A Russian View of the US Diplomatic Service
Babel and Diplomacy
The Intelligence Controversy
Ford celebrates its 75th anniversary with new better ideas... including diplomatic discounts.

'78 MARK V DIAMOND JUBILEE EDITION

'78 FORD LTD
Delivers superior full-size benefits of room, comfort and ride for the same price as its smaller competitors. Has a surprisingly efficient engine and a deep-well trunk.

'78 FORD FAIRMONT
The Ford in your future. Fairmont's a new generation of car from Ford. With almost 90% of the interior space of some full-size cars, it has the fuel efficiency of a compact. A maintenance schedule of 12 months or 10,000 miles for oil changes and 20,000 miles between tune-ups can drastically reduce maintenance costs.

Please send me full information on using my diplomatic discount to purchase a new.

WRITE TO:
DIPLOMATIC SALES: FORD MOTOR COMPANY
815 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006/Tel: (202) 785-6047

NAME
ADDRESS
CITY____STATE____
COUNTRY____ZIP____
Debate on Retirement
JAMES D. PHILLIPS 3

Communication re: The Status of Women
MS. JONES 4

US Diplomatic Service: As Others See Us
Y. NIKOLAYEV 6
Dissent Under the Carter Administration

For half a century, the American Foreign Service Association has been the professional organization of Foreign Service people, active and retired. While we have turned increasingly in recent years to union activities, we have never forgotten our professional vocation. Our certificate of incorporation declared that one of our objectives is "to promote the intelligent, efficient and skillful discharge of the professional duties of the Foreign Service and of the missions of the Foreign Affairs Agencies in the service...of the United States." In other words, we are interested not only in what the country can do for us, but what we can do for the country.

This ceremony expresses our professional vocation. But the tenth such occasion, the fact that this is the second consecutive year in which one of these awards has not been given because of lack of nominations, and the concept of zero-based thinking, all make this a good time to re-examine this program.

The awards were launched in 1968, in the middle of a war which divided the Service as well as the country. Perhaps the donors wanted to help the career Service overcome the psychoses of the 1950s, an "inordinate fear of anti-Communism"—a case of shakes that led President Kennedy to call the State Department "a bowl of jello." The history of the awards is essentially one of dissent against the foreign policies of two Republican administrations, and many of the awardees have been honored for their efforts to rid the Service, and our policy, of an "inordinate" fear of Communism.

When President Carter was elected, many of us hoped for a more creative, mutually reinforcing relationship with our political leadership. After all, he had written admiringly of the career Foreign Service in his campaign biography, and most of his Transition Team were former colleagues. AFSA wrote to him one year ago:

Historians tell us that successive Presidents have taken office with a distrust for the career Foreign Service, believing it to be stuffed with holdovers from the previous Administration who want to make him look bad, and mandarins who regard him as an interloper in foreign policy matters. In fact, the Foreign Service is a non-partisan professional cadre that works for only one President at a time, fully recognizes his or her primacy in foreign policy, and has served successive Presidents as a motivated and disciplined force for implementing national policy.

One year later, we must say in all candor that the transition has been rough, that we have not yet attained a productive relationship which serves fully the national interest, and that there is a great concern within our ranks about the future of the Foreign Service:

• The small number of career officers among Presidential appointments in the Department suggests that the Administration does not want to use career people in senior policy-level positions. Career people are absent or virtually absent from other agencies, which I will not identify, having great influence in foreign policy.

• Some senior foreign affairs agency officials are sometimes heard to complain, either for attribution or perhaps on background, that they cannot carry out the Administration's policies because of bureaucratic obstacles raised by career officials. This is a tired old line, repeated during every Administration by people seeking to explain away their own failures and to justify hiring of friends. We expected better of this Administration.

• Contrary to the spirit of openness which the President promised, and to the Reorganization Act, which call for wide participation in the preparation of reorganization plans, only a handful of OMB, State, and USIA officials were privy to the preparation of the plan to reorganize public diplomacy. As a result, the plan not only does not resolve, but deepens, the dilemma of State policy guidance versus Voice of America news-gathering credibility.

• In his attacks on the "lifestyle" of his subordinates, a senior Presidential appointee often sounds like he's running against the Agency he's supposed to be running—and do such attacks increase the prospects for Congressional and public support for the Administration's planned increase in that Agency's programs?

• Some senior officials, the best and the brightest veterans of such successful moral crusades as the civil rights and anti-war movements and the Carter campaign itself, seem to regard criticism of the human rights policy, or caveat about its implementation, as bordering on immorality or disloyalty to the Administration. It is difficult to have a serious discussion with someone who thinks you're immoral; and we hoped we had seen the last of demands, implicit or explicit, for "positive loyalty."

• In his campaign biography, Mr. Carter said "For many years in the State Department we have chosen from among almost 16,000 applicants about 110 of our nation's finest young leaders to represent us in the international world." Last weekend, thousands took the annual Foreign Service examination once again. But if the recommendations of a task force on which career Foreign Service people are a small minority are implemented, few of the people who passed the examination will be able to enter the FSO Corps for the rest of this fiscal year.

David Bruce once said:

"Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation. It is not a system of moral philosophy; it is rather the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states."

Our role as professional diplomats requires us to carry out faithfully the policies of the administration of the day, but also to advise that administration candidly when we believe that such a policy, however moral, however popular it may be, runs contrary to the national interest in our foreign relations. If the Administration were to show that it welcomes such advice and believes in the value of the career Foreign Service to the nation, so much the better. If not, we will continue in any case, as diplomats and policy advisers, to do our duty. And this Award ceremony will continue as an expression of appreciation and admiration for those who show courage under fire, even if the fire comes from the left rather than the right. The President wrote "Why Not the Best?" With all the modesty traditionally associated with Foreign Service people, we, the career Foreign Service, are the best.

Let's get together and implement foreign policy that will advance the interest of the land we love, and reflect credit on both the Administration and the Service.

(President Lars Hydle delivered these remarks at the 10th annual Awards program on December 9, 1977.)
Debate on Retirement

JAMES D. PHILLIPS

Those who have commented in these pages on early versus late retirement have missed several cogent arguments, in my opinion, by taking too narrow a view of the issue. They have tended to weigh the pros and cons from the individual and Foreign Service points of view without giving sufficient thought to society as a whole. But the common good should not go unchampioned in a debate of historic import, and surely whether FSOs should be put to pasture at 60, 65, or 70 is nothing if not historic.

Consider the broader implications of the Department's preferred policy of turning FSOs loose at 60 without training or preparation, to write their memoirs, interfere in local governments, take cordon bleu cooking classes, drop in at Embassies abroad, misinstruct young people at colleges and prep schools, bombard learned journals with quarrelsome articles, botch jobs in commerce and industry, annoy their neighbors, visit their children and their spouses. The social costs are tremendous. Think, for example, of the endless bother to editors caused by the average FSO-retired's obsessive need to write; think of the unnecessarily high demand for psychiatrists' couch time; think of the clogged dockets of small claims and police courts.

The truth is that a career in diplomacy, with its arcane observances, its demand for overgeneralization or superspecialization, its nomadic way of life and xenophilia renders anyone with twenty or more years experience unfit for retirement at any age. Outside the Service, in normal society, the ex-diplomat is an ungainly bungler, like an owl pulled out of a tree at noon or a Washingtonian in Boston. How intelligent it would be if the Department did the decent thing, without pressure from Congress or the courts, and abolished retirement altogether.

Some will object that if old timers are kept in there will not be enough jobs in the Service to accommodate younger officers who are impatient to savor the illusion of authority and status that comes with senior positions. The voice of youth in the debate is perhaps most clearly heard in FSO-5 J. Snivley Twill's widely acclaimed Open Forum article "Euthanasia: The Only Way Out."

Without contesting the force of Twill's logic, I contend there is another way out of the dilemma. The model solution lies almost under our noses, no further away than Williamsburg, Virginia. The Department need only create a new bureau, located perhaps in some nearby annex, where superannuated seniors could spin out their golden age actually performing the tasks they performed throughout their active careers, only this time for the instruction and edification of the public. A modest fee would likely cover the costs of the entire operation, given the crowds of tourists that could be expected, thus creating no additional drain on the Treasury. Youth would be served and, in Twill's apt phrase, "the old crocks would be kept off the track."

Let our premium wines introduce your guests to the famous Napa Valley.

The Napa Valley in Northern California is famous for its viniculture, and the premium wines of The Christian Brothers offer a delightful introduction for guests of the embassy. Whether it is the truly American Zinfandel or a Chardonnay distinctively Californian we are certain that the premium wines of The Christian Brothers will gain favor at the embassy's table. So, we invite you to write for our Export Guide if you buy wine for Embassies or American delegations. We offer complete service anywhere in the world.

From The Christian Brothers of California.

WRITE: CHARLES J. CANDIANO, DEPT. F.S., FROMM AND SICHEL, INC., 655 BEACH STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94109, U.S.A.
Worldwide Distributors: Fromm and Sichel, Inc., San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978
COMMUNICATION

The Status of Women

The Department’s directives on affirmative action, while laudable in themselves, seem almost irrelevant when applied to our Foreign Service personnel stationed abroad. After all, assignments, promotions, and salaries are largely decided in Washington. For many senior officers at the post, accepting with resignation the assignment of Ms. Jones and avoiding “sexist” comments in her efficiency report probably constitute as much as they feel called on to do.

From the vantage point of a woman officer who has served several tours abroad, I believe there is much more to the question than that.

If a supervisor really wants to get the most out of a woman assigned to the mission—and I suspect some secretly see themselves as martyrs doomed to carry an extra burden for the sake of women’s liberation—perhaps he should ask himself a few soul-searching questions:

1. Do you assign a woman officer the same workload, both in substance and volume, that you would assign a male officer of the same grade and experience?
2. Do you find yourself looking around for jobs “suitable for women?” Do you try to “help her out” by taking over the more challenging assignments, rather than letting her take what comes?
3. Do you expect the same quality of work that you do from a male officer? Do you lower your expectations, or find fault with everything she does, simply because no woman can be expected to do a decent job?
4. Do you give the same serious consideration to her opinions and suggestions that you would if they were offered by a male colleague?
5. Do you trust the judgment and conclusions in her analytical reports, or are you constantly calling them into question? Do you arbitrarily substitute your own judgments for hers, even when she is more closely involved in the subject at hand?
6. Do you take the same interest in training a new woman officer that you would in training a male JOT, or do you sit back and expect her to “prove herself”? Are you seriously interested in her career development?
7. Do you answer her legitimate questions forthrightly, or do you in effect say “if you’re so smart you should know that?”
8. Do you routinely pass along information that would be useful to her in her work, or do you smugly wait for her to relearn it for herself?
9. Are you perhaps too ready to make yourself available to men (or women) reluctant to deal with a woman officer instead of suggesting that they “go to Ms. Jones, who handles that”—thereby depriving her of valuable contacts and undermining her status in the community?
10. Do you pass along to her opportunities to represent the mission at official functions which would be assigned as a matter of routine to a male officer in the same job?
11. Do you laugh along with others who ridicule women’s liberation, or do you publicly acknowledge the competence of your women officers?

We can insure your china during your stay in Peking.

For more than 45 years, the Government Service Policy has given added security to U.S. employees stationed abroad.

Worldwide all-risk coverage for government employees.

This policy covers all household goods and declared personal effects, such as furs, jewelry, silverware, paintings, antiques, cameras, liquor and priceless heirloom china.

It insures valuables, and accompanying luggage, against fire, theft, mysterious disappearance, floods, windstorms, and breakage—at any location in the world.

Special rates for American Foreign Service Association members.

Whether you’re stationed half-way around the world in Peking, or just across the ocean in London, the yearly premium is the same. It is computed as follows: first $1,000, 2%; next $4,000, 1-1/2%; and remaining value, 1%.

The annual rate for a total valuation of $10,000 is only $130—and special lowered rates are available to AFSA members.

When the policy is extended to cover goods-in-transit, the premium charge depends upon origin and destination. A separate, all-risk transit policy, with $50 deductible, can insure your automobile wherever it travels.

For additional information, write to us at our Main Office address, or, if you’re in town, call us (202) 234-5600.

Security Storage Company
of Washington

Main Office: 1701 Florida Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009
Maryland: Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Marlow Heights, White Oak
Virginia: Alexandria, McLean

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978
I believe the real test of equality is the extent to which a woman is expected to carry her full share of the work-load and is actively supported in doing so. I wonder how many other women have had written into their efficiency report that Ms. Jones is a capable officer, but unfortunately the work she was assigned to do did not justify a recommendation for promotion. Whose failure was that?

The questions above are not hypothetical. They derive from actual situations in which I have found myself on one occasion or another. I believe the real loser, in the last analysis, was the United States Government, which was not getting the full benefit of the talents it was paying for.

If it is fair that women should be given equal opportunity for careers in the Foreign Service, it is also fair that the Foreign Service should get maximum use of the resources which women bring to their jobs. Unfortunately, the fact is that archaic attitudes still limit their ability to contribute fully to the work of the Foreign Service.

It is true that a few supervisors have responded to the above questions in ways that constitute affirmative action in its fullest sense. They deserve credit for their probity.

Speaking again from my own overseas experience, however, I have found that I have often been more gracefully supported by the so-called "machos" of Latin America once they became aware of my function in the mission than I have by my male colleagues at the post. The latter have at times seemed more anxious to avoid offending host country nationals' supposed sensitivities than to get on with the job. There is a lesson there somewhere.

—"Ms. Jones"
The character of the diplomatic service of a state, that is, of that part of its machinery which deals with external relations, is determined by its social system and the concrete tasks the country’s ruling class sets before its diplomacy in this or that historical period...

In this context, interest is attached to some specific features of the US diplomatic service, which became manifest in its formative period and have remained to our own day, and which make it noticeably distinct from the diplomatic services of other capitalist countries, whose organizational structure, forms and methods took shape back in the feudal period and were inherited by the bourgeois system...

In America, the new bourgeois state emerged in the course of a liberation struggle carried on by the population of the British colonies against Britain, which, Lenin said, was “...one of those great, really liberating, really revolutionary wars.” The struggle was directed by the Continental Congress, which, until the adoption of the first US Constitution, exercised the functions of government and which was the prototype of the US Congress...

The Continental Congress also inaugurated the US diplomatic service by instituting in 1775 a foreign policy agency called the Committee of Secret Correspondence, which sent its representatives to France, Spain and several other European countries to secure their support in the fight against the British Empire.

The Committee of Secret Correspondence consisted of members of the Second Continental Congress, which represented rival factions and groups. That is why the discussion of any foreign policy issue involved controversy and conflict and this naturally complicated and frequently even rendered impossible any urgent decisions...

For instance, when the “moderate” Silas Deane was sent to Paris to negotiate an alliance with France against Britain, the “radicals” John Adams and Arthur Lee were also sent across with similar powers to strike a “balance.”

In one of his letters, Benjamin Franklin, then on a mission to France, and also shadowed by several “dou-
bles.” described this system as follows: “Speaking of commissioners in the plural puts me in mind of inquiring if it can be the intention of Congress to keep three commissioners at this court; we have indeed four with the gentleman intended for Tuscany, who continues here, and is very angry that he was not consulted in making a treaty. . . . We shall soon have a fifth. . . . But as to our number, whatever advantage there might be in the joint councils of three for framing and adjusting the articles of the treaty, there can be none in managing the common business of a resident here. On the contrary, all the advantages in negotiation that result from secrecy of sentiment and uniformity in expressing it and in common business from dispatch are lost. In a court, too, where every word is watched and weighed, if a number of commissioners do not every one hold the same language in giving their opinion on any public transaction, this lessens their weight. . . .”

However, despite the imperfections of the diplomatic service of the US Revolution, it coped with its tasks. Lenin put a high value on the agreements the United States signed with France and Spain against Britain, and called them “agreements with some oppressors against others.”

These successes of the fledgling US diplomacy were promoted above all by the fact that the tasks it was setting itself in that period were historically progressive and that the key diplomatic posts were then filled by outstanding political leaders like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson.

The fact that the US diplomatic service was set up by Congress and was directly guided by it also determined one of its long-term and basic features, namely, the considerable and constant influence on its work exerted by the legislative body. . . . Hence, the constant zigzags in US foreign policy, the constant changes of leadership at the State Department and of US diplomatic representatives abroad and the sharing out of diplomatic posts among non-professionals, followers of the party in power, and so on . . .

The obvious imperfections of the Committee of Secret Correspondence made necessary its reorganization, and in the spring of 1777 it was transformed into the Committee for Foreign Affairs, once again a body consisting of members of Congress. When it turned out that the reorganization had done nothing to improve the conduct of foreign affairs, it was decided to set up a Department of Foreign Affairs, as an executive body to be headed by a Secretary of Foreign Affairs. An official proposal was tabled at Congress on January 10, 1781, on this matter, despite resistance from the “radicals,” who insisted on the old arrangement.

The proposal emphasized that “the extent and rising power of these United States entitles them to a place among the great potentates of Europe.” It also made provision “for the Department of Foreign Affairs to be kept always in the place where Congress shall reside.”

The Department had on its staff only the Secretary, two assistants, two clerks and an interpreter. R. Livingston, who was appointed Secretary, simultaneously took part in the work of Congress as its plenipotentiary.

Livingston worked hard to enable the Department of Foreign Affairs to act without interference from Congress, and merely to report to it. He also began to put the foreign-service house in order, setting up ranks and a system of salaries depending on the importance of the posts. This helped to eliminate the old arrangement under which US diplomatic representatives paid for their own keep by engaging in commerce. The US consular service also began to take shape.

Livingston’s measures met with such fierce resistance in Congress, that in 1783 he was forced to resign, and the post of Secretary of Foreign Affairs remained vacant for 18 months. . . .

However, by then the spirit of the revolutionary changes in the United States had markedly evaporated, and there was a growing urge on the part of the US bourgeoisie to pursue a “traditional policy,” including foreign policy, so that the need for a professional diplomatic department virtually met with no more resistance in Congress and outside it. . . .

In accordance with the still effective Act of Congress of July 27, 1789, instituting the US diplomatic department, the Secretary of State was “to perform and execute such duties as shall be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States agreeable to the Constitution.” Consequently, in legal terms the head of the diplomatic bureau was given a highly peculiar status: he is not a responsible member of the Administration, but only a kind of “adviser” to the President on foreign policy matters . . .

The peculiar status of the head of the US diplomatic bureau usually did (and still does) much to complicate the process of adoption and implementation of US foreign policy decisions.

Considering that the Secretary of State was frequently appointed to his post as a result of diverse domestic political manoeuvres, it often happened that he became irrelevant because he had no prestige with the President and was not trusted by him. This made the Presidents use their own confidants (like Colonel House under Wilson or Harry Hopkins under Roosevelt) to frame and put through the most important policy acts. . . .

Under the Nixon Administration, when the President’s National Security Adviser Kissinger came to play a highly active role in framing and putting through US foreign policy, the State Department found itself largely out of touch with the meaningful diplomatic issues, and according to the prominent US Senator Stuart Symington, became the “laughingstock of Washington.” Kissinger’s subsequent appointment to the post of Secretary of State, while continuing in his post as the President’s National Security Adviser, that is, a virtual merger of the two posts “on a personal basis,” did not help matters, and there was even more noise over the “excessive concentration of power” in his hands. As a result, the post of White House Adviser went to one of Kissinger’s closest associates, which meant formal abolition of the merger between the “maxi” and “mini” state departments, but the situation continued in fact until the new Administration was installed in 1977.

Judging from President Carter’s statements, he appears to be trying to re-establish the old arrangement under which the Secretary of State is the President’s chief adviser on foreign policy matters. But one would think that the elements built into the status of the head of the US diplomatic bureau back in the late 18th century will continue to be felt in the future as well, depending on the concrete domestic and foreign policy circumstances. . . .
Up until the end of Civil War of 1861-1865, and the start of Reconstruction, the US diplomatic service had a minor role to play not only within the state apparatus, but also in US foreign policy.

US capitalism, still too weak economically and militarily to rival the other European powers in the world arena, concentrated on “rounding off” its territory at the expense of neighboring areas on the American continent. In 1818, the United States formalized its earlier seizure of Florida in a treaty of sale with Spain. In 1845, it occupied Texas and in 1848 nearly half the territory of Mexico. In the following years, it put through a number of other expansionist acts, chiefly in Latin America. These territorial gains were carried out under the immediate direction of Congress and the President, by military departments, and the authorities of the States neighboring on the occupied areas, so as to leave the impression that these were not foreign policy acts, but domestic matters of the United States, or, at any rate, acts of “local importance.”

All of this made the positions of the diplomatic service within the state apparatus weak and enabled other agencies to usurp its functions.

Thus, when the First Pan-American Conference was mooted in 1826, on the initiative of Simon Bolivar, leader of the national liberation movement in Latin America, it took Congress four months to discuss US participation in the Conference at the suggestion of US Secretary of State Henry Clay. By the time the US representative reached Panama, the Conference had been wound up...

In the first half of the 19th century, the US diplomatic service was most markedly hit with the chronic malaise of personnel fluctuation. The parties voted into power in an election immediately “shook up” the diplomatic posts, which were filled with its representatives, regardless of whether these had the necessary training or ability, and went mainly to those who had made large contributions to the campaign fund. (Upon the inauguration of the new President, all US Ambassadors traditionally tender their resignation, so enabling him either to confirm them in their posts or to replace them.)

Only after the Civil War, which ended in favor of the industrial North and paved the way for the conversion of the United States into a highly developed industrial power, US ruling circles also turned their attention to the need to fortify the diplomatic service, while building up their military, notably naval, power...

The establishment of geographical bureaus at the State Department gave it a higher organizational structure, even when compared with the Foreign Ministries of the Western powers, which had their geographical subdivisions included in a “political department,” while the functional departments—economic, cultural and so on—had their own geographical offices. All of this hampered operations and increased bureaucratic red tape, and so on.

As a result, the US diplomatic service, while having a relatively small staff (by 1881, the State Department had had only 48 officials), was better prepared to tackle the tasks facing it in the forthcoming bout between US imperialism and the old European colonial power, Spain, over Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and the US emergence in the world arena as the major capitalist predator.

The seizure of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico, the occupation of Cuba and the annexation of the Hawaiian islands from 1898 to 1902, were followed by the staging of a coup in Panama and the seizure of the Panama Canal zone in 1903, and the virtual occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1905 to 1907. With the proclamation in 1898 of the notorious “open door” doctrine, and its participation at the turn of the century in putting down the popular uprising in China, the United States launched upon establishing its influence over the whole of the Far East. The Theodore Roosevelt Administration helped Japan to prepare and fight the war against tsarist Russia between 1904 and 1905.

The US diplomatic service had an active role to play in all these aggressive acts, and was twice reorganized and expanded, in 1906 and 1909. The number of geographical bureaus at the State Department was increased to four, and the legal service was enlarged. Special attention was given to enhancing the role of career men both in the diplomatic and in the consular services, notably, within the senior echelon of the State Department (the Secretary of State and his four Deputies). A press bureau was set up and regular press conferences became traditional. During the First World War, the State Department included a Secret Intelligence Bureau.

In 1905, another attempt—as futile as earlier ones—was made to limit the sharing out of diplomatic posts for domestic political considerations. On instructions from the President, only the posts of ambassadors and envoys were shared out, all the other posts in the diplomatic and consular services had to go to career men. At the same time, measures were taken to ensure due social composition of US diplomacy, with the posts being filled by men coming exclusively from the ranks of the US bourgeoisie. Thus, Richard Salett says that a secretary of the diplomatic service needed much more money than he received as a salary, so that he could exist only if he had a big personal fortune. He added that sons and sons-in-law of rich men turned out to be excellent diplomats. Of course, this meant that they were truly loyal to the interests of US capital.

On the whole, however, the pace of development of the US diplomatic service in that period lagged behind the scale of US foreign policy. The staff of the diplomatic apparatus remained relatively small: by the start of the First World War the State Department had 35 diplomatic officials and 135 clerks, and the “whole machinery of foreign policy” was in the head, or as the joke then went, “under the hat” of the Assistant Secretary of State, the veteran Alverey (sic) Adee, who had served at the State Department for 54 years under 22 Secretaries of State.

President Wilson, who was known to have great ambitions in foreign policy, time and again ignored Secretary of State Lansing and the State Department. Indeed, he went so far as to set up in New York, with his assistant House, in circumvention of the State Department, an agency to prepare the forthcoming peace talks, headed by House’s son-in-law, and including a number of journalists, historians, and so on. The State Department did not always receive copies of the documents framed by this agency. Eventually, Secretary of State Lansing had to resign. Nor did the refusal of the US Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles do anything to enhance the prestige of the diplomatic service.

In the inter-war period, the extremely reactionar...
hidebound US foreign policy as a whole was clearly reflected in the diplomatic service. Secretary of State Colby, who took over from Lansing, won notoriety as the architect of the absurd US stand in refusing to recognize the Soviet Union. For 16 years, the State Department gave a lead to the most diehard anti-Soviet circles of the United States, resisting the establishment of diplomatic relations between their country and the USSR.

In that period, US diplomacy had a secondary role to play in international affairs, as compared with that of the other capitalist powers, and was clearly slower in responding to events and in displaying flexibility and mobility. In 1920, G. V. Chicherin said: "US diplomacy suffers from some kind of provincialism, from an inadequate knowledge of world relations. This foremost capitalist power has a role to play which falls far short of that which it could have played had it been in possession of the remarkable diplomatic art which is at the disposal of the British ruling circles." At international conferences and on other occasions, US diplomatic representatives most frequently remained passive observers.

Of course, the fact that the diplomatic service was passive did not mean that the foreign policy of US imperialism as a whole was also passive. The United States was stepping up its aggressive intervention in the affairs of other countries, but this activity was largely carried on by the war department, the intelligence service and various "special representatives," some of whom were bankers and businessmen.

The 1924 Rogers Act alone did something to effect a structural improvement of the US diplomatic service. Under it, the diplomatic and consular services (a total of more than 600 officials) were merged in a single foreign service, but the actual merger dragged out for years and was more or less realized only after the Second World War.

On the other hand, in 1927, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover managed to put through Congress a law allowing his department to have its own representatives abroad. Hoover's example was followed by the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture and even by the Bureau of Mines Industry. The appearance of these numerous missions and representatives, who did not, as a rule, feel bound to coordinate their acts with the US Embassy, let alone take instructions from it, did not make the US diplomatic service activity more orderly.

The Second World War initially led to relatively minor changes in the structure of the State Department. Some 100,000 Americans found themselves in the military operations area and had to be evacuated, released from internment camps, and so on, and a special department was set up in 1939 for these purposes. The economic service was somewhat enlarged.

However, there was an ever more manifest desire on the part of the US ruling circles to prepare for the hour when the war, they hoped, would end with the exhaustion of the countries fighting in Europe and Asia, which would enable the United States to dictate the peace terms, determine the post-war order and put through its scheme for establishing a system of US world domination. The diplomatic service began to prepare for this eventuality, even before the United States itself was involved in the war: in January 1940, a special committee chaired by Sumner Welles, a Deputy Secretary of State, was set up, and in February 1941 a group for collecting and analyzing information on the post-war plans of the allied and neutral governments. By the end of 1941, the staff of the State Department had noticeably increased.

The foreign service was also rapidly expanding, notably with the establishment of a number of military bureaus, whose sphere of action included foreign countries, where they had their own missions (Foreign Economic Administration, Office of War Information, Coordination of Inter-American Affairs, and so on). Sillit says that US diplomatic missions were driven to desperation by the ill-considered statements and acts of these representatives. The President even issued an order in this connection instructing all US representatives abroad that they must submit to the foreign policy direction of the State Department, which set up a special committee chaired by the Secretary of State. However, the confusion and the inter-departmental bickering and intrigues went on.

Let us note that during the Second World War the institution of special presidential representatives and ambassadors on special assignments had a great positive role to play. President Roosevelt sent his confidants, like Harry Hopkins and Averell Harriman, on special missions which helped to speed up and facilitate the achievement of understandings and agreements with the Soviet Union and other states in shaping the anti-Hitler coalition and making more efficient use of its potentialities to rout Nazi Germany and its satellites. It is safe to say that inasmuch as the machinery of the US diplomatic service at that time was on the whole extremely reactionary and hidebound, with anti-Soviet circles calling the tune, there would have been a great slowdown (and the time factor was then highly important) or a total frustration of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on pooling efforts in the fight against Nazism, if they had been conducted through the State Department.

The aggressive policy of forging world domination, which US ruling circles adopted after the Second World War, also predetermined the status of the US diplomatic service.

Addressing a subcommittee of the US Senate on national security operation and provision of personnel (Jackson Subcommittee) in 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared: "When I was on the General Staff in the Pentagon at the end of the war, the State Department at that time was not filling in all of the needs for policy leadership and guidance that were required at the Penta-
gion with its vast deployments all over the world. In effect, where there is vacuum, those who have to act one way or the other have to make policy, and so we were making a good deal of policy in the General Staff at the end of the war.

Ambassador E. Briggs, an experienced US diplomat with 40 years of experience, described the situation in even franker terms: "During World War II, the State Department and its overseas personnel were rather generally pushed aside, and the military took over diplomacy. Since the surrender of Germany and Japan brought not peace but the cold war, the military remain today very much—and very willingly—in the diplomatic picture."

He gave examples of his experience as Ambassador in a number of countries, when the military almost entirely trampled on the diplomats.

The Jackson Subcommittee noted that "in the postwar years, the United States greatly expanded its overseas operations. Alongside the old diplomatic missions, large, semi-independent organizations for economic and military aid and cultural and information programs grew up. Labor, Agriculture, and other departments and agencies sent representatives abroad. American military bases and installations, with sizable American forces, were established in many countries. Many of these organizations and representatives had their own lines of reporting to Washington and had statutory authority and responsibilities defined by Congress. . . . All of these developments placed the authority and prestige of the Ambassador in doubt and put great strains on the old diplomatic machinery."

In 1968, for instance, the US embassy in France had 273 State Department officials and 653 Pentagon officials. A veteran US diplomatist, R. Murphy (sic), sadly stated in his memoirs: "More than half a million American military personnel and their families are scattered over the globe, and it is inevitable that the Departments of Defense and State occasionally disagree on correlation of foreign policy. . . . Ever since World War II thousands of American military men have been learning about foreign affairs, and some of them are persuaded they could do a better job in diplomacy than the career diplomat."

For its part, by the early 1960s, the CIA had 3,700 of its agents operating in the guise of diplomats, while the State Department had about 3,900 diplomatic officials. Thus, in 1960s, 16 of the 20 officials at the Political Department of the US Embassy in Austria were CIA agents. But the point was, of course, not the number of agents, but the extent to which the CIA conducted its "diplomacy" of subversion and provocations, armed plots, coups, and assassinations of statesmen and politicians in foreign countries.

The US press subsequently reported (and the State Department refrained from denying the report) that during the war in Vietnam the US embassy in Cambodia regularly helped to target US Air Force planes engaged in the carpet bombing of the country with which the United States still had "normal diplomatic relations."

Within the State Department itself, operations were restructured on military lines. In 1946, Congress passed the Foreign Service Act, which invalidated the 1924 and subsequent acts determining the system of ranks and salaries in the US diplomatic corps, the procedure governing appointments, promotion, and so on.

The procedures already adopted by the US Navy were introduced for US diplomats. Special committees began regularly to consider the dossier of every US diplomat to decide on his promotion or dismissal, if they found that he had not been fit for promotion over a period of years. In this way the "purge" of US diplomatic service officials who were "too liberal" was made permanent, and it was provided with something like a sound legal basis.

The drive mounted by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s to rid US diplomacy of "communist infiltration" also had a great influence in shaping the personnel of the US diplomatic service. It had always been reactionary, but now the last few officials who dared to make a more or less objective evaluation of the international situation were driven out.

These processes produced a situation in which President Kennedy, elected in 1960, had to declare that the US diplomatic service was extremely unwieldy and shot through with red tape, so that it was ultimately un governable even by the White House.

Stewart Alsop, an informed Washington columnist, described this characteristic episode. Kennedy had asked the State Department to send him a brief—which he wanted that very day—concerning US policy with respect to British Guiana. However, the State Department promised to let him have it "within a week or two." When the columnist inquired why the President could not be supplied with a brief on such an urgent matter that very day, a friend at the State Department told him: "But my God, man, you can't expect a subordinate officer to produce a policy paper out of his hat. It would be as much as his career was worth. First, a paper would have to be drafted, and then it would have to move up through the various levels of the Office of Inter-American Affairs. Then there would be clearances and consent of European Affairs, International Organization Affairs, Intelligence and Research, etc. Then it got up near the Secretary level—clearances would be from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, maybe Treasury or Commerce. And finally the paper would have to be cleared by the National Security Council. A policy in an afternoon? Good God!"

President Kennedy set up at the White House his own "mini state department" consisting of the staff of his special National Security Adviser. Let us note, however, that this did not prevent the United States from suffering some scandalous farces in its aggressive policy, like the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961 and its blockade in 1962, the US involvement in the "dirty war" in Vietnam, and so on. The reason did not lie in a crisis of the diplomatic service, but in a crisis of US foreign policy itself.

The complete subordination of the US diplomatic service to the purposes of armed aggression and subversive activity naturally reduced US diplomacy to a state of extreme decline, and of this broad public circles became painfully aware. More and more items in the US press sharply demanded that radical measures should be taken to put the State Department in order, but the criticism was, as a rule, concentrated on various aspects of organization of the central apparatus and the embassies, the system of appointments, training and promotion of personnel, etc., and tended to ignore the main thing, namely, the defective and unrealistic character of US foreign policy itself. However, the growing discontent with the state of the US diplomatic service was in itself highly symptomatic.
Lyndon B. Johnson, who followed Kennedy at the White House, was most concerned with lying in the State Department's activity with that of the Pentagon, the CIA and other departments. With that end in view, an intricate system of coordination on three levels was set up: first, for the countries, on the level of the State Department's geographical bureaus and their equivalents in other departments; second, for the regions, on the level of Assistant Secretaries of State (so-called interdepartmental regional groups), and on the level of the departments (so-called higher intergovernmental group headed by the Deputy Secretary of State). To these permanent coordinating agencies were added a great number of special inter-departmental groups, committees, and so on.

It was the common view of those taking part in all these “groups” that this intricate system soon became a nightmare, and merely added to the confusion. Nor could it have been otherwise, because the “coordination system” was designed to step up the attainment of what was obviously an unattainable goal: in the conditions of the world balance of forces, which tilted in favor of socialism, to deliver a blow at the socialist states and the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia. Besides, neither the Pentagon, the CIA nor the other departments, which had long since ceased to reckon with the State Department, could be made to submit to it overnight, let alone on matters arising from the country’s overall aggressive line.

The period of escalation of the aggressive war in Vietnam undoubtedly marked one of the greatest declines both of the diplomacy and the diplomatic service of the United States. In its efforts to display an urge for a political settlement in order to cover up the US aggression in Vietnam, US diplomacy merely initiated “peace probes” from time to time, and then raised loud noises on this score in the pro-government press. It was obvious, however, that these “probes” boiled down to a patently unrealistic demand that the patriotic forces should surrender on US terms.

When the inevitability of defeat became obvious even to the US ruling circles, and the Johnson Administration was forced, in view of the forthcoming Presidential elections, to enter into negotiations in May 1968 with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the DRV, the US diplomatic department, far from making any attempts to advance these negotiations, in effect joined the Pentagon and the CIA in driving them into an impasse. This largely predetermined the defeat of the Democratic Party in the Presidential elections.

It is noteworthy that in the last few months of the Johnson Administration, the US diplomatic service was in a state of actual disintegration. In May and June 1968, anticipating a Democratic defeat at the polls, responsible officials of the State Department and of other civilian departments began feverishly to cast around for jobs in business, at the universities, in various funds, and so on. When faced with inquiries from foreign diplomats, they waxed ironic, and frankly advised them to wait until the new Administration was installed. The Under Secretary of State, Eugene Rostow, left in October 1968, and the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in November...

The line of “Vietnamization of the conflict” adopted by the new Nixon Administration was worked out and then put through by the White House virtually without the State Department, or to be more precise, despite its covert resistance. Let us recall, for instance, that the US Embassy in Saigon, headed by Ambassador Bunker and then by Ambassador Martyn (sic), was a rabid advocate of the interests of the Saigon clique headed by Thieu, which sought to drag out the war.

President Nixon’s resignation following the Watergate scandal and the approach of the new presidential elections brought about a sharp change in the situation. Attacks on detente and the policy of normalizing relations with the USSR were stepped up by the reactionary extremists: the military-industrial complex, the Zionists and ultra-rightists, and this gave a boost to the numerous obscurantist elements in the US diplomatic apparatus, who, in breach of the elementary rules of the officials’ code of conduct, began assiduously to supply the political opponents of the President and the Secretary of State with secret information about the Administration’s foreign policy acts and to contrive various difficulties by all possible means.

Under Nixon and Ford, the US diplomatic service itself was not subjected to any structural or other reforms. Within a few months of Kissinger’s installation in the State Department, it turned out that “he uses the department more than when he was only a presidential adviser, but the operation is still based on a small personal team.”

Appointments to ambassadorial posts continued to serve as a reward for contributions to party funds and for other services... In May 1973, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to discuss this matter, in connection with the appointment to the post of US Ambassador to Luxemburg of a certain Ruth Farkas, who together with her husband had donated $300,000, US Secretary of State William Rogers declared that the sale of ambassadorial posts “had persisted through all Administrations” and was “a fact of life of our system.” The woman was confirmed by the Senate Committee and took up the ambassadorial post.

A Senate Committee led by Senator Fulbright voiced its disapproval of these practices and recommended that the share of Ambassadors drawn by the Administration from among outsiders should not exceed 15 per cent of the total, while persons who had contributed over $10,000 to the ruling party’s campaign fund should not be confirmed by the Committee for these posts. But this made no difference. During the electoral campaign, James Carter declared in his book: “We top this off with the disgraceful... policy of appointing unqualified persons to major diplomatic posts as political payoffs.

Continued on page 31
Old Tippecanoee in Bogotá

ROBERT E. WILSON

General William Henry Harrison is perhaps the least remembered of American presidents, since his term of office lasted just one month. Affectionately known as "Old Tippecanoee" because of his victory in the Battle of Tippecanoee, 1810, the motto for his election campaign in 1840 was "Tippecanoee and Tyler Too," which turned out to be particularly appropriate. His running mate John Tyler was to be the first Vice President to succeed to the presidential office upon the incumbent's death in office and was to serve three years and eleven months.

If Harrison's brief experience as president has been all but forgotten, so has the fact that, like five other early presidents, Old Tippecanoee also served his country as a diplomat. He was, in fact, our first Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Colombia, and the only American president to serve in a diplomatic assignment in the Western Hemisphere. He was also one of the first to be declared persona non grata.

There was much interest in the Latin American independence movement and especially in Simón Bolivar, the Liberator, sometimes known as the Washington of South America. A friend of Harrison, Colonel Charles S. Todd, served as American Confidential Agent in Bogotá from 1820 to 1823, and was perhaps responsible for Harrison's seeking appointment as Minister to Gran Colombia in 1823. "Gran Colombia" included the present-day republics of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panamá.

Harrison was disappointed when the job was not given to him in 1823. Instead, President James Monroe appointed Richard C. Anderson as the first Minister—but without the title of Envoy Extraordinary—to Bolivar's Gran Colombia.

Having failed to gain the desired appointment in Bogotá, Harrison asked to be sent to Mexico, and was again passed over in favor of Joel R. Poinsett, who was to be declared persona non grata for interference in local affairs.

Having failed a second time to win a diplomatic appointment, Old Tippecanoee ran for the Senate, where his prestige was enhanced by service as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. He was still interested in a Latin American diplomatic appointment, however, and finally, largely through the influence of Secretary of State Henry Clay, President John Quincy Adams appointed him Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Gran Colombia in 1829.

During these years, Bolivar's dream for a united continent was gradually being frustrated by local rivalries, dissension, and separatist movements. The Liberator, whose power also extended to Bolivia and Perú, was forced to spend much of his time outside of Gran Colombia. His dream of a Union of American States culminated in the Congress of Panamá of 1826. Minister R. C. Anderson from Bogotá was assigned to attend that meeting as representative of the United States, but unfortunately died en...
Bolivar was in Caracas endeavoring the creation of the Pan American Union. Actually, 50 years were to elapse before Bolivar's dream was realized in part through the creation of the Pan American Union.

Following Anderson's death, the Legation in Bogotá was headed by chargé d'affaires Beaufort Watts. On one occasion in 1827, when Bolivar was in Caracas endeavoring to suppress a secessionist movement, Watts became alarmed that General Santander was threatening to usurp power in Colombia. Watts became alarmed and continued his representation in Bogotá until his successor's arrival.

Harrison became convinced soon after taking office in Bogotá that Bolivar, far from giving up the military dictatorship he had established, was planning to make himself emperor. The idea was repugnant to him, and his fears were nurtured by a coterie of Colombians and foreign residents who were plotting to overthrow Bolivar and thwart the monarchical scheme. The Minister entertained Bogotá society at a lavish Independence Day party on July 4, 1829.

Meanwhile, on the very same day that Moore presented his credentials, John Patrick Moore, finally arrived in Bogotá on September 21, 1829. The ship which had brought Moore had gone on to Brazil, and it was to be many months before arrangements could be made for Harrison's repatriation.

Continued on page 30
"Perhaps of all the creations of man language is the most astonishing."—Lytton Strachey

The diplomat suffers more than most from the punishment the Lord inflicted on man for trying to build a tower that would reach to heaven. How can amity and mutual understanding be created in a world that speaks several thousand languages? Even the Foreign Service Institute can teach only several score.

George Steiner called man's multiplicity of languages "the incomunicados that so absurdly divide him." Foreign Service officers deal every day with the effects of the division, especially when they are assigned to a post where, in the Lord's words as reported by the prophet Ezekiel, there are "many people of a strange speech and of an hard language whose words thou canst not understand."

In a world where individuals of the same language often misunderstand one another with harmful consequences, it seems almost miraculous that linguistic confusion between diplomats or governments has so rarely been blamed as the cause of serious harm. Yet, some instances are known and others have undoubtedly taken place without being noticed. Sir Harold Nicolson, both a practitioner and historian of diplomacy, wrote, "Nobody who has not actually watched statesmen dealing with each other can have any real idea of the immense part played in human affairs by such unavowable and often unrecognizable causes as latitude, affability, personal affection or dislike, misunderstanding, deafness, or incomplete command of a foreign language."

Nor does the use of interpreters always prevent misunderstanding. Only two years ago Daniel P. Moynihan became quite angry when Soviet United Nations delegate Jacob Malik said the United States should "take care." Moynihan retorted that the United States was not intimidated by threats. Malik said later a UN interpreter had incorrectly translated a Russian word that actually meant "take heed." Moynihan asked Malik's forgiveness and added, "The record must be amended to show that the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union said what he wanted to say."

An incompetent interpreter placed George Washington in a humiliating position when he signed the document surrendering his Virginia militia men to a superior force of French and Indians at Fort Necessity in 1754.

A few days earlier Washington's troops had surprised a small French detachment, killing several including the commander. The commander of the French surrounding Fort Necessity was the brother of the slain officer. The terms of capitulation were given to Captain Jacob Van Braam, Washington's only French-speaking officer (there had been another but he had collapsed from the effects of a wound), and brought to the little stockade. It was dark and raining.

Van Braam was a Dutchman who had come to Virginia only two years previously. His French was considered satisfactory but his English was poor. Washington asked him to translate the surrender terms. Another officer wrote later: "It rained so heavily that he could not give us a written translation of them; we could scarcely keep the candle lit to read them; they were wrote in a bad hand on wet and blotted paper so that no person could read them but Van Braam, who had heard them from the mouth of the French officer."

Van Braam laboriously translated the rain-soaked document. When he came to a mention of the slain French officer he told Washington it referred to the officer's death as an assassination. The terms of the surrender were widely circulated in Europe and Washington was mortified to learn he was being portrayed as a man who had admitted to an assassination.

In 1945 a single word again led to misunderstanding. At the Potsdam meeting, the Allies issued an ultimatum threatening "utter de-
struck of the Japanese homeland" unless Japan surrendered unconditionally. The Tokyo government decided to stall for time by belittling the ultimatum without actually rejecting it. John Toland describes what happened:

"Prime Minister Suzuki told reporters: 'The Potsdam Proclamation, in my opinion, is just a rehash of the Cairo Declaration and the Government therefore does not consider it of great importance. We must mokusatsu it.' The word means literally 'kill with silence,' but as Suzuki later told his son, he intended it to stand for the English phrase 'no comment,' for which there is no Japanese equivalent. Americans, however, understandably applied the dictionary meanings: 'ignore,' and 'treat with silent contempt.'"

President Truman wrote in his memoirs that the Japanese response was to call the proclamation "unworthy of consideration... absurd... presumptuous." A few days later the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

Most historians believe the President would have ordered the bomb dropped in any case. However, said Michael Girsdansky, "If in fact this mistake did confirm America's resolve to drop the atomic bomb, the error may well have been the most costly linguistic blunder in human history."

Christopher Columbus took an interpreter with him when he sailed westward from Spain in 1492. It was commonly believed in Europe that Arabic was the mother of all languages, so he took along a man who knew Arabic, as well as Hebrew and Aramaic. His disappointment was great when the Indians encountered on San Salvador on October 12 understood none of the interpreter's languages.

Columbus took several Indians with him when he set sail for further exploration of the area. They were useful as guides and eventually learned a few words of Spanish, but sign language had to be the principal means of communication throughout his exploration of the Bahamas and the Caribbean.

Since Columbus was convinced he was somewhere in the vicinity of China, he sought every opportunity to find evidence of the Grand Khan. And he was, of course, much interested in finding gold. On one island he asked some Indians—by signs and the display of gold objects—where he might find gold. They replied by pointing to the interior of the island and uttering a phrase that sounded to him like "El Gran Can." He immediately dispatched a diplomatic mission—headed by the Arabic-Hebrew interpreter—to meet the Grand Khan.

Most of the early explorers of the New World took Indians away with them as guides or trophies, and some eventually could be of at least slight use as interpreters. When Cortes sailed to Yucatan in 1519, he took along a young Indian another Spaniard had brought back to the Spanish settlement in Cuba the year before. Also in the party were two priests, who tried mightily to convert the natives of Yucatan to Christianity, and explained the spiritual benefits that would accrue from conversion. William Prescott commented that "the Indian interpreter must have afforded a rather dubious channel for the transmission of such abstruse doctrine."

"Nixon quoted numerous remarks by himself and the Soviet premier, but credited the interpreters only with translation of the dirty words. He did say that while his own interpreter was whispering into his ear what Khrushchev was saying on another occasion, he had time to formulate telling replies."

with them as guides or trophies, and some eventually could be of at least slight use as interpreters. When Cortes sailed to Yucatan in 1519, he took along a young Indian another Spaniard had brought back to the Spanish settlement in Cuba the year before. Also in the party were two priests, who tried mightily to convert the natives of Yucatan to Christianity, and explained the spiritual benefits that would accrue from conversion. William Prescott commented that "the Indian interpreter must have afforded a rather dubious channel for the transmission of such abstruse doctrine."

Perhaps only the most skilled interpreters know to what extent great men misunderstood one another, and they are bound by discretion. Sophia Porson, a State Department diplomatic interpreter, once said (without offering examples) that "we're bound to hear some pretty outrageous and even idiotic things said that we have to convey." Charles W. Thayer, an FSO who often acted as an interpreter of Russian for high-ranking officials, remarked that "if
The principal negotiator is wordy or at all imprecise, it is difficult for the interpreter to translate his imprecisions accurately."

The memoirs of famous men show no suspicion that linguistic confusion could have been one of the rocks on which foreign policies foundered. To them, the interpreter was as basic as the telephone and scarcely more worthy of attention. References to interpreters are perfunctory.

Richard Nixon mentioned the presence of interpreters in two of the "Six Crises" in his book of that name—when he faced violent leftist demonstrators in Latin America and in his unpleasant encounter with Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow, both as Vice President.

In Caracas, Mr. Nixon wrote, his interpreter translated the obscenities shouted at him by the leftists, and put into Spanish his rejoinder that they were nothing but cowards. In Moscow, he said, Khrushchev's own interpreter blushed at the earthy language he had to put into English for the visiting American statesman. Mr. Nixon quoted numerous remarks by himself and the Soviet premier, but credited the interpreters only with translation of the dirty words.

He did say that while his own interpreter was whispering into his ear what Khrushchev was saying on another occasion, he had time to formulate telling replies.

President Truman referred to the presence of interpreters at Potsdam, but said nothing further about them except that "if there was any disagreement among the interpreters as to the proper Russian word or its English equivalent, they would settle it right there."

Dean Acheson wrote that when he talked with Portuguese dictator Salazar in 1952 he had the services of "a truly great interpreter" from the US Embassy staff. But in his lengthy descriptions of numerous four-power meetings on Germany he had nothing to say about his interpreters—except to remark that it was "an excruciating bore" to have to sit around and wait for every speech to be translated into the other two languages.

Although Acheson saw nothing worth recording about the work of his interpreters, he wrote with amusement about the linguistic relationship between Chancellor Adenauer and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, an Alsatian "who had spoken German long before he had spoken French." At a 1951 conference Schuman began to reply to Adenauer in German without waiting for translation. "This did not bother Eden or me," Acheson recalled, "as we counted on learning sooner or later what they were talking about, but it greatly upset Schuman's Foreign Office aides, who were great sticklers for the use of French. They would pull at his coattails to make him wait until what he had understood perfectly was repeated in French and English."

Since perfect understanding is a desirable condition, it would be surprising if an interpreter did not at least occasionally try to provide more clarity than the original statement contained. Sophia Porson told of such an attempt by a young interpreter for General Mark Clark in a meeting with Charles de Gaulle.

Clark was trying to extract a concession from de Gaulle. The interpreter, trying to be helpful, translated de Gaulle's French into English, then added comments like "General de Gaulle says no but I think he means maybe," or "I think if you press him on it he'll change his mind."

At the end of the meeting, Mrs. Porson said, de Gaulle turned to the young interpreter and in good English thanked him for his fine interpreting. "The moral," she said, "is that you have to assume that people know what you're saying, particularly in English."

Charles Thayer's failure to make that assumption caused a small flap in Washington in 1945. Thayer's military mission in Yugoslavia was being replaced by the first post-war US diplomatic mission. He escorted the new ambassador, a former businessman, to see Marshal Tito. Thayer related what happened in his book, Diplomat.

The new ambassador, carried away by Tito's charm, urged the Marshal to go to Washington and assured him he would get a warm welcome. Thayer knew the ambassador had no authority to issue such an invitation and that Tito would not be welcome anyhow. "I paraphrased the ambassador's words, expressing the hope that some day, after he had turned over the reins of government, Tito might find it interesting to come to America and see how we dealt with our problems."

Unfortunately, Tito had been taking English lessons. "He looked at me, smiled, and wagged his finger: 'Colonel, you know very well the ambassador said no such thing.'" Soon the Yugoslav mission in Washington relayed to the State Department a message accepting the ambassador's invitation. Consternation! However, the death of President Roosevelt made it possible to inform Tito that his visit would have to be indefinitely postponed.

I have sympathized with diplomatic interpreters ever since that evening in Paris many years ago with another young American soldier and two young ladies whose complete ignorance of English was matched by my friend's utter lack of French. I would have preferred to give all my attention to the winsome creature whom chance had made mine for the evening, but I was repeatedly pressed into service as the linguistic channel through which they negotiated the terms that would govern their future relationship. "What did he say?" "Why is she mad at me?" "Tell her I'm not married." "He keeps saying the same word to me. What does it mean?"

They bickered constantly in their mutually incomprehensible languages. My imperfect French was stretched beyond its limits in trans-

Continued on page 28
AFSA NEWS

CONTENTS
Selection Out .................................. 17b
Mandatory Retirement .......................... 17c
Promotion Prospects ............................ 17e
Neil Boyer on EdBoard .......................... 17g
AID/AFSA Actions .............................. 17d
AFSA Scholarships .............................. 17e
Presidential Appointments ...................... 17e
Housing Allowance ............................ 17g
Foreign Service People ....................... 17h

10TH ANNUAL AWARDS CEREMONY

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to employees of the foreign affairs agencies at the Tenth Annual Awards Ceremony sponsored by the American Foreign Service Association on December 9.

The William R. Rivkin Award, presented by the Rivkin family in honor of the late Ambassador, was given to John D. Blacken, Foreign Service officer in the State Department. Mr. Blacken in his sixteen years in the Service has made significant contributions to the development of leaders in southern Africa, silhouetting the ebb and flow of human rights in Brazil and creating within the government acceptance of the need for a new Panama Canal treaty.

G. Nicholas Mauger, III, Foreign Service officer in the State Department, received the W. Averell Harriman Award for junior officers. This Award, presented by the veteran diplomat and public servant, cited Mr. Mauger’s maturity, analytical ability, and intellectual courage in dealing with local leaders in a heavily charged political atmosphere in Micronesia.

The Leonard H. Marks Award for creativity in communication is presented annually to a Foreign Service Information Officer in the United States Information Agency. This year’s recipient of the Award from the former Director of USIA is George R. Thompson. Mr. Thompson is being recognized for his success in creating the English Language Center in Riyadh, developing USIA’s first modern multi-media cultural center in Khartoum, and establishing the agency’s new regional Arabic periodical which he edits and produces in Tunis.

Association President Lars H. Hydle introduced the speaker and his remarks appear on page 2 of this issue. The awards, each of which carries a $1,000 tax free stipend, were presented by the donors.

HELP WANTED

What are your ideas and thoughts on:
1. Should there be a Foreign Service Code of Ethics????
   If “Yes,” what points should be covered????
2. What makes a career in the Foreign Service unique????
   How is the Foreign Service, as a profession, distinct from other professions????
AFSA members and other readers of the *FS Journal* are urged to send their thoughts, ideas, comments to our new Professional Affairs Committee.

Recent attacks on the Foreign Service for the lack of any adequate code of ethics and claims that the Foreign Service is just a warmed-over version of the Civil Service make it important to examine these matters. If those critics are right, then the Foreign Service loses any justification for special allowances and benefits, or even a special pay and retirement system. Because of concern prompted by these and other attacks, the AFSA Governing Board created the Professional Affairs Committee and assigned it this responsibility.

The Committee has a rather wide mandate. Its terms of reference are:

a. arrange for the discussion of foreign policy issues among Members and Associates as well as other experts in the foreign affairs agencies and elsewhere, using the Foreign Service Club whenever possible, and collaborating, as appropriate, with non-governmental organizations and the media, in order to strengthen their understanding of foreign policy issues, with a view to enlarging public interest and awareness of these issues, and support for the professional role of the Foreign Service:

b. pursue relationships with non-governmental organizations and the media, in order to strengthen their understanding of foreign policy issues, with a view to enlarging public interest and awareness of these issues, and support for the professional role of the Foreign Service:

c. assist the Editorial Board in obtaining material suitable for publication on professional matters and substantive foreign policy issues;

d. develop for Board approval a statement of the uniqueness of the Foreign Service as a career:

e. report to the Board on the desirability and feasibility of a Foreign Service code of ethics:

f. recommend to the Governing Board other ways in which AFSA can promote the intelligent, efficient, and skillful discharge of the professional duties of the Foreign Service and of the missions of the foreign affairs agencies.

Committee members are:
Eugene M. Braderman, Chairman; Robert G. Cleveland; Neil A. Boyer; Charles W. Freeman, Jr.; Martin F. Herz; Harry Petrequin; and Paul V. Ward.

AFSA members are urged to send their views as soon as possible to the Committee, c/o American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. Contributions are needed before the end of February 1978.

Using your responses as a basis, AFSA plans a conference on this subject early in the spring of 1978. A report on the conference will be published in the *Journal*. Ultimately, if desirable and feasible, a formal Foreign Service Code of Ethics and/or a statement on the uniqueness of the Foreign Service as a career will be considered for adoption by the Governing Board and circulated widely.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978
SELECTION-OUT FOR TIME-IN-CLASS

Court Case: Colm v. Vance: The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision in the case of Colm v. Vance on November 18, 1977. The appellants were Foreign Service officers in the Department of State who lost their jobs as a result of selection-out for time-in-class in 1968 and 1970, respectively. At the district court level, Judge Gasch had ruled in December 1975 that the plaintiffs (Mr. Colm and Mr. McIntyre) had no property interest in continued employment with the Department of State after the expiration of their allotted time in class, and they therefore had no constitutional entitlement to be provided with procedural due process (that is, a hearing) before they could be dismissed.

The appellants argued before the Court of Appeals that their dismissals had violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, in that neither was afforded a hearing prior to his termination and had no opportunity to see the entire contents of his personnel file and to object to erroneous comments made in efficiency reports. The cases arose prior to the enactment of the grievance amendments to the Foreign Service Act, which AFSA helped to draft and to secure passage of in 1975. They claimed that they were entitled to a fair opportunity to be promoted, including the right to challenge adverse material in the files upon which promotion decisions are based. This right, the appellants urged, should be recognized as a constitutional right, providing a qualitative dimension to the property interest which adheres to employment during the time-in-class period.

The Court declined the invitation to rule on constitutional grounds whether the appellants had set forth an acceptable basis for finding a constitutional right to make the kind of challenge to their personnel files which the appellants had been unable to make prior to their dismissals. In its decision, the Court said, "we are not yet ready to accept this invitation to travel further down the way of constitutionalizing every manner of government personnel decision." D.C. Cir. No. 76-1252, slip opinion p. 9. However, the Court did overrule the judgment of the district court, which had ruled in favor of the government without a trial on the merits. The Court of Appeals cited several provisions of the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. 987, 991, and 993) which they said, might suffice to provide the appellants with a basis for their claim to a fair consideration for promotion, without resorting to a determination whether that right is found in the Constitution or not.

The case was remanded to the district court so that the district court can examine the question whether the statutory provisions of the Foreign Service Act provide a basis for the relief the appellants claim. In the event the court finds they do not, the district court would then decide whether there is a constitutional basis under the due process clause for relief. A final determination on the merits will therefore await renewed consideration of the case by the district court.

We will continue to keep you informed as the case progresses.

AFSA SAYS "NO" TO NEW PROPOSALS ON "SELECTION OUT"

AFSA has rejected the Department of State’s proposal of last August to agree upon the Department’s revised procedures on Selection Out on performance grounds. As proposed by the Department, officers would generally be selected out of the Foreign Service upon being ranked in the lowest 10% of their class by any two non-consecutive Selection Boards. The proposal also included the discontinuance of the Performance Standards Board and Special Appeal Board and provided that the only opportunity for appeal from selection out would be to the Foreign Service Grievance Board.

AFSA’s decision to say “No” was circulated to Chapters abroad in the following telegram:

1. On December 5, 1977, AFSA sent a letter to State management in response to its new proposals on selection out. Key portions of letter follow: "AFSA transmitted the proposals to the field through telegram and to the Washington membership. The response was helpful to us. We have had extensive discussions and study on the matter, and a number of different and alternative formulations have been explored and thoroughly debated. We have appreciated management’s detailed and complete responsiveness to the questions that we posed during the process.

We have reached the conclusion, based on our extensive survey, debate, and comprehensive consideration of the issues, that we do not accept management’s new proposal.

On selection out for low-ranking, we wish at least for one more year, to continue with the performance standards board procedures which were carefully developed after long study and consultation.

In the interest of stability, morale, and equity, and considering the overwhelming desires of our members and our concern for the welfare of the Foreign Service, AFSA cannot associate itself with the proposition that mere low-ranking alone is a sound selection out criterion. In addition, we are not convinced that such a proposal would satisfy the due process requirements of Lindsey v. Kissinger." End of text of letter citation.

2. AFSA/W appreciates the many helpful responses which contributed to this decision. Seasons greetings. Hyde Vance.

The Department has not yet reacted to our letter.

In USIA, we are informed that AFGE, the AFL-CIO affiliate representing Foreign Service employees in that agency, has agreed to procedures whereby FSOs can be selected out on performance grounds if ranked for three consecutive years in the low 3 per cent.

USIA VOLUNTEER SPEAKER PROGRAM

The Association recently learned, through one of our retired members, that USIA had apparently adopted a rule precluding use of the services of retired USIA officers in the Voluntary Speakers Program overseas. We could discern no rational basis for such a policy and wrote USIA Director John Reinhardt to ask for an explanation. We are pleased to report that no such policy currently exists. Mr. Reinhardt replied in part, “We welcome and indeed seek the participation in these programs of any speaker whose qualifications match specific Agency and post requirements and whose international travel plans accord with our timing needs.”
MISMANAGEMENT BLOCKS PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES

Morale among communication personnel and other specialty Foreign Service categories is at an all-time low. This dismal situation results from the almost zero number of promotions granted last year and with no prospects for improvement this year.

In a letter of November 29 to Deputy Under Secretary Ben Read, AFSA protested that a principal cause for the lack of promotions appears to be the Department’s mismanagement of the Foreign Affairs Specialist (FAS) program. Because of procedures implementing that program and the differences in GS/FSS/FSRU pay schedules, many employees who converted to FSRU or FSO, received unearned promotions to higher ranks. During the past few

NEW ED BOARD MEMBER

Neil A. Boyer recently became Deputy Director of the Policy Planning and Reports Staff of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. For the past year he has been Chairman of the Secretary’s Open Forum, a position which included production of the quarterly Open Forum journal. He is the author of a number of articles in that journal and of other Open Forum documents.

Mr. Boyer previously served in the Office of Policy and Plans of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and prior to that was director of the government’s “reverse peace corps” program, called Volunteers to America. He is a graduate of Moravian College and New York University School of Law, and served in the first Peace Corps group sent to Ethiopia.

years, approximately 200 such de facto promotions were given to communication personnel converting to FSRU. The result is a denial of merit promotional opportunities.

AFSA called upon management to amend conversion procedures so as to correct this serious situation. Promotions received through the conversion process should not cause a reduction in the number of merit promotion opportunities, as has been the practice in the past. In fact, there should be an upward adjustment in this year’s number of promotions to accommodate for the denial of promotions during earlier years.

As we go to press, we understand that because of this and related problems with the FAS system, the USIA is about to announce procedures to dismantle the FAS program in that Agency.

REPORT FROM HONG KONG

We hear from Mary Couey in Hong Kong that a group of women there has successfully formed an overseas chapter of the League of Women Voters. Their activity was a response, in part, to the Overseas Citizens’ Voting Rights Act of 1975 which greatly increased the opportunity for Americans abroad to vote in Federal elections. In addition to increasing the spread of information on election issues, League chapters also serve as forums for increased understanding of many topical issues, including such questions as taxation of overseas allowances and the availability of energy. Ms. Couey noted that League membership is open to men as well as women; the word “women” is retained in the title for historical reasons only.

Ms. Couey writes that her interest in the League began in Milan shortly after the Voting Rights Act was passed. Apparently, Marcia McDonough in the League’s national headquarters at 1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 is the appropriate contact for persons interested in forming other overseas chapters. Ms. McDonough is sensitive to the expatriate scene and, once a chapter is formed, ensures that it receives a regular supply of League materials.

MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE: ??

As previously reported in AFSA News, the Federal District Court for Washington, D.C. ruled last June that mandatory retirement from the Foreign Service at age 60 is unconstitutional. The final court order confirming this decision was issued October 14. As of press time, the Solicitor General has not yet decided whether to appeal that decision in order to seek a full evidentiary hearing of the issues involved. Both the Secretary of State and AFSA have urged such an appeal as both are disturbed by the long-range implications of the District Court’s decisions which work to undermine the assertion that the characteristics of a career in the Foreign Service are substantially different from the Civil Service and justify a more liberal retirement system and other benefits.

Responding to our request in the July issue of the Foreign Service Journal, 45 individuals and eight Chapters have voted for the continuation of mandatory retirement at age 60, while 24 persons voted to abolish any mandatory age limitation.

Up on Capitol Hill, the House and Senate have passed separate bills raising mandatory retirement from age 65 to age 70 for most private employers. The Senate Bill makes no mention of Federal employees. The House Bill removes those employment systems which involve special risks, such as the Foreign Service, and allows those systems to continue with whatever retirement age has been previously legislated. It appears unlikely that the Senate-House conference will reconcile the many differences in these two bills until some time next year.

SECOND CAREERS

Many members of the Foreign Service will be interested to learn that retired Ambassador Joseph Palmer, 2nd, was recently appointed full-time director of the Foreign Student Service Council in Washington, D.C., which offers hospitality, seminar and information programs for students here in Washington and nationwide.
Keypersons’ Meeting

A reorganization meeting for AID Keypersons on December 1, 1977 was well attended. Keypersons indicated what they viewed as priority topics for the Standing Committee. A presentation was given which outlined revitalization of the Keyperson Network beginning in Washington, followed by efforts to reaffirm or initially establish contact with Keypersons in every Mission. The Keyperson Network is critical to keeping the Membership informed of events and keeping the Standing Committee apprised of Members’ concerns.

Foreign Language Training Negotiations

AID/AFSA representatives are negotiating with AID management to improve foreign language proficiency of the Agency’s Foreign Service employees. Forty percent of established AID overseas positions have been designated as language essential. Of all AID positions in Asia, only ten currently require a language capability. AFSA believes that if the Agency is to carry out its overseas development programs effectively, highest priority must be given to the opportunity for foreign language training for its employees. AFSA is negotiating to provide up to three language incentive step increases for S-3 proficiency in esoteric languages and two step increases for newly attained S-3 proficiency in French. We are very interested in receiving your views on language and other training programs.

Promotions

On November 28, 1977, the following self-explanatory letter was sent to management, to the Special Assistant for Labor Relations, Earl Klitenic:

Pursuant to Section 8 of Executive Order 11636, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the Agency for International Development developed and agreed upon a promotion safeguards agreement. This agreement was recorded in a letter to Mr. Stephen Wallace, Co-Chairperson of the AFSA/AID Negotiating Committee from Ms. Edna A. Boorady on June 16, 1976, and signed by AFSA on July 1, 1976.

This agreement stated in part: “The number of promotions by class and by backstop category which management expects to recommend or make shall be established prior to the submission of findings and recommendations by the evaluation panels. Management shall provide AFSA with a copy of the memoranda establishing these numbers and AFSA shall hold such memoranda in confidence.”

AFSA repeatedly requested that Agency representatives provide the information required under this section in a timely fashion. On November 25, 1977, AFSA was notified for the first time by phone of the number of promotions by class and by cluster. By that date most of the evaluation panels had already completed and submitted their recommendations and findings. The Agency’s failure to provide AFSA with the information requested prior to the dates the panels concluded their work was in clear violation of the Safeguards Agreements.

In order to prevent a recurrence of this unwarranted violation of our collective bargaining agreement, AFSA requests a meeting with you to consult on an amendment to the Safeguards agreement.

AFSA has since met with management on this matter and intends to negotiate a stronger agreement.

The information acquired by AFSA independently on the kind and number of foreign service promotions authorized by the Administrator and resulting from the recent panels is given below. The limited number of promotions (57) continues to highlight management’s inability to solve the excessive grading problem. There are no promotions for FSS personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster (and backstop code)</th>
<th>From R-4 to R-3</th>
<th>From R-5 to R-4</th>
<th>From R-6 to R-5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Direction and Development (01, 02, 85, 94)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Management (09, 10, 15, 20, 25, 27, 50, 55, 60, 70, 71, 80)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Support (03, 04, 06, 08, 91, 93)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Draft AFSA Legislation on Foreign Service Development Officer Corps

As reported via a prior Redtop, the draft legislation has been given to management for consideration and support. To date, there has not been a substantive response on this matter even though several months have elapsed, and the proposed new legislation on Development Assistance has gone through several drafts.

Flexitime

Management continues to review a several-month-old survey of employees which was designed to elicit attitudes toward a flextime work system in Washington. Many positive replies were received, especially from FSS employees. A management response is expected shortly.

Former AID Employees in Vietnam

The following excerpt is taken from a recent field cable:

“. . . we have emphasized and reemphasized that our program . . . calls for the most sophisticated, knowledgeable and experienced people we can lay our hands on, and frankly we are tired of the Vietnam syndrome where old buddies seem to dip into the Vietnam grab bag to come up with old buddies. We are not in the process of kicking PL 480 commodities out of aircraft for Montagnards, nor are we involved in a commodity pushing program in the boondocks, nor are we walking around with pistols on our sides and money to hand out . . .”

This intemperate, ill-advised cable has been brought to the special attention of management by requesting that appropriate action be taken to counsel the author of the cable. In this same context, AFSA has also requested that management take every opportunity to neutralize the prevalent and generalized negative attitude re-
Your AFSA Washington representatives continue to monitor a wide array of personnel and sundry issues. We continue to solicit your ideas on all matters of interest and appreciate all inputs provided.

AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS

This is our final notice. All applications and supplementary materials for the AFSA 1978-1979 Financial Aid Grants and Merit Awards for the dependent daughters and sons of members of the Foreign Service community, active, retired or deceased, must be postmarked by February 15, 1978.

For application forms and related materials call or write: Mrs. Lee Midthun, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 (202) 338-4045. Please note that a new application must be submitted for each year that a candidate wishes to be considered.

Eighty-eight Financial Aid Grants have been made for 1977-1978 ranging from $300-$1,000 with a maximum of $2,000 to any one family. Twenty Merit Awards of $500 each were awarded last June to graduating high school and preparatory school seniors.

STATE'S TERRORISM EXPERT BECOMES INVOLVED

Only weeks after being appointed the Department’s new Coordinator to Combat Terrorism, Ambassador Heyward Isham unfortunately became a victim of terrorism on the streets of Washington.

According to press reports, two men attempted to rob Isham as he was emerging from his parked car with his wife early one evening near Dupont Circle. He was able to strike one of the men with a rod from his car which caused both of them to begin to run away. When Isham started to run after them, one man turned and shot Isham in the leg. Fortunately, the wound was not too serious, and the Ambassador returned to the office within a few days.

AFSA PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE REPORT

AFSA has taken a new tack in its perennial battle against the appointment of unqualified, purely political patronage chiefs of diplomatic missions. We have formally engaged the Congress in what we believe can be a constructive dialogue on the issue. The operating assumption behind our move is that the President is not necessarily the sole source of poor patronage appointments. He is also under steady pressure from prominent members of his own party to make patronage appointments.

We reproduce below a self-explanatory exchange of correspondence between Lars Hydle and appropriate Members of the House and Senate. We would only point out once more that AFSA’s objection is not against political appointees per se. It opposes unqualified appointees, people whose sole apparent recommendation for the job is “participating actively in the political process.”

The following letter was sent to Congressman Lee Hamilton, a member of both the Select Committee on Ethics and the Committee on International Relations, and Senator Adlai E. Stevenson as Chairman of the Select Committee on Ethics.

AFSA respectfully requests that the [Senate/House] Select Committee on Ethics consider establishing for its members a standard which would end the practice of Members recommending to the President candidates for chiefs of American diplomatic missions abroad on the basis of political patronage, rather than genuine expertise in the field of foreign affairs and/or a record of distinguished public service.

While we recognize that the actual nomination of candidates is solely the responsibility of the President, we believe that it is difficult for the President alone to hold to the high standards he has set for himself. The President was quoted in one February issue of the Washington Star as saying, “Quite often our nation has been embarrassed because ambassadors and other very important persons have been appointed not on the basis of their merit but on the basis of political payoff. This will not be done in the next four years.” Unfortunately, the evidence is strong that it has been done several times already.

AFSA has been compelled to oppose five ambassadorial nominees who had neither a recognized expertise in foreign affairs nor a record of distinguished public service. There is evidence that the President has been influenced by political factors in choosing these candidates for the United States diplomatic service.

AFSA applauds the Select Committee on Ethics for its efforts to help remove senior diplomatic appointments from the political patronage system.

There are two important reasons. The first is that it is disrespectful of the country in which the person is to represent the United States. We would not send a Gluck or de Roulet to France or Great Britain. Why send them to Ceylon or Jamaica? Is it because these countries are small, unimportant, or unimportant? We contest the idea that because a country is less than a major power it should receive a mediocre, incompetent United States ambassador. We deplore our good name and undercut our diplomatic effectiveness.

In today’s world of vigorous multilateral diplomacy, in which decisions are made on North/South economic issues, Law of the Sea, and nuclear proliferation, among other matters of serious concern to the United States, representatives of small countries play increasingly important roles. We cannot afford to appoint ambassadors to these countries the way we used to appoint postmasters.

This brings us to the second reason for removing senior diplomatic assignments from the political patronage system. The career public servants in the field of foreign affairs whom the Association represents are as anxious as any other group of Americans, if not more so, to see the process of post-Watergate domestic political reform succeed. We want to be proud of the political system we represent in foreign lands. We know that people of all races and creeds abroad depend on America’s defense of the integrity of the democratic form of government. We also know how disappointed they are when we do not respect our own system of political values.

AFSA applauds the Select Committee on Ethics for its efforts to help restore popular faith in democratic government. We believe that as part of this...
process, political patronage appointments of ambassadors should end, and we ask your help to accomplish this goal.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this matter.

AFSA received the following replies from Congressman Hamilton and Senators Stevenson and Schmitt (ranking minority member of the Senate committee):

Thank you for your letter of September 23, 1977 concerning the desirability of ending the practice of Members recommending to the President candidates for Chief of American diplomatic mission abroad on the basis of political patronage.

The issue you have raised is both important and difficult. Since no individual is likely to admit that any such recommendation was on the basis of patronage considerations, perhaps the only effective way to eliminate such alleged abuses would be to prohibit the making of any congressional recommendations whatsoever. However, such a course would obviously have political and First Amendment problems.

There is some narrow precedent for limiting the scope of congressional recommendations regarding appointments to Federal jobs. Existing law provides that a congressional recommendation for an individual seeking a job in the competitive service may not be considered unless it relates solely to the applicant’s “character and residence.” But such a limitation does not apply to political or other noncareer status appointments. In another provision of law, an effort has been made to “de-politicize” the Postal Service. The law provides, in effect, that congressional recommendations may not be accepted unless first requested by the Postal Service.

Finally, I have been advised that Advisory Opinion No. 1 issued in 1970 by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct which, while not directly on point, can be read to imply acceptance of a Member’s right to make recommendations regarding diplomatic appointments. I attach a copy of that advisory opinion for your interest.

It would appear that the appropriate legislative vehicle for an effort to control congressional recommendations would be an amendment to House Rule XLIII. Given the brief background I have mentioned, it would seem that an amendment could: (a) prohibit all congressional recommendations relating to diplomatic appointments; (b) could limit such recommendations to character references; or (c) could prohibit congressional recommendations unless specifically requested.

Over the coming weeks I would like to talk to appropriate members about this issue to see if they think some step should be taken and, if so, what specific step is most desirable.

I appreciate your interest in this matter and I want to help insure the continued vitality and well-being of our excellent foreign service.

And:

We have your letter of September 26, 1977 in which you ask that this Committee undertake to establish a standard for the Senate with respect to recommendations by Members to the President for positions as Chiefs of American diplomatic missions abroad so as to reduce the role that patronage appears to play in the selection process.

This is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, and we are advised that it has the matter under consideration.

We do not favor a Senate rule which prevents Members from recommending for such appointments persons who have been active in political parties and campaign for public office. Such a Senate rule might prevent the nomination of persons highly qualified. It could also discourage persons from participating actively in the political process. More likely, it assumes too much about the influence of Members—too little about the influence of others. No one should be disqualified from making recommendations to the President.

We are following up actively by supporting Senate Resolution 258, which would reform the Senate’s confirmation process. The resolution calls for written standards by which nominees for high office could be judged for their qualifications. It would also set up a special Senate office to review the financial and professional background of the nominees. Reproduced below in part is President Hydle’s letter to Senator Ribicoff.

I am pleased to inform you that AFSA supports Senate Resolution 258 relating to the confirmation responsibility of the Senate, which you and Senators Percy and Javits introduced on September 8. We would like very much to testify in favor of the Resolution if and when public hearings are held.

Senate Resolution 258, in our view, should go a long way to achieve a goal AFSA and all Americans informed on the subject have sought for years. To use the words of the draft Resolution, we would like to see the nomination and confirmation of American Ambassadors who “by reason of background, training or experience are affirmatively qualified for the office, to which they have been nominated.” We recommend, however, that the requirement of filing personal financial statements, which are open to public inspection, be limited to nominees to specific positions. Otherwise the Senate will be flooded with paper every time the promotion list for Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service Information officers, or regular officers of the armed services is submitted for confirmation.

As the Senate is aware, a large number of unqualified, purely political patronage Ambassadors have been appointed by Presidents of both parties over the years. Seventy of these Ambassadors may have actually harmed the United States’ relations with the countries to which they were accredited. In these cases, both the White House and, unfortunately, the Senate, through its confirmation function, have left the impression that the United States does not really take seriously the quality of representation sent to certain countries—large and small.

Although the American people in the post-Watergate era are fed up with politics as usual and President Carter condemned the practice of patronage Ambassadorial appointments during his campaign, the present Administration has not ended this practice.

After reviewing the qualifications of the President’s Ambassadorial nominees—in the way philosophically the Office on Nominations in AFSA has done in Senate Resolution 258—AFSA has opposed five of the current Administration’s choices—much the same way the Senate should if Senate Resolution 258 works the way it is hoped.

You should also know that in order to encourage the nomination of clearly qualified Ambassadors, AFSA has also asked the Senate and House Select Committee on Ethics to consider establishing standards which would end the practice of Members of Congress recommending to the President candidates for Chief of American diplomatic missions abroad on the basis of political patronage, rather than genuine expertise in the field of foreign affairs and/or a record of distinguished public service. (Copy of the letter to Senator Stevenson enclosed.) Should Senate Resolution 258 be adopted, AFSA would hope to discuss the question of standards for appointments with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the sixty days which the Resolution provides for the development of such a policy.

To sum up, AFSA applauds the initiative by you and Senators Percy and Javits to deal forthrightly with the question of qualifications of nominees to major government positions—Senate Resolution 258. We look forward to the opportunity to testify on its behalf.

171 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978
US/UN HOUSING ALLOWANCE CUT FOR STAFF EMPLOYEES

In 1973 a housing supplement for employees of the US Mission to the United Nations was authorized which provides an allowance to compensate those who are required because of important representational responsibilities to live in the extraordinarily high-rent area immediately surrounding the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Forty-five positions were considered for allowances, including some staff personnel. The program was instituted not on the basis of the strict qualifications but solely to reach the authorized position level.

On July 1, 1977, at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, GAO was asked to assist in making a judgment as to whether these payments were authorized. After a thorough review of job descriptions of the employees receiving the allowance, GAO determined that it is unlikely that support staff would be required as part of their official duties to attend a substantial number of representational functions, and therefore the payment of the housing allowance was not authorized. As a consequence seven secretaries lost their allowance.

To the Department’s credit, the GAO’s September 27 termination date was ignored and payments were continued through December 31. The Department also arranged transfers for those who requested it and paid the cost of breaking leases and moving expenses.

What is upsetting about this is that not all staff secretaries had their allowances taken away. Only those secretaries who did not work for Ambassadors lost their allowances. Secondly, when the secretaries were assigned to the Mission, they were told they would receive the allowance for their entire two-year tour of duty—no mention was made of representational responsibilities.

Surely management could have handled this in a more gracious and equitable manner by providing the necessary funding to cover the lost allowance until those affected were reassigned upon completion of their normal tour of duty.

FSECC UPDATE

The overall purpose of the FSECC is to provide confidential counseling services and educational information for the foreign affairs community. In support of this general purpose, specific objectives of the FSECC include the provision of a wide range of counseling, information and referral services concerning:
- Individual and family counseling;
- Appropriate educational alternatives;
- Educational and other diagnostic evaluations;
- Career awareness, interests, aptitudes;
- Special education grants to offset excess educational costs for children with handicapping conditions or exceptional needs;
- Liaison services between students in the US and their parents abroad.

FSECC maintains a current library and file containing information about:
- Public and independent schools in the D.C. area;
- Boarding schools and colleges in the US;
- American and non-American day and boarding schools and colleges abroad;
- Diagnostic and evaluation centers and individual professionals in various disciplines;
- Career awareness and occupations;
- Summer programs: camps, schools, volunteer opportunities.

A private service, FSECC is sponsored by the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and by the Association of American Foreign Service Women (AAFSW). Members of the sponsoring organizations are not charged for the first hour of service each year and pay $15 per hour subsequently. Non-members pay $25 per hour.

FSECC office hours are 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.

JOIN AFSA
(OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO JOIN)

BRIEFING OF SELECTION BOARDS “CORRECTED”

When welcoming members of two 1977 Selection Boards, the Department’s spokesman departed from the normal text of remarks to express some personal views regarding today’s requirements for the Foreign Service. Unfortunately, those personal remarks went beyond the limits for the occasion and made reference to the importance of personal brilliance, Affirmative Action and the Department’s new proposals for selection out, which were still under consultation with AFSA.

Responding to Association protests, the Director General reassembled the members of those Boards to read a statement. The statement emphasized that the Board’s decisions must be based only on the published precepts and special directives which had been agreed to by the Department jointly with AFSA, as provided for under Executive Order 11636.

CONFUSED IDENTITIES
AFSA IS NOT AFSPA

The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the American Foreign Service Protective Association (AFSPA) are separate and distinct organizations. Unfortunately, people sometimes incorrectly assume because of the similarity of names that the two associations are the same or, at least, are inter-related. Thus AFSA frequently receives mail or inquiries on health and life insurance matters which have to be forwarded to AFSPA, which also uses the short name of “Foreign Service Protective Association.”

Persons wishing information on health and life insurance matters should take care to use AFSPA’s full name and address which is: American Foreign Service Protective Association, Suite 1305, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. (Tel 393-4220)

SECOND CAREER

Former Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson has been elected chairman of the Board of Directors of the Business Council for International Understanding which is active in promoting understanding between business and governmental persons interested in foreign trade matters.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978 17g
Foreign Service People

Deaths

Blake. Dolores A. Blake, wife of James J. Blake, Ambassador to Iceland, died on November 30 at Andrews Air Force Base. Mrs. Blake accompanied her husband on assignments to Brussels, Calcutta, Tripoli and Reykjavik. In addition to her husband, she is survived by a daughter, Kathleen, three sons, Stephen J., David and Robert, her parents, Mr. and Mrs. David L. Quaid, Floral Park, N.Y., two sisters and two brothers.

Bruce. David K. E. Bruce, who served as ambassador to France, West Germany, Britain and China, died on December 5, in Washington. Ambassador Bruce’s long career of public service included serving as a delegate to both the Maryland and Virginia state legislatures, service with the American Red Cross in London in World War II. OSS Chief in Europe from 1943-45, assistant secretary of Commerce and head of the Marshall Plan for France, in addition to his Foreign Service and State Department assignments. He was named Ambassador to France in 1948, to Germany in 1957, to England in 1960 and as head of the liaison office in Peking with the rank of ambassador but without the formal title in 1973. W. Averell Harriman called Bruce “the most brilliant representative of our country abroad in my generation.” Ambassador Bruce was the author of “Revolution to Reconstruction” (1939). He is survived by his wife, Evangeline, 1405 34th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007 and two sons, David and Nicholas.

Conlon. Bradford Haynie Conlon, son of FSIO and Mrs. Edward J. Conlon, died on October 24 in a canoeing accident on the Potomac. In addition to his parents of 3713 Harrison Street, N.W., he is survived by a brother, Bruce. A Brad Conlon Memorial Fund has been set up at Kodaikanal School and contributions may be sent to P. O. Box 748, Pompano Beach, Florida 33060.

Goodwin, Ellis M. Goodwin, FSIO-retired, died on December 4 in Chevy Chase. Mr. Goodwin joined the Foreign Service in 1929 and served in Haiti, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Portugal before his retirement in 1958. Since then he had pursued an interest in genealogy and written articles for the New England Historic Genealogical Society and the National Genealogical Society. He is survived by his wife, Miriam, 107 Summerfield Road, Chevy Chase, a son, William, of Oil City, Pa., a brother and two grandchidren.

Hall. William O. Hall, Ambassador-retired, died on November 8 in Portland, Oregon. He joined the State Department in 1946 and the Foreign Service in 1954, serving at London, Karachi, as Ambassador to Ethiopia and Director General of the Foreign Service before his retirement in 1963. He received the National Civil Service League career service award in 1966 and was named Career Minister in 1969. In addition to his wife of 5325 SW Westwood View, Portland, Oregon 97201, he is survived by two sons, William Jay of Anchorage and Robert Barnard of Washington, a daughter, Sarah Booth Sternglantz of Stony Brook, N.Y., a brother and two grandchildren. Memorial contributions may be made to the American Foreign Service Association Scholarship Fund.

Harter. Dorothea E. Harter, daughter of FSIO and Mrs. John J. Harter, died of injuries suffered in an automobile accident on December 9. She was a student at St. Agnes Episcopal School for Girls. She is survived by her parents, a brother, Lai, and a sister, To¬nia, of 11593 Embers Court, Reston, Virginia, another brother, Tian, of Peoria, Illinois, and her paternal grandparents. Memorial contributions may be made to A.R.E. Summer Camp Program, P.O. Box 595, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23451.

Keene. Carolyn W. Keene, who served in the Embassy in Rome in the 1940s and 1950s, retiring there in 1961, died on October 4. Her father, Francis Bowler Keene, began his Foreign Service career as Consul to Florence in 1903. She is survived by two nephews, Francis and Russell Chute, of London.

Licht. Alice M. Licht, wife of Irving H. Licht, FSR-retired, died October 16 in Abidjan. Mrs. Licht traveled extensively with her husband on his AID assignments in Burma, Togo, Upper Volta and Chad. In addition to her husband, c/o Entente Fund, BP 20824, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Mrs. Licht is survived by a daughter, Ellen, a son, Gordon K., both of Washington, D.C., her mother and father.

Patterson. Jefferson Patterson, Ambassador-retired, died on November 12, in Washington. He joined the Foreign Service in 1921 and served at Peking, Bogota, Constantinople, Breslau, Oslo, Berlin, Lima, Brussels, Cairo, and as Ambassador to Uruguay before his retirement in 1952. He was the author of four books, Family Portraits, Capitals and Captives, Diplomatic Duty and Diversion, and Diplomatic Terminus. He is survived by his wife, the former Mary Marvin Breckinridge, of 3108 Woodland Dr., Washington, D.C. 20008, a daughter, Patricia, of Manchester, N.H. and a son, Mark, of Telluride, Colorado.

Stuart. Ruth Sherman Stuart, wife of FSIO-retired John Stuart, Jr., died on May 7, in New York. Mrs. Stuart accompanied her husband on assignments to Germany, Switzerland, the Niger, Morocco, India, Southeast Asia and USUN. Mrs. Stuart worked with the USAF in Germany and served with delegations to ECOSOC. I.L.O., GATT, the Law of the Sea Conferences and other international meetings in Geneva. In the Niger she organized the first English teaching program at the Embassy and in New Delhi she worked for the Embassy and the Peace Corps. In addition to her husband of 180 West End Ave., New York 10023, Mrs. Stuart is survived by a brother, Ray C. Sherman.

If you can wade through some extraneous (but funny) material on post reports, selection out, assignments and representation allowances, you will find some valuable tips on etiquette in Life and Love in the Foreign Service.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

An introduction to foreign service life for the student contemplating the career, a chuckle for friends and relatives back home, this 64-page book is only $1.00 from:

American Foreign Service Assn.
Dept. L, 2101 E. St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Please send ........ copies of Life and Love in the Foreign Service at $1.00 per copy to:

Name

Address

Foreign Service Journal, January, 1978
Operation Quis Custodiet, Etc.:

THE INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY

S. I. NADLER

In a simpler era, intelligence activities consisted of the clandestine collection of information about foreign countries, usually for military purposes, and were considered a fact of international life. Robert Benchley could amuse many and upset few with the observation: “Every country has spies in every other country, and every other country knows about them. It is merely a form of international courtesy, like exchange professors... In fact, they give a rather nice cosmopolitan air to the streets.”

World War Two and the Cold War drastically altered the intelligence profession in two fundamental respects. First, there is the continuing technological revolution in techniques of intelligence, generally viewed as a desirable development. Thanks to electronic interceptions of communications and photographs from satellites, information once unobtainable by any means is now routinely made available to analysts, and they, with the indispensable aid of computers, arrive at conclusions with a degree of accuracy which not too many years ago would have been deemed impossible.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department’s intelligence components allot the largest parts of their budgets to collection by technological means. The US and the USSR have implicitly sanctioned such activities to monitor each other’s adherence to agreed arms levels. The SALT I Agreement specifically provided that neither country would interfere in the operation of the other’s “national means” for verification.

The second change gave the intelligence profession a totally new dimension, and this has not been so easily accommodated. As perceptively described some fifteen years ago by Margret Boeri, “What one may call ‘classical’ espionage was essentially a wartime activity which consisted of bringing home enemy secrets, most often military ones. Today, in what we choose to call peacetime, espionage goes on in every aspect of life—cultural, political, intellectual, and military—and in the camps of any and all potential and actual enemies and even of one’s allies. It has active aims which were entirely missing in classical espionage, the sowing of confusion among enemy public opinion and the undermining of the enemy’s way of life.”

These “active aims,” or covert operations, have come to include such actions as influencing elections in foreign countries, economic warfare, coups d’état, and, perhaps, assassinations. In the preface to a new book, The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues, the editor states: “The effectiveness and morality of US foreign intelligence activities has... been the subject of widespread controversy, discussion, and debate over the past decade.” In an introduction to the same book, Senator Frank Church (Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Actions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, which issued its final report in April 1976) says more specifically that there “has never been any question about the propriety and necessity... of gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence... nor about the means to acquire such information... What has become controversial has to do instead with the so-called covert op-

S. I. Nadler, FSIO-retired, served in Tientsin, Singapore, Taipei, Buenos Aires, Ankara, and Washington. During World War Two, he was an Army officer, assigned to the OSS in China.
erations of the CIA . . . 

Thus, the "subject of widespread controversy, discussion, and debate over the past decade" has, for the most part, been one activity, covert operations, of one agency, the CIA. The issue has gone beyond the question of morality. It has become clear that no responsible legislator believes that the United States, in today's world, should give up its covert action capability any more than it should undertake unilateral disarmament. The issue has become that of control, with the Congress determined to assume a far stronger and more direct regulatory role.

The very legality of the CIA's engaging in covert action was long a point of contention. At the same time, the inherent contradiction between the requirements for secrecy and the nature of congressional supervision remained an obstacle to the devising of a mechanism for congressional supervision of intelligence activities, including covert operations.

Most frequently cited as CIA's authority for covert action is Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (which brought the CIA into being), which instructs the agency to "perform such other duties relating to intelligence as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Also cited are the "inherent powers" of the President in foreign affairs and as Commander-in-Chief, and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

Those objecting to citation of the National Security Act of 1947 insist that, if it had been the intent of the Congress to authorize the CIA to engage in covert activities, it would have so stated. Debate about the "inherent powers" of the President is as old as the presidency. Interestingly, in 1846 the eleventh president, James Polk, sparked the first crisis over the use of the Executive Branch for covert activities, when he refused to give the House Foreign Affairs Committee information on Secretary of State Daniel Webster's expenditures from "Secret Service Funds.") The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, ironically, was intended and designated as "Limitations on Intelligence Activities." But in for-

bidding expenditure of funds by the CIA for "other than exclusively intelligence activities" except with presidential approval and subsequent reporting to appropriate congressional committees, it effectively recognized that the CIA does indeed engage in "other than exclusively intelligence activities."

The contradiction between the need for secrecy where intelligence and related activities are concerned and the congressional supervision essential to our democratic system has not been reconciled. More and more, however, we have come to realize that some contradictions cannot be reconciled, and therefore, have to be accommodated. It is often forgotten that our democratic system not only tolerates, but demands, secrecy in certain areas, among them the ballot, the grand jury, and doctor-patient, priest-parishioner, and attorney-client relationships.

A significant question was not asked for a long time. Since the Congress could have established stronger control over the CIA and covert action any time it so desired, why had it not done so thirty, twenty, or even ten years before? The answer is obvious, if not reassuring. Until recently, the Congress has not wished to assume such control—and the concomitant responsibility.

In May 1976, Senator Church reminded his colleagues that, less than ten years after the creation of the CIA, Senator Mansfield had introduced—unsuccessfully—a resolution to create a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence Activities and that, in the two decades following, more than 200 similar proposals had been made, also without success. As Senator Leverett Saltonstall admitted in April 1956: "It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress and a citizen, would rather not have . . . ."

Outside observers arrive at much the same conclusion, although expressing themselves more bluntly, especially outside observers who have previously been on the inside.

Former CIA Inspector General and Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., writes: "Of all the controls and review mechanisms over the intelligence community, potentially the most powerful is the Congress . . . . The issue is not so much one of authority as it is the reluctance of the members of Congress to get into sensitive intelligence matters . . . ." According to journalist Leslie Gelb, who spent several years as a Senate aide and as a Defense Department official, the "fact is that many liberals stay away from all the intelligence subcommittees because they do not want to be tagged in the future with having tacitly approved an operation, even if they agreed to it, or because they want to be free to criticize if anything goes wrong."

Revelations which were part of the fallout from Vietnam and Watergate eroded such reluctance. In May 1976, Senate Resolution 400, Proposed Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities, was passed, 72-22, with six not voting. In introducing the resolution, Senator Church said: "This is a time for a new beginning . . . The creation of a new permanent intelligence oversight committee is an absolutely necessary first step toward establishing an agreed-upon procedure by which problems of national importance that are necessarily secret in character can be addressed within the constitutional framework."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., expressed the concern of many, when he wrote: "A joint congressional committee could . . . help; but, though such a committee can and should review targets and priorities, it cannot really oversee the day-to-day detail of clandestine operations." He went on to endorse a proposal made by Franklin A. Lindsay, a former high-ranking CIA official. In January 1975, Lindsay suggested that " . . . a more effective way to apply the sort of mature judgment needed would be to create a review committee of men seasoned in foreign affairs who have reached a career position where they can put in the substantial time necessary to think through the risks of covert operations and the possibility of accomplishing the same ends by overt means. Such a
review committee would buttress and support the . . . highest level policy approving process.’’

There are many sound ideas as to what the next step should be. All of them, however, will be of academic interest only if something positive and effective is not done, and done soon, about restoring the damaged self-respect and shattered morale of a dedicated group of individuals who necessarily work in the shadows so that their fellow citizens may walk in the light. Columnists Rowland Evans and Michael Novak have referred to ‘‘the beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency,” its ‘‘vulnerability as Congress’s favorite whipping post,” and the fact that ‘‘the four-year victimization of the CIA has left deep wounds.” One retired CIA officer refers to headquarters at Langley simply as ‘‘a disaster area.”

None of the foregoing is meant to imply that career intelligence officers object to investigations into past illegalities. They are as interested as anyone—more than most—in exposure of the tiny minority which may have committed assorted excesses. Nor has increased congressional supervision met with objections within the CIA. On the contrary, at least four former Directors of Central Intelligence—McCone, Helms, Bush, and Colby—have publicly stated that this would be welcome. And David Phillips, President of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, testified before the Congress that 98 per cent of that organization’s membership favored an [oversight] committee.

As succinctly stated by Leslie Gelb, just ‘‘as it was wrong to pin American involvement in Vietnam on the lies of the Pentagon, so it makes little sense now to blame CIA for 30 years of covert operations. In both cases, the causes were rooted in the national American consensus behind the waging of the cold war. And in neither case will the nation profit from the experience unless this is recognized.’’

In the light of the past decade’s traumatic experience, the intelligence community would be well advised to look toward the future and make suitable preparations. Inevitably, the pendulum will start to swing in the opposite direction, and orthodox intelligence activities, not covert action, will come under critical scrutiny. And the target entity will probably be some organization other than the CIA, with the National Security Agency a logical choice.

One can almost hear the chairman of a House Committee opening a meeting with the words: ‘‘We find ourselves this morning not going after the CIA . . . but being rather interested in the . . .

‘‘The path ahead will not be an easy one, especially for those senators and representatives who accept service on new, more directly involved congressional oversight committees in the area of intelligence. Ultimately, their task may well prove as vital as that of those whose activities they are regulating.’’

NSA . . . because allegations have been made to the effect that the NSA . . . One can almost see a headline in the newspaper: ‘‘Controls on NSA Reported Sought.” As a matter of fact, the chairman of a House Committee has already spoken the above cited words; it was in 1975, and the congressman was Otis Pike. And that headline has appeared in a newspaper—the New York Times of March 7, 1976.

Until comparatively recently, the NSA enjoyed special status. So secret is the agency that, compared with it, the CIA, in the words of Time, ‘‘is as open as a New Hampshire town meeting.” Established by Executive Order in 1952, the NSA’s existence was not even acknowledged until 1957. It is the one federal agency completely exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. Its annual budget is estimated as nearly double CIA’s, and its employees around the world may number more than eighty thousand. The NSA has two primary missions: protecting US communications from foreign exploitation, which is to say, communications security (COMSEC); and exploiting foreign communications to provide information to the United States Government, that is, signals intelligence (SIGINT).

The NSA has begun to lose its special status, its troubles probably beginning in June 1975, when the Rockefeller Commission’s Report revealed that the NSA has fed 1,100 pages of material on American citizens into the CIA’s ‘‘Operation Chaos,” which was aimed at uncovering foreign influences among US radical groups. The following October, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen became the first NSA director to testify in public about the agency’s activities, when he appeared before Church’s Senate committee. He testified that, from 1967 to 1973, the NSA had intercepted international calls or cables of 5,925 foreign nations—and of 1,680 Americans.

With due respect to the first and fourth amendments, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw visible lines in a shadow world. Between 1967 and 1973, for example, the NSA had several watch lists, covering the requirements of several US agencies. ‘‘At the height of the watch list activity,” Gen. Allen stated, ‘‘there were about 800 names on the [total] watch list, and about one-third of these 800 were from the narcotics list. We estimate that over this six-year period, about 2,000 reports were issued by the NSA on international narcotics trafficking and about 1,900 reports were issued covering the three areas of terrorism, Executive protection, and foreign influence over US groups.” Saying, ‘‘I am not the proper person to ask concerning the value of the product from these four special efforts,” Gen. Allen added, ‘‘We are aware that a major terrorist act in the United States was prevented.” [Emphasis added.]

For the present, the controversy has subsided. While it raged, it wrought considerable havoc, but it did let some light into unnecessarily dark corners. Now, in its aftermath, determined individuals are

Continued on page 27

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978 19
Communications Officer Combines Archaeology with Photography

Secrets of a Frankish Cemetery

Story and Photographs by
JOHN M. LEMANDRI

Archaeology and photography have always interested John M. Lemandri, a Support Communications Officer with the American Embassy at The Hague. He recently had the opportunity to combine both hobbies when a friend, German archaeologist Dr. Reinhard Andrae, asked him to photograph a Frankish Christian cemetery from the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. Taking three weeks leave, Lemandri joined the expedition of Giessen University students, who for the third consecutive year continue to exhume over 500 skeletons from a weed-clustered field near the town of Griesheim, Germany. First discovered in 1907, the site is one of the oldest Frankish cemeteries in Europe.

During the first week the problem arose of how to photograph each grave accurately from an overhead view. A camera with wide angle lens was mounted on a wooden tripod and positioned over each skeleton. Previously, the only way to make an accurate picture was by drawing one. A peculiarity was that all the skeletons lay with their heads toward the East. Dr. Andrae explained, "it was important for early Christians to be buried facing the Holy City of Jerusalem."

While most precious objects had been stolen a few years after burial, many of the graves contained an abundance of artifacts of value to the archaeologist. Iron spearheads, swords, shields, pots, glass and ceramic beads were the most common finds unearthed. All items were photographed or drawn in the position found. Gold, silver and iron brooches, inscribed with crosses, were discovered with a few of the skeletons, while a group of seven post holes arranged in rectangular formation are believed to be the remains of the oldest wooden church within the state of Hessen.

Each day brought one hardship after another as a steady downpour of rain filled the excavations. To overcome this dilemma a series of plastic-covered tents were built over the important graves.

The previous year an important discovery was made with the finding of an engraved bone comb. On it was the biblical scene of Jesus Christ changing water into wine as three of his disciples looked on. While the comb is believed to have originated in Egypt, a locket containing herbs from the Molucca Islands in Indonesia had also been discovered at a nearby site. From the evidence of these finds, a vast trade network existed during the early medieval centuries.

Just recently the torso and head of a 4,000-year-old Neolithic man was found in a north corner of the excavation. Although the grave contained no personal objects, Dr. Andrae was able to date the remains because they lay in a North to South direction and were buried in the fetal position.

The most important discovery to date is the skeleton of a middle-aged man with an artificial leg, the first ever found in Central Europe. The leg was once composed of a wooden stem with bronze shoe, but only the metal remains. Local anthropologists theorize that the operation was performed in the Mediterranean area or by a Mediterranean trained doctor who came to Germany in the seventh century.

The excavation continues, through most of the finds have been carted away to museums and Lemandri is back at his communications office. His work is far from complete as he is processing the photographs at home.
A bone comb from Egypt etched with the scene of Christ changing water into wine as three disciples look on.

John Lemandri prepares the grave of a Frankish warrior for photography. Long and short swords are beside skeleton. A bronze centerpiece and handle of a shield lie adjacent to the head.

Right, Germans and Americans view one of the graves open to the public. Precious objects, removed during excavations, are later replaced in original positions.

Support Communications Officer John Lemandri prepares to photograph the excavation of a grave.

A golden medallion studded with glass and semi-precious stones. Meticulous work by student archaeologists has enabled them to restrung the beads in their original form.

Anthropology student Sabine Thale cleans a 1300-year-old jaw.

Holding a Frankish pot, student archaeologist Harald Schultz is silhouetted against the sun.
ARMAGEDDON REVISITED
By Sean Kelly

ENOLA GAY, by Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts. Stein and Day, $11.95.

Named for her pilot's mother, the Enola Gay was the B-29 that dropped the first atomic bomb—over Hiroshima, at sixteen minutes past eight on the morning of August 6, 1945. In that instant, 80,000 people died or were seriously wounded, a city was destroyed, and mankind was propelled into the nuclear age. Enola Gay is the story of how that instant came to be.

It is fascinating reading, even from the distance of more than three decades. The authors spent two years researching the book, and turned up much new information in the process—including the fact that several American prisoners of war were among Hiroshima's casualties. They also learned that, unbeknownst to American military planners, Hiroshima had already been chosen by the Japanese as the secret headquarters for the defense against the expected US invasion of the Japanese homeland.

The raid on Hiroshima, and the one that followed a few days later on Nagasaki, made that invasion unnecessary—at an estimated savings of over a million American casualties. On August 14, the Japanese announced their surrender, and World War II came to an end.

But the real story behind the Enola Gay, and the authors tell it well, lies in the preparation for the raid: the creation of the Top Secret 509th Composite Group, its training at desolate Wendover Field in Utah, and its movement to the Pacific island of Tinian where the atomic raids were launched. In the background is the ever-present shadow of the Manhattan Project, the two billion dollar effort of which the 509th was to become the delivery unit.

The Manhattan Project Director, General Leslie Groves, wielded unprecedented power in wartime Washington, even down to the process of selecting the targets for the atomic raids. He wanted to drop the first bomb on Kyoto, but Secretary of War Henry Stimson wouldn't hear of it. "Kyoto is a historical city," said Stimson. "I visited it when I was Governor-General of the Philippines and was very much impressed by its ancient culture." Groves still wanted Kyoto as the first target, and his insistence in keeping it on the reserved list probably saved that city from being destroyed in the American fire-bomb raids that were sweeping Japan at the time.

The choice of Nagasaki was even more happenstance. Flying a borrowed plane, the pilot of the second raid was aiming for Kokura, but fuel and weather problems got in the way. At the last minute, he switched to the alternate target and Nagasaki thus became the second victim of atomic warfare.

The Day Before Doomsday picks the story up from the Enola Gay, and brings the nuclear arms race to its present dimension. Sidney Lens finds little new in President Jimmy Carter's stated intention to reduce nuclear armaments to zero. He says that "every President since World War II has made similar statements, and usually more forcefully." He adds:

"There has been no end of rhetoric for peace, disarmament, and arms limitation. Yet despite six thousand negotiation sessions on disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations, not a single nuclear warhead has been destroyed as a result of agreement between the superpowers."

On the contrary, says Lens, the stockpiles are getting bigger, new warheads are being introduced—as are the means for delivering them. More importantly, membership in the nuclear club—one restricted to a handful of nations—is getting bigger. Lens quotes President Ford as saying that, by the year 1985, forty nations will have the material and the capability to produce nuclear weapons. By 1995, the figure is expected to be a hundred nations.

"Lens finds that "the United States is far from an innocent bystander in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. It exports more than two thirds of the Western World's civilian nuclear technology, and thirteen of the twenty-nine countries to which it makes such sales have refused to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty." But the dangers of proliferation are not restricted to the activities of governments. What is even more menacing to Lens is the likelihood of individuals—"terrorists, guerrillas, blackmailers, and cranks"—shifting from TNT and plastique to plutonium."

Thirty-two years after the Enola Gay dropped her bomb on Hiroshima, US leaders—says Lens—still fail to understand what really occurred on that August morning in 1945. "The cardinal error of postwar Washington"—in his view—"has been its failure to recognize that the three axioms of prewar policy relating to military might, war, and national sovereignty, were invalid for the nuclear age."

According to Lens, the "triple revolution" brought about by the flight of the Enola Gay demands that we reappraise our basic notions about the values of militarism, war and sovereignty. "Is there," he asks, "really such a thing as national security?" Can it exist without international security, including the security of Russians, Chinese, Africans, Asians, Latin Americans—and North Americans?

"The nuclear age," says Lens, "gives us no choice. The human species has become victim to its own genius, and must therefore subdue its inner greed and its outer ambitions, or perish."
command Kissinger acquired over the bureaucracy, the strong direction he gave to policy, and his achievement and Nixon's in breaking with the past and adjusting American policy to a triangular relationship with Russia and China.

Morris recreates the atmosphere of the Nixon-Kissinger White House—a task he seems to relish in what turns out to be a self-portrait of Roger Morris as well as a portrait of Henry Kissinger.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

To China with Love

CHINA REVISITED: After forty-two years, by Chiang Yee. Norton, $9.95.

"Seeing once is better than hearing about it a hundred times"—old Chinese saying.

Those who have enjoyed "The Silent Traveller" in London, Paris, New York, Boston, San Francisco, Japan, and elsewhere know what a special treat will be theirs in Chiang Yee's latest book, a pictorial account of his return to China after four decades.

Those who have thought of him as solely an artist, poet, scholar, may not have known his other aspects. Governor of a district in China, he was forced by the local warlord to leave China in 1933. Since then, he has been professor of Chinese at Columbia University, Phi Beta Kappa Orator at Harvard, and Senior Specialist at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, as well as gaining an international reputation for his paintings and calligraphy.

Summarizing in words his impressions of China in the summer of 1975, he writes:

"First of all, the feeling of peace and prosperity in the air everywhere was the most striking change from the days when I lived in China... Another point is China's technical advances... I saw that now everybody had enough to eat, all eight hundred million of them... When I left China in 1933... Only 20 percent of the four hundred million Chinese could read and write. When I was in China... in 1975, I was told that 90 percent or even 95 percent of the eight hundred million had some education... Another great development in China is the unusual medicare, which has been extended to all Chinese, both countryfolk and town dwellers... One thing is absolutely certain, this great mass of eight hundred million has become unified, and mutually supportive, more than ever before in their history."

Possibly, his chiaroscuro painting of the dark old days and the bright new days seems too Manichean. Yet what man of three-score-and-ten who sees family and native land after 42 years would not rejoice and be exceeding glad? And so accentuate the positive. If this personal testament is a bit on the "To-China-With-Love" side, who would not understand?

—ROBERT W. RINDE

Japan's China Trip


The 1972 opening of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was "more than a mere extension of Sino-American accommodation" argues this cautious, fact-filled study. Professor Lee (University of Kansas) claims it showed Japan's decision not to remain a passive participant in the balance of power game; he gives no similar judgment on China's motives because, as he notes in his preface, of lack of materials and because his focus is mainly on the Japanese internal politics of the China question. He does speculate that Chou seized on the Sato-Tanaka transition as the moment to respond to Japanese overtures because he feared the USSR might be about to approach Tanaka. Professor Lee's conclusion is interesting: "The relationship... is perhaps asymmetrical and unstable." This detailed history of the 1949-1972 period, even if largely from the Japanese side, is valuable to have.

"The river and mountain are so beautiful like this!" A line from one of Mao Tse-tung's poems. Drawing from China Revisited by Chiang Yee. W. W. Norton.
Japanese public awareness of China—or, “cognitive orientation” in Professor Lee’s prose—is criticized for its limitations, e.g., only one of three knew China to be a communist state. But the same poll showed 80 percent knew China had exploded nuclear weapons. The Japanese are well aware of their neighbors; this enables Japanese-American close relations to survive distance and problems. Lee sees only China’s acceptance of massive collaboration in accepting Japanese capital and technology as possibly threatening the US position.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Cultural Evolution

The Tribal Eye, by David Attenborough. W.W. Norton & Company, $14.95.

This book, based on the BBC television series of the same name, is one of the finest books available on the subject of tribal art, the art of preliterate, nonindustrial societies—primitive art, if you will. The author does not limit himself to discussing the art of a former era, however, but rather provides an engaging commentary on primitive art and its encounter with modern Western culture. The text is written with a sense of drama and perception, supported by superb photographs. There is a chapter on the African art of the Kingdom of Benin, and another on Dogon wood carving, but this is not a book solely of interest to Africanists. Other chapters deal with the carvers of the tribes of the American and Canadian northwest, with the pre-Columbian gold work of South America, cult houses of Melanesia, and rug-making among the nomads of Iran. But primarily this book deals with the process of adaptation and change which takes place as cultures evolve in response to trade, other cultures, and colonization. This is a tremendous book, guaranteed to instill new enthusiasm and appreciation in anyone with the slightest interest in the subject. Foreign Service families will want to include this book in their personal libraries, and should find that it heightens their awareness of the forms of artistic expression as they take up new residences abroad.

—CHARLES O. CECIL

Weatherwise

A Change in the Weather, by Fitzhugh Green. Norton, $9.95.

Mark Twain is supposed to have said that “everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.” The fact that this famous remark was actually written by Charles Dudley Warner in an 1890 editorial for the Hartford Courant only serves to underscore the general lack of knowledge about our weather and what Man is doing to it, and it to Man. Warner’s remark may have been amusing when he wrote it, but it soon became one of the tritest truisms of our time. Yet, today, as Fitzhugh Green so vividly explains in his book, A Change in the Weather, scientists and military planners are indeed doing something about the weather—and what they are doing is neither amusing nor trite. In addition, the everyday activities of men and women throughout the world are, unwittingly, causing changes in the weather, and the earth’s ecosystem generally, which could have profound effects on the lives and the very survival of coming generations. Mr. Green gives a fascinating account of how our weather is changing, or can be changed, and why. But the title of his book could be misleading, because the author tells us not only about the weather but also about the whole range of critical and awesome environmental modification issues with which mankind must cope.

Mr. Green was Associate Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from 1971-77 where he oversaw the Agency’s international activities. Earlier, he was a career USIA officer and a member of the staff of Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.). In the latter capacity, he helped write the legislation creating the FSIO corps as well as a Pell Senate Resolution that was instrumental in persuading the Nixon Administration to reconvene negotiations on the Law of the Sea and to promote the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning weapon of war destruction on the seabed. The varying perspectives of a career diplomat, legislative aide, and senior environmental administrator have, therefore, been brought together in this book.

But what has the weather got to do with diplomacy, which is the chief concern of the Journal’s readers? Ever since the creation in 1974 of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), The Department of State has realized that it must exercise greater leadership in managing the international problems associated with the global environment and technology. More generally, the United States and other participants in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment pledged “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”

There are potentially great benefits to be realized through efforts to modify the environment, for example by enhancing rainfall; however, carrying out such activities without considering their international implications could lead to serious disputes with other countries. For example, Mr. Green points out that there is “a widespread worry that enhancing precipitation in one community can be done only at the expense of the normal precipitation in another.” An effort, therefore, to increase the rainfall in southern Texas could give rise to charges of “rain rustling” by Mexico. More serious yet, the Soviet Union is considering the diversion of a river now flowing into the Arctic Ocean so that its waters will flow instead into the Caspian Sea where the water level has been declining due to heavy irrigation demands on the Volga. If this happens, however, the decrease in fresh water flowing into the Arctic Ocean could increase the salinity there to the point where the water would no longer freeze. If this happens, Green warns, “there may be a climatological domino effect with incalculable results to other regions and countries.”

In an ever more crowded and interdependent world, the daily activities of the citizens of one country increasingly impinge on the interests of other nations. Assessing and dealing with the problems of living together on Spaceship Earth could well dominate the diplomacy of tomorrow, and Fitzhugh Green’s book is an excellent introduction to the challenge that lies ahead.

—GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON
The Worst is Yet to Come

According to Sherry, well before the end of World War II an essential component of American Cold War militarism evolved, largely on the basis of “lessons” of the 1930s and early 1940s. An ideology of preparedness grew up, with elements of force structure, strategy, and political-military outlook that in large measure both self-fulfilling and self-defeating in the Cold War. The preparedness ideology arose, Sherry suggests, as American military leaders ruminated on the implications of surprise attack, menacing trends in technology that made strategic surprise easier, the reduced value of America’s once-formidable natural geographical defenses, and the heightening destructiveness of warfare. In the midst of World War II, these leaders believed that worse could—and indeed might—come. The leaders’ three-fold response was to forge close, continuing links with the scientific and industrial communities, to campaign for postwar universal military training, and to seek large postwar force structure, particularly in strategic air forces.

The author believes that his work refines and completes the traditional trinity of explanations for public policy: the economic, which in Cold War revisionism means Open Door imperialism; the political, which means traditional and historical suspicion of the Soviet Union in bilateral and especially in multilateral contexts; and Sherry’s contribution, the military. Sherry’s novel idea is that, because concern for American national security and the main plans for assuring it after the war antedated Soviet-American tensions, the military outlook and emphases of early Cold War probably contributed to that tension; logically, they could not have been its product, as the traditional view has had it.

The author concludes that the preparedness ideology “helped to encourage and excuse America’s activities as a global policeman.

AUTHORIZED EXPORTER
GENERAL ELECTRIC
Refrigerators • Freezers • Ranges
Washers • Dryers • Air Conditioners
Dishwashers • Radios • Phonos
Small Appliances
Available for All Electric Currents
Local Warehousing for Immediate Shipment

General Electronics, Inc.

SHOWROOM: 4513 Wisconsin Ave.,
Washington, D.C. 20016  E.Merson 2-8300
WRITE FOR CATALOG. Our catalog is
sent to administrative officers em¬
bassies and consulates throughout
the world.

RIVERSIDE TOWERS
Proudly bearing a tradition of
distinction in service
TO WORLD TRAVELERS
—EXQUISITE—
Seventy-two suites, studios and efficiencies,
elegantly decorated, all apartment facilities,
color television, maid service, fully air conditioned.

—CONVENIENT—
A superb location, directly opposite the State
Department and amid the centers of busi¬
ness, culture and government.

—ECONOMICAL—
Less expensive than most conventional hotel
rates offered for the same daily, weekly, and
monthly rental plans.

“A unique concept in furnished apartment-
hotel accommodations designed to meet
apartment requirements. The small conge¬
rial staff creates a warm, friendly atmo¬
sphere.”

As a guest of Riverside Towers Apartment-
Hotel special privileges are extended to you
at Wayside Inn since 1797, Battlefield Crys¬
tal Caverns and the GAFIA Lodge Recreational
Complex in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley.

For Reservations Contact:
RESIDENT MANAGER
RIVERSIDE TOWERS APARTMENT-HOTEL
2201 Virginia Ave. NW, Washington,
D.C. 20037
Phone (202)452-4600 Cable: RIVERSIDE

JOIN
DACOR
NOW
Diplomatic & Consular Of¬
cicers, Retired—known as
Dacor, Inc.—welcomes both
active and retired FSOS, FSRos, FS10s, and FSSOs.
Dues $20.00 annually. Inter¬
esting Bulletin. Group In¬
surance. Other beneficial
features.

Members may stay at Dacor House while on leave or
consultation. May apply for
club membership in Dacor
House. Excellent meals.
Reasonable rates. Fully air
conditioned. Club rooms for
entertaining.

For further information and
application forms write to
DACOR, INC.
1718 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978 25
The facile references to "appeasement" and Pearl Harbor could justify "nuclear deterrence, global intervention, peacetime conscription," and the evolution of the military-industrial complex. "In 1945," he writes, "the alternative to preparedness and global peacekeeping appeared to the policymakers to invite national suicide. The course they ultimately followed became for the world, including the United States, substantially as dangerous."

Despite the book's conclusion —too much the product of the self-conscious student liberalism of the Vietnam era—it sets forth a convincing and important general thesis. Sherry makes clear that postwar American military posture and the beginnings of postwar strategic plans owed more to the lessons of the 1930s and 1940s than to early Soviet-American irritations.

—THOMAS H. ETZOLD

**Nobel-ity**

*The Russian Rockefellers* by Robert W. Tolf. Hoover Institution Press, $14.95

The name Nobel is usually associated with the Nobel prizes and its Swedish Maecenas, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite. But the rest of the Nobel family was equally talented and successful, deriving its wealth from a wide range of business enterprises and from the Caspian oil fields of Imperial Russia.

Alfred's father, Immanuel, and brothers Robert and Ludwig, with their progeny, formed an industrial dynasty of remarkable range, versatility and achievement. After some initial failures in Sweden, Immanuel, who was trained as an architect, emigrated to Russia in the middle of the 19th century where he became a pioneer designer and manufacturer of steam engines, and an innovative armsments producer whose specialty was underwater mines. Alfred went back to Sweden to specialize in chemistry, but eldest son Robert founded the family properties in the Baku oil fields, and Ludwig, an engineering genius and the most dynamic brother of all, created the refineries and marketing system of one of the world's first integrated oil companies; by World War I, half of the world's supply of crude petroleum was coming from the Baku oil fields. Their holdings were swept away by the Bolshevik revolution, but at its pre-war height the Nobels controlled an industrial empire of formidable proportions with 50,000 workers and a tanker fleet of 300 vessels.

The author of this unique contribution to an understanding of Czarist Russia—whose industrial history is virtually a blank page—is an ex-foreign service officer who spent three years of research on the project in six countries. The book is a useful corrective to the notion that Russian technological progress dates only from the Revolution.

—CHARLES MACHELING, JR.

THE SEEING GLASS

Susceptible to yellow doorways, street gardens, predictions, old bricks in London's last light, swimming swans, trees spread with green furred nuts. Fond of words, all creatures that smile, old ladies in the grand style, unassuming dawns, unescorted dews, bare winds, what I cannot change about yon.

Katie Louchheim
INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY
from page 19

applying the lessons painfully
learned. A streamlining of the in-
telligence community has begun. A
new congressional regulatory, or
oversight, mechanism is taking
shape. Under a new Executive Or-
der, which will have been issued by
the time this reaches print, it is
likely that the national intelligence
estimate, upon which the President
relies heavily to make policy deci-
sions, will represent a blend of sev-
eral positions, rather than an exclu-
sive distillate of the CIA’s percep-
tions. And the President, in August
1977, gave the Director of Central
Intelligence the power to decide on
the final budget for the several in-
telligence agencies. In the past, a
committee made this decision, and
the Director of Central Intelligence
controlled only the CIA budget
(which, it may surprise some, rep-
resents less than fifteen per cent of
the total US intelligence budget).

The path ahead will not be an
easy one, especially for those
senators and representatives who
accept service on new, more di-
rectly involved congressional over-
sight committees in the area of in-
telligence. Ultimately, their task
may well prove as vital as that of
those whose activities they are reg-
ulating. Certainly, it will be as
thankless, in addition to which the
congressional overseers will not
enjoy the benefit of anonymity.

Schooled in compromise as a
way of professional life, these con-
gressional overseers of intelligence
and covert action will have to ac-
custom themselves to an area
where there are no middle roads,
only decisions which demand to be
made without delay and offer sim-
ply a choice between alternatives
which may differ only in degree of
unpleasantness. If they are fortu-
nate, they will never find them-
selves in the nightmarish position
of Churchill and his closest ad-
visors on November 14, 1940.
Because the British had acquired a
device with which they were able
to crack the “unbreakable” Ger-
man code (the “Ultra” secret, only
recently revealed), they had ad-
vance warning of a devastating air
raid to be made on a city. To have
ordered evacuation or taken other
action to save the city or its in-
habitants would have risked letting
the Germans know that the Allies
were aware of their most secret or-
ders and plans, often before the
German field commanders con-
cerned. The decision was to pro-
tect the secret, and Coventry was
destroyed, with accompanying at-
rocious civilian casualties.

From time to time, the congres-
sional intelligence overseers may
have to remind themselves that the
Constitution they have sworn to
uphold consists of more than the
first ten amendments. In the first
sentence of the Preamble, for
example, two of the six objectives
of “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]
this Constitution of the United
States America” were to “insure
domestic tranquility” and “provide
for the common defense.” In this
age of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, nuclear weapons, and in-
ternational terrorism, support of
these two objectives involves a
formidable task and an awesome
responsibility. But the task cannot
be shirked, nor the responsibility
avoided, except at a cost few, if
any, would care to calculate, much
less advise us to pay.

THE FIRST THING YOU DO IS
PLAN YOUR MOVE
Domestic as well as international door-to-door
service.
- Storage.
- Air Freight
- Export Packing and Crating

Information on request: call: (TOLL FREE)
800-336-4544
Virginia or D.C. 703-569-2121

INTERSTATE
Van Lines, Inc.

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE:
L.C.C. No. NC-1745
5801 ROLLING ROAD
SPRINGFIELD, VA, 22152

THE NEW YEAR
Right!

Start
Join Your
Credit
Union!

6% + ½% BONUS Dividend Declared for
Fourth Quarter 1977
Dividends paid and compounded Quarterly
Effective Annual Yield 6.39%
(Calculated on $1,000 for one year)

Year
STATE DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
Washington, D.C. 20520  (202) 832-3282

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1978 27
lating his rather blunt English into French that would not further offend her, and putting her suspicions into English that would not discourage him completely. I strove desperately to pass on the essentials of what they said to each other, but without creating a level of anger that would prompt even greater demand for interpreting services. Only if they reached an amicable understanding would I be able to concentrate on my own pressing business with my own young lady.

As a diplomatic interpreter I was a flop. The negotiations finally broke down completely and the principals simply sat and glowered at each other. This might have let me carry out my own plans, but when my friend's disgruntled companion announced she was leaving, my young lady loyally and instantly said she, too, would depart. And they did. International relations had been worsened by an incompetent interpreter.

I never again ventured into the linguistic minefield of conference interpreting, or any other kind for that matter. In later years, however, I had a little experience at having others interpret for me, which was an ordeal in its own way. My mind would wander uncontrollably in the minute or two between the end of my English and the interpreter's English version of a Greek reply. I would think about tonight's party, or tomorrow's trip to the beach, or even of what I ought to say next. But since what I ought to say next depended on the nature of the reply to my previous statement, I could do little by way of useful preparation. Furthermore, in my fear of being misunderstood, I began to sound like Henry James, making terribly subtle distinctions and elaborating at length on the obvious. I took great pains to offer comments that simultaneously showed good intentions, immense courtesy, and rock-hard knowledge of the pertinent facts. My interpreter informed me, with utmost politeness, that I was making it very difficult for him. Perhaps greater experience would have let me pay as little attention as a statesman to the language barrier. But I never reached the point where an interpreter was only a smoothly-functioning machine that would take my golden thoughts, clothe them in another language and hand them, still pure gold, to the other side. I feared they would emerge as a base alloy.

In face-to-face discussions with people of another language, a monoglot has no control over what is done to his words by an interpreter. He can sometimes exert a certain control when written communications are being translated, since there is time for consultation about meanings, distinctions, and even subtleties intended or accidental.

Working with translators of written documents is a demanding exercise in understanding your own language. When a translator says, "Exactly what does this mean?" or "You used this word instead of its synonym; why did you choose one instead of the other?" you must actually think about what you have written. Translators can be brutal...
in their questions about euphemisms commonly used in communiques and press releases. They are trained to seek clarity; if opaqueness is what you want, the translator must be told, otherwise he may reveal what you prefer to keep veiled.

Although written translation is somewhat easier to control than rapid oral interpreting, the risk still exists that a translation may not be an exact echo of the original intent. A method for checking on the translation’s accuracy was devised by George C. Marshall 30 years before he became Secretary of State. He wrote about it in his memoirs of service in the First World War.

As a captain on the staff of the First Division in France, Marshall was ordered to draft a letter to the French general in charge of training the raw US troops. The division commander would sign the letter, which would tell the French general some of his proposed training methods were quite unacceptable.

“To insure accuracy of translation,” Marshall wrote, “I had Lieutenant Hugo (a French liaison officer) translate the letter into French, and then had Captain Seligman, another of our liaison officers, retranslate Hugo’s translation back into English. I feared Hugo’s native politeness might cause him to smooth down the embarrassingly frank portions of the letter so that the meaning and emphasis would be lost. It was necessary to repeat this procedure three times before I succeeded in obtaining a French translation which conveyed the exact meaning intended.” The French general, Marshall added, “was much hurt and incensed.” But the training methods were revised.

Marshall understood what J. M. Synge meant when he said, “A translation is no translation unless it will give you the music of a poem along with the words of it.” Not many drafting officers try as hard as Marshall to make sure the desired tone is preserved in translation. Entirely too often, no thought is given to whether the original written English is clear enough to survive the journey through the translator’s mind into the mind of a foreign reader. The translator then faces the dilemma described by W. H. Auden:

“In a case where the original is really obscure, that is to say, the translator’s difficulty in understanding it is not due to his own ignorance or stupidity, what is he to do? Should he give as literal a translation as he can, and thus write a . . . sentence which he cannot himself understand, or should he write an intelligible . . . sentence at the cost of altering what the original text actually says? Personally, in cases of desperation I believe he should take the second course.”

Auden was talking about literary translation. In the world of diplomacy the translator is not encouraged to fool around with “what the original text actually says.” The task of both interpreters and translators would be much easier if their bosses would make it their aim to acquire “the appropriate and graceful use of language” which George Kennan called “one of the prime requirements of the diplomatic profession.”
TIPPECANOE IN BOGOTA
from page 13

dentials, September 25, word reached Bogotá of the outbreak of a revolt headed by Harrison's friend, General Córdoba, at Antioquia. The revolt was crushed and the leaders apprehended.

Having given up his official status, Harrison proceeded to write a long, 4400-word letter to Bolivar which was to result in a demand for his recall. According to Belaunde's Bolivar and Spanish-American Thought, "Diplomatic history does not record a more flagrant case of violation of the duties of neutrality and diplomatic convention." A few pertinent quotations will illustrate its tenor:

"An old soldier could possess no feelings but those of the kindest character towards one who has shed so much luster on the profession of arms; nor can a citizen of the country of Washington cease to wish that in Bolivar the world might behold another instance of the highest military attainments, united with the purest patriotism and the greatest capacity for civil government.

"But I contend that the strongest of all governments is that which is most free. The possession of arbitrary power by the Government of Colombia will not be the means of securing its tranquility; nor will the dangers of disturbances solely arise from the opposition of the people.

"General, the course which Washington pursued is open to you. Are you willing that your name should descend to posterity amongst the mass of those whose fame has been derived from shedding human blood, or shall it be united to that of Washington as the founder and the father of a great and happy people? The place which you are to occupy in their esteem depends on yourself. Farewell, W. H. Harrison."

Harrison was still in the country in January, 1830, when the Colombian Government officially demanded his departure on the grounds that:

"1. He entertained hostile and insurrectionary sentiments and made them public;

"2. He knew of the intended insurrection of General Córdoba, and refused to inform the government;

"3. He aided and abetted a plot for a rebellion in the capital;

"4. He wrote an insulting letter to the Liberator."

Harrison finally left a few days later. The publicity created by the demand for his recall aroused some criticism in the United States, and in defense of his action he published a 70-page pamphlet entitled "Remarks of General Harrison, Late Envoy to the Republic of Colombia, with Certain Charges Made against him by that Government." In the pamphlet, he reproduced the full text of his now famous letter to Bolivar.

Ten years later, when he was running for president under the motto "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too," the Colombian incident was recalled not as an example of his bad judgment, but as a demonstration of his belief in representative government and straightforward speech.
The road traveled by the US foreign policy runs from the revolutionary War of Independence to the attempts to establish US world domination. Even US bourgeois historiographers, despite their bias and apologetics, have to admit that US history is chiefly one of aggression and territorial seizures.

Thus, three US professors, L. Gardner, W. La Feber and T. McCormick, say in their book, *Creation of the American Empire: US Diplomatic History*, published on the eve of the US Bicentennial, that US history has amounted to “the creation of an American empire.” The highly authoritative Brookings Institution published the results of a survey early this year which shows that since 1945 the United States has resorted to the threat or use of armed force on 215 occasions to back up its foreign policy, including 33 cases involving the threat to use nuclear weapons. Of course, what is important is not just the number of “cases” but also the fact that US foreign policy since the Second World War has been, and on the whole remains, a policy of armed aggression and nuclear blackmail.

The constant emphasis in US foreign policy on force, on armed aggression has invariably determined the subordinate status of the diplomatic service with respect to the military department, and subsequently also to the US intelligence department. When the policy of diktat and armed aggression led to the country’s greatest fiasco in its history—the defeat in the Vietnam war in the 1970s—US diplomacy and its diplomatic service quite naturally found themselves in the throes of a deep crisis.

A characteristic feature of US diplomacy and its diplomatic service is that they are prone to influence from the day-to-day domestic political fighting, the clashes between Congress and the White House, between the Democratic and the Republican Parties, and so on. A practical consequence of this is instability and hesitation in putting through the US foreign policy line by its diplomatic service, and in the behavior of its diplomats.

At present, the US diplomatic service, which is the largest in the world, with a staff of nearly 24,000 and an annual budget of roughly $1 billion, is going through a period of highly painful adaptation to the need for a more realistic line in US diplomacy than the one which had been pursued over the past quarter-century. It is, of course, hard to anticipate how this process will run, but when analyzing it the specific features of the historical evolution of the US diplomatic service should undoubtedly be taken into account.
Preventive Medicine

I was gratified to read (in the November 1977 Journal) that MED is about to establish a section on Environmental Coordination and Preventive Medicine, along the lines advocated in my article, "Cancer and Foreign Service" in the May 1976 Journal. Although your writer avoids use of the term, cancer and cancer-producing carcinogens at our Foreign Service posts around the globe must be among the principal concerns of any such section. As I have described elsewhere, MED's record in this area has been characterized by tragic gaps and inadequacy in the past (admission of which is at least implied by establishment of the new section).

It is greatly to be hoped that the new unit will move rapidly to correct past mistakes and establish the most modern and effective procedures available. For the benefit of the entire Foreign Service community, AFSA's Members' Interests Committee should concern itself with assuring that the new Environmental Coordination and Preventive Medicine unit, once established, actually works.

Louis E. Kahn

Ambassadorial Appointments

I found the statement concerning presidential appointments in the AFSA news section of your October 1977 issue of the Foreign Service Journal both useful and wise. Accordingly, I asked that it be placed in the Congressional Record for November 4, 1977. I have enclosed a copy of the insert for your convenience.

I have long been a strong advocate of basing our ambassadorial appointments on competence, not on politics.

Again I commend you for your valuable and articulate statement. With best wishes,

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
United States Senator

"Soybeans & Atomic Bombs"

Apparently space limitations in the December FSJ caused the elimination from my essay of one of its most important points. The reason debate on the issue of the establishment of an international trade and investment department in the federal government is bound to intensify is that Senators Roth and Ribicoff have introduced legislation—S. 990—based on Stephen Cohen's proposals to do just that. Furthermore, a separate assessment by Cohen of the organization of the executive branch for the management of international economic policy has been published by the House International Relations Committee which recently ordered a second printing of 3000 copies because of the unusual demand. We are well advised to read The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems and Proposals for Reform. It is a subject whose time has come.

Joseph V. Montville

Hemenway Suit Dismissed

AFSA has just learned that the $100,000 lawsuit by former AFSA president John D. Hemenway and four supporters has been dismissed by a federal court. The suit had been brought against AFSA and ultimately, 26 individual defendants following Mr. Hemenway's recall from office in November 1976. This dismissal was on the procedural ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.

"You've never learned, Arnold, that dissent often means keeping your mouth shut."
When you're moving to foreign shores for awhile—protect your possessions—personal and household—with TRAVEL-PAK. One TRAVEL-PAK policy does it all! From here—to there—while there (including storage if requested)—and back home again all are covered in your TRAVEL-PAK policy.

And if you become involved in a situation for which you may become legally liable—TRAVEL-PAK includes comprehensive personal liability coverage.

You can go all the way with TRAVEL-PAK.

When you return to the Washington area—call us—we'll be happy to help you set-up a sound, economical insurance program covering your home, auto and life.
If you're connected with the foreign service, here's the easiest way to get that new car you want.

Buy it direct from Chrysler Corporation. Our diplomatic discounts can mean a lot more car for a lot less money. Chrysler's 1978 DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM is an exclusive plan offered to members of the diplomatic corps, foreign service, and various qualified international organizations.

Should you qualify, you'll get the Chrysler product of your choice, built to your exact specifications. Quality cars such as Aspen, Cordoba, LeBaron, or Monaco are now available throughout the globe. All backed by service, parts and warranty protection — in the U.S. or overseas. To find out more about the DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM or our Super Saver Diplomatic Specials just return the coupon below.

If you qualify, you'll get the Chrysler product of your choice, built to your exact specifications. Quality cars such as Aspen, Cordoba, LeBaron, or Monaco are now available throughout the globe. All backed by service, parts and warranty protection — in the U.S. or overseas. To find out more about the DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM or our Super Saver Diplomatic Specials just return the coupon below.

Buy it direct from Chrysler Corporation. Our diplomatic discounts can mean a lot more car for a lot less money. Chrysler's 1978 DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM is an exclusive plan offered to members of the diplomatic corps, foreign service, and various qualified international organizations.

Should you qualify, you'll get the Chrysler product of your choice, built to your exact specifications. Quality cars such as Aspen, Cordoba, LeBaron, or Monaco are now available throughout the globe. All backed by service, parts and warranty protection —