point." The more professional observer of China, however, will be looking forward to an appropriate passage of time when Richard Solomon will once again be in a position to write more serious work on US-China relations. With his new insights, that book should be worth waiting for.

—LEO A. ORLEANS

A Private View

PUBLIC PERSONS, *by Walter Lippmann, Liveright, $7.95.*

The late Walter Lippmann was the greatest political columnist of his age, perhaps of any age. He was great not so much because of the infallibility of his predictions, nor because of his prescience and inside information, but because his judgments of men and affairs transcended the limits of his time and reflected a mind steeped in the culture and history of western civilization.

Lippmann began life as a political philosopher, and would no doubt have enjoyed a distinguished academic career had he not become attached to the American delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. Thereafter he remained continuously in public life for fifty years, sacrificing some degree of the Olympian privacy that he cherished for the role of newspaper columnist that enabled him to exercise an extraordinary influence over statesmen and the educated public.

This collection of short pieces entitled *Public Persons*, edited by Gilbert Harrison, provides an insight into Lippmann's views about prominent public figures that were only hinted at in his columns. A constitutional aversion for controversy and the need to keep his contacts open usually led him to eschew personalities and character aspersions, however justified. The following samples show Lippmann at his most pungent and may give the reader an incentive to dig deeper:

On William Jennings Bryan—"Although he was three times nominated for President, he really had no conception of the mental effort required to administer a government or frame its policies."

On Sinclair Lewis—"Mr. Lewis is forever running about the world and giving out interviews about how Main Street is to be found everywhere. He is probably right for he takes it with him wherever he goes."

On General de Gaulle—"His genius consists in the capacity to see beneath the surface of events . . . . . to the obscured facts and forces which will prevail."

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

They Talked to Oriana

INTERVIEW WITH HISTORY, *by Oriana Fallaci (translated by John Shepley). Liveright, $10.95.*

A collection of interviews with leading world figures, *Interview with History*, the latest work by the noted Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, is marred from the start by the cross purposes of the author. While on the one hand she proclaims that the book is meant to be no more than a direct witness to 14 political leaders of contemporary history, she simultaneously adds that "our existence is decided by a few people, by their dreams and caprices, their initiative and will," and she approached each interview with an eye to answering the question of how such people differ from the rest of us. The resulting book is something of a mishmash. The bulk of the work is given over to the interviews themselves in which Fallaci displays an undeniable talent for her work, and through which the reader is able to glean insights into both the humanness and the political standpoints of the personalities involved. It is a mark of Fallaci's ability to draw out her subject that Henry Kissinger disclosed the now celebrated secret of his success to her: "The main point arises from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans like that immensely. Americans like the cowboy who leads the wagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse . . ." In the same manner, she was able to elicit from Nguyen Van Thieu the emphatic statement: "*Moi! C'est moi le chef!*" Likewise, her flair for asking the right question makes the interviews with Golda Meir and Yasir Arafat of particular interest.

The book, however, is flawed by Fallaci's evident unwillingness to allow the reader to draw his own conclusions from the words of the personalities. Instead, each interview is preceded by several pages of the author's conclusions about

the character of the man or woman to be interviewed, the quality of the interview and even the circumstances through which the person rose to eminence. Needless to say, the twin beliefs stated in the preface of the book, that "the most tragic side of the human condition seems to me precisely that of needing an authority to govern," and that "not even a selective criterion justified their (i.e. Kissinger, Meir, et al.) power," render her later conclusions somewhat predictable. Despite its uneven quality, *Interview with History* remains worthwhile for the contribution it makes to our understanding of some of those who have shaped the international environment.

—TIMOTHY D. KILBOURN

Neque clausam, neque nostrum

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, *by Jesse W. Lewis, Jr. American Enterpsise Institute, $3.95, paper.*

About 75 years ago Mahan saw the Med as a scene of "continual competitive struggle." This book's inventory of the weaponry and political problems of the 17 countries of the region would confirm Mahan even without the presences of the superpowers' ships and aircraft. FSO Lewis, a former newspaperman and now serving as political-military officer at Jiddah, modestly terms his book an "annotated catalogue," although he includes a great deal of informed analysis and personal observation.

The major part of the study turns on the US-USSR rivalry at sea. Mr. Lewis is sympathetic to the plight of Sixth Fleet officers watching the Soviet presence grow while their own freedom of action and resources seem to be declining, but he concludes that in war the Soviet fleet is doomed, if the Sixth survives the first 15 minutes. His cool-eyed prediction on the real effect of the entry of the Soviet carrier *Kiev* into the Med ("marginal tactical advantage" with political and psychological overtones) contrasts with the *New York Times*'s excited reportage when the *Kiev* did appear in July 1976.

A suggestion of interest is that the Department set up "Mediterranean watch officers" to monitor regional developments. Mr. Lewis also wants to overcome the Department's devotion to bilateral relations as the framework for US policy and operations by an interagency Med group.

Altogether an interesting and useful book.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Middle East Info

THE NEW WORLD BALANCE AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: *Reality or Mirage? edited by Seymour Maxwell Finger. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, $12.00.*

It would be unfair to criticize the Middle East experts whose speeches appear in this book, published in 1975. The speeches were made in May 1973 at a colloquium held in New York under the auspices of the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs. Five months later the 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke out. The oil embargo that followed showed that the rules of the game may have shifted, and some of the speakers might be embarrassed by having their words quoted with the benefit of hindsight.

Nevertheless, the book makes fascinating reading, and the appendices (including the rarely-mentioned Rogers Plan) help make this volume a valuable source of information on the Middle East. I am only sorry that it was not published earlier.

—JAMES H. BAHTI

Jefferson as Vintner

JEFFERSON AND WINE, *edited by R. de Treville Lawrence, Sr. Vinifera Wine Growers Association, Publ.*

Thomas Jefferson, Esq. of Virginia—patriot, statesman, president, ambassador, author, architect, inventor, enologist, vintner—indeed, perhaps our only Renaissance man. I have known bits and pieces about him, just as you have. I have been satisfied to settle for "No nation is drunken where wine is cheap" without knowing what followed. I have read his own monograph on his visit to the vineyards of France. And that's about it—until NOW. A fantastic piece of scholarship has just been published by the Vinifera Wine Growers Association of The Plains, Va. 22171 called *Jefferson and Wine* ($4.50 paperback, $7.95 hard cover plus 50c mailing). Volunteer researchers and essayists have tackled the vast array of letters, dozens of thousands of them, to and from Jefferson on the subject. The editor, R. de Treville Lawrence, Sr., has skillfully pulled their findings all together. And the result is not only a fascinating book, but a piece of Americana, worthy of '76. Have you ever heard before such Jeffersonisms as "Taste cannot be controlled by law" or "For with slight efforts how could we obtain great results? It is foolish even to desire it." It's all there and hundreds more. And in case you were wondering about what I started to quote up above, here's how it goes:

"No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober, where the dearness of wine substitutes ardent spirits as the common beverage. It is, in truth, the only antidote to the bane of whiskey. Fix but the duty at the rate of other merchandise, and we can drink wine here as cheap as we do grog, and who will not prefer it? It's extended use will carry health and comfort to a much enlarged circle."

(Letter to Mr. de Neuville, Dec. 13, 1818)

—ROBERT J. MISCH

Nigeria Revisited

HARMATTAN, *by Thomas Klop. Bobbs-Merrill.*

For every "Old Nigeria Hand," particularly those stationed there during the Biafran War, a book on Nigeria is a delightful nostalgia trip. *Harmattan* is a suspense novel set in Lagos just before the 1966 coup that ushered in the three year civil war. The book is short on plot and weak in explaining the many aspects that led up to the war, but Mr. Klop builds the suspense well and he certainly remembers the geography of Lagos. Despite all the years he lived there, he does not give the impression that he enjoyed Nigeria or liked the people all that much, which raises the inevitable question, "Then why write about it?"

Mr. Klop makes several comments decrying those who, on their first assignment, develop *Afromania*. Many have found it difficult not to fall victim to that very pleasant disease, but as everyone knows, no matter where one is assigned nor when they arrive, "Things were better in the old days." The plot involves a 50-year-old bachelor who searches for his missing nephew, a Peace Corps Volunteer; falls in love with the wife of one of the coup plotters; tries to escape with both; and . . . (one should never reveal the end of

a suspense novel.) When Mr. Klop writes of the Foreign Service it sounds very much as though he failed his own entrance exam, went on to success in other fields but has never quite forgiven the Department for keeping him out of the club. *Harmattan* is enjoyable, light reading but for someone looking for clues for understanding Africa or learning the "Why?" of the Biafra problem, this is not the book.

—JOHN ST. DENIS

COLD

Cold is one of those
things you can't crumble
in your hand, although
it is crisp
It is like an invisible
fog that creeps up and
closes you in
In any shape or form
cold is bitter, stinging,
and numbing
Cold is hardship
Cold is frightening

—Robert W. Sherwood
Foreign Service Junior, aged 10

An Endangered Species

DR. NINA AND THE PANTHER, *by Shirley P. Wheeler. Dodd, Mead, $8.95.*

The author of this work (whose late husband, Joseph C. Wheeler, was Consul-General in Florence until his death in 1970) gives a penetrating account of a time in American life that seems remote in its qualities of innocence and heroism but still close enough to appear familiar in many ways. It is the story of an indomitably resourceful lady—the author's mother—who chose to study medicine at the turn of the century, when this was not done. In order to finance her studies, she was obliged by the reluctant elders of an evangelical movement, in which she had been entangled since childhood, to take a step that amazed even her contemporaries. But that was only one of many surprising things about Dr. Nina—beginning with the way she had reacted, as a small child, on meeting a panther in a mountain wilderness. (When this happened she was gathering food for her invalid mother, who lived year-round in a *tent* in a then-remote area of Pennsylvania.)

This is an exciting story, but it is more than that. The author has an understanding of human nature which she articulates in simple and compelling terms; and when portraying the best in human nature, she gives us something that is very moving. Well worth reading: it may even make you decide that the species is worth saving.

—RALPH STUART SMITH

EMISSARY

(To gentle, gifted FSOs and wives)

Birds of far venture,
Exotic nesting,
Cherished young;
Wingspread polished by
A tracery of travel.

Falling from the clouds
To weave their nest
With foreign rookery.

They share the sparse seed,
Sing the strange call
Of migratory wonder.

Shield them from envy,
This most endangered flight;
For nature's artfulness
Has made their plumage bright.

—Nancy Barton

REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF THE REGISTER

from page 2

ing public knowledge of the staffing of our overseas diplomatic establishments will be the end of the matter.

There is still in the public domain, after all, a very large body of inconvenient information about the make-up and staffing of our overseas missions. At most posts abroad, for example, the host governments regularly publish more or less comprehensive listings of the officer (and sometimes even clerical) staffs of all foreign missions accredited to their capitals. The names in these documents can easily be collated and assembled in new up-to-date compilations, as informative in their way as the artless old Registers of preterrorist days.

Has it been wise, indeed, for the Department to supply, as it has often done, details on the previous assignments of its personnel when seeking visas for them to take up their new duty assignments? And what of the names of newly commissioned or assigned Foreign Service officers so thoughtlessly published from time to time in the Federal Register? Must such "irresponsibility" on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee now be corrected? For surely these listings, when collated with names from diplomatic lists and from other sources, can as easily be misused by our enemies as the information in the skimpy little entries in the Biographic Register?

Are we now also to have to take up the problem with the publishers of *Who's Who in America?* That great repository of information about the careers of important Americans is not wholly free from material for some mischief. This is because it is standard practice of the editors of "Who's Who" (or at least so it was when I came to be listed in "Who's Who" in 1962) to obtain biographic summaries of all newly appointed FSO-3s and above. Ought we not now ask the editors to lower their standards just enough to leave out at least the new FSO-3s?

Exactly how the Department, in consultation with the interested intelligence agencies, should hereafter go about dealing with these aspects of the matter is of course a question of some delicacy. Perhaps it is not even one which can suitably be discussed with proper seriousness in a publication with such a wide readership as the *Foreign Service Journal*. My own, perhaps cynical, suggestion would be that, as one thing which could be done with little difficulty and with no danger to anyone presently stationed abroad, the names of non-FSOs (both of real-life persons and of wholly fictitious creations) be added to the lists in the Federal Register, in the diplomatic and consular lists, and so on. In this fashion, the work of enemy analysts would be much complicated. Cryptographers often seek to throw off enemy cryptanalysts by inserting what are called null groups in the messages they are transmitting, and readers with intelligence experience will see the ready feasibility of this method in

our diplomatic practice.

It has sometimes seemed to me, indeed, that something along these lines may already be being done. Such an impression is almost inescapable when one idly skims through the long lists of new appointees in each month's issue of the State Department *Newsletter*. Stranger things have come to pass, in a world in which slogans about security pass for the wisdom of the ages.

I would hasten to add, however, that the problem of over-exposure of the identities and previous careers of some members of our missions abroad, if it be a real problem, could better be dealt with by what students of political tactics would call "flight forward." I mean that the names of all of our officers with intelligence functions now or in the past could be published openly instead of being withheld in the present half-hearted way. At the same time, an announcement could be made by a suitably authoritative spokesman that such information was entirely irrelevant, as in truth it almost is, as to the identity of the particular individuals responsible in fact for carrying out particular policies of the United States Government. And if this did not work, we could go on to make it clear that the luck of the draw would decide who lived in the Chief of Station's house, who drove the Ambassador's limousine, who kept track of sexual deviation in the Regional Security Office, and so on. This would be the equivalent of the practice, successfully implemented in some revolutionary armies, of assigning leadership roles by lot. Since (as anyone with wartime army experience, or with long service at a variety of posts abroad would have to admit) purely random and chance factors already play a predominant role in the whole assignment process, an imaginatively thought-out and implemented reform along these lines would both improve our efficiency and thwart the efforts of terrorists to pick out and punish individual members of particular professional sub-groups within our embassy staffs.

The point of all of these observations, of course, is that the problem is not one which will go away when the Biographic Register is no longer on sale at the Government Printing Office. For it is obvious that the listings in the Biographic Register had nothing to do with the deaths of our Ambassador and DCM in Khartoum sometime back, nor of course with the recent killing of the Ambassador, the DCM, and an Arab chauffeur in Beirut. And the same is true, whether it is fashionable to say as much or not, of the murder of an AID public safety section FSR in Montevideo some years ago, or of the shooting of a political section FSR in Athens earlier this year. It is naive, and unworthy of the Department's responsibility for serious political analysis, for anyone in authority to pretend, as now seems to be the case, that locking away the Biographic Register, or changing its contents in some way, will have the slightest effect on the problem at hand.

THEIR REVOLUTION—AND OURS

from page 23

continent. The density of population was 4.5 persons to the square mile. We had a per capita income relatively high for the standards of the day. Though mercantilism still prevailed, we were manufacturing a substantial part of our own requirements. We had a cadre of skilled manpower. We had begun technical innovations of worldwide significance. We had a philosophy of optimistic experimentation.

By contrast, the new nations emerging today are frequently plagued with overpopulation, unemployment and underemployment, and with a lack of the skills necessary for development. India's population density at the time of independence was 286 persons to the square kilometer. Few of the new countries had a per capita income above $100. Business and trade remained almost entirely in the hands of outside interests. Enterprise was often inhibited by tradition.

Further, at a time when independence brought new needs for infrastructure and support, revenues sometimes declined and subsidies ended. The new leaders faced the frustration of enormous economic problems and pressures unlike anything faced by our young republic. It is not surprising that order and security to permit economic development often became higher priorities than personal freedom, or that Marx was as frequently read as Jefferson.

In assessing our relationship to the new nations, we have given inadequate weight to the impact on attitudes and emotions of the fact that we are an economic colossus. Not only were our early circumstances different; ours today are vastly more so. As the economic problems in the second and third decades of independence have become more significant and the source of deep emotions, this economic disparity has a profound effect on our relationship. It shatters more profoundly than the political circumstances the assumption of a similarity of experience.

The passage of time between the two revolutions has also been a factor. The world is very different. Rapid communications have meant that the new nations have been forced to consolidate their independence under pressures of rapid change and the spotlight of world opinion. This fact is perhaps not as fundamental to the analysis as it may seem. Even across two hundred years, this fact does not change the elements of race, institutions, size, and opportunity which have made the two experiences so different.

In challenging the thesis of similarity, there is always the risk that it will add to the disillusionment of those Americans watching the new nations. That is not the intention.

The intention is, instead, to eliminate the expectations and assumptions bred by the premise that the new nations of the 20th century are as we were—or assumed ourselves to be. The intention is to eliminate the belief that the authoritarian and socialist manifestations of the bulk of the new nations are mere aberrations of an otherwise fundamentally democratic so-

ciety.

These new nations are important to us. We live with them on a finite globe. We must negotiate with them, trade with them, and listen to them. To do so we must understand them as they are and not as we would wish them to be.

As we face their rhetoric and their demands in international forums, it is not enough to call them extreme or unreasonable. These are nations facing problems of stultifying ancient ways, overpopulation, inadequate infrastructures, poverty, illiteracy, and acute sensitivities of kinds that we cannot fully imagine from our own experience. Their suspicions, their shrill demands, are not surprising.

If we appreciate the fundamental nature of their societies and their problems, we will not expect that the problems between us will be ultimately resolved by their adopting our ways of looking at problems and institutions. We will appreciate more the limitations of our influence. Our relationship with them will need to be an adjustment between two quite different kinds of societies. Our own experience in 1776 provides no real model.

To point to these differences and the limits of our influence is not to suggest, either, that the deeply held principles which arose out of our Revolution are irrelevant to these new nations. To a small group of educated thinkers in each of these countries, the principles of democratic freedom and respect for human rights remain fundamental hopes. They seek, often desperately, a way to translate our experience into the traditions and systems of their countries. They seek earnestly an alternative to autocratic despotism or authoritarian socialism. They know that the alternative will not be achieved by returning to democratic principles planted in their societies and temporarily obscured. The alternative will be achieved only by the implanting of new ideas. To these societies, the experience of the United States is as new and as revolutionary as it was to the countries of Europe in 1776.

The American Revolution then has not become a true model for most of the new nations of this century. Whatever may be their indebtedness to our history, they are more guided by ancient traditions and current circumstances. To perpetuate the concept of current similarity is to risk further disillusionment on both sides.

The American Revolution and the respect for human rights which it fostered remains an inspiration to many who hope that principles resembling the fundamentals of our own society can yet be established elsewhere. This hope justifies our remaining true to these principles and continuing to hold out hope and help to those seeking a similar way in other societies. If the American Revolution is extended in the 20th century, however, it will not be to revive fundamentally democratic societies temporarily obscured; it will be to inspire them where they do not yet exist.

LETTERS TO FSJ

Literary Sidelight

I read Edward Devol's account of literarary figures prominent in the history of American diplomacy with interest and approbation. Space did not allow him to mention some lesser but intriguing illuminati who labored in obscure consular posts. One such was the writer Albion W. Tourgée, who happened to be the American consul in Bordeaux in April, 1898. On the 8th day of the month he wrote a despatch to Secretary of State William R. Day in response to a request for information on the movements of Spanish men of war in the region. The Navy wanted to make proper preparations for a war with Spain, then impending and in fact soon to begin. Apparently Tourgée had been scolded recently for injecting humor into his official reports. Here is his comment: "I am in mortal terror lest I should again be found guilty of undue levity in reference to official matter, but should you see fit to report this to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy [John D. Long], it would seem to me very appropriate to accompany it with the information that, as no American ship of any sort has entered the roadstead of the Garonne in three years, there would hardly be any place on the planet where a Spanish gunboat could do our commerce less harm." Apparently Tourgée did not suffer fools gladly.

DAVID F. TRASK
Washington, D.C.

Philosophy of Business

In the *Foreign Service Journal* of June, 1976 Hans N. Tuch states "It is my experience that representatives of international enterprises working abroad feel more secure and comfortable with and therefore favor authoritarian governments in the developing world." I wonder if Mr. Tuch recognizes this is the same charge often made against representatives of the United States Government, particularly Foreign Service officers, working abroad. I personally do not believe it is a valid characterization of either representatives of multinational corporations or Foreign Service officers. This is based on some 23 years as a Foreign Service officer and almost eight years with a large international company since my retirement.

I believe both groups are much more comfortable working in countries where laws and legal processes are operating than in countries where capricious action can be taken by a small ruling group. In fact, representatives of international companies realize that the protection they have in the latter type of country is almost nonexistent, which is not the case for representatives of the sovereign United States Government.

If representatives of international companies perceive the choice to be between an authoritarian government of the right, and an authoritarian government of the left, they would philosophically choose the former. To misinterpret this as favoring authoritarian governments *per se* is a serious error. I believe Mr. Tuch has made such a misinterpretation, or else his statement is based on a very small sample.

HOYT PRICE
FSO-Retired
Allison Park, Pa.

Heesh, Now!

3 FAM's new editorial policy banning sexist pronouns impels me to contribute the following:

SEXIST AXIS

A recent 3 FAM transmittal letter rules that all material hereafter published in that manual will avoid sexist pronouns.

He/She as the case may be
can render to each gender peace
if all will use officially
the ambisexist pronoun "heesh."

JIM YOUNG
Dacca

The Good Old Days

A photograph in the April issue of the Department of State *Newsletter* brought back recollections of the good old days. It was a photograph of Consul General and Mrs. John Eaves taken on the occasion of the inauguration of the new residence of the Consul General at Madras.

I was the American Consul at Madras from 1931 to 1935. In those distant days there was no official residence for the officer in charge of the consulate. On arrival at the post he had to look around for what he could find. I would mention first that the house he found, however pretentious or unpretentious it might be as viewed from the outside, was without plumbing, because no house in Madras had plumbing. When you went to the bathroom the waterboy poured water in a washtub for your bath and the sweeper (an Untouchable) carried away in a pail what even kings and queens and consuls, as decreed by Nature, cannot avoid. Nor did any house have screens on the windows or doors. Ceiling punkahs circulated the air and confused the mosquitoes and/or flies.

Because we had no screens we had an occasional visitation of ants. I will first bring to your attention the flying variety, the kind attracted by your lights at night, usually arriving in time for dinner, when you had guests. They made marvelous glider landings in your soup and pilaf. I will next allude to the second variety, the terrestrial variety, the kind that streamed into your house and made a bee line for your food pantry, which I may remark in passing was locked with a lock which spelled R-A-S-C-A-L when opened. All memsahibs did that to discourage unauthorized hands. A third variety, a superspecies, streamed in and headed for the baby's crib, where they killed the baby when the ayah, or baby's nurse, was not looking. 'Twas rare, this happening, but they say it did happen.

And because you had no screening you put coir mats at the outside doors to discourage the cobras from entering. We had, too, those cute little creatures called, it my memory serves me correctly, geckos, which crawled around the walls and upside down across the ceilings, at first causing dismay lest they fall where they were not wanted. After a time one became accustomed to these minor distractions.

Air conditioning was undreamed of. The GAO had decreed that no baby buggies, pianos or refrigerators could be transported at Government expense. So we had no refrigerators, because none could be found locally. We lived on the country, with the help of an ice box. The cook, having first gone into conference with memsahib, was in the bazaar early each day

and bought his menu for the day fresh, and the milkman brought his cow to the house to be milked before witnesses.

My salary was $4,000 per annum, and that was all that the USG in its wisdom saw fit to provide, per annum or otherwise. There was no cost of living allowance, no entertainment allowance, no credit for serving at an unhealthful post, and, horrors, no overtime pay. There were no official automobiles, singular or plural. You got to work in your own car at your own expense, and if you attended High Society you got there the same way. I could expound further on the domestic arrangement but we will now cast our eyes for a brief moment on the Consulate.

It was located in a commercial office building facing the harbor, third floor up, rented space, reached by a stairway marked well by the salivary stains of betel juice. The sea breezes rarely blew in from the sea to freshen our brows. They generally blew the other way. My staff, when I was lucky enough to have a vice consul, numbered eight. During the first three years that I had the honor of serving at that post the staff numbered seven. During that period, having no vice consul to spell me, I had no leave, local or otherwise, My dear wife, steadfast and true, also stayed manfully at her post. American missionaries went to Kodaikanal, up on the mountain tops, for relief from the heat or when ill, and the British went to Ootacamund. Home leave in the United States was not exactly practicable anyway because of the cost and the time element. The USG not feeling it expedient to bear so heavy a burden, we would have had to pay our own way, by ship, to and from. Air travel in the early '30s? No way.

I have a 1972 photo of the staff of the Consulate General at Madras. I have just counted up to 128 faces and quit. To be fair, though, some of those faces belong to USIS. I suspect, however, that there might be a vice consul or two scattered somewhere in the crowd. In my time we had not yet heard of getting periodically acquainted with our homeland, lest we become mavericks and lose the home touch. If we harbored the idea it was up to us to pay the bill, if somebody could locate an available vice consul.

Some of the things I have said were peculiar to Madras. The money and personnel problems were not. They applied in general to the Foreign Service of those times. In 1935 I was transferred to Izmir. There was no available vice consul there either, and Izmir was still a long way from home. It was not until near the end of 1938 that my wife and I saw the shores of our homeland again, on transfer to San Jose, Costa Rica.

Did I wax sore at anybody? No, that was our life, and we took it as it came. In brief, we adapted. If there was a Grievance Board in Washington it was a one man Board, the Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. Generally they were kindly and understanding men, but you nevertheless did not fool around with them. There was always Punta Arenas, near Tierra del Fuego, or Timbuktu.

What now about the comforts and conveniences of the new, and shall we say improved, Foreign Service? You have come a long way since those good old days, Baby.

CHARLES W. LEWIS, JR.
FSO-Retired

Carlsbad, N.M.

Food for Thought

Re: George G. Wynne's adventure into word sleuthing, FSJ, August, it seems that that famous 30-year war was also the source of the name of a food. Every time they tried to feed their French captive, Nick, some of their good black bread, he would answer, "Pas pour Nicole" (Not for Nick), which became pumpernickel.

MERTON LOUIS BLAND

Karachi

EDITOR'S NOTE: George Wynne remarks that he heard this probably apocryphal story in a different version. When Napoleon occupied Westphalia he asked for black bread for his horse, Nicole, "pain pour Nicole." Word sleuths are also invited to check the American Heritage Dictionary.

Sweet Reason

If overseas allowances are to be taxed as salary, then they should be considered as salary for all purposes and specifically when it comes to calculating the "high three" years for retirement purposes.

HARRY I. ODELL

Bern

The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary. Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service* JOURNAL, *2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.*

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

"I don't understand the inspector's remark about 'going native.' I thought they wanted us to have native servants and use local transportation."

AFSA NEWS

This portion of the JOURNAL *is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.*

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication.

CONTENTS

24 AFSA MEMBERS' RECALL SOUGHT (Sequel)

The petition reported in last month's *AFSA News* calling for recall of all members of the Governing Board (except Mr. Hemenway) and all members of the Interim Recall Committee and all five recognized proponents of Mr. Hemenway's recall was submitted to the Association Secretary on September 16. The petition, signed by 50 retired AFSA members (including Mr. Hemenway) and by John Harter, an active-duty State member, was submitted under AFSA Bylaws Article X and Article II, Paragraph 6. The petition was immediately referred to the Legal Committee, which reported back on September 27 that it was defective in attempting to recall nonmembers of the Board when there were no recall procedures applicable to them under the Bylaws, that it should be revised to specify which Board member was charged with what offense and which specific Bylaw had been violated. On October 1 Vice President Hydle requested the President in writing to specify his charges and state whether he intended to follow the general Recall Procedures (published in the June *FSJ*). By press date there had been no reply.

CHARLOTTE CROMER AFSA'S SECOND V.P.

On October 13, the Governing Board of AFSA elected AID Representative Charlotte Cromer Second Vice President, succeeding John Patterson who has been assigned to Rwanda.

Ms. Cromer, who is serving her second term as a member of the Board, will continue Mr. Patterson's efforts to obtain equity and fairness for AID's Foreign Service. In addition, she will pursue the following objectives: Helping advance the role of FSS secretaries to a more professional level; encouraging the hiring of more women as FSRs and working on a fair placement system for FS employees.

Ms. Cromer has been employed as a Foreign Service Secretary for AID for the past 12 years, serving in Turkey, Thailand and France. Under AID's upward mobility program, she is now an FSR-7, in the Office of Population.

RECALL OF PRESIDENT

On October 1 a secret ballot was sent to all Association members for their final vote on whether to recall Mr. Hemenway from the AFSA Presidency. On Monday, November 15 these ballots will be picked up from the post office box and counted.

NOTICE

Documents relating to the Recall Election were recently distributed to all active AFSA members. These documents include a statement from the proponents of recall but none from the opponents. Both sides were invited, at the same time, by the Recall Committee, to submit statements for inclusion with the recall material. Only the proponents of recall responded.

Archie Lang, Chairman
Recall Committee

TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF HOME LEAVE EXPENSES

The April 1974 issue of the *Journal* reported that AFSA was supporting legal efforts to have home leave expenses recognized as valid income tax deductions for Foreign Service personnel.

Our objective has been to secure a decision by a US Court of Appeals upholding the deductibility of those expenses. One Court of Appeals, in the *Stratton* case, found in favor of the taxpayer on this issue, overturning a contrary decision by the Tax Court; that case was decided by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (for the West Coast states, Hawaii and Alaska). Unfortunately the IRS refused to follow *Stratton* in other circuits, and AFSA has backed further litigation in the hope that the IRS will acquiesce if another circuit supports the taxpayer.

The AFSA-backed case, *Hitchcock v. Commissioner*, was recently decided by the Tax Court, which must act before a Court of Appeals can consider the matter. Not surprisingly, the Tax Court reaffirmed its earlier holding against tax deductibility; however, the Court did accept the AFSA argument that home leave is compulsory, and that point should be helpful if the decision is appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. AFSA is now considering whether or not to support an appeal, and if it does so, will request voluntary contributions by members, which are considered tax-deductible.

AFSA COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES

AFSA has appointed a Committee to organize Executive Branch and Congressional support for reform in the selection of American ambassadors. The AFSA Board has asked Ambassador Olcott Deming (Ret.) to chair the Committee. They plan active consultation with leading foreign affairs organizations and academic experts in firming up an AFSA action program to increase the number and percentage of professionals appointed as Chiefs of Mission.

"An overhaul of the system that condones the selection of large numbers of ambassadors as rewards for political support is long overdue," Ambassador Deming told the *Journal*. "It is unfair to the Service and to the American people. There is no objection to such distinguished individuals as the Harrimans, Galbraiths, Reischauers, and Ellsworth Bunkers, but the the time has come to end the practice of appointing unqualified non-career men and women to represent our country abroad."

The United States Congress has concerned itself with the problem and the Senate recently adopted an amendment proposed by Senator Mathias of Maryland to put a 20 percent ceiling on non-career ambassadorial appointments. While the provision was deleted by the Joint Conference, Ambassador Deming thinks reform legislation has reasonable prospects in the next Congress if AFSA organizes a vigorous effort on the Hill with the support of interested private groups and individuals.

Preliminary results of a statistical analysis by the Committee into ambassadorial appointments over the last 40 years indicate that the seven Presidents in office since 1933 have appointed non-career people to lead about 37 per cent of our overseas missions. At present there are 39 non-career Ambassadors or about 33 percent. The *Foreign Service Journal* will carry shortly a detailed statistical report on the Committee's findings.

JOIN AFSA
(OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO JOIN)

DISTRIBUTION OF AFSA "RED TOPS"

AFSA publishes flyers, called "Red Tops," on an *ad hoc* basis as one means of keeping all employees of the Department of State, AID, and USIA in Washington and overseas informed on current developments of specific interest. Publication of "Red Tops" is an expensive service but copies are distributed free of charge. Because topics discussed may have rather limited interest, full distribution throughout the foreign affairs community is not always provided. In some instances, distribution does not include overseas posts or is limited to employees of only one agency.

"Red Tops" are not mailed to individual AFSA members but rather are sent in bulk to posts overseas and to the various Mail Rooms in the different Bureaus and Offices for further local circulation. AFSA Keypersons should ensure that upon receipt their local Mail Room personnel understand their responsibilities in this regard. If a particular area is not receiving an adequate number of copies, please send a memorandum to the AFSA office at 3644 New State.

To date, no "Red Top" has been issued which was believed to be of general interest to retired Foreign Service personnel. Nevertheless, it is recognized that certain "Red Tops" may be of interest to individual retirees. Upon request, a copy of any desired issue can be mailed to them.

For general information, there follows a list of all "Red Tops" published in 1976. Notice of future issues of "Red Tops" will appear as a regular item in this section of the *Journal*.

"Red Tops" Issued in 1976

Number	Title	Date
1.	A Status Report to the USIA Foreign Service	1/12/76
2.	Selection Board Precepts	1/15/76
3.	The AFGE Challenge at USIA: The Real Issue	1/15/76
4.	USIA Management—Election Neutrality of Election Tilt	1/20/76
5.	Dear FAS Colleague	1/21/76
6.	AFSA vs AFGE: There *is* a difference	1/22/76
7.	Dear USIA Collegues	3/1/76
8.	The Promotion Fiasco	3/3/76
9.	AFSA Seeks a Counselor	4/6/76
10.	New Management Proposals on State Foreign Service Officer Promotions	4/15/76
11.	Buzzard Point—GSA's White Elephant	4/23/76
12.	Post Decertification Report	6/2/76
13.	AID's Contempt for the Foreign Service: A Case Study	5/26/76
14.	State's Proposed 1976 F.S. Promotion Precepts and AFSA's Reply	6/10/76
15.	State's Proposed Changes in its F.S. Promotion System Answers to Members' Questions	6/10/76
16.	Notice to All Foreign Service Personnel	6/9/76
17.	What Should Be Done About AID?	6/11/76
18.	Preview of 22 Benefits Proposed by AFSA's Members' Interest Committee	6/18/76
19.	Taxation of Overseas Allowances: Latest Returns	7/1/76
20.	AFSA Lauds New Assignment Precepts	7/14/76
21.	AID's Contempt for the Foreign Service—Pt. 2	8/20/76

AMERICAN EXPRESS CREDIT CARD PROBLEMS

Many AFSA members have been hassled and even had their credit ratings damaged due to late payment of their American Express bills. The problems stem from the inherent slowness of the diplomatic pouch. Heretofore, American Express has been unwilling to recognize the hard fact that mail service from and to remote areas of the world is very slow.

American Express has required all cardholders to pay bills on a due and timely basis without exception, the same standards being applied to those overseas as those in the United States.

The Association has contacted American Express in New York, and has gotten word of a new bill collection system to be used for people with diplomatic pouch addresses (but not APO addresses). When the system is initiated in about six months, members with Amexco cards will be billed every 45 days (as opposed to the 15 or 30-day domestic basis). We would appreciate receiving members' reactions and comments since the system is still under development. Write to: Members' Interests, AFSA, Room 3644, N.S.

AFSW REPORTS BEST BOOKFAIR EVER

Passing the fifty thousand dollar mark for the first time, this year's AAFSW Bookfair earned more—by thousands of dollars—than any of its fifteen predecessors. As always, proceeds are earmarked for the Foreign Service Educational Counseling Center, the Scholarship Fund of the American Foreign Service Association, and selected educational projects in the greater Washington area. All concerned—those who generously donated books and objets d'art; volunteers who picked up books, helped sort and price, or served in the stacks and as cashiers; and those who attended, and made purchases at, BOOKFAIR '76—have reason to feel gratified.

Although the new, bi-level site of the Bookfair (Twenty-third Street foyers) was approached by the committee with some trepidation, it turned out to be more spacious, more satisfactory, and better received by the patrons (long used to the previous site in the Exhibition Hall) than had been anticipated. The process of adapting to the new locale was considerably eased by the unstinting cooperation of Visual Services and General Services personnel.

An innovation of Bookfair '76 especially well received by prospective purchasers was an annotated catalog of rare books and other special offerings.

By the time this appears in the *Foreign Service Journal,* work on BOOKFAIR '77 will have begun, again undertaken by volunteers. Foreign Service personnel at home and abroad, as well as others who labor in the Washington vineyards, will again be urged to donate books, stamps, and artifacts. As a matter of fact, this may be considered the first such urging for 1977. Mail should be addressed to Chairman, Bookfair '77, Room 8326 NS Department of State, D.C. 20520. Arrange for local book pickups by calling 598-5946 or 363-1831.

1977-1978 AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS

Applications are being mailed out for the 1977-1978 AFSA Merit Awards Program for 12th (and graduating 11th) grade high school and preparatory school students and for the 1977-1978 AFSA Financial Aid Program for college and university undergraduate study.

For applications and information, write to The AFSA Committee on Education, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037. The deadline for completion of the application is February 15, 1977.

Mrs. Dean Acheson in front of her painting in the Art Corner with Sylvia Alspaugh, coordinator of art contributions for Bookfair '76.

FSECC PLANS FOR '76-77

The Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center is pleased to announce some changes designed to better meet the needs of families at home and abroad. The field of education is one that touches and preoccupies all parents today but for those parents and children in the world of foreign affairs it is even more complex. Information concerning many aspects of the field is sorely needed. It is our goal to fulfill this need.

In a few weeks a special communication outlining the services that FSECC offers will reach you. Attached to this will be a questionnaire which we urge you to fill out and return to the center as this information will help us to help you.

The center will continue to offer individual and family counseling as it has done so successfully in the past.

LIST OF CHAPTERS

The Governing Board has created a Membership Committee to mount an extensive membership drive between now and the end of the calendar year. The Committee is considering a system of rewards for local Chapters showing an AFSA representation at the post of 75 to 80% of eligible personnel assigned. Also under consideration is a plan for individual rewards for members who sign up 5 or more new members. Details follow.

Below is a list of Chapters with AFSA Reps as recorded in the Membership Office of AFSA as of October 15, 1976. Chapter Reps are urged to send in corrections.

Post	*Chapter Chief*
Abidjan	Joann Jenkins
Abu Dhabi	George Naifeh
Accra	John Kean
Adana	Donald M. Austern
Addis Ababa	Bruce C. Rogers
Algiers	Russell Morrow
Amman	Lloyd George
Ankara	Charles Mast
Antwerp	(Brussels Rep)
Asuncion	George Kachmar
Baghdad	Gary S. Usrey
Bangui	Bonnie Pates
Banjul	Douglas Broome
Barcelona	Robert E. Prosser
Beirut	Ann I. Cyr
Belgrade	Edward Malby
Berlin (Mission)	William Landfair
Berlin (Embassy)	Victor Wolf, Jr.
Bern	Richard J. Higgins
Bilbao	Robert E. Prosser
Bogota	John Stephens
Bonn	John J. Hurley, Jr.
Bremen	John E. Bennett

Brussels	Lawrence B. Lesser
Brussels (NATO)	Pierre Shostal
Bucharest	E. Ashley Wills
Budapest	F. Brenne Bachmann
Buenos Aires	Eileen Janus
Bujumbura	David Kaeuper
Cairo	Edward L. Peck
Calcutta	Joseph P. O'Neill
Cali	John Caulfield, Jr.
Canberra	Jack M. Carle
Capetown	Robert W. Robinson
Caracas	Barry Jacobs
Casablanca	Thor H. Kuniholm
Ciudad Juarez	Donald Camp
Conakry	Timothy E. Roddy
Copenhagen	Robert D. Emmons
Cotonou	David Nall
Curacao	Donald Kreisberg
Dacca	William Oliver
Dakar	James O'D Maher
Damascus	James R. Hooper
Dar es Salaam	Hugh MacDougall
Dublin	Robert DuBose
Durban	E. Anthon Berg
Dusseldorf	Margaret Brummer
Edinburgh	Kirby Smith
Florence	Ovsanna Harpootian
Frankfurt	Marshal J. Kennedy

Freetown	Curtis Stewart
Geneva	Robert B. Allen
Gaborone	Richard Hoover
Genoa	D. Clark Norton
Georgetown	Timothy Dunn
Guatemala City	Robert N. Allen
Guayaquil	Philip Metzler
The Hague	Thomas G. Martin
Hamburg	Warren E. Wills
Hong Kong	Dennis Harter
Islamabad	Teresita Schaffer
Istanbul	Richard Dawson
Jakarta	Gary Christian
Jerusalem	Ernest J. Fischer, II
Jidda	David Mangan
Kabul	Charles W. Johnson
Kaduna	David Jensen
Karachi	Marvin Garrett
Khartoum	John Hartley
Kathmandu	Robert N. McGovern
Kigali	Margaret McMillion
Kinshasa	Cyril Cox
Kuala Lumpur	Joseph Snyder
Kuwait	Bruce McKenzie
Lagos	Harvey Clew
La Paz	John Curry
Libreville	Cornelia Bryant
Lima	Leon M. Johnson
Lisbon	Richard Melton
Lome	Robert J. Kott
London	Jack Binns
Madras	Samuel A. Keller
Madrid	Robert E. Prosser
Managua	Albert H. Stone
Manama	Lois A. Clark
Manila	Charles Salmon
Maseru	Harry R. Johnson
Mexico City	John Hamilton
Milan	David A. Ross
Mogadiscio	David M. Walker
Monterrey	Edward Michal
Montevideo	Donald Guerriero
Montreal	Darryl Dally
Moscow	Ann Darbyshire
Munich	Robert Tynes
Muscat	John Beck
Naples	Manuel R. Guerra
New Delhi	Robert Coe
Ndjamena	Roger L. Hart
Niamey	Patricia Willey
Nouakchott	Norman Garner
Oslo	David Holton
Ottawa	Edward V. Nef
Palermo	Carl W. McCollum
Panama	Ault Nathanielsz
Paris	Robert Maxim
Paris (USOECD)	Robert Maxim
Paris (UNESCO)	Robert Maxim
Peking	Richard Mueller
Port Louis	Barbara A. Van Tuyl
Port-au-Prince	Kevin Burke
Port-of Spain	Edward M. Harkness
Prague	Robert J. Montgomery
Pretoria	Herman Rossi
Quebec	K. Patrick Garland
Quito	Stephen H. Muller
Rabat	Barbara Sullivan
Rangoon	John Parker
Reykjavik	Susan Todd
Rio de Janeiro	John Caswell
Rome	Martin A. Wenick
Rotterdam	Lyle A. Vanravenswaay
San'a	Clyde S. Adams
San Jose	George W. Ogg
San Salvador	Ralph Winstanley
Santiago	Michael Stevens
Santo Domingo	Leonardo Neher
Sao Paulo	John P. Treacy
Seoul	Jay H. Blowers
Seville	Robert E. Prosser
Sinai F.M.	James Schill
Singapore	A. Markham Crocker
Stockholm	Seymour Chalfin
Strasbourg	David M. Adamson
Sydney	Patrick W. Brennan
Taipei	Edward Wilkinson
Tananarive	Gerald de Santillana
Tegucigalpa	Kirk-Patrick Kotula
Tehran	Robert Hammond
Tel Aviv	Ann K. Korky
Tokyo	Howard McElroy
Toronto	James Mason
Tripoli	Karl Darga
Tunis	Marshall Casse
Valleta	Artis Person
Vienna	George Anderson
Vientiane	William Doolittle
Warsaw	Richard Milton
Wellington	Thomas J. Wajda
Winnipeg	Daroslav Vlahovich
Yaounde	Nancy E. Morgan
Zagreb	Stephen Dubrow

Foreign Service People

Deaths

Cheney. Edward R. Cheney, FSO, died on September 18 in a plane crash near Manila. Mr. Cheney entered on duty with the State Department in 1951 and joined the Foreign Service in 1952. He served at Penang, The Hague, Managua, Bombay and Lima before his assignment in Manila. Mr. Cheney twice received the Department of State Meritorious Honor Award, in 1968 and in 1975. He is survived by his wife, Sally Leavitt Cheney, c/o Foreign Service Lounge, Department of State, four children, Mrs. Robert Seyfarth, Jr., Margaret R., E. Drew and Thomas L., and a brother.

Henderson. Peter Henderson, son of Ambassador-retired Douglas Henderson, was killed in a helicopter crash in Guatemala, on October 4. Mr. Henderson was associated with the First National City Bank. In addition to his father and stepmother of 78 Chestnut Street, Weston, Mass., he is survived by his wife, Pamela, 5 Hathaway Road, The Landings, Savannah, Georgia and three children, also two brothers and three sisters.

Ramsey. Paul W. Ramsey, FSR-retired, died on September 15, in Washington. Mr. Ramsey joined the State Department in 1961 and served as Associate Editor of the Department *Newsletter* until his retirement in 1973. He is survived by his wife, Mabel M., 11154 Forest Edge Dr., Reston, Virginia, two sons, Paul Ramsey, Jr., Middletown, Conn., and Ronald Ramsey, Sterling Park, Virginia, and five sisters.

Schiavone. Dina Schiavone, wife of Daniel Schiavone, FSO-retired, died on September 29, in Washington. In addition to her husband, of 6027 Argyle Terrace, Falls Church, Virginia, she is survived by three children, Shirley, Patricia and Frank.

A taste children prefer.

Sure, fluoride is important in fighting cavities – but so is proper brushing. And that's why we made Aim.®

According to the mail we get, children by the score brush longer, more thoroughly and *willingly* when they switch to Aim fluoride toothpaste.

We can't *guarantee* this will happen in your home, but isn't it worth a try? Especially since dentists blame so many cavities on bad brushing habits.

Aim's fluoride is stannous fluoride.

Aim has stannous fluoride – the exact amount considered effective against cavities.

But Aim has something the leading fluorides don't. A taste children prefer. In fact, in tests with more than 1300 children against *both* leading fluoride brands, children preferred Aim by almost 2 to 1.

A gel that's low in abrasion.

Because Aim is a gel, it has an unusually fast "dispersal rate." This

means, when your child brushes with Aim, it spreads the good taste *faster* in the normal brushing time.

Aim is also low in abrasion.

All of this makes Aim a true advance.

If you have a child in the cavity-prone years, ask your dentist about Aim.

Like any dentifrice, Aim should be used as part of a program of good dental care. So see the dentist regularly, brush often, and take Aim against cavities.

Take Aim against cavities!

Hundreds of foreign service people worldwide are enjoying great savings on great cars from Chrysler.

Can you?

In all probability, you can. If you're reading this, you must be connected with the diplomatic or foreign service in some capacity or another. And that's about the only connection you need to qualify for Chrysler Export's Diplomatic Purchase Program ... and for significant savings on any of the Chrysler '77 varieties. Be it an Aspen, Volaré, Cordoba, Plymouth, Dodge or the most luxurious Chrysler.

Great cars. At great savings. And that's great news for those that qualify. Find out if you do. Complete the coupon and we'll send all the details.

Chrysler Export
Diplomatic Sales
560 Sylvan Avenue
Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey 07632
(212) 279-7350

Or

Chrysler Export
Diplomatic Sales
1100 Connecticut Ave
N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036
(202) 296-3188

Send information on your Diplomatic Sales Program, and these Chrysler products

DODGE
- ☐ Aspen
- ☐ Monaco
- ☐ Charger SE
- ☐ Sportsman Wagon

PLYMOUTH
- ☐ Volaré
- ☐ Fury
- ☐ Gran/Fury

CHRYSLER
- ☐ Cordoba
- ☐ Chrysler

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

EXPORT DIVISION CHRYSLER CORPORATION