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November 1981. Volume 58, No. 10. ISSN 0015-7279.
LETTERS

Vietnam’s Patriots

James C. Thomson Jr.’s “The Indochina Tragedy” (Journal, July/Aug.) is interesting and informative, and particularly so as regards the bureaucratic background of policymaking on Vietnam. I look forward to the publication of his book Sentimental Imperialists.

Still, it occurs to me that Mr. Thomson could have made his article even more valuable by including a discussion of the role played by South Vietnamese patriots in the closing years. Records show that, from the signing of the Paris Agreement in January 1973 to the fall of Saigon, the South Vietnamese fought well—often heroically—to defend their land. The bloody battle of Xuan Loc—when American help had ended and Saigon was already doomed—will go down as one of the most valiant military actions in Vietnamese history.

Also, I believe Mr. Thomson somewhat overstates his case when he writes that the government was taken “totally by surprise” by the sudden and rapid fall of South Vietnam. In reality, from the loss of Ban Me Thuot on March 11, 1975, and the consequent outpouring of refugees, we in the embassy were increasingly apprehensive for the future. Our apprehensions were heightened by the reluctance of the Congress to vote the funds to provide South Vietnam with vitally needed military supplies. Our apprehensions were such that at the end of March the embassy and the military forces in the Vietnam area mounted an evacuation effort to remove all Americans from South Vietnam, except for a skeleton staff of officials. Thomson writes of disarray and danger. This there was, but it was minimized by the skill of our military forces and by an agreement made with the North Vietnamese that their armies would not molest our evacuation.

One other point. Mr. Thomson is of the view that President Johnson
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could have de-escalated our involve-
ment in Vietnam in the expectation
that "at the worst a neutralist gov-
ernment would come to power." I
doubt this. I feel sure that Johnson
would have appreciated that a gov-
ernment of neutralists could be but
a mockery, a stepping stone to take-
over of the South by the communist
autocrats in Hanoi.

Josiah W. Bennett
FSO, retired

Culture Shock

The State Department has al-
dready done some things for me as a
foreign-born spouse. It has given me
courses in three languages, two area
studies, departure, re-entry, teach-
ing English, and a number of work-
shops. I have been well-prepared
to go abroad with my husband and I
have enjoyed being at posts. But I
am thinking back, about how I felt
when I came here nine years ago.

No one knows how many foreign-
born spouses are in the Foreign
Service. There may be as many as
90 percent of all spouses. We all had
problems. And no matter how well
prepared we were, we suffered from
culture shock.

After conversations with several
foreign-born spouses, one thing is
clear to me: most want to forget the
difficulties of their arrival here.
Perhaps we all just want to be
integrated. We do not want to be
looked at as a group apart. And we
are not a group; our only similarity
is that we are foreign-born spouses
in the American Foreign Service.

Nine years ago, I got married,
left my country, my family, my
friends, my job. I moved to the
States with a very limited English
vocabulary. It was my own decision.
No one forced me.

I at first wondered what was
wrong with me. I felt guilty. Why
could I not function? I can laugh
now, but some things made me cry
in the beginning. I could not cook a
turkey, read a cookbook, decide
what to buy in the supermarket,
understand yards, inches, Faren-
heit, dishwashers, can openers,
washing machines. My university
education seemed a waste. I was
totally unprepared.

I am grateful for all the courses I
have taken at the Foreign Service
Institute, but I am convinced that
something needs to be done specifi-
cally for the foreign-born spouse
upon her or his arrival in the United
States. The FSI could teach courses
in spoken and written English. The
Overseas Briefing Center could have
a crash course in survival for new-
comers (shopping, cooking, how to
deal with the mechanical wonders
of the American home). There should
be someone you can call, preferably
from your native country. In the
beginning, you need to know that
you are not alone, that everybody
has problems adjusting.

The problem is whom to get in
contact with, to pair new arrivals
with well-adjusted volunteers. Be-
cause of the privacy act, there is no
easy way. It is up to each individu-
al to come forward.

So, if you are a newcomer or an
old hand, please get in touch with
me if you think a program for the
newly arrived foreign-born spouse
would be of help.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Searching In Vain


No one who spends twenty-five years in the U.S. Foreign Service can remain blind to the post-WW II view of America as both liberator and exploiter of the Western world and its fringes. In this collection of short stories, John Bovey, who retired from the diplomatic corps in 1972, probes the curious blend of affection and resentment that sometimes characterizes relations between Americans and the foreign populations in whose midst the Americans dwell.

Transient Americans float around places in France, the Netherlands, Norway, Morocco, questioning the value of the institutions and ideologies at whose shrines they serve, ultimately resorting to a search for some sort of transcendent love and fellowship. The search usually ends in vain. When it is not mobility, it is the ineradicable vestiges of the master-servant relationship, left by the confrontation between the United States and less technologically advanced countries, that present genuine human interaction with insurmountable barriers. "The Garden Wall" is a representative scenario. The wife of an American colonel stationed in Casablanca hires an Arab to fix a crumbling wall that surrounds her house. The situation highlights the complications inherent in a relationship between a Muslim misogynist and a guilt-ridden female who represents American hegemony.

Bovey's Americans rarely reminisce about experiences on their native soil, which lessens the credibility of some of these pieces. But on the whole they are imaginatively conceived stories that effectively raise a final question: At what point do desirable liberators become undesirable aliens?

—CONSTANCE BUCHANAN

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NOVEMBER 1981
Blurred Vision


Harry Rositzke, a retired CIA officer who has written widely on intelligence matters since his retirement in 1970, here reworks and updates the material in John Barron's 1974 KGB. Though there is naturally a great deal of duplication in the contents of the two books—it could hardly be otherwise given the scarcity of reliable published information on the subject—this newest survey of Soviet intelligence is a worthwhile addition to the general literature on Soviet spying.

Rositzke has an obvious fascination for the psychological make-up of the secret agent. This leads him into digressions on the mental outlooks of such secret agents as Kim Philby. The reader interested in the KGB's operations will see these as distractions, but they are worth reading nevertheless.

But the book has weaknesses as well. There is no bibliography, and the discussion of the KGB's expertise in the collection of technical intelligence is inadequate. The book may also be faulted for its assumption, and on the front jacket its flat declaration, that the KGB is "the world's best intelligence organization." This is a popular view but it is surely one that needs considerable qualification. It is true, to be sure, that the KGB is probably the best-financed intelligence organization in the world, that it has the most agents, and that it has the strongest backing from its government. And certainly it is true that its technical efficiency is very high indeed. But the organization can scarcely be termed the world's best so long as the political advice it generates for its superiors in Moscow has for so long been so demonstrably poor—in Afghanistan and Poland and, over the years, in Prague, Budapest, East Berlin, Cairo, and Peking.

If the Soviet economy were flourishing (all Soviet enterprise managers are approved by the KGB), if the Soviet population needed no iron curtain to keep it at home, and if Russia's political allies were not so obviously unreliable, then one might suppose that the regime in Moscow.
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Drucker has, for a generation, been a caustic critic of economics and its practitioners. This slim volume summarizes and updates his plea for a new economic rationale based on productivity and its causes and obstacles. This system "would give guidance to analysis, policy, and behavior... and might thus become what all great economists have striven for: a 'humanity,' a 'moral philosophy,' a 'Geisteswissenschaft,' and rigorous 'science.'" No one today can say whether the Next Economics will be designed by another Adam Smith, David Ricardo, or John Maynard Keynes, Drucker says, "or whether it will emerge in a gradual shift, resulting from the work of a great many competent people, as did the shift from the classic to the neo-classic economics of marginal utility a century ago."

Drucker also argues the following points in this marvelously provocative book:

- Efficient management of technology requires business to become innovative—which Drucker argues it has not been for the last 50 to 75 years;
- Four common assumptions about multinational corporations are false: that developing countries account for a major source of their sales, revenues, profits, and growth; that their capital is required for Third World economic development; that their operations amount to "global exploitation"; and that the "parent company" with wholly owned "branches" is the "right" organizational form in developing countries;
- The performance of public service institutions—especially government agencies—"may be the fundamental, the central need of modern society," and government operations need not be inefficient;
- With the coming rediscovery of "scientific management," advocated as early as 1903 by Frederick Winslow Taylor, the man formerly called the boss will become the servant of the workers;
- The extension of the life span is the greatest achievement of this century—making people over 65 our fastest growing "minority"—and will require the virtual elimination of mandatory fixed-age retirement within a few years, increasing reliance on part-time employees, and forcing basic changes in existing pension systems.

—JOHN J. HARTER

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The Pay Cap: A Bad Deal For the Taxpayer

“Resignations, retirements, and morale problems are taking their toll on the quality of executive leadership and will continue to do so and grow worse unless steps are taken to improve salaries and to alleviate the serious problems of pay compression.”


The decision by the president and Congress to retain a “cap” or limit on executive salaries at the $50,112.50 level is a bad one for all Americans—government employees and other taxpayers alike. The Reagan administration and the 97th Congress should reconsider their error by placing this issue on the agenda of pressing national business requiring urgent attention.

They might want to begin with the following findings:

- Foreign Service employees under Executive Schedule V (i.e., at the Senior Foreign Service level) have received three pay increases since 1969. During this time, Civil Service General Schedule employees have received 13 pay increases;
- In the past 11 years the Consumer Price Index has risen 180 percent. Executive V level salaries have risen less than 35 percent;
- If a person made $30,000 in 1972, he or she would have to earn $59,580 today merely to stay even with recent inflation;
- Since October 1969, private-sector executive salaries have increased 125 percent and General Schedule salaries have gone up 84 percent, while Executive Schedule V salaries have increased an average of only 35 percent;
- Retirement rates among government executives between ages 55 and 59 have reached, according to one survey, “staggering proportions.” In 1978 the percentage of top-pay federal employees eligible to retire who left the government was 17.6 percent. In August 1981 the figure had climbed to 95 percent of those at the pay-ceiling level;
- A Presidential Commission reported in December 1980 that “there is growing evidence that low salaries are a major reason for highly talented people declining appointments to key positions in the federal government.”

The major question is: Will the American public—through its elected leaders in the White House and Congress—squarely face the fact that equitable salaries must be paid to ensure that the best available talent is willing to come into and remain in government service? Or will some elected officials continue to ignore the problem, preferring instead to indulge in simplistic and polemical rhetoric concerning the competence of government executives whenever the subject of compensation is raised? Most members of the foreign affairs community take pride in doing work they consider important and rewarding. At the same time, these executives expect fair pay involving at least limited material incentives (when compared to private-sector opportunities).
Congress seemed to recognize the problem back in 1970 when it passed the Comparability Pay Act and later, in 1975, the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act (PL 94-82). The latter act was intended to allow automatic salary increases by which government executive compensation would approach, but not reach, the salary scales of private sector executives. In fact, on only one occasion—in 1975—was the mechanism allowed to work. In every other year, Congress, during the appropriation process, has ignored statistical evidence justifying salary adjustments.

As a result of the pay freeze for senior executives and modest pay increases at lower levels, a serious problem has resulted, namely severe pay compression. With the latest 4.8 percent pay increase, the $50,112.50 salary will now be earned by Foreign Service personnel beginning at the FS 1 step 4 level. It doesn't take a managerial genius to spot the potential problems inherent in a system in which a supervisor, his or her boss, and their subordinates all receive the same salary. It has been estimated that if the Executive Level V pay ceiling is not lifted by 1984, then the total number of affected employees government-wide (currently 46,200) will be 140,000, or approximately 7.2 percent of the entire federal workforce. For those who care, a problem of crisis proportions is at hand.

The 1980 Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries recommended increases in executive pay to a high rate of $70,000. The pay cap now affects over 2,500 Foreign Service employees of State, ICA, and AID, and a combination of lifting the pay cap and raising salaries to the recommended levels would cost slightly over $3 million.

Unlike the criteria commonly used to determine adequate compensation in the marketplace, key factors in determining government employee compensation are “political reality” and the “public mood.” Congress in 1975 amended the Comparability Pay Act of 1970 so that members of Congress and high-ranking officials would receive the same annual adjustment provided to other federal employees. Unfortunately, this procedure was carried out only once—in 1975. Although the governments of Britain, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, among others, have rejected the argument that legislative pay should be linked to that of federal government employees, the U.S. Congress in practice seems to hold to this view despite the managerial problems and personal inequities it causes. There is no legal basis for this policy and, as one Congressman observed, there are few parallels between the career patterns, career expectations, and responsibilities of congressmen and federal government executives.

As Congressman Michael Barnes has noted: “The issue of what we are doing to the federal government by continuing to unreasonably hold down the salaries of the people we seek to manage the programs that are initiated by the Congress is slowly . . . destroying the efficiency of the federal government itself.” He added: “I just think it is terribly unfortunate that we find ourselves in a position in which, once again this year, those people who seek to serve the people of the United States are called upon to make the most direct and immediate sacrifices, because they want to serve the public. But they want to do so in a way that permits dignity.”

The issue is clear: A commitment to improved management of the federal government and a sense of fairness to dedicated and talented government employees require that the administration and the Congress move swiftly to lift the pay cap. As a routine matter they should provide executives, at a minimum, the same level of salary increases provided to other federal employees. If Congress feels that PL 94-82 is faulty, then a more rational compensation plan should be substituted to remove the matter of executive-level pay compensation from the political vicissitudes of a given moment. The American people and executives in the foreign affairs agencies deserve no less.
Did the U.S. and Britain Miss a Chance to Change Postwar History in Asia?

By EDWIN W. MARTIN

Ever since Robert Blum’s article “Peiping Cable: A Drama of 1949” appeared in the New York Times (Aug. 13, 1978) and revealed the existence of a top secret message to the “highest American authorities” purportedly from Chou En-lai, there has been speculation as to its significance for Sino-American relations. Some scholars have strongly questioned its validity, while others have cited it to support the view that the United States had a genuine opportunity to reach an understanding with the Chinese Communist leadership in the late spring of 1949. Possibly, as Blum comments, there was even “a potential chance to keep China unaligned in the cold war, and thus perhaps to change the course of postwar history in Asia.”

In the course of some research at the Public Record Office in London in the late spring of 1981, I came across Foreign Office documents dealing with this same message as it was received by the British government. Comparing the versions of the Chou message received by the Americans and the British, and the surrounding circumstances, provides a new basis for evaluating its significance.

The Chou message was conveyed to the Department of State in a telegram dated June 1, 1949, from Consul General Edmund Clubb in Peiping (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 8:357-60). The previous day the message had been given orally to Colonel David Barrett, an assistant U.S. military attaché, by a “reliable intermediary,” later identified as Australian journalist Michael Keon. Chou did not want his name mentioned and said if the message were attributed to him he would disavow it.

Moreover, according to Clubb’s telegram, “Chou desired what he said be conveyed to British, expressed preference transmittal be through department.” But the State Department chose not to act on this suggestion; the first word the Foreign Office had of the Chou message was in a “very top secret” telegram from Governor Grantham of Hong Kong received in London on August 10 (FO doc. 371/75766 F12075/G).

While the Americans had obtained the Chou message secondhand, the British got it thirdhand. As Governor Grantham reported:

Fitzgerald, former British Council Representative in Peking, arrived here three days ago from Peking. He was the bearer of an important message from Chou En-lai for H.M.G. This message was passed to him by Michael Keon... Chou did not wish to use consular channels for transmitting a message to H.M. Government and in giving Keon message he emphasized repeatedly that greatest care should be taken to keep his name out.

The main thrust of the message Fitzgerald brought to Hong Kong was similar to that Keon gave Barrett in Peiping more than two months earlier. Both versions argued that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was bitterly divided between a strongly pro-Moscow radical faction under the leadership of Liu Shao-ch'i and a liberal faction under Chou En-lai's leadership. The latter advocated early establishment of relations with the Western powers since they alone could help China out of its dire economic straits. A victory for the Chou faction would mean that the CCP would not always follow Moscow's foreign policy lead but would exercise a moderating influence, thus reducing the danger of war.

There were some significant dif-
ferences, however, in the versions received by the British and Americans, differences that seem to have been deliberately tailored for each audience. As given to the Americans, the message dwelt at length on China’s serious economic plight, Chou’s faith in American economic prowess, and the need for American economic aid. The version received by the British through Fitzgerald, on the other hand, said nothing at all about U.S. aid, and a more detailed version later provided to the British by Keon himself in mid-September even held that China could not expect aid from the United States, which had aided the Kuomintang. The plea for aid contained in the American version argued that “China still not communist and if Mao’s policies are correctly implemented may not be for long time.” The British version, according to Fitzgerald, held that the Chinese Communists “are hundred-percent convinced communists and they consider communism is the only answer to China’s problems.” The American version recalled friendly wartime contacts between Americans and the CCP and hoped “American authorities remembering this would believe there were genuine liberals in party who are concerned with everything connected with welfare Chinese people and ‘peace in our time’ rather than doctrinaire theories.” The British version contained nothing of these sentiments but instead stressed the dangers of war should the Liu faction win out in the current factional struggle. To the Americans, Chou’s message mentioned only de facto relations, but the British version spoke of “normal” diplomatic relations with the West.

The inconsistencies, even contradictions, in the versions of the Chou message delivered to the Americans and the British raise doubts as to its authenticity. There has never been any confirmation from an official Chinese source that the message actually originated with Chou. Nevertheless, the U.S. and British officials who dealt with the message all appear to have accepted it as having originated with Chou, and their ranks included some formidable China experts, especially in the case of the Americans.

Colonel Barrett had spent some twenty-five years of his army career in China and was fluent in Chinese. As commander of the Dixie Mission in Yanan in 1944 he had come to know Chou En-lai well. Consul General Edmund Clubb, a Chinese-speaking Foreign Service officer of a scholarly bent, also had spent many years in China at a variety of posts, including remote Thwa and Changchun. Ambassador Leighton Stuart in Nanking, to whom Clubb had repeated the Chou message, was born and brought up in China, became a missionary educator, and headed Yenching University for more than twenty-five years. He was personally acquainted with both Mao and Chou and with other, lesser lights in the ranks of the CCP. It would be hard to find a trio of non-Chinese officials, then or now, who combined as much experience of China together with as diversified a knowledge of China’s political, cultural, and military affairs as these three. Thirty years later it is difficult to challenge their on-the-spot judgment that the message came from Chou.

Other Questions

But if the authenticity of the Chou message was not seriously challenged, its American and British recipients did have other questions. Was there really a serious split in the CCP leadership? Did the message represent a genuine plea for help or was it a propaganda ploy? As far as can be judged from his spot judgment that the message actually originated with Chou, Stuart expected that even if granted U.S. aid, the Chinese Communists would maintain close political ties with the Soviet Union, desiring to “continue diet of Soviet political bread but eke out diet with American economic cake.” Even though Chou had asked that no reply be given to his message, Clubb recommended a reply, one that would make clear that the United States wanted to maintain relations with the Chinese nation, but that these relations “must be based on mutual understanding, respect, and cooperation, on reciprocity as well as egalitarianism.”

After receiving Chou’s message and seeing Clubb’s comments, Ambassador Stuart declared in a telegram of June 7 to the State Department that the Chou message was “a call for help” and contained “an extremely important indication as to possible American policy”—obviously not the words of a man skeptical of the good faith of the message (FR 8:372-73). He, too, recommended a reply, one which would tell Chou that the United States “would be as ready now as we have always been to assist” the people of China in their struggle “to attain independence and national sovereignty and in their need of economic betterment and technological progress,” provided that a “basis of mutual self-respect and confidence could be reestablished between China and U.S.” Stuart suggested that Chou be reminded that the Communist treatment of U.S. consular officers in China, particularly those in Mukden (where the U.S. consul general and his staff had been held under house arrest for some seven months) and constant anti-American propaganda could not create “an atmosphere conducive to friendly relations.” He recommended the reply close with a statement sincerely welcoming Chou’s protestations of pro-Western sentiment but pointing out that “they cannot be expected to bear fruit until they have been translated into deeds capable of convincing people of U.S. that continued American support of Chinese objectives is in mutual interest of both countries.”

The State Department accepted Clubb’s and Stuart’s judgment as to the authenticity of the Chou message and the desirability of replying to it. In a message later approved by President Truman, the department on June 14 instructed Clubb to “prepare a reply on plain paper without signature or designation source” but to transmit it only if he could do so either directly “or thru [sic] completely reliable intermediary without danger of disclosure” (FR 8:384-85, 388). In substance, the reply expressed the American
hope “to maintain friendly relations with China and continue social, economic, and political relations with that country insofar as these relations based on principle mutual respect and understanding and principle equality and are to mutual benefit two nations.” The message continued much along the lines Ambassador Stuart had recommended.

The American reply to the Chou démarche was never delivered, though it was not for want of effort on the American part. While Chubb did not give the reply to Keon, he did use Keon as an intermediary to try to make arrangements for either Barrett or Chubb himself to give the reply directly to Chou or to his secretary. However, the Communists were unprepared to make such an arrangement and told Keon not to initiate an approach again.

**Dubious Purpose**

In contrast to the Americans, the British apparently never seriously considered making a reply to the Chou démarche. While the British were inclined to accept the authenticity of the message, they were immediately more skeptical of its purpose than were the Americans (FO 371/75766 F12076). The first British official to comment on it for the record was Guy Burgess, then a relatively junior official in the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office, working on China and the Philippines. In a minute dated August 15, Burgess noted that “fairly extensive diffusion of this top secret information by Chou and his choice of journalistic channels makes the thought of a plant very obvious indeed.”

Patrick D. Coates, the Far Eastern department’s China political officer, was the next to comment on the Chou message. Unlike Burgess, who had no China experience, Coates was a China specialist, having served in four posts in China between 1937 and 1946. While Coates agreed that “the possibility that this message is a plant” could not be dismissed, he felt that an “air of verisimilitude” was lent to the message by Chou’s “disarming statements” that the Chinese Communists were one hundred percent communist and that one of his leading supporters (Lin Piao) “nourishes a strong hatred for all foreigners.” Had Coates had access to the American version of the Chou message, he might have reacted differently, since neither of the “disarming statements” he cited were in it.

On August 16 Assistant Under-secretary Esler Dening, a Japan specialist, sent a memorandum to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on the Chou message. Pointing out that it was now clear “the Americans have had the gist of this message for some time” but had “not disclosed this to us or discussed it with us,” Dening asserted the message should be regarded as of some importance and that on the whole it had “a ring of truth.” He did not think the British attitude should be unduly affected by the possibility that Chou had employed the “time-honoured technique for a party to say that it is moderate, and that unless one makes concessions to it a more extreme party will gain power.” After all, Chou had not concealed the fact “that his party are one hundred percent communist and consider that communism is the only answer to China’s problems.” He went on to warn:

The Americans will no doubt argue that the message is a plant and that we should ignore it... If, in the terms of Chou En-lai’s message, his opponents win, then we will be thrown out neck and crop, and the Americans will say, ‘I told you so.’

Dening’s rather sad misapprehension of the American reaction to the Chou démarche would have been avoided, of course, if the State Department had been frank with the British about it to begin with.

As matters turned out, it was His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin who dismissed the message as a plant, rather than the Americans. His views are contained in the following brief note dated August 17:

The S/S says that this move of Chou En-lai’s reminds him very much of the attitude adopted at one time or another by various less extremist politicians in Soviet satellite states. He points out that whether we responded to approaches from so called moderates or not, the extremists always won. All in all, the S/S tends to the view that this move is in accordance with standard Soviet tactics.

It seems apparent that Bevin’s reaction to the Chou démarche was based on his own experience with Eastern European communists, which he trusted in this instance more than he did the judgment of his Foreign Office experts, Dening and Coates.

Coming after the foreign secretary had already pronounced on the subject, the comments of Sir Ralph Stevenson, British ambassador in Nanking, on the Chou message are somewhat of an anticlimax; nevertheless they are worth recording as the British view from within China (FO 371/75765 F12952).

Noting that the roundabout method of delivery of the message and the lapse of time since it was originally given to Keon militated against its accuracy, Stevenson found it difficult to disentangle the original message from interpretations by the persons through whom the message had passed. Stevenson thought the “genuineness of Chou’s alleged motives at least open to suspicion,” and found it difficult to judge the purpose of a communication “to which Chou can scarcely have expected any reply, or even any indication as to how it may have been eventually received.”

Although Stevenson felt that the message confirmed his view that two opposing groups existed in the Communist hierarchy—a view widely held by foreigners in China at the time—he had reservations on other points, especially concerning Communist professions of a desire to trade. In his view, “So long as the ideological and anti-foreign bias continues to predominate... they will be in no hurry to take concrete steps to relieve British and other foreign business from disabilities which they are now suffering,” a judgment which, unhappily for foreign businessmen, proved all too accurate.

**Different Account**

The foregoing British reactions to the Chou message were based on the version transmitted by C. P. Fitzgerald to the governor of Hong Kong in early August. About six weeks later, Keon himself arrived in Hong Kong from Tientsin and, as reported in a telegram from Governor Grantham dated September 14, “personally confirmed and amplified [the] message brought by Fitzgerald” (FO 371/75775 F16584/G). The governor pointed out, however, that in some respects Keon’s account differed from Fitzgerald’s. One difference “of fundamental importance” was that, according to Keon, Chou
had “lost tremendous ground recently, largely owing to leakage of news of his contact with the outside through Keon,” while Fitzgerald had given the governor to understand “that Chou En-lai’s group had been somewhat strengthened by recent events.”

The Foreign Office officials concerned with the Chou message seemed to believe that their minutes on the Fitzgerald version adequately covered the situation still and they had nothing to add. But the officials of the office of the commissioner general for Southeast Asia in Singapore (at that time a British colony) produced a top secret memorandum dated October 20 covering both versions (ibid). While these analysts “generally agreed the message was authentic though no doubt a trifle embellished in the telling,” they were divided on the question of whether there really was a schism in the CCP. However, the fact that Chou became both the prime and foreign minister of the new Central People’s Government on October 1 made the existence of a schism seem even more doubtful. The memorandum concluded:

... that the message is merely another example of the familiar communist technique of assuring intended victims that their intentions are the exact opposite of what they really are, and that the message forms part of a definite deception plan designed to lull British and American apprehension and possibly to encourage trade approaches by United Kingdom interests on terms favorable to Communist China.

This is similar to the conclusion voiced by Consul General Clubb in a telegram to the State Department dated June 27 (FR 8:398-99). Reflecting on why the Communists had refused to accept any American reply to the Chou message, Clubb offered four possibilities. The first, and the most logical explanation in Clubb’s view, was that the Chou démarche “was designed serve political purpose of causing U.S.A. view Communist leaders more sympathetically, and perhaps letting sympathy affect U.S. attitude re: trade or direct aid, but did not constitute sincere expression of Communist views.” Clubb acknowledged, however, that Barrett thought this explanation was “unlikely in view of Chou’s character,” and Clubb himself had not offered it as a possible explanation when the Chou message was first received. He then had taken the message seriously and recommended a reply. Despite his change of view, Clubb did not regard having done so, believing that the American attempt to reply had served the “purpose of (1) testing willingness Chou’s group continue with matter and (2) exploring field.”

The desire of the Americans to test the bona fides of the Chou démarche may account, in part, for one of the most intriguing aspects of the whole affair—the claim that news of the démarche had been leaked to the party with dire consequences for Chou and his faction, and (almost) for Keon himself. Keon’s versions of how the leak occurred vary somewhat according to his audience. The leak story Keon gave the Americans contained only hints of the elaborate tale he was to tell the British later.

**Cloaks & Daggers**

The gist of his story to the Americans is set forth in a telegram dated July 11 from Clubb to the Department of State (FR 8:779-80).

Keon reports to Barrett on basis information given him, Keon, by Chinese Commie girl with whom he intimate, that Commies charge he hanged matter Chou note by failing (1) make clear no specific reply expected and (2) keep Chou En-lai’s name out of matter, Chou being undesirable of being brought into it personally. Keon, however, confirmed that (1) Barrett’s notes of Keon’s report were faithful record of meeting experienced by Keon, and (2) Chou had said without hesitation that Barrett would know from whom message came. Commie said [sic] moreover, per same source, is now disturbed by what they view ‘ambassador’s efforts contact Chou through other sources’ for presumed purpose endeavoring still deliver American reply. Keon expressed opinion Chou himself is ‘on the spot’ as result denouement.

In mid-August Keon told Barrett he had been taken in a cloak and dagger atmosphere to Chou En-lai’s secretary, Chang, who told him an elaborate case was being prepared against him on a charge of spying and that he should attempt to secure an exit permit before a final decision was taken in this matter by the highest authority, presumably Mao himself (FR 8:496-98). According to Keon, Chang had also maintained that had the Chou démarche not leaked, some other pretext would have been found for Soviet assumption of a strong hand in China. Barrett commented that he was convinced Keon, whom he described as “badly frightened,” told the story as he heard it and that the “possibility of Soviet pressure” could not be excluded.

But when Keon got to Hong Kong in mid-September he apparently said nothing about the Communists’ suspicions of him. Instead he told the British he had learned the following: Though strictly enjoined not to communicate the Chou message to any person not of American nationality, Ambassador Stuart had told his Chinese secretary, Philip Fugh, who went and saw Huang Hua (then head of the Alien Affairs Bureau in Nanking and now foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China), who in turn told Liu Shao-ch’i, the leader of the radical faction. A few days later Liu left for Moscow, returning within a week with a group of Soviets who pressured Mao Tse-tung to reject the views held by Chou En-lai (FO 371/75775 F16684G).

Keon said he got this story from a woman whom he had met when he was at General Chen Yi’s headquarters in Shantung in 1947 and who was now employed in the Political Department of the Peking administration. He claimed that Chou’s secretary had confirmed the story and that Consul General Clubb had heard it from other sources. As a result of the leak, according to Keon, Chou had probably been reprimanded by Mao, and had only been saved from “a severe fate” by General Lin Piao, who had sent a message to Mao threatening trouble if anything happened to Chou. The upshot of all these happenings was that the pro-Soviet radical group was now in the ascendant.

Two points are worth noting in this rather implausible tale. First, Huang Hua has long been considered to be a protegé of Chou’s. He was certainly so regarded by Ambassador Stuart, who had known him since he was a student leader at Yenching University named Wang-Ju-mei. Thus, even had Philip Fugh known about the Chou démarche (and there is no evidence that he did) and had he informed Huang, it

(Continued on page 32)
AFSA Reaches Accord On Danger Pay Differential

AFSA has reached agreement with State and AID management on regulations covering danger pay to Foreign Service employees at posts where “civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions” prevail.

Under the new regulations, additional compensation of a maximum of 25 percent over basic salary can be paid for service at "danger posts" designated by the secretary of state. In most cases, the allowance will be granted only when evacuation of dependents and/or nonessential personnel has been authorized or ordered, or at posts at which dependents are not permitted. "Danger posts" currently include Kabul and San Salvador.

At posts where danger pay is authorized, that portion of the hardship differential attributable to political violence will be reduced to avoid dual crediting. For example, at a 25-percent hardship-differential post where 10 percent is based on political violence, the differential would be reduced to 15 percent, and the employees could receive in addition 25 percent danger pay (if the maximum is authorized, as expected in most cases), for a total of 40 percent over basic salary.

If an employee is also authorized payment of a special incentive allowance (regulations for which have not yet been approved), the sum of that allowance plus danger pay cannot exceed 25 percent of basic salary.

When danger pay is terminated or revised, the special incentive allowance and regular hardship differential will be concurrently reviewed to assure that appropriate rates are established. In other words, there is no possibility that, in the illustration above, danger pay would be lifted, the differential would remain at the reduced rate, and a review would be "delayed." Danger pay will remain in place until the review is conducted.

Stephen Chaplin Named to Journal Editorial Board

Stephen M. Chaplin, the chief of the Fast Guidance Unit, Planning and Policy Staff, in the International Communication Agency, has been named to fill a vacant seat on the Journal Editorial Board. He is the ICA representative on the AFSA Governing Board and will serve a liaison role between the two boards.

Chaplin wrote features for the New Orleans Item and Honolulu Advertiser in the late ’50s and supervised publication of the base newspaper at Maxwell Air Force Base in 1962-63. After obtaining a bachelor’s degree from Kenyon College and a master’s from University of California, Los Angeles, he joined the old U.S. Information Agency. Besides service in Washington, he was assigned to the embassies in Buenos Aires and Mexico City. Later, as a branch public affairs officer at the consulate general in Hermosillo, Mexico, he wrote a monthly column for ten regional papers on topics of bilateral interest. Since then he has done graduate work at the Sino-Soviet Studies Institute of George Washington University, directed the Cultural Center at the Bucharest embassy, and been a country affairs officer for France, Portugal, and Spain. He is married to an attorney and has two young boys.

State Lifts Ambassador Pay Cap

The State Department lifted the “ambassadorial pay cap” on September 6 after what the Association has characterized as “a long and arduous battle.” Previously, high ranking Foreign Service employees at hardship posts—many of whose basic salaries were already limited by the federal pay cap—also lost differential payments for which they would have been eligible. The reason was no employee could receive in salary plus differential more than $100 less than the ambassador at the post, and ambassadors were not authorized to receive differentials.

Under the new regulations, all employees—including ambassadors at Class II, III, and IV posts—are now eligible to receive payment of salary plus differential up to $60,562.50 per year. This amount is $100 less than the salary authorized for a chief of mission at a Class I post. Differential payments are still not authorized for ambassadors at Class I posts.

The Association’s efforts to pressure the department to lift the pay cap included extensive efforts on the Hill and exerting force on management.

Governing Board Fills AID Standing Slots

On August 25, the AFSA Governing Board approved the membership of the new AID Standing Committee. The committee deals with the full range of matters affecting the AID Foreign Service corps, and members of the committee act on behalf of AFSA in dealing with management, researching topics of interest to AID Foreign Service personnel, and responding to the requests of members.

The members of the new standing committee are: Bill Schoux, PPC BR, chairman; Ralph Barnett, ASIA PD; Dick Delaney, LACCAR; Steve Giddings, PREH; Charlotte Kjellmark, AA ST; Bill McKinney, ASIA PRTB; Alex McKinnon, MO CRM; Henry Miles, AFR DP; Tom O’Connor, AFR SWA; Ron Witherell, NE TECH.
Educational Program Honors
Former AFSA President Bleakley

The 1981 Henderson-Satterthwaite Citation was presented to former AFSA President Kenneth W. Bleakley to honor his participation in the Foreign Affairs Seminar program, program director Robert M. Donihi announced. The citation, named for Loy W. Henderson and Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "without whose beneficent interest, encouragement, and participation these Foreign Affairs Seminars would not be," recognizes individuals who have contributed to the program that has been running discussion classes on international issues in conjunction with a number of area colleges since 1974.

Bleakley, now deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, was presented the award by Joan M. Clark, director general of the Foreign Service, who spoke at the ceremony.

Lease Signers Urged
To Insist on Diplomatic Transfer Clause

Foreign Service employees who sign a lease for rental of a house or an apartment while assigned to Washington are urged to insist on the inclusion of a diplomatic transfer clause, according to the AFSA Members' Interest Coordinator. Such a clause enables the employee to break the lease with 30 days' notice if he or she is transferred. Most leases do provide for military transfers, but Foreign Service personnel should be aware that these clauses do not apply to them.

AFSA has heard of the case of a junior officer who signed a one-year lease on an apartment in Arlington. He was assigned overseas after he had occupied the apartment for just a few months. The lease did contain a military transfer clause, and when he gave 30 days' notice he was assured there would be no problem because locating tenants is easy in the Washington area.

The officer was understandably dismayed when he later received a bill charging him for two months' additional rent. The landlord had not been able to locate a tenant, and the lessee was liable for the amount.

Along with the State Department and members of Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired, AFSA has been cooperating in the seminar program bringing the discussion of diplomacy to continuing education audiences and young persons connected with Prince George's Community College, Anne Arundel College, Montgomery College, George Mason University, Catholic University, Mount Vernon College, and Andrews Air Force Base. The seminars "intend to convey a knowledge of foreign policy problems, an increased comprehension of the diplomat's task, and heightened respect for the diplomat," said Donihi, a former Foreign Service staff legal officer. "Credit for the success of this program belongs to the dozens of diplomats who have breathed the life of their experiences into it."


Recently, the intercom system in the AFSA building failed, briefly leaving no method for the receptionist on the third floor to alert workers on the second floor to incoming calls. She solved the problem by rigging a string and a weight from her window to the floor below. When a call came in she would reach out the window and pull on the string. Is this what the phone company means by their slogan, "Reach out and touch someone"?

AFSA Raises Journal Subscription Cost To Nonmembers

For the first time in almost five years, the Association has raised Journal subscription charges to nonmembers, from $7.50 a year to $10, effective January 1982. At the same time, the single-issue price will go up from $.75 to $1.25. The $7.50 dues allocation to the Journal that pays for members' subscriptions will remain unchanged. The increase was a result of rapidly rising production costs.

Two-year subscriptions will now cost $18. Subscriptions going overseas will cost $11 for one year and $20 for two years. Members may purchase gift subscriptions at a discount rate, $8.50 domestic and $9.50 overseas. For library rates, agency rates, and bulk rates, please contact the Journal office.

When the Journal was founded in 1924, subscriptions cost $4 annually and copies cost $.35.

Newspaper's Error Results in False Hopes for Tax Savings

An article in a summer issue of the Wall Street Journal's Asian edition has resulted in a small flood of cables from the field asking for confirmation of the newspaper's contention that the new U.S. tax code makes government employees eligible for the $75,000 exclusion on foreign-earned income.

The Wall Street Journal was misinformed. The exclusion only applies to individuals paid by the government while overseas, who are not entitled to tax-exempt allowances that Foreign Service employees receive.

Foreign Service personnel, as federal employees stationed overseas, are accorded separate tax treatment under the U.S. tax law. As Prentice-Hall's Excerpts From the 1981 Tax Law states: "The exclusion is intended to cover individuals paid by the U.S. government but who are not eligible for foreign-area cost-of-living or Peace Corps allowances." Except for post differentials, Foreign Service allowances are exempt from taxation.

AFSA is pretty sure that the new tax code virtually shuts the door on the exclusion for all federal employees. The implementing regulations will provide more specific answers, but it will be some time before they are completed and published.
Retirement Update: Important Changes Predicted

An atmosphere of uncertainty settled over the Washington bureaucracy following the reconvening of Congress after the August recess. The first round of budget cuts was already in the works and the second wave was on the drawing board. Today, the metallic ring of axes being sharpened is again in the air, and the name of the game is trying to predict how, where, and when they will fall. One thing appears certain: the federal government’s retirement programs are going to be hit, one way or another.

At this writing an interagency task force on entitlement programs is beginning work on developing proposals to pare back expenditures in such areas as federal retirement, both military and civilian, Medicaid, food stamps, and all other entitlements except for Social Security. Social Security is slated to undergo further scrutiny, this time by a “blue ribbon” commission consisting of 15 members, of which five will be appointed by the president, five by the majority leader of the Senate, and five by the speaker of the House. Until this commission completes its report and submits its recommendations (probably not until after the 1982 elections), there probably will be no changes proposed for Social Security—with two exceptions.

First, it seems probable that Congress will rescind its earlier action to eliminate the minimum Social Security payment of $122 a month and will restore this benefit to all of those eligible—except persons drawing retirement annuities or pensions from public employment. In the case of the latter, the recipient would lose $1 of the minimum Social Security monthly payment for each $1 that his or her public retirement payment exceeds $300 monthly. In no case, however, will the monthly Social Security payment be reduced below the amount actually earned by the individual recipient. While this is not final, it appears likely that when Congress finally completes action on this matter, the minimum Social Security benefit will be restored to all persons who are currently drawing this benefit, with the change in payment policy becoming effective fairly soon.

Second, the president has asked for interfund borrowing among the three Social Security trust funds to solve temporarily the financing problem of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance fund. The borrowing would increase this fund and decrease the disability and hospital funds.

The task force on entitlement programs is working to develop a set of legislative proposals on the programs involved, including Civil Service retirement. (Under Section 827 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, any law ‘‘of general applicability,’’ affecting Civil Service retirement is automatically extended to cover Foreign Service retirement as well.) The expectation is that the task force may come up with recommendations for basic legislative changes in the federal retirement system, such as raising the age of voluntary retirement, revising the formula for computing retirement annuities, and perhaps altering the method of calculating cost-of-living adjustments to retirement annuities. While nothing definite is known about what is in the works, there is little doubt that proposals for fundamental alterations in the federal retirement structure designed to reduce costs will be forwarded sometime this fall to Congress for legislative action.

Through its affiliation with the Fund to Assure an Independent Retirement—FAIR—AFSA is geared up to resist vigorously, by all legislative and legal means, any effort to undermine the present structure of Foreign Service retirement eligibility and benefits. The year ahead promises to be an active one.

Apply Now For 1982-83 AFSA Scholarships

Applications are now available for dependent students of Foreign Service personnel who have been or are currently stationed abroad, for the 1982-83 AFSA/AAFSW scholarship program, scholarship director Dawn Cuthell announced.

Two types of awards will be made. The AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards of $500 go to 22 graduating high school students and are awarded on the basis of academic excellence. The Financial Aid Scholarships are for undergraduate study and are based solely on need as established by the College Scholarship Service, Princeton/Berkeley. Grants range from $200 to $2000 for individuals, with a $3000 limit for families.

The application deadline for the AFSA/AAFSW scholarships is February 15, 1982. Details on these scholarships and others available to dependent students of Foreign Service personnel appear in the Foreign Service People section of this issue (page 31).

63 Works Featured in AAFSW Art Show Honoring State Bicentennial

To help celebrate the State Department’s bicentennial, the Association of American Foreign Service Women held an art show that featured 63 works by 22 of its members. The show ran in the department’s Exhibition Hall from June 1 to August 10.

The artworks were executed in a myriad of media, including oils, charcoal, prints, acrylics, and watercolors. Most of the paintings were of overseas scenes. As AAFSW President Patricia Ryan said: “The artists among us have a great advantage. They have a truly portable career which Foreign Service life enhances and enriches.” Twenty percent of the profits from the show were donated to the AFSA/AAFSW scholarship fund.

AAFSW President Patricia Ryan (left) and Director General of the Foreign Service Joan Clark at art show opening ceremonies.
New Tax Act, New Opportunities

That it takes money to make money may have become cliche, but it could not be truer than under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. With its goals of encouraging savings and capital formation, the act poses new opportunities in both income tax savings and investment decisions.

Two changes cover Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). First, IRAs are now open to all individuals, including Foreign Service employees and those already covered by either an employee retirement plan or a Keough plan for the self-employed. Second, the maximum deposit will rise to $2000 per person employed, or $2250 for those with a non-employed spouse (as long as a minimum of $250 is placed in that spouse’s account) effective January 1.

The principal benefit of an IRA is the immediate tax reduction on gross income for the year in which the return is filed, as interest and dividends qualify as untaxable revenue. The individual’s approved investment choices for IRAs include money market funds, stock or bond mutual funds, and annuities, along with traditional banks and savings & loan institutions. Under the act, IRA restrictions include an additional 10-percent penalty on the amount withdrawn plus normal income tax payments should the individual withdraw his or her investment before age 591/2. In departure from past practice, hard money assets and collectibles do not enjoy the act’s benefits.

Also revised under the act are provisions applying to All-Savers Certificates. As of October 1, such institutions as banks, savings & loans, and credit unions were offering these certificates for one year at 70 percent of the U.S. Treasury Bill auction rate for the previous month. Since these provisions expire on December 31, 1982, the certificates present an opportunity for those in the 30-percent and higher brackets to generate once-in-a-lifetime income. Earnings from certificates may also be exempt from state income taxes. Penalties for early withdrawal include a three-month loss of interest as well as loss of the tax-free exemption.

The certificates’ interest rate for October 2 is 12.6 percent, meaning that an individual would deposit $7,930.21 to receive the maximum $1000 of tax-free income, while a couple would deposit twice that amount to receive its $2000 maximum. Should an investor anticipate the possibility of early withdrawal, he or she would be advised to break the certificates into smaller denominations at the time of purchase to minimize the possibility of penalties.

The act also significantly changes capital gains tax provisions. Dividends received as shares in domestic public utilities now are excluded from up to $750 in income for individual and $1500 for joint returns. These dividends have a zero base and will be capital gains if held for one year and a day. The capital gains maximum rate has been lowered from 70 percent to 50 percent, the same as the earned income maximum. The new taxable limit is 20 percent, or $20 per hundred dollars of 40 percent of the capital gain. The capital gains exclusion for those aged 55 or older has been raised to $125,000.

In miscellaneous sections child-care benefits have been increased, and the “marriage penalty” for families with two earned incomes has been reduced. A shortened time for real estate depreciation will take effect January 1, and substantial tax credits will be given for rehabilitation of buildings, especially historic landmarks. For further information about the act, request the 63-page booklet, Summary of H.R. 4444, available from the Government Printing Office.

The new act affects many other points in various ways, but space limitations prohibit more detailed coverage. Please address specific questions to the members’ interest coordinator, AFSA, and I will try to answer them in future columns.

—HOWARD GLICK, financial planner

AAFSW Bicentennial Print Exhibition

In celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Department of State, the Association of American Foreign Service Women will co-sponsor with the National Museum of American Art an exhibition entitled The Print in the United States from the Eighteenth Century to the Present. Appropriately enough, a smaller version of this exhibition had an international setting for its premiere this July in Mexico City. The exhibition, now expanded to 90 prints, was selected by Janet Flint, print curator at the National Museum of American Art, who has also written an informative essay for the illustrated checklist.

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The prints in this exhibition include copper engravings, etchings, aquatints, stipple engravings and mezzotints, woodcuts, and lithographs, as well as experimental contemporary works. Among the most popular nineteenth-century subjects were cityscapes featuring the impressive buildings rising all over America, The City of Washington from Beyond the Navy Yard (1834) by William James Bennett, is a beautiful example of this genre. AAFSW has chosen this especially handsome hand-colored aquatint for a poster to commemorate the State Department Bicentennial.

The poster The City of Washington will be offered through the Housing Office for $10, or write: Publications Chairman, AAFSW, P.O. Box 8068, Washington, DC 20024. Please add $1 for mailing.

Inside Iran’s Revolution

Both the Shah and the Carter Administration Vacillated and Procrastinated Too Long

By JOHN D. STEMPEL

The Iranian revolution is not over. Survivors of the coalition which took power in 1979 presided over the dismantling of the Pahlavi political system and the disintegration of Iran’s economic structure, but they could not exhibit consistent administrative skills, let alone build a government capable of giving direction to revolutionary striving and effective prosecution of the war against Iraq. The shaky institutionalized framework that bubbled up intertwined the hostage seizure, the war, and the unending conflict between Islamic extremists and leftists. Thus the more radical Mujahidin factions (about a third of the total) found it convenient to cooperate with the Fedayeen in blocking any rapprochement between the United States and the Khomeini regime, even to the point of holding dozens of diplomats captive.

The unorthodox behavior of those in power after the revolutionary takeover sent shock waves through nearly every world capital. Later, Iran’s isolation was greatly intensified by the hostage crisis. Even though that albatross has been removed, the country’s foreign policy has continued to be in total disarray. It is impossible to take an advance peek at the twists and turns Iran has yet to endure, but future revolution will surely be shaped by past events and reaction to them. What has happened in Iran provides interesting perspectives on how societies cope with upheaval and change and what the consequences for the rest of the international system can be.

Revolutionary Theory

From a theoretical perspective the most important question is whether the Iranian revolution could have been prevented—or at the very least channeled in the direction of less radical and destructive change—if different policy choices had been made on the part of those involved. Everyone in Iran had gained materially during the 15 years of development from 1963 to 1978, some groups much more than others. Psychologically, however, the masses had become alienated from the governing structure. They perceived themselves as either being cut off from an effective voice in politics or becoming worse off relative to others in the country. What happened supports the theory that revolutions do not occur when living conditions are at their worst, but when the situation is getting better but does not keep up with expectations.

The Shah assumed his subjects would continue to support his regime because of the economic advances he instigated. As conditions got better, their attention turned more and more from matters of minimal well-being to having a say in their own affairs. At the crucial moment, with loyalty to the Pahlavi monarchy in the balance, the Shah favored the devil he knew—authoritarian control—rather than the devil he didn’t—unrestricted political participation.

Another generally accepted idea about the origin and development of revolution is negated by events in Iran. Nothing occurred there to support standard Marxist and Western theories that to control the rural populace is to hold the key that can unleash violent upheaval. The farmers remained on the sidelines, perceiving the conflict to be a dispute among city dwellers. Three months after Khomeini’s forces seized power, the overwhelming majority of villagers in rural towns near Teheran believed the Shah would return to the throne after a deal was worked out with the Islamic leadership.

Historically, the most important consequence of the revolution may prove to be the rise of religion as a significant political force. Blending theocratic ideology with mob power on a sustained basis offers an alternative revolutionary model to supplement Marxist and other paradigms. It is a way to replace the authority and legitimacy of a monarch or other secular leader with another kind of power based on a different justification. Tactically, it accomplishes its aim without resorting to massive sustained violence. In this case the fundamentalists proved that even a powerful armed force can be destroyed from within. The most disturbing element about Khomeini’s Islamic movement is not its doctrine but its effective mobili-
zation of a diverse society into a political organization supporting a religious government. Clerical supremacy as asserted by Khomeini is an implicit standing challenge to secular governments everywhere.

However, the nationalistic and religious ideology of the Islamic militants who took over legitimacy and power in February 1979 offers neither the organizational capacity to manage Iran nor a philosophical or ideological program that will have long-term appeal to the majority of the population. Today’s Islamic leadership has retained the fanatical loyalty of some, the grudging support of others, and the “loyalty of indifference” of many more. As Iran’s economy continues to crumble, though, the tribal groups and the leftists are becoming more powerful every day as they win adherents to their respective causes. Khomeini’s charisma, the war with Iraq, and the absence of an effective challenger have enabled the Islamic movement to retain control, albeit frayed.

The Iranian Perspective

Successful revolutions naturally tend to evolve toward the most fanatical positions advocated. Whether what happened in Iran had to follow the usual pattern is much less certain. Had the Shah seriously attempted to develop the political system in the early 1970s, the outcome surely would have been different. The monarch was hesitant, because he had not been pleased with the consequences when he had tried to loosen things up a bit in 1961 and 1962. Unfortunately, encouraging participation involved risks the Shah was not prepared to take. If he had been more flexible, perhaps the revolution could have been avoided altogether. At the very least the basis for domination of the opposition by the moderates rather than the extremists would have been established. But Mohammad Reza Pahlavi lacked sensitivity and understanding, unable to foresee the outcome of his inability to choose between allowing greater participation or enforcing harsher measures. His temporizing gave him the worst of both worlds.

The overwhelming majority of Persians backed the revolutionary coalition not to reverse Iran’s policy of economic progress but to “purify” it. However, the Islamic fundamentalists around Khomeini reject what they call the “Westernization” of Iranian society, seeking to return instead to the old ways and to abandon all efforts to modernize the country. The Islamic Republican Party has the power to reverse the Shah’s economic policies, but it has offered few constructive choices to replace them. Rejecting modernization is unlikely to remain a viable policy. The gross national product declined at least 20-25 percent in 1979 and the drop was far greater in 1980. Yet most Iranians see nothing wrong with economic betterment. Their attachment to Islam is modified by practical considerations. After all, one of the reasons they opposed the Shah was because too many of them thought they were getting less than their due. Khomeini’s fundamentalism cannot remain an ideology of mass appeal beyond the moment of severe economic dislocation without some sort of hyper-stimulus, such as the Iraqi invasion. It will have great difficulty surviving its own political success.

A large majority of the peasant farmers and lower class urban poor are wholly uninterested in the doctrinal aspects of Khomeini’s campaign against modernization and Western cultural values. They are content with the revival of Islam, the reactivation of Koranic law, and the tightening of restrictions on women. As for the middle class, as the implications of fundamentalist economics become clearer, it will feel increasingly more alienated, particularly the women. Yet the willing participation of this part of society is essential in order to revive Iran’s commercial and economic prospects. The middle class possesses the skills the economy needs.

Islamic rule has encouraged the growth of leftist, anti-religious feel-
ing within the body politic as short-
ages grow, high unemployment con-
tinues, patriotism fades, and revolu-
tionary euphoria gives way to inter-
necine bickering. The Islamic consti-
tution has alienated the tribal minor-
ities as well as Khomeini's more
moderately inclined religious rivals,
both groups being appalled by his
particular brand of Shiasm. Revolu-
tionary tribunals, operating under
Islamic law and condemning former
officials to death for "war against
God" or "corruption on earth," have
had the same unintended con-
sequence for Khomeini that SAVAK did
for the Shah. Rumors of the corrup-
tion among the mullahs are also re-
miniscent of the Pahlavi regime.

Obviously, the Islamic movement
is in trouble. Weakening its opposi-
tion to certain aspects of modern-
ization will antagonize its extremist
colleagues and Khomeini will lose
valuable supporters in the struggle
for political legitimacy. On the other
hand, if it bents to the ingrained
hypocrisy of attacking moderniza-
tion while trying to make the coun-
try work, it will discourage the very
talent on whom its effectiveness as
a governing force depends—the busi-
nessmen, skilled laborers, and
trained military officers. Eventually
rejecting materialism in favor of Is-
lamic asceticism will bring the Is-
lamic movement to the same choice
the Shah faced—to conciliate or to
courage. A militant, moralistic gov-
ernment is likely to turn quickly and
decisively to coercion and re-
pression, but in the name of Allah,
not the state.

The U.S. Perspective

For the United States, the revo-
lution put past, present, and future
strategy and tactics into question.
The consequences of what happened
in Iran have stimulated serious con-
cern about the adequacy of the
American foreign policy and decision
making process. Obviously what has
occurred there since 1978 has not
been in the best interests of the
United States. There is chagrin at
the disappearance of one of the
"twin pillars" in the Mideast and
self-criticism and recriminations over
past policy choices. Especially for
the next few years, there is bound
to be greater instability in the re-

region and chronic shortages of oil for
the developed countries. In the fu-
ture, the United States will be faced
with assimilating the unpalatable
results of the upheavals in Iran.

As far back as the beginning of
the revolutionary period, contradic-
tory U.S. moves reinforced the am-
biguities in American policy. The
long delay in appointing a new am-
bassador in 1977 was read in Te-
heran as an insult. Simultaneously,
Iran's human rights record, a sen-
tive point with the Shah, was heav-
ily criticized on the one hand, while
Iran's value as a regional ally was
praised on the other. The dissidents
took heart from U.S. displeasure at
conditions in Iran but reacted an-
grily to public praise of their country
as a stable regional ally. Both Amer-
ican policies, though diametrically
opposed, reinforced the growing
strength of the opposition.

Many other American moves were
interpreted two ways depending on
the proclivities of the observer. The
Shah perceived the Carter-Brze-
zinski phone calls after the Jaleh
Square riots as evidence of support,
but when he asked Ambassador Sul-
ivan to confirm their thrust, Sulli-
van could not get instructions from
Washington to do so. The revolu-
tionaries thought the calls sent a
different message: the United States
was abandoning its concern for hu-
man rights in favor of all-out sup-
port for the Pahlavi dictatorship.

In other examples, neither the
opposition nor the establishment
elite understood what the United
States was thinking in November
and December 1978. Both sides
made overtures for American sup-
port of their position, but none was
forthcoming. Subsequent U.S. pres-
sure for the Shah's quiet departure
was widely regarded by the few re-
main ing loyalists as rank betrayal.
The opposition suspected some sort
of a trick, particularly after General
Huysen arrived. Once again, the
United States got no credit for its
efforts from either quarter.

An especially poignant example
of the missed opportunities caused
by the lack of communication be-
tween the U.S. government and the
Khomeini forces occurred when the
Ayatollah announced from Paris on
January 10 that any country which
accepted the Shah into exile would
not be penalized by the revolution-
aries. Without direct contact, there
was no reliable way to exploit this
opening in a timely fashion, yet it
should have been possible to pre-
pare for the arrival of the Shah in
the United States on terms ac-
ceptable to the fundamentalist cler-
gy. Unfortunately, Khomeini's state-
mement was made when internal bur-

eaucratic conflict was sharpest over
whether to back the military in Iran
or to act as a mediator between the
revolutionaries and the collapsing
government. Both the Iranian estab-
ishment (what remained of it) and
the dissidents felt betrayed. Given
America's past involvement, leaders
on both sides of the struggle ex-
pected a U.S. initiative to help ease
Iran through some kind of transi-
tion. At this point an accommoda-
tion with Khomeini was not out of
the question. Washington would
have been able to take a major step
toward its overriding objective, to
bring the military through the revolu-
tionary transition with continued
ability and some influence, pre-
venting the total dominance of the
fundamentalist radicals.

What was missing in the policy
and decision making process was a
willingness on the part of the presi-
dent to choose and then to make his
decisions known to all the govern-
ment officials affected. By late De-

cember lower level organizational

c
conflict had worked its way up to
the highest level, with no possibility
of resolution in sight. Despite emb-
assy misgivings, the president re-

ained publicly positive until his
breakfast press conference on De-

cember 7, when he expressed doubts
for the first time about the Shah's
ability to survive politically. Later
that month the U.S. government of-

ically supported the monarch's de-

cision to leave his country.

When Shahpur Bakhtiar became
prime minister, the United States
supported him immediately, des-
pite embassy warnings that unre-
strained American backing would be
"a kiss of death." The president re-
jected the Sullivan thesis that the
U.S. should take advantage of its
historical position and mediate the
revolutionary turmoil, orchestrating
an outcome more consistent with
American interests in regional sta-

bility.

There was some advantage to
playing both sides of the policy fence
as long as possible, hoping that the
situation would change or that new
information would make the choice
easy. But by January, Sullivan saw
the opportunity for effective decision
making slipping away and continual-
lly pleaded with Washington via the
telephone and telegrams to act de-
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who assumed power after Bakhtiar's resignation, U.S. haste to normalize relations with his government heightened Iranian suspicions of American intentions.

Differences of opinion are common in policy and decision making, but what was lacking in terms of Iran was a sense of direction. Only administration insiders can tell who was ultimately at fault—the president himself or his senior political appointees, Brzezinski at the National Security Council, Vance and Christopher at the State Department, or Admiral Turner at the CIA. Without more firm control from the top, conflict within the policy process, reinforced by glaring uncertainty, impeded both rapid, in-depth analysis and choice itself.

In a fast-moving crisis such as this one, obvious differences of opinion also delayed carrying out policies and decisions that already had been made. Emotional commitments reached such a fever pitch after the revolutionary victory in February 1979 that some State Department and National Security Council employees were not speaking to each other.

Arguments over “who blew it” in Iran continued to hobble effective policy and decision making after the revolutionary takeover. The State Department became enamored of the post-Shah government. After all, the embassy had good ties with Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and his key lieutenants. Urged on by both American and Iranian contacts within the United States who had supported the revolution, Washington encouraged establishing a working relationship with the new government immediately. To facilitate the smooth transfer of allegiances, the U.S. government did not formally protest the takeover of the embassy in February 1979, except for those complaints made while the capture was actually in progress and a formal request for compensation for damages. As relations between the two governments slowly improved, the embassy staff, which had been drastically reduced after the February incident to a low of about 30, was back up to 70-plus by the summer. The rebuilding was based on signs that the United States and Iran were moving toward a standard diplomatic relationship.

Too little attention, however, was being paid to the less benign members of the revolutionary coalition. How increasing the embassy staff would be perceived by radical Islamic groups and the hard-core left was discounted. Consequently, when President Carter was faced with the decision whether to allow the Shah into the United States for medical treatment, he based his choice primarily on the fact that it was the morally correct thing to do.

Although the State Department protested the president’s wish, based on well-documented embassy objections, Vance agreed with the president that to admit the former monarch on humanitarian grounds would be possible. The opinion of on-the-scene diplomats was overridden, even though they had specifically mentioned in cables that allowing the Shah into the United States could lead to another seizure of the embassy. Carter, Vance, and others on the National Security Council thought the Bazargan government could ride out the storm, particularly since the prime minister himself had promised that the embassy would be protected against demonstrators. Two days before the Shah arrived in the United States, Henry Precht was dispatched to Teheran to reassure the revolutionary moderates that America was not abandoning its improving relationship with the provisional government but meeting a humanitarian need. While Bazargan and his foreign minister,
Ibrahim Yazdi, accepted those assurances, the Mujahidin and the Fedayeen did not, especially after Bazargan talked with Brzezinski in Algiers. Exactly two weeks after the Shah arrived in the United States, the embassy was seized once more.

There have been debates over whether it was the Shah's arrival in the U.S. or Bazargan's meeting with Brzezinski that precipitated the takeover. Such an argument misses the point. The haste with which the United States sought to normalize relations with the revolutionaries created a climate that heightened already neurotic Iranian suspicions about American intentions. Under the circumstances some kind of show of force against the U.S. embassy in Teheran was almost certain to occur eventually. Even if the Shah had not come to New York and Bazargan had not met with Brzezinski, some event would have provided the excuse the radicals needed. After the first attack on the American embassy following the revolutionary takeover, if Washington had adopted a more coolly correct posture and cut the size of the official U.S. presence in Iran—and kept it small, thus indicating its unwillingness to do business as usual in the face of outrageous provocation—a more realistic relationship between the two nations most probably would have evolved. Once the die was cast, the revolutionaries rejected all U.S. efforts to negotiate the freedom of the hostages, largely because of a fierce sense of righteousness and because of a rapidly expanding political deadlock within the country.

In the months following the takeover, the State Department focused almost exclusively on meeting the shifting sets of release conditions. Other methods of dealing with the situation were given short shrift and deliberately downplayed. Consequently, when a rescue attempt was considered, Carter formed a very small group from the Defense Department and the C.I.A. to plan and carry out the raid. With the exception of Vance (who vehemently opposed the action) and his deputy, Warren Christopher, no one from the State Department was involved. Within that framework, when the rescue was attempted, the breadth of perspective was greatly reduced. Vast reservoirs of official expertise were never tapped. The presidential commission appointed to investigate the failed mission concluded that over-restrictive planning greatly inhibited the raid's prospects for success.

First the foreign affairs bureaucracy had sputtered along, then the U.S. military had proved to be a paper tiger. Once again, this time under the disadvantage of a double failure, the Carter administration was compelled to play a waiting game, relying on external pressures to force the resolution of the hostage issue.

Using Hindsight

Being aware of the impact of U.S. choices on the Iranian crisis in terms of the knowledge of policy and decision makers at the time can indicate what to watch for in the future. For example, how might the United States have reacted to avoid the confrontation that developed between the dissidents and the Shah? Paying more attention to the physical condition of the key participant would have helped. If policy makers had been sensitized in 1976 and 1977 to the increasing likelihood of instability, the outcome could have been different. Encouraging a healthy dose of suspicion is another, especially since too many policy and decision makers rejected out of hand analyses opposed to established American policy. The case of Iran is the strongest argument yet for senior policy makers to encourage both more provocative intelligence analysis and active questioning of established assumptions.

In terms of intelligence gathering, American capabilities have been reduced drastically from 1967 to the present on the assumption that more is not needed in terms of money spent. Yet it was far more expensive in the long run to have withdrawn officers stationed in Iran than it will be to replace lost American influence in the area. It is not possible to exercise effective great-power diplomacy using minimal resources.

How the American presence in Iran over the years built up the opposition and tore down the Shah suggests that the United States needs to take a thorough look at the impact of a sizable American community on a foreign society. In Iran, pragmatic decision makers moved step-by-step into a situation of overcommitment without looking at the broader trend. At the same time, President Carter was reluctant to exercise U.S. influence, partly from the praiseworthy belief that insiders know what they want better than outsiders do. Unfortunately, this attitude did not take into account the fact that Iranians of all political persuasions were taking their cues from perceived U.S. policy. America could not avoid being influential, even if it did not wish to be.

The United States did not attempt to influence events either directly or indirectly until September 1978, after Jaleh Square, America had expressed concern for human rights before that, but until the Huyser mission in January 1979 U.S. "intervention" was limited to positive public statements. However, the very presence of so many Americans in Iran inferred support for the Shah and his policies.

Surprisingly, the revolutionary victory in February 1979 created a situation not wholly unfavorable to U.S. interests. American diplomats exploited their longstanding contacts with the opposition to establish goods ties with Bazargan. This continued until unflattering U.S. reactions to the revolutionary executions, expressed most vividly in a letter from Brzezinski to the Shah, created a climate that heightened already neurotic Iranian suspicions about American intentions. Unfortunately, this attitude did not take into account the fact that Iranians of all political persuasions were taking their cues from perceived U.S. policy. America could not avoid being influential, even if it did not wish to be.

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Every administration has used its own rules, but a permanent system would ensure the game is played more fairly

By CHARLES R. FOSTER

The nomination of Joseph V. Reed Jr.—longtime aide to the former chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller—as ambassador to Morocco again brings to public attention the method by which such appointments are made. Aside from Reed's qualifications or lack of them for a key diplomatic post, a more important issue deals with the employment of safeguards to assure that ambassadorial posts are filled with the best qualified person, career or non-career. A brief description of the way in which Reed was proposed and endorsed for the position will illustrate why reform in this area is imperative.

In the past, each administration has established its own procedure for selecting, screening, and approving ambassadorial appointments before they are sent to Congress. President Carter, along with his proposal to reorganize the Civil Service, established in February 1977 a broad-based Presidential Advisory Board on ambassadorial appointments to screen non-career appointees. The Reagan administration has returned to a more traditional method. This involves small private meetings attended by White House and State Department staff at which candidates are screened before being sent to Secretary of State Alexander Haig for endorsement and then to the president. In Reed's case, however, this procedure was circumvented. According to Terence Smith of the New York Times, the State Department Ambassadorial Appointments Committee and the White House staff endorsed another candidate, John A. Shaw, a former member of the staff of the under-secretary for management and a senior fellow of the Georgetown Institute for Strategic and International Studies. This recommendation was ignored, as White House chief of staff Michael Deaver simply told the joint State-White House meeting that Reed's candidacy had already been approved by Secretary Haig in a private conversation. (New York Times, May 30, 1981). Reed's name was then submitted to the president along with other nominations, but it was not sent to the Senate for confirmation until early September.

Returning Favors

Patronage is not new to foreign affairs. All presidents have rewarded their supporters. In Reed's case the appointment appears to have been a return favor to David Rockefeller for his support of the Reagan-Bush ticket. As early as January, Rockefeller recommended that Reed, his confidential aide, be given an ambassadorship. In a February 20 letter to the president, Rockefeller submitted Reed's name for posts in major European capitals and New Delhi as well as for that of chief of protocol. In each instance his name was overridden, until at an April 28 meeting Deaver suggested Reed for the Moroccan post.

Incidents such as the Reed appointment are disturbing to career Foreign Service officers and to the informed public. Foreign Service officers often feel bitter about an unusually large number of non-career appointees. The general feeling is that if the United States has a trained, professional diplomatic corps, then it should be used by the president. To the public, non-career appointments, especially when the appointee's close association with the president is brought to their attention by the media, smack of under-the-table dealings and politics in its most pejorative sense.

These criticisms reflect two major issues involved in the controversy over ambassadorial appointments. First, who is appointed? Is the nominee a Foreign Service professional, a business magnate, or an academic? Does he or she have international experience? Second, how is the nominee selected, screened, and appointed? Who is involved in the process of appointments?

In a January 1981 article in the Foreign Service Journal, Martin Herz states certain qualifications that an ambassador should possess. Among these he lists professionalism—experience, training, character, and technical skills. In addition an ambassador should have what Herz calls "empathy," which is attained through years spent in cross-cultural communications. Clearly these factors are all very valuable.

In a recent discussion of ambassadorial appointments, a member of Carter's Presidential Advisory Board on ambassadorial appointments specified three vital qualities for nominees. In addition to demonstrated professional competence, an ambassador should inspire trust and be able to communicate on all levels and establish a good rapport not only with his staff, but also with the people of the host country and with Congress.

One might add further qualifications. As in all nomination procedures, the decision of who is best qualified involves subjective judgments, even after establishing competence in technical areas (foreign language proficiency, administrative skills, etc.). Past practices would not necessarily provide an appropriate basis for establishing qualifications. The tradition of sending black officials to Africa and Hispanics to
Latin America has been counterproductive on those occasions when the host country has viewed such an appointment as patronizing. A set of guidelines could discourage these appointments by ensuring that the evaluation of a candidate's suitability for a particular post involves more than consideration of racial or ethnic background. Can one introduce any objectivity into the qualifications dilemma? Can a set of guidelines be proposed to assist those involved in the process?

For many, "professionalism" is the key criterion. But does professionalism imply only previous foreign affairs expertise and experience, as many career diplomats are wont to argue? Demonstrably no; individuals can acquire a foreign affairs professionalism on the job as well. All non-career appointees without previous experience need not be incompetent, just as all career officials need not be suited for an ambassadorship despite their professional experience.

In addition to qualifications of individual nominees, several other factors are involved in the appointment of ambassadors. The host country often seeks an ambassador with easy access to the president, or one with whom they have had previous contact. Phillip Alson, a non-career appointment with doubtful international qualifications, was appointed to Australia in part because of his personal ties to Jimmy Carter. These ties were expected to improve diplomatic communication between Australia and the United States. Similarly, King Hassan II of Morocco was known to prefer a man with strong personal ties to the president—a Joseph Reed rather than a career diplomat. Domestic political concerns, specifically the recent recognition of the rights of women and minorities, have also been a factor in past appointments. Thus, on the one hand, pressures mount to appoint qualified persons, yet political factors impede the attempt to appoint individuals strictly on the basis of demonstrated merit.

In 1976 Jimmy Carter, as part of his "anti-Washington" campaign, promised that he would reverse the tradition in which at least one-third of the U.S. ambassadors had been non-career appointments. In comparison to the Nixon and Ford appointment records, which averaged 32 percent and 38 percent non-career appointments, respectively, Carter reduced the average to 27 percent, thus demonstrating some depoliticization of the process.

President Reagan has been slow in exercising his prerogative to appoint ambassadors. Initially, Reagan seems to have returned to the pre-Carter tradition. In October, with Reagan having named less than half the number of ambassadors normally appointed by a full-term president, about 40 percent are non-career. It is still unclear what the final proportions will be, but the early figures do not bode well.

Screening Candidates

The Presidential Advisory Board on ambassadorial appointments established by Carter was a new institution in U.S. history. It was established with several purposes in mind. As a screening committee which reviewed the qualifications of non-career nominees, it was to aid the president in choosing his diplomatic staff wisely. But it also served another purpose: If faced with the prospect of nominating an obviously unqualified person on whose behalf the president was obliged to come forward for political purposes, it would then be the board—not the president—which assumed the task of eliminating the unqualified candidate, thus sparing the president a "bad guy" image. Moreover, through the appointments to the board itself, Carter was able to wield some political influence.

The procedure used by the Advisory Board was straightforward. The board would review the qualifications for non-career nominees proposed by the State Department, the White House staff, the Senate, and other concerned agencies, consider each candidate's expertise, and suggest between three and five nominees for a specific post.

This procedure, although simple, was not effective for basically two reasons, according to a former board
member. First, the members simply did not have enough information about nominees on which to make sound judgments. The names were assembled on computer sheets divided into qualifications and areas of expertise. However, there was usually “someone who knew someone” and this informal information was considered along with the official data during the screening. Scarcity of information sometimes limited the process to a basic weeding out of the most unsuitable candidates. Second, the board simply did not meet often enough, thus allowing even less room for proper decision making.

An additional criticism of the board deals not with procedure, but with its composition. The board was basically a citizens’ group in that it was not composed of a majority of career Foreign Service officials. However, in the judgment of the former board member, this allowed for broader review of the candidates’ qualities and qualifications than would have occurred with a board composed solely of career officials. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the board looked at qualifications seriously and heeded State Department briefings as to recommended qualities for various posts, the judgments that the group rendered were in the end still somewhat subjective.

The current administration has returned to what can be termed the traditional way of appointing ambassadors, that is, exercising White House control over selections. Nominees must go through two screening sessions before they are sent to Secretary Haig and the State Department for political and security approval. If Haig accepts the selections, the list is then sent to President Reagan for approval before being presented to the Senate for confirmation.

The recent nomination of Joseph Reed highlights just how far this procedure has strayed from institutional guidelines. Reed’s name, already in the pipeline of the normal selection pattern, was withdrawn from that process by Secretary Haig’s early endorsement and submitted directly to a list awaiting presidential approval. A strong recommendation from David Rockefeller, who wrote Reagan that Reed “could contribute importantly to... your political objectives,” may have contributed to this circumvention of the State Department—White House screening sessions. In Reed’s case, the influence of notable friends seems to have supplanted the need for the established bureaucratic process to run its course. Certainly, the completion of that process does not guarantee the appointment of persons qualified in foreign relations. The recent nomination of Faith Whittlesey as ambassador to Switzerland is a case in point. The 42-year-old member of the Delaware County Council in Pennsylvania and member of a Philadelphia law firm seems to have no apparent foreign affairs experience.

Judging the qualifications of nominees is and will always be a subjective task. Past qualifications and expertise can only provide clues as to a nominee’s likely actions and reactions once on the job. However, the appointment process itself could be regulated to enhance the objectivity of the procedure.

A permanent Presidential Advisory Board should be established as a means of introducing some measure of regulation into the process. The board by its very existence would remove some political pressure from the White House. Also, it would assist the president in narrowing the field of candidates. Of course, changes would have to be made—more detailed information should be made available and the board should probably meet more frequently. To facilitate the handling of substantially more information, a permanent staff would have to be created. Additionally, it could be stipulated that the board should be composed of a greater number of career Foreign Service people, who could offer their opinion on prospective nominees, similar to the American Bar Association’s procedure for giving recommendations on judicial nominees.

The creation of such a board would not automatically guarantee that all nominations will meet with general approval or that untoward political patronage will not result—the Carter nominees did include some doubtful cases—but all candidates would have to go through the same established and consistent procedure.

Once such a board were established and its tasks and responsibilities more clearly defined, a pattern of behavior would emerge that would facilitate the process of selection. New guidelines would be set up for gauging a candidate’s professionalism. Criteria, though not necessarily rigid ones, would be established for the purpose of evaluating a candidate’s past experience and specific qualifications. Since the board would ideally be made up of State Department and White House staff, and might include persons from academia, business, and international organizations as well, individual candidates would be subject to a broad spectrum of judgments. Although the members of the board would change with a new administration, the permanent secretariat would provide continuity.

In the final analysis, it is the quality of the candidates themselves which is paramount. An experienced and competent appointee should have some foreign affairs background, some administrative abilities, and a cross-cultural rapport with the people of the host government. This last quality should include a willingness to learn the local language. Even a political appointee should meet these minimum qualifications. But beyond ensuring the quality of the ambassadorial appointees themselves, we need the consistency and regulation that would be provided by an established internal selection process that in certain cases would be able to heed the demands of political patronage.

The question of ambassadorial appointments remains a thorny problem for any administration. Yet a few well-chosen reforms in the selection process itself would provide both the best antidote to capricious actions by the secretary of state or the president and the most reliable means of ensuring the quality of our ambassadors.

“Beyond ensuring the quality of appointments, we need consistency provided by an established selection process”
Inside Iran's Revolution

(Continued from page 21)

their views that Iran could only benefit by keeping the hostages. It also undercut the more moderate Iranian officials who argued for a speedy release to minimize the damage.

The pace of social and political change demands that policy and decision makers—whether diplomats in the field or the president and the cabinet departments involved on the National Security Council staff—exercise greater flexibility. Accurate intelligence is always necessary, but if the Iran crisis shows anything, it is that better management of analysis and better development of options are the more pressing needs. The organizational diversity of the U.S. foreign policy community is a source of strength, but it is also a source of weakness if it is not handled properly. Otherwise, it breeds different points of view leading to policy immobilization. Coping with increasing complexity and speed of change requires strong organizational leadership, particularly at the highest levels of government. A coherent American philosophy could avoid at least some of the cyclical alternations between too much and too little involvement.

A Broader Perspective

When looking at a revolution from the broadest perspective two types of political issues are relevant: those affecting the nation under attack from within and those affecting it from without. The experience in Iran speaks to both. For the besieged state the most important question is “Was this revolution necessary or inevitable?” The Shah made some critical decisions—increasing the pace of economic development, diverting a significant percentage of expanding resources to military expenditure, and delaying political reform by refusing to allow others to participate meaningfully in decision making.

Had the regime gradually allowed greater popular participation and a more open system, the monarch would have had to work harder at his job and forgo at least some of his more grandiose plans. However, his people would have concentrated on electoral and parliamentary politics, not revolutionary activity. If he had opted for gradual rather than ultra-rapid economic development in 1974, social stresses could have been minimized. As late as November 1977 a well-thought-out plan offering dissidents a fair chance to participate in politics, backed by a willingness to use force if they rejected compromise, could have diverted the budding revolutionary coalition from violence to electioneering. The trick is to block the growth of an effective revolutionary organization, channeling the opposition into activities that reinforce the structure of society, instead of tearing it down.

The issues facing those observing a revolutionary situation from outside are different. How does one recognize when political unrest is about to cross the limits within which society can contain and adjust itself? How fundamental is that unrest? What should be the response—if any—of other countries?

The rapid unraveling of the U.S. position raises both practical and philosophical questions about the desirability of close relations with developing, potentially unstable societies. Are Western values, which have motivated most countries to strive for increased economic development, under sustained fundamentalist religious and cultural challenge? Or is Iran’s Islamic experiment an exception to, rather than the forerunner of, a tide?

The special relationship the United States enjoyed with Iran did not help that country stave off the fundamentalist threat. In fact it made the regime more vulnerable than it might otherwise have been. Though Washington dealt with Iranian problems in terms of specific cases rather than as part of an overall challenge, from the beginning the Islamic radicals clearly and consistently rejected modernization, seeking a return to Islamic law, customs, and government. Despite this goal the revolutionary regime does not seem so willing to forgo advantages which Westernization provides the country—an economic base, modern weaponry, and instant communication with the rest of the world. Arguing the pros and cons of the various aspects of this issue is the single most disruptive political force the revolutionary coalition deals with today.

Iran’s future prospects are cloudy at best, disastrous at worst. The detention of the 52 Americans, an extraordinary, illegal act which violated the very basis of diplomatic practice, projected the revolutionary takeover and its aftermath onto the world stage. If Iran were a small nation in an out-of-the-way place, this might not have been the case. Unfortunately, the country is at the center of a critical strategic area. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan have doubly sharpened the world’s focus on the Mideast. These two events, followed by Iraq’s attack on Iran, have posed the specter of a collision between world powers in the volatile region stretching from Bangladesh to Libya.

Given the inherent weakness of the Iranian government on both organizational and substantive issues, coupled with the potential for foreign intervention, what are Iran’s prospects? The most likely possibility is a continuation of the present institutionalized chaos, because of the failure of any faction to establish itself firmly. Forces within Iran will continue to pull the country apart, increasing the power and importance of tribal and ethnic groups, whose commitment to a centralized state is less strong than their concern for themselves.

Then, in time-honored Persian fashion, two, five, or seven years ahead circumstances will favor a new “man on horseback,” a new Reza Shah. Whether king or commissar, from the left or from the right, but most likely with some discreet foreign support, he will emerge from Iran’s armed forces or from among the array of guerrilla or tribal leaders. Distinguished by his force of personality, the fledgling dictator will reunify as much of present-day Iran as has not already passed under foreign control and destroy the power if not the personages of the religious extremists. He will seek to unite the country against further encroachment, joining with the more moderate religious leaders who will emerge from the shadows to pronounce a final benediction on the wreckage of Iran’s clerical authoritarian experiment in the supremacy of mosque over state. Still, Iran will be faced with one of the oldest problems in political philosophy: how to reconcile seizing power with attaining legitimacy. It is hoped that the new format will yield more positive prospects than the last.
Screening applicants at a high-fraud post is more than a grind: It's a war of nerves and deception

By ROBERT L. LANE

A few positions in the Foreign Service test a junior officer's mettle as thoroughly as the non-immigrant visa line at a high-fraud post. A certain camaraderie and esprit de corps binds the NIV line consular officers, from new recruit to seasoned veteran. The analogy to combat is also apparent in their jargon: the waiting room becomes the war zone, the interviewing line the trenches. An officer may remark that he just blew an applicant out of the water. Psychologists could have field day studying this phenomenon.

An NIV officer may be excused an indulgent smirk when a colleague professes to appreciate his situation, for few people understand this very specialized aspect of Foreign Service work. One must have sat on the visa line eight hours a day for a year to comprehend the true nature of the work. Perhaps this account can give the flavor of such a tour.

On any given day, about half the applicants lined up outside the embassy are potential illegal immigrants posing as tourists. By the end of the day, many of the bonafide tourists will have been refused visas, while many of the illegal immigrants will be on their way to the United States with valid non-immigrant visas. This situation exists because visa fraud has become extremely sophisticated and the consular officer's job correspondingly more difficult.

The interviewing officer is the first line of defense against illegal immigrants. According to U.S. law, the applicant standing before him is assumed to be intending immigration unless he can establish to the officer's satisfaction that he intends to depart from the United States after a brief visit. This "guilty until proven innocent" feature of the immigration law is contrary to the spirit of the American style of justice, and it is responsible for much of the psychological pressure on the consular officer. The officer often assumes an adversary relationship with the applicant from the outset. Because there is no absolute proof that an applicant will leave the United States at the conclusion of his visit, the law requires the officer to make a reasoned judgment. Failure to convince the officer results in being turned down. This method of decision causes the officer to say "no" about fifty times a day during the rush season.

Compelling Evidence

The local press will regularly chastise consular officers for being capricious and arbitrary. This is understandable, since the average visa interview lasts less than three minutes and the officer makes as many as a hundred decisions a day. Though he bases his judgments on the evidence at hand, the law does not specify what evidence should be submitted. It provides vague guidelines about proof of compelling ties, leading it to the officer to determine whether the applicant's ties to his homeland are compelling. Applicants continually ask, "What evidence can I bring to convince you?" The answer is, "We will consider anything you would like to show us."

Since the law places the burden of proof on the applicant, he is left to his own devices. Conventional wisdom has it that the services of an intermediary are required to guarantee the approval of a visa application. This intermediary is sometimes a government official or a family friend, but it is usually a travel agent. The travel agent performs a dual function: to insulate the applicant from loss of face in case his visa is refused (the applicant can always blame the agent) and to improve the overall appearance of the case by tailoring the application to conform to certain expected standards. These standards may vary from one agent to another, but they are somewhat uniform. As a billboard across the street boldly proclaims: "Our staff of three former U.S. embassy employees, with a combined 65 years of experience, will help you secure guaranteed visa approval."

To the local mind, this tailoring of applications is not fraud; it is merely a response to the U.S. immigration system. If wealth is required, evidence of wealth will be presented. If land holdings are required, evidence of property ownership will be presented. To the applicant, the fact that these tax returns and land titles are fraudulent does not constitute a dishonorable act. In his mind he has only met the requirements for a visa established by the U.S. government. He has engaged the services of an experienced intermediary who has convinced him that his application will certainly be approved if he only presents the appropriate papers. The applicant therefore is flabbergasted when the incensed consular officer pushes his papers back under the glass and informs him that they are all fake.

"Of course they are," he is thinking. "What does that have to do with anything? I paid good money for them and I have fulfilled all documentary requirements. Where's my visa? I have played the game by the rules, and the consular officer has insulted me for my efforts."

Robert L. Lane is a first-tour Foreign Service officer at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Philippines. "The Journal" is a new section for articles on diplomatic history and personal experiences by our readers relating to Foreign Service life.
Where does that guy get off, anyway, telling me that I'm trying to defraud the U.S. government? It's a business transaction, pure and simple: I bring in the papers my travel agent gave me, and I get my visa! I'm not a fraud, I'm not dishonorable. In fact, I'm one of the pillars of society and the envy of all my townmates!

"How can I face them now, after the consul has insulted me? What was he babbling about 'compelling ties' and whether or not I'll come back? Of course I'll come back! What does he have, a crystal ball or something? Can he look into the future and tell me that I'm going to change status and get a job and petition all my relatives? It's not fair! The consul didn't even look at my papers, only my tax return! I'm going to apply again!

The interview had gone like this:

"Where are you going, sir?"
"United States."
"Where in the United States?"
"California."
"Where in California?"
"Los Angeles."
"Where do you plan to stay?"
"Any available hotel."
"Why?"
"See your beautiful country."
"Anyplace in particular?"
"Disneyland, Universal Studios, Golden Gate Bridge, Knott's Berry Farm, Statue of Liberty, Las Vegas."
"What do you do for a living?"
"Businessman."
"What kind of business?"
"Farming."
"What kind of farming?"
"Agricultural."
"Do you have livestock?"
"Yes."
"Poultry and piggery?"

"Yes, sir."
"Sir, I have a hard time believing that you make a quarter of a million a year from your poultry and piggery farm."
"Why, sir?"
"Because I think your tax return is fraudulent. Where did you get it?"
"No, sir. I got it from the Bureau of Internal Revenue."
"Sir, we spoke to the director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue last week and he told us what an authentic tax return looks like. This isn't one."
"Yes, sir."
"Sir, I'm sorry, but you don't qualify for a visa. It's primarily because your plans are so vague. I'm not convinced that you have compelling ties to your country and I don't think that you would ever come back. I also have some real problems with your tax return. I think you're trying to defraud the U.S. government."
"What more papers do I need, sir?"
"Sir, I would not recommend that you re-apply, especially not with these papers. They're fake."
"Thank you."
"Thank you very much, sir. Goodbye."

This clash of cultures is re-enacted four or five hundred times a week at each interviewing window. After a few weeks, an NIV officer has very few delusions about human nature. Even when an applicant is exposed, he often compounds the misrepresentation by continuing to deny it, or he becomes indignant that the officer has insulted his integrity, his honor, and his sense of face. On one occasion when an officer informed an applicant that his papers were fraudulent, the applicant seized the initiative and expressed his indignation in no uncertain terms.

"Sir, I would like to remind you that you are a visitor in my country and that you should learn some manners. You have insulted me, and
by extension, my family and my country and my national honor. I will not stand for such treatment. You are denying me my human rights. My papers are not fake and fraudulent as you have alleged. I will not leave this window until you issue me a visa.” With that he planted his elbows on the counter and refused to budge.

Though the applicant’s papers were patently fraudulent, the authenticity of the documents had ceased to be the issue. The officer tried persuasion, but to no avail. Finally he announced over the loudspeaker to some two hundred waiting applicants that they would not be interviewed until their countryman departed the premises. Peer pressure triumphed. When the same applicant returned three days later, both parties were very civil, and tried persuasion, but to no avail.

The most difficult position on the visa line is the reconsideration window. In an average day during the rush season, the reconsideration officer will interview 100 applicants and issue 15 visas. He says “no” to about 85 people a day, most of whom have been coached by a travel agent and are prepared to argue or contest his decision. The reconsideration officer must be quick, decisive, thick-skinned, and a picture of patience. He is usually the senior member of the line.

Unfortunately, the longer an officer remains on the line, the more difficult it becomes to maintain his objectivity and perspective. After several months on the visa line an officer usually opts for one of two routes: to become lenient and give every applicant the benefit of the doubt, or to become rigid and give no one any leeway. It is psychologically much easier to interpret the law loosely than strictly. This moral drift often has the tendency to polarize a visa line, as applicants begin jockeying for position to avoid the monster.

To see what happens when monster meets rejected applicant, let us return to the example of the poultry and piggery farmer. His travel agent has outfitted him with some brand new papers to supplement his old set, telling him that these papers are guaranteed to convince the consular officer. He now has the title to his Mercedes-Benz and his Toyota Corolla, the business registration from his handicrafts shop that he runs on the side, and also some stock certificates attesting to his ownership of 100,000 shares in A-Z Trucking Corporation. He will also bring in the wedding invitation from his long-lost cousin Tilly in Stockton who is getting married next week. After Tilly’s wedding, he will visit his great-uncle in Chicago who is suffering from myocardial infarction (see Red Cross telegram) and will probably pass away any day now. What hard-hearted vice consul could turn him down now?

“Do you have anything new to show us today, sir?”

“Yes, sir,” he says, pushing a two-inch stack of paper under the glass.

“Where are you going, sir?”

“Stockton and Chicago, sir.” As the applicant launches into his memorized speech, the reconsideration officer glances over the previous officer’s notations: See your beautiful country... Any available hotel... Disneyland... Poultry and piggery... Fake tax return... Claims 250K gross.

“...and because my great-uncle is sick, his last request is to see me before he dies, sir.”

“I’m sorry, sir, but I agree with the previous officer. At this time, your ties to your country are not sufficiently strong to—”

“But, sir, you haven’t even looked at my papers!”

“Sir, I don’t think you’re coming back.”

“Of course I’m coming back! I have cars. I have stocks. I have a handicrafts business. I have—”

As the applicant fulminates, the officer glances over the previous officer’s notations: See your beautiful country and your national honor. I will not stand for such treatment. My papers are not fake and fraudulent as you have alleged. I will not leave this window until you issue me a visa.”

“In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the officer is handling his 94th case. He has issued 12 visas. All the first-time applicants are gone. The group of 30 applicants in the waiting room have all been refused at least once before. The interviewing officers divide the remaining applicants among themselves to speed things along. At least five totally unqualified applicants receive visas because the officers are too aggravated to argue...
with them. Ten minutes later the waiting room is empty, and the officers are reading their mail. The moral of the story: Unqualified applicants are more likely to receive visas at 2 p.m. than at 8 a.m. Consequently, many applicants for reconsideration arrive at the consular section late in the morning, just before the doors are closed.

Two officers leave the section to grab lunch across the street. At the crosswalk they are accosted by a young man carrying a stack of five passports. Soon his family members are chasing the beleaguered NIV officers through traffic.

"Sir! Excuse me, sir, I only ask a moment of your time. My family was refused visas and the consul didn't even tell us why. He just gave us this and said, 'I'm sorry.'" The applicant brandishes his explanation letter.

"Did you read it?"
"No, sir."
"If you have anything new to show us, you can re-apply after four working days," the officer says as he stalks off.

The two junior officers consume five beers as they swap stories over a half-hour lunch. Normally such an intake would guarantee a pair of splitting headaches by 5 p.m., but the pressures of NIV work are such that neither officer's abilities are impaired. Every officer has his own individual outlet. Some pop Valium, others abuse their wives. Some swim miles daily, others take out their frustrations through karate classes.

Back at the office the reconsideration officer sorts through the day's crop of congressional inquiries. Each letter has a refused application attached; in some cases the applicant has been refused three or four times. The officer looks over each application and prepares a letter to the congressman explaining the reasons for refusal. He notices that one of the letters is written on behalf of the poultry and piggery farmer he refused in the morning. "My constituent and his wife are very concerned that their son will miss their family reunion in Chicago," writes the congressman. "All their sons and daughters will be there. It appears that their eldest son is the only member of the family not in the U.S. I am also told that the American Red Cross has confirmed the illness of a relative here. Please look into the case and address your response to my regional office in Chicago."

The reconsideration officer examines the application more closely. Family and relatives in the U.S.: None. Purpose of the trip: Visit the great United States and see my great-uncle before he dies. Very interesting. He drafts the following reply to the congressman:

Embassy records indicate that Rodolfo S. Bautista was refused a visa most recently on August 10, 1981. Visa was denied under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. This section of law prohibits the issuance of non-immigrant visas to applicants who fail to overcome a statutory presumption that they are intending immigrants to the United States.

Mr. Bautista is 36, married, and has eight children to support. He derives a modest income from his poultry and piggery farm. Although he claimed an annual income of $30,000 from his farm, such an income is highly unusual for someone in his circumstances. His parents and all his brothers and sisters have emigrated to the U.S. Because he concealed this fact on his visa application, the credibility of his case has been seriously damaged. He mentioned nothing about a family reunion during his visa interview, but stated his intention to stay in hotels. Because of Mr. Bautista's strong family ties to U.S. and correspondingly weak financial ties to his country, the interviewing consular officers were not convinced that he would ever depart from the U.S. after a brief visit there.

Due to his repeated inability to qualify for a visa, Mr. Bautista has been asked not to re-apply. Embassy regrets that it cannot reply more favorably at this time. Please be assured that Mr. Bautista has received every consideration consistent with visa law and regulations.

Satisfied that this rebuke will squeal the case, the reconsideration officer begins another draft. He has a dozen inquiries pending, and will probably take them home again.

A week later the following commercial cable is received from the congressman: "Urgently request favorable consideration visa case Rodolfo S. Bautista. Family emergency. Will apply your office soonest. Regards."

For his third application Mr. Bautista arrives at the embassy at 11:45 a.m. This time his documents read...
like a chapter from *Gray's Anatomy*. He has letters from an American doctor in Chicago describing at length his father’s condition: an embolism of the right ventricle compounded by aggravated cardiopulmonary dysfunction. But the old man just might pull through if his eldest son is at his bedside. He also has a Red Cross cable verifying the illness, and an affidavit of support from his sister the accountant in Chicago guaranteeing all financial support while he is in the U.S.

Mr. Bautista is one of the last applicants in the waiting room at 2:30 in the afternoon. He is shuffled to one of the vacant windows where the officer asks him a few perfunctory questions and issues the visa. He is given a pink card and told to return in two days at 2 p.m. to window three. When he returns at the appointed time, he receives a one-month, one-entry visa annotated: “To visit sick father, Sisters of Mercy Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, two weeks.” It is his ticket to a new life. He joins his relatives in Chicago a week later, never to return.

Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Mr. Bautista lands a job as a chauffeur for the World Health Organization. His new status allows him to bring his entire family to Chicago on G visas. His wife and eight children join him within a year. The migration is complete.

Though the applicants portrayed in this account are fictitious, their stories are by no means unusual. They represent about half of the people in line on any given day at a high-fraud post. The fact that they are quite often successful makes the vice consul’s job that much more difficult.
FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE

1982-1983 AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships for Foreign Service Juniors

Applications are now available for dependent students of Foreign Service personnel, who have been or are currently stationed abroad, for the American Foreign Service Association Scholarship Programs. The AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships are for graduating high school students only, and are based on academic excellence. These awards range from $200 to $2,000 per year. The Scholarships are for undergraduate study and are based solely on need as established by the College Scholarship Service, Princeton/Berkeley. Grants range from $200 to $2,000 for individuals, with a $3,000 limit for families. Write for applications and information now from the Scholarship Programs Administrator, AFSA, 2101 E St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. The deadline for completion of applications is February 15, 1982.

Other Scholarships Available to Foreign Service Students

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to dependent students of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information directly to the schools, colleges, and universities indicated.

Dana Hall School, Wellesley, Massachusetts: The Norris S. Haselton Scholarships are awarded to sons and daughters of Foreign Service families where need is indicated. For complete information write John M. Niles, Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 37909.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukenes Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to children of Foreign Service personnel. Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the government or of a state government. Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Vermont Academy: An Edward R. Cheney Memorial Scholarship is being awarded to the son of a Foreign Service person. Those interested in applying should write to the Director of Admissions, Vermont Academy, Saxtons River, Vt. 05154. The Academy enrolls approximately 220 students in grades nine through postgraduate; girls and boys only.

Yale University: Scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son or daughter of an American Foreign Service Officer who demonstrates financial need. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son of a member of the United States military services, or of an employee of the federal government. Complete information is obtainable from the Director of Financial Aid, Box 2770 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

Deaths

Russell R. Lord, who in the late 1940s was acting deputy commissioner for Bavaria and later served as a Foreign Service officer in Tokyo, Manila, and Nepal, died July 21 in Owosso, Mich. He was 75.

An industrial engineer in private industry for 14 years, Lord entered the Army at the start of World War II, retiring from the service in 1946 as a colonel, with a Bronze Star earned in Germany. Following his career in the Foreign Service, he retired in 1971. Survivors include his wife, the former Alberta P. Palmer, whom he married in 1944, a foster son, and two sisters.

Married

Donald Camp, to Elizabeth Hart, on July 5 in St. Paul, Minn. A Foreign Service officer, the groom will be assigned for the next year to the Foreign Service Institute.
The Chou Démarche
(Continued from page 16)

is highly unlikely that Huang would have tattled to Liu.

Second, there is circumstantial evidence that Huang received at least the substance of the Chou message from CCP headquarters.

About a week after Ambassador Stuart had received the Chou message from Clubb, Fugh called on Huang Hu at Huang's request. Referring to Fugh’s question at an earlier meeting as to whether the CCP desired communication or industrialization first, Huang said he could not answer that, but the CCP was anxious for economic recovery, and receipt of American aid would be decisive. Stuart reported to Washington that this was the first time Huang had raised the subject of American economic assistance, “albeit indirectly” (FR 8:377-78). Indeed, only two days before, when Stuart had asked what he, Stuart, might do “to further mutual relations between our two countries,” Huang had responded that “all CCP wanted from U.S. was stoppage of aid and severance of relations with ‘KMT government’” (FR 8:752-53).

The abrupt change in Huang’s line on American aid between June 6 and June 8 could only have reflected receipt of new guidance from CCP headquarters, guidance that was now consistent with the Chou message given Barrett on May 31. Rather than Stuart leaking the Chou message to Huang through Fugh, it is much more likely that someone in the party, having noted the inconsistency in the line Huang gave Ambassador Stuart on U.S. aid June 6 with that contained in the Chou message, sent Huang new instructions, which caused him to request Fugh to call on June 8.

In any event, the Chinese seem to have gone to some trouble to ensure that Keon did report the leak story. Why did the Communists bother? The answer can only be speculative, of course, but one clue may be contained in the first report the Americans received of the leak to the effect that the Communists were annoyed about Ambassador Stuart’s continuing efforts to contact Chou En-lai, apparently to deliver the American reply. The story that the message had leaked thereby causing serious trouble for Chou emphasized the undesirability of further American efforts to see Chou. Moreover, if taken at face value, the leak story bolstered the credibility of the message itself by giving further evidence of bitter factional strife within the CCP. It also explained why the pro-Soviet faction was gaining the ascendancy, a phenomenon that already seemed apparent to foreign observers by mid-summer.

The questionable aspects of the leak story, however, tend to support the view that the démarche was a propaganda ploy, designed to mislead rather than to enlighten. Yet, was Bevin right to dismiss the démarche simply as a move “in accordance with standard Soviet tactics”? Much of what Chou En-lai told Keon may well have represented his personal preferences as to the course of Chinese Communist policy at the moment. At the same time, Chou must have been aware as he expressed these views to Keon for transmission to the American and British authorities that the CCP would follow, and he would support, a pro-Soviet policy.

To be this as it may, one fact seems to stand out clearly in the welter of inconsistencies and contradictions revealed in the British and American experience with the Chou démarche—Chou did not want or expect a reply. His message was not intended to be the opening gambit in a diplomatic dialogue. The British accepted this and did not attempt to reply. The Americans tried to reply but were rebuffed. Thus, at best the Chou démarche was informational, setting forth Chou’s personal views; at worst it was deliberately deceptive, designed to mislead. In any case it did not represent an opportunity to change the course of history.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

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